THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

The Process of Cultural Change:

A Case-study, with particular reference to the Grievance Procedure in Cambridgeshire Constabulary

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by

Christopher Mark Speechley BA MEd

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Summary

Title: The Process of Cultural Change: A Case-study, with particular reference to the Grievance Procedure in Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

This thesis examines the process of cultural change within an organisation. The organisation is the police service in general, and Cambridgeshire Constabulary in particular. The research is action-based and interventionist in nature. It involved an attempt to change an aspect of culture within one police force. The change programme which introduced a new staff grievance procedure commenced in January 1994.

In 1993, Cambridgeshire Constabulary had four recorded grievances. Independent research (Kelly J. 1993) suggested that staff had no faith in the existing grievance procedure and overt sexist behaviour was endemic. Following this intervention 95 grievances were recorded in 1995, an increase of 2375%. Additionally, 69.5% of those grievances were resolved by first line managers compared to 0% in 1993. A comparative study of other forces with a similar grievance procedure indicated that none had experienced a similar change. Additionally, following the intervention, independent research into police occupational culture in Cambridge (Muston J. 1996) could not find evidence of overt sexist behaviour, citing the new grievance procedure as a reason for this change.

The most significant factor in facilitating this change in culture was the *re-socialising* of all police managers as part of a specialised training programme. This training focused on the *micro-actions* of change. This was possible because *organisational defence routines* and *meta-directions* were first identified. The training used aspects of culture to sub-consciously engage managers in the learning process. Role-play played a significant part in this process and allowed a new *psychological contract* to be developed between managers. These managers then acted as *significant others* and helped to change staff's belief in the grievance procedure. As staff began to use the procedure and managers dealt with previously undiscussible issues so aspects of the organisations culture changed.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers.
Aggrieved	Someone who has made a grievance.
CPTU	Central Planning and Training Unit, a National Centre that undertakes the Training of Police Facilitators, Curriculum Design, Evaluation and Promotion Examinations.
Crime Figures	The number of reported crimes.
DTC	District Training Centre for training new recruits.
Detection Rates	The percentage of reported crime that is detected.
Grievance Procedure	A procedure that staff (not the public) can use to complain about issues that concern them.
FEG	Force Executive Group (senior management of the Force)
General Orders	Issued weekly providing information on staff movements and policy and procedural changes.
Grievance Handler	Someone who looks into a grievance.
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary.
Home Office Circulars	Guidance to police forces about policy and procedural issues.
H. R. Dept	Human Resource Department, formerly known as the Personnel Department.
Intelligence - led	A style of policing that concentrates on suspected criminals, not individual crimes, making as much use of intelligence as possible.
PC	Police Constable.
PDP	Personal Development Profile.
Perpetrator	Someone who has allegedly caused a grievance.
Probationer	A police constable within their first two years of service.

Respondent	Someone who has allegedly caused a grievance.
Sector Policing	Policing a smaller area in an effort to improve local knowledge, develop ownership of local problems and local accountability.
Stage II Review	The final report of the stage II review of police probationer training.
Standing Orders	Guidelines issued by Forces.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Aim of Thesis

The aim of this thesis is to examine the process of change within an organisation, in this case the police service. In particular, it focuses on factors that influenced the successful implementation of an internal staff grievance procedure in Cambridgeshire Constabulary. This research aims to identify factors that helped and hindered the process of change and areas for further research.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into four main areas. Chapter's one to eight provide a description and explanation of relevant literature and research arising from the title of this thesis: *'The Process of Cultural Change: A Case-study, with reference to the Grievance Procedure in Cambridgeshire Constabulary.'* This necessitated a review of research across a broad range of disciplines, including Psychology, Education, Sociology and Management. An in-depth knowledge of the police service was also required.

The introduction provides an overview of the chapters contained within the thesis and introduces many key issues. Chapter two provides an historical and a contemporary description of the police service on a macro level, in particular focusing on aspects of occupational culture, for example, fairness and equality issues. Chapter three discuses issues concerning organisational change that specifically relate to the police service. Chapter four examines the need for an internal staff grievance procedure and how it has

been implemented across the service. Chapter five discuses what an organisation is, it considers organisational goals, policy development, strategy and structures, finally focusing on the police service as an organisation. Chapter six introduces the issue of culture within an organisation, and discusses the role culture plays and the extent that culture influences an organisation's operations. Chapter seven builds on this approach and considers a number of different factors that affect cultural change within an organisation. It discusses different approaches to cultural change, which lead to the conclusion that organisations consist of individuals, and individual change is at the core of organisational change; this is a central theme of the thesis. Chapter eight discuses the individual by considering learning theories that help to assist in facilitating individual change.

Chapter's nine and ten examine the 'action-based,' interventionist research, which is presented as a case-study review of cultural change within Cambridgeshire Constabulary, in particular the introduction of a new staff grievance procedure. This change programme was managed by myself over a 15-month period. The project was known as the 'Equality of Service Project' and the case-study examines, in-depth, the change process and subsequent outcomes.

Chapter's eleven and twelve provide an analysis of the findings and results from this change programme. The results are given in both quantitative and qualitative terms. A comparison is also made with six other police forces operating similar grievance procedures to set the cultural change that occurred in Cambridgeshire within a context.

Chapter's thirteen and fourteen provide a discussion, analysing and examining many of the issues concerning organisational change that emerged from this research. Conclusions are drawn and further areas for research identified.

While conducting this research, the author was invited to assist in a cultural change programme being undertaken by the South African Police Service (SAPS). Because of the considerable cultural differences between the two countries, the results cannot be safely transposed from one organisation to another; nevertheless similarities were found. Therefore, relevant data from the SAPS change programme is used to illuminate points of similarity that seem to cross cultural divides.

The Police Service

Following this introduction, the thesis commences with an historical and contemporary review of the police service at a macro level. It discusses key issues, including those of fairness and public image. It discusses the creation of an acceptable public image by its founders, which most orthodox opinion states was achieved probably to the highest degree by the end of the 1950s. Since then, the service's image has been in decline. Why has this happened? A number of highly-publicised cases have appeared before the Court of Appeal, such as the 'Guildford Four' and 'Birmingham Six', which have raised public concern over issues of fairness and justice. These, combined with a growing number of cases appearing before industrial tribunals on grounds of race and sex discrimination, have also raised public concern about impartiality and bias in police culture.

Equal Opportunities and Change

Central to the theme of fairness and impartiality is the concept of equality of opportunity. It is highly unlikely that police officers will deliver a fair and equitable service to the public unless they themselves believe that they are being treated fairly by their own management and peers. This is a powerful argument in advocating the necessity for the police service to deliver a 'fair and efficient' internal quality of service to its employees. However, there is a growing body of research critical of equal opportunity practice in the police service (e.g. HMIC 1993[1] and 1995[2], Brown *et.al.* 1993[3], Holdaway and Barron 1993[4]). Research into the development of initiatives designed to improve equality of opportunity indicates that successful implementation not only involves a significant change in systems and procedures, but also a change in organisational culture (Speechley 1993[5], Westmarland 1994) [6]. For example, institutional and personal discrimination have been found in many aspects of the police service, in particular personal harassment, bias in appointment to specialist posts, task allocation and promotion (Brown *et.al.* 1993[7]). Many forces have invested considerable time and money in attempting to bring about change in these areas, but many attempts have been found to be inadequate (CPTU 1993[8]; Holdaway and Barron 1993)[9]. At a recent

[1]   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. *Equal Opportunities in the Police Service*, Home Office, 1993.
[2]   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary., *Developing Diversity in the Police Service*, HMSO, 1995.
[3]   Brown J., Anderson R. and Campbell E., *Aspects of Sex Discrimination within the Police Service*, Home Office, 1993.
[4]   Holdaway S. and Barron A-M, *The Resignation of Black and Asian Officers from the Police Service.* Dept Sociological Studies, Sheffield University, 1993.
[5]   Speechley, C. *An Assessment of the Developmental Nature of Equal Opportunity/Community and Race Relations Training by the Home Office Police Central Planning and Training Unit.* Unpublished M.Ed. dissertation. University of Hull, 1993.
[6]   Westmarland L. *An investigation into possible barriers to women's promotion in Durham Constabulary.* Dept. Sociological Studies, University of Durham, 1994.
[7]   Brown J., Anderson R. and Campbell E., *Op.Cit.,* 1993.
[8]   Community, Fairness and Quality-Review Team, *Minimum Effective Training Levels,* Police Central and Planning and Training Unit, 1993.

reconvention (October 1995) at the Home Office Specialist Support Unit (established to provide training on community and race relations issues) most police officer's present were critical of the progress. These officers had been engaged in trying to bring about change in these areas for the past five years and the following comments were typical:

> *"The police service is only paying lip service .... I wonder if we've done anything at all, nobody is interested, its become what we feared flavour of the month ...... nothing has really changed"(field notes)[10].*

Researchers, such as Holdaway and Barron, (1993)[11] have questioned whether constabularies are actively implementing and developing positive action programmes of any type. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabularies, (HMIC) 'Thematic Inspection of Equal Opportunities' (1993)[12], identifies many areas where the service is failing to achieve an acceptable level of equality of opportunity. Recent inspections of forces, such as Merseyside, by HMIC have been extremely critical of the lack of progress made by management in this important area. HMIC (1993) also commented in their thematic inspection of the police service[13]:

> *"The inspection revealed some chief officers and not others committed to equal opportunities. Where chief officers have expressed commitment to achieving equality of opportunity, senior managers not committed to equal opportunities will increasingly become more isolated and less influential. Without commitment at the highest level some senior managers will continue to frustrate progress in establishing and operating procedures designed to bring about fair treatment".*

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[9]   Holdaway S. and Barron A-M, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

[10]   Field notes, Reconvention of graduates of the Home Office Specialist Support Unit, October 1995.

[11]   Holdaway S. and Barron A-M, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

[12]   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

[13]   HMIC, *Ibid.*, 1993.

The Police Service and Grievance Procedures

In 1989, in an effort to improve fair and efficient practices in the police service, the Home Office issued Circular 87/1989[14] that encouraged all forces to establish equal opportunity policies and internal staff grievance procedures. Establishing an internal grievance procedure to address issues that staff feel aggrieved about should be seen as essential to the police service, particularly when, as previously discussed, the image of fairness and impartiality is so important. Establishing a culture that is supportive of this approach is even more important if rhetoric is to become reality. Although Home Office Circular No. 87/1989[15] recommended the introduction of an Equal Opportunity Policy and a Grievance procedure, the recommendations were largely restricted to aspects covered by legislation, i.e. Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976. The principles contained within the circular considered the procedure should consist of three stages. If the grievance could not be satisfactorily dealt with at one stage it should proceed to the next. Most forces, therefore, have had a grievance procedure in place since the early 1990s, but these were largely restricted to discrimination on the grounds of race, gender and marital status. The recommended grievance procedure contained in Home Office Circular 87/1989 did not require grievances to be recorded at stage one, but it is questionable whether this would have actually added significantly to the number of grievances recorded in most forces at this time because of the cultural issues that existed, e.g. Fear of victimisation and recriminations. Research by HMIC (1993)[16] and Brown et.al. (1993)[17] indicated little actual use was made of grievance

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[14]   Home Office, Circular No. 87/1989, *Equal Opportunities Policies in the Police Service,* 1989.
[15]   *Ibid.,* 1989.
[16]   HMIC *Op.Cit,* 1993.
[17]   Brown, J. *et. al. Op.Cit.,* 1993.

procedures. This resulted in a second Home Office circular 16/1993[18] that provided revised guidance on the introduction of a staff grievance procedure.

Results from the above research and research (Kelly 1993)[19] carried out within Cambridgeshire Constabulary indicated considerable fear and anxiety amongst staff concerning the use of the grievance procedure. They feared reprisals in terms of victimisation from colleagues and damage to their career if they made a grievance. It was against this background that the introduction of a new grievance procedure was proposed for Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project'

In January 1994, I was appointed as the Project Manager of Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project' and given the task of developing a number of Quality of Service and Equal Opportunity initiatives. However, before exploring the nature of this project I considered it necessary to explain my experience at the Central Planning and Training Unit (CPTU) because of the effect it had upon my approach to implementing change in Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

For three years prior to managing the 'Equality of Service Project' I had worked at the CPTU. This is a Home Office establishment which has the task of designing training for constables, sergeants and inspectors in England and Wales. My initial role at the CPTU was as a 'Director of Studies' which involved facilitating 11-week trainer

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[18]   Home Office, Circular No. 16/1993 entitled *'Guidance on the Operation of Grievance Procedures'*, 1993.
[19]   Kelly J . *Gender Culture Audit For Cambridgeshire Constabulary*, Unpublished document, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, 1993.

courses designed to train police officers in the theory and practice of training. In 1992, I was appointed as the first 'Community Relations, Race Relations and Equal Opportunity Officer' for the CPTU; the role included developing training programmes for police officers nationally. One of the most important projects was to manage a major research initiative (CPTU 1993)[20] consisting of a team of ten inspectors, with external academic consultants to analyse what should be the minimum training levels for police officers, based upon identified need, in the areas of Quality of Service, Equal Opportunities, Community and Race Relations and Ethics. This and other research concerning the implementation of change (Speechley 1993)[21] provided considerable insight into some of the problems of achieving successful change, not only at the CPTU, but also across the police service nationally. It became clear from contact with many forces that there was a need for research into different aspects of influence to the process of change within the police service. Whilst this is a somewhat subjective view, many attempts at change did appear to be unco-ordinated and ill-conceived. For example, as a result of previous research (CPTU 1993)[22] it was shown that no force had undertaken a training needs analysis in equal opportunities, despite embarking upon major and extremely costly training programmes. Therefore, much of the training was duplicated. It did not meet the needs of the organisation and was unlikely to achieve desired change. This provides a brief description of my experience that undoubtedly influenced the approach I took in managing change within Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

I considered that introducing a new grievance procedure and equal opportunity policy without first achieving significant cultural change to rectify this situation would almost certainly be doomed to failure. This situation, therefore, provided a unique

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[20]   CPTU, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[21]   Speechley CM., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[22]   CPTU, *Op.Cit*, 1993.

opportunity to examine the process of facilitating cultural change within an organisation which is the subject of this thesis. However, before proceeding to chapter two, which discusses the police service in more depth, I think it would be beneficial to consider the process of change in broad terms. This approach will hopefully, assist the reader to consider some of the issues that help and hinder change, whilst reviewing different aspects of police culture.

The Process of Change

Organisations are always changing, even the most stable and bureaucratic organisations change, staff retire and staff leave, new staff join, procedures and systems change. New technology is introduced and existing technology changes, for example, faxes, photocopying machines, word-processors and E-mail. External factors, both social and political, bring about change. All the above pressures affect the police service, technologically, socially and politically, although their effect may well manifest itself in different ways to that of the private sector. Whilst this thesis is about change, it refers to the police service, although arguably many of the issues would equally apply to many other organisations.

Social Pressures for Change

A recent example of social pressure to change is the strong public feeling against the export of live animals. This has affected the police service by increasing pressure upon the service to provide sufficient police officers at ports to ensure the export of live animals in accordance with the law, whilst at the same time allowing for peaceful protest. This obviously has an effect on the public's image of the police, which is harder to quantify, but no less important. Social change has also affected ferry companies, but in a

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different way; for example, by the loss of business. Most ferry companies appear to have adapted to change by distancing themselves from the practice of exporting live animals, presumably to preserve their public image and overall market share. The police service cannot so easily distance itself from what has become an unpopular activity. A similar example of social change that has affected the police service is in trying to provide fair and unbiased policing of the 'Newbury by-pass' project. Again, this is certain to affect the public's image of the police, but determining what that effect is and how to respond to it is a different matter. Here the concept of change in order to appear the same becomes critical. This is different to that usually used which is more evolution than revolution. The police may have to change some aspects of its activity to respond to changing environmental pressures and preserve an image of fair and unbiased policing.

Political Pressures to Change

An example of a political factor affecting most public sector organisations is the continuing trend to privatise many activities. The police service is not exempt from this process. This could involve more fundamental change, for example, escorting of prisoners to court by private security firms. This means the police service has to simply stop performing a function; here the change is total. Both external and internal pressures, social, political, financial and technological mean that the police service is under constant pressure to modify its activities. How it reacts to these pressures and manages the process of change is another matter.

Reacting to Pressures to Change

Change is continuous, the only real question seems to be how organisations understand and react to change. For example, how effective is the organisation at

predicting the need to change? How successfully are those changes managed? The effective management of change depends on a number of different factors, for example, is change occurring at the most appropriate time, or is change occurring only after prolonged public and political pressure has been bought to bear? Are external factors forcing the organisation to change? Is change occurring at the most desired time in an organisation's development? Is it following on the heels of another major change, possibly in the opposite direction? Is change happening in the 'right' direction and how is that direction determined? Identifying an organisation's current state, considering both internal and external factors, is critical in determining the most appropriate direction in which to change, but how is this achieved? To embark upon major change without knowing where you are starting from seems folly, yet many change programmes within the police service seem to follow this pattern. For example, introducing major training programmes without some form of training needs analysis seems almost commonplace in some forces. Having determined the need for change, considered the timing in the organisations development and the appropriate direction, many factors can still act to resist change. These resisting forces can cause mutated versions of change to occur, sometimes creating a culture far from that envisaged and sometimes preventing change happening at all. An example of this can be found in one particular initiative recently introduced into many forces, 'intelligence-led crime investigation'. Research by Speechley and Lumley (1996)[23] and Maguire and John (1995)[24] provide clear evidence of mutated change occurring within the police service.

A large number of texts exist that explore different aspects of organisational change and, to a lesser extent, cultural change. However, some commentators, such as

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[23]   Speechley, C. M. and Lumley, S. *The Relationship Between Uniform and CID (And its impact on Crime Investigation)*, Unpublished Document, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, 1996.
[24]   (1995) Maguire, M. and John, T. *Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants integrated Approaches*, Police Research Group, Home Office, p54, 1995.

Williams *et.al.* (1993)[25], still consider that there is little empirical research into creating,

managing and implementing the change process . Stacey (1993)[26] argues:

> *"Failure of strategy is most frequently due, not to poor formulation, but to the difficulties of implementation. Despite the recognition of its importance, however, the question of implementation continues to receive relatively little research attention".*

Research into change within the police service is even more limited. An understanding of

the very terms 'organisational and cultural change' can be critical to understanding the

change process; this will be the subject of discussion in later chapters of the thesis.

Authors on organisational and cultural change are becoming extremely critical of

managers embarking on major change programmes with little or no knowledge of

change. Ward (1994) reinforces the importance of this point:

> *"Worse still, I found to my horror that many of those whom I encountered busily working to bring about organisational change travelled with frighteningly little intellectual luggage. Organisational change means dramatic change in the lives of many people - suppliers, employers, owners, consumers, people at all levels of society. Often the effects of change upon such lives are hard to predict, but terrible prices are paid. Thus, merrily to incite organisational change without relevant professional expertise is both extremely unprofessional and morally abhorrent".*[27]

[25]   Williams A., Dobson P., and Walters M., *Changing Culture*, IPM, 1993.

[26]   Stacey, R. D. *Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics*, Pitman p65, 1993.

[27]   Ward, M. *'Why Your Corporate Culture Change Isn't Working..... And What to Do About It'*, Gower, pp xii, 1994.

Summary

This chapter has introduced some of the problems associated with organisational change in the police service. The introduction of a staff grievance procedure in the police service has, at best, been slow, and having little or no affect. There are many factors that have influenced this process, one undoubtedly is police culture. Organisational culture is increasingly being seen to be highly relevant to an organisation's performance, particularly in achieving successful change. This research and other research, Dixon and Stanko (1995)[28], Holdaway and Barron (1993)[29], (Speechley and Lumley 1996)[30] has indicated that recent change programmes in the police service, such as the move to 'Sector Policing' and Intelligence-led crime investigation, appear to be in danger of failing because of a failure to understand and adequately address cultural change. Cultural change will, therefore, will be the subject of more detailed discussion in later chapters, but the next chapter will set the scene for this discussion by first focusing upon the historical development of the police service.

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[28]   Dixon, B. and Stanko, B. *'Sector policing and public accountability',* Policing and Society 5: pp 171 - 183, 1995.

[29]   Holdaway S. and Barron A-M, *Op.Cit,* 1993.

[30]   Speechley, C. M. and Lumley, S. *Op.Cit,* 1996.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POLICE SERVICE

In many ways an organisation's culture can be viewed as the manifestation of mechanisms that individuals have learnt in order to cope and survive within that organisation. An organisation's culture can be viewed as representing the history of that organisation, therefore an understanding needs to be developed, not only of how cultures are structured within an organisation, but of how they have changed and developed. It is, therefore, essential before discussing present aspects of culture in the British police service, to review briefly the history and development of the service. In many ways Young (1993)[31] echoes this view and considers that the events surrounding the establishment of an organised police force in the nineteenth century are crucial to any exploration of the cultural style of policing today. Therefore, to move forward it is necessary to first look back. As Bate (1994)[32] argues:

> *"Managers do not tend to be historically minded. Theirs is a language and outlook that prefers forward-looking concepts to backward-looking ones, hence the almost insatiable demand for words like 'vision', 'forecasts' and 'plans' ".*

Most management models (e.g. McKinsey 7-S) tend to ignore the historical perspective, but it is necessary to consider the past if present and future goals are to have any hope of

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[31]   Young, M., *In the Sticks, Cultural Identity in a Rural Police Force*, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1993.
[32]   Bate P., *Strategies For Cultural Change*, Butterworth and Heinemann, Oxford, pp 140-141, 1994.

successful implementation. As Knowles (1978)[33] argues, in an educational context, adult learners do not bring their experiences with them into education as a separate entity; they are their experiences. This emphasises the importance of recognising past experience and the effect it has on future learning before embarking on re-education programmes. I would argue this is just as true for change programmes within an organisation as it is in the world of education. This is because organisations consist of individuals and learning new ways of thinking and doing is a key component of any significant change programme. For these reasons, then, a brief review shall follow of the historical development of the police service.

Historical Perspective

Policing in England and Wales followed in the footsteps of the French Revolution and the concentration of the masses in the newly-expanded and industrialised cities. Control of disorderly crowds was an important consideration in the structuring of the organisation. The Industrial Revolution had created a new wealthy middle class, but in the main it had allowed the richer aristocracy and landowners to solidify and increase their position. The London Metropolitan Police, established by the then Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel, was formed in 1829. It was formed only after a number of previously unsuccessfully attempts that can be traced back for nearly 100 years. Six parliamentary committees were established between 1812 and 1822 to consider London's policing arrangements, all but one recommended against a new police force for London until the 1829 Act (Reiner 1992)[34]. The reluctance to establish a police force is, perhaps, now difficult to understand considering the lawlessness of the time. In London in 1828 it is

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[33]   Knowles, M., *The Adult Learner: A Neglected Species*, Houston , Texas: Gulf Publishing Co., 1978.
[34]   Reiner, R., *The Politics of the Police*, Harvester and Wheatsheaf, pp 16 -18, 1992.

estimated that one person in every 383 was a criminal (Ramsey 1929)[35]. Peel clearly stated that the police service should be created on the same lines as the military. One of the first commissioners was an ex-military officer, and as Blumberg and Niederhoffer (1990)[36] explain there really was no other organisational model for the police to follow, apart from the church. The new police were, therefore, intended to replace the military on largely para-military lines. In addition to the 1829 Act, 'The Municipal Corporation Act' 1835 and the 'County Police Act' 1841 required all counties and boroughs to establish police forces. Prior to the establishment of police forces it was the army which took on the responsibility of maintaining order during periods of extreme civil disorder. The police took on this role only ten years after their formation.

The Chartist movement and the rejection of their petition by government led to a series of strikes across the country. During this period, the police were used to impose control and protect the ruling elite, thereby increasingly becoming agents of social control. Young (1993)[37] argues that it was a result of these and other events in the first half of the nineteenth century that created a cultural style of policing and police work that helped to condition a specific way of thinking. This way of thinking had the effect of creating an 'us and them' component, where working class struggle for equality was suppressed by the agents of the social elite. The social elite, however, denied the police the standing of the professions and in essence placed them in a social 'no man's land'. This position of supporters of the social elite helped to create a wealth of metaphors to describe those who challenged the *status quo*, such as *'crime waves'*, *'the crap who live in X'*, *'black bastards'* and as Young (1993) argues:

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[35]   Ramsey, A. C. C., *Sir John Peel* , London, p87, 1929.
[36]   Blumberg and Niederhoffer, *The Ambivalent Force - Perspectives on the Police*, p 122, 1990.
[37]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, pp 12 - 14, 1993.

" A resulting belief that patrolmen are ... the foot soldiers of the company, they make the concept of belonging and cultural identity a part of a vanguard action".

This view of the police's role in controlling society, and in many ways controlling a particular segment of society, in my experience is not considered in any depth during initial police training. Failure to consider broader structural issues, which, by their very nature, involve theoretical analysis and reflection, may go some way to explaining the obsession with action and pragmatism in day-to-day police culture. A consequence of this course of action may be the reinforcement of the belief that the police are in a constant fight to stem an incoming tide of mayhem stemming from, as Reiner (1992)[38] argues, 'disintegrating morality and society in decline'.

Interestingly, the introduction of the police service represented a major change by establishing an official body to maintain social control and order, thereby increasing investment and stability. This helped to promote the development of industrial and financial institutions, and stability was brought to an increasingly lawless London. This pattern of disorder and violence, preventing investment and growth, can be seen in many countries, Yugoslavia seems to provide an obvious example. When stability is provided investment begins to increase, countries such as South Africa are currently experiencing; this phenomena. In the case of South Africa, BMW (the car manufacturer), have recently threatened to withdraw a one billion Rand investment programme because of increasingly high levels of crime (September 1996)[39]. This tends to suggest that a police service that enjoys a reasonable degree of public support and is effective at helping to control crime levels is essential to a country's economic development.

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[38]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.*, 1992.
[39]   The Times, 2nd September 1996.

Conformity and Discipline

Reiner (1995)[40] considers that rigid control of the police officer's private life was part of a deliberate strategy adopted by the original architects of British policing. To achieve conformity and discipline a strict discipline code was developed to closely regulate what police officers were allowed to do in their private lives. This was intended to reduce the widespread hostility towards the new police and turn them into the, 'embodiment of impersonal rectitude, patrolling symbols of social authority, individuals' incarnations of the collective conscience' (Banton 1964)[41]. But what is the cultural legacy of this approach? One thing that can readily be identified is a strong sense of apartness and probity. Reiner (1995) further argues that the police in Britain have a scared character, particularly when compared to the police in the United States. To achieve a culture of conformity and discipline the police service was designed as a bureaucratic institution with a clear hierarchy, based firmly upon the military model. The strict discipline code was rigorously enforced and dismissal for drunkenness was not uncommon in the last century. The new police certainly provided a more professional standard of law enforcement. This was reflected in the fact that only 500 of the original 3,000 recruited in 1829 remained in post four years later. This high rate of turnover must surely have reinforced the need to conform to accepted standards. Police officers were also accountable to the courts for their action and to win public support a strategy of minimal force was developed. Reiner (1992) demonstrates this process of converting people into 'well-regulated machines, that are the impersonal embodiments of bureaucratic authority' in the following quotation:

[40]   Reiner, R. 'From Scared to Profane: The Thirty Years' War of The British Police', published in *Police and Society*, Vol 5, pp 121 - 128, 1995.

[41]   Banton, M. *The Policeman in the Community*, Tavistock, London, 1964.

> *"Amid the bustle of Piccadilly or the roar of Oxford Street, P.C. X 59 stalks along, an institution rather than a man"* (London Quarterly Review 1856)[42].

This culture either attracted, or encouraged police officers whose political orientations are to the right; they are conservative both politically and morally (Reiner 1992)[43]. Despite this, most police officers come from working class backgrounds, including most senior officers (Reiner 1991)[44]. They are, of course, on occasions, in conflict with the working class during organised labour disputes such as the 1984 miners' strike. The legacy of this approach in establishing the British police service, which arguably was quite appropriate for its day, is an organisation that is very stable, but incredibly difficult to change.

To illustrate some of the present day effects of this historical legacy the following example may be useful. Whilst working on this chapter at the Police Staff College (during 1995) I noticed that the uniformity of dress was particularly striking. If uniform was not worn, a traditional suit was seemingly compulsory wear for course attendees, conformity and probity were very much the norm. This was reinforced by an order not to wear denim in the main bar. Another factor that was less obvious, but reinforced the apartness of the police service, was the strikingly low level of use made of the well stocked library. I asked a member of library staff if this was typical? He/she informed me that:

> *"The library is not as well used now because courses are much shorter and most people who use the library are outside researchers".*

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[42]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.*, p63, 1992.
[43]   Reiner, R., *Ibid.*, p121, 1992.
[44]   Reiner, R. *Chief Constables*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chap 4, 1991.

This seems to reinforce the apartness of the police to the outside world, and also emphasises a culture that places little value on research. By studying other perspectives and gaining greater insights to everyday phenomena, future police managers would be engaging in a process that broadens the mind and helps to prevent intellectual isolation. The simplistic reduction of course lengths may very well be reinforcing a more insular culture.

To return to the creation of the police service, most orthodox opinion seems to consider that the establishment of the new police was a resounding success:

> *"It is an unquestionable historical fact that the appearance of public orderliness in Britain and of individual willingness to co-operate in securing and maintaining it coincides with the successful establishment of the police institution"* Reith (1943)[45].

By the turn of the century, the police had largely overcome any serious opposition, certainly from the middle and upper classes of society. However, there is some evidence to suggest that this was not the case across all classes of society.

By the early 1960s there were signs that all was not well, for example race riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham, but the Royal Commission that reported in 1962 [46]showed the police enjoyed very high levels of support from nearly all sections of society. Some 85.2% of the professional and managerial classes had 'great respect' for the police, whilst 81.8% of the skilled working class did and 81.9% of semi-skilled or unskilled working class. Reiner (1995)[47] concludes that by the 1950s policing by consent was achieved in Britain to the maximal degree it is ever attainable.

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[45]   Reith, C., *British Police and the Democratic Ideal,* Oxford University Press, p 3, 1943.
[46]   Royal Commission on the Police, *Final Report,* Cmnd 1728, HMSO 1962.
[47]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.,* p60, 1995.

Impartiality and Fairness

Since the end of the 1950's the police service's image has been in decline, but to consider why this has happened I shall return to the establishment of the service. When the modern police service was first established in 1829 its founders realised that fundamental to the acceptance of the police was the concept of fairness and a non-partisan approach. The then Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel, and the first Commissioners Rowan and Mayne recognised this and understood it to be essential if the police were to win acceptance and, ultimately, respect and support. Rowan and Mayne declared:

> *"That in the middle of acute social conflict they endeavoured to prevent the slightest practical feeling or bias being shown or felt by the police ...... the police should not only be, in fact, but believed to be impartial in action and should act on principle"*[48].

Such was the importance the creators of the police placed upon impartiality that police officers were excluded from voting until 1887. Providing an image of impartiality and fairness were key elements in establishing the police service and making it an acceptable institution. A failure to recognise the importance of this, or to effectively maintain it, in my submission, has resulted in an increasing gap between public expectations of fairness and impartiality and an ability to deliver that quality of service the public and media increasingly demand. Reiner in 1991[49] considered that this manifested itself in an increasing haemorrhage of public confidence. A culture of secrecy and silence has developed and this culture is extremely destructive, for it prevents change and stops management addressing many internal and external fairness-related issues. Evidence of this can be found in a number of highly-publicised cases that have appeared before the Appeal Court, two examples being the 'Guildford Four' and the 'Birmingham

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[48]   Miller, W. *Cops and Bobbies*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p67, 1977.
[49]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit*, p74, 1991.

Six'. Internal issues of fairness and discrimination have also been the subject of increasing publicity. Industrial tribunals have become increasingly busy with cases of alleged sex and race discrimination within the police service, two examples are the ex-Merseyside Assistant Chief Constable Halford and Police Constable Singh from Nottinghamshire. The damage these and other cases have done to the police service's image of fairness and impartiality is difficult to measure, but these and other factors have certainly affected the public's perception of the police. As Reiner (1995)[50] comments:

> *"At the same time [as the previously mentioned cases]*
> *they appear increasingly ineffective in preventing crime*
> *(which is being recorded at all-time record levels), as well*
> *as detecting it after the event (as plummeting clear-up*
> *rates seem to indicate). Apart from numerous opinion*
> *polls, more methodological rigorous surveys register a*
> *steady decline in public confidence in the police during*
> *the 1980s".*

Providing an image of impartiality and fairness were key elements in establishing the police service and making it an acceptable institution. As previously mentioned, by the 1950s most of the population had great respect for the police. This may be partly due to a society that did not question authority or the establishment to any great extent, but also may be due to the successful promotion of this image. However, increasing media attention and a public willingness to question established norms increased the police service's vulnerability to critical media exposure. A failure to recognise this phenomena, or to act effectively upon it has resulted in an increasing gap between public expectations of fairness and impartiality and the service's ability to deliver this level of quality of service. This has occurred in parallel with an unprecedented rise in crime and fall in detection rates.

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[50]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.*, Vol 5, pp 121-128, 1995.

Before considering change within the police service it is necessary to examine different aspects of police occupational culture that may indicate the need for change and in which direction change should take place. I have placed particular emphasis on aspects of culture that impinge on fairness and impartiality. There are three reasons for this. The first is that from the evidence available this is the most important area for the service to concentrate upon in order to re-establish a more enhanced public image of a fair and impartial police service. Secondly, the introduction of a staff grievance procedure can, I suggest, be a major factor in achieving an internal culture of fair and impartial treatment of staff, which is a key thrust of this thesis. Thirdly, I believe that unless this culture predominates internally there is little real hope of it predominating externally.

Equal Opportunities

Police culture has been described by Smith and Gray (1983)[51] as a male culture that in many ways is similar to those found in all male institutions, such as a rugby club or boys' school. Smith and Grey (1983) explain that these values help to create a culture that stresses drinking as a test of manliness, places importance on physical courage and sees glamour in violence. To address some of these cultural problems in 1986 the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, considered that the police should be *representative of the community it serves'*. Legislation has existed since 1975 to make unlawful discrimination on the grounds of gender. Legislation making racial discrimination unlawful existed some years earlier, but it was not until Home Office Circular 87/1989 *Equal Opportunities Policies in the Police Service* that any significant moves were made to implement legislation in these areas. In 1985 Jones (1986)[52] found that no police force

[51]   Smith, D. J., and Gray, J. *Police and People in London*, Vol. iv *The Police in Action.* The Policy Studies Institute, London 1983.
[52]   Jones, S. *Policewomen and Equality: Formal Policy v Informal Practice,*

had a written equal opportunity policy in place, despite being some 10 years after implementation of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. In 1991 the then Home Secretary Kenneth Baker named 11 police forces that still had not introduced such a policy. It is, therefore, not surprising that, despite legislation and Home Office Circulars, research (e.g. HMIC 1993[53] and 1995[54], Brown *et.al* 1993[55], Holdaway and Barron 1993[56]) shows that policewomen and members of visible ethnic minorities are still subject to discrimination. The push for change in equal opportunity practices in the police service seems to emanate from various sources, Royal Commissions, academic research, media commentaries on high profile discrimination cases and HMIC. Most are concerned not only in a change in various systems, but also with a change in police occupational culture. Equality of Opportunity has, therefore, been raised as a major issue that has attempted to force a number of changes in the police service, some more successful than others, but as Young (1991)[57] explains:

> "*It perhaps would be somewhat optimistic to expect one Act of Parliament to influence a whole range of deeply ingrained attitudes and amend a conservatively male culture which is never keen to pursue radical change*".

Although the police are arguably morally conservative, police culture certainly does depart from strict puritanical lines when the issue of gender raises its head, as Reiner (1992)[58] states, *"the police world is one of old fashioned machismo"*. Despite the formal integration of women into the service they do continue to experience discrimination as

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Macmillan 1986
[53]   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary., *Op.Cit.*, 1993
[54]   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary., *Op.Cit.*, 1995.
[55]   Brown J., Anderson R. and Campbell E., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[56]   Holdaway S. and Barron A-M, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[57]   Young, M., *An Inside Job*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p195, 1991.
[58]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.*, p124, 1992.

indicated by a growing number of sex discrimination cases. Differential deployment and task assignment are two such examples which Jones (1987) has reported.[59]

Historical Perspective: Women in the Police Service

The history of women entering the British Police Service has been documented by a number of authors, for example, Jones (1987)[60] Radford (1989)[61] and Heidensohn (1992)[62]. Jones identifies a number of phases. Policewomen were first seen as guardians of women and children whose morals were threatened by the demands of a licentious soldiery during world war one. Owings (1925)[63] argues that the first world war provided the catalyst for women and their male supporters who wished to see women as police officers. While the outbreak of the war was the immediate occasion for recruiting women as police volunteers, this was by no means a new idea. A delegation of women's groups had already approached the Home Secretary in June 1914, before the war began. The vigilance and purity movements were behind this pressure and their aim was the appointment of women police constables with powers equal to those of men.

Between the world wars there began formal recognition of duties relating to women. Two early inquiries considered the employment of policewomen and both the Bridgeman Committee of 1924 and Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures of 1929 recognised the value of policewomen, particularly with women and children.

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[59]   Jones, S. *Op.Cit.*, 1986.
[60]   Jones, S. *Ibid.*, 1986.
[61]   Radford, J. 'Women Policing Contradictions Old and New', in Hanmer, Radford and Stanko (1989) (eds.), *Women policing and Male Violence*, Routledge: London, 1989.
[62]   Heidensohn, F. *Women in Control? The Role of Women in Law Enforcement*, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1992.
[63]   Owings, C. Women Police: *A Study of the Development and Status of the Women Police Movement*, Bureau of Social Hygiene, Hitchcock, New York, 1925.

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(Jones 1986)[64]. With the outbreak of the second world War policewomen's duties had expanded into the Criminal Investigation Department. Between the 1920s and 1960s the number of policewomen had gradually risen, and, in 1966, there were 4,000 women officers out of a total of 95,000 male officers (4.2%). By 1971 there were 3,884 police women, 3.9%. Throughout this period, policewomen were employed largely within separate policewomen's departments and in 1971 this was still largely the case.

In 1972 Sir Robert Mark, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, disbanded the policewomen's department and integrated women into general police duties, although some informal integration had also begun outside London. Radford (1989)[65] notes that the legacy of this history is important when considering attitudes towards and roles played by women today. Jones (1986)[66] reinforces this point in the following way:

> *"Although integration has occurred theoretically, the role*
> *of women is ambiguous, in that they are not fully accepted*
> *by their male colleagues and furthermore, they no longer*
> *have the recognition of being a specialist traditional*
> *policewomen's work, which in some sense might*
> *compensate for the lack of equality with their male*
> *counterparts"*

This aspect of restricted deployment is institutionalised within the police and whilst progress has undoubtedly been made, this appears to still be problematic. Brown *et.al.* (1993)[67] found that women were nine times more likely to report being restricted in their duties due to physical considerations than men. Women constables were more likely to be given inside station duties, safer beats, undertake accompanied patrols than men,

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[64] Jones, S., *Op.Cit.*, p3, 1986.
[65] Radford, J. *Op.Cit.*, 1989.
[66] Jones, S., *Op.Cit.*, 1986.
[67] Brown, J. et. al., *Op.Cit.*, p81, 1993.

and less likely to be assigned to public order duties than men. Women officers are also more likely to deal with victims of sexual offences and young offenders than men. This was still the case in 1996. For example in a 'Family Unit' at a certain police station that employs six officers in the department five are policewomen and one, the sergeant, is a male. (Field Notes 1996).

Young (1991)[68] reinforces how control is maintained within the police service by the use of orders restricting the dress of female officers. He gives an example from 1960 in Northumberland Constabulary, a further example in 1980 in the amalgamated Northumbria Police Force and, finally, in 1987 in West Mercia Constabulary. The examples are strikingly similar, despite the 27-year time period. He concludes with the following excerpt from West Mercia orders:

> "*All officers must clearly understand that the wearing of jewellery whilst on duty in uniform for decorative purposes is totally unnecessary and contrary to the principles of a disciplined service*".

Violence and Physical Strength

Whilst I was working at the Central Planning and Training Unit and in Force Training, training police officers of all ranks and civilian employees from a wide number of forces, a consistent theme emerged. Most officers showed gender bias when dealing with violent people and potentially violent situations. Male officers freely admitted that in a violent, or potentially violent situation, they would prefer to be accompanied by a male officer. The reason they generally put forward was the greater physical strength that males normally enjoy. This view was confirmed in research carried out in Northumbria in 1979. A woman chief inspector collected the views of divisional commanders and the

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[68]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, p217, 1991.

main views reported were the natural lack of physical strength of policewomen and how

policemen feel they have to protect them Young (1991)[69]. Young provides other similar

examples where the focus of the problem of women dealing with violent situations is a

woman's problem:

> "......We do not think they are physically able to cope with
> violence" (Attributed to a Welsh delegate *Police*
> Magazine , June 1976).[70]

Experience at the 'sharp end', (dealing with violent persons and public order situations) is

placed very high among the desirable qualities and skills within police culture. This

aspect of police culture, therefore, places those less capable in this area at a considerable

disadvantage within the predominant 'macho culture'. However, analysis of actual risk

has shown that police officers had 20% fewer deaths than estimated from standard life

tables. Jermier *et.al.*, (1989)[71] concluded that whilst policing is more physically

dangerous than some occupations it is far from the top of the list. More critical than

actual danger is apprehension about physical harm. The research showed that excitement

and status attached to physical danger is a critical element in a police's officers self-image

and lifestyle.

Smith and Gray (1983)[72] use the phrase *'cult of masculinity'* to describe the

occupational image of policing. Jones (1986)[73] suggests that the increasing number of

policewomen poses threats to policemen's self-image by inhibiting their use of 'raunchy'

language and exposing the fact that much routine police activity does not involve fights

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[69] *Ibid.*, p232, 1991.

[70] Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, p229, 1991.

[71] Jermier, M., *et. al., Reaction to Physically Dangerous work; A Conceptual and
Empirical Analysis. Journal of Organisational Behaviour*, 10. p15-33, 1989.

[72] Smith, D. and Gray, J. *Op.Cit.*, Vol IV, Policy Studies Institute. Nov. 9. p 93,
1983.

[73] Jones S., *Op.Cit.*, 1986.

or physical danger. A range of studies in the United States has shown that women do perform as well in patrol duties as patrolmen. Only one study found that women are, in fact, not as good as men on patrol duties. Interestingly, the main assumption underpinning this judgement was questioned by a Federal judge during a hearing in a sex discrimination case. The judge did not accept that the key duties of police officers are to project an image of physical strength and power. These were the dimensions used to make the judgement that men were better than women at patrol duties. The judge did not support this view (Coffey *et.al. 1992*)[74].

Of course, a major difference between policing in the United States and the United Kingdom is in the carrying of firearms by police officers. This in itself would be a significant difference, but in addition to a firearm the range of equipment to deal with violent people carried by police officers in the United States is far more comprehensive than in this country. Whilst on an exchange visit to Chicago (1992), I interviewed a small number of policewomen. One recounted an incident she had dealt with concerning the arrest of a burly drunken male. She said:

> *"I approached a male in a bar and told him he was under arrest for drunken behaviour, with this he pushed me away. I then used my electric stun device to stun him and when he fell to the floor I handcuffed him and arrested him. If this had not worked I would have used the pepper spray, and if that had not worked I would have used my side-handled baton. Only when all of these options had failed would I have used my gun".* [She was four feet nine inches tall.]

Most officers in the United States whom I interviewed were appalled at the lack of technology available to British police officers to deal with violent people. Whilst not

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[74]   Coffey, S., Brown, J. and Savage, S., *Policewomen's Career Aspirations. Some Reflections on the Role and Capabilities of Women in Policing in Britain*, Police Studies, Vol 15.1 p13-19, 1992.

all of the blame can be laid at the doors of government or senior police managers, there does appear to have been an element of complacency and a failure to react quickly or comprehensively enough to this massive change in society, where police officers are now more frequently assaulted. One aspect of this complacency has been an extreme reluctance to equip officers adequately with the necessary technology to deal with violent people and, in this respect, I am referring to, day-to-day policing, not riot control. Enforcement of the law is a necessity, particularly with violent and disorderly people that put many members of the public in fear of violent crime. There appears to have been an almost acceptance by government of the appalling number of police officers assaulted [15,141 officers during the year 1994/95][75] . An official response will, no doubt, argue that extended-batons and C.S. gas are now being issued, but I wonder if this is a further example of the police service failing to change rapidly and comprehensively enough to changing environmental pressures.

The number of roles a police officer has to perform requires an officer to possess a wide range of skills and abilities. Research carried out during the 'Stage Two Review of Police Probationer Training' (MacDonald, B., et. al. 1987)[76] identified a list of skills and abilities. Physical strength is not one of the areas identified. Of course, some female officers are stronger than some male officers, and dealing with violent people is a problem for both genders. Therefore, to be prejudiced against female officers on the grounds of physical strength is somewhat illogical, but culture very rarely is logical. Indeed, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 makes it unlawful to discriminate on the grounds of physical strength in providing a genuine occupational qualification. Focusing blame upon the victim is a common occurrence when examining equal opportunity

[75]   Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary and Police Federation, 1996.
[76]   MacDonald, B., et. al. Police Probationer Training - Stage Two Review, HMSO, London, 1987.

issues, identifying that the whole system is unfair is much harder to recognise. A lack of adequate equipment and training in dealing with violent people affects all police officers, but particularly seems to affect adversely those of a slighter build, which are proportionately more likely to be women. This failure to equip officers adequately to deal with violent situations may well represent an institutionalised form of indirect-discrimination that particularly adversely affects women.

Of course, this is a cultural phenomena that goes beyond the police service. An example of this occurred after the stabbing of Lesley Harrison, a woman police officer in Merseyside (December 1992). Many national newspapers questioned whether policewomen should patrol alone, but did not examine the issue of how all police officers could be better protected. By taking the former stance, they were reinforcing an image of the 'weak vulnerable woman'. Young (1991)[77] reinforces this point by referring to a number of articles published in the *Newcastle Evening Chronicle* in 1979 which showed how a number of female police officers had their careers cut short by violence. The same reference was not made to male police officers, but, as Young (1991) goes on to explain, two-thirds of the injuries caused to female officers were caused by female prisoners in custody and female officers would have still been dealing with female prisoners, even if they were excluded from the provisions of the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act.

Dealing with violent incidents and anticipating such incidents can be extremely stressful, but other activities can be extremely stressing. Wexler and Logan (1983)[78] undertook an interview-based study on women police officers in a Californian Police Department. Most officers felt that organisational stresses were the most significant

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[77]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, p247, 1991.
[78]   Wexler, J. G. and Logan D. D. 'Source of Stress Among Women Police Officers'. *Journal of Police Science and Administration.* Vol 1, pp 46-53. 1983.

causes of stress, but the next most significant cause of stress were those related to sexual

harassment. This, then, shall be the subject of the next section in reviewing police culture.

Sexual Harassment

Within the framework of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is the provision to

protect men and women from sexual harassment. Underpinning most definitions of sexual

harassment is the notion of being subject to unwanted sexual behaviour (Rubenstein

1988)[79]. The range of behaviour includes offensive flirtation, suggestive remarks, jokes of

a sexual nature, touching, displays of pornographic pictures; the list could continue.

Harassment at its most serious included sexual blackmail, physical assault and even rape

Brown (1991)[80].

Brown *et.al.* (1993) argues that much of policewomen's occupational life is spent

coping with the tacit or explicit opposition to their presence in the workplace. It appears

that not only do women have the difficult task of dealing with the stresses, both

perceived and actual, of physical danger, but also the additional stresses associated with

sexual prejudice and discrimination. Knoer (1991)[81] found the results of clinical

interviews with 34 policewomen from the United States showed that their major source

of difficulty was sexual harassment. Brown's *et.al.* (1993)[82] study of sexual harassment in

the British police service indicated that the most commonly experienced form of sexual

harassment was hearing sexually explicit comments about woman's appearance or figure.

These caused an unpleasant impact for between a third and a half of the women reporting

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[79]   Rubenstein, M., *Sexual Harassment*, Industrial Relation Services, 1993.
[80]   Brown, J. *Policewomen's Experiences of Sexual Discrimination and Sexual Harassment*, p8, Hampshire Constabulary, 1991.
[81]   Knoer, W. *Job Stress in Policemen: An Empirical Study*, Winter pp 10-11, 1991.
[82]   Brown, J. *et.al.*, *Op.Cit.*, p81, 1993.

the experiences. In the same survey, 30% of policewomen experienced being subjected

to unwanted touching and 6% of the women reported being seriously sexually assaulted.

Nearly all policewomen experienced some form of sexual harassment from policemen and

this was significantly greater rate than that to which other women working within the

police were exposed. Eighty eight per cent of policewomen sometimes, or often, heard

sexually explicit comments, or suggestive jokes about women, and 36% found this

offensive and 65% suffered comments about their own appearance. Civilian female

employees reported a significantly low rate of harassment across most areas. For

example, 64% experienced jokes about women compared to 88% of policewomen.

This section certainly portrays a situation where sexual harassment is a problem

within the police service and suggests it is more of a problem than that experienced by

most employers. This situation has resulted in a series of cases appearing in the media

and before industrial tribunals and has, undoubtedly, damaged the police service's image.

The next section considers the extent of the problem faced by visible ethnic minorities.

Racial Discrimination

Approximately 1.05% of the police service in England and Wales is made up of

ethnic minority officers, this figure compares with a ethnic minority population of 5.2%.[83]

A number of studies have shown that racially prejudicial attitudes are endemic to the

police service. Bayley and Mendelsohn (1968)[84] sum up this view in a review of a number

of studies:

> *"Are policemen prejudiced? The answer is yes, but only*
> *slightly more so than the community as a whole".*

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[83]   Central Office For Statistics, 1991 Census.
[84]   Bayley, D. and Mendelsohn, H. *Minorities and the Police*, New York: Free
Press, 1968.

The Policy Studies Institute study (1983) [85]confirms this view, but found this attitude does not transfer to the dealings with the public. Police officers are largely drawn from working class and lower middle class backgrounds. These groups represent the bulk of society and, as such, the police are representative of these groups. Racially prejudicial attitudes are not restricted to constables; it should also be noted that prejudicial views are also common amongst chief constables themselves (Reiner, 1991)[86]. More recent research found racial discriminatory behaviour to be much more widespread in internal working practices. Holdaway and Barron (1993)[87] found that an established feature of the occupational culture identified in research spanning many years is officers' persistent use of racist banter and jokes. Whilst the Kinsley Lord Report (1994)[88] acknowledges that overt racial banter may have declined, it finds that there is still a perception that a black officer still has to try harder to be on a level footing.

Racism, then, is also perceived as a problem within the police service. However, in the early 1990s a staff grievance procedure was introduced at the behest of the Home Office, to provide a system to deal with perceived wrong-doing within the organisation. The success of this procedure would, of course, depend upon a culture supporting the individual's right to express opinions about issues that have so far amounted to organisational taboos, such as personal instances of sexual and racial discrimination. The next section explores the extent to which this culture exists.

[85]   Policy Studies Institute, *Op.Cit.*, vol. IV, p109, 1983.
[86]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.*, pp 204-210, 1991.
[87]   Holdaway, S. and Barron, A.M., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[88]   Kinsley Lord, *The Metropolitan Police Service, Development of an Equal Opportunity Strategy*, p12, Kinsley Lord and The Metropolitan Police Service, 1994.

Freedom to Express Opinions - Rhetoric or Reality

In recent years there has been an attempt to make the internal management style of the police less militaristic, as previously mentioned the introduction of a staff grievance procedure forms part of this process, but Reiner (1991)[89] also found when interviewing chief constables:

> *"The majority view was that a participative management style, based on a strong degree of consultation, was not only desirable but more effective".*

However, this view should be seen in contrast to the view that most chief constables expressed on police discipline; 53 per cent thought the relaxation of discipline caused management problems. A participative management style and a strongly imposed regime of discipline that suppresses the public exposure of wrong-doing appears to be diametrically opposed to a more open and participative style of management. This situation typifies the mixed messages that currently seem to exist in the police service. For a participative style of management to be effective, staff have to believe there is true consultation taking place. A number of reasons exist for developing this style of management, including a belief that staff are more likely to go along with change if they have at least been consulted. Additionally, senior management cannot possibly fully understand what goes on at every level in the organisation and are, therefore, dependent on ascertaining staffs' views for the organisation to perform efficiently. Reiner (1991) found that this participative management style was comparatively rare:

> *"Consultation was a subtle tactic for managerial control rather than a supplement for limited know-how at the top".*

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[89]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.,* p 229. 1991.

True consultation depends on open communication between both parties, this necessitates a culture where staff are not afraid to voice their fears and concerns to management, but historically staff in the police service were not encouraged to question or challenge their treatment by management. This created an environment of secrecy, as Cain (1973)[90] argues, a culture of *'us and them'* and the illusion of control. This, of course, presents immense problems for senior managers, for it is very easy to believe they know what is happening within the organisation, but the reality may be very different. Considerable evidence exists (Brown *et.al*[91], 1993, Kelly 1993[92], Morgan 1995[93], HMIC 1995[94]) to suggest a culture still persists where staff are afraid to express their opinions on many subjects, particularly those of a threatening personal nature, such as harassment or discrimination. This has led to a situation where staff relations have increasingly become a cause of concern, as Reiner (1991) states in interviewing chief constables:[95]

> *"After financial matters, the next most significant problem was personnel management and communications".*

It would also appear that some senior managers believe they know and understand the culture that exists in their force; this may be dangerous assumption. As one chief constable of a small force (1000 officers) said when interviewed by Reiner (1991):

> *"I don't think there are any problems that are allowed to fester ......"* [96]

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[90]   Cain, M. E., *Op.Cit.,* 1973.
[91]   Brown *et.al., Op.Cit.,* 1993.
[92]   Kelly J., *Op.Cit.,* 1993
[93]   Morgan, M. *A user survey of procedures for dealing with harassment and bullying,* Unpublished Dissertation, pp 1-16, Hampshire Constabulary, 1995.
[94]   HMIC, *Op.Cit.,* pp 7-14, 1995.
[95]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.,* p 229. 1991.
[96]   Reiner, R., *Ibid.,* p234, 1991.

This view should be compared to Brown's *et.al.* (1993)[97] research that indicated that

sexual harassment in the police service was a widespread problem. HMIC (1995)[98] also

found in their second thematic inspection of the police service that:

> *"There was evidence of continuing high levels of sexist and racist banter, perhaps more covert and subtle than before, but no less destructive".*

The assumption made by the chief constable suggests that if a force is smaller staff are

more prepared to come forward with their concerns, and senior management are more in

touch with their staff. This assumption that, *'problems are not allowed to fester'*, is

questionable in a force of any size. Cambridgeshire Constabulary is one of the smallest

force's in the country and, if this assumption was true, then staff would feel free to share

with management their concerns. However, evidence from the 'Equality of Service

Project' appears to challenge this view. A questionnaire distributed in June 1994

indicated only 16.9% of staff thought the methods used to select staff for promotion

were fair and objective. There was a considerable level of dissatisfaction with staff

selection, but only four grievances were recorded in 1993. Only 30.1% of staff thought

they would receive a fair hearing if they made a grievance, clearly staff were dissatisfied,

but were not prepared to report matters openly. Fear of making a grievance was also

found by the HMIC (1995) in their inspection of 13 police forces:

> *"Many women and ethnic minority staff felt that anyone who raised issues would be denigrated, ignored or dealt with inappropriately .... There was a worrying lack of faith in the grievance system".*

Clearly, then, staff were far from happy with a number of issues, but there was also a real

fear of reporting instances of perceived unfair treatment. Reiner's (1991) research clearly

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[97] Brown, J. *et.al., Op. Cit.*, 1993.
[98] HMIC, *Op. Cit.*, pp 7-14, 1995.

indicates that chief constables state they want a culture where staff can openly report their concerns, but evidence contained in HMIC's (1995) report suggest this has not been achieved. A reluctance by staff to report concerns represents considerable barriers to the successful implementation of equal opportunity policies and grievance procedures in the police service. Recent research by HMIC (1995) also indicates barriers that may prevent the successful implementation :

> *"There are many individuals who see equal opportunities as crucial to the development of a modern, efficient and diverse work force for the next century, but entrenched attitudes continue to frustrate or dilute their best efforts .... There was a general feeling that the service lacked a cultural or managerial ethos on how to treat staff, and that management training in the development of people and in conflict resolution was often inadequate".*

These comments raise several issues, one of which indicates that if change is to be successful, there needs to be a more fundamental change than simply introducing new polices and procedures. This section commenced by discussing the extent to which staff felt confident in being able to voice their concerns, particularly those of a threatening or embarrassing nature, such as, harassment, bullying, unfair selection and discrimination. There appears to be a desire by some senior managers to promote a culture that encourages this, but the reality of present police culture does not appear to reflect this. As the HMIC (1995) concluded:

> *"The Service needs to recognise that the mechanisms designed to improve equality of opportunity and the efforts of individuals to promote them will be ineffective in the long term without an accompanying shift in general attitudes and culture".*[99]

This section has considered whether freedom to express opinions, particularly about perceived wrong-doing, is a prevalent part of current police culture and from the

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[99]   HMIC, *Op.Cit.,* p 10, 1995.

available evidence one cannot help but conclude that this is largely not the case. This means that the introduction of new grievance procedure without an accompanying change in culture is almost certainly doomed to failure. The next section considers a structural barrier that also prevents change occurring in the police service.

Police Bureaucracy

An aspect of police culture that manifests itself today, but stems from the creation of the police service, is its bureaucratic and hierarchical structure. A key strength of a bureaucracy should be the development of technical expertise, normally situated within a department. Here the police service seems to differ; it has been common practice, in my experience, for the service to appoint staff into positions with little or no technical knowledge. It is also common to spend vast sums training officers only to then make little or no use of that training. The police service has possibly developed the worst of both worlds, one of the strengths of a bureaucracy is that it does have experts in given areas making decisions over those issues that need technical expertise. But a major disadvantage of a bureaucracy is a reluctance to change, or an almost in-built mechanism to prevent change; therefore the organisation is very slow to react to changing environmental conditions. This is personified in the interaction between the rank system and the bureaucratic culture. Although officers may have far greater technical expertise in a given area, including management, they are often not allowed to manage a function because of their rank. A bureaucracy also denies the human element in the organisation, so a strong culture may develop that can be counterproductive to the aims of the bureaucracy. In many ways, the police service may have inherited many of the disadvantages of a bureaucracy (because of the interaction between the bureaucracy and the rank structure) without benefiting from the advantages of technical expertise. Also, a

bureaucracy, whilst efficient at repetitive work, is riddled with conflict, between the top and bottom of the organisation and between departments. Its managers spend much of their time resolving people problems and holding the bureaucracy together. This situation has probably developed because the originators of the service did not need areas of technical expertise; therefore the issue did not arise, but with the increase in technology, technical expertise has been ever more important. I would suggest that the service's militaristic bureaucracy has been obsolete for some years now, but this is another example of a failure to address cultural issues, despite massive evidence that indicates a need for urgent change. A final example of this is contained in the 'Sheehy Enquiry' (1993)[100]. This Inquiry recommended the abolition of a number of ranks, including deputy chief constable and chief superintendent. Yet some three years later, many forces still have officers of these ranks, still wearing the rank insignia and their organisational structures still contain these positions.

Summary

The effect of the persistent negative aspects of police culture pose a serious problem for the police service and, in particular, the management of change. In some ways senior police managers now seem to be facing a similar problem to that of their founders, that of public trust, support and confidence. This, in essence, means that it is even more important to deliver, and be seen to deliver an impartial non-biased service. As Reiner (1995)[101] argues:

> "In the much more fragmented, pluralistic, multi-cultural
> world of post-modern society acceptance of the police can
> only be conditional and based on pragmatic grounds of
> efficient and fair delivery of services".

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[100]   Sheehy, P. et.al., Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards, HMSO, pp 17 - 34, 1993.
[101]   Reiner, R., Op.Cit., Policing and Society Vol 5, pp 121-128, 1995.

Successfully achieving the delivery of a fair and efficient service to the public involves, in my submission, considerable change on behalf of the service. This change not only involves changing structures (which in themselves are aspects of culture), but also other major aspects of police culture. I have described a number of aspects of culture within the British police service but, addressing the root cause of unfair and discriminatory behaviour must be a priority for the police service, whose image was so carefully created by its founders. These issues, I submit, strike at the very core of the British police service, and can be ignored only at its peril.

This chapter, then, started by briefly reviewing the development of the police service and its relevance to present day aspects of culture. It then examined various aspects of police culture, particularly fairness, equal opportunities, freedom to express opinions on perceived wrong-doing within the organisation and the bureaucratic structure of the police. A large amount of evidence has been gather over a number of years by researchers indicating a need to change, but the reality appears to be little has changed in police occupational culture. This, I submit, is a classic symptom of an organisation locked into a downward vicious circle. In many ways, the police service is a victim of a failure to change, to appear to stay the same, but why has this happened? The next chapter provides a review of some of the police service's attempts at change, particularly culture change, and examines some of the reasons why they have not been successful.

CHAPTER THREE

POLICE CULTURE AND CHANGE

Measuring culture is a difficult and inexact science. Trying to measure change to

police culture over a 30-year period is even more difficult. However, by comparing some

older research with more contemporary work, it is possible to examine some aspects of

the process of cultural change within the police service. For example, Cain (1973)[102]

provides a description of policing in an urban area in the early seventies. She found that:

> *"Constables were oriented primarily to crime-fighting, a*
> *task which in fact formed a very minor part of their*
> *working day".*

Holdaway (1983)[103] 10 years later found much of Cain's description of police

occupational culture still highly relevant, the emphasis was still on fighting crime, as

opposed to community service, which was not perceived as macho. Whilst Cain's

research is over 20 years old, research by Dixon and Stanko (1995)[104] into the

development of 'community-based sector policing' (Sectorisation) suggests little has

really changed, despite many structural changes. Cain (1973) found that the act of

making an arrest for a criminal offence was in the eyes of constables at the core of 'good

policing'. Because making criminal arrests is a comparatively infrequent event other

arrests gained importance and stature, for example drunkenness or minor public order

offences. This is not to say these arrests were not justified, rather the importance of

arrests is related to the need for action, which Cain (1973) found constables expressed.

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[102]   Cain, M. E., *Society and the Policeman's Role*, London, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1973.
[103]   Holdaway, S. *Inside the British Police*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.
[104]   Dixon, B. and Stanko, B., *Op.Cit.*, 1995.

Muston (1996)[105] found the same desire for action in her ethnographic study of police

culture in Cambridge some 23 years later:

> "A desire for action and excitement was central to the
> police culture of officers in the city. Action and excitement
> were perceived as emerging from the spontaneity,
> unpredictability and variety of reactive policing ....".

As previously mentioned Cain (1973) also found aspects of a crime-orientated

culture were equally important in the definition of 'good' police work. Again Muston

(1996)[106], 23 years later, found a crime-orientated culture as opposed to a

service-orientated culture:

> "Opposed to this crime-orientated perspective, there was
> a much less enthusiastic response to 'service work'. This
> was regarded as monotonous, mundane and boring and it
> was often resented as it was perceived as imposing upon
> authentic policing."

Major aspects of police culture, such as a bias towards response policing as opposed to a

service oriented approach, would appear to be highly resilient to change, despite

numerous structural, procedural and system-led attempts at change. Why then is police

culture so difficult to change? One answer lies in the use of culture in the singular, rather

than the plural. Evidence suggests (Manning 1993[107], Chan 1996[108]) that in reality a

number of different cultures exist within the police service, therefore changing one

culture does not necessarily mean that others will change. These different cultures appear

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[105]   Muston, J. *Investigating Police Culture in Cambridge City Police*: An
Ethnographic Study, Unpublished MA dissertation, Dept. of Criminology, University of
Cambridge, p55, 1996.
[106]   Muston, J. *Ibid.*, p26, 1996.
[107]   Manning, P. *'Toward a Theory of Police Organisation: Polarities and Change'*,
paper given to the International Conference on Social Change in Policing, 3-5 August
1993, Taipei.
[108]   Chan, J. *Changing Police Culture*, British Journal of Criminology, Vol 36, No. 1,
pp 109 - 135, Winter 1996.

to have developed because juxtaposed to unchanging aspect of police culture are activities designed to relieve the boredom of 'mundane police work'. For example, during quiet times police officers engaged in activities such as 'tea stops', or getting their 'heads down on nights'. Officialdom traditionally frowned on these activities, therefore, the lower ranks were dependent on each other for the retention of secrecy. This phenomena, secrecy from senior management, encouraged the work group to look to itself to provided the prime source of role definition. Therefore, a culture developed that is apart and separate to that of senior management. This culture is maintained through secrecy, the closeness of the 'shift' and the necessity to provide '24-hour cover' which places them apart from senior management (Please note: This reinforces the point that a bureaucracy provides the illusion of managerial control). Manning (1993)[109] suggests that there are, in fact, three cultures of policing, 'Command', 'Middle Management' and 'Lower Participants'. More recent research by Chan (1996)[110] confirms this view. If these cultures are largely separate, then it would appear to follow that changing senior management culture, for example, without specifically changing cultures at other levels, is unlikely to result in significant change. This would appear to be one of the most important reasons why so many structural changes seem to have so little impact at other levels, particularly at the operational and shift level.

The above examples illustrate the persistence of police culture and the difficulties inherent in changing it; in many ways the whole organisation is designed not to change. The hierarchical rank system acts to reinforce apartness and difference, making change even more difficult. Ineffectual attempts at change affect issues far beyond the internal management of the police, as Lumley and Speechley (1996)[111] found in their investigation

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[109]   Manning, P. *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[110]   Chan, J. *Op.Cit.*, 1996.
[111]   Lumley, S. and Speechley C. M. *The Relationship Between Uniform and CID*

into the implementation of 'intelligence-led crime investigation' it can directly affect police performance in crime investigation. The Audit Commission (1997)[112] recently reported that a large number of forces were failing to improve detection rates, despite increases in budgets and a fall in recorded crime over the last three years. Stephens and Becker (1994)[113] argue that this has affected the police service's image as effective controllers of crime. They also suggest that this represents a vicious downward cycle because, when public trust and confidence in the police fall, so do the levels of co-operation and information which, in turn, makes it harder for the police to defeat and solve crime. A growing body of research (Holdaway and Barron, 1993[114], CPTU 1993[115], Dixon and Stanko, 1995)[116] then indicates that the police service is failing to manage change adequately, including crime investigation. Maguire and John (1995)[117] in their review of 'intelligence-led' crime investigation found that:

> *"The possible negative influence of broader 'cultural'*
> *factors should not be underestimated [when bringing*
> *about this change]".*

The failure to understand and manage cultural change appears to be resulting in a number of change programmes failing. These failures in turn affect performance, thereby reducing public confidence in the police. Bate (1994)[118] identifies this phenomena (organisational vicious circle) and also indicates the power it has in bringing about, on some occasions, the ultimate destruction of organisations.

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and the Effects on Crime Investigation. Cambridgeshire Constabulary, 1996.

[112] The Times, *Police clear-up rate falls in spite of budget increases,* p6, The Times 30 January 1997.

[113] Stephens, M. and Becker, S. *Police Force - Police Service, Care and Control in Britain,* Macmillan, pp 220-229, 1994.

[114] Holdaway S. and Barron A-M, *Op.Cit.,* 1993.

[115] CPTU, *Op.Cit.,* 1993.

[116] Dixon B and Stanko B, *Op.Cit.,* 1995.

[117] Maguire, M. and John, T. *Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants Integrated Approaches,* Police Research Group, Home Office, p54, 1995.

[118] Bate, P., *Op.Cit.,* 1994.

Implementation of Sector Policing

At the present time (1997) the concept of 'Sector Policing' is being implemented in most forces. The term finally emerged from the Metropolitan Police's 'Plus Programme' and was used to describe the concept of 'Geographic Policing'. The concept is certainly not new, rather an attempt to revert to the 'golden age' of policing where the local bobby walked the beat, day in and day out and was in touch and able to respond to the demands of the local community. Reiner (1991)[119] found that these concepts, espoused by Scarman, are now widely accepted by chief constables.

Following the 'Plus Programme', an internal implementation team charged with re-examining the deployment of officers came down in favour of radical change in the organisation of local policing. The policing was to be aimed at:

1. Making the most effective use of current resources;

2. Working in close co-operation with the local community;

3. Encouraging officers to "own and get ahead" of local problems by identifying and helping to tackle their underlying causes;

4. Encouraging visible and accessible patrol by known local officers;

5. Delivering a " better quality of service" provided by local officers committed to their tasks, enjoying the support and approval of the local people - policing by consent".

(Metropolitan Police 1991)[120]

Dixon and Stanko (1995) provide a review of the sector policing initiative undertaken in part of the Metropolitan Police area. They found that one of the major problems experienced, particularly with public consultation, was the expectation of the

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[119]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit., Chief Constables*, p125, 1991.
[120]   Metropolitan Police, *Sector Policing: Guide for Divisional Management Teams*. London, para., 2.5. 1991.

public for the police to deal with 'minor matters', such as illegal parking and

inconsiderate dog owners. They found that this caused a major clash with police

occupational culture which focuses on the need to 'fight serious crime'. As Dixon and

Stanko (1995) argue:

> *"In appearing to give less scope for action, excitement*
> *and variety than the fast response work offered by the*
> *relief system, community problem-solving under sector*
> *policing clashed with some of the most celebrated features*
> *of the occupational culture of the lower ranks".*[121]

They also found that sector policing seemed to have little effect on officers' approach to

responding to these calls from the public:

> *"Far from seeing a call from the public as an opportunity*
> *to diagnose and deal with an underlying problem the*
> *philosophy of response work under sector policing was*
> *much the same as it had been under the relief system - get*
> *in, get out get on to the next job"*.[122]

Resistance to the change that sector policing brought on more peripheral issues

were largely overcome during their research, such as changes in shift patterns, but the

more fundamental aspects of change were much more resistant:

> *"Ordinary sector officers were no more prepared to think*
> *of themselves as accountable to the public rather than*
> *their peers (and occasionally their superiors) than they*
> *had been in their days on relief".*[123]

The whole point of sector policing was to improve community links, (No. 2 working in

close co-operation with the local community) and provide a better service to the

community. Home Beat officers, who would probably have closer contacts with the local

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[121]   Dixon, W. and Stanko, B. *Op.Cit.*, Policing and Society, Vol 5, 3 pp 171-183,
1995.
[122]   Dixon, W. and Stanko, B., *Ibid.*, p179, 1995.
[123]   Dixon, W. and Stanko, B., *Ibid.*, p180, 1995.

community than any other officers, found their expertise was no more valued under the new system of sectorisation, than under the old system. Sector policing introduces a new structure to police in a given area, however, unless this cultural resistance is tackled, the chances of successful implementation must be extremely remote. As Dixon and Stanko (1995) conclude:

> *"What we describe as a culture of resistance to some of the fundamental principles of sector policing poses a serious threat to the new system's ability to deliver greater public accountability"*.[124]

The 'Plus Programme' has been one of the most significant attempts at cultural change in the police service. It was preceded by a review by management consultants Wolff Olins (1988)[125]. They concluded that there needed to be a profound cultural change which must accompany and reinforce managerial changes. As Brown (1992)[126] states, this change initiative highlights areas of difficulty in implementing change, notably a proportion of mid-ranking officers who appear to be blocking the changes. Judge (1991) [127] comments that a survey some two years after the introduction of the 'Plus Programme' revealed the familiar complaints from officers directed at management as too distant, slow to praise, insufficiently supportive and unwilling to consult. Judge (1991) also found that it has also been averred that even at senior command level enthusiasm for 'Plus' has, in many cases, been distinctly tepid. Whilst the middle ranks of police management appear to be the butt of much criticism, by providing an alleged 'frozen layer' resistant to change, Judge's comments that problems may also exist at the very highest levels of management.

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124   Dixon, W. and Stanko, B., *Op.Cit.*, p182, 1995.
125   Wolff Olins, *A Force for Change*, p16, 1988.
126   Brown, J. *Changing the Police Culture*, Policing, pp 307-322, 1992.
127   Judge, T. 'The Ivory Tower', *Police*, Vol., 23, 6, pp 4-5, 1991.

Managing organisational change is extremely complex, requiring understanding of

issues across a wide range of disciplines including psychology, sociology, management,

education, as well as a deep understanding of the police service and its rich contextual

setting. It also requires, in my submission, an understanding of a range of approaches to

research, particularly from the social sciences. The process of change is multifaceted and

multi-dimensional, often the presenting problem is only symptomatic of other underlying

problems. It is questionable whether the current training offered to police managers to

manage this process is adequate; indeed the evidence suggests this is not the case. The

complexity of managing change, which requires considerable theoretical appreciation and

organisational reflection, is in many ways an anathema to the police. As Young (1993)[128]

argues:

> *"Policing is a world of day to day pragmatism, and not*
> *one much concerned to reflect on the history, political*
> *ideologies, or those social events which have influenced*
> *the occurrences that it is now called to deal with".*
>
> (Please note: The manifestation of culture in an
> organisation in many way represents that organisation's
> history. This point will be expanded upon in Chapter 5).

Young's finding helps to explain the seeming indifference many senior managers have to

culture, particularly the effects culture has on organisational change. To review these

influences would mean to analyse factors which are largely produced in complex and

lengthy qualitative text, not quantitative statistical information. Reiner (1992)[129]

reinforces this view:

> *"It is important to stress the very pragmatic, concrete,*
> *down to earth, anti-theoretical perspective which is*
> *typical of the rank and file and indeed chief constables".*

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[128]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[129]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.*, p128, 1992.

Being labelled too academic in the police service is a phrase used by some senior managers, to minimise what is being said and has the effect of failing to reflect and analyse why something is, has, or has not happened. Managing cultural change is difficult and complex, but when considering change it is an area that managers should be engrossed in, Holdaway and Barron (1993)[130] found:

> *"Chief Officers are yet to adequately draw and grasp the serious organisational and managerial problems it poses [occupational culture]. There is a need to repeatedly draw their attention to the various ways in which this extraordinarily resistant culture creates, in our view, the primary context for considerations of organisational change."*

Holdaway and Barron (1993) go on to explain that there is a significant gap between the rhetoric of police reform and the evident consequences of reform on the ground. Additionally, they found that the culture tended to manifest itself in the negative, rather than the positive:

> *"Rather than placing emphasis on positive and hopeful aspects of police work in which social structure has been preserved, people have been helped, crime prevented and community bonds affirmed, its heart is a triumphant defeat".*[131]

The failure by many senior managers to understand the importance of culture and its implications for organisational development and change is a major cause of concern, and one cannot help but reflect on Ward's (1994)[132] comments concerning manager's lack of understanding about cultural change, contained in the introduction (page 12).

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130   Holdaway, S. and Barron, A-M, *Op.Cit.*, Sheffield University, 1993.
131   Holdaway, S. and Barron, A-M, *Op.Cit.*, p97, 1993.
132   Ward, M., *Op.Cit.*, pp xii., 1994.

Failure by managers to conceptualise what organisational change means before embarking upon major change programmes is increasingly becoming the subject of criticism from a number of authors on change (Ward 1994[133], Bate 1994)[134]. Culture will be discussed in greater depth in later chapters, but a basic understanding of terms such as rituals, metaphors and symbols and their effect on organisational development seem to be a fundamental requirement for managers of change. For example, rituals can affect aspects of social behaviour and how we perceive the world. Rituals use theatre and drama for effect; in this way social reality is continually constructed and reconstructed. Young (1993)[135] makes this point and goes on to explain that police reality is particularly experienced as a drama, as theatre, as farce and as a ritual. Reality is culturally constructed, presented in dramatic, metaphoric and persuasive terms, as if it were real. But how does this sustain itself and make itself so difficult to change. Young (1993) considers the answer lies in the fact that the symbols employed are heavily pregnant with emotion and feeling, invoking a feeling that, for example, we are all disappearing in a 'sea of violence' and, 'drowning in waves of crime'. Meaning and emphasis is, therefore, drawn from the theatre and drama, rather than the substance. This aspect of police culture is additionally compounded by a bias towards pragmatism and against theoretical analysis, which prevents critical analysis of perceived reality and places heavy emphasis on metaphors, symbolism and the anecdotal. This phenomena, combined with an anti-theoretical bias, is one of the key reasons why so many attempts at organisational change fails. The bias against theoretical understanding and critical analysis means the very phenomena that are affecting individuals' (and the organisations') construction of reality will not be exposed. Therefore, most change programmes commence from a false

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[133]   Ward, M., *Op.Cit.*, pp xii, 1994.
[134]   Bate, P., *Op.Cit.*, 1994.
[135]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, p163, 1993.

assessment of the current situation and tend to address symptoms, rather than underlying problems.

Under Valuing Research

Bias against academically rigorous research and reflection, in favour of action and pragmatism, makes it possible to see how difficult it is to expose reality and, therefore, how difficult to change that socially-constructed reality, which forms the organisation's culture. In essence, it is a classic organisational vicious circle; heavy bias against research of a rigorous academic nature prevents analysis of social phenomena that forms organisational culture. Without reliable and accurate analysis of the situation, management must inevitably make uninformed decisions. Also, where such work is produced it is largely left unread or valued. An example of this is given by Young (1991)[136]:

> "Jones's book remained untouched on the shelves of Northumbria's modest library in its first two years, even though it had good reviews; and the influence of this research has been all but negligible".

Indeed, I have not met any other police officer that has read Young's own work, which offers an extremely vivid description of police occupational culture. The importance of this aspect of police culture and its impact on the management of change cannot be overstated. For change in any desired direction can only occur once accurate assessment of a reality takes place. The lack of understanding of the role culture has to play in organisational change combined with inadequate analysis of the situation means that subsequent efforts at change are almost bound to be misdirected and doomed to failure.

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[136]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, 1991.

Approaches to Research

Traditional research methods used within the police service, such as performance indicators, questionnaires and statistics may provide measurement of something, but will almost certainly not provide exposure of the bizarre nature of organisational culture. Only a multi-method approach using largely qualitative research methods will achieve this, such as those found in the social sciences. The descriptive capability of this form of research, I would suggest, is essential for managers of change if they are to have any real insight into organisational effectiveness and the process of change. As Young (1993)[137] explains in discussing police culture:

> "The thick description reveals the way order, conformity, conservative thought, preserving practice, laws, rules, and other cultural constraints must always prevail. Moreover, it exposes how vast networks of interconnecting practices are ritualised to ensure the 'truth' remains sacrosanct and powerfully operative on the audience"

Reiner (1995)[138] reinforces this point when considering public attitude surveys and cultural issues. He is sceptical about the capacity of questionnaires responses to chart meaningfully anything, but idealised and artificial attitudes which bear little relation to reality. Qualitative evidence, such as that produced in ethnography and case-studies, whilst much harder to measure, can provide an invaluable insight into what actually is happening prior to, and during, a period of change. It is essential to continually evaluate progress during a period of change, if successful implementation is to occur. Maguire and John (1995)[139] similarly concluded in their review of a number of forces attempts to change to intelligence-led crime investigation:

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[137]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, p164, 1993.
[138]   Reiner, R., *Op.Cit.*, p124, 1995.
[139]   Maguire, M. and John, T., *Op.Cit.*, p 55, 1995.

*"Once the system is in operation, it needs to be
continually monitored and reviewed. This is necessary to
identify areas in which it is failing, or in which undue
pressure is being put upon officers ......"*

Failure to carry out a meaningful evaluation two years after implementation of

intelligence-led crime investigation in Cambridgeshire Constabulary was identified by

Lumley and Speechley (1996)[140] as a major reason for organisational poor performance

(lowest detection rates in the country). As one person said some two years after the

change was made:

"The Crime Strategy has been used as an excuse to do nothing".

Evidence of this could be found in official minutes which showed senior managers

attributing problems with the change programme to problems with *'bedding in'* some two

years after implementation. Early evaluation helps to identify problems before they

become major issues and permits changes in direction to be made at an early stage. This

is the principle that underpins action-research espoused by Lewin (1952)[141]. Making use

of early evaluation to inform managers of change of course depends upon an appreciation

of the value of research and an understanding of the process of change.

Failure to Act Upon Research

Considerable evidence of a failure to use or act upon relevant research was found

when a team of ten police researchers (of whom I was the Project Leader) examined over

350 separate pieces of research in an attempt to ascertain the minimum training levels for

police officers (CPTU 1993)[142] . They identified that the police service consistently failed

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[140]   Lumley, S. and Speechley, C. M., *Op.Cit.*, 1996.
[141]   Lewin, K. Group Decision and Social Change. In G. E. Swanson, T. N.
Newcomb, and E. I. Hartley (Eds.), *Reading in social psychology, rev. ed.* New York:
Holt 1952.
[142]   CPTU, *Op.Cit.*, p9, 1993.

to implement well-founded recommendations. It became increasingly clear to the researchers that, without positive action to affect police culture, little change would occur. Heidensohn (1992)[143] reinforces this view in her examination of women in the police service.

However, such is the power of police culture that those who do dare to challenge the perceived 'truths' are normally either not listened to, or isolated. In speaking to a number of people following the implementation of the Crime Strategy in Cambridgeshire Constabulary a number of people used the expression, *'king with no clothes on'*. People recognised that there were many problems with the change programme and would discuss the matters among themselves and with more junior managers, but were reluctant to discuss their thoughts with senior management. Many managers in the force had complained about a number of the changes for most of the two years in which the Crime Strategy had been implemented, but most senior managers appeared to have largely dismissed what they said, or had been unaware. This highlights the importance of research to expose problems of implementation and the necessity for management to act upon the research where it is available to rectify identified problems.

In many ways, these examples highlight the problems that any strong hierarchical organisation has in managing change. The power of earlier conditioning to the institutional norms act as social inhibitors and can induce a state of, 'paralysis' and 'cultural blindness'. This suggests that, before you can bring about organisational change, you need to expose the organisational culture you are trying to change that creates this state. Having exposed the culture, it is then necessary to enter an unlearning process before new learning can begin, in essence a re-socialisation process. This process of

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[143]   Heidensohn, F., *Op.Cit.*, p97, 1992.

learning to analyse critically what has been uncritically accepted in the past is largely the domain of training, but a very special form of training. This raises another problem with change in the police service, that of a culture that appears to place little value on training.

Under Valuing Training

If organisational change amounts to the same thing as cultural change, as Bate (1994) argues and culture consists of commonly held attitudes, values, beliefs and assumptions then changing these attributes becomes critical in achieving organisational change. This will be the subject of much greater discussion in later chapters, but one of the main vehicles used to modify attitudes, values, beliefs, assumptions and behaviour is training. However, if the police service places little value on training then, in essence, it is devaluing one of the most important organisational functions necessary to achieve successful change. Whilst there may be evidence to suggest this is culturally a British phenomena, many successful companies take a different stance, for example, Smith-Kline Beecham, a major multinational company, describe their top facilitators as amongst the 'jewels' of the organisation. Training should play a major part in helping staff to learn to adapt to new and more appropriate ways of thinking and behaving, which are essential if meaningful change is to occur.

Bureaucratic Resistance, Power Relationships and Change

The police service is an organisation largely based upon the military-bureaucratic model. Within this framework Walker (1994)[144] argues that his research indicates there are two key conceptual dimensions to understanding power relationships within the police service. The first is *'Instrumental power'*; this largely revolves around two key areas, that of 'threat and inducement' and 'control of resources'. These are used to bring

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[144]   Walker, N., *Op.Cit.*, pp 43-45, 1994.

about control and compliance within the organisation. 'Threat and inducement' depends upon effective monitoring for its successful application. 'Control of resources' is less exact in its application and does not depend to the same degree on monitoring for its successful application. *'Normative power'* is exercised through the establishment of norms or agreed standards of conduct, i.e. culture.

Normative power is usually more concerned with the possibility of sharing or harmonisation. Both types of power form elements of an organisation's culture, but *normative power* is normally achieved thorough establishing a culture where staff share the values of the organisation. *Instrumental power*, which uses mechanisms such as the discipline procedure, can impose change to a degree, despite a hostile culture, but this will probably have only a very limited short-term effect. These two concepts of power are not mutually exclusive and considerable overlap can exist. Walker's (1994) research into police culture found that within instrumental relationships there was little incentive for the initiator to develop a caring and sympathetic understanding of the circumstances and aspirations of the other party. Neither was the other party likely to want to reciprocate. Walker (1994) also found that the exclusionary and self-perpetuating quality of this type of power relationship is further enhanced by the fact that bureaucracy:

> *"provides a currency of instrumental power that*
> *organisational elites can conveniently mint for their own*
> *use"*[145].

The effect this can have on attempts at change can be quite alarming. Walker (1994) argues that bureaucratic methods tend to be offered as solutions to problems of their own making. Rule infractions are met with new rules. This is evident in many forces and personified by the large number of 'Standing Orders'. Sanction avoidance is usually met

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[145]   Walker, N., *Ibid.*, p44, 1994.

with closer monitoring, not analysis of underlying causes. An example of this is contained in the following case-study which occurred in one force during a period of organisational change.

Case-study: Sanction Avoidance Equals Closer Monitoring

This particular force was engaged in a process of organisational change. The intention was to move to a less centralised organisation, with a higher degree of empowerment for managers. This was accompanied by the delayering of management layers and a higher degree of divisional autonomy. Part of this process was to move to 'Sector Policing'. Sector policing in this context meant that an inspector was given responsibility for policing a geographic area, rather than providing time-based cover for a larger area, as part of a shift (The underlying idea is that it is possible to achieve closer links with the community by providing a more local service). To achieve this it is particularly important for the inspector to build links with the community (population of 30,000 plus), by attending various local meetings. As part of the implementation process it became apparent that it was impossible to provide this service and 24-hour inspector cover. This point was raised with senior management, and indeed large parts of the force had operated with limited inspector cover for over 10 years. There had been certain problems at one particular station in the force some months early that involved inspector cover during the night. This problem was arguably one of management culture, rather than 24-hour inspector cover. The solution to the dilemma of providing 24-hour inspector cover or sector policing, was dictated centrally to the whole force by senior management. *'There will be 24-hour inspector cover on every division'.* If necessary more inspectors would be appointed at the cost of fewer constables. As one divisional senior manager said, *'what does that say about empowerment and autonomy'?* (Fieldnotes 1996)

Walker (1994) argues all of this leads to an *"instrumental cycle which meets failure with a policy of more of the same"*[146]. This approach, I suggest, represents classic symptoms of an organisation locked into a vicious circle. Attempts at change are almost doomed to failure unless this vicious circle can be interrupted by introducing a new way of perceiving the problem and a fundamental change in organisational culture. In the above case, the process of delayering management to release resources, so that more constables could be appointed, was ignored. The principles of sector policing were seriously threatened and the whole process of empowerment was placed at risk. There were many other solutions to this problem that would not have threatened the whole

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[146]   Walker, N. *Ibid.*, p44, 1994.

process of change. For example, better call-out procedures, shared cover by different divisions, or letting each divisional management team decide its local needs, are but three possible solutions. The impression given, I would suggest, is an organisation that is happy to change structures and systems, but very uncomfortable with changing 'how things are done around here'.

On the face of it, then, the bureaucratic model, as found in the police service, with its emphasis on top-down management and an elaborate structure of internal regulation, does provide a mechanism to ensure uniformity and conformity. This may have the appearance of providing control and co-ordination of a large organisation like the police service, but this may not be the case because of the high level of freedom and discretion officers enjoy when patrolling. Walker (1994) acknowledges that cultural pluralism may exist, which further reinforces Manning's (1993)[147] and Chan's (1996)[148] view that three separate cultures exist (command, middle management and lower participants). Walker (1994) also identifies the importance of sanctions to maintain this system of control and the inherent difficulties that this system has in bringing about change:

> *"Police bureaucracy can encourage a rule-based*
> *pedanticism, a reluctance or inability to adapt to new*
> *circumstances, an unduly narrow policy-making base and*
> *autonomous style of personnel management, which by*
> *neglecting the human dimension of a job, with high stress,*
> *potential may encourage loss of motivation, absenteeism*
> *and extensive 'easing behaviour'"*[149].

Additionally, whilst the military-bureaucratic model does offer some control over operational police activities, it has failed to provided sufficient control to prevent a

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[147]   Manning, P., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[148]   Chan, J., *Op.Cit.*, 1996.
[149]   Walker, N., *Op.Cit.*, p47, 1994.

number of well documented cases of malpractice. The reality is that the different layers of the organisation develop ways of avoiding doing what the other wants them to do, which represents a major obstacle for managers of change. Unless this aspect of police culture is recognised and changed, then the vicious circle will not be broken.

Different sources have identified police occupational culture as the major factor in preventing development and change in the police service. Walker (1994)[150] acknowledges that the legacy of a strong instrumental culture has proven hard to displace and suggests that reforms to the training system, designed to promote greater awareness of alternative management philosophies, are dismissed by some students as weak when considered against the prevailing current of organisational practice. This point also tends implicitly to reinforce the low regard in which training is held within the service. Walker (1994) also considers that even more robust reforms have fared little better, citing the Operational Policing Review (1990):

> "Beneath the institutional facade there had developed scant commitment to the rationalistic, participative ethos of 'Policing By Objectives' (Joint Consultative Committee 1990)".[151] Jones, et.al., (1994)[152].

Also in reviewing development of crime prevention in the police service, Walker (1994) comments that, in spite of some developments, there was still evidence of a wider failure by the police to make substantive changes in introducing effective crime prevention polices. Jones, et.al., (1994)[153] reinforces this point more powerfully when commenting on 'community policing' and 'crime prevention':

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[150]   Walker, N., *Op.Cit.*, pp 43-65, 1994.
[151]   Walker, N. *Ibid.*, pp 43- 65, 1994.
[152]   Jones, T., Newburn, T. and Smith, D. J. *Democracy and Policing*, Policy Studies Institute, London. p286, 1994.
[153]   Jones, T., Newburn, T. and Smith, D. J., Ibid.., p287, 1994.

"There was much rhetoric during the 1980s in support of 'community policing and 'community-based crime prevention', but there was no clear line of development in putting such ideas into practice. Any police contribution of community based crime prevention schemes was minor .... there was a continual lack of clarity in the structures within police forces for dealing with crime prevention. Changes tended to make matters worse".

The prevailing culture seems to dictate, then, that the management of change in the police service is highly problematic and, even where evidence of this is provided, it is still not acted upon. For example, research carried out by the police themselves (CPTU 1993) [154] indicated severe problems with implementation and as Dr Ghazzali, academic supervisor to the research project, prosaically commented in the Executive Summary:

"Historically police policy-makers have attempted to incorporate new thinking into the existing culture and organisational structure, rather than instituting change to the culture and structure .... it is far easier to achieve the former and without positive action to effect essential change, culture will remain largely static".

Is this position (poor management of change) unique to the police service, or do other organisations suffer from similar problems in implementing significant change programmes? The following data (Bulletpoint 1997)[155] suggests that while the police service may suffer particularly severe problems it is certainly not unique:

- **75% of all transformation efforts fail (major organisational change)**

- **50-75% of all re-engineering projects fail (business process re-engineering)**

This data certainly suggests that the police service does not appear to be unique in experiencing severe difficulties in the management of change, but the police service

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[154] Community, Fairness and Quality-Review Team, *Op.Cit.*, p 6, 1993.
[155] Bulletpoint, *Why Change Fails*, Vol 1, pp 1-3, 1997.

certainly does face some particular problems, if only because of its historical development.

Summary

This chapter, then, has examined a number of areas where the police service has attempted to bring about change, for example, sector policing, crime prevention, intelligence-led crime investigation, all of which have achieved limited success. If meaningful change is to occur in the police service, it is necessary to interrupt the vicious circle which conspires to prevent change. Some of the key aspects of this vicious circle have been discussed in this chapter. They are the undervaluing of research, an over reliance on quantitative research, undervaluing of training, lack of understanding of organisational culture, managers of change untrained and a failure to evaluate adequately prior to, during and following change. All these attributes are currently acting to prevent organisational development and change in the police service. Failure to understand what an organisation actually is and the role culture has to play in the effective development of that organisation has, in my submission, resulted in many changes, particularly in the field of equal opportunities, proving to be rhetoric rather than reality, the introduction of grievance procedures being only the latest example. The next chapter, then, focuses on one particular area of change, the introduction of a staff grievance procedure.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND CHANGE

Legal Perspective

The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, excludes police officers

from the protection it affords most employees in the provision of unfair and constructive

dismissal. Civilian members of staff are protected under the legislation. In interview with

a representative of the Equal Opportunities Commission (1994)[156] they stated that the

instigation of grievance procedure for police officers originally came about because

police officers had been omitted from the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act

1978. In essence, the Commission felt that police officers did not have an avenue open to

them if they believed they were being treated unfairly. For this reason, they lobbied hard

for the introduction of an internal grievance procedure for police officers.

Recent case law and, in particular, *W A Goold (Pearmark) Ltd v McConnell*

(1995 IRLR 516)[157], provided that the employer's failure to provide and apply a

grievance procedure amounted to a breach of the employment contract, which entitled

the employees to resign and, therefore, claim constructive dismissal. The Employment

Appeals Tribunal agreed with this decision; it held that it was an implied term in any

employment contract that employers should reasonably and promptly give employees an

opportunity to obtain redress in any grievance.

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[156]   Field notes March 1994.
[157]   Institute of Personnel Development, *People Management*, Vol. 2. No.1 'A
grievance procedure in implied contracts', p 35, 1996.

The term 'grievance procedure', however, as used in the context of this thesis, has a broader meaning than the purely legislative approach described above. It is used here to describe an internal mechanism designed to allow members of staff to raise issues in which they feel aggrieved or concerned. Near and Miceli (1985)[158] use the term, 'Whistle-blowing' in a similar context to describe what someone does when they raise an issue within an organisation, or indeed external to the organisation. They define whistle-blowing as:

> *"The disclosure by organisation members of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that may be able to effect action".*

This definition is intended to incorporate omissions as well as commissions. The definition used by Near and Miceli covers most aspects of wrong-doing, but does not extend to ineffective organisational practices. For example, a staff selection system that is highly inefficient at selecting the right person for a particular post. If the selection was carried out in good faith, it could hardly be described as, immoral or illegitimate. For the definition to incorporate inefficient practices, it would need to be extended.

Near and Miceli (1995)[159] consider the effectiveness of whistle-blowing should be viewed not in a legal sense, but rather whether the person complaining accomplished what she or he sets out to accomplish, *"namely, the implementation of organisational change, as opposed to obtaining a judgement"*. They, therefore, define the effectiveness of whistle-blowing as:

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[158]   Near, J. P. and Miceli, M.P., Characteristics of organisational climate and perceived wrongdoing associated with whistle-blowing decisions. *Personnel Psychology*, 38: pp 525 544. 1985.

[159]   Near, J. P.. and Miceli, M.P., Effective Whistle-Blowing, *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp 679-708, 1995.

> *"The extent to which the questionable or wrongful*
> *practice (or omission) is terminated, at least partly*
> *because of whistle-blowing and within a reasonable*
> *period of time".*

A preliminary study by Leonard (1993)[160] indicated that cultural changes that encouraged

individuals to report concerns and specific actions within organisations can be beneficial

to the organisation. Near and Miceli (1995) qualified this view and consider that:

> *"Whistle-blowing in itself is not an unqualified good; its*
> *benefits are gained only when the complaint is valid and*
> *is effectively handled, resulting in positive change".*

Establishing a procedure that allows staff to raise an issue, and for that issue to be

handled effectively, is in essence what Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of

Service Project' attempted to achieve. This initiative involved, not only the development

of various policies and procedures, but also a change of culture. Research and guidance

in this area is difficult to find as Near and Miceli (1995) state:

> *"Empirical research on conditions that lead*
> *whistle-blowers to be effective in getting organisational*
> *wrong-doing stopped is woefully absent".*

Near and Miceli (1995) consider that organisational culture may well affect the

extent to which whistle-blowing is seen as appropriate within a given organisation and

this will also affect the organisation's ability to change. Near *et.al,* (1993)[161], considers

the most pertinent aspect of culture is probably the organisation members' shared values

regarding wrong-doing and whistle-blowing. Citing other research, Near and Miceli

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[160]   Leonard, B. Study documents workplace fear, violence. *HR News* 12 (11): 1, 14.
1993.
[161]   Near, J. P.. , Baucus, M. S., and Miceli, M.P. Espoused organisational culture for
wrongdoing: Relationship to culture-in-use. *Administration and Society*, 25: pp 204-226,
1993.

(1995)[162] propose that effectiveness is enhanced in organisations in which the culture discourages wrong-doing, encourages whistle-blowing, and discourages retaliation against whistle-blowers.

This section, then, provides further evidence to suggest that simply introducing a new grievance procedure without providing a supportive culture would almost certainly be ineffective. Staff would not have faith in the procedure, therefore, would not use it and, unless the organisation had faith in it, it would not learn from grievances. Chapter two provided considerable evidence (e.g. HMIC 1995) to suggest that staff do not have faith in existing grievance procedures and, as will be discussed later, this was certainly the case in Cambridgeshire Constabulary prior to 'The Equality of Service Project'.

Stability or Instability

Making a grievance, or whistle-blowing, generally creates a state of instability in an organisation, or a particular part of an organisation. It causes questions to be asked, including questioning values, beliefs and core assumptions that comprise the organisations culture. This may be viewed in a negative light, particularly by those who have experienced an organisation which has had a largely stable internal environment. Having an internal culture that is very stable may appeal to those working in an organisation, but, as Miller[163] (1990) argues, if an organisation maintains development along a given path, normally building upon its strengths, eventually it will fail because the organisation has probably learnt to develop in terms of evolution rather than revolution. This may have served the organisation well, but eventually evolution will not be an adequate response and change will not be radical enough for the organisation to stay in

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[162]   Near, J. P. and Miceli, M.P., *Op.Cit.*, p 701. 1995.
[163]   Miller, D. *The Icarus Paradox: How Excellent Companies Can Bring about Their Own Downfall*, New York: Harper Business, 1990.

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tune with a changing world. Pascale (1990)[164] builds upon this argument and explains success in the organisational context, as, 'operation in a state of non-paradoxical forces'. Both of these arguments recognise that organisations must have the ability to change and sometimes radically change to survive. Stacey (1993)[165] argues that these two studies provide evidence that directly question the validity of many explanations of a successful organisation. Both Miller and Pascale consider that failure flows from stability and success flows from some form of managed instability. Stacey further comments in reviewing a number of organisational models:

> "*What all of these conclusions have in common is recognition of the significant and irremovable instability of organisational life if there is to be any innovation, transformation and new strategic direction*".

The above arguments present a considerable problem for the police service, which is an organisation that is very bureaucratic, hierarchical and has a strong occupational culture of resisting change. The level of control which is arguably available thorough the military-bureaucratic model leads to the illusion of control and rhetoric which emphasises dedication to the official mission, Walker (1994)[166]. The bureaucratic nature of the police service makes it extremely difficult to change, it is an organisation that is used to depending on systems, procedures and a rank hierarchy to maintain stability, yet the above (Miller 1990, Pascale, 1990, and Miller 1993) all suggest that a certain degree of instability assists in achieving organisational development and effectiveness.

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[164]   Pascale, R. T. *Managing On The Edge: How Successful Companies Use Conflict to Stay Ahead*, London: Viking Penguin 1990.
[165]   Stacey, R. D., *Op.Cit.*, pp 208-246, 1993.
[166]   Walker, N., *Op.Cit.*, p 37., 1994.

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Producing instability whilst still managing the business process would appear to be the key to a successful organisation. Stacey (1993)[167] argues that this instability should be provided by feedback-loops that encourage organisation reflection, development and learning:

> "The models of a number of key authors such as Weick
> (1977)[168], Forrester (1961)[169], Argyris (1990)[170] and Bion
> (1961)[171] all have in common the incorporation of positive
> feedback-loops into their models of organisational
> development."

A well-managed grievance procedure may provide such a feedback-loop; of course, this would depend on different factors that would allow staff to raise not only minor issues, but be able to question issues that challenge the organisation's core assumptions, defence routines and taboos. These are the very areas of organisational culture that provide its inherent stability. Having a mechanism that allows staff to challenge and question practices without fear of retaliation should be viewed as particularly important to public sector organisations. In many public sector organisations, including the police service, it is often difficult to measure effectiveness in any meaningful way. For example, in the police context it is possible to measure 'detection rates', but these do not take account of how the victims of crime were treated, or how willing witnesses were to come forward. Additionally, the police service is a monopoly; the public do not have any choice as to where they report crime, or who investigates it. These factors in practice mean there is little real incentive to be efficient and, in my experience, many internal practices are allowed to continue, even though they seriously affect efficiency. Challenging, or

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[167]   Stacey, R. D., *Op.Cit.*, p209, 1993

[168]   Weick, K., Organisational Design: organisations as self-organizing systems, *Organisation Dynamics*, Auterm, pp 31-67, 1977

[169]   Forrester, J., *Industrial Dynamics*, Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, (1961).

[170]   Argyris, C., *Overcoming Organisational Defenses: Facilitating Organisational Learning*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Prentice-Hall, 1990.

[171]   Bion, W. R., *Experiences in Groups and Other Papers*, London, Tavistock Publications, 1961.

questioning, these practices is often seen as a taboo subject, amounting to 'career suicide' for those who dare to make such a challenge. These factors combine to make an organisation that is very stable, but difficult to develop or change. An effective grievance procedure may, in my submission, provide a mechanism not only to challenge individual wrong-doing, but also issues that affect organisational efficiency.

Stacey (1993) defines success in the organisational context, as, *'the ability to survive by innovating and transforming itself'*[172]. However, he does make the point that it may not be desirable for some organisations to be highly innovative and be continually changing. He quotes several examples, including the police service. This does not mean that the police service should not have an effective mechanism to prevent and deal with wrong-doing, nor does he mean an organisation should not be innovative. Indeed, the other example Stacey uses, the nuclear industry, makes the point clearer and helps to separate the notion of a high state of innovation from that of learning through feedback systems. The point I believe Stacey makes is that for some organisations, providing a safe, reliable service is more important than being highly innovative; however, even in these organisations it is essential to have a system where staff can report 'wrong-doing' and the organisation can learn.

The grievance procedure in the police service is often perceived to be a mechanism that is simply designed to be a method of resolving issues affecting minorities. However, here I am arguing it can be a way of changing many aspects of an organisation's culture. This is, of course, dependent on staff having confidence in the procedure and the procedure actually achieving what it is meant to, without recrimination directed against the person or persons raising the grievance. If it is successfully managed,

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[172]   Stacey, R. D., *Op.Cit.*, p 211, 1993.

in my submission, a grievance procedure can bring about positive change in an organisation by improving systems, policies and modifying aspects of negative behaviour. Evidence to support this statement and other effects of the grievance procedure are explored in more detail in the case-study analysis of Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project'. In essence, what I am arguing is that a grievance procedure should be seen as a mechanism for organisational change, not just as a mechanism to assist individuals to right a perceived wrong.

The Police Service's Grievance Procedure

Home Office circular No.87/1989 introduced the concept of grievance procedures for police officers to most forces in England and Wales. The circular was distributed on the 7 November 1989 and highlighted the importance of good equal opportunity practice to the image of the police service:

> *"There is a clear link between a commitment to equal opportunities principles in police recruitment and employment, ... and the expression of those principles in the high professional standards of conduct on which the reputation of the service depends. Unfair or unlawful discriminatory practices not only lead to resentment on the part of those who suffer from them: they also affect adversely public perceptions of the police as a service and a career".*[173]

The circular reinforces the link between unfair and unlawful discriminatory practices within the police service and the image the service projects to the public. The importance of the public's perception of the police service as an impartial and non-bias service is mentioned throughout the thesis, particularly in chapter two. Home Office Circular 87/1989 was primarily concerned with the introduction of equal opportunity policies and

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[173]   Home Office, Circular No. 87/1989, *Op.Cit.*, para. 3., 1989.

a grievance procedure in the police service, but also made the point that it was necessary

for staff to believe in the concept of equal opportunities:

> *"The creation within the police service of a genuine belief
> in equal opportunities, coupled with the knowledge that
> unfair or unlawful discriminatory practise will not be
> tolerated, should yield benefits not only within the service
> itself but in a more positive public belief in its fairness,
> professionalism and improved relationships with the wider
> community"* [174].

The Home Office clearly considers that there is a strong link between internal

practices and the police's relationship with the community. The circular represented an

attempt at cultural change within the police service, by trying to draw senior managers

attention for the need for staff to develop a genuine belief in equal opportunities, even

though considerable evidence existed that suggested practice was far removed from this

belief. The circular also recommended training, and monitoring, but, other than this,

there was little specific guidance on how to achieve what amounted to a major change in

police occupational culture. Also, an example of a three-stage grievance procedure was

provided as appendices to the main body of the text, but with little or no explanation as

to the purpose of the procedure.

In 1993 a second Home Office Circular, No 16/1993 [175] recommended broadening

the scope and structure of grievance procedures; this should be seen in the light of the

report issued at a similar time by HMIC. The HMIC commented (1993):

> *"The majority of forces inspected have had few or, in
> some cases no grievances recorded. Not requiring formal
> recording at the first stage of the grievance procedure
> may have been important to establish informality.*

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[174]   Home Office, *Ibid.*, para. 3., 1989.
[175]   Home Office, Circular No. 16/1993 entitled *'Guidance on the Operation of Grievance Procedures'*, 1993.

> *However, not recording at the first stage results in lack of management information about issues which may be persistently occurring throughout the force.*"[176]

Research carried out by Brown *et.al.* (1993)[177] showed that 53% of forces responding stated that at the time of enquiry their grievance procedure had not been used at all. Thirty per cent of forces had between one and four grievances recorded and only three forces had ten or more reported grievances. These figures were taken from only 23 of the possible 43 forces that could have responded, so the actual situation may be far worse. This growing body of evidence showed that all was not well with the operation of grievance procedures in the police service and, in reality, little had really changed.

Home Office circular No.16/1993 provided a far more detailed approach to the grievance procedure and widened its scope to include police and civilian staff. Home Office circular No. 87/1989 had restricted the grievance procedure to police officers, although many forces already had in place a separate grievance procedure for civilian staff under local authority schemes. The circular (16/1993) also tried to clarify the scope of the grievance procedure to included, 'other cases of unfair treatment', as well as those areas covered by legislation i.e. Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts. The circular also expands upon the purpose of the procedure; para 5 is reproduced below:

> *"Effective grievance procedures are essential for the delivery of equal opportunities policies. They provide a means of ensuring that individual members of staff who feel aggrieved about the way they have been treated, either by management or by their colleagues, are given every opportunity to have their grievance resolved in a fair and just manner".*

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[176] Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, *Op.Cit.*, para 2.52, 1993.
[177] Brown J., Anderson R., and Campbell E., *Op.Cit.*, p 43, 1993.

Whilst the grievance procedure suggested in the circular was much broader in scope, it still did not link the effectiveness of grievance procedures with organisational performance and, more importantly, did not recognise the grievance procedure as a mechanism for change. The overwhelming impression was still that grievance procedures were for the benefit of the individual and minorities in particular. They were not marketed as a fundamental management tool to bring about cultural change and improve organisational performance. The circular did provide more advice on implementation and emphasised that the existence of a grievance procedure would not, by itself, encourage staff to bring grievances to the attention of line managers. It stated:

> "Forces need to ensure that all staff are aware of the grievance procedure, and have confidence in the willingness and ability of management to operate the grievance procedure".[178]

It gave advice on the need for training, and recommended that training for line managers might best be delivered in-force[179]. It also recognised that the effective implementation of grievance procedures will depend on the skill and knowledge of line managers. The pivotal role of line managers, which depending on who made the grievance, could of course be any rank from sergeant to deputy chief constable (or civilian equivalent) seems to have been made. However, it would appear few forces have provided specific training on grievances, and no advice was offered on the nature and scope of such training.

HMIC (1995)[180] performed a second thematic inspection of Equal Opportunities, they found that:

> "In some forces no-one whom HM Inspector met was prepared to use it, and there was a general lack of support

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[178]   Home Office Circular 16/1993, *Op.Cit.*, para. 7, 1993.
[179]   Home Office Circular 16/1993, *Op.Cit.*, para. 9, 1993.
[180]   HMIC, *Op.Cit.*, pp 49-52, 1996.

for it or confidence in its use. Many people felt they would be victimised if they raised a grievance and that no matter how good the policy, it would not help in resolving the issue it was designed to address. Junior staff often felt their line managers lacked understanding of or commitment to the procedure and would be unable to resolve issues, particularly those concerning racial or sexual discrimination harassment or bullying. "

This indicates that in over five years there had been little real progress in implementing the grievance procedure across the police service and staff generally lack confidence and, therefore, do not use the procedure. As Kinsley Lord (1994)[181] found in the Metropolitan Police:

"Staff, while sometimes driven to invoke it [Grievance Procedure] and reporting some cases of its being abused by those who want something they may not merit, have told us generally that they fear using it. "

Summary

The thesis so far has examined a number of areas of police occupational culture and has examined how the service manages change. It is clear that most significant change programmes have suffered severe difficulty in implementation because of a failure to change aspects of police culture. The introduction of a staff grievance procedure has proved to be no exception to this finding.

However, this chapter does suggest that one possible approach that could achieve the goal of successfully managing cultural change is to use police bureaucracy to change itself. An effective grievance procedure is, in essence, a bureaucratic system designed to bring about change. The critical element in this process is, of course, staff having faith in the procedure, for the procedure to work. This necessitates a major cultural change

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[181]   Kinsley Lord, *Op.Cit.,* para., 3.34, 1994.

taking place in the police service and achieving this is the subject of the case-study

analysis of the Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project'.

The next chapter then builds on many of these issues by examining exactly what

an organisation is and the role culture plays in organisational development and change.

CHAPTER FIVE

WHAT IS AN ORGANISATION?

All organisations have at least one function, or more likely, a number of functions to perform, some of which may be complementary, some of which may be competing. In addition to performing functions, organisations have other reasons for their existence. Mullins (1993)[182] argues that the goals of an organisation are the reason for its existence and for its operations. The goals of an organisation largely dictate its activities and in so doing affect the nature of inputs into the organisation and outputs from the organisation. A goal may be conceptualised as some future state; it is what the organisation is striving to achieve. This description of an organisation is, of course, over simplified because many organisations, particularly in the public sector, have many diverse and competing goals. For example, the police may strive to stay within a budget, but then experience a number of major crimes which force difficult decisions to be made. Does the force stay within budget or fully investigate the crimes? The clarification of an organisation's purpose and future intentions is clearly important for its success. This may seem an easy exercise, indeed if it was limited to simply rewriting the official goals it would be, but making them happen in reality is often far more difficult. This brings us back to the question of what is an organisation?

Organisations are often perceived as innate entities, but this denies the fact that goals only have meaning in the minds of people, as Mullins (1993) argues:

"Strictly, organisations have no goals, only people do".

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[182]   Mullins, L.. J., *Management and Organisational Behaviour*, Pitman, London, pp 272-300, 1993.

This is an extremely important statement because the conceptualisation of what an organisation actually is and is not is vital, in my submission, because it fundamentally affects the approach taken when embarking upon a programme of change. An organisation may be seen to consist of, for example, goals, policies, structures, systems and physical entities, but who sets the goals, who endeavours to achieve them or does not try to achieve them? The answer is people. An organisation exists only in the minds of people; how they perceive that organisation or part of it will largely determine how they react to it.

Employees, as well as directing their efforts towards the achievement of formal goals, also operate many informal goals that can be very different to those espoused by the organisation, and this can include the most senior managers. An example of this in the police service can arguably be found in the field of equal opportunities. The service has been obliged to introduce equal opportunity polices with the goal of providing equality of opportunity for employees and the public alike. However, research (e.g. HMIC 1993[183], Westmarland 1994[184], HMIC 1996[185]) has shown that some managers, even at the highest levels, have been far from committed to the achievement of those goals. Two very different worlds begin to emerge-that of reality and that which is espoused by the organisation. This difference between espoused-goals (formal - rhetoric) and the goals-in-use (reality) demonstrate the complex nature of organisational culture and, therefore, the management of change. To compound this situation even further, staff will also have many other informal goals that have nothing to do with the organisation's goals. For example, promotion, increased status, desire for higher wages, pursuit of training for individual benefit rather than the organisation's, and the pursuit of personal

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[183]   HMIC, *Op.Cit., Equal Opportunities in the Police*, 1993.
[184]   Westmarland L., *Op.Cit.*, 1994.
[185]   HMIC, *Op.Cit.*, 1996.

relationships. In many ways, then, an organisation can be seen to be a small cross section of society, in fact I would argue, in reality an organisation is a society. If an organisation is a society, then it may well be a society with additional goals that are espoused by the organisation, but this should not stop it from being conceptualised as a society. Indeed I would suggest it would be a pointless exercise in trying to conceptualise it differently, a view shared by Silverman (1984)[186]. By this definition, then, an organisation is a society that operates formal espoused organisational goals, informal organisational goals and goals that are informal and personal to individuals within that organisation.

Any attempt at organisational development, whether that be major change or more routine development must, in my submission, take account and develop strategies to address these issues if it has any hope of success, as Mullins (1993) states:

> *"An organisation will be more effective when personal*
> *goals are compatible with organisational goals".*

Here we see the first indication of one of the major difficulties experienced in organisational change. An organisation's survival may very well depend upon its ability to adapt and change to the demands of its external environment. However, if individuals do not perceive the change to be in their best personal interest a major resistant factor becomes apparent. For example, let us assume that most people have managed to move to a job within the organisation that they are reasonably competent and happy with, at least for the time being; their lack of motivation to change may well become an enormous barrier that is highly resistant to change. Many organisations simply dismiss employees who openly display hostility to the change, but resistance can manifest itself in many other ways, therefore changing how employees perceive and react to the change may

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[186]   Silverman, D., 'Going Private', *Sociology*, 18, (1984), pp 191-204; reprinted in D. S. Pugh (ed.), *Organisational Theory*, Penguin, 1990.

well be critical to its success. In fact a state of 'cultural dissonance' I would suggest is almost inevitable when an organisation embarks upon change that affects people's day-to-day lives. This state of unease and turmoil creates a powerful force which manifests itself in individuals as a desire to return to a state of normality, or how it used to be. People and culture are central in conceptualising what an organisation is. This may seem obvious, but I would suggest that many people perceive an organisation to be something very different. Evidence of this is contained in the previous chapter in the discussion about the militaristic-bureaucratic structure of the police.

Lord Sieff (1991[187]), former chairman of Marks and Spencer, considers the most important issue for a successful organisation is a policy of good human relations with all concerned with and in the operation - employees, customers and suppliers. Lord Sieff makes the point very clearly:

> *"Everybody who reads this book will have seen how much attention I attach to all management, from the top downwards, implementing a policy of good human relations at work and of business responsibility to the community".*

The emphasis is heavily on good employee relations and this is echoed by other particularly successful business people, such as Antia Roddick, of the Body Shop. Indeed Peters and Waterman's (1982) seminal work, *'In Search of Excellence'* emphasises the importance of culture in successful companies. This theme will be explored in greater depth later, but a growing consensus does appear to be suggesting that an organisation is a culture; a society, with a socially constructed reality.

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[187]   Sieff, M. Lord Sieff of Brimpton), *Management The Marks and Spencer Way*, Fontana Collins, 1991.

Objectives, Policy and Strategy

Objectives form a layer below organisational goals and are more specific in nature. A number of objectives may exist to achieve an overall organisational goal. Policies within an organisation contain a framework and provide guidelines to form the basis of espoused decision making within the organisation. For example, a policy may exist only to recruit people with 5 or more GCSEs, the objective being to recruit better qualified staff and the overall goal being to provide the highest quality of service to the 'customer'. It is within the organisation's strategy that objectives and policy are made to achieve the organisation's goals, espoused or otherwise. Mullins (1993) argues that some form of corporate strategy or planning is necessary for all organisations, particularly large organisations within the public sector. A strategy is also necessary if people are to work together to achieve the benefits of mutual reinforcement, which will help to reduce individual fear and anxiety.

Secondly, a strategy is necessary to deal with the effects of changing environmental conditions by helping to provide a perception of order and rationality to the process of organisation development. An organisation is surrounded by a constant state of change; even if the goals are being achieved, the organisation's environment is almost certainly evolving and changing. This process affects people within the organisation even if it is at the informal level. Organisations are, therefore, fluid, goals do not really exist, they are merely a measure of a process; this process is change. Everyday people reconstruct reality in some way. They come to work, they speak to people, they complete paperwork, they make decisions, the process is fluid, it is not static. But within this change is a pattern of repetition, a pattern of habit, a knowledge of what people are familiar and comfortable with. This familiar pattern helps to reduce fear and anxiety and

is, therefore, sustained by those within the organisation. To enter into the world of perceived change is to enter a world of anxiety, fear and tension, because even though the reality of social interaction at work is constant change, people within the organisation are unaware of it; when they become aware they fear it. Even when things are changing people perceive them to be the same. Therefore it is not change that causes fear, but people's awareness of that anticipated change that causes potential fear, particularly the pace and direction of that change. Strategy helps to provide individuals with security by providing a framework to explain how changes are to progress. But the reality may be very different. This section again emphasises the importance of people and emotions when trying to understand what an organisation is and how it changes.

Structure of an Organisation

As I have already explained, an organisation is a social system and people within that system will form their own relationships and, in a sense, their own structure within a structure. Nevertheless, an organisation's structure will almost certainly have an impact upon personal relationships within an organisation. Drucker (1989)[188] argues that it is the correct design of structure which is of most importance in determining organisational performance. I agree with this point, but only in so far as understanding that structure is merely a part of the organisation's culture.

Organisations may be defined in many different ways; for example private and public sector would be one way of defining an organisation, but this would tell us very little about the structure of the organisation. Mintzberg (1991)[189] defines five types of organisations:

[188]   Drucker, P. F. *The Practice of Management*, Heinemann Professional, 1989.
[189]   Mintzberg, H., 'The Structuring of Organisations', in Mintzberg, H, and Quinn, J. B. (Eds.), *The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, Cases*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey,

1. *Simple structure*. This is a structure in which the entrepreneurial style of management is usually found. In a *simple structure* power and authority gravitate to the centre, because there is little or no techno-structure, few support staff, minimal differentiation between departments, and a very small hierarchy. This structure is personified by the typical owner-manager, or may even exist in a small department or squad.

2. *Machine bureaucracy*. This works according to rules and regulations established by the centre of the organisation, for example, the police or prison services. In such an organisation, control is almost an obsession, centralisation is high but power is divided to some degree between the 'strategic apex' and the techno-structure manifested as departments.

3. *Professional bureaucracy*. This is a bureaucratic organisation but not centralised, for example, universities and medicine. This kind of structure is guided by its operating core towards professional autonomy. It is dominated by highly-trained professional specialists, employed because their work is too specialised to engage others without prolonged training. A professional bureaucracy is normally broken up into specialisms, where staff are already largely trained to perform their role and are largely indoctrinated into the professional body. The machine bureaucracy is run by hierarchical authority, the professional bureaucracy by the power of expertise. A machine bureaucracy sets its own standards whilst the professional bureaucracy has a professional body to set its standards. This structure is very democratic but suffers from difficulties of co-ordination, corporacy and knowing where jurisdiction begins and ends.

4. *Divisional structures*. This is a structure where responsibility is devolved to divisions, with overall goals, objectives and policy defined largely by the centre. This can be seen as a devolved version of the machine bureaucracy. There may be a number of divisions that

1991.

are almost autonomous, but still controlled ultimately by the centre. A common failing here is the over interference of the centre in operational performance.

5. *The adhocracy*. This is a structure which is highly organic. It is represented by organisations with few formal structures, rules and procedures, for example management consultants, or young research-organisations in computer software. The adhocracy is not seeking the repetitive use of professional knowledge and skills, but is at the forefront of constant change.

The bureaucratic organisation, as previously argued in chapter two, is associated most closely with the police service. Weber (1930)[190], stated that a bureaucratic organisation is technically the most efficient form of organisation possible. He argues:

> *"Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files,*
> *continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination,*
> *reduction of friction and of material and personal costs -*
> *these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly*
> *bureaucratic administration"*[191].

Weber uses the machine as an analogy, and this is understandable when consideration is given to the time of writing (beginning of the 20th century). A bureaucracy represents a depersonalised form, where structures, systems and procedures should operate almost devoid of human form. A clear hierarchy exists within the organisation, with authority depending on the position or office held. This view of an organisation is diametrically opposed to that espoused earlier in this chapter where an organisation is seen as a society that is fluid and highly personalised. In studying this dichotomy and other aspects of organisations, the Aston Group introduced a multi-disciplined approach, drawing upon

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[190]   Weber, M. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Allen and Unwin, 1930.
[191]   Pugh, D. H. and Hickson D. J., *Writers on Organisations*, Penguin, pp 5-8 ,1989.

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psychology, sociology, economics and politics. They tried to arrive at dimensions by which organisations could be understood and compared. As Pugh and Hickson (1989)[192] explain:

> "At its simplest, the Aston Group isolated two primary elements of any organisation, how far the activities of its personnel are structured and how far its decision-making authority is concentrated at the top, which between them sum-up much of what an organisation is like."

This definition, whilst useful, does not really help to clarify the dichotomy, for whilst an organisation may appear to be very closely controlled we have seen in other chapters how much of organisational life can exist outside this 'officially controlled world'. But within this definition the police service seems to be both highly structured in terms of activities and has a high concentration of authority at the top. Although it should be said serious attempts are being made to reduce this by delayering management layers and placing more responsibility at lower levels of management.

The Police Service as an Organisation

The police service, when established, faced considerable opposition and a key requirement was to:

> "Assuage the fears of those who felt that a full-time police force would provide a powerful weapon in the hands of dominant political and economic groups seeking to entrench a 'specific order' tied to their own particular interests", Walker (1994)[193].

To achieve this goal the military-bureaucratic model provided the appearance of order and control which were thought necessary to prevent things going, 'too far'. In this respect, the development of the military-bureaucratic model for the police service was

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[192]   Pugh, D. H. and Hickson D. J., *Ibid.*, pp 9- 15, 1989.
[193]   Walker, N., *Op.Cit.*, p 34, 1994.

probably the most appropriate organisational model available. However, as we have seen this concept is based upon the myth that 'bureaucracy and structure' equals 'control and order'. Within western culture this is synonymous with 'efficiency and achievement' and when viewed from an historical perspective this is quite understandable. From the days of the Roman Empire, the military-bureaucractic model has been seen to succeed and achieve dominance and order. This model could be said to be responsible for the development and dominance of the British Empire, where it could be argued control and order was bought to many disorganised and rebellious nations. This is obviously a highly contentious and emotive argument, but does provide some rationale as to why the belief in the military-bureaucratic model was so dominant for so long, particularly in the police service. As Walker (1994) explains:

> "Transposed onto the policing domain, the adoption of the
> bureaucratic template conveyed the message that the
> police organisation represented a disciplined, impartial
> body of men, a rational machine for the establishment of
> 'general order".

The only other organisation the police could have based itself upon at this time was the Church. It was not until the 20th century that organisational theorists began to question and challenge these models of how organisations are structured. However, the durability of the military-bureaucratic model has meant that the police service has largely continued to follow this approach. This model of an organisation offers inherent strengths; for example, it is easy to visualise and explain, but there are fundamental problems with this approach. It looks reassuringly logical and sensible, splitting the organisation into functional parts and arranging those parts in a hierarchy. In essence, though, it is a reductionist device and views the whole as the sum of the parts. Whilst this approach provides an easy-to-understand view of an organisation it over simplifies the reality of

organisational life. For example, splitting an organisation into functional parts, separately controlled can be the first step of building a separatist culture and then the 'them and us' battles begin. The first problem with this type of organisation may well be that of true integration, and turning rhetoric into reality.

A different approach may be charting how people behave, as opposed to their function in the organisation; this may well display a different picture of the organisation. Most organisational charts only show their organisation in respect of internal characteristic's, normally functional responsibilities. This can be referred to as a closed system and shows the organisation in terms of inputs and outputs. However, as Ward (1994)[194] argues, a closed system of an organisation appears very simple, it appears rational, and highly useful, but it is also utterly inadequate. He argues that it is inadequate because the workings of a modern organisation are not self-contained. They are not sealed, but rather interact with the outside world. This is particularly true for the police service which may appear to be isolated from society, but in reality interacts closely with society at its roughest edge. This does not mean to say that the police service has to respond to every external influence. It does mean it has to monitor its internal culture and constantly change to stay in touch with the society it serves, in essence it must change to stay the same. Additionally, on occasions the external factors can be so massive that they render the closed system approach useless. An 'open system' approach seems more suitable where environmental influences are taken into account and the organisation responds accordingly. Sometimes these changes can be minor, on other occasions they may be significant. However, I would argue that an 'open system' approach is almost impossible for any bureaucracy to achieve. The main purpose of a bureaucracy is to

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[194]   Ward, M., *Op.Cit.*, p 11, 1994.

maintain control and eliminate the possibility of external factors affecting the 'efficient' operation of the organisation, not responding and reacting quickly to major change.

Culture within an organisation acts as a mechanism within a bureaucracy to maintain the *status-quo*, but on occasions external environmental factors necessitate change. Here we have a dichotomy between effectiveness and comfort. Systems are necessary within an organisation, even of moderate size. Without systems, chaos would result. Systems bring bureaucracy and reinforce culture, culture reinforces systems. To bring about change in order to react to environmental pressures it may be necessary to alter systems, for example, how a complaint is dealt with from a member of the public. Changing written systems and procedures will have some effect, but whether it will bring about meaningful change, is open to question, why? Culture is the system of the mind, unless this is changed in-line with the written system, change will probably not occur.

In order to respond to environmental pressures, an organisation may commence a programme of change. An example, which this thesis will focus upon, is the implementation of a grievance procedure within a particular police force. Changing systems and procedures, or structures within an organisation, without changing the culture will probably result in a 'cultural lag.' In other words, structures, systems and procedures change, but what people actually do and think does not change. Little real change takes place because people find ways of circumventing the intended changes. This leads us to question whether there is a way out of this dilemma.

Summary - Towards a New Concept of an Organisation

Research in organisational change has traditionally focused on the 'subject -
object' relationship. In other words, it has looked upon the organisation as an 'object'
with structures, systems, management and the person as the 'subject'. This has allowed
an 'illusion of manageability' to develop because those engaged in research into
organisations and the work environment largely approached it from this perspective.
Silverman (1984) considers this has occurred because most studies into organisations
begin from a management perspective. They focus on 'systems-theory' and deny the view
that organisations are products of action and interactions of people motivated to pursue
their own purposes, which their own value system dictates as important. As Pugh and
Hicks (1989) argue:

> "Organisations are systems of interdependent human
> beings. Although this has been recognised implicitly by
> [most] writers and explicitly by some, their main concern
> has been with the 'formal system' - its aims, the principles
> on which it should be constituted to achieve them, and the
> methods by which it should function. People have been
> considered as a special resource, ... but people are a
> rather special resource. They not only work for the
> organisation - they are the organisation"[195].

The importance of this statement for the study of management and organisations is
immense. The areas of knowledge and understanding necessary to manage organisations
effectively immediately become, education, psychology, sociology, anthropology, as well
as the more traditional areas of management. In managing an organisation, and in
particular, change within an organisation, the emphasis should now firmly move to a
'subject-subject' perspective. This approach is one that sees reality constructed as a
process of mutual creation by people and between people. Where organisations and
people exist, a recognition that they both exist for and within each other. This should not

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[195]   Pugh, D. H. and Hickson D. J., *Op.Cit.*, p151, 1989

be confused with a simple 'input-output' model of relationships. The importance of this implication for understanding organisational development and change, is the processual qualities that occur in the mutual creation of reality. The challenge now is to consider how change might be understood when the processes of reality construction are located in 'subject-subject' relationships, which, in turn are understood as relations of mutual construction of reality. These then are issues contained in the culture of an organisation and it is to that subject that I now turn, both in terms of definition and the effect culture has upon change.

CHAPTER SIX

CULTURE WITHIN AN ORGANISATION .

Culture in an organisational setting has received growing attention from an increasing number of publications which suggest that corporate culture influences an organisation's performance (Sackman 1991)[196]. Research has also shown in a study of high performance companies in North America that paying attention to organisational culture is an important ingredient in achieving organisational success (Frost *et.al.*, 1985) [197]. As Peters and Waterman (1982) found:

> *"Without exception, the dominance of and coherence of culture proved to be an essential quality of the excellent companies. Moreover, the stronger the culture and the more it was directed towards the market place, the less need was there for policy manuals, organisation charts, or detailed procedures and rules. In these companies, people way down the line know what they are supposed to do".[198]*

This concept of an effective organisation should be compared against the highly bureaucratic, rule-based nature of the police service, as described in previous chapters. It would seem desirable to try to change the police service to a less bureaucratic organisation and attempts have been made to do just this, with varying degrees of success. However, writers on culture within organisations, such as Bate (1994),[199] have found that many organisations have embarked on change programmes with an inadequate understanding of culture, and specifically culture within their organisation. They assume there is a 'common sense' understanding of what culture means and, as such, this will do

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[196]   Sackman, S. A., *Cultural Knowledge in Organisations*, Exploring the Cultural Mind, p1, Sage 1991.
[197]   Frost, P. J. *et, al. Organisational Culture*, Sage, p 16, 1985.
[198]   Peters T. J. and Waterman R. H. *In Search of Excellence*, Harper and Row New York pp 75-76, 1982.
[199]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.*, 1994.

(Bate 1994)[200]. This is an interesting phenomena, as 'common sense' in itself can be seen as a product of a culture. Ward (1994) shares a similar view:

> *"Most change programmes fail before they ever begin.*
> *They fail because people conceptualise about them in an*
> *inappropriate manner. When it comes to change most*
> *people operate from a condition of pure ignorance"*[201]

If the same mistake is not to be repeated in exploring organisational change and culture in this dissertation, then the beginning of the chapter seems the most appropriate place to commence the process of defining what is meant by the term 'Culture'. Only then will I explore its relevance to an organisation and its effect on organisational change.

What is Culture?

There are a number of definitions that try to clarify what the term culture means and, perhaps, the most commonly understood in western society is an everyday term used to explain 'refinement of the mind'. This term is often used by the media to mean the arts, literature, opera and the theatre. Whilst this definition offers one explanation, it is very narrow and of little use when considering culture within an organisational setting. Anthropologists have provided a different approach to defining culture, probably the most famous definition being E.B. Taylor's explanation (1871):

> *"That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief,*
> *art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and*
> *habits acquired by man as a member of society"*.[202]

This definition begins to expand the concept of culture beyond the arts to include ways in which people think about issues, such as morals and beliefs. This definition of

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[200]   Bate P., *Ibid.*, 1994
[201]   Ward M., *Op.Cit.*, p 36, 1994.
[202]   Quoted in Leach, E. *'Social Anthropology'*, Fontana, Glasgow, pp 30-39, 1982.

culture has meaning for all of us, because we have all been exposed to environmental influences that affect our belief systems. The more commonly-used definition of culture restricts access to people who can afford to visit the opera or theatre etc. Culture is generally considered to be much broader in meaning and is something that affects everyone in society. For example, the generally-held belief that it is wrong to kill is something that nearly everyone subscribes to, but where has this belief come from? Kessing (1981), in his definition of culture, expands the ideational aspects of culture and begins to provide some clues as to the answer:

> *"Systems of shared ideas, systems of concepts and rules*
> *and meanings that underlie and are expressed in the ways*
> *that human beings live"*[203]

Culture as a guideline to behaviour

This explanation suggests that culture is more than a set of commonly-held ideas, but is also a set of guidelines, both explicit and implicit, which individuals have as members of a particular society. The society could include a nation, a small village, an organisation, or part of an organisation. The guidelines tell people within that society how to view the world, how to experience it emotionally and how to behave in relation to other people. Culture also provides them with a means of communicating these guidelines to others who understand the particular culture. Additionally, culture provides a means of passing on the guidelines to those joining the society, whether that be the next generation, or new employees joining an organisation, or a department within an organisation. To illustrate this point Helman (1984)[204] argues that, to some extent, culture can be seen as the:

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[203]   Kessing, R. M. *'Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective'* Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, pp 518, 1981.
[204]   Helman C. G. *'Culture Health and Illness'*, Butterworth and Heineman, pp 2-3, 1984.

> *"Inherited 'lens' through which the individual perceives and understands the world".*

These views correlate highly with Hofstede's (1991),[205] who argues that culture can be seen as the' *Software of the mind '.* Hofstede argues that culture forms the mental programmes on which people make decisions about their chosen course of action to events. He states that people can deviate from these programmes, but, nevertheless, they do indicate what reactions are likely and understandable, given one's past experiences.

Culture - The Software of the Mind

In examining organisational culture it is the '*Software of the mind'* that I shall concentrate on, because it is this area that seems the most appropriate to study when attempting to bring about organisational change. For example, the '*Software of the mind'* dictates what we understand as 'common sense', because 'common sense' comprises a set of assumptions and beliefs commonly held to be 'right'. In an organisational context these beliefs and assumptions have been passed from one generation of employees to another. They can form a blindness to new solutions to problems, ideas, explanations, or ways of doing things. Therefore, if we assume we have a good understanding of culture, based on 'common sense', we are probably using our personal understanding of culture, which will probably be far from adequate. Indeed, by making this assumption at the start of any change programme we are in danger of immediately falling into a cultural trap. If this is the case and Bate (1994) is correct in his observation, even at the beginning of a change programme the seeds of failure are being sown by assuming that an adequate understanding of culture is not necessary before attempting to bring about significant cultural change. As Bate (1994) argues:

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[205]   Hofstede, G. ' *Culture and Organisations* ', McGraw-Hill, London, pp 4-8, 1991.

> *"Common sense is one of the prime targets of the exercise [cultural change] because it is this which stands between people and change. It is the enemy of change; it discourages any kind of reflection, introspection or criticism, and above all it paralyses action."*[206]

Bate clearly sees the mental programmes of 'common sense' as a major obstacle to change, because the way they restrict critical analysis and form as Morgan (1986)[207] argues a *'Psychic Prison'*, or cognitive trap. This then forms the mental programs Hofstede (1991) refers to as the *'software of the mind'*. We would not expect a computer software programme to do something it was not designed to do without modification, or upgrading, yet in the organisational setting managers of change often expect their employees to do just that. Failure to understand the role the *'software of the mind'* plays in the organisational setting and the accompanying failure to modify these mental programmes is, in my view, the root cause of the failure of so many change programmes.

Researching Organisational Culture

One of the most prominent writers on organisational culture is Schein and he expands upon many of the above points, which become particularly important when researchers try to understand an organisation's culture prior to designing an intervention to change it. Schein (1991)[208] argues that there are three competing approaches in defining culture through research methodology:

1. The first approach he terms **'The Survey Research Approach'**. This approach emphasises the measurement and quantifying of culture through questionnaires. Schein

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[206]   Bate, P., *Op.Cit.,* p220, 1994.

[207]   Morgan, G. *Images of Organisation*, pp 199-203, Beverly Hills: Sage. 1986.

[208]   Schein, E. H, What is Culture, reproduced in '*Re-framing Organisational Culture*,' Ed, Frost, P. J., Sage, p 243, 1991.

(1991) argues that this approach, whilst giving the impression of being a deep conceptual

definition, actually reduces 'culture' to a surface *attitudinal concept.'* He considers that

this reduces the meaning of the term culture to the same as climate. He goes on to state

that questionnaires are unlikely to uncover the deep conceptual terrain that culture deals

with in human systems. This view is shared by Frost *et.al.* (1985)[209] he considers that

research designs and methods commonly used in studies of organisations (based on

questionnaire/survey techniques) have been largely inappropriate for the study of many of

the variables that show promise in exploring deeper meaning. This approach also

assumes that organisational cultures have common dimensions. Schein (1991) considers

that it is possible that cultures can be considered to be similar to personalities in that they

are at least partly unique and it is this uniqueness we should also study, rather than solely

concentrating on similarities.

2. **Analytical Descriptive Approach.** Schein (1991) considers that this approach also

dwells on the measurement of culture. The approach concentrates on dividing culture

into components and examining those components. The core stays largely untouched and

undefined whilst its visible components, such as rituals, rites, and stories, form the

prominent position. Schein (1991) argues that these are only the symbolic manifestations

of the deeper phenomena that Bate (1994)[210] terms *'Meta-Directions'*. By studying the

form it is possible to miss the substance that contains the true meaning behind the various

components of culture. Also, culture should be seen as consisting of more than its

component parts. How these parts interact with each other is equally important.

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[209]   Frost, P. J. *et, al., Op.Cit.,* pp 16, 1985.
[210]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.,* pp 199- 201,1994.

3. **The Ethnographic Approach.** This approach provides considerable descriptive detail of an organisation's culture, but Schein argues that this approach paradoxically leaves unexamined the conceptual and definitional problems of culture as applied to organisations.

In considering all three approaches, each has its advantages and disadvantages in bringing together a definition of culture. A series of questionnaires, over a period of time, can provide some information about an organisation's culture, even if only superficially. The results may help to show that culture implies stability even in the face of enormous pressure to change. They may also help to provide evidence of trends in staff's espoused opinions and beliefs. Schein (1991) states that ethnographers have identified the remarkable degree in which ideas, concepts and values are shared, even in quite undeveloped societies. When new members join a society they will almost inevitably accept some of those values and beliefs held by that society. Ethnographers have identified that culture pervades nearly all aspects of life. Measurement of cultures, even in a primitive way, makes it possible to identify similarities across different collectives.

Schein (1991) developed a model of culture from a number of different approaches and draws on anthropology, sociology and social psychology. He also considers it important to add a further dimension, the *'clinical perspective'*. He argues, and I agree, that you gain an invaluable perspective in defining culture when you attempt to change it. People are often only to willing to put forward their values and beliefs when they consider that something they hold dear may be endangered.

Schein's definition of culture

1. A pattern of shared basic assumptions.

2. Invented, discovered, or developed by a given group,

3. As it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and, internal integration,

4. that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and , therefore

5. is to be taught to new members of the group as the

6. correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.

Schein's definition sees culture as being a mental programme that short-cuts critical thinking to form basic assumptions. These assumptions come from past experiences in dealing with situations. Of course, a group of people exist for culture to exist and they must be capable of recognition in some way. Additionally, they must be stable enough to have some form of communication and some consensus about basic assumptions. If the consensus does not exist, at least to some degree, then the culture does not exist. The culture of the group will indicate how it has learned to solve its problems. This, in a sense, offers a way of understanding the history of an organisation because its culture represents what its past experiences have made it. Hofstede (1991), uses a definition of culture that is slightly different to Schein's.

Hofstede's definition of culture

1. Holistic; referring to a whole, which is more than the sum of its parts

2. Historically determined; reflecting the history of the organisation

3. Related to what anthropologists study; like rituals and symbols

4. Socially constructed; created and preserved by the group of people who together form the organisation

5. Seen as the soft part of management

6. Difficult to change; although authors disagree on how difficult

Hofstede concludes these points by further defining culture as the:

> *"Collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one organisation from another".*[211]

Whilst these definitions differ there are obviously many similarities. Hofstede agrees with Schein that culture is historically determined and forms a mental programme in individuals and between individuals. This mental programme, the *'software of the mind'* can be represented and observed in many ways, including metaphors, rituals and symbols. They both see culture within an organisational setting resting in the mental programmes people have and in the interaction between people. These mental programmes consist of values and beliefs which form assumptions about the world around them. Schein's definition, discussed above, identifies three levels of culture, and Bate (1994) considers this to have become the standard reference for defining culture. The three levels are as follows:

Surface Level - Artefacts, Creations and Attitudes: Symbols, rituals, myths, heroes, stories, legends, words, gestures, dress, appearance; the list could go on. Artefacts can change as fashion changes and this is why they are at the surface level of culture. Artefacts are visible, they can be organisational structures, procedures and even processes, although these are harder to define.

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[211]   Hofstede, G., *Op.Cit.*, p180, London, 1991.

Middle Level - Values: How things ought to be. For example, what reward system is in place; where are resources in the organisation. They can be the strategies, goals and the espoused justification for strategies or action.

Deepest Level - Basic Assumptions: These are unconscious and taken for granted. They are the ultimate source of values and action. Any social world consists of a collection of signs that are essentially devoid of all meaning until they are noticed and interpreted by members of the collective. Some of the meaning is given at the value level and others as basic assumptions, the signs provide a short-cut and prevent endless analysis of information. Whilst many of the assumptions may be valid, they can become outdated and no longer valid without members of the group realising. Examples of this phenomena can be seen in the training given to soldiers in the first world war. The training bore little relevance to modern warfare, focusing on drill and practice attacks on well-mown playing fields. It did not equip soldiers to deal with the reality they found.

Culture in a 'Socially Constructed World'

As previously argued, organisations can be considered social worlds and any attempt to change that world as a social intervention. Society is not a pre-given reality, consisting of social facts to which individuals are subject. The 'social constructionist' view, originating in the 'Chicago School,' emphasised instead the way in which individuals continually reinvent the social world around them. This social world is mediated by culture which, therefore, not only exists within people, but also between people. Culture is a world constructed on perception, myths and truths and supported by emotions. Truths used in this context are really, of course, beliefs which are created by

people and, to some extent, are fictions. To move from one culture to another is to change one set of beliefs for another.

The concept of strategy in this case, then, is really 'how it is done', whether it should be incremental, gradual, evolution or revolution, coercive or participative. In the case of the South African Police Service in 1995, cultural change was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number of police officers' suicides (184), which, perhaps, reinforces the comments in the opening paragraphs of this chapter concerning the immense impact cultural change can have on the lives of individuals.

A socially-constructed world will always consist of shape and form. This is made up by language, symbols, myths, beliefs and rituals, all embedded in structure. Intervention in this socially-constructed world may involve changing moral systems, common sense systems, belief systems, and collective assumptions. This list could obviously continue but it can be seen that cultural change is a very intangible and qualitative process and does not define culture as an object or thing. It involves a world of uncertainty, ambiguity and contradiction. It is the opposite of the 'keep it simple' school of thought, for this is a world of complexity where a simple solution will nearly always be the wrong one.

An organisation, of course, does not just have one culture, but rather consists of many interacting with each other. Many of these cultural structures are invisible, but are to be found throughout the organisation. They are the deep seated cultural systems that give the organisation its consistent form. Organisational change literature has largely concerned itself with a rationalist, reductive approach until comparatively recently. This,

in many ways, mirrored the behaviourist approach in psychology. It explained part of the picture, but left major areas unexplained. More recent approaches to organisational analysis have tried to be more expressive, not merely to explain an organisation in its instrumental, economic and material form, but also in its ideational and symbolic form. This approach offers a far more comprehensive perspective of organisational culture and differs fundamentally from the traditional rational, or 'scientific - re-engineering' approaches found in most organisations. An example of this is the typical line drawn plan of an organisation's structure, where different departments' responsibilities and functions are neatly divided into boxes. The reality, of course, is always very different with departmental responsibilities overlapping and duplicated. The 'keep it simple' school tries to provide the illusion of order and discipline and this is, of course, an example of a basic assumption operating.

Such is the complexity of culture within an organisation that design and representation should become an art form, symbolically trying to represent reality. Our ability to measure cultural components, such as values, beliefs, attitudes and assumptions is still very limited. These limitations make it difficult to define cultural phenomena, such as, 'Organisational Common Sense', which is the knowledge that guides and enables ordinary conduct in everyday life. Producing clearly-defined models of culture within the traditional scientific manner inevitably only serves to over simplify and mislead the reader. Culture can then be seen as a complex system of thoughts and within that system elements can be contradictory. Culture should always be considered in the plural, never the singular. It should become clear to the reader that trying to change the whole complex entity we call organisational culture at one time is a nonsense. As Bate (1994) argues:

"The idea of changing the whole organisation's culture must be abandoned. Such an ambition is both silly and misguided".

Three Perspectives on Culture

Sackman (1991)[212] proposes that three different approaches to culture have developed which incorporate some of the previous views. The different approaches have developed different perspectives on culture which, to some extent, depend on the discipline in which they originated. The *Holistic Perspective* draws on the work of anthropologists. They integrate cognitive, emotional, behavioural and artefactual aspects of culture into an all-encompassing whole. They see culture as being ways of thinking, feeling and reacting that are acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols. Sackman argues that the *Holistic Perspective* is widely accepted in management literature. This perspective appears to capture the multi-dimensional aspects of culture, but also makes research very difficult, because of its all-encompassing nature. Hofstede's definition of culture, described above, seems to rest predominantly in this area.

The *Variable Perspective* originates in the Cultural Materialistic, Functionalist, and Behavioural Sciences fields. It is largely concerned with behaviour, symbols, rituals language, myths and artefacts that are observable and quantifiable. Inference can also be drawn from self-reports. Culture is viewed as something an organisation has, it is a variable that can be controlled to achieve a certain outcome. This view certainly overlaps into the *Cognitive Perspective* because meaning and inferences are drawn from observable aspects of an organisation.

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[212]   Sackman, S. A., *Op.Cit.*, pp 18 - 31, 1991.

The *Cognitive Perspective* focuses on ideas, concepts, blueprints, values, and norms that are seen as the core of culture. These cognitions are sometimes referred to as 'Organisational Knowledge'. This perspective is concerned with culture as a something people learn, changing culture is, therefore, a learning process. This perspective largely incorporates Schein's approach to culture and has become the dominate view within managerial literature. Sackman (1991), defines this cognitive structural component of culture as:

> *"Sets of commonly held cognitions that are held with some*
> *emotional investment and integrated into a logical system*
> *or cognitive map that contains cognitions about*
> *descriptions, operations, prescriptions and causes. They*
> *are habitually used and influence perception, thinking,*
> *feeling and acting."* [213]

Cognitions become commonly held by the processes of social interaction (which in my view draws this perspective closer to the *Holistic Perspective* than Sackman argues). Some cognitions will have already formed prior to individuals joining the organisation, others will develop within the organisation. As they develop and are seen to succeed and be relevant to the needs of the individual, through repeated application emotions become attached to them; with emotions come degrees of importance. These cognitions are commonly held and relatively stable over time. Cognitions provide the mechanism to classify and interpret phenomena and, according to the meaning assigned to them value. Cognitions are used by people to construct and understand reality. They are an interrelated network that forms a system that appears logical and correct to the holder. This is sometimes known as a 'cognitive map'[214]. Sackman (1991) argues that there are four structural components relevant to culture in an organisation. The first is a

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[213]   Sackman, S. A., *Ibid.*, p 34, 1991.
[214]   Toleman, E. C. Cognitive Maps in rats and man. *Psychological Review,* 5, 189-202. (1948).

descriptive category (what is), second causal-analytical attributions (how), thirdly causal-normative attributions (should) and lastly 'why'.

'**Dictionary Knowledge**' (descriptive), is used to describe the 'what is' category and highlights knowledge that is important within that particular cultural setting to describe something. For example, in the police context, being a good police officer, is probably interpreted as being someone who, 'arrests a lot of criminals', or 'gets stuck in, in public order situations'.

'**Directory Knowledge**' (causal-analytical attributions) (e.g. how). This describes causal relationships to operational aspects of events, practices and processes. It defines how people interact 'properly' within a given environment. Within the police context this could define managers' 'proper' behaviour. For example, people do not just walk into a ACPO officer's office without having made an appointment with his/her secretary first.

'**Recipe Knowledge**' (causal-normative attribution). This is cause and effect relationships of hypothetical events (what should happen). They are concerned with what should and should not be done when one is faced with specific events. It forms the recommendation based upon past collective experiences. For example, to get promoted in the police service one 'doesn't rock the boat', or one 'doesn't make a grievance'.

'**Axiomatic Knowledge**' provides the final cause as to 'why' something happened or not. They are *a priori* and their existence is based upon fundamental beliefs and assumptions. They form the reasoning for specific actions in promoting certain people, structuring the organisation in a certain way or choosing a certain strategy.

A cultural knowledge map, developed by Sackman (1991), is shown below:

Table 3.1 The Cultural Knowledge Map: Definitions and Characteristics of the Different Kinds of Cultural Knowledge

KINDS of Cultural Knowledge	COGNITIVE COMPONENTS	CHARACTERISTIC QUESTION	MANIFESTATIONS
DICTIONARY KNOWLEDGE	descriptive categories	"what is" "that exists"	difinitions and labels of things and events
DIRECTORY KNOWLEDGE	causal-analytical attributions	"how are things done"	expectations about cause & effect relationships, descriptive theory of action
RECIPE KNOWLEDGE	causal-normative attribution	"should" "ought to"	cause & effect relationships of hypothetical events prescriptive theory of action
AXIOMATIC KNOWLEDGE	causes, assumptions/wants	"why things are done the way they are"	fundamental beliefs

CENTRALISM/ IMPORTANCE — high ... low

ACCUMULATION of Cultural Knowledge — time

Cultural cognitions and the maps that display them are relatively stable over time. They represent commonly-held beliefs of everyday behaviour that is constantly reinforced over time. Research has shown, (Weiner 1980)[215] that we tend to ignore single experiences that refute our cognitive cultural maps.

In considering the three perspectives put forward by Sackman I have concentrated on the *'Cognitive Perspective'* as this appears, in my view, to offer a richer source for developing an understanding of cultural change. Changing cultural cognitions would appear to offer the key to changing part of an organisation's culture. This is because organisations consist of people and whatever form of change is to take place it will involve changing in some way individual cognitions; change, then, is fundamentally a learning process. Clearly no single perspective provides an approach that is adequate to define culture totally and, perhaps, culture will finally be seen as an amalgam of all three approaches. To illustrate this point, simply changing cognitions, without changing rituals, symbols, structures, procedures or reward systems, will probably fail. The reason for this is that people will return to an environment that has not really changed and, as Piaget (1934)[216] argues, unless accommodation or assimilation occurs there is a innate desire for cognitions to revert to their previous form. Additionally, this reversal will possibly make future change initiatives all the more difficult.

Culture, something an organisation has, or is

If culture is so all-encapsulating and so fundamentally affects many areas of individual life and human interaction within an organisation, is culture something an

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[215]   Weiner, B. *Human Motivation,* New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980.
[216]   Piaget, J., *The Moral Judgement of the Child,* London, Routeledge and Kegan Paul., 1934.

organisation has, or is? Many writers on organisations view culture as a separate

component of change, this can be seen in the *Variable Perspective* described above.

Mckinsey puts this perspective forward in his 7-S framework model reproduced below

(quoted in Peters and Waterman, 1982 [218]):

McKinsey 7-S framework. (Reproduced by permission of Harper Collins)

At the core of the model is shared values, where structures, systems, style etc.,

surround the core. This is the traditional 'scientific rationalist' approach to culture; it is

something an organisation has and is seen as a component that cultural re-engineering

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[218]   Peters T. J. and Waterman R. H, *Op.Cit.*, 1982.

can change, as Deal and Kennedy (1982) [218] argue, a strong culture is a powerful lever for guiding behaviour.

An holistic or cognitive view of culture offers a very different perspective, rather than societies having a culture, societies are cultures. If this argument is true for societies why should it not be any less true for an organisation? Bate (1994)[219] clearly states culture is not something an organisation has, rather culture is something an organisation is. Schein (1983)[220] argues that the anthropological view is that culture is synonymous with organisation and this view is now shared by most academic writers.

We have seen that culture, using either Schein, or Hofstede's definition has an enormous impact on human activity within any organisation. The police service spends at least 80% of costs on staff. The organisation depends on people for its effectiveness; it achieves its purpose largely through people, the product it deals with is people. Surely culture must amount to the organisation, or an extremely large part of it? In such organisations this leaves us with an axiomatic finding that no conceptual difference should be made between a strategy for organisational change and a strategy for cultural change.

What is Culture: An Answer?

There are many different definitions of culture, Sackman (1991) has identified over 250 and they vary depending upon the discipline the author focuses upon. Psychologists tend to see culture as something that determines behaviour and even

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[218]   Deal T. E. and Kennedy A.A. Corporate Cultures. *The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life,* Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 1982.
[219]   Bate, P., *Op.Cit.,* p12, 1994.
[220]   Schein E. H. The role of the founder in creating organisational cultures. *Organisational Dynamics,* Summer, pp 13-29, 1983.

personality. Anthropologists search for meaning that underlies human creations and have tended to focus on small communities. They see culture as a 'monolithic entity' and have not tried to generalise concepts beyond this position. Managerial approaches have tended to draw from different disciplines, but their main interest in an organisational setting goes beyond description, understanding and explanation, to prediction and control (Sackman 1991).[221] The end goal for managers is to improve the effectiveness of the organisation.

However, some confusion seems to have occurred in the various approaches adopted in defining culture between 'what is culture' and 'how does culture manifest itself'. For example, culture may manifest itself in various symbols, but it is the interpretation that individuals place upon those symbols that provide meaning. This process of interpretation is a cognitive process based upon 'cultural knowledge' of a society. This process is normally unconscious and allows individuals to form implicit assumptions about the world around them. If we consider what is culture and how it manifests itself as separate questions, then this seems to restrict the definition of culture to a 'learnt mental programme', or as Hofstede (1991)[222] argues, and I agree, the *'software of the mind'*.

Manifestation of Culture

Sackman's (1991) description offers many aspects that include, in my view, the manifestation of culture within an organisation. However, this approach provides a powerful tool in which culture can be viewed and the process can help to identify when change is necessary. It can also help to conceptualise planned change and provide an

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[221]   Sackman, S. A., *Op.Cit.*, p 17, 1991.
[222]   Hofstede, G., *Op.Cit.*, p180, London, 1991.

invaluable tool to assist in evaluation. I have, therefore, reproduced below a brief

interpretation of this work:

Directory Knowledge:

(Descriptive information as to what exists)

* Goal and Accomplishments

* Strategy

* Structure

* Orientation towards organisational members

* Physical work environment

Here it is possible to consider the extent to which intentions have been realised. A

comparison can be made between what is thought to exist, or intended to exist compared

to what exists in reality. Sackman (1991) argues that views as to 'what exists' will vary

within the organisation. This is more likely to depend on function, rather than boundary.

She also found that similarities are greater between functional domains, than across

geographic divisions. In the police service this appears particularly true in the Criminal

Investigation Department, which appears to have closer cultural ties within the

department than across geographical divisions. Variations as to what exists will also be

experienced based upon position in an organisation's hierarchy and Sackman is critical of

previous research into organisations that have focused too heavily on culture from senior

management's perspective.

Dictionary Knowledge

(How things are done)

* The way tasks are accomplished

e.g. Autonomy, team effort, access to senior management

* The way people relate to each other

e.g. Titles, dress for occasion, first names

 * The way that knowledge is perpetuated

e.g. Training, mentoring, external or internal delivery

* The way change is accomplished

e.g. Evolution or revolution, Well tested and researched first, consultation or imposition.

Recipe Knowledge

(Should do)

* Acting v Talking about acting

* Time frame i.e. Faster or slower

* Approach to problem areas

* Approach to change

Axiomatic

(why and assumptions)

* Individual theories-in-use[223]

In this section I have explored what is meant by the term 'culture' and have

focused upon a definition revolving around mental programmes that individuals have

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[223]   Argyris, C. and Schon, D. A. *Organisational Learning II*, Addison Wesley, 1996.

acquired. I have considered how culture can manifest itself within an organisation, but before exploring if it is possible to change those mental programmes it would be useful to examine how they are acquired in the first instance. This, then, leads us to the focus of the next section, the origins of culture.

Origins of Culture

Hofstede (1991)[224] argues that culture is learned, not inherited. He considers that it derives from one's social environment, not from one's genes. He distinguishes human nature and an individual's personality and places culture firmly between the borders of both, although where the borders lays he acknowledges is open to question. Human nature, he argues, provides our basic needs, such as hunger, anger, fear, love, joy and sadness. These needs are universal across all cultures, but how we react to them, Hofstede argues, is largely defined by culture. Personality, he states, is the unique personal set of mental programmes we each possess. They are derived from learnt behaviour and genetically inherited. He defines learnt as:

> *"Modified by the influence of collective programming,*
> *culture and by unique personal experiences, personality"*
> [225]

Hofstede (1991) argues that scholars in the past have underestimated the impact of learning from previous generations in the creation of cultural differences and have exaggerated the role of genetic inheritance. This mistake has partly been responsible for many problems arising from cultural bias. For example, where people are perceived to be less intelligent, or able, because of their race, or gender, they have suffered prejudice because of an alleged inherited deficiency.

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[224]   Hofstede, G., *Op.Cit.*, p 3- 10, London, 1991.
[225]   Hofstede, G., *Op.Cit.*, pp 5-7, 1991.

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Learning plays a very important part in the acquisition of the mental programmes and largely dictates our reactions to the environment. We all carry certain patterns of thinking, feeling and potential for acting in certain ways, which were learned throughout our lifetime, but predominantly in early childhood. In early childhood we are at our most susceptible to learning and assimilating because of our dependence on others for survival and our lack of awareness of cultural restrictions.[226] The mental programme that comprises our attitudes, values and beliefs are learned within the social environment in which we grew up. The programming usually starts within the family and continues with the neighbourhood, school, media, peers and numerous other environmental influences.

Schein (1983)[227] considers that in an organisational setting, culture begins with the founder of the new group with some beliefs, values and assumptions about how to proceed and teaches those to new members through a range of different methods. If the group succeeds, then the values, beliefs and assumptions are taught to new members. The members of the group have only limited choice as to whether they initially accept the new values. He considers that culture always begins with thoughts that represent predictions about how things are (beliefs) and statements of how things ought to be (values). As beliefs are tested out and shown to work overtime, they become assumptions and then it is no longer a new belief and there is no need to test them. If this is a shared process, or at least vicariously shared, it becomes a shared set of assumptions by that group of people. Validation occurs both internally and externally. Externally by how well the task is completed and internally by reduction of emotions, such as fear, embarrassment and anxiety that are associated with meaningless and unpredictability.

Frost (1985)[228] argues that shared assumptions get their stability in part from the fact that

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[226]   Hofstede, G., *Op.Cit.*, p 4, 1991.
[227]   Schein E. H., *Op.Cit.*, pp 13-29, 1983.
[228]   Frost, P. *et.al.*, *Op.Cit.*, 1985.

they provide meaning structure and predictability to the members of the group. This can be seen in the police service in a number of change programmes. For example, Sector Policing (which requires a more community-orientated approach to policing) has been seen to fail because officers still continue to be action-orienated crime-fighters (Dixon and Stanko 1995)[229]. I would suggest the main reason for this is that they know this role and, by continuing to act in this way, it provides them with structure and meaning, thereby reducing emotions, such as embarrassment, anxiety and fear.

Learning beliefs, values, assumptions and attitudes can be seen as essential to the acquisition of culture. Values as previously stated are how things ought to be. Hofstede (1991)[230] considers values to be broad tendencies to prefer a certain state of affairs over another; he considers values to be the core of culture. They are amongst the first things children learn. Hofstede also argues that Development Psychologists believe that by the age of 10 years most children have their basic value system firmly in place and after that changes are difficult to make. He also argues that because they were acquired so early in life many values remain unconscious to those who hold them. If people are unaware of many of their values, it means they are not in a position to discuss them, or critically analyse what they have uncritically accepted in the past. It is impossible to observe someone's values, they can only be inferred from the way people behave in different situations. Note I have said how people behave, which is not necessarily the same as how they say they would behave, but more of this later. If learning provides the key to how culture originates, then surely it should also provide the key to changing culture.

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[229]   Dixon, B. and Stanko, B., *Op.Cit.*, pp 171 - 183, 1995.
[230]   Hofstede, G., *Op.Cit.*, pp 12- 26, 1991.

Summary

This chapter has discussed at some length what culture is within an organisational setting and how it can manifest itself in that setting. The concept of whether an organisation has a culture or whether it is a culture has also been discussed. The importance of culture to improving organisational effectiveness has also been demonstrated. The next section, then, will begin to explore the nature of the process of cultural change.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CULTURAL CHANGE

Ward (1994)[231] considers culture to be implicit assumptions in general and in particular the set of assumptions implicit in behaviour. He considers the power of culture is derived from its implicit nature and in order to change culture, the implicit must be made explicit. The emphasis he and others place on the implicit assumptions and the role they play in culture is of immense importance. It is because the assumptions are implicit and we are largely unaware of them that makes them so powerful and difficult to change. Nearly all commentators on culture see it as a cognitive process held by and between the members of a society. This, in essence, is a psychological and a sociological process. It must surely, therefore, follow that managers of change need a thorough understanding of culture, including aspects of psychology and sociology, such as learning processes, attitude and behavioural change before embarking upon any cultural change programme.

Restructuring

To bring about any significant change in an organisation will inevitably mean bringing about cultural change and, as Ward (1994) argues, *"most change initiatives fail"*[232]. Few organisations have not experienced some form of restructuring exercise during the last 10 years; restructuring has also been used as a method to reduce costs by reducing the number of people. Delayering management is a popular approach and one like many other organisations the police service is experiencing. Restructuring can provide the illusion of change without actually bringing about fundamental change in

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[231]   Ward, M., *Op.Cit.*, p 4, 1994.
[232]   Ward, M., *Ibid.*, pp 117, 1994.

behaviour in the organisation. The result can be a return to previous practices with little increase in performance. As Ward (1994) explains:

> *"Changing the structure will not automatically change the process i.e. what people actually do".*[233]

If management layers are reduced without preparing and supporting the remaining managers a gap will appear, the only real change will probably be fewer managers and less being done. Those who have remained may not change their role, only their title. This is a recipe for organisational disaster. The gaps left may be vital in determining organisational effectiveness. An example may be a reduction in various people issues, such as training, appraisal and welfare. Issues arising from this gap may well go undetected for sometime, but eventually will have disastrous results for an organisation. Restructuring may form part of a change programme, but will almost certainly achieve little of value by itself.

The more elements of an organisation that share the desired goals, the more likely desired change is to happen. If significant cultural change is to occur, every aspect of an organisation should work to the same goal. What makes cultural change distinctive from other areas is the stress it places on the multifaceted (structure, strategy and process) and multi-disclipinary (theorists, designers, strategists, developers) Bate (1994).[234] People-handling skills, training and personal development become the hard areas of organisational development; autocratic, aggressive leadership become the soft options. Successful change is very unlikely to result from one approach, it will probably be neither evolutionary nor revolutionary, planned nor unplanned, top-down nor bottom-up; it is

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[233] Ward, M., *Op.Cit.*, p 99, 1994.
[234] Bate, P., *Op.Cit.*, p 27, 1994.

possible to continue this list, but the point is made. Successful change will probably involve nearly all components in some way or another.

Cultural change means changing values, attitudes, beliefs and shared assumptions which are acquired through learning and socialisation. Holdaway and Baron (1993)[235] found in their recent research into the police service clear examples of a failure to address occupational culture when introducing change, with a result that little real change occurred. Indeed, they found that culture was very often all but ignored. If culture is such a complex issue with so much uncertainty and confusion surrounding it then the reader could be forgiven for asking the question why change it, why not leave well alone? The reason is, of course, that culture is a fundamental part of any organisation, if not the organisation, to ignore it when considering any change can clearly be seen to be disastrous. There are two fundamental issues to consider before answering the question of when to change culture, which the next section will explore.

When to Change Culture?

First Order Change: Conforming Strategy

The first answer to the question when to change culture can be found in the notion of 'Conforming Strategies'. The purpose behind this approach is to maintain and develop an existing culture. This may be seen as changing in order to stay the same and should be considered as cultural development, rather than cultural change. To stay in the same place, there is a need to continually change. Marks and Spencer seem to provide a good example of this, in order to maintain an image of high quality and a customer orientated approach to business, continual change is made, as society and customers'

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235   Holdaway S. and Barron A-M, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

tastes change. The continual introduction of new and exotic food lines is a case in point. The secret of success is to react continually to the market and keep very much in touch with customer wants and demands. Continuity and order are the primary goals of this strategy. However, this approach can make managers in these organisations cultural conservationists. It can have the effect of promoting imitators rather than innovators, copiers rather than creators and certainly not individuals who are prepared to challenge existing practices. A police-related example is given in the following case-study:

Case-study: Innovators and the South African Police Service

An officer in the South African Police was considered a rebel by management in the mid -1980s. He/she did not agree with many aspects of the apartheid regime and was prepared to challenge senior officers as far as his/her position allowed. As a result his/her position became increasingly difficult even to the extent that he/she was denied access to various sensitive materials and given menial tasks. His/her position became so untenable that he/she could not effectively carry out his/her job and the individual eventually left the organisation. Only following the elections in 1994 did the creation of an external environment exist that demanded radical change and the political power existed to bring it about. This person was then invited to return to the force in a very senior position. People who were prepared to confront and challenge were now in demand. The culture of the South African Police had been extremely effective at maintaining the status quo and did not generally promote those who did not match this profile. The result of this was an organisation that had become increasingly out of touch with the community it policed, and in many ways an increasingly ineffective organisation.

In organisations that strives to maintain cultural stability there will always be many vested interests and, therefore, always many espoused reasons why the organisation should not change. A state of 'cultural blindness' occurs and very often those internal to the organisation cannot see what is happening. In a sense it's like asking a goldfish in a bowl to see the water. Another example from the South African Police Service is given in the following case-study:

Case-study: South African Police Service, Training or Sport

Whilst trying to introduce major cultural change during 1995, the South African Police Service embarked on an extensive training programme. The programme was intended to greatly enhance the training of new recruits, particularly focusing upon issues of democracy and equality. This particular part of the programme was intended to train those responsible for implementation of the field training element. What became very noticeable immediately, to the outside observer, was the significant impact the accommodation and facilities had upon the training. The sports facilities at the police training centres were excellent, far better than any British Police training centre, but the classrooms were appalling. No heating, no cleaners, hard wooden seats, concrete floors and no equipment, such as television or video recorders. There appeared to be a seeming blindness by some senior managers to this problem, which was accompanied by indignation when it was pointed out. The contrast between the classroom and the opulence of their offices and sports facilities was immense. A combination of cultural blindness and personal vested interests had created the situation and was maintaining the *status quo*.

Control is also a major feature of conforming strategies, perhaps the very reason for their existence. This can manifest itself in many different ways, for example, by having a culture that precludes questioning and challenging one's treatment by management. This was the perception held by many staff in Cambridgeshire Constabulary prior to the implementation of a new grievance procedure and equal opportunity policy. It was even more prominent in the South African Police Service. Perrow (1972)[236] identified three levels of organisational control that act to maintain control:

1. Control which is expressed in direct orders.

2. Control operating indirectly through programmes and procedures.

3. Control exerted by operating on the ideological premises of action.

Cultural control operates largely at the third level. That is not to say the other levels do not affect culture, or are not part of culture, obviously they are, but the third level alters, or dictates, how people think and behave. This, in reality, is more mind control rather than behavioural control which would act on specific actions. Another example is provide by the South African Police Service in the following case-study:

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[236]   Perrow, C., *Complex Organisations. A Critical Essay.* Scott Foreman, Glenview Ill 1972.

Case-study: Morning Prayers

An example of ideological control was the practice of morning prayers, which were performed at the start of each day of a pilot course designed to train supervisors, as part of the new field training element of the change programme. Morning prayers were a tradition within police training in South Africa and were carried out in a large hall at the start of the day. The class consisted of 87 supervisors/managers of mixed rank, race and religion. The prayers were Christian, but interestingly know one declined to attend, or challenged why they were carried out, or whether they had to attend. The prayers, as a ritual, seem to have a powerful effect in reinforcing past practices and culture. No one asked if the students wanted the prayers, or what religion they should be held in, they simply went ahead as they always had done.

In the above case no one saw the opportunity that was presented by using this ritualistic process to help bring about change. This ritual could have been used to reinforce the change, for example, by asking students whether they wanted the prayers or performing the service in different religions on different days, to reflect the multi-cultural make-up of the class. The management of the training centre operated an unconscious process of control. This process of control has three basic facets, all of them found within cultural control strategies within an organisation, as Kirkbride (1983)[237] explains:

> *"Firstly, there is the dissemination of the values and norms favoured by the elite group; secondly there is the denial, refutation and ultimately censorship of beliefs, values and norms which threaten the position of the elite group; thirdly there is the attempt to define and limit the parameters of permissible and normal discussion of beliefs, values and norms."*

In the South African example this was not carried out with the conscious intention of mind control, at least not at the time of writing (June 1995), rather managers were either unaware or had not thought through the effect of their actions. A carefully-controlled organisational culture, similar to that found in the police service, may

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[237]   Kirkbride, P. S., *Power in the workplace. An investigation of the phenomena in industrial relations utilising data from an engineering company.* Unpublished Dissertation, University of Bath, 1983.

seem the ideal, a guaranteed way of achieving effectiveness and change; of course the

reality is nearly always different. Gabriel (1992) [238] argues:

> *"There is within every organisation a large un-colonised*
> *terrain, a terrain which is not and cannot be managed, in*
> *which people, both individually and in groups, engaged in*
> *all kinds of unsupervised spontaneous activity."*

This part of the organisation he refers to as the *"unmanaged organisation"*, it is the part

that will frequently destroy the most serious attempts at cultural change. It is often, as

Argyris and Schon (1996)[239] argue, the *'theory-in-use'*, as opposed to the

'espoused-theory'. It is the real values and beliefs that individuals possess, some they will

be aware of, some they will not. Their behaviour may be quite contradictory to what they

believe it is, or they may simply behave in a different manner in different situations. It is

known in the police service as 'canteen culture' and as Holdaway and Barron (1993)[240]

make clear, it is what police managers should be obsessed with. I suspect it is what all

managers in whatever organisation should be obsessed with. It is, I believe, the single

most important factor in bringing about significant and desired cultural change. Bate

(1994) considers that the defiance and resistance is particularly prevalent in 'total culture'

organisations. In short no matter how much power the senior management may have, the

informal systems will be able to repel most kinds of ideological invasion. Another

approach has to be found to the top-down behaviourist approach which solely operates

on individual actions and performance. This is not to say the top-down approach is

wrong, simply it is unlikely to succeed on its own.

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[238]   Gabriel Y., The Organisational dream world: workplace stories fantasies and
subjectivity. Paper presented to the 10th International Aston/UMIST Conference ,
Organisation and Control of the Labour Process, Aston University England, 1992.
[239]   Argyris, C. and Schon, D. A., *Op.Cit.*, 1996.
[240]   Holdaway S. and Barron A-M, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

This section commenced by considering the concept of conforming strategies often found in organisations that are concerned only with first order change. Eventually this kind of evolution will almost certainly be inadequate to maintain organisational effectiveness. The organisation's culture, as in the case of the South African Police Service, will gradually become more and more out of touch with environmental demands and a more radical form of change is required. This is the subject of the next section.

Second Order Change: Transforming Strategies

This approach provides the second answer to the question when to change culture? Second order change involves entering a process which is designed to move from one place to another. This is the more commonly understood approach to change and is more change than development. This approach was required when, for example, the South African Police Service wanted to change from a highly disciplined para-military style of policing, to a community-based police service, where policing is by consent.

It seems almost inevitable that organisations will adhere to one approach for too long, either developing culture, or constantly undertaking major change. This is particularly true of highly bureaucratic, hierarchical organisations, such as the police service, where their very structure makes change difficult. In many ways, the police service is designed not to change and is very effective in maintaining the *status-quo*. For example, having a rank system that only allows movement upwards, also having uniforms and insignia, which act as powerful visual reinforcements of position and differentiate between police and civilian staff. This type of organisation is almost certain to persist with conforming strategies long after society has demanded change, because it is fundamentally designed not to change. A situation may develop where the culture has

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become a liability and is actually acting to hold things back. This happened during the change programme in the South African Police Service, where decisions had to be constantly referred to the highest level and little actual empowerment had taken place. This slowed the change process, but gradually, following a training programme, some middle managers started to operate outside the normal channels, circumventing more traditional managers to achieve change. Individuals operating outside the normal structure and procedures is not really the answer, for where this has happened it indicates a situation where the inertial forces within the structure have weakened the organisation so seriously that it has impaired the organisation's capacity to adapt to the changing environmental factors. Further rearrangements of the different cultural components no longer offer a viable solution. Now it is the structure and form that has to change.

Cultural Blindness

In the South African Police Service's change programme there was a clear need for a fundamental culture change. The endless layers of management and constant necessity to pass every decision up the management hierarchy was no longer viable. Resources were required for more, better trained and highly-paid constables, not a multitude of management layers. The culture and structure had worn out, the reality they were designed to deal with no longer existed. This situation can actually exist for some considerable time before managers address the issue, sometimes they never do. Sir John Harvey-Jones (1989)[241] came across this affliction during his chairmanship of ICI. He called it *'collective blindness'*, a failure by management to see either a crisis, or an opportunity, even when it was staring them in the face. The result is that when a change

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[241]   Harvey-Jones J. *Make it happen. A reflection on leadership,* Fontana an Imprint of Harper Collins London. 1989.

programme is introduced, an idea which may have been conceived as a 'palace' frequently ends up as a 'tent', blown away on a wind of culture Bate (1994)[242].

As previously mentioned, Morgan (1986)[243] has compared the organisation to a *'psychic prison'*. Krefting and Frost (1985)[244] share the same idea in describing this phenomena as 'blinders'. They argue that 'organisational culture' is funnelled through the unconscious and differs from the espoused organisation. Viewing culture as being to a significant degree rooted in the unconscious leads to an emphasis on its deeper aspects, and the difficulty those who are part of that culture experience in accessing those hidden assumptions.

Vicious Circle Syndrome

The ultimate form of cultural blindness, the repeated application of the same old formulae, is known as *'vicious circle syndrome'*, which if intervention does not occur will lead to the ultimate destruction of the organisation. Very often the help of an outside consultant is necessary to rectify this problem because of its inherent nature. Changing an organisation's culture under these circumstances will nearly always be revolution, rather than evolution; a slight amendment will not do.

The identification of a potential vicious circle was made during the implementation of the new training programme in the South African Police Service. A fundamental problem had occurred where facilitators either did not exist, or were enthusiastic, but lacked the ability to deliver the necessary training. This was

[242]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.*, p 92, 1994.
[243]   Morgan, G. *Op.Cit.*, pp 199- 206, Beverly Hills: Sage. 1986.
[244]   Krefting, L and Frost, P. J., Untangling webs, surfing waves, and wildcatting: A multiple-metaphor perspective on managing organisational culture. In Frost, P. J. et al. (eds.), *Organisational Culture*, Beverley Hills: Sage. 1985.

compounded by a total lack of internal evaluation. Under these circumstances the organisation was almost certainly doomed to repeat the same mistakes, but have the illusion of success because no reliable feedback existed. The suggested solution which was not enacted at the time of writing was to run a one-off course to equip a small elite group of facilitators and evaluators to begin to train many others and eventually provide sufficient numbers of adequately-trained facilitators and evaluators. They would then be in a position to assist the South African Police Service in their change programme, thereby escaping the vicious circle. This particular vicious circle seems to have originated through the lack of a 'critical path analysis'. Had this technique been used in the design phase of the change programme, identifying the need to have adequately trained staff in place prior to implementation would have become easier to recognise.

Identification of vicious circles followed by the subsequent exploration of their causes is essential if management are to break into and control them, rather than vicious circles controlling the manager. This is the whole essence of the process of managing and bringing about cultural change. The point which Bate (1994) makes is heavily reinforced in the police context by Holdaway and Barron (1993)[245] who consider managers should be obsessed by police culture and engrossed in strategic implementation, rather than concerned only with strategic policy formulation.

Frequently organisations concern themselves with a series of restructuring exercises and fail to recognise the importance of culture or people. This syndrome, sometimes known as 'not another review', leaves people bemused and uncertain. They end up being unclear as to their role and what is expected of them. Not enough time or · effort is put into consolidation or development. To some extent, Cambridgeshire

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245   Holdaway S. and Baron A-M, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

Constabulary were experiencing this phenomena at the time of the 'Equality of Service Project' and the project team were very aware of this and developed strategies to deal with this situation when introducing what would inevitably been seen as yet another change.

This chapter has, so far, explored two different approaches to change. A number of factors will determine what type of change is required in the organisation's development cycle, revolution or evolution. Conservative cultures tend to focus power on inertia and have various devices to block change, such as the hierarchical rank system found in the police service. Theses cultures tend to find it easier to handle first order change (updating, improving, evolving etc.), rather than more fundamental second order change (a major movement from one culture to another). Second order change creates real problems because these type of organisations are designed not to change. Various systems and procedures, some contained in legislation, others in local systems act to block second order change. These procedures, combined with a set of assumptions about, 'the right way' to do things and 'what is important', act to restrain attempts severely at second order change. Before second order change can be successfully implemented, it will almost certainly be necessary to expose and address the underlying cultural components before attempts can be made at cultural change. Also, some types of organisations are more prone to major cultural problems, such as *vicious circle syndrome,* than others. Again, these tend to be strong conservative culture organisations that have successfully developed a slowly evolving culture. They have successfully developed this kind of culture without developing a strategy for the other. Least prone are the informal continually changing types of organisation. As Bate (1994)[246] argues:

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[246]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.*, p129, 1994.

"A strategy for cultural order and development without a strategy for change has built in obsolescence. "

Equally, a strategy for cultural change without strategy for development will never enjoy the benefit of change. The point is that both strategies are appropriate and both should be used at the right time and in the right way. A major problem would appear to be that most managers engaged in change, and this seems particularly true of the police service, have little comprehension of culture and its various components. Therefore many of the issues are never considered, let alone addressed during a period of change. This point was made in the previous chapter; there appears to be an assumption that knowledge of culture is unnecessary to achieve successful organisational change, an assumption I would suggest, is totally untrue. A key issue must be evaluating what type of change is required; this is the subject of the next section.

The Role of Evaluation in Achieving Change

The previous section discussed two major types of cultural change - first order change, which tends to be more gradual, and second order change, which involves a major change; a movement from one place to another. The vital decisions to be made by those involved in cultural change is to decide when to change and in which direction. Whether it should be first order change or second order change will depend on accurate assessment of the current situation. Managers have to base their decisions on the best information available and the reader should begin to realise that the quality of that information is critical, if the most appropriate change strategy is to be identified. Therefore, developing a mechanism to obtain this information, in a continuous ongoing, way becomes vital to the successful management of change. If this is not successfully achieved, the chances of carrying out effective organisational change may, in my

submission, be very limited. Managers can really only guess what is happening in their organisation; information is often anecdotal and decisions will inevitably be poorly informed. The gathering and analysis of this information should obviously be continuous, although at certain times this may be more intense than others. Change will probably fail unless basic assumptions are first identified, and if incongruent with the new culture, changed to achieve a best fit.

Questionnaires can be used to provide information about staff's attitudes, values and beliefs. However, this process is far from perfect; questionnaires by their very nature limit the information that can be obtained and may reduce culture to a review of climate and ignore more fundamental aspects, such as basic assumptions. A totally non-structured approach can be so wide-ranging to make analysis of data extremely difficult. An appropriate mixture of quantitative and qualitative research methods seem to offer the best solution. Ethnography can offer a particularly useful approach to identifying underlying assumptions (Hobbs and May 1993)[247]. Deciding the most appropriate methodology, balancing time restraints and resources against the depth of research and cost can become critical. A small organisation may have no choice, but to employ an outside consultant to perform this work. However, the cost of this can be prohibitive if the research is very wide ranging, in a large organisation, for example. The cost, in the case of the South African Police Service, which did not have an internal evaluation facility, for their training programme became prohibitive. The evaluation was carried out by researchers from four different universities. No organisation could sustain this level of financial commitment on a continuing basis, nevertheless evaluation is essential if first order, or second order, change is to be achieved. The only alternative

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[247]   Hobbs R., and May T., *Interpreting The Field, Accounts of Ethnography*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.

that is affordable and desirable is to employ people within the organisation to perform this role. A small group of internal 'evaluators' is critical, I believe, if managers are to have the information they need. That does not mean they should not employ outside consultants to advise on methodology and provide an external perspective, but this is far less expensive than employing consultants to perform the whole task. Internal evaluators can also have a greater insight into existing organisational culture, although this has to be balanced with the possibility of 'cultural blindness'. Introducing internal evaluators also has the advantage of identifying cultural systems, such as vicious circle syndrome, or maladaptive mentalities. As Bate (1994) argues:

> *"Every organisation will have its own unique set of 'ism's'*
> *that it will need to identify and address in its own unique*
> *way".*

The problem, of course, is identifying these processes that are often hidden under layers of manifesting symptoms. Here, properly-trained evaluators using appropriate methodology can provide an invaluable aid to organisational development with ongoing evaluation and monitoring. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to using internal evaluators is the tendency to 'shoot the messenger'. One way of reducing this problem is to make them directly accountable to the most senior manager.

Case-study: Evaluation and Police Training

An example of such a system being used during a cultural change programme was by the Central Planning and Training Unit (CPTU). The CPTU is an establishment responsible for the design of training, training of facilitators and the evaluation of training for the Police Service in England and Wales (excluding the Metropolitan Police), up to and including the rank of inspector. In 1986 the CPTU made a fundamental change in the training of police facilitators. The transition involved moving to a student-centred, participative style of training which was diametrically opposed to the previous traditional pedagogical style. This, of course, involved a much more fundamental change than just altering the teaching style in the classroom. The principles behind this style of learning involved a fundamental change in the culture that existed in all police training establishments.

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In traditional police training the culture at training centres was one where discipline was imposed on strict military lines. Hours were spent on drill, instructors stood at the front of class lecturing on law, and a rigid segregation policy (male and female accommodation) existed. Curfews were imposed so students had to be in their rooms by 11 p.m. and in some centres students even had to walk around the centre in step. The whole environment was one of conformity and imposed discipline. Students were, in essence, treated like children by a management regime determined to impose discipline. To change from this culture, to a culture that encouraged individuality and self-discipline, both of which are necessary for student-centred learning to exist, involved a major cultural change. This process was both difficult and protracted, lasting over an estimated five-year period. On many occasions, evaluations were carried out to assess aspects of culture within the training centres, such as equality of opportunity. The role of evaluators, who were attached to the CPTU, was to both monitor developments and carry out evaluations of specific areas. They provided reports of actual change, as opposed to espoused change and their independence from the training centres provided an essential element, to the change process. Their reports were largely qualitative in nature, offering in-depth analysis of many cultural issues and sometimes made in an extremely hostile environment. The reports, on occasions, were critical of management at training centres, but provided an invaluable lever in initiating and sustaining change.

The role of the evaluator, and within this title I include inspection and audit as methods of evaluation, is crucial at any time in an organisation's development. The term 'evaluation' comes from the field of education, where it has increasingly been seen as an integral part of the training cycle. Evaluation plays a key role in providing invaluable information, which acts to provide quality control and feedback for ongoing development. It does this by assessing the following:

1. The effectiveness of the methods being used.

2. The achievement of the objectives set by both facilitators and trainees.

3. Whether the needs originally identified, both at organisational and individual level have been met (Bramley 1991)[248].

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[248]   Bramley P. *Evaluating Training Effectiveness*, McGraw-Hill, p 89, 1991.

I would add to Bramley's list; 'The worth to the organisation of the aims and objectives originally identified'. It can be seen that, with very little adaptation, a very similar criteria could be used when analysing organisational change. For example:

1.1. The value to the organisation of the aims and objectives originally identified.

2.2. The effectiveness of the methods being used.

3.3. The achievement of the aims and objectives set by management.

4. Whether the needs originally identified, both at organisational and individual level, have been met.

Goldstein (1986)[249] defines evaluation as:

> *"The systematic collection of descriptive and judgmental information necessary to make effective decisions related to the selection, adoption value and modification of various.......', 'Change Strategies'"*.

I have substituted 'change strategies', for Goldstein's 'Instructional Techniques', but the purpose is still the same, only the end goal has changed. The term 'evaluation' provides an appropriate vehicle to supply managers of change with vital information during a change programme. This, as I have previously argued, is necessary to assess the success of the programme and indicate any necessary alterations in direction.

Whenever a change programme comes to an end, it is traditionally considered an opportune moment to evaluate its success; though this approach hardly helps to provide managers of change with the information they so desperately need during implementation. Indeed, Goodman and Dean (1982)[250] argue that pre-programme evaluation provides a vital role. They argue that there should be a focus on the factors

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[249]   Goldstein, I. L., *Training in Organisations,* 2nd Edition Brooks Cole 1986.
[250]   Goodman, P. S. and Dean J. W. 'Creating long-term organisational change' in Goodman Associates, *Change in Organisations,* Jossey Bass, California. 1982.

which affect the persistence of a new policy or procedure, which has been introduced as intended change. They feel that institutionalisation is a continuum which starts with knowledge of the change at one end, then goes through performance and preference, to reach incorporation into norms and values, at the other end. In order to evaluate where individuals and groups fall on this continuum, it is necessary to examine five processes:

1. **Socialisation** - the extent to which information is transmitted to organisational members about the required behaviours (including where their assumptions are at the present time and how they got there).

2. **Commitment** - whether people are accepting the change by personal choice or because of external constraints.

3. **Reward Allocation** - the extent to which rewards are related to desired behaviour.

4. **Diffusion** - the extent to which the new form is spreading to other parts of the organisation.

5. **Sensing and Calibration** - the extent to which feedback information, which can be used to take corrective action, is available.

Culture clearly interacts with these five processes and it is against these that we might be able to predict whether or not the change is likely to be accepted into organisational practices, procedures, norms and values. Evaluation is, therefore, an essential tool in any change programme, but it is also vital at any time in an

organisation's life. This point is emphasised because, as already discussed, identifying when to change is an important consideration in deciding how to change. This point is illustrated in the next section which examines cognitive aspects of change within an organisation.

Cognitive Aspects of Change

If an organisation has developed a culture, or a particular sub-culture, that in a sense is the opposite to the post-modernistic chaos, typified by ambiguity, constant change and fragmentation; if instead the organisation, or part of it, has developed a culture of order, where all uncertainty and ambiguity have been purged (where tranquillity, ethnocentrism, historical continuity, with strict adherence to routine, and a legitimising philosophy exist); this will fundamentally affect the cognitive, affective, social, intellectual and linguistic processes within which people operate. Where this culture operates, only first order change is likely to occur. An evaluator should be trained to identify and understand these cultural phenomena and report to management who should be in a position to react and intervene. [This approach to cultural change of constant evaluation and intervention was used by Cambridgeshire Constabulary during the Equality of Service Project. Discussion of the effects is included in a later chapter.]

Where this culture does exist it will fundamentally affect the way people think and behave in that organisation. Indeed it is the way people think. It reflects a lack of critical thinking, reflection and analysis of events. It shows a lack of skills in learning to think critically and is typical of, as Argyris and Schon (1978)[251] argue, *'Single loop-learning'* and undoubtedly presents a major barrier to any significant cultural

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[251]   Argyris, S. and Schon D. *Organisational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978.

change. Changing this fundamental mind-set should be the main task of any change

programme, although very often the symptoms of the phenomena are treated, rather than

the problem. An example of this can be found in the police service in a programme

designed to tackle racism.

Case-study: Race Relations Training and the Police

The training programme provided by the Home Office Specialist
Support Unit (SSU) has been running for the past six years (1989-95) and is
designed to tackle the problem of racism in the police service. The programme
has been designed to modify police officers behaviour. The programme is
delivered in different phases; Phase one, Awareness; Phase two, Knowledge;
Phase three, Skills; and finally phase four, Integration. There may be many
months, indeed years, between each phase. Information on different cultures is
passed particularly during phase two, and each phase is normally one day long.
However, most forces have not progressed beyond phase two, indeed some have
not yet commenced phase one. Phase three, at the time of writing, was not
available (October 1995). Some forces have delivered phases one and two
together over one day, other forces have delivered them separately. The problem
manifests itself as racism, racial discriminatory behaviour by some police
officers towards colleagues and members of the public. However, I would
suggest that this is only symptomatic of an underlying problem. The problem
manifesting itself as racism is a cultural issue revolving around a lack of critical
thinking skills and a culture that is typified by certainty in the knowledge that 'I'm
right.' (single-loop-learning)

The SSU's approach has been to try to change culture by tackling the
symptoms of the problem, racist behaviour, not the real problem. A lack of both
critical thinking skills and double-loop learning. The results of this approach
were commented on at a recent reconvention of police officers trained by the
SSU during the previous five years, and who have been working in this field for
nearly all of the last five years:

> " *The police service is only paying lip service .... I wonder if we're
> done anything at all, nobody's interested, it's become what we feared, flavour
> of the month ...... nothing has really changed.* "

Whilst this cannot be said to be a comprehensive review of the change programme

undertaken by the Home Office Specialist Support Unit, these views were typical of most people

present. This is an area that demands further research, but I suggest is an example of a change

programme that has focused on the symptoms of the problem, not the underlying cognitive issues

and has had predictable results. The issue of changing attitudes, values, beliefs and assumptions will be examined in more detail in the next chapter on individual change.

Many of the problems associated with the SSU's approach to change have been highlighted on many occasions, particularly the failure to address 'critical thinking skills' and 'double-loop learning', but there does not appear to have been any significant modification to the change programme. Bate (1994) is very critical of many organisations' approach to change. He argues that they are too inflexible:

> "*The criticism I would make of normal ways of implementing change is that on the whole they tend to be narrow and inflexible and to be framed with too little regard to the particular purpose for which they are required.*[252]"

This is almost bound to occur, unless there is an adequate mechanism to analyse what effect the changes that have been initiated are having. This is the strength that 'Action-Research' has; it builds in flexibility into the whole approach, but it does depend on having the appropriate knowledge and skills available to undertake the change.

The next section examines four different approaches to change and provides an example from manufacturing industry. This is followed by an examination of the specific areas that change should focus upon and is directly linked to the SSU's change programme.

Different Approaches to Change

There are four main approaches to change. Selecting the most appropriate approach should largely be determined by the organisation's current position in the

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[252]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.*, p 211, 1994.

cultural cycle, and the role of evaluation in determining this has been emphasised in previous sections.

Aggressive Approach

This approach is radical and confronting, it tends to be led by one person who most definitely is going to bring about fundamental change. This person tends to be dogmatic and single-minded, change is going to happen and they are going to make sure it does. The advantage of this approach is that it can be innovative, idealistic and deals in plain, simple messages. This approach will confront and discredit the sacred-cows of the organisation. This approach may be necessary at certain times to make things happen, but it does have the disadvantage of alienating people along the way. Eventually sub-cultures develop designed to subvert the change programme. If this approach was introduced following an intensive period of 'second order change' it may well receive a very hostile reception, so timing can be everything.

Conciliative Approach

This approach is more gentle and tries to be all things to all people. It is high on detail, but lacks a core idea. It involves a high level of participation and works on consensus, so is likely to be widely accepted throughout the organisation. This approach is also likely to achieve a high level of penetration, but to achieve this can be very time consuming. Time can be saved by running workshops (training), but to be successful this requires a high level of skill and understanding of adult learning by the facilitator. Having an open mind and a willingness to accommodate new views is a strength of this approach which makes it very flexible, and what has been painstakingly achieved people want to keep.

Corrosive Approach

This approach has no obvious guiding principle as the point is not to disclose your hand until necessary. This approach is secretive, other than high on marketing, although the marketing may well have hidden agendas. Self interest prevails and staff become very mistrusting. This means that penetration is low, except, of course, where staff are unaware of the changes being made. This approach also avoids structural changes that would increase the chances of discovery.

Re-socialisation Approach

This approach depends greatly on the type of training undertaken. If it is simply knowledge-based then its effects are likely to be extremely limited. The skill of the facilitator is paramount. Workshops where facilitators have received a minimum of training, for example, a one-week course are almost doomed to failure and may actually make the situation worse, rather than better. An example of this was found in a police force in the UK. The idea was to improve quality of service. Facilitators were given a one week training course and then sent off to facilitate one day workshops on 'quality of service'. The force had a number of facilitators who had completed an 11-week facilitators course, but these were not used. The result was workshops ended up, as one participant put it, *"as management bashing sessions, I walked out at lunch time"*. The consensus of many participants in that force was that the workshops had not achieved their goal.

Training is not a neutral process and, if carried out badly, can have negative consequences for the organisation; this initiative had the effect of making subsequent

change programmes harder to introduce and may have well made the situation worse, rather than better.

The re-socialisation approach specialises in communicating core messages and achieving commitment from participants. This is very much the domain of attitudinal and behavioural-based training. Where this approach is used with more traditional training, I consider, it can also provide those involved in change with the necessary knowledge and skills without which change will not occur. If the re-socialisation is undertaken across the organisation, then penetration will have the greatest chance of success. One of the greatest problems of this approach is durability, but I believe this can be addressed. [Establishing change in attitudes and beliefs will be the subject of much greater discussion later]. Unless the re-socialisation process is truly participative, interactive and reflective, people will not feel compelled to defend and maintain what they have helped to create.

Case-study: Manufacturing Industry

A UK manufacturing company tried to move to a 'team-based' approach to production. They reorganised themselves into teams and attempted gentle persuasion to bring about change, but found that production actual fell. Analysis of the situation identified that managers were, in reality, calling themselves facilitators, but in practice many were carrying on in their same role; their behaviour and underlying assumptions had not changed. Team management did not exist. It was decided to stop production altogether and undertake a short, but very intensive, re-socialisation programme. The production-line had not been stopped in nearly 40 years. To persuade the senior management to stop production was a difficult task. When the training had finished it became apparent that some managers would never make the transition, but the majority did. Production then started to increase, initially quite slowly, but then significantly increasing beyond the original production level. The manager specially brought in to manage this change programme commented:

"Sometimes there is only one way to cross a chasm and that's with a giant leap".

The above example illustrates the different approaches used to manage this change programme. Initially the conciliative approach was used to try to persuade staff to change their working methods and culture. Whilst this may have won some people round it did not produce change in the desired direction. Here evaluation of what was really happening indicated a much more fundamental change was necessary and indicated that managers simply did not have the desire or ability to facilitate a team working. The culture of the teams needed to alter to accommodate this change. To stop all production and provide training called for an aggressive stance to be made. The single-minded determination and belief of the change manager appears to have been the most appropriate approach at this time. Each approach was used at the correct time in the change process, and this highlights the need for flexibility and continuing evaluation.

In considering how to institute cultural change, I started off by arguing that it is essential for those engaged in the change process to have an adequate understanding of culture. If evaluation forms a further vital ingredient, then managers of change must surely have adequate knowledge and skills in this area. Without adequately-trained staff to undertake the change process, it is doubtful whether there can be any hope of success.

Focus of Cultural Change

Meta-Directions (Bate 1994)[253] exist at a cognitive level, they are the thoughts by which we construct our values, beliefs and attitudes towards the world; they are genuinely held. *Meta-Directions* should not be confused with policy statements, vision statements or mission statements, that many organisations issue. These can be *Meta-Directions*, but are likely to be rhetoric, rather than reality. Changing *Performance* (behaviour and action) will be far less impactive because the scale is much smaller. You

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[253]   Bate, P, *Op.Cit.*, p198-200, 1994.

may, for example, change the way a person answers the telephone, their words may change, but changing the culture to one where customers are truly valued will affect every interaction staff have with customers. This is obviously much more difficult and an organisation may settle for a first order change, maintaining the existing culture and slightly altering certain aspects of *Performance*. A second order change would involve a fundamental change in culture. This may be necessary, but would depend on the state of the organisation's existing culture and other environmental factors.

Peckham (1976)[254] considers cultural change occurs when the balance between *Direction* and *Performance* is disturbed. Within this model we should try to clarify exactly what is meant by these terms. *Direction* can be interpreted as the structure, systems and procedures of the organisation, in other words the content. *Performance* is the everyday enactments within the organisation. *'Meta-Directions'* can be considered as the directions behind *Directions*. They provide the cultural and philosophical component to an organisation. *Meta-Directions* provide the form to the organisation. As Bate (1994)[255] explains, they give identity, wholeness and organisation to directions and performance. *Directions* act as their agents in the field ensuring philosophy is translated into action. A representation of this cultural system is contained below:

FORM	CONTENT	PROCESS
Meta-Directions	*Directions*	*Performance*
(Philosophies and theories-in-use)	(norms and espoused-theories)	(action and outputs)

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[254]   Peckham M. *Romanticism and Behaviour. Collected Essays II.* University of South Carolina Press Columbia. 1976.
[255]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.*, p 198-200, 1994.

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Bate (1994) considers that changing *Meta-Directions* will have a proportionately greater impact than changing either of the other two components. He considers that *Meta-Directions* are the frame within which reality is defined. Change these and, as Bate (1994) argues, the whole definition of reality changes. Changing structures and procedures will inevitably affect the culture of an organisation, but clearly these are likely to be far less impactive than changing *Meta-Directions.*

A change in *Meta-Directions* offers a far more powerful and fundamental way of changing culture. To facilitate this process, a fundamental change in cognition will probably be necessary. This is fundamentally a learning process where knowledge, attitudes, values and beliefs have to change and is generally the arena of training, but if it is to be effective it has to be a very different form of training to that generally experienced, hence the use of the term 're-socialisation'. This approach devotes itself to changing the underlying frame of meanings and values and leaving directions and performance to follow on naturally and developmentally behind. This approach is located in the most strategic and influential area to affect major second order change. *Meta-Directions* affect *Directions*, which in turn affect *Performance.* The example given earlier, regarding the SSU's change programme, I would suggest, focused on *'Performance'* rather than *'Meta-Directions'.* One of the *'Meta-Directions'* operating in this case was the assumption that many police officers have that task and action are more important than reflection and thinking. Therefore, little emphasis is placed on research, analysis or the ability to think critically. These areas, I would suggest, need to be addressed before, or at the same time as issues such as racism, which is, to some extent, symptomatic of a lack of an ability to reflect critically on events.

Bate (1994) argues that the above theory is very convincing and may be appropriate for effecting major cultural change, but there is considerable doubt as to whether, in its present form, it is actually capable of making any real mark on the *Meta-Directions* of an organisation. However, this is exactly what the Equality of Service Programme (Cambridgeshire Constabulary) attempted to do.

Bate (1994) considers the main reason for this theory failing to work is that it has no theory of learning associated with it, only a theory of teaching which, he states, and I agree, is very different. A training programme that depends upon the traditional approach to training is doomed to failure almost from the outset. This is consistent with Louis's (1989)[256] suggestion that culture cannot be taught on simple information-giving lines. Her point is that learning must be active, it has to be sought by the individual concerned following the reverse of the information-seeking principle. This explanation offers us the first clue as to how this change in *Meta-Directions* might be achieved. Participants must be switched into an active receptive mode; they need to participate in the kind of independent, self-directed, exploratory, responsible and active learning process that is absent from most change programmes.

The question seems to be, is this really possible to achieve, can a theory of learning be developed that is compatible with a change in an organisation's *Meta-Directions*? I would certainly not suggest that this approach would work in isolation, but if it is possible, then it may provide the basis for achieving major cultural change. As Bate (1994) concludes:

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[256]   Louis M. R. Newcomers as lay ethnographers: acculturation during organisational socialisation. Working paper, Boston University. Also in, *Organisational Climate and Culture* (ed. B. Schneider), Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1989.

"While intervention at the level of an organisation's Meta-Directions would seem to offer one of the most promising routes for achieving cultural change, the field is still waiting for an approach that is capable of doing just that".

This, then, is the focus of this thesis, the development of a theory of learning and change that is capable of offering some insight into this amazingly complex area. Too often has the writer seen and experienced the illusion of this process which has achieved little positive change and sometimes created negative change. The challenged, then, is to try to explain what is possible and how that is achieved.

Summary

Culture is a multifaceted, multi-dimensional concept. It contains at least four different types of cultural knowledge and at least eight different content areas, or dimensions. Strategic planning by itself often does not produce visible change, because people carry out the strategy. Many change programmes treat culture as a nuisance and plans are developed, despite the existing culture (Sackman 1991)[257].

If successful cultural change is to occur, the kind of people, as well as the structure and systems that support them in their activities, are crucial in realising strategic intentions. Having the right kind of people in place can be obtained by selection, but this may not always be possible, or successful. Here the role of training is crucial, or as I have already explained should be more correctly named 're-socialisation'. Re-socialisation of staff is essential, if they are going to fit the intended strategy. This not only includes thinking in a different way, but also behaving in a different way. The change programme needs to deal with many areas and dimensions, it needs to be built in a logical sequence,

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[257]   Sackman, S., *Op.Cit.*, pp 150-162, 1991.

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to minimise duplication and inconsistency. Systems and procedures need to be redesigned to support the thoughts and actions desired. All of this depends upon the commitment of staff to the desired goals, motivation to put that commitment into action, and the knowledge and skills to achieve them.

Again and again different authors have emphasised the role that people have to play in helping or hindering change. They have highlighted how often the influence they have through culture seems to be left out of change programmes and, consequently, the programme fails. I consider that those engaged in the management of change must have adequate knowledge and understanding of cultural change, evaluation and individual change, if successful change is to occur.

This chapter concludes with the assertion that successful cultural change will probably only occur at a cognitive level by changing *'Meta-Directions'*. This involves changing underlying assumptions, values, beliefs and behaviour; this is essentially a learning or re-learning process. Those engaged in change must also have adequate knowledge, understanding and skills to facilitate an andragogical and participative approach to learning. There are, no doubt, many other areas that they should be familiar with, such as marketing, planning, costing etc., but I believe that these are of less significance than understanding complex individual human systems that form culture. Organisations consist of people, and any change in culture, which is socially constructed, must involve changing people's mental programmes. For change to occur there must be a change in individuals' cognitions and behaviour. This, in essence, is a learning process as Mervis and Berg (1977)[258] argue:

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[258]   Mervis, P. H. and Berg D. N. *Failure in Organisational Development and Change*, Wiley and Sons, 1977.

"The change efforts of the past become the learning efforts of the future".

A re-socialisation programme is necessary, not only to change individual cognitions, but also to change cognitions between people. A programme that attempts only to change individual cognitions without taking account of how culture is created and continually re-created in the social setting of the workplace, I would suggest, will have little chance of success. The focus, then, of the next chapter builds upon this premise by examining the process of changing individual and organisational *Meta-Directions*.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CHANGING THE INDIVIDUAL

Personal Development and the Affect on the Organisation

Any significant change in an organisation will inevitably mean changing individuals', attitudes, values, beliefs, assumptions and behaviour. This change could follow direct input from a specifically-designed behaviour modification programme and some learning theorists have been especially vocal in advocating this approach, or it could be part of a more wide-ranging change programme. In any event, changing an individual's attitudes etc., is fundamentally a learning process or, more accurately, a re-learning process. This, then, is the focus of this chapter; developing an understanding of this process and its relevance to organisational change.

We have all experienced being the recipient of teaching or training. Some of us have experienced trying to teach others, whether individually or in groups. Whatever end of the relationship we have experienced, we have all developed informal learning theories. We like a particular style of lecture, or text book, or how a course has been structured. In many ways, this resembles how various cures were used in medicine before scientific testing of theories were established. Indeed, even though more scientific methods of testing are in place, people in some societies still make use of the local witch doctor, which is a good example of how difficult it is to modify existing learning, even if that prior learning is not logical or rational. Our present ability to measure many aspects of learning is still very primitive and variables, such as context and individual motivational factors make the development of a comprehensive learning theory extremely difficult; however, this does not mean we should not try to develop learning theories, or

make use of them where they do exist. Within education many teachers operate with shaky and inconsistent theories of learning and have great difficulty in justifying on theoretical grounds their daily educational decisions (Parsons *et.al.*, 1983[259]; Edward's and Mercer, 1987)[260]. Nowhere is this more apparent than in many of our universities and training establishments. A more serious danger arises when ideas are put into practice without proper theoretical safeguards, because when the expected results do not materialise no one knows why. Often the whole approach is dismissed as unworkable, sometimes prematurely; many training initiatives have suffered this fate.

Informal Theories

As we develop theories, constructs and beliefs these allows us to predict the consequences of certain events and help us to explain certain outcomes. Although we try to develop these theories out of scientifically-observable components and relations we inevitably end up having to fill in many gaps in our observations and make a number of assumptions. These assumptions come from of different sources; our everyday experience of life, views from parents, teachers, peers, television and so on. The advantage of developing these theories is that it saves us time in analysing a mass of incoming data, the disadvantage is that although once the theory may have been accurate, and this may be questionable, it may now be redundant, but we do not realise it.

Before considering different theoretical approaches to learning it is becoming increasingly apparent that relevance and purpose to learning is an essential element in motivating people to learn and helping them understand. For example, many people use

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[259]   Parsons, J. M., Graham, N. and Honess, T. 'A teacher's implicit model of how children learn', *British Educational Research Journal*, Vol. 9, pp 91- 101, 1983.
[260]   Edward, A. D. and Mercer, N. *Common Knowledge: the development of understanding in the classroom*, Methuen, London, 1987.

complex mathematical skills in the workplace, but were not successful at mathematics at school. The main difference appears to be the context in which the concepts are used, because the context appears to assist the user to see a direct relevance and purpose. This, then, suggests that it is important to first engage participants in the learning process by showing them relevance and context. This process was used, both explicitly and implicitly, during the 'Equality of Service Project' and will be discussed later. However, the next section will first focus upon the three main learning theories, Rationalist, Behaviourist and Constructionist.

Learning Theories

Rationalist

The idea that learning is a natural growth process to be developed by experience is found in many classic theories of learning and education. Chomsky's (1980) theory of 'mental organs', restricting what we learn is typical:

> *"My own suspicion is that a central part of what we call 'learning' is actually better understood as the growth of cognitive structures along an internally directed course under the triggering and partial shaping effect of the environment ...."* [261]

This approach does have an intrinsic feel to it, in that some people seem to be naturally better at some things than others, e.g. musically more talented, good at eyeball co-ordination.. However, it does not really explain how people learn within that framework. Rationalist theories can, therefore, easily become all encompassing. Trying to design teaching experiences that facilitate this process also highlights the vagueness of the theory. An assumption that is rooted in this theory is that, by giving people

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[261]   Chomsky, N., *Rules and Representations*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1990.

experience of something means they have learned something. This assumption has no

basis in reality, because we all know of people that are very experienced, but are still very

poor at what they do. A common assumption is that experience equals competence;

evidence of this is found in numerous job adverts where so many years experienced at 'X'

is requested as a perquisite. Nevertheless, there is something in the notion of unlocking a

natural talent, and the opposite to that is, no matter how hard some people try, they will

never be good at' X'. Singing is my particular 'X'.

Learning by Association - Behaviourism

The basic principle that underpins many of the theories connected with learning

by association and behaviourism, is that events that tend to occur together in experience,

will be represented together in the mind. As Wilson (1980)[262] states:

> "An association is simply two or more entities which are
> linked so that elicitation of one can lead to elicitation of
> the other".

This principle leaves no room for thought or control of any kind, it is a totally

involuntary process. With sufficient repetition, a series of associations can be bought

together to form one representation. This theory, combined with utilitarianism, formed a

powerful partnership, as Leahy (1987)[263] explains:

> "The result is a completely mechanistic picture of the
> mind in which idea follows idea automatically, with no
> room left for voluntary control. The exercise of will is an
> illusion. ..... Reasoning is no more than the associative
> compounding of ideas".

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[262]   Wilson, K. V., *From Associations to Structure*, Amsterdam, North Holland, p
105, 1980.
[263]   Leahy, T. H. *A History of Psychology*, Eaglewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, p 143,
1987.

At the turn of the twentieth century, as a reaction against Freud and psychoanalysis, psychologists concentrated on observable visible actions to determine the causes of behaviour. Associationism developed largely along behaviourist lines. Many of the experiments were carried out on animals and one of the discoveries was that learning could be identified with certain conditions For example, the degree of pleasure, comfort or dissatisfaction resulting from specific behaviour. Thorndike (1911)[264] established certain laws of behaviour, for example, the greater the satisfaction or discomfort the greater the strengthening or weakening of the bond. Also, the probability of a response occurring in a situation increases with the number of times the response has occurred in that situation in the past.

Behaviourism dominated learning theory until the 1960s and one of the main proponents was W. S. Skinner. He argued that behaviour could be shaped almost at will by using the 'law of effect'. Skinner argues strongly that reinforcement of behaviour has to be extremely quick after a given behaviour, or the effect would probably be lost. Where this reinforcement is part of a carefully-controlled programme Skinner (1968)[265] concludes that once we have made sure effects do occur, and that they occur under conditions which are optimal for producing changes, and once we have arranged the particular type of reinforcement, these techniques permit us to shape the behaviour of a people almost at will. Skinner (1968), however, acknowledges the difficulties in teaching in a classroom with the necessary degree of reinforcement to achieve this goal. He estimates that 25,000 reinforcements would be necessary in the first four years to successfully reinforce efficient mathematical behaviour. Skinner considers the teacher 'is

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[264]   Thorndike, E. L., *Animal Intelligence*, Macmillan, New York, 1911.
[265]   Skinner, B.F. *The Technology of Teaching*, Appleton-Century and Crofts, New York, pp 9-23, 1968.

out of date' and a greater reliance must be placed upon information technology to provide this level of reinforcement.

The behaviourist approach does provide some clue to how we learn, but is far too simple to be effective. It can explain the power of habit and the difficulty of unlearning a skill or aspect of behaviour, but it does not explain many complex mental functions. For example, if I practice my golf swing the process I go through in actually making the swing means I have too little time to think about it; it is, in essence, learning by trial and error and some useful instruction. Behaviourism may largely explain how we learn a skill and physical behaviour, but can it explain how we learn other functions? Events in the world do not happen in repetitive pairs or sequences of action, a great deal of what we experience is new and different; circumstances dictate that we have to interpret events to understand how to react to them. Learning is clearly more complex than behaviourism allows for, but this does not mean the theory is totally wrong, simply it is not the whole picture. Unfortunately, evidence of this can be found in long-term evaluations of the transference of behavioural treatments of speech defects in children into the every day environment; the results have been extremely poor. (De Villiers and De Villiers, 1979).[266] This, coupled with other experiments, have forced many to concluded that there must be a thinking process that intervenes. This thinking process is the subject of the next section.

Constructionism

Constructionism largely developed from the work of Jean Piaget and was first published in the 1920s. It is based upon the idea that 'schemas of action' are constructed from experience. This theory proposes that we are born with the ability to sort and

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[266]   De Villiers, P.A. and De Villiers, J. G., *Early Language*, Fontana, London, p 113. 1979.

responding to sensory data. This data forms mental constructs which are the building blocks of learning; this process begins from the moment of our birth, and possibly even before that. Constructionism is a process of development, which, by definition, is a process of change and therefore is, in my submission, the first building block to understanding organisational change. Constructionism represents the co-ordination of action known as 'operations' with the outside world, our 'environment'. As we develop, our actions and the patterns of change in our environment become co-ordinated; the outcome of this process is what becomes represented in our mind. Here, then, lies the way in which we formulate what we term as attitudes, assumptions, beliefs and values.

In constructionist theory, learning and development are virtually indistinguishable. However, one way of looking at it is to consider learning normally taking place at the outer edges of a construct in small incremental steps. The construct is modified without altering its core shape. When this process gets to a certain point, the structure becomes so altered and change spread has become so extensive, fundamentally altering the shape and structure of the construct or series of constructs, that the whole form has 'reformed' into a new entity. These processes and, in particular, reforming, are what we usually recognise as developmental change. Piaget (1977 and 1978)[267] defines this process slightly differently, he considers that 'accommodation' occurs when schema's or concepts from the environment totally dominate over our preconceived constructs. 'Assimilation' he argues, occurs where our schemas only slightly modify to allow events and experiences from the environment to influence our construction of reality. Piaget (1977 and 1978) argues that our basic schema stays the same unless a careful interaction and

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[267]   Piaget, J., (1974a) *The Grasp of Consciousness*, trans. Wedgwood, S., published 1977, London, Route and Keegan Paul.
          Piaget, J. (1974b) *Success and Understanding*, trans., Pomerans, A. J., published 1978, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

balance occur, thereby allowing learning to take place. If accommodation dominates, then only imitation occurs; we try to copy and, because we do not understand or believe, inevitably we will; revert to our previous schema when the influence causing the change is removed. This, I believe, is a major reason for so many change programmes failing to achieve their objectives. Where assimilation dominates play is the only result. We will not, or cannot, allow environmental influences to alter how we perceive and construct the world. Where we perceive environmental influences to be negligible, and we will if necessary, we find a way to preserve our constructed reality(e.g. minimising, rationalising). Piaget (1977 and 1978) also argues we have an innate desire to make sense of the world even if the sense is wrong, hence our truths are only beliefs. These two concepts, I suggest, are critical to understanding organisational change. They are the very foundation of individual change and, therefore, organisational change.

However, whilst constructionism is the most popular class of learning theory among educational psychologists today it still has its critics. The theory has been criticised for vagueness and difficulty in translating into practice. Piaget has been criticised for describing his mental structures only in terms of formal logic, ignoring the emotions and feelings, which we invest in our constructs, particularly in relation to values and beliefs. Johnson-Laird (1983)[268] argued this was a theme that ran through all of Piaget's work. Nevertheless by the late 1960s this model of learning was heavily endorsed in schools, the Plowden Report (1967) being very influential in this process. But putting theory into practice is completely different. A survey of primary school practice by, Galton et.al., (1980)[269] indicated that few teachers actually applied it strictly,

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[268]   Johnson-Laird, P. L. *Mental Models*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
[269]   Galton, M. et.al., *Inside the Primary Classroom*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980.

resorting instead to traditional teacher-centred methods. Whilst this is a subjective view, my experience of training facilitators of adults is very similar; in the main only the illusion of constructionist, 'student-centred' learning takes place. The reason for this, I believe, lies in the difficulty in working in this area, which necessitates lengthy training of facilitators, which most organisations do not understand, or recognise the vital role these individuals can have in bringing about organisational change.

Learning in a Social Context

All three theories of learning restrict themselves to learning within the individual; therefore learning is perceived as a mental process, occurring within the mind of the individual. Yet both behaviourism and constructionism need outside factors to assist learning; they need some action to occur before learning can occur. It could be argued that we learn to operate in society in the same way as we do in any other given circumstance. However, this does seem to minimise the role of others in the learning process, which my experience certainly dictates is quite considerable. Rationalist theorists argue that we achieve this through innate social needs laid down in the course of evolution. Learning a language, as an infant, is an example of the need for learning to occur in a social setting; the reactions of others are necessary for learning to occur, whether the behaviourist or constructionist theory of learning applies. To some extent, when a reasonable standard of reading has been achieved the text provides some of the necessary feedback that others have previously provided. This, of course, has its limitations, for example, without others how do we know whether we are pronouncing a word correctly. Skinner (1968) argues that society consists of a dual process in which we are all becoming unwittingly conditioned and, at the same time, unwittingly conditioning other people (or helping to create or re-create organisational culture). A constructionist

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views action as necessary to learn about others, and to learn about ourselves and how to interact with others. Vygotsky, a Russian educational psychologist who died in 1934, but whose work was discovered in the west only in the 1960s agrees with the constructionist's view of learning, but argues that much of the learning is done within the social setting, as distinct patterns of social relations. Vygotsky (1981)[270] considers the mechanism underlying higher mental functions is a copy of social interaction:

> *"All higher mental functions are internalised social*
> *relationships. These higher mental functions are the basis*
> *of the individual's social structure .... Even when we turn*
> *to mental processes, their nature remains quasi-social in*
> *their own private sphere, human beings retain the*
> *functions of social interaction".*

Vygotsky (1981) considers that social interaction forms a vital role in learning. One of the main implications of Vygotsky's work for organisational change is the concept of the *'zone of proximal development'*. This concept is concerned with the manner in which we arrange the environment so that an individual can reach a higher level of learning, understanding, application, or more complex abstract conceptualisation. The *zone of proximal development* is:

> *"The distance between an actual developmental level as*
> *determined through problem solving under adult guidance*
> *or in collaboration with more capable peers"* (Vygotsky
> 1978)[271].

This concept appears as true for adults as it does for children. Why should it be otherwise, surely in learning something new we are all children? If someone is explaining how to improve some aspect of golf they will probably explain using technical language,

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[270]   Vygotsky, L. S. 'The genesis of higher mental functions', in Wertsch, J.V. (ed.) *The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology*, M. E. Sharpe, New York 1981.
[271]   Vygotsky, L. S., *Mind in Society: the development of higher psychological processes*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., p86, 1978.

if we do not understand that, they will then start to use metaphors or tropes that we will understand. This process has the effect of allowing them to enter our *'zone of proximal development'*. An example I experienced was the golf instructor suggesting playing a good shot is like baking a cake, the right ingredients have to go in before you can get a good result out. As Bruner (1985)[272] explains:

> *"The tutor or the aiding peer serves the learner as a vicarious form of consciousness until such a time as the learner is able to master his own action through his own consciousness and control"*

This concept of using others to build our understanding is known as *'scaffolding'* (Bruner, quoting Vygotsky 1985)[273] and indicates the importance of social interaction in learning. The other person may be a teacher, trainer, peer, group of peers, or a *'significant other'* (people we are likely to believe or take particular note of). Social constructionist learning theories emphasise learning as a social, co-operative process that allows us to learn more about the world around us than just the acquisition of cognitive knowledge. We learn about others' intentions, their feelings, values and beliefs. We learn about rituals, the importance of symbols and our position in social interaction. The significance of this theory to the acquisition of culture within society at large, and within an organisation is immense, but the question still remains as to how we can use the concepts to help to bring about change. Before attempting to answer that question, culture as I have already discussed, contains many concepts, but attitudes, assumptions, values and beliefs are key to understanding culture. These areas will be the subject of the next section.

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[272]   Bruner, J. S. 'Vygotsky: a historical and conceptual perspective' in Wertsch, J.V. (ed.) *Culture, Communication and Cognition: Vygotskian perspectives*, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 24-5, 1985.
[273]   Bruner, J. S., *Ibid.*, 1985

Values and Attitudes

Attitudes are generally considered to have been learnt and have a great deal to do with how we behave. This is a common sense explanation, but leaves many aspects unanswered. For example how do we learn our attitudes? How do they affect our behaviour? If they do affect our behaviour is this affect consistent across various situations?

Measurement

Research into attitude change can be traced back some years and stems from work undertaken in the measurement of attitudes. Until it was possible to begin to measure attitudes successfully it was impossible to measure whether any real change had occurred and if a change had occurred was it in the desired direction? Thurstone (1929) [274] pioneered much of the early research into attitude measurement and considered that attitudes, whilst complex, could be measured in much the same way as any other physical attribute. Thurstone (1929) largely addressed the issue of how much someone was in favour, or opposed to any given subject. He did not concern himself with other issues, such as why the person felt that way, but confined himself to measurement on an 'attitudinal continuum'. Whilst this provides a useful form of measurement on a single continuum, it does have severe limitations. For example, what someone espouses as their attitude may not in reality, be what they actually do, or believe, but more of this later. Thurstone (1929) acknowledges the complexity of attitude measurement and other techniques have subsequently been developed to measure attitudes, such as, 'semantic differential'.

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[274]   Thurstone, L. L. and Chave, E. J. *'The Measurement of Attitude'*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1929

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Research in this area by Osgood (1954)[275] used 'factor analysis' to measure underlying dimensions. The research identified a set of dimensions which proved very stable, even across different cultures and languages. They found *'Evaluation (*good-bad*); Potency* (strong-weak) *and Activity* (active-passive)' to be the three most relevant dimensions in attitude measurement. Evaluation, measuring meaning, and the other components tend to interact with the meaning. The measurement of attitudes, then, is vital if we are to consider if attitudes can be changed. With the development of techniques in attitude measurement went developments in research into attitude change.

Change

Hovland *et.al.,* (1953)[276] from Yale University, concerned themselves with attitude change, rather than how people acquired attitudes. Their approach was heavily influenced by the strong behaviourist influence of the time. They concentrated on one-off communication rather than the slow dripping-tap approach, such as that used in an advertising campaign. Their findings tended to be rather obvious, but did ascertain that people committed to more extreme opinions are less easily persuaded than those with more neutral positions. Research in the 1960s and 1970s tend to concentrate on **'Cognitive dissonance'** of people's reappraisals of their previous view point (Eiser 1994) [277]. Cognitive dissonance is an emotional state that occurs when two simultaneously held attitudes or cognitions are inconsistent. This can also occur when there is a conflict between one's beliefs and one's behaviour.

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[275]   Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J. and Tannenbaum, P. H. *'The Measurement of Meaning,'* Urbana, I L., University of Illinois Press, 1954.
[276]   Hovland, C. ., Janis, I. L. and Kelly, H. H. ,*' Communications and Persuasions: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change'* New Haven, C T: Yale University Press, 1953.
[277]   Eiser, J. E. *'Attitudes, Chaos and the Connectionist Mind',* Blackwell, Oxford, pp 12-13, 1994.

Gestalt psychology developed a theory of **'cognitive balance'**:

'The more balanced we see things the more difficult it is to change.'

This assumption is very important because it introduces a motivational factor to attitudinal change. Whatever the true state of affairs we do not like contradiction, complication or ambivalence. We prefer to think of some things as good and some as bad, and leave it at that. There seems to be an innate desire to return to the previous state of cognitive balance, even if we know it is illogical. This view concurs highly with Piaget's (1934[278], 1977, 1978)[279] view of learning. We do not like our evaluative judgements challenged or muddled. In thinking this way lies not the rule of reason, but intolerance, prejudice and solutions based on the elimination of mixture and opposition. As Eiser (1994)[280] argues:

> *"The very blandness of the theory's superficial*
> *reasonableness disguises the warning it implies".*

Yet as Eiser (1994) comments, this warning has rarely been recognised, or commented upon, even by authors working directly within this tradition. Eiser (1994) goes on to argue that consistency in our attitudes is something we are generally proud of, but he states this should be something to be proud of, only if we can develop a more critical conception of consistency.

Festinger (1957)[281] argues that if one is induced to act in a manner that is inconsistent with some prior attitude, then the thought that one acted that way will be inconsistent with the thought that one held that attitude. This inconsistency will be

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[278]   Piaget, J., *The Moral Judgement of the Child*, London, Routeledge and Kegan Paul., 1934.

[279]   Piaget, J., *Op.Cit*, 1977 and 1978.

[280]   Eiser, J. E., *Ibid.*, p 15, 1994.

[281]   Festinger, L. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Evanston, I L, : Row, Peterson. 1957.

experienced as a form of discomfort, or negative arousal. This feeling previously described as *'cognitive dissonance'*, will then motivate attempts at cognitive restructuring to resolve the previous balance. Whilst this may take place there are a number of factors that block this process. For example, how we recall events can be extremely biased, phenomena, such as *'selective remembering,'* may occur; our memory of what really happened can easily allow us to provide a very different account of events from reality. Even if we do recall events reasonably accurately, which can be assisted by the use of feedback, Argyris (1982)[282] argues that most of us have learnt how not to effectively reflect on events, particularly where they are threatening our personal value system. However, if Festinger (1957) is correct, then with the help of others there is a method of creating a motivational force to restructure attitudes if they are inconsistent from those we believe we hold. This view emphasises the importance of social interaction in learning as espoused by Vygotsky (1981). The other feature of Festinger's (1957) research is that restructuring is more likely to occur where the rewards we receive are smaller. This seems to run totally against the behaviourist approach and seems to indicate, according to Festinger (1957), that restructuring works only where people feel they have made a *'free choice'*. If people are forced to behave inconsistently with their prior attitudes, they show more attitudinal change in the direction of increased consistency with their behaviour if offered larger rewards (Linder 1967)[283].

Eiser (1994) argues that just knowing that you have done something that could seem inconsistent with your prior attitude need not necessarily lead you to feel

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[282]   Argyris, C. *How Learning and Reasoning Processes Affect Organisational Change*, in *Change in Organisations* Paul S. Goodman and Associates, Jossey-Bass, pp 47-86, 1982.
[283]   Linder, D. E., Cooper, J. and Jones, E. E. , Decision freedom as determinate of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 6, pp 245-254, 1967.

uncomfortable or change your attitude. You may simple dismiss the action as insignificant, or put the blame on others, or perhaps more likely view the event through a very biased lens, thereby minimising any inconsistency. What Eiser (1994) considers much more likely is that individuals would re-appraise their attitude if *'freely chosen'* behaviour produced 'bad consequences', or even created a real risk of negative consequences. This position requires a view of attitudes where people can reflect and evaluate their attitude, feelings and behavioural decisions, and I consider it is of immense importance to designers of cultural change programmes.

This view, in many ways, is consistent with other work carried out by Argyris and Schon (1996)[284]. They argue that most of us learn in a way which denies reflection on attitudes, values, beliefs and indeed behaviour, and use the term *'single-loop learning'* to describe this phenomena. They argued that we have learnt to hinder the development of reflection which could help us to analyse our attitudes and behaviour critically. The social and cultural constrictions placed on giving honest feedback, essential if we are to become aware of both the negative and positive consequences of our actions, mean we are denied the very means necessary to bring about useful change. If attitudes are indeed learnt, then it may be worth spending a few minutes attempting to define learning before considering Argyris and Schon's work further. Brookfield (1986)[285] describes learning as:

> *"The phenomena of internal mental change, whether that*
> *be characterised as a flash of gestalt insight, double-loop*
> *learning, or a rearrangement of neural paths".*

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[284]   Argyris, C. and Schon, D. A. *Organisational Learning II*, Addison Wesley, p 255, 1996.
[285]   Brookfield, S. D. *'Understanding and facilitating adult learning'*, Open University Press, p47, 1986.

Such internal phenomena would be discernible externally in the form of permanent behavioural change and it would be by observing such change that we would reason that learning had occurred. Although this offers only one explanation of the term 'learning' it does provide a useful beginning which will be explored later in this dissertation. Before moving on, the issue of 'freely chosen behaviour' should not be lost and is closely linked to the concept of learning. In work that I carried out during the 'Equality of Service Project', in an attempt to bring about attitudinal, behavioural and cultural change, participants felt that being treated in an adult, self-directed way was very important to them and helped them to re-appraise their past attitudes and behaviours.

Espoused-Theory and Theory-in-Use

A development of this approach is to understand the meaning people create when they interact with each other. As Argyris (1982)[286] explains, cognitive psychologists, sociologists, ethnomethodolgists, and existentialists have been primary contributors to this line of enquiry. Schon, Argyris and other experientially orientated theorists have tended to favour this approach, which focuses on the individual and social construction of reality. They highlighted major differences in the theories of reality that people espouse and the reality as it exists when they act out the theory. Frequently individuals are unaware of these differences and can often be discovered only by observing people in action and inferring meaning from their action in the contextual reality in which it exists.

Argyris and Schon (1996) suggest that the source of meaning is in the theories of action people use (not those espoused) and that learning systems of society reinforce these theories. Therefore, behaviour change that is to be at all sincere and lasting (as

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[286]   Argyris, C., *Op.Cit.,* pp 47-86, 1982.

described by Piaget, page 147) requires changes in the theories that people use and in the learning systems of the organisation. In deciding how to act in a given way, people use their reasoning processes which underpin their *theories-in-use*. Reasoning processes are those activities by which we create beliefs and assumptions that are assumed or proven to be valid and from which we draw conclusions. They are our truths which are, of course, only our dearly-held beliefs. Popper (1969)[287] suggests this reasoning process is at the core of how individuals construe reality. Learning, then, could be defined as occurring when an individual or group of individuals achieve what they intended; in that if there is a match between their desire for action and the actuality or outcome of that action. A secondary form of learning can be said to have occurred when a mismatch is identified between intentions and outcomes and the problem is recognised and corrected. An organisation can provide an environment where more productive learning is likely to occur and this would very much benefit the organisation. Organisations are inevitably products of their environment and contain people who have been socialised with their own environment which has created their *theories-in-use*. The organisation, then, in many ways is a prisoner of this socialisation process, even though the management may wish they were not.

This phenomena is frequently experienced in the field of equality of opportunity. For example, individuals may genuinely believe they do not sexually harass people at work and feel such behaviour is undesirable. Possibly the organisation has developed policies and procedures which forbid such behaviour and individuals may support such policies. The problem arises where individuals' *espoused-theory* does not match their *theory-in-use*, or the organisations' goals, and they actually do sexually harass members

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[287]   Popper, K. R. *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*. (3rd ed., rev) London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1969.

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of staff. Changing this behaviour is vital if instances of unlawful behaviour are to stop, which is not only unpleasant, but also potentially very expensive for an employer. Two approaches to learning new behaviour are proposed by Argyris (1982).

Single-Loop Learning

Argyris (1982) argues that whenever an error is detected and subsequently corrected without the underlying values changing, be it individual, group, inter-group, organisational, inter-oganisational, then this behaviour is single-loop learning (also note this concept is similar to Piaget's concept of play, see page 147). Single-loop learning focuses on performance and action. It simplifies the learning process and simply involves changing such performance. For example, in the case of sexual harassment if a male member of staff was to continually put his arm around a female member of staff, and she told him to stop doing it and he did, this would be single-loop learning. The behaviour has changed in the specific case, but the underlying reasons have not been addressed; he does not understand why it was wrong and is, therefore, likely to think the problem was hers, not his. Argyris (1982) also argues that organisational learning may not be said to have occurred when someone has identified a problem or invented a solution, but only when someone has actually implemented the solution.

Double-Loop Learning

Double-loop learning is of a more fundamental nature and involves re-assessing the governing variables (assumptions, values and beliefs) that impinge on action. *Double-loop learning* occurs when mismatches are corrected by examining and altering, first the governing variables, and then individual action. Governing variables are the actual, rather than the espoused, beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions people

possess. These governing variables can be inferred from observation of individuals acting as agents for the organisation. *Single-loop learning* is appropriate for the routine repetitive issues. *Double-loop learning* is more appropriate for the more complex non-programmable subjects, such as social interactions in the work place and management decision making.

A model of change was created by Lewin (1952) some years ago, and other writers have subsequently built on this model. The model proposes that there are three stages involved in the change process:

Unfreezing

Introducing new values and behaviour

Refreezing

The model assumes that unfreezing occurs by showing that actions lead to unintentional outcomes and assumes an innate desire to rectify such inconsistencies. Practice and experimentation with new action is assumed to lead to desire attitude, value, belief and behavioural change. However, Eiser (1994)[288] argues that this will occur only where the negative consequences are experienced, or are likely to be experienced. The other major difficulty is that individuals have to first identify there is a problem at all. Argyris (1982) argues this model is useful only for *single-loop* learning and for abstract discussion. Experimentation carried out by Schon and Argyris (1976) discovered that individuals lacked the skills to learn new behaviour and skills. Where individuals were using *single-loop learning* that did not involve fundamental identification and review of the governing variables, this was possible. However, re-assessing governing variables can be very threatening and cause considerable fear, anxiety and mistrust. Where this is the case, individuals involved in this process need the help of others. Where the introduction

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[288]   Eiser, J. E. *Op.Cit.*, 1994.

of others is involved, the risk factor increases and the need to create an effective *'safe learning environment'* becomes imperative.

Argyris (1982) also points out a further interesting feature - the level of awareness that individuals have to the fact they do not have such skills. He argues that this lack of awareness may not be due to *'some void or lack of knowledge'*, but may be tactically designed. This suppression may be due to a suppression of feelings. Argyris (1982) also states that the basis for individuals not being in touch with their feelings may not simply be a reluctance to express them or some kind of defensive process; but is probably a learnt reasoning process that unknowingly distorts the necessity to be in touch with and express feelings. In western culture the expression of feelings, particularly for males, is highly culturally bound and a macho culture, as found in the police service, does not reward the expression of feelings, such as fear or hurt. If an effective reasoning process is dependent for *double-loop learning* on the correct identification of feelings, then re-learning the accurate identification of feelings is essential for the achievement of cultural change. Using this concept played a vital part in the re-socialisation of managers during Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project' which will be discussed in the following chapters.

A further problem lies in the assumption that you can understand an individual's values simply by asking them. This assumption is questionable. The assumption ignores issues which are highly significant, for example, where there is a difference between *theory-in-use* and *espouced-theory* there may be reasons for this occurring. To constantly question one's *theories-in-use* because they may be socially and culturally unacceptable would surely become intolerable. Therefore a means to cope with this

inconsistency is provided to give a socially acceptable reality. To express *theories-in-use* even to one's self can be very threatening, therefore one learns to adapt and create a more acceptable reality. Learning this way of being provides a fundamental part of development and allows us to survive in the world. For example, a child's honesty can be very refreshing, but sometimes embarrassing because the child has not learnt what is socially acceptable. Learning not to be open and honest when discussing embarrassing or threatening issues can be socially profitable but can equally be organisationally disastrous. Only where a very special non-judgemental environment is created within the organisational setting can such cognitions be openly expressed or discovered. Again, this is discussed in the review of the 'Equality of Service Project'.

Constructing Reality From Values, Attitudes and Beliefs

Research carried out by Argyris (1982)[289] found that when individuals were asked to comment on a written conversation between X and Y they assumed that their evaluations and attributions were obvious, concrete and required no testing. They also developed a micro-causal theory of what happened between X and Y in the conversation. When the individuals were asked to give their reactions to the conversation they organised the meaning inferred from the sentences into a causal sequence to explain the effect. Argyris (1982) argues that in doing this they enacted or constructed reality; their diagnoses represented their view of what happened. All appeared to enact reality by creating a causal view that contained attribution and evaluation. When the above was pointed out to the respondents, initially about 50% expressed surprise, shock and disbelief that they had unknowingly used such a strategy to comment on the conversation. A significant feature of this research was the high level of consistency in the way respondents reacted; this was even true across different cultures.

[289]   Argyris, C., *Op.Cit.*, p 57, 1982.

The reasoning processes and actions of respondents may offer such a high level of consistency for respondents to distance themselves from the recorded conversation so they can design and manage their actions. Argyris (1982) argues it is not possible to react in an organised manner without first extracting from and organising from what has happened. This is known as *'constructing and enacting reality'*. High levels of inference are necessary if this process is to work, because they make possible 'on-line management' of reality. Simon (1969)[290] argued that the environment in which we live is too complex for the human mind to deal with directly; therefore a simplified version is created. Attitudes, values, beliefs and assumptions are essential to help short-cut the processes taking place by quickly assessing the worth of a subject or issue. This suggests there is a hierarchy of concepts that make it possible to create a new simplified reality which is necessary to survive. In other words stereotyping and other versions of shorthand are essential for survival, but herein lies the real danger, as Argyris (1982) states:

> *"Why do individuals use such concepts that contain such a high probability for miscommunication? And why do individuals use such concepts when they advise others not to do so? And why, in many cases, do they do so when they are simultaneously advising others not to do so?"*

Attribution theorists observe that individuals tend to act like naive scientists; they seem to have an innate desire to create sense out of their world even if it is only their version of sense. More often than not they tend to blame others for errors, and to attribute any positive consequences to themselves (Kelly 1979)[291]. The question then appears to be why do individuals behave in such a way? There is a high level of consistency in how they react, and individuals cannot create a new set of guidelines to

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[290]   Simon, H. A. *The Sciences of the Artificial.* Cambridge, Mass. M. I. T. Press, 1969.
[291]   Kelly, H. H. *Personal Relationships: Their Structures and Process.* Hillsdale, N. J., Erlbaum. 1979.

react in a certain way for every set of circumstances. Schon and Argyris (1976) propose that human beings design their actions. They suggest there are two kinds of theory of action. The first is *espoused-theory* of action. But research has shown that few respondents acted in the same way as they espoused, which brings us to the second theory, *'theory-in-use'*. The gap between the two theories can be significant. They argue if we can make explicit the *theory-in-use*, then we can explain, predict and have a basis for changing these findings. However, I have already suggested that there are powerful reasons for the existence of the two theories. 'Unawareness' is designed, incongruence is designed, if they were not designed the overload on the information processing systems would be immense. This does not mean that the *theory-in-use* cannot be exposed and changed, but that special training is required to achieve this goal and the 'Equality of Service Project' was designed to do just this. *Theories-in-use,* then, are learnt behaviours that display underlying *Meta-Directions.* They were, perhaps, relevant at one time, but circumstances may have changed and they are no longer useful to that individual or organisation.

Argyris and Schon (1976) created a model of *theory-in-use* that most individuals appear to use. Model One, has four governing variables:

1. Strive to be in unilateral control.

2. Minimise losing and maximise winning.

3. Minimise the expression of negative feelings.

4. Be rational.

Model one also has two behavioural strategies:

1. Advocate your views without encouraging inquiry (thereby remaining in unilateral control and, it is hoped, win).

2. Unilaterally save face - yours and other people's (thereby minimising upsetting others or making them defensive by refraining from giving negative feedback).

They theorise that this model has been learnt thorough socialisation. When asked to explain how they learnt the above behaviour most people answer they don't know, or at a very early age.

Schon and Argyris (1976) argue that to change the way in which people behave, their *theory-in-use*, they must go through experiences where they identify the rules, the theories behind their response. If they have successfully identified the rules that comprise that part of the *theory-in-use* they can frequently modify what they have previously learnt. Therefore, action is necessary before learning of this nature can take place, because an individual has to expose their *theory-in-use* before they can hope to change it. Role-play and case-study are methods that are available to allow this process to take place and were extensively used during Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project', but this will be discussed later.

Consequences of 'Model One' thinking for Organisations

The model one theory causes individuals to make unjustifiable attributions and evaluations. People see no reason or justification to test their attributions and evaluations, because they believed them to be true. They are not aware of the many inferences embedded in their reasoning processes because everything is obvious and concrete. They had not learnt to think critically, or even what critical thinking actually

meant. As learners they are psychologically immature (Brookfield 1986)[292]. This is not surprising because they had learnt throughout life that most people would not disagree with them, or challenge their rules.

Schon and Argyris (1976) found that individuals made inferences that were at high levels of abstraction, where validity was problematic. They acted as if the inferences were not abstract but concrete. Such thoughts and actions will lead to unrecognised inconsistencies, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-sealing processes and, therefore, escalating levels of error. Here lies the route to bias, prejudice and discrimination. An automatic process is in being; individuals cannot effectively reflect on their behaviour because of their *theories-in-use*. They are aware of inconsistencies in others' behaviour, but they are programmed to withhold essential feedback in case they are held responsible for upsetting them. Even where they do attempt this, it is usually borne of immense anger built up over time. The feedback is then delivered in such away as to make the rejection almost inevitable. Any change programme that involves change in human behaviour must face up to, and deal with, this reality if it has any hope of success.

Research by Argyris (1976a) found that without the help of a trained facilitator individuals cannot undertake the necessary *double-loop learning* to escape this phenomena, even though they cognitively understand the process. An organisation may develop a culture that is more likely to be predisposed to *double-loop learning*. For example, it may have a commonly held belief that valid information is a good idea. However, frequently the *theory-in-use* is that valid information is a good idea, as long as it is not too threatening. If the information is too threatening, strategies are often adopted to hide or, change the information into a more acceptable form. This situation will

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[292]   Brookfield, S. D., *Op.Cit.*, 1986.

inevitably occur in any organisation where members are programmed with model one concepts.

Summary

This chapter has discussed, albeit briefly, learning theories concentrating on the constructionist approaches to learning. Within this framework, I have considered the vital role that social interaction plays in the formation, assimilation and accommodation of constructs. I have suggested that unless the *'zone of proximal development'* is reached, participants to any learning activity will not see the relevance and purpose of that activity to them and will, therefore, dismiss the learning as irrelevant. As Brookfield (1986)[293] explains:

> *"They [adult learners] like their learning activities to be*
> *problem centred and to be meaningful to their life*
> *situation, and they want the learning to have some*
> *immediacy of application. The past experiences of adults*
> *affect their current learning, sometimes serving as an*
> *enhancement, sometimes as a hindrance. Effective*
> *learning is also linked to the adult's subscription to a*
> *self-concept of himself or herself as a learner. Finally,*
> *adults exhibit a tendency toward self-directedness in their*
> *learning".*

If the *'zone of proximal development'* is reached, and as it will be different for everyone, a student-centred approach to learning seems the only possible choice; then *'scaffolding of learning'* from others may be possible. Where the learning concerns values, attitudes, beliefs, assumptions and behaviour, and in organisational change it nearly always will, this process may be painful. But as Brookfield (1986)[294] argues:

> *"At times facilitators will be called upon to prompt adults*
> *to confront painful facts and realities about their personal*
> *and work lives and about the social structures in which*
> *lives are rooted".*

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[293]   Brookfield, S. D., *Ibid.,* p31, 1986
[294]   Brookfield, S. D., *Ibid.,* p97, 1986

This process may well lead to *'cognitive dissonance'* occurring and the skill of the facilitator is to help individuals through this process, which may amount to a *'significant emotional event'* for that person. The danger here is two fold. First to achieve a sense of *'cognitive balance'*, individuals may take away the wrong message as a form of *'flight behaviour'*, in other words anything will do to stop the emotional distress. The second danger is to revert back to the previous, or similar, construct upon returning to the work environment, hence low transference of learning occurs.

Argyris and Schon (1996) have provided a major theory suggesting why individuals do not change to keep in touch with their changing environment, so that everyone is 'well balanced'. But to summarise, because the socialisation programme that individuals go through is so successful at teaching *'model one learning'*, it allows individuals to become blind to their *theories-in-use* and makes it highly unlikely that they can effectively reflect on past events or think critically. For these reasons, without skilled intervention it is highly likely that they will re-create their past errors, possibly in a slightly amended format. *Theory-in-use* learning as seen in *single-loop learning* interacts, not only to maintain and reinforce these consequences, but also to keep individuals unaware of the extent to which they are responsible for causing the consequences.

Whilst the consequences of this phenomena as demonstrated by Argyris and Schon are considerable for the individual, for an organisation they can have alarming effects. They create a situation where employees are in a *psychic prison*, stifling development and creating old solutions to today's problems. The organisation is trapped by its staff's inability to escape from this mind-set. Even if they recognise the need to change, they will probably lack the ability to succeed. Those who are not within this

cultural mind-set will be dismissed and those who dare to suggest what is happening will probably be dismissed, or even punished. Here we must be reminded of Bate's (1994) vicious circle syndrome and the disastrous consequences it will have for an organisation.

Cultural change in an organisation necessitates learning, learning necessitates action to deal with *espoused-theories* and *theories-in-use*. Therefore, experiences need to be created in a social setting, where people can reflect on, and evaluate, their freely chosen courses of action and obtain feedback from relevant others. These, then, are some of the principles upon which Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project' was based. The process and outcome of this cultural change initiative are the subject of the following chapters.

CHAPTER NINE

METHODOLOGY

This chapter explains the methodology used during Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project'. This project was designed to bring about cultural change within one particular police force. The research methodology selected was a case-study analysis of the interventionist, action-research undertaken as part of this change programme. A case-study, in this context, is one exploring a single entity, which is bound in time and activity (Yin, 1989)[295] (Creswell, 1994) [296]. Detailed information has been collected about this activity, the process of implementing a new grievance procedure and equal opportunity policy in Cambridgeshire Constabulary, using a variety of methods over a sustained period of time.

In design, the study was largely descriptive and analytical, with a mainly qualitative approach. However, quantitative methods of data collection were used, for example, a questionnaire was used at the start of the project. Additional quantitative data was available from the number of grievances recorded prior to the introduction of the new grievance procedure and after intervention. Further quantitative analysis was carried out by comparing how many grievances were resolved and at what stage they were resolved, before and after intervention.

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[295]   Yin, R. K. *Case-Study Research: Design and Methods*, Sage Publications, 1989.
[296]   Creswell, J. W., *Research Design Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Sage Publications, p 12, 1994.

Theoretical Development

This research did not begin with a specific theory to test or verify, although as explained in the previous chapter, some guiding principles were used to try to achieve cultural change. If any theory did exist it was very broad in nature; for example, that cultural change within an organisation was unlikely to occur unless the attitudes, values, beliefs and assumptions of staff support the organisation's goals. Other similar broad-ranging theories could be added; for example, it would be necessary to ensure structures and systems matched and reinforced the organisational goal if culture was to change. Therefore, case-study research in this context was consistent with the inductive model of thinking, in that a more specific theory may emerge during the collection and analysis of data. This theory would be 'grounded' in information from the study. In case-studies, 'pattern theory' is particularly relevant. This refers to an explanation that develops during naturalistic or qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba 1985)[297]. 'Pattern theory' does not place emphasis on logical deductive reasoning, but rather contains an interconnected set of concepts and relationships. It does not demand causal statements. Neuman (1991)[298] argues that instead pattern theory uses metaphor or analogies so that relationships makes sense. Pattern theories are systems of ideas that are designed to better inform. The concepts and relationships within them help to develop a mutually reinforcing closed system. Using grounded or pattern theory, that places emphasis on emergent theoretical development and inevitably restricts the placement of any specific theory. In essence, a specific theory must come at the end of the research as it emerges from analysis. Therefore, theoretical development is placed in the discussion at the end of the thesis.

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[297]   Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. G., *Naturalistic Inquiry*, Sage, 1985.
[298]   Neuman, W. L., *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, p39,1991.

Sample

Cambridgeshire Constabulary comprises some 2000-plus members of staff, both police and civilian. The force had, at the time of this research, about 1266 police officers, 522 civilian members of staff and 245 special constables. In 1994 the force had a budget of £59.8 million, of which £51.8 million was spent on staff costs (86.6%)[299]. The force is largely rural, but has two medium-sized cities. Cambridge is an old university city with a population of 100,000. Peterborough is a larger city with a population of 180,000 which has been developed into a 'new town' with a mixture of industry and commerce. The total population of Cambridgeshire is 683,200 and the force has one of the lowest police-to-population ratios in the country. The rest of the force consists of a number of small market towns in a largely rural setting.

Additionally, data was collected from a small number of other forces engaged in the process of implementing a new grievance procedure. This was undertaken to set the change that occurred in Cambridgeshire Constabulary in some context. Six other forces which operated a similar grievance procedure were compared by examining the method used to introduce the grievance procedure, the numbers of grievances recorded prior to implementation and the number recorded after implementation. A breakdown of the sample size of each forces is given in Chapter 12.

Additionally, whilst working on the thesis during 1995 I was asked to assist 'The South African Police Service' (SAPS) with it's cultural change programme. SAPS is a national police service of some 140,000 officers and many of the problems it faced were considerably different from those experienced in the United Kingdom. However, in

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[299]   Cambridgeshire Constabulary, *Annual Report 1993*, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, 1994.

introducing change many of the problems appeared remarkably similar, only on a greater scale. This offered a unique opportunity to make some comparisons, although I obviously appreciated the enormous cultural differences between the two countries. I have, therefore, used examples which seem to illuminate aspects of change that appear consistent across cultural divides. In the main they appeared to confirm trends identified in Cambridgeshire Constabulary's case-study and helped in the building of a conceptual framework to provide theoretical interpretations and insights.

Action-Research

Before exploring the methods used in this evaluation it should be emphasised that the project was based on the concept of 'Action Research' espoused by Kurt Lewin (1952) in his seminal work on planned change[300]. Lewin theorised that pure research models involving control groups and controlled experimental manipulation are neither feasible nor desirable when dealing with human systems. Lewin considered that one major problem lay in measurement. Measurement of social phenomena, such as culture, attitudes and organisational effectiveness, inevitably mean the techniques used to measure the effects of a prior intervention, themselves, automatically become the next intervention. The problem with measurement combined with the dynamic nature of a complex human system contained within an organisation of some 2000 employees necessitated a different approach to that traditional used within the police service i.e., a working party or project group tasked with examining a given area which then produce a report with recommendations.

This traditional approach denies the dynamic nature of an organisation and the effect each intervention has on the human system operating within it. The implementation

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[300]   Lewin, K., *Op.Cit.*, 1952.

process itself inevitably alters the original concept and may be in need of almost immediate modification. Earlier work by the author found the police service to be littered with reports that have been soundly researched, but many of the recommendations never implemented (CPTU)[301]. Holdaway and Barron (1993)[302] commented in recent research into the police service.

> "*All constabularies now need to marry their strategic planning to a programme of strategic implementation. Policy development, implementation and monitoring are often conceptualised and operationalised as three distinct phases of the policy process. In reality the inter-relatedness of the social world creates a more complex context where policy-initiation and implementation are inextricably linked. There is an important sense in which policy is made as it is moulded in practice by the various police ranks....... Strategic planning must, therefore, incorporate strategic implementation and this is where all chief officers should direct their attention. At the moment they are in danger of creating and sustaining a world of strategic policy that recognises the stumbling block of the occupational culture but does not reach out to it with a strategy of implementation*".

This project was, therefore, designed to use the concept of 'Action Research' as an essential component in bringing about organisational change. In previous chapters I have argued that organisations are, in fact, cultures and societies. They are extremely complex and multifaceted, whilst changes to structures, systems and procedures may produce some change they are unlikely to produce the intended outcome. Because culture is fluid and dynamic, it often changes in unexpected ways. An example of this is the implementation of intelligence-led crime investigation in Cambridgeshire Constabulary. Part of the implementation process involved splitting the traditional Criminal Investigation Department (CID) into small units. This initiative, which amounted to a significant attempt at cultural change, was not evaluated for over two

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[301] Community, Fairness and Quality Review Team. *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[302] Holdaway, S. and Barron A-M, *Op.Cit.*, p7, 1993.

years, but the consequences of this segmentalist approach was extremely damaging

(Lumley and Speechley 1996)[303]. Had the concept of 'Action-Research' been used,

problems could be have been identified and remedial action taken at an early stage. This

is a major benefit of using action-research in organisational change, where it is so difficult

to identify underlying problems. Elliott (1991)[304] makes this point in the educational

context, where often initial research may have misunderstood the nature of the problem,

or what needs to be improved; therefore errors are likely to occur. This is not to say that

intervention should be a random process, because this would neither be ethical nor

effective. Rather action-research recognises the complexity of formulating a theoretical

model that will predict consequences accurately and builds in a contingence plan to

rectify possible errors.

Schein (1988)[305] also considers that pure research models that use control groups

and controlled experimental conditions fail to address the inherent complexities of

organisations adequately. He feels this to be the case because:

1. We do not have precise enough measurement to determine what would constitute a

control group for something as complex as an organisation.

2. It would not be ethical to withhold an initiative from an organisation, or part of an

organisation, particularly when this could have a major impact on the lives of people

within that organisation.

3. It would be impossible to isolate, or control, the numerous variables in the rich

contextual setting of an organisation.

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[303]   Lumley, S. and Speechley C. M. *Op.Cit.*, 1996.
[304]   Elliott, J., *Action-Research For Educational Change, Open University Press*, pp 72-73, 1991.
[305]   Schein E. H., *Op.Cit.*, p241, 1988.

Schein (1988) also argues that the study of human systems within organisations can progress by using the action-research philosophy. He considers that by using carefully-designed organisational interventions (not experimental treatments) and studying their effects greater knowledge can be gained. This may not fit the traditional scientific criteria for research, but by observation, interviews, and other appropriate methods he argues it is possible to produce a reasonably bias-free approach to research.

The final point I considered when choosing to use this approach was governed by the subject matter. Organisational change involves change, not observing static behaviour, but deliberately trying to bring about a change in behaviour and attitudes and beliefs. As Lewin (1952) argues: *"If you want to study an organisation try to change it"*. This point goes back to Holdaway and Barron's (1993) earlier statement concerning the development of policy in isolation from implementation. The purpose of the thesis was to study implementation within an organisational setting, therefore action-research actually was part of the process of implementation. An example of this can be found by studying the effects of the decision to involve staff in the design/implementation process, as advocated by (Schein 1988) [306]. The following model was therefore used, it was developed by Kemmis *et.al.* (1981)[307] and is based upon the philosophy of action-research:

1. Identify and clarify general idea.

2. Reconnaissance

3. Construct general plan

4. Develop action steps

5. Implement action steps

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[306]   Schein E. H., *Op.Cit.*, p239, 1988.
[307]   Kemmis, S *et.al.*, *The Action-research Planner*, Victoria Australia, Deakin University, 1981.

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The basic premise behind action-research, then is constant on-going evaluation

and, therefore, several mechanisms were built into the project to facilitate this process.

First feedback was constantly used from other members of a force-wide project group.

Second, monitoring of grievances made during the implementation process helped to

identify changes that needed to be made and, finally, feedback from managers attending

one of the 34 manager's courses over a six-month period provide an invaluable source of

information. Data gained thorough this process allowed the project to develop and

amend both the equal opportunity policy and grievance procedure to their final state.

Collection of Data

The question of cataloguing and analysing the data proved problematic because

of organisational constraints of having to run a major project at the same time as carry

out research. Normally a thorough review of relevant literature would first occur before

carrying out specific research. To some extent this did happen, but not to the level I

would personally have wished prior to implementation. However, outside political

pressures from Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, pending industrial tribunal

cases and internal pressures to comply with Home Office circulars necessitated action

and the introduction of new policies and procedure. This approach encouraged the

research to be 'action-oriented' and, as the project progressed, research began to produce

a conceptual framework based in 'grounded theory' (Strauss and Corbin 1990)[308]. This

helped to illuminate and question, or support theoretical formulations, whilst minimising

preconceived bias. As Creswell (1994)[309] argues, one of the strengths of this research is

the continual comparison of data with emerging categories, and the theoretical sampling

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[308]   Strauss, A., and Corbin, J., *Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990.
[309]   Creswell, J. W., *Op.Cit.*, p12, 1994.

of different groups to maximise the similarities and difference. Data for this research was, therefore, collected in the following way:

i)   A brief review of relevant literature occurred prior to the implementation of the Equality of Service Project. However, this was a continuous process and has been more intensive following the completion of the project in March 1995. The results of this literature review are largely contained within the first eight chapters of this thesis.

ii).   Measurement of the situation prior to implementation by:

a) Analysis of previous research carried out in other police forces into related issues by independent researchers, internal police research and reports of HMIC.

b) Analysis of research that had already been undertaken in Cambridgeshire Constabulary. The above information provided a broad picture of many cultural issues within the police service but this provided specific information about the force's culture. For example, 'The Gender Culture Audit', carried out by Kelly, (1993),[310] an independent, researcher, contains comment and analysis following interview with 58 female police officers.

c) Kelly's (1993), research was largely carried out at constable or sergeant level and did not really ascertain senior managers' views. I considered that senior managers would be critical to the implementation of any cultural change programme and, therefore, decided to interview a number of senior managers as part of a general reconnaissance. I interviewed two ACPO ranks, seven superintendents (out of a total of 13) and one senior civilian manager which represented over one third of senior managers. These interviews

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[310]   Kelly J . *Op.Cit.,* 1993.

were largely unstructured and all but one was taped (one person objected to the presence of a tape recorder).

d) Whilst conducting these interviews, I visited every police station in the force and carried out participant observation of a non-contributory nature, which also helped to illuminate the previous findings from the above sources. To record this information I used a diary to make as many notes at the time, or soon afterwards, as possible.

e) At the beginning of 1994 the number of existing grievances was very small, four were recorded during 1993, two of which were registered with an industrial tribunal. Critical analysis of these and interviews with people involved in those grievances indicated clear areas for development.

f) The previous research provided a qualitative description of the organisational culture within Cambridgeshire Constabulary regarding equal opportunities and the grievance procedure. Whilst the qualitative data was highly descriptive, it was decided to supplement this research with a more quantitative source of data from a questionnaire. A questionnaire was therefore designed (Appendix four) to obtain the opinions and beliefs of staff concerning a number of equality issues. The questionnaire was also designed to provide a benchmark against which future change could be measured and would help to analyse trends over a period of time. The initial questions dealt with the level of confidence that staff had in the selection methods used by the force and was piloted on three internal Equal Opportunity courses in May 1994. A focus group discussion with 31 staff on these courses resulted in some amendments, both to the structure and content of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed through the internal post in plain

covered envelopes. A pre-addressed envelope was included to encourage returns. The questionnaire was also printed on bright yellow paper; previous experience with questionnaires indicated that response rates seemed to be higher if the questionnaire was printed on brightly coloured paper. The questionnaire was distributed to 512 members staff (36% of all staff) in June 1994. Because the number of female police officers are proportionately small compared to male officers, about 12%, I decided that it was necessary to send the questionnaire to all female officers, to obtain a large enough response rate to be statistically significant. An equal number of male officers and civilian members of staff (civilians have equal proportions of male and female staff) were sent a questionnaire. Male police officers and civilian staff were randomly selected; 332 questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 64.8%.

iii)   All managers in the force were trained, both police and civilian (294) and included every rank from sergeant to chief constable. The course lasted for two days and on average there were 10 participants on each course. Participant observation of this process provided an immensely rich source of data which I recorded at the time in a diary.

iv)   The courses were evaluated by all participants at the end of the course by completion of an anonymous feedback form. The forms were collected at the end of the second day, so virtually 100% were completed. The completed forms were left by participants, turned upside down by the door as they left, this was to ensure that both completion and collection was totally anonymous. (Appendix five).

v)   Following the completion of the training programme I interviewed a sample of staff who had made, or dealt with, a grievance under the new procedure. Staff were also interviewed who had been involved in the new grievance procedure, either as a perpetrator or connected in some other way. Additionally, questionnaires (Appendix 14 and 15) were also completed at the time of interview by people who had made, or dealt with a grievance. Interviews were carried out as follows:

> a. 13 members of staff who had made a grievance.
>
> b. 13 members of staff who had handled a grievance.
>
> c. 16 members of staff who were involved in a grievance, i.e. perpetrator.

vi)   Analysis of the number and type of grievances was also made following introduction of the new grievance procedure. This also included examining the level of resolution at each stage.

vii)   Six other forces were also visited. Interviews with staff responsible for introducing a new grievance procedure took place and any available evaluative data was obtained. A comparison was made with the number of grievances recorded prior to and after introduction of the new procedure. I should clearly state that this was a very limited comparison and really only serves to indicate the need for further research across a larger cross section of police forces.

Treatment of Data:

A two-file system was used to collect the data which helped to create a progressive focus, which I believed would best support this type of research. I shall briefly explain how this worked. File A consisted of an index of interviews and

documents which make up the data base. The data base contained the original interview tapes, field notes, completed questionnaires, recorded grievances and other relevant documents. File B consisted of an index of the issues as they emerged which are cross-referenced with each piece of supporting evidence. In essence, the qualitative data was triangulated and analysed. At least three separate sources of information were used before an issue was highlighted.

This method of data collection has some fundamental flaws which I attempted to allow for. First, it did provide a progressive focus on emerging issues, but they could very easily become based upon quantity, i.e. the number of times an issue was raised, rather than the quality of the data. Secondly, the interpretative nature of the system allowed for the creation of subject headings which could be highly subjective. The headings were obviously derived from analysis of the available data which gave the appearance of progressive focus. However, action-based research has to be, by its very nature, reflective and requires the use of judgement, particularly when it is of a highly naturalistic nature. This system of data collection is suitable for emergent, action-based research of a highly qualitative nature, but if the researcher has a particular bias it may contaminate the findings. This caused me some concern, particularly when many of the emerging issues were exactly as I expected them to be. As a participant and someone who was not only directly involved in the intervention, but also observation, it was inevitable that any analysis of data was going to be interpretative and filtered thorough my own experience. The strength of action-research, as part of an organisational change programme, is that it does allow for rapid responses to be made, but to some extent there is bound to be a highly subjective element.

To combat the above phenomena, I attempted to minimise the subjectivity in four ways. The first way was as a result of being a director of studies at the CPTU. In this role you undertake six months of intensive training, where particular emphasis is placed upon developing critically thinking skills, i.e. de-centring and questioning your own bias and assumptions. This, I believed, allowed me to question the findings for personal bias continually, but, of course, this method is not foolproof. Second, I continually sought verification from other members of the project team and other staff as to their interpretation of the findings. Third, I used quantitative data to act as a comparative to the qualitative data. For example, there was a significant increase in the number of grievances; this was an undisputed fact and indicated something had happened. The effectiveness of the new grievance procedure was assessed by referral to the number of grievances made before and after implementation, the ratio of those successful resolved and at what stage in the procedure they were resolved. Finally, I submitted all the data to a qualified and experienced evaluator from another force to check for bias. Whilst this was time consuming, I believed it essential to minimise the effects of my own unintentional bias.

The next chapter, then, contains a case-study, which provides a description of the change programme undertaken as part of Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project', which led to the introduction of a new grievance procedure.

CHAPTER TEN

A CASE STUDY

THE EQUALITY OF SERVICE PROJECT

Reconnaissance (January - May 1994)

Cambridgeshire Constabulary initially introduced an Equal Opportunity Policy in

1987 (Appendix 3) and was one of the first force's in the country to do so. However, by

1994, this policy had been superseded by guidance from a number of sources, including

HMIC and the Home Office. The existing policy restricted itself to areas covered by

legislation i.e. gender, race and marital status, but did not concern itself with the myriad

of other issues to which fair treatment could apply. The existing grievance procedure

(Appendix four), for police officers was introduced in 1989; this also restricted itself to

areas covered by legislation. An equal opportunity steering group and a separate quality

of service steering group, both chaired by the deputy chief constable had existed for

several years. In 1993, both groups were amalgamated under one heading; however, the

last time they met was in July 1993.

Existing Training

Since 1992 about 600 constables had received 2 days of training, as part of a

programme based upon the community and race relations training package developed by

the Home Office Specialist Support Unit (SSU). The training was delivered by in-force

facilitators who had attended the SSU's six-week 'Trainers' Course'. Managers, both

police and civilian, had received a one-day training session, provided by the SSU with the

assistance of a force trainer. This training was subject to an internal evaluation (1992)[311] and the evaluation report raised some important issues. For example:

> "The Equal Opportunities initiative was successful in
> creating a general awareness of the national issues and
> concerns. The situation involving personal liability for
> actions was more than stressed to the groups. The manner
> in which such points were put across may have caused
> some rejection of the training process itself".

The report suggested that, while the training did raise awareness, it was largely ineffective. This was due to a number of factors that the report attempts to explain:

> "The absence of clear links between force-stated
> objectives as well as a final 'reporting back', mechanism
> tends to indicate a missed opportunity to harness fully the
> training provided to the force's needs. The view that the
> objective in regard to 'promoting current force policy' was
> not greatly advanced is, perhaps, most briefly reflected in
> the words of an acting inspector. Having completed the
> seminar, he was asked what the force policy consisted of.
> His reply was ' stay within the law? - I have no particular
> awareness beyond that' ".

Other problematic issues were raised, such as the style of training, which tended to be very didactic and pedagogical. This training programme appears to have been an attempt at cultural change within the force, but lacked a comprehensive cultural change strategy. The report provides examples of this:

> "The lack of direct visible links between ACPO rank
> officers and the initiative made some feel the commitment
> was not complete. Many 'in-force' problems were used to
> illustrate how key policies were publicly felt to run against
> any Equal Opportunities programme".

Additionally, whilst the programme attempted awareness raising it did not go beyond that, but the absence of any skills-based training was recognised by only a few. The outcome of this training initiative, staff having a two-day training package and managers a one-day package, was also problematic. Staff appeared to be more aware of equal

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[311]   Cambridgeshire Constabulary, *Equal Opportunities: Awareness Training For Supervisors*, Evaluation Report, unpublished document, 1992.

opportunity issues, particularly aspects of legislation, than their managers. This led to a situation where staff were increasingly able to recognise infringements by managers, not only of policy, but also breaches in codes of practice and legislation, whilst managers remained largely unaware of the complexities contained within the law. Organisationally, this was potentially disastrous and urgent intervention was necessary to rectify the situation.

Internal Pressures to Change

The above explanation illustrates some of the internal factors influencing the need to introduce new policies and procedures and also indicated a need for expeditious implementation, but these still did not provide adequate organisational, or efficiency motivators to change. The Sex and Race Discrimination acts provide all staff with a procedure to pursue a claim of discrimination to an industrial tribunal. However, this process is extremely expensive both to the force and staff associations, often leaving all sides embittered. Interviews with police officers who had registered a case of alleged discrimination with an industrial tribunal, following the invoking of the existing grievance procedure, indicated that none wanted to pursue their grievance to tribunal and all felt that if their grievance had been dealt with differently, then this process would have been unnecessary. This research also indicated that the successful resolution of a grievance depended on early intervention by a manager, who the aggrieved has confidence in and a procedure which staff also trusted. When the project commenced in January 1994 the force had two cases registered with an industrial tribunal and it was clear that the grievance procedure, as it then existed, had not worked for either of the two plaintiffs, or the organisation.

Research carried out by Auton *et.al.*, in 1993 [312] indicated that staff had little or no knowledge of the grievance procedure, or any faith in it. The quotations contained below provide some indication of the culture that existed in 1993. They are drawn from two separate pieces of research. The first is from Kelly (1993),[313] an independent researcher, commissioned by the force to research equality issues within the force:

> *"The grievance procedure is laughable because it requires you to report whoever is harassing you to a more senior officer who would be a man. So you would have to go to a very high rank. This would be a man obsessed with evidence. The chances are you are going to be moved. They'd have a quiet word and be 'all lads together'. Is it worth it ? "*

> *"I wouldn't use the complaints procedure as everyone would know about it. I know someone who made a complaint and it wasn't taken seriously"*

> *"The whole culture is one of suspicion and doubt"*

> *"If you say something has been happening over a period of time they'd say, why didn't you tell me about it on day one? You can't win. And what would happen to your career?"*

Research from other sources also indicated that there were considerable cultural obstacles to overcome in introducing a new grievance procedure, if staff were going to have any more faith in the new procedure than the old. The following quotes were contain in an internal research document entitled, *'Equality Issues in the Workplace'*, (Auton *et.al.* 1993)[314].

> *"The force published an Equal Opportunity Policy Statement in June 1987....... Everyone we spoke to was unaware of this document and would not know where to get hold of a copy, although it was published on General Orders 5/1987".*[315]

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[312]   Auton, M., *et al., Peterborough District Sub-Division Study of Equality in the Workplace*, Unpublished document, Cambridgeshire Constabulary 1993.
[313]   Kelly J., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[314]   Auton, M., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[315]   Auton, M., *Ibid.*, p 9, 1993.

> *"The perception of staff on this sub-division, and we have
> no reason to doubt that this is a belief held throughout the
> force is that:*
>
> *i. It relates only to female staff.*
> *ii. The grievance procedure is not understood and
> certainly not trusted.*
> *iii. Equal opportunities exists in this force as a policy
> statement only.*
> *iv. Managers lack the understanding of grievances to deal
> with them.*

It can be seen that there were a number of internal pressures to bring about change, but

most of these had been in existence for sometime prior to the project commencing

without any real action taking place.

External Pressures to Change

External pressures to change came from a number of different quarters, for

example, the following comments were made by the HMIC in their 1993 inspection of

Cambridgeshire Constabulary:

> *"Her Majesty's Inspector was disappointed at the lack of
> knowledge amongst officers on matters concerning equal
> opportunities and the grievance procedure. Whilst these
> comments do not exclusively apply to Cambridgeshire, it
> is evident that a written policy and strategy on this subject
> has not received the degree of internal understanding
> necessary and Her Majesty's Inspector will wish to witness
> an improvement at the time of his next inspection".*[316]

Added to this in March 1993 Home Office curricular 16/1993[317], was circulated

to all forces. This circular recommended increasing the scope of grievance procedures,

and added pressure upon the force to amend the existing procedure. It can be seen that

there was considerable pressure, both internally and externally on the force to try to

improve the situation. However, it was not possible to introduce a new grievance

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[316]   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, *Report of Annual Inspection of*
        Cambridgeshire Constabulary Home Office, pp 5 1993.

[317]   Home Office, *Op.Cit.,* 1993.

procedure that covered all aspects of internal fairness, without amending the Equal

Opportunity Policy which still restricted itself to areas covered by legislation. Therefore,

in January 1994 I was asked to undertake a project to develop a number of initiatives

under the heading of Equal Opportunity and Quality of Service. I considered the most

significant change was the introduction of a new grievance procedure, because this had

the potential, as is argued in chapter four, to bring about fundamental culture change.

The above research indicted that in many ways the force was no better or worse

than many other forces. Staff had little faith in the grievance procedure, which was hardly

used. Of the four grievances made during 1993, two were registered with an industrial

tribunal, one was made and apparently lost for six months and the other was resolved.

Staff had little knowledge of the Equal Opportunity Policy or existing grievance

procedure. The above data provided a broad picture of the situation in January 1994, but

significantly, senior managers' views appeared to be missing. The role of senior managers

in implementing cultural change is critical to its success, as Wilson (1994)[318] argues:

> *"It is management thinking and action which ultimately*
> *determines an organisation's characteristics and culture*
> *in which people work".*

I, therefore, decided to interview all sub-divisional senior managers and visit each police

station in the force.

Interviews with Senior Managers

Staff selection problems were a consistent theme raised by senior managers, they

felt they were spending too much time selecting staff and were not allowed enough

freedom to appoint the staff they want. As one superintendent said:

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[318]   Wilson, T., *A Manual for Change*, Gower, p xii, 1994.

*"I'm still in a cultural time warp, I feel comfortable with
the system where, if you had a vacancy you'd try someone
in it who you thought was OK; if it worked out they'd stay,
if not they would go. It was OK because nobody bitched
about having the same opportunities".*

This is an example of the strength of culture that was prevalent at the time. Systems were

in place to restrict some local selection procedures by senior managers, but at times they

were unwelcome and seen as an unnecessary restriction. There was considerable

evidence from the headquarters-based, Career Development Department that some

managers regularly tried to circumvent systems in an effort to appoint their particular

favourite. Another point the above comment raises is the attitude of senior managers to

individuals that raise potential grievances. As one superintendent said:

*"The grievance procedure is nothing but a whinger's
charter."*

These comments are both indicative of an attitude displayed by a number of senior

managers at the time, but it must be said not all shared this view.

About 12 months earlier (March 1993) the report entitled, 'Gender Culture Audit

For Cambridgeshire Constabulary', by Kelly (1993)[319], was distributed to all

sub-divisional commanders. The report criticised many aspects of culture within the

force, as already discussed. Kelly (1993) found that 61% of policewomen and 64% of

civilian women were sure that the force had an Equal Opportunity Policy. The report put

forward a comprehensive package of recommendations to address many of the problems

found during the research. However, it was now a year later, and there did not appear to

be any real evidence of implementation. I, therefore, asked senior managers to comment

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[319]   Kelly, J., *Op.Cit.*, pp 23-30, 1993.

on what they had done to implement the recommendations contained in Kelly's research.

The following reply was typical:

> "I can't remember what it said, was it the document that
> quotes were in, as to women and blacks particularly ......?
> I recall responding to it, I circulated it to the management
> team and returned it to where it came ..... The only
> initiative we took within the sub-division was that we
> personally spoke to every female officer, and indicated we
> would take any grievances and treat them seriously and
> they could report them to their shift inspectors without
> any repercussions, because it seemed tailored to equality
> amongst women".

No grievances were recorded during the year that followed from this sub-division. This

approach should be balanced with some positive initiatives developed on one

sub-division. Here the sub-divisional commander appointed a small working party that

produced a report on equality issues on that division (Auton *et.al.* 1993)[320]. The members

of this working party however, received an extremely hostile reception from some peers

and managers. As one of them said:

> "It was horrible, they hated us, on occasions it almost
> amounted to physical attacks from some managers; all we
> did was to produce a report on equality issues on our
> sub-division, but at least our sub-division did something
> and the issue was placed on the agenda".

The interviews provided evidence of five central themes:

1. Equal opportunities was largely seen as a minority issue and not central to the

successful well being of the force.

2. Responses to claims of discrimination from senior managers were likely to be

victim-oriented and hostile.

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[320]   Auton, M., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

3. Research, albeit commissioned at considerable expense by the force, was not valued or acted upon.

4. Little or no actual change had taken place.

5. Major cultural change was required if the new grievance procedure had any hope of success.

It would be unfair to leave the reader with the view that all senior managers' held these opinions; they certainly appeared typical of the majority (at the beginning of 1994), but as one did comment:

> *"Equal Opportunities will not work in the police service*
> *until people realise it is not only the right way of doing*
> *things, but it is also the best way".*

Interviews with Aggrieved Staff

As I have already mentioned, evidence from previous research into Cambridgeshire Constabulary (e.g., Kelly 1993 and Auton *et.al.*, 1993) indicated that there existed a fear of making a grievance, or of voicing opinions contrary to the accepted norm and, subsequently, staff had little faith in the grievance procedure. Evidence suggested this was due not so much due to the procedure that was used, but rather to the people who operated it. An example of this is given by a member of staff who had made a grievance under the old procedure. This individual was interviewed by a senior manager as a result of making a grievance. I interviewed the aggrieved some months later. He/she said:

> *"When I went in he (Y) opened the conversation, he was so*
> *official it was unbelievable, you would not have realised*
> *there was such a gap in the rank, he never smiled*
> *throughout and he was very tense throughout the*
> *interview, I got the impression that he was doing*
> *something he did not want to do, nor wanted to give any*
> *time to; he was doing it under sufferance. Very early on I*

was knocked off balance and I never got it back again. Nearly all of the questions were closed and they were phrased in such a way, that I found it very difficult to answer very simple questions. He became very angry and frustrated, because I was not delivering what he wanted to hear. I think I said, 'Sir I can't give you a clear answer.' There were quite long pauses in between the questions and answers and I became confused.

Question: Did you think the grievance was resolvable at the start of the interview?

Reply: Yes, all I ever wanted was someone to listen to me, but I don't think he took any account of what I said.

Question: What would you have liked to happen?

Reply: I should have been listened to, that was the biggest thing, I deserved to be listened to. When X (another senior officer) moved to the department he saw me and I felt he could have resolved it, as he said don't worry the cavalry was here, but he had the whole chain of command against him, he just didn't deliver, I felt he was forced to let things take their course, he was the only humanitarian.

Question: What was the worst thing that happened?

Reply: The worst thing was the interview with Y, I could see that other managers socialised together, but I really believed that Y had the clout to resolve it. But I realised the hopelessness of the situation, there was nowhere else left to go, it just destroyed me. The way Y acted reduced me to rubble, I was absolutely destroyed by that interview.

Question: What was the best thing that happened?

Reply: If we can make progress now, making sure a similar incident doesn't happen again or at least having some sort of structure where if people are having problems, there is someone they can go to. But using the same managers in the same department, well it didn't work for me. The other thing was the need for support, I felt really isolated and thought the job didn't care about me".

This individual, who was the complainant in a case of alleged unlawful discrimination, indicates that the worst aspect of the whole situation was the final interview which took place under the old grievance procedure. This was, in his/her view,

even worse than the acts originally complained about. This theme was identified by other people interviewed who had made a grievance under the existing procedure, even though this number was very small (4 in 1993). Why did this happen, these were skilled senior managers who were used to interviewing staff? A possible reason seems to lie in the prevailing culture that dictated past and present practices. Staff were not supposed to question their treatment, senior managers were not used to this and many did not know how to handle the situation. The closest concept they had to dealing with a grievance was interviewing members of staff under the complaints and discipline procedure. Here interviews generally took place under caution and the outcome could well be the instigation of criminal or disciplinary proceedings, the emphasis certainly was not on resolution. The grievance procedure, if it was to work, necessitated a radically-different approach, much more in-line with other developments in management, such as empowerment, teamwork and consultation. This was a major departure from the culture most managers had personally experienced, that of an unquestioning autocratic and bureaucratic management structure. Interviews suggested that individuals believed they were doing the right thing, but were trapped in a cultural mind-set that created a *blind-spot*. These *blind-spots*, could be described as *'Cultural Dysfunctionalism'* (Bate 1994)[321]. They place cognitive barriers on perception, self-reflection, and learning. The sum total of their effect in this case was organisational under achievement; an internal grievance procedure had existed for four years, but had the effect of making things worse not better.

Analysis of current culture indicated it was necessary to obtain further quantitative data by way of a questionnaire. Kelly (1993) had restricted her research to interviewing female members of staff, which gave an unacceptable bias in her findings.

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[321]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.*, p88, 1994.

She was aware of this and explained this to the force but, nevertheless, was told to go ahead regardless. The results of the questionnaire would also provide an additional benchmark to ascertain where the change programme was starting from, without unnecessarily delaying the implementation of the programme. The research methodology behind the questionnaire is discussed in the previous chapter but, following collation of the completed questionnaires and analysis, the following information became available.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire was distributed in June 1994 to 512 members of staff and had a response rate of 64.8% (see chapter 10 for details). An analysis of the responses made now follows. The questions are shown in bold and the responses, with comment, are shown below:

Q 1. I believe the methods used to select staff for posts in this force are fair and objective.

Response: Agree 24.5%   Disagree 43.3%   Unsure 31.9%

Q 2. I believe the methods used to select staff for promotion in this force are fair and objective.

Response: Agree 16.9%   Disagree 39.7%   Unsure 43.4%

The responses to these questions appear to indicate a low level of satisfaction with selection methods used by the force at the time. This seem to indicate that staff were on occasions dissatisfied about a particular selection process. Indeed more people disagreed with the statements than agreed. Staff were obviously dissatisfied or unsure as to the level of fairness and reliability of the selection methods used and you would, therefore, expect that there would have been a correspondingly high level of recorded grievances. However, there were no recorded grievances in the first six months of 1994 in respect of selection and only two in 1993. This evidence would appear to correlate with the

evidence contained in the previously mentioned research regarding the lack of trust and confidence staff had in the existing grievance procedure.

Q 3. All vacancies for posts, except in exceptional cases, should be advertised.

Response: Agree 87.1%   Disagree 9.0%   Unsure 3.9%

The response to this question indicated a clear desire to see most posts advertised, although this may not always be practical or desirable, i.e. extremely short notice. At this time some post were advertised and some were not; no clear advertising policy existed.

Q 4. I believe the force is committed to Equality of Opportunity.

Response: Agree 43.5%   Disagree 25.3%   Unsure 31.2%

The response to this question was particularly encouraging as the majority of staff did believe the force was committed to this issue and is, perhaps, a result of the earlier training that staff had received; nevertheless a sizeable minority were unsure. The high level of dissatisfaction shown regarding selection procedures also, perhaps indicates that staff did not make a close link between selection for posts and equal opportunities. This may have been indicative of a lack of understanding as to what constitutes equality of opportunity; nevertheless, most did agree with the statement. However, this finding was not supported by qualitative research (e.g., Kelly 1993 Auton *et.al.,* 1993). Schein (1988) is critical of the use of questionnaires in gathering data on organisational cultural issues. He considers that they merely skim the surface of cultural issues, and the response to this question may well support this view.

Q 5. I consider the appraisal system used for police officers (when they have completed their probation) provides an accurate assessment of that person's performance.

Response: Agree 24.7%   Disagree 46.7%   Unsure 28.6%

Q 6. I consider the appraisal system used for police officers (during their probation), provides an accurate assessment of that person's performance.

Response: Agree 49.2%   Disagree 17.0%   Unsure 33.8%

The responses to Questions five and six were only answered by police officers. It can clearly be seen that the probationers' appraisal system enjoyed a much higher level of support than that used by all other officers in the force. The probationer system assesses officers against 36 skill and ability areas, whereas the other system uses only eight areas. During the critical analysis of existing grievances, all appraisals of one rank were reviewed over a five-year period. The quality of the appraisals was generally very poor, and often late in completion, sometimes never being completed. Comments were made that they were bland and little evidence was offered in support. Overall, the appraisals indicated that appraisal skills were very low in most supervisors; the current system used by most police officers in Cambridgeshire was inadequate and the probationer system was far more accurate and popular. All of these observations were made some three years earlier in an evaluation of the force appraisal system.[322] This is, perhaps, a further example of the ineffectiveness of traditional approaches to research and their subsequent effect, or lack of effect, in bringing about change in the police service. Most of the recommendations made in the evaluation in 1991 were never acted upon, therefore the same weaknesses still existed.

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[322]   Cambridgeshire Constabulary, *An Evaluation of Cambridgeshire Constabulary's Appraisal System*, Unpublished document, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, 1991.

Q 7. I think there should be an appraisal system available to all civilian members of staff.

Response: Agree 75.4%   Disagree 7.2%   Unsure 17.4%

Q 8. I consider the new civilian appraisal system being piloted provides an accurate and reliable measurement of performance.

Response: Agree 11.6%   Disagree 12.5%   Unsure 75.9%

Both questions seven and eight applied only to civilian members of staff. When the questionnaire was distributed, no appraisal system existed for civilians; however a new system was in the process of being piloted in one part of the force. This was accompanied by a training programme for supervisors. Nevertheless, this response does indicate a high level of uncertainty amongst staff about the new appraisal system, but an overwhelming number of staff wanted an appraisal system.

Q 9. I consider that I have adequate knowledge and understanding of the force grievance procedure.

Response: Agree 49.3%   Disagree 32.6%   Unsure 18.1%

This response was possibly the most surprising. Previous research indicated that staff had little or no knowledge of the procedure. It would appear from this response that staff believed that they had adequate knowledge and understanding, which clearly contradicts the previous findings. Of course, this is a very subjective question and the experience of the facilitators running the 'Managing Conflict and Grievance Courses' found that managers' knowledge was generally very poor. A legitimate criticism of this question would be to ask that if the grievance procedure is hardly ever used, do staff need a higher level of understanding. Perhaps this thought was in the mind of the people who answered

this question and skewed the replies, or simply they believed they were more competent in dealing with grievances than they actually were.

Had this research simply been restricted to asking staff what training they wanted, or felt they needed, then clearly providing more information on the grievance procedure would not have been a high priority. However, when previous grievances were examined and aggrieved staff interviewed, the data showed that grievances were not being dealt with effectively. There was clearly a mismatch of how people perceived their ability and reality. The reasons for this may simply be that there had been so few grievances (four in 1993) that most staff did not know how difficult they could be to resolve. Evidence from interviews with aggrieved staff indicated that some managers lacked conflict management skills and so gave the impression of being unsympathetic. The evidence seems to suggest that grievance handlers believed themselves to be competent, but the reality from the point of view of aggrieved staff contradicted this view.

Q 10. I would value having an informal and confidential source of advice and support on fairness-related issues.

Response: Agree 78.4%   Disagree 2.7%   Unsure 18.9%

The response to this question indicates a clear desire for confidential advice. Whilst this was not directly part of this project, it did indicate the need to introduce an 'Informal Contact System', which was planned for 1996. This response does raise another question as to why they wanted an informal contact system. This is, perhaps, supportive of other evidence in that it reinforces the lack of confidence in the existing grievance procedure.

Q 11. If I made a grievance I would be confident of receiving a fair hearing.

Response: Agree 30.1%   Disagree 26.8%   Unsure 43.1%

The response to this question indicates a considerable level of uncertainty, with only one third of those responding thinking they would receive a fair hearing. This response is supported by qualitative data.

Q 12. This question related to selection methods and asked staff which method they preferred.

The question was not directly related to this project, but briefly, 78.5% wanted selection by a mixture of assessment centre, interview and past appraisals. Staff did not want selection by senior officers alone, which is, perhaps, indicative of the level of mistrust shown by questions one and two.

Q 14. Have you any other comment you would like to make concerning selection and appraisals in Cambridgeshire Constabulary?

This question was of a qualitative nature and required staff to write their responses. Two key issues emerged. The first concerned the perception of civilian staff who believed they were treated apart and separate to police officers and that bias was shown in selection for posts in favour of ex-police officers. This response also supports the response given to questions 1 and 2. The following comments were typical:

"There are too many civilian posts filled by ex-police officers under 'jobs for the boys and girls'"

"I would like to see every job advertised, even moves within departments. Plus a career structure for civilians; at the moment there is no way you can better yourself"

The second issue concerned the appraisal system used for police officers, when they have completed their probation. Again the response to this question supported the response made to questions 5 and 6. The following comments were typical:

"Appraisals on staff should be along the lines of the probationer system with objective assessments based on evidence".

Q 15. How important do you feel the issue of Equal Opportunities is to the police service.

Very Important	Neither Agree/Disagree	Not Important
71.7%	23.0%	5.3%

The response to this question showed that most staff thought equal opportunities was very important to the service, which was very encouraging. However, evidence from some of the other questions, on selection and the grievance procedure, combined with evidence from interviews and existing grievances, indicated there was still a considerable shortfall of the necessary knowledge and skills to deal with issues in this area. This helped to focus the training on these areas, rather than purely awareness-raising.

The information gained from the questionnaire and qualitative data gained from interview, observation, analysis of previous grievances and previous research helped to provide an understanding of many of the underlying attitudes, values and beliefs, as well as some key assumptions that were being made. This process of gradually peeling back layers of culture to expose the *Meta-Directions* that govern behaviour (Bate 1994)[323] helped to identify what the specific problems were, rather than the manifesting symptoms. The reconnaissance exercise helped to identify key issues that needed to be addressed if implementation of a new grievance procedure was going to be successful. These issues were as follows:

1. Change the attitude, values, beliefs and assumptions *(Meta-Directions)* of managers to the grievance procedure so that they saw it in a more positive way.

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[323]   Bate, P., *Op.Cit.,* pp 198 -200, 1994.

2. Develop a belief *(Meta-Directions)* in managers that they are empowered to deal with the grievance and that they would not personally suffer any adverse treatment.

3. I also theorised if managers believed in the grievance procedure they would influence their staff to have more faith in the system. I considered this to be particularly important for more junior managers who were probably going to be seen as a *'significant other'* (Sullivan 1947) [324] by staff because of the closeness of there relationship.

4. I also considered it essential to develop adequate knowledge and skills of managers so they could effectively deal with grievances.

The reconnaissance helped to construct a general plan that, in turn, formed a development strategy. Analysis also indicated that the introduction of a new grievance procedure without addressing many cultural issues was likely to result in little actual change. If a new grievance procedure was successfully implemented, then the research indicated that the number of grievances would increase as staff felt more confident in raising issues. It would probably take some time to resolve many of these problems, therefore, the number of grievances would remain high, but would eventually decline. The next section, then, discusses how the implementation strategy was put into effect.

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[324]   *Significant Other* as first proposed by Sullivan (1947), is any person who is important and influential in affecting an individual's development of social norms, values and personal self-image. Usually a significant other is someone who has power over and provides a point of reflection for accepting and rejecting values, norms and behaviours.
        Sullivan, H. S., *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry*, Washington, W. H. White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947.

Construction of a General Plan (June to September 1994)

Project Structure

It became clear from analysis of all the data mentioned in the previous section

that if the Equality of Service Project was to have any hope of success an organisational

structure needed to be developed to assist the implementation programme. An 'Equal

Opportunity and Quality Of Service Steering Group' already existed, its purpose was to

develop issues under these separate headings. However, the last time this group met was

in July 1993. From discussion with senior managers and the infrequent nature of the

meetings it became clear that the steering group was no longer effective. Senior

managers in charge of the Human Resources and Quality of Service departments

indicated that they were aware of the situation and were eager to develop a revised

structure. A suggested structure was subsequently developed and a paper submitted on 3

May 1994 to the Force Executive Group for approval. The basic structure is shown

below (Model three):

EQUALITY OF SERVICE
PROJECT
STRUCTURE

FORCE EXECUTIVE

GROUP

FULL-TIME PROJECT TEAM

Project Manager and two members of staff

PART-TIME PROJECT TEAM

Representatives from Departments and Staff Associations

NORTHERN	CENTRAL	SOUTHERN	HEADQUARTERS
Divisional Action Groups	Divisional Action Groups	Divisional Action Groups	Divisional Action Groups

MODEL 3

The diagram shows a central project team and an action group on each division accountable to the deputy chief constable. The central project team consisted of three full-time members of staff, which included myself as project manager. This group formed the core of the project structure. I considered the re-socialisation of managers to be the key element in any implementation plan, therefore this staffing level was necessary because of the need to train all managers within a four-month period, prior to implementation. When the re-socialisation programme was completed, it was intended to have one full-time member of staff and an assistant providing the central functions, i.e. support, advice, monitoring, intervention and evaluation (This role was taken on by the appointment of a equal opportunity manager on the 11th March 1995). Although a full-time project manager was necessary, it was also essential to have other key functions represented on a part-time basis. Therefore, all relevant functions were represented and encouraged to take part in the development of equal opportunities and quality of service within their own areas of responsibility. It was intended that these people would continue in these roles when the project was completed, as part of an ongoing Equality of Service Group. In addition, each division was to have a local 'Action Group' who were responsible for the development of initiatives on division.

The aim of the structure was to allow as much local ownership as possible by giving each division autonomy in the development of their own initiatives through their respective action groups, but still providing corporacy through a central project group, chaired by the deputy chief constable. The purpose of the central project group was to offer advice, assistance and to co-ordinate divisional/departmental initiatives. It was also acknowledged that some initiatives required central implementation, such as the new equal opportunity policy and grievance procedure, but the divisional project groups

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could assist in the marketing of this process. The third function of the group was to provide a monitoring and evaluation role.

How did the Structure Work?

The entire project group met about once every six weeks from the summer of 1994. It provided a forum where views could be expressed and information could be disseminated. At each meeting, a representative from each of the divisional action groups reported on progress and/or problems encountered. However, some members indicated concern over a lack of direction and purpose during the early part of 1995. This is probably a valid comment and certainly adequate time for the full-time members of staff became increasingly difficult because of the demands placed upon them in developing the new equal opportunity policy, grievance procedure and, particularly, facilitating the managers' re-socialisation courses. The divisional action groups met with differing success; the force was undergoing a restructuring process and demands placed upon managers were considerable. This undoubtedly affected the work of the action groups; however some met with more success than others.

The original concept used during the project, 'action-research', demanded a constant review of the implementation process to meet changing needs and demands. This concept was not used to its maximum potential regarding the overall structure of the project group. The influence the project structure had over the process of implementation is an area that demands further research; however, the evidence to date indicates that the structure did not appear to have been particularly influential in implementing the new grievance procedure. This is true with one exception, that is the role of the deputy chief constable as the project sponsor. Several times his position and power were vital in

obtaining resources and intervening with some senior managers. For example, a key element of the implementation programme was the re-socialising of all managers. To achieve this I considered it necessary to work with a facilitator of the highest quality, who was used to dealing with high conflict training. The only trainer I could identify with the necessary skills was employed on a division in a non-training role. The management on that division were understandably unwilling to release that person and only the intervention of the deputy chief constable made this possible. There were other occasions where the use of this power became important. This seems to only demonstrate the importance of rank in an hierarchical structure, such as that found in the police military-bureaucracy.

Development

As a result of analysis of the available data and a review of the existing grievance procedure, a report was presented to the Force Executive Group (FEG) in July 1994. This report provided a detailed developmental strategy for the successful implementation of the new equal opportunity policy and grievance procedure.

The paper argued that whilst a policy was not a substitute for action, it was still a necessary prerequisite in providing guidance to assist in the development of practices and procedures. A new and more comprehensive Equal Opportunity Policy, in-line with developments across the service, was recommended and a draft included. This draft policy was designed to incorporate other areas not covered by legislation, such as sexual orientation and disability. The new grievance procedure could not be introduced without major changes to the equal opportunity policy. For example, people had to know it was

the policy of the force to treat everyone fairly, not just minority groups covered by legislation.

As previously argued, there was a strong case for introducing a new grievance procedure as soon as possible. All of those interviewed, however, who had made grievances had stated their cases could have been easily resolved early if their grievances had initially been dealt with differently. Home Office circular 16/1993[325] recommended the development of a new grievance procedure in March 1993, but this still had not been implemented. The introduction of a new grievance procedure was, therefore, a high priority for the force. A review of grievance procedures in use in a number of other forces and guidance laid down in Home Office circular 16/1993 assisted in the design of the new procedure. However, analysis of the current situation, by the previously mentioned methods provided an equally important source of information. Therefore, a redesigned grievance procedure was developed and this early draft was presented to the FEG. The principles behind the new grievance procedure are shown below. The changes represented a major departure from the previous procedure:

1. *The scope of the procedure was widened to incorporate any grievance.*

2. *It was envisaged that the grievance should be dealt with at the lowest possible management level and resolved as soon as possible.*

This meant, for example, that a sergeant may have to deal with a grievance that involved a more senior officer. The concept behind this was that the person receiving the grievance should be responsible and empowered to resolve the matter as quickly as

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[325]   Home Office circular 16, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

possible. This represented a major change in culture that went far beyond the introduction of a new grievance procedure, but rather struck at the heart of an hierarchical rank system

3. *A grievance could be made to any manager, police or civilian, not necessarily the aggrieved person's line manager.*

Interviews indicated that managers within the same department were often perceived by the aggrieved to be biased because of their close association. This may not have been true, but this appeared to act as a block to resolving grievances.

4. *The grievance procedure was for all members of staff, police, civilian, and members of the special constabulary.*

Previously there existed two separate grievance procedures, one for police officers and the other for civilians. No procedure existed for special constables.

5. *All grievances were to be recorded.*

Draft forms were presented to record details of a grievance. It was argued this was necessary to provide anonymous management information which was necessary, if trends were to be identified and development needs analysed.

6. *Grievances were to be treated confidentially; only in the most serious cases was that confidence to be breached.*

Fear of a breach in confidentiality was a consistent theme raised by staff and quoted in a number of interviews as being a major stumbling block preventing people making a grievance.

7. *A full-time equal opportunity manager was to be appointed once the project was complete, in the meantime the project team would provide this role.*

All of the above principles represented a major change to the culture of the force and successful implementation would be critical if real change was to occur.

Implementation (September 1994 to March 1995)

Implementation is probably the most complex and difficult part of any project and the implementation process can so fundamentally affect the original concept that the finished product may bear little resemblance to the original aims. A comprehensive implementation plan, which included a time-scale with specific milestones, was, therefore, developed (Appendix 17). The effective operation of the new grievance procedure depended upon the willingness and ability of managers to operate the system as intended. To give managers that ability required training involving not only the development of knowledge and skills, but also in many cases, a change in attitudes, beliefs, values and assumptions, together with the commitment of senior management. Whilst this may appear an expensive option, the force had invested a considerable amount of resources over the last few years in remedial action that still left all parties involved embittered and disillusioned. It appeared that resources would be better diverted to prevention, rather than cure.

To combat the pressure to implement the policies and procedures by the time of the next HMIC inspection (October 1994), it was argued that the introduction of a new equal opportunity policy and grievance procedure, whilst an urgent priority, would be

ineffective unless managers were first adequately prepared. Recent HMIC reports had been critical of unstructured implementation and other independent research (Westmarland 1994)[326] highlighted problems with unco-ordinated short-term solutions adopted by some forces. The presentation concluded that the proposed implementation plan for a revised policy and grievance procedure provided a structure which ensured full and effective implementation at the earliest possible date (December 1994).

Early consultations with the different staff associations and trade unions indicated support for the proposed equal opportunity policy, grievance procedure and implementation plan. With the resources available, it indicated that a new equal opportunity policy and grievance procedure could be in place by the end of 1994. I argued that many of the changes in both equal opportunities and quality of service involved significant cultural change that could affect many areas within the force and I, therefore, urged management to define the culture they wished to see, or they would be in danger of getting the culture they deserved. The FEG was requested to approve in principle the above, or make specific alternative recommendations. All the above, except the last point, defining the culture that senior management wished the force to have, was approved.

Cultural Change

Culture provides, as Morgan (1986)[327] argues, a *'psychic prison'* which often means we offer a past solution to a present-day problem and, because it is locked in the past, culture tends to force organisations to develop in a circular rather than linear fashion. Patterns of thinking and logic endlessly repeat themselves, producing more of

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[326]   Westmarland, L., *Op.Cit.*, 1994.
[327]   Morgan, G., *Op.Cit.*, pp 199-203, 1986.

the same with respect to action and behaviour. The challenge, therefore, was to break

out of this cultural mind-set and establish a culture where managers would listen and take

responsibility for dealing with staff problems and grievances, rather than avoiding the

issue, or focusing blame on the victim, or 'shooting the messenger'. The goal was to

create a culture where managers would take action to prevent bad practice and,

eventually, lead to a working environment which negated the need to make a grievance.

Cultural change, in essence, means facilitating a change in behaviour, attitudes,

beliefs, values and basic assumptions of individuals and groups within an organisation. In

this case, research indicated the target group should be all managers in the force. As

Wilson (1994)[328] argues:

> *"Organisation change, therefore, operates as much on the*
> *thinking skills of managers as on any other element. This*
> *is because it is management thinking and action which*
> *ultimately determine an organisation's characteristics and*
> *culture in which people work".*

I considered this change to be second-order in nature and was more revolution than

evolution. I considered the best method of achieving this change was to undertake a form

of *re-socialisation* of managers. The *re-socialisation programme* was designed to win

commitment by changing *Meta-Directions* and also provide knowledge and skills to

change aspects of *Performance*, thereby changing the prevailing culture.

Accurate identification of the areas that needed changing was paramount if the

re-socialisation process was to have any hope of success, but this process is more

difficult than it first appears, particularly where a major change in culture is desired. As I

have already explained, a multi-method approach was used to gradually and

[328]   Wilson, T., *Op.Cit.*, 1994.

progressively expose blocks to successful implementation. Some of these were simple; for example having a grievance procedure that was easy to understand. Others related to direct training needs; for example a lack of knowledge and understanding of how the existing grievance procedure worked. Research carried out externally to Cambridgeshire was also used, for example analysis of the national promotion assessment centre for sergeants. The, 'Objective Structured Performance Related Examination' (OSPRE)[329] showed that, 'managing conflict with staff' was the area that discriminated best between the good and poor candidates. Additionally, when over 200 sergeants were questioned they ranked 'personnel work' at the top of their list of training needs. As the report concludes:

> *"The data from the task analysis and from the OSPRE*
> *therefore agree, and together the results suggest that the*
> *most salient training need for sergeants is managing*
> *conflict in their personnel role".*

Analysis of the above data, by the use of sequential triangulation (Creswell 1994), [330] resulted in the identification of areas that needed to be addressed if the implementation was to be successful. These areas contained elements that directly related to *Performance* and *Directions;* for example, managers should be able to explain the workings of the grievance procedure and alternative courses of action. Other areas were far more difficult to expose and were deeply ingrained within the organisation's culture; these formed some of the *Meta-Directions* that govern behaviour. For example, police officers had been indoctrinated into a way of thinking that demanded evidence 'beyond all reasonable doubt', but the legislation that relates to sex and race discrimination operated on the burden of proof being, 'the balance of probabilities'. Although it was possible to explain this to police managers, most did not seem to understand the difference, or alter

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[329]   McGurk B. J. and Platton *The Training Needs of Police Sergeants in England and Wales,* CPTU 1993.
[330]   Creswell, J. W., *Op.Cit.,* pp 173-190, 1994.

how they behaved to complainants. Their belief in 'how things should be done' was saturated with emotion and conviction following years of conditioning. These core values, beliefs and assumptions that comprise *Meta-Directions* were not explicitly contained in the list of competencies developed, but were implicit in many. For example, managers should be able to deal seriously, sympathetically and promptly with any complaint.

The list of competencies that managers needed, to deal successfully with a grievance and to resolve conflict in the work place, are contained in appendix five. In compiling the list of competencies, account was also taken of the police specific competencies developed for police managers by the CPTU (1993)[331] The aims and objectives of the re-socialisation programme coincided heavily with those contained within the Management Charter Initiative (MCI) competencies for managers. It was, therefore, decided to offer managers the opportunity to qualify for this MCI element. This voluntary aspect of the training involved those managers who wished completing a self-assessment form which was verified by the facilitators. It was considered that this would add an incentive to those managers who wished to pursue outside management qualifications and add credibility to the course. The facilitators in turn had to qualify as 'D32/33 Assessors' under the National Vocational Qualification Scheme (NVQ). This involved independent assessment by assessors from Suffolk Regional College under the auspices of the City and Guilds. This proved more time consuming than originally envisaged, but eventually both facilitators qualified. The use of the competencies greatly assisted the facilitators in designing the course, on-going measurement to evaluate the success of individual courses and provided a cornerstone in the final evaluation of the programme. The real challenge then, was to develop a re-socialisation programme that

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[331]   CPTU, Community, Fairness, and Quality Review Team, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

not only improved participants' knowledge and skills, but also changed individual and organisational *Meta-Directions*.

Design of the Re-socialisation Programme

The length of a course in almost every training programme is nearly always a compromise between, what the evidence indicates is the correct length and what the organisation will allow. In this case, the re-socialisation courses were limited to two days which was thought necessary to minimise abstraction levels. Although this was a short period of time, I thought that considerable change could still be achieved. However, a third day would have permitted more time for skills development.

I considered it necessary for all managers in the force to undergo the same process if they were all to have a shared understanding. This was necessary if trust between managers was to be achieved. The new grievance procedure was designed to allow any manager to enquire into issues raised, which would, in all probability, mean they would have to question fellow managers about decisions they had made. I, therefore, considered it essential to reduce suspicion and ensure that all managers understood the process that was taking place before full implementation of the grievance procedure.

The first part of the re-socialisation programme was designed to equip managers with the necessary knowledge of the law, the new equal opportunity policy and the new grievance procedure. It was also designed to give managers an understanding of how discrimination and unfair treatment could manifest itself within the organisation. The second part of the programme focused on developing conflict management skills, in

particular, dealing with people involved in grievances i.e., the aggrieved and the alleged

perpetrator. The programme was also designed to encourage managers to take

responsibility for preventing and resolving instances of alleged unfair treatment, as soon

as possible and at the lowest possible management level. The focus of the new grievance

procedure was on resolution, not on blame or punishment.

Distance Learning Package

Because the duration of each programme was limited to two days, it was

considered necessary to maximise this time on changing *Meta-Directions* and skills

development. I hypothesised that a large part of knowledge acquisition could be achieved

by distance learning. A distance learning package (Appendix 11) was, therefore, designed

to provide managers with a common level of knowledge and understanding. To reach

managers' *zone of proximal development'* (Vygotsky 1978)[332] a number of case-studies

were included. The case-studies were real accounts of incidents that had happened in the

police service; it was hoped that this would help managers to see a direct relevance

between the legislation and their roles as managers. Answers were also provided in the

workbook. This workbook was produced on high-quality paper with pages for

note-taking at the back. The intention was that it would remain as a permanent resource

for managers attending the course. The workbook was normally sent out about two

weeks prior to the course, but on occasions, due to administration and printing problems,

this period was considerably shorter.

A full description of the re-socialisation programme is provide in the next section

which examines what actually happened; but briefly, the first day was designed to

concentrate on clarification of aspects of knowledge, understanding, and more

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[332]   Vygotsky, L. S., *Op.Cit.,* 1978.

importantly, to engross participants in the re-socialisation process by using aspects of current police culture. This progressed to application of that knowledge by using police related case-studies. These were used both as individual tasks and in small groups. Only at the end of the first day was the new grievance procedure introduced.

The second day commenced with a discussion of the new draft grievance procedure. This progressed to working with a far more complex case-study (page 25, Appendix six) again police-related. Participants worked in small groups, identifying what the issues were and how they would deal with the situation. They were then asked to role-play in a series of different situations linked to the case-study. This was done to examine their behaviour and the affect it had on dealing with aspects of the case-study. At the end of the second day, a video reconstruction of a police-related industrial tribunal was shown and debriefed. These issues will be dealt with in greater depth in the next section, but before that other initiatives will be briefly discussed.

Other Initiatives

Before the re-socialisation programme commenced, a meeting was held with representatives of all the respective staff associations and trade unions. The meeting was held to ascertain their views and to seek their support for the proposed change programme. A difficult issue was discussed that related to the re-socialisation programme, I considered that if an individual became too disruptive during the programme, then that person should be asked to leave. The staff associations and unions supported this stance, though it was never necessary to resort to this course of action. A request was made from the associations for the programmes to be run between Monday and Thursday to minimises abstractions at the weekends. Although this meant no break

between each programme for the facilitators, this was agreed. The atmosphere at the meeting appeared very positive with a constructive exchange of views.

A newsletter (Appendix seven) was distributed in August 1994 to all members of staff, explaining some of the initiatives that were planned and indicated that the re-socialisation programme was scheduled to commence in September 1994. The next section examines that process in greater depth.

The Re-socialisation Programme

The First Day

After administration matters were completed an Icebreaker exercise was introduced. Individuals were asked to share with the person sitting next to them, 'one thing they would like to change in Cambridgeshire Constabulary'. This exercise normally generated considerable debate concerning the change process the force was experiencing, namely delayering management layers, intelligence-led crime investigation and restructuring. However, participants were not allowed to dwell on any subject; this was necessary to maintain pace, but the exercise did appeared to get people thinking about the process of change at an early stage. This was followed by a brief lecture (about 15 minutes) outlining why there was a need to change the grievance procedure. Evidence was presented from the research already undertaken which led to a brief explanation of the process of change. A model of change was developed for this purpose and is shown below (Model four):

MODEL OF CHANGE

ORGANISATIONAL GOALS

Statement of Common Purpose

Legislation, HMIC, 'Getting Things Right', Force Policy

INDIVIDUAL

Knowledge
Understanding
Attitudes
Skills

JOB

Practices Systems
Procedures

The model was explained in the following way. At the **Organisational level** there was an abundance of aims and goals formulated, both nationally and in force. Many related to the equal opportunity policy and grievance procedure; for example, legislation, codes of practice, Home Office circulars, HMIC's Thematic Inspection of Equal Opportunities and Force Policy. Others related to Quality of Service initiatives for example, 'Getting Things Right' (ACPO 1993)[333]. In total, it was explained there was a plethora of different drivers creating organisational goals, but these in themselves would not bring about change.

At the **Job level** it was explained that systems existed but, in some cases, needed development, for example the grievance procedure. Emphasis was also placed on evidence from the 'Gender Culture Audit' (Kelly 1993)[334] that indicated that there were practices which were very problematic, for example, sexual harassment and a mistrust of the current grievance procedure. It was also explained that simply introducing a new procedure would not change the force's current culture in respect of grievances and that research suggested that of the three levels involved, the one requiring the most development for the successful implementation of the new grievance procedure was the **Individual level**. It was argued that, at present, most staff simply did not have the ability to provide a quality service in these areas, and this was particularly true of many supervisors and managers. Emphasis was placed on the fact that this was not intended as a criticism of individuals, but rather is symptomatic of a corporate failure on the part of the service to train its managers adequately. It was argued that staff required the appropriate knowledge, understanding, attitudes and skills necessary to achieve organisational goals, if those goals were to be translated into reality. The lecture

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[333] ACPO, Quality of Service Committee, *Getting Things Right*, ACPO, 1993.
[334] Kelly, J. *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

concluded that, in essence, the introduction of a new grievance procedure involved a significant change in culture for Cambridgeshire Constabulary. For culture change to occur, I explained that all three levels must support and complement each other. After the presentation, participants' comments were sought, although this was early in the course and people still appeared hesitant, many seemed to understand the rationale behind the course, which was the main purpose of the lecture. A number of people also commented on how pleased they were that the force had decided to train staff prior to implementation. They perceived this to be a new approach to introducing change in the force.

Knowledge Check

Following the presentation, participants were asked for comments about the distance learning package. Nearly all participants appeared to have read the material and thought it was easy to understand. This impression was confirmed by the use of a test to ascertain the knowledge level of participants. The test consisted of 16 questions and is shown at Appendix eight. The average score was 89.4% (or an average of 14. 3 correct answers). The question that caused the most difficulty asked participants to give an example of indirect discrimination. A number of case-studies were used subsequent to this test which explored the concepts of both direct and indirect discrimination.

During the first four courses the completed knowledge tests were checked by the facilitators, but after that each participants marked their own test and a comprehensive debrief followed, very often lasting the rest of the morning. Self-marking appeared to produce less anxiety and helped to encourage a safe learning environment. There was no discernible reduction in the level of participants' knowledge.

Application of Knowledge

The course progressed by asking participants to apply their knowledge to a case-study. All the case-studies used on the course were based upon real reported cases taken from forces across the country. The first case-study was based upon the sexual harassment of a new female probationer by her supervisor. Participants worked in small groups to decide what issues were contained in the case. Following this discussion, they were asked to decide how the matter should be resolved.

A major stumbling block for police officers was understanding how to apply the law to real cases, in particular understanding the difference in the burden of proof required in an industrial tribunal, compared to that required under criminal law. The police had quite rightly been trained to look for 'hard' evidence and to prove a case beyond, 'all reasonable doubt'. Most participants also had difficulty understanding that an industrial tribunal could draw, 'reasonable inference', from 'primary facts'. This cognitive and cultural mind-set seriously affected the ability of most participants to apply and analyse the law in real cases. Even civilian staff found this difficult, but they, no doubt, had been exposed to a similar culture. This had serious implications when it came to dealing with grievances, because managers would almost certainly be looking for an unnecessarily high level of evidence which the law, or the procedure, did not demand. For example, in a case of sexual harassment it may be one person's word against another, in criminal law this would probably be insufficient to prove the case, but under the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) this may well be adequate.

The problem was tackled with a video which reconstructed an industrial tribunal. The video was from the BBC's Mosaic Series entitled 'Equal Before The Law' and

reconstructed a case of racial discrimination in the Health Service. Participants were then asked to decide if direct or indirect discrimination had taken place in either one, both, or none. Individual participants were asked to give their answer and the responses varied considerably with the minority of participants getting the right answer. Further discussion then took place in small groups before re-examining their initial findings. Finally, an explanation was given by the facilitators and the concluding part of the video was used to clarify this difficult area.

Grievance Procedure - Consultation

Only at the conclusion of the day when participants appeared to understand the full implications of the legislation was the new grievance procedure introduced. It was left to this stage of the course so that participants would understand the context and implications surrounding its introduction. Although the grievance procedure covers nearly all aspects of staff treatment, far beyond the requirements of the legislation, a base understanding of the legislation was thought essential. Also the grievance procedure uses the 'balance of probabilities' as the burden of proof, the same as an industrial tribunal and developing a understanding of this concept, as already explained, was thought essential if successful implementation was to occur. A draft of the procedure was handed to participants and they were asked to read the document. Emphasis was placed on the fact it was still in draft format and they had opportunity to amend the procedure. This was a concerted attempt to build a *'psychological contract'* with managers, it was hoped that, by including them in the development of a new grievance procedure, it would help to increase ownership and commitment. This seemed particularly welcome with a number of participants saying that:

"For the first time I really feel consulted".

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An example of making amendments to the procedure was to increase the time limit at the first stage from seven to 14 days. As well as allowing time during the course for participants to read the draft grievance procedure (which in itself was an unusually but important symbol), most took the draft away with them and appeared to study it further overnight.

The Second Day

The second day commenced with a review of the grievance procedure. This process normally lasted about an hour. Participants were invited to make whatever comment they wished and explore any queries they had. The facilitators tried to listen carefully to comments made and the procedure evolved and changed as the courses progressed. Twenty one draft versions of the procedure were produced during the 34 courses before a final version was achieved. This process was time consuming, but was an integral part of the re-socialisation programme.

Following the discussion on the proposed grievance procedure a more complex case-study was used, this was taken from the distance learning book (Appendix six page 25). This case-study concerned alleged sex discrimination against a male officer applying for a position in a crime team. Participants working in small groups were asked to look at the issues involved and present their findings. Having examined the issues, the groups were asked to consider how they would deal with the case. Groups were constantly re-mixed to ensure there was a wide exchange of views and opinions among participants.

Role-play

Role-play was chosen at this point for a number of reasons. First, people had by this time gained a reasonably adequate level of knowledge of the main legislation and how it applies. They had gained an understanding of the grievance procedure and, through the use of case-studies, had understood how it applied to the police service. The case-studies also helped participants to explore how prejudice and discrimination manifested itself in the police service. It was possible to watch many individuals begin to consider some of the issues from a different perspective, but this was a far cry from applying that knowledge in a real situation. Managers had no concept to base future action upon, other than what they had previously experienced and these had proved to be largely inappropriate for successfully resolving a grievance. Here it may be useful to recount the interview an officer had with a senior manager after making a grievance under the old system (page 209). Managers generally had only experienced interviews, which were either of a criminal or of a disciplinary nature. I hypothesised that, unless they had another more appropriate mental model to base future action upon, there would be little transference of learning from the classroom to the workplace, therefore little actual change. I certainly felt that without role-play, if grievances were made, they would not be resolved at the first stage. Role-play, as Van ments (1990)[335] argues:

> *"Role play is ideally suited to enable students to learn new roles, become more aware of their own roles, and understand more clearly other people's point of view. It is a highly appropriate technique for social skills training, not only because of its ability to sensitise in this way, but also because of the way in which direct information on how to deal with certain situations and with officialdom can be incorporated into the scenario".*

Managers were being asked under the new grievance procedure to deal with grievances as and when they happened. If this meant speaking to a manager of a

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[335]   Van ments, M., *The Effective Use of Role-play*, Kogan Page, p30, 1990.

considerably higher rank, then they would have to do this. This represented a massive cultural change; previously the culture had been one of deference to higher ranks, not to openly question or challenge. The richness of role-play would not only help to develop skills and strategies to achieve this, it would provide individuals with *a mental presentation*[336] to base future action upon that was different to their past experience. Additionally, role-play would allow senior ranks the opportunity to experience being questioned and challenged. I theorised that this process would allow mutual understanding to develop through sharing this experience, thereby developing trust.

Role-play to most participants was particularly daunting, they were performing in front of peers, junior and senior managers. However, it should be understood that it was used as a deliberate attempt to use aspects of police culture to change the culture. As Young (1993)[337] comments, theatre and drama are powerful aspects of police culture heavily impregnated with emotion. I therefore, theorised that this could be used to develop a sense of camaraderie among participants who would unite in adversity and in so doing implicitly develop ownership of the vehicle by which this was achieved; the grievance procedure. Role-play, however, was extremely threatening for most participants, so a method had to be found to make this activity as safe as possible, whilst still achieving the objectives. The solution was to divide participants into three groups. Each group took on the role of grievance handler, aggrieved and perpetrator respectively. One person was asked to play the role, but the group decided who that person was to be and the approach they wanted to take. At any time, the role player could stop the process and confer with their own group. Working in groups in this way

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[336]   A *mental presentation* is a cognition that represents an event, in a sense it is a map that symbolises or represents an abstract characterisation of action and consequences.
[337]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

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seemed to provide an added security and make the exercise less threatening. The initial role-play was normally between the grievance handler and the aggrieved. This would be debriefed by the facilitators with widespread group participation. The next role-play would often be between the grievance handler and the perpetrator, although this would not always be the case. The group decided the sequence of events. This was done to maintain as much *free choice* as possible. Again, the debriefing process would take place. The focus was on skills and strategy development in dealing with conflict situations, but, more importantly, exposing behaviour and examining the affect it had on individuals and the process of resolving the grievance. *Espoused-theories* were discussed and *theories-in-use* were exposed. *Organisational defence* routines were also discussed at length. This process continued for most of the second day, participants frequently being rotated, so as many people could take part as possible.

There was concern by some participants about approaching senior managers with a grievance, but the role-plays allowed these scenarios to be explored in a relatively safe environment. As the debriefs developed, participants learnt skills and strategies for dealing with grievances. Feedback from senior managers on the course proved invaluable to all participants and allowed different perspectives to be gained. The role-plays allowed many issues to be addressed that otherwise would have been missed. The fact that many senior managers were far more radical in their demands when playing the role of the aggrieved constable than more junior managers, allowed the human side of management to be seen. The problems that senior managers faced could also be seen and discussed. The multi-rank nature of the courses was vital in achieving this common understanding and ownership. Many issues concerning the force were discussed that were not directly

related to the grievance procedure and the process allowed greater understanding of each other's problems.

The day concluded with a brief clip from a reconstruction of part of the P.c. Singh industrial tribunal. Discussion followed and issues were highlighted that could have been dealt with better. At the end of each course, participants were asked to complete an anonymous feedback form (Appendix two). The feedback forms were analysed after every course to provide constant monitoring.

Summary

In all, 34 courses were run over a six month period and 294 managers were trained. The courses attempted to engross participants in the *re-socialisation* process by using aspects of culture, often implicitly, to enter their *zone of proximal development*. Role-play helped to expose their *theories-in-use* that form *Meta-Directions* and, by allowing as much *free choice* as possible, begin the process of changing individual cognitions. By integrating all levels of management on the course *organisational defence routines* could be openly discussed without focusing blame on any one particular management level. This helped participants take ownership and responsibility for dealing with a situation, rather than expecting another management level to rectify the situation.

In April 1995 the new equal opportunity policy (Appendix 12) and grievance procedure (Appendix 13) were officially launched, although participants were asked to use the new procedure if a member of staff wanted to make a grievance in the intervening period (Sept. 94 to April 95). In April 1995 posters (Appendix 15 and 16) were put up in police stations throughout the force. Copies of the new equal opportunity policy and

grievance procedure (Appendix 11) were distributed to all staff with their pay slips. The

next part of the thesis, then, focuses upon the outcome and results of this change

programme.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

Course Feedback Forms

The initial reaction of participants to the re-socialisation course was measured by use of post-course feedback forms (Appendix Two) that were completed by nearly all 294 participants. They were anonymous and were collected at the end of the course in a manner designed to preserve anonymity. Measuring a course's success by asking participants to provide some form of written feedback only provides limited information for an evaluation. Tyler (1949)[338] argues that the process of evaluation is essentially the process of determining to what extent educational objectives are actually being realised. Since educational objectives are essentially changes in the way people behave, then evaluation is the process for determining the degree to which these changes in behaviour are actually taking place. Questionnaires hardly provided evidence of any change in behaviour, merely an indication of what participants were thinking and feeling at the time of completion. These types of questionnaire, used at the end of a courses, have justifiably received criticism and they are sometimes known as 'happy sheets'. One argument that has given rise to this term is that when the forms are completed, normally at the end of the course or session, participants are in a state of euphoria, dazzled by the facilitators. Also participants may have enjoyed the social interaction and consequently there is a danger that the facilitators will be rated much higher than they should be. Of course, the opposite effect can occur, participants may not like the facilitator and may not have enjoyed being with others in the group. Whichever is the case, they do provide

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[338]   Tyler, R. W., *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction*, Chicago

instant reactions that otherwise would be lost. They also have the benefit of a near 100%

response rate, which would be difficult to achieve once participants have left the course.

Additionally, the information is fresh in the minds of participants and, as long as a

confidential method of collection is available, honest responses can be expected. The data

can also help to identify problems of transference of learning from the training

environment to the workplace. For example, if the course is of sound design and

participants rate the course highly, then if little change occurs the area for concern may

lie in the workplace, rather than the training environment. With these points in mind,

analysis of the feedback follows.

Analysis - Course Feedback Forms

	Low				High
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Q 1. How valuable was the workshop to you?	0	0.3%	3%	31%	65.7%
Q 2. How would you rate the calibre of the training?	0	0	2%	47.3%	50.7%
Q 3. How would you rate the content of the workshop?	0	0.3%	5.1%	55.8%	38.8%

Participants clearly felt that the course was a success; they rated the value of the

workshop very high, 86.7% scored a four or five on a scale of one to five. This was also

reflected in comments by some participants after the course, either immediately

afterwards, or several months later. For example:

"You really enthused me, we all said that".

Q 4. What subject would you like more information on, if any?

Most participants did not want any further information at the time of completing the questionnaire. The majority of those who did answer, wanted more information on legislation and case law. A smaller number also wanted information on selection procedures and civilian discipline procedures.

Q 5. What will you do differently in your role now, than you did before the workshop?

A number of strong themes were identified following analysis of the responses to this question:

1. Keep better records of staff behaviour.

2. Document problems and provide evidence for appraisals.

3. Be more confident when dealing with grievances and difficult staff issues.

4. Listen more carefully to individuals' complaints.

5. Be able to explain the grievance procedure and offer advice.

6. More aware of the pitfalls.

7. More aware of own prejudices and bias.

8. Act in a more preventative manner and look for potential grievances.

9. More aware as a manager of own responsibilities.

About two weeks after the course one participant dealt with a grievance, following a case of alleged sexual harassment. That person commented:

> *"A couple of weeks ago, before I had the training, I wouldn't have known what to do and probably wouldn't have done anything when I heard about this. I now know I had to do something - the course gave me the confidence to know what to do".*

Question 6:	Agree	Neither Agree/Disagree	Disagree
a. The pre-course work book was clear and concise?	86.4%	8.7%	4.9%
b. The pre-course work book was easy to work through?	88.6%	8.6%	2.8%
c. The pre-course work book was aimed at the right level?	82.3%	12.4%	5.3%

The distance learning package (Appendix six) was well received, as the above responses indicate. The use of real police-related case-studies helped participants to make a direct link between the legislation and their role as managers. All participants appeared to have read the book prior to the course, although a few acknowledged they did not read it until the morning of the course. Course participants soon appeared to know that there was a 'test' at the beginning of the course and, even though participants marked the test themselves, it appeared very important to them that they did reasonably well in front of their peers. Peer group pressure seemed an important motivating factor in completing the distance learning material.

Q 7. The support package provided has/will be very useful.

Not very useful				Very useful
1	2	3	4	5
0%	1.1%	10.7%	30.6%	57.6%

A support package was provide for every participant; this included a copy the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Codes of Practice; copies of the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts; draft copies of the force grievance procedure and equal opportunity policy, and the phone number of the project group. All of these documents were provided in a hard-covered folder. At the end of the course, participants' responses indicate this was favourably received, although the test was obviously going to be its usefulness in the workplace.

8. What further support material (if any) would you like?

Most participants answered none to this question. However, nearly all the responses that were made indicated they wanted updating on new legislation and case law.

9. The length of the workshop was:-

Too Long	About Right	Too Short
0.7%	90.8%	8.5%

The above response indicated that most participants thought the length of the course was about right.

10. Any other comments.

There were many positive comments about the course, most participants stating it was very useful and was relevant to their role. The following comment was typical:

> *"This has been one of the most relative, informative and worthwhile training courses I have attended. Very well presented and informative at all levels".*

Whenever an issue was raised by a course participant the facilitators would try to resolve it as soon as possible, in other words they would try to role model what they wanted participants to do. For example, on a number of occasions complaints were received about the quality of food. The facilitators would immediately speak to the centre management and on several occasions additional or alternative food was provided. This process was not made explicit, but a number of participants commented on the fact the facilitators seemed to *'walk the talk'* and were prepared to address difficult issues at the time.

Participants particularly welcomed the mix of ranks and staff (police and civilian); indeed every comment made concerning this issue was very positive. Participants seemed to feel it allowed them to understand each other's perspective and problems more fully. A criticism made by some civilian staff was that the course focused too much on police officers. There was certainly greater emphasis paid to police officers, possibly too much. The following comment was typical:

> *"A well run and informative course; my one criticism*
> *would be that on occasions we seemed to get bogged down*
> *on items specific to police officers".*

The feedback was generally very positive. The main areas of criticism are outlined above. The questionnaires were generally completed in an informative and descriptive manner. As I have previously mentioned the main criticism against placing too much reliance on this approach to evaluation is that participants on a course want to provide positive feedback because they do not want to hurt the facilitators' feelings and do not want to think they have wasted their time on an irrelevant course. This criticism must be weighed against the advantages of obtaining an immediate anonymous response from participants when the experience is fresh in their minds. To provide a more balanced picture it was, therefore, necessary to interview a sample of the participants some time after the course.

Post-Training Interviews

At the conclusion of the training programme, a series of interviews was carried out with staff. They included questioning people who had made grievances, handled them, or had been more generally involved in them. Also a number of people who had

had a grievance alleged against them (respondents) and other people, such as senior managers, were interviewed. As part of this process, people who had made grievances and managers who had dealt with grievances were asked to complete a questionnaire at the time of interview (Appendix nine and 10). This was done to provide quantitative data to supplement the more qualitative comments. Because I had actively been involved in facilitating the courses, I was aware of the potential for bias. I considered that by approaching this part of the research using two methods (interview and questionnaire), this would help to provide a safeguard against unintentional bias. The questions also helped to provide some structure to the interviews. The next section provides the results and analysis of this process.

Grievance Handlers

Thirteen members of staff were interviewed who had dealt with grievances. Eleven had attended the re-socialisation course prior to dealing with a grievance, two had not. Below are the results of the questionnaire together with relevant comment made during the interview. The response is shown as actual numbers rather than percentages because the numbers were too small for reliable statistical analysis.

Q 1. Have you dealt with a grievance?

Yes 13 　　 No 0

Q 2. I feel I dealt with the grievance effectively.

3 Strongly Agreed 　　 8 Agreed 　　 1 Neutral 　　 1 Disagreed 　　 0 Strongly Disagreed

The perception of most grievance handlers was that they had been effective in dealing with the grievance. One person said:

*"I felt the aggrieved left feeling they had done something
positive by speaking to me."*

Q 3. I felt confident when dealing with the victim.

10 Strongly Agreed   2 Agreed   1 Neutral   0 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

The one person to answer this question in a neutral manner had not experienced the

re-socialisation course. The following response was typical from those who had attended

the course:

*"I felt quite confident, I could explain the procedure when
asked ..... I would not hesitate in taking on someone else's
grievance."*

Q 5 I felt confident in explaining the grievance procedure.

6 Strongly Agreed   6 Agreed   1 Neutral   0 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

Again, the one person to answer this question in a neutral manner had not attended the

course. Comments were made to support this response and this one was typical:

*"I felt quite confident I could explain the procedure and
forms."*

Q 4. Maintaining confidentiality when dealing with the grievance was not

problematic.

5 Strongly Agreed   3 Agreed   1 Neutral   4 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

Confidentiality became one of the most significant issues for all parties involved, and one

of the most difficult to resolve. Comments were made to support this response and the

following were typical:

"Confidentiality was difficult to maintain and, without the training, almost impossible."

"Confidentiality was a problem, particularly when senior management had not been trained."

Q 6. I believe I remained objective and non-judgemental when dealing with the grievance.

4 Strongly Agreed   8 Agreed   0 Neutral   1 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

In some instances, this has been a problem and the intervention and monitoring by the equal opportunity manager has provided a vital safeguard to the process. The policy that in normal circumstances only someone in a managerial position, in relation to the aggrieved, can deal with a grievance is designed to assist with objectivity. The following comments were typical:

> From a grievance handler...... *"I could see the aggrieved person's point of view, but you have to lift yourself out, otherwise credibility goes"*

> From a respondent ......*"I felt the grievance handler was working for the aggrieved on one grievance and felt ticked off, but on another, the grievance handler was very good and wasn't threatening."*

> Finally from a senior manager........." *If the grievance handler has got an axe to grind it can be a problem, nevertheless even with that I feel it's a really good system."*

The ability to remain objective is a skill that the training attempted to address and this is an area in which role-play was particularly helpful. However, this would have undoubtedly required a longer course; certainly a third day, as originally requested, would have been a great help in developing these skills. A major problem is that of perception, in that a grievance handler can believe they are being objective when they are

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giving the impression they are not. There was not time on the course for all managers to experience personally dealing with a grievance through role-play and this, in some cases, will remain a development need. Of course, the other side of the argument must not be lost. It is very natural to become defensive when one feels they are being criticised, even though that is not the intention of the grievance handler. In either case, the equal opportunity manager provides a neutral and confidential source of advice for all parties.

Q 7. I felt confident in dealing with the alleged perpetrator.

3 Strongly Agreed   8 Agreed   2 Neutral   0 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

Both neutral responses were from managers who had not the attended the course. This is particularly significant when, for the first time, managers were being asked to approach other managers of a more senior rank, who potentially had a grievance recorded against them. A comment from one who had not attended the course seemed to sum up the situation:

> *"I wasn't sure what my role, title or position was within the procedure .... I needed an explanation of the philosophy of the grievance procedure and its purpose ".*

Q 7a. I feel the two-day training course equipped me to deal with the grievance.

7 Strongly Agreed   4 Agreed   0 Neutral   0 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

(Please note that two people interviewed had not yet attended the course)

The feedback at the end of the course was extremely positive, but I considered the 'acid-test' would be when managers actually had to deal with a grievance. The comments

contained below were typical of managers who had dealt with a grievance in some cases several months after attending the course.

> *"The course enabled me to deal with grievance in a confident and proficient way".*

> *"When I got a grievance it was clear in my mind what was expected of me."*

> *"The course really equipped me to deal with the grievance."*

> *"I feel completely happy with the training, support and advice I have received, the two day training was excellent."*

Q 8a. The support package handed out on the course was useful.

6 Strongly Agreed   4 Agreed   1 Neutral   0 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

(Please note that two people interviewed had not yet attended the course)

Most managers had referred to the support package since the course, particularly when dealing with a grievance. However, some managers thought that a more up-to-date procedure and forms should have been circulated by the project team.

> *"If I had received an up-dated procedure it would have helped."*

> *"The support package was good to go back and refresh my memory again; it's vital for that."*

Q 8. What else would have been helpful in preparing you to deal with this grievance?

Very few comments were made under this heading and were largely limited to more knowledge of policies and procedures i.e. Civilian contracts and advertising posts.

Q 9. What was the hardest part about dealing with the grievance.

Two main related themes were identified. These were convincing the aggrieved that the matter would be treated confidentially and encouraging the aggrieved to be open and frank. Until all managers had attended the re-socialisation course, these issues were a major concern, and cases were reported where senior managers demanded to know what was going on and were concerned in case, 'Headquarters got to hear about what was happening before them'. This caused pressure to be placed upon grievance handlers to disclose information to senior managers and obviously affected the confidence aggrieved parties had in the system.

Q 10. Do you feel you dealt with the grievance as promptly as you could have?

4 Strongly Agreed   6 Agree   2 Neutral   1 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

Most grievance handlers felt they had dealt with the matter as quickly as possible, although pressures of work and leave commitments sometimes caused matters to be delayed. Most considered having a 14-day time limit for the first stage was appropriate.

Q 11. Do you consider the new grievance procedure to be a positive asset to the force?

9 Strongly Agreed   3 Agreed   1 Neutral   0 Disagreed   0 Strongly Disagreed

Most of those questioned strongly agreed with this point, in fact nobody disagreed. This was true not only of those interviewed, but of everybody who came into contact with the

project team except those managers who had not experienced the re-socialisation programme. Some of these managers could be particularly vocal in their criticism.

12. Did you seek advice when dealing with the procedure?

Yes 9 No 4

The role of the equal opportunity manager proved pivotal in this area, as one grievance handler commented:

> *"There still needs to be the oracle to consult, you need someone to give a different opinion, this is particularly important where confidentiality applies."*

13. Any other comment

Comments in this area were largely related to requests for more information on up-to-date legislation/developments.

Conclusion

The overwhelming impression gained from managers who had handled a grievance, both from the interviews and completed questionnaires, was a positive one. While they recognised it was a difficult task, they felt the course had adequately prepared them and what was being asked of them was quite achievable. It was noticeable that the only negative comments came from the few managers who had not experienced the re-socialisation programme. The following comments are from managers who had experienced the course:

> *"I feel comfortable dealing with these."*

> *"I wouldn't hesitate in taking on someone's grievance again."*

A comment made by someone who had dealt with a grievance under the new system, but had not experienced the course presents a different picture:

"I was confident in dealing with the person but not the grievance procedure, because I hadn't been trained".

However, from evidence available, particularly from members of staff who had made a grievance, it is possible to deduce that successfully dealing with a grievance means more than simply understanding the procedure. The aggrieved has to feel valued and a non-judgemental attitude has to be displayed from the grievance handler. It would appear it was more important for the grievance handler to have ownership and commitment to the underlying philosophy of the grievance procedure, which was a key aim of the re-socialisation programme, than complete understanding. Those managers who had not attended the course certainly did not appear to display that commitment and their attitude seemed more consistent with the previous culture. The next section examines the views of staff who had actually made a grievance under the new procedure.

Aggrieved Staff

Thirteen members of staff were interviewed who had made grievances. Again they completed a questionnaire at the beginning of the interview and the results and analysis are reproduced below.

(Questions shown in bold)

Q 1. They dealt with the grievance promptly.

5 Strongly Agreed   6 Agreed   1 Neutral   0 Disagree   1 Strongly Disagree

The only negative response to this question related to a grievance dealt with under the old system, the only one that forms part of this data.

Q 2. They treated the grievance seriously.

8 Strongly Agreed   5 Agreed   0 Neutral   0 Disagree   0 Strongly Disagree

There was a high level of satisfaction from the people questioned regarding this matter, with all of those questioned feeling their grievance had been dealt with seriously by management.

Q 3. They seemed interested in me as a person.

6 Strongly Agreed   4 Agreed   2 Neutral   1 Disagree   0 Strongly Disagree

Once again, the only negative response to this question was from an aggrieved person dealt with by a manager who had not experienced the re-socialisation programme. Most aggrieved staff did feel they were valued as a person and the grievance handler did care about the outcome. Nearly all of those interviewed stated they felt the grievance handler was doing more than just going through the motions.

Q 4. They dealt with me sympathetically and sensitively.

6 Strongly Agreed   4 Agreed   2 Neutral   1 Disagree   0 Strongly Disagree

Again the two neutral responses to this question were from aggrieved staff whose grievance was dealt with by someone who had not attended the re-socialisation course.

All people whose grievances were dealt with by managers who had attended the 'Managing Conflict and Grievance' course responded positively to this question.

Q 5. They explained the workings of the grievance procedure to my satisfaction.

5 Strongly Agreed   5 Agreed   2 Neutral   1 Disagree   0 Strongly Disagree

The response to this question correlates highly to responses made by managers who had experienced the re-socialisation programme. A comment made by an aggrieved person whose grievance was dealt with by a manager who had not attended the course illustrates the point.

"He was just as much in the dark as I was".

Q 6. They handled my grievance with an appropriate level of confidentiality.

6 Strongly Agreed   5 Agreed   0 Neutral   2 Disagree   0 Strongly Disagree

This was one of the areas where aggrieved staff voiced the most concern. Whilst most were pleased with how their grievance handler dealt with this problematic area, two felt that their grievance was not dealt with in an appropriately confidential manner. One was dealt with by a manager who attended the re-socialisation programme, one by a manager who had not. The following comments were typical from staff who had made a grievance:

> *"Nothing came from the grievance handler, even though people knew about it".*

> *"Confidentiality is vitally important for the aggrieved".*

Q 7. I believe they enquired into my grievance thoroughly.

6 Strongly Agreed   4 Agreed   2 Neutral   1 Disagree   0 Strongly Disagree

Once again, the negative comments were made by aggrieved staff whose grievance was dealt with by a manager who had not attended the re-socialisation programme.

Q 8. They were non-judgmental in dealing with my grievance.

6 Strongly Agreed   6 Agreed   1 Neutral   0 Disagree   0 Strongly Disagree

This response should be compared with a few comments made by alleged perpetrators who did feel that grievance handlers were, on occasions, too involved and were judgmental.

Q 9. To what level of satisfaction was your grievance resolved.

LOW						HIGH
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Response						
0	0	1	1	5	5	1

It can be seen that most answered this question very positively (84.6% of aggrieved scored five or above), although because the numbers are too small it cannot be held to be statistically significant.

Q 10. Have you suffered any adverse treatment as a result of making a Grievance.

Statement	Yes	No
Serious adverse treatment	0	0
Minor adverse treatment	0	0
Unknown	0	4
Not to my knowledge	6	0
None	3	0

No member of staff suggested they had suffered any adverse treatment as a result of making a grievance. Some stated they simply did not know whether they had or not. This result was particularly pleasing considering the myths that surround people making grievances, some even perpetuated by senior managers. An example of the latter point is given below:

> *"When X found out I was making a grievance he/she said,*
> *'Do you want to get promoted? Do you want to get*
> *ahead?'"*.

This comment was made by a senior manager who had not experienced the re-socialisation programme and indicates the negative culture that existed prior to this intervention. The comment also confirms the necessity for all managers to experience the course. The evidence from this evaluation suggests that victimisation was not at all common and no evidence was found to suggest it had occurred, although it still remained a concern of staff.

11. Do you consider the new grievance procedure to be a positive asset to the force.

Statement	Yes	No
Strongly Agree	4	0
Agree	8	0
Neither Agree/Disagree	0	0
Disagree	0	0
Strongly Disagree	0	0

It can clearly be seen that all responses to this question were extremely positive.

12. Would you make another grievance?   Yes 13   No 0

I considered the 'acid test', to show whether or not the new grievance procedure was working from the aggrieved person's point of view, is whether they would be prepared to make another grievance, 100% of staff questioned said they would.

13. Any advice you would give to people dealing with a grievance.

> *"Keep it confidential."*

> *"Keeping the aggrieved party up to date is probably the most important thing."*

> *"Don't try to bulldoze me into anything."*

The above comments were typical of many made and highlight concerns felt by aggrieved staff. The issues of confidentiality and being continually updated were raised by nearly all aggrieved members of staff interviewed.

14. Any advice you would give to people making grievances.

The following remarks were made that illustrates the main points both in the questionnaire and during interview:

> *"Think hard before making it, don't make petty grievances which could lower respect for the system."*

> *"Glad I went through and did it, I would have missed out if I hadn't done it."*

> *"Have realistic expectations of what can be achieved by the grievance procedure."*

Comments were overwhelmingly positive and in favour of the grievance procedure.

Conclusion

All aggrieved members of staff interviewed, who had had a grievance dealt with by a manager who had attended the re-socialisation programme, felt very positive about the outcome of their grievance and the grievance procedure in particular. This was true, even when they did not get what they wanted, but at least they felt it was investigated fairly, thoroughly and promptly by someone who cared. These findings should be compared to the extremely negative comments experienced by aggrieved staff prior to the re-socialisation programme (see page 193 in particular).

The evidence presented so far suggests a significant change in culture occurred following the re-socialisation programme. The next section takes a more quantitative approach to this change by comparing the number of recorded grievances over a three-year period (1993, 1994 & 1995).

Recorded Grievances

Table one provides a simple comparison of the number of recorded grievances over a three-year period. It also includes the ratio of grievances to staff.

Table 1

Year	Number Grievances	Grievance to Staff Ratio
1,993 (original grievance procedure in place)	4	508.3
1,994 (Re-socialisation programme commenced Sept. 94)	28	72.6
1,995	95	21.2

Although this table shows a substantial increase in the number of recorded grievances, over a three-year period it conceals where this increase began. For example, in the first eight months of 1994 there were only seven grievances made. The re-socialisation programme commenced in September 1994 and, between September and December 1994, 23 grievances were recorded. Figure one displays the information contained in table one graphically:

Grievances   1993   1994   1995

Figure 1

Table one and figure one provide information concerning the numbers of grievances recorded in 1993, 1994 and 1995. A grievance procedure had existed since 1990, but no accurate records were kept. It would appear, however, from extensive research that only two or three grievances were made during this time. From 1993 onwards, records were far more reliable; therefore comparison is made only from this year.

Figure one shows the rate of increase in the number of grievances during 1993, 1994 and 1995. Table two, provides a more detailed analysis of the rate of increase between 1993 and 1995. This data is broken down into four-monthly periods. Figure two provides the same information graphically.

Grievances recorded over four monthly periods

Table 2.

Four-Monthly Period	1,993	1,994	1,995
January to April	1	0	26
May to August	2	5	35
Sept. to December	1	23	34

Record grievances made in four monthly periods. (Training commenced on the 16th September 1994).

Figure 2.

It can clearly be seen that there was a very sharp rise in the number of recorded grievances from September to December 1994. This directly correlates with the commencement of the re-socialisation programme. This rate of increase maintained itself until the end of 1995, when the figures were collated. Whilst a Newsletter (Appendix seven) was distributed at the beginning of August 1994, there was no discernible increase in grievances and nobody referred to the Newsletter during interview, or during the re-socialisation programme. The initial increase from June to August 1994 may be due, to some extent, to the fact that the project team were examining the existing grievance procedure, so when a problem occurred there was someone to refer it to. Whilst this is a subjective judgement I think at least two of the seven grievances can be attributed to this.

So, during the first eight months of 1994 seven grievances were recorded. In September 1994, the re-socialisation programme for managers commenced and in the following eight months there were 47 recorded grievances, an increase of **671.4%**. In 1994, there was a total of 28 grievances compared to four in 1993 an increase of **700%**. In 1995, there were 95 recorded grievances, an increase of **2375%** over 1993.

The above evidence suggests that a significant cultural change has occurred and been sustained. Staff feel more confident in making a grievance and have more faith in the grievance procedure. However, unless there is a corresponding increase in the level of resolution at the first stage of the procedure, it is questionable whether the change will be sustained in the long-term. The next section, then, examines the rate of resolution.

Resolution

Table three provides a brief breakdown of grievances made during 1993, 1994 and 1995 and shows the stage at which they were resolved.

Table 3.

Stage of Resolution	1,993	1,994	1,995
Resolved at Stage 1	0	21 (75%)	66 (69.5%)
Resolved at Stage 2	0	2 (7.1%)	5 (5.3%)
Resolved at Stage 3	1 (25%)	1 (3.6%)	1 (5.3%)
Resolved at Stage 4	0	0	0
Unresolved	3 (75%)	2 (7.1%)	9 (9.5%)
Ongoing	0	2 (7.1%)	14 (14.7%)
Total number of grievances	**4**	**28**	**95**
Total percentage resolved	**25%**	**85.7%**	**80.1%**

Please note: That some grievances shown as 'ongoing' may also be subject to other proceedings; therefore cannot be resolved until those proceedings are complete.

Care should be taken in interpreting 1994's figures. In essence the 1994 figure can be divided into two parts, pre re-socialisation and post re-socialisation. No grievances were resolved at stage one prior to the re-socialisation programme. Table 3 indicates that most grievances were resolved at stage one following the re-socialisation programme. This evidence, combined with evidence gained at the time of interview with members of staff who have made a grievance, indicates that most grievances are successfully resolved by junior managers at the first stage.

Aggrieved Staff

Table four provides a brief analysis of aggrieved members of staff:

Table 4.

Aggrieved	1,993	1,994	1,995
Civilian	0	4	33
Police Officer	4	22	59
Special Constabulary	0	2	3
Male	1	15	48
Female	3	13	47
White	3	25	91
Visible ethnic minority	1	3	4

This data would benefit from far greater research to ascertain why certain differences exist; for example, why was there such a low number of civilian grievances in 1994 compared to 1995? However, the purpose of this thesis is cultural change within an organisation and for that reason I have not gone beyond this initial stage of analysis in this area. Table five, shown below, provides a breakdown into the type of grievances record.

Table 5.

Type of Grievance	1,993	1,994	1,995
Fairness	0	15	67
Harassment	0	1	11
Racial Discrimination	1	1	2
Racial Harassment	0	0	1
Sexual Discrimination	3	4	4
Sexual Harassment	0	6	9
Marital Status	0	1	0
Victimisation	0	0	1
Total	**4**	**28**	**95**

Again this table would benefit from further research to analyse why some issues were more prominent than others, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, all the data from this section does indicate that there was a significant increase in the number of recorded grievances and there had been a significant increase in the level of resolution at stage one.

Summary

The police service is an organisation that relies heavily on human resources and an image of fairness and impartiality. Therefore, having procedures that help to promote this type of internal culture and one that encourages issues of concern to be raised and dealt with is particularly important. Equal opportunity policies and grievance procedures should provide an important element in helping to ensure fairness and equity within an organisation. Unfair treatment, or a perception of unfair treatment, is probably one of the

greatest de-motivators; therefore, having procedures that allow concerns to be addressed without fear of retribution is essential for the maintenance of a motivated workforce.

In 1993, staff showed little faith in the existing equal opportunity policy or grievance procedure. A rewriting exercise would have had little or no effect and would have amounted to what Bate (1994) [339]terms as, 'First Order Change', i.e. change to stay the same. A more fundamental 'Second Order Change' was required if the grievance procedure was to be used. This necessitated changing attitudes, values, beliefs and assumptions *(Meta-Directions)* as well as *Directions* and *Performance*. Once the re-socialising of managers began, in September 1994, a dramatic increase in the number of grievances followed. This is shown graphically in the previous sections (Figures 1 and 2). In 1993 four grievances were recorded. In the first eight months of 1994 only seven grievances were recorded. In September 1994 the re-socialisation programme for managers commenced and in the following nine months there were 64 recorded grievances, an increase of **711%**.

Of the 64 grievances recorded in the nine month period, following the commencement of the re-socialisation programme, 52 **(81.25%)** were resolved at the first stage. Four were resolved at stage two **(6.25%)** and one at stage three (**1.6%**). It can be seen that the vast majority of grievances were successfully resolved by junior managers at the first stage. In 1995 **69.5%** of grievances were resolved at the first stage. Probably the best 'acid-test' for the grievance procedure from the aggrieved person's point of view, is whether they would make another grievance. All members of staff interviewed, who had made a grievance, said if necessary they would make another. Most grievances were fairness-related issues, (for example, perceived bias in selection),

[339]   Bate, P., *Op.Cit.*, 1994.

but a significant number did relate to sex discrimination. This chapter has provided a review of both raw quantitative and qualitative data. Chapter 13 provides an analyse of this data but, before this, I believe it is necessary to set the change in a context. To provide this context, the next chapter will examine comparative data from six other police forces.

CHAPTER TWELVE

COMPARISON WITH OTHER FORCES

Following the circulation of Home Office circular 16/1993 most police forces introduced either a revised grievance procedure, if one did not already exist, or an entirely new procedure. It is impossible within the time and resources available to analyse what has happened in every force, but a comparison has been made between a small number of other forces. Evidence has been obtained from six other forces; this comparison is limited and is an area that would undoubtedly benefit from further research. However, direct comparison is difficult because grievance procedures vary considerably from force to force. For example, some do not record grievances at the first stage, others do. Some forces contacted do not have anyone dedicated to equal opportunities and could not provide reliable information concerning the number of grievances, or at what stage they were resolved. The forces that have been selected, therefore, are possibly more proactive in this area than other forces; they also all record grievances in a similar manner to Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

The number of recorded grievances between 1993 and 1995, for each of the seven forces, is shown in table six on page 271. The next section provides a brief description of each force (excluding Cambridgeshire Constabulary) and includes a short résumé of that force's activities in equal opportunities and the development of a grievances procedure.

Force A

Force A is larger than Cambridgeshire Constabulary, in having some 5043 members of staff; however, it is similar in having both large cities and rural areas within its boundaries. It should also be noted that this force has had a full-time equal opportunity manager since 1992 and is the only other known force to have provided specific management training on dealing with grievances. Following a year's development Force A's grievance procedure was introduced in January 1992. A general awareness manual was produced and circulated around the force. Every member of staff should have received a leaflet which explained the equal opportunity policy and grievance procedure. It is now acknowledged within the force that these were very wordy documents and their relevance to staff's needs were not directly apparent. An updated grievance procedure was launched in June 1994.

A training programme commenced at the beginning January 1995, its aim being to train managers to deal with grievances. The training programme consisted of a presentation, video compilation of police-related case-studies and discussion. The training session lasted about four hours and was targeted at managers up to the rank of superintendent, both police and civilian. Senior managers had a one hour presentation and divisional management teams had a similar presentation. The four-hour training sessions for police managers was well received; analysis of the questionnaire used at the end of the session indicated that participants considered the training had equipped them to deal with grievances.

Force A has undoubtedly experienced an increase in the number of grievances between 1993 and 1995, 572.7% (see table six), however, most of this increase occurred

during 1994 (427.3%). The training of managers commenced on 3 January 1995 and the number of grievances increased by 134.04% during that year. In 1995 68.3 % were resolved at the first stage. Whether the training has affected the rise in the number of recorded grievances is difficult to ascertain because there appears to have been a general trend upwards any way. If anything, the rate of increase during 1995 actually slowed down.

Force B

This force has 1950 members of staff; it does not have a full-time equal opportunity manager. It has had a grievance procedure since 1990. In 1991, a leaflet was circulated to staff explaining the grievance procedure. In 1994, a new grievance procedure was launched in-line with Home Office circular 16/1993. In September 1994, a leaflet was distributed to all staff explaining the new procedure and managers received further written advice. Managers had received no specific training on managing grievances. However, chief inspectors and above attend a two-day training course, based upon the SSU's training package. This was delivered by SSU staff. In 1993 Inspectors received one day's general equal opportunity training based upon the SSU package. In 1993, independent research was undertaken in this force and a report was presented making a number of recommendations, though implementation would appear to be extremely slow. The number of grievances recorded are shown in table six, but the highest number was eight in 1995.

Whilst there has been an increase in the number of grievances between 1993 and 1995, (200%) the numbers are very small and, therefore, cannot be statistical relied upon, other than to indicate a general upward increase. Whilst some management training has

taken place, it has not been specifically aimed at grievance handling or conflict resolution. In 1995, 12.5% of grievances were resolved at the first stage.

Force C

This force has 2110 members of staff and introduced a grievance procedure for police officers in 1991. In that year, all staff up to and including, chief inspectors received the SSU's one-day awareness training. Superintendents and above received one day's training provided by 'The Race Relations Advisory Service'. This force has had a full-time equal opportunity manager since 1991. In 1993, all grievances had to be registered and comprehensive monitoring took place. In 1995, all sergeants and first level civilian staff were provided with one day's equal opportunity training. A contact officer scheme has also been in existence since 1991.

In 1995, this Force had 24 recorded grievances (see table six). Whilst there has been an increase in the number of grievances between 1993 and 1995, this is only 26.3%. However, this force has started from a proportionately higher figure when compared to the other forces. In 1995, 10.3% of recorded grievances were resolved at the first stage.

Force D

This force has 1989 members of staff and has had a full-time equal opportunity manager since 1993. In 1994, a new grievance procedure was introduced and a explanatory leaflet was distributed to all members of staff. In 1994, senior management received one day's training from an independent outside consultant that focused on sexual harassment. This training continued throughout 1995 to include all managers. Most staff have received one day's training along the lines of the SSU's phase one

package; this was delivered by in-force facilitators. This force experienced 17 recorded grievances in 1995, which was a slight decline over the previous year; 29.5% were resolved at the first stage.

Force E

Force E has 2318 members of staff. The equal opportunity manager was appointed in 1995 principally as a personnel officer, but with responsibility for equal opportunity issues. The force has trained nearly all members of staff with the SSU's phase one package. It is currently considering employing outside consultants to provide additional training for staff. In 1995, the force had seven recorded grievances of which three (42.9%) were resolved at the first stage.

Force F

Force F has 1937 members of staff. In 1993, a police officer was appointed as the full-time equal opportunity officer, but was replaced after one year with a part-time external consultant. Nearly all members of staff have received the SSU's phase one, training. Phase two of the SSU's training programme was not pursued. More specific management training in dealing with grievances is being considered. A new grievance procedure was introduced in 1994. In 1995, 20 grievances were record, 20% being resolved at the first stage.

Analysis

Table six provides a full breakdown of recorded grievances for each force between 1993 and 1995.

Table Six.

FORCE	1,993	1,994	1,995
Cambridgeshire	4	28	95
Force A	11	47	63
Force B	4	6	8
Force C	19	21	24
Force D	4	23	17
Force E	3	5	7
Force F	7	19	20

Force A is the only other known force to have undertaken specific training in dealing with grievances. Force B, has not undertaken any training for managers, and development of equal opportunity initiatives appears to have been somewhat limited, although plans are in hand to improve the situation. Force C has had and equal opportunity officer for sometime, as has Force D. Both of these forces have provided considerable general equal opportunity awareness training based upon the SSU's phase one package. Force E does not have anyone dedicated to equal opportunities, but has delivered phase one of the SSU's training programme. Force F has also delivered the SSU's phase one training and has a part-time external equal opportunity adviser.

Whilst this by no means offers a comprehensive comparison across a wide range of forces and is certainly an area that should be subject to further research, it does provide some useful data to compare what happen in Cambridgeshire Constabulary with other forces. Research indicates that at the time of writing, with the exception of Force A, no other force has combined the implementation of a new grievance procedure with the training of managers in the handling of grievances and conflict in the workplace.

Although Force A is the only other known force that has undertaken specific management training in this area, the approach was significantly different to the re-socialisation programme adopted in Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

While table six provides useful comparative data, it obviously presents a somewhat distorted picture because of the wide variation in the number of staff employed in each force. Figure three compares the ratio of grievances to staff across all seven forces and is displayed graphically on the next page.

Figure 3: Grievance/Staff Ratio

	1993	1994	1995
Cambs	0.0020	0.0138	0.0495
A	0.0022	0.0093	0.0125
B	0.0021	0.0031	0.0041
C	0.0090	0.0100	0.0137
D	0.0020	0.0116	0.0085
E	0.0013	0.0022	0.003
F	0.0036	0.0098	0.0103

Figure three shows the number of grievances recorded as a ratio against the number of staff. The greater the number, the higher the number of grievances actually recorded. The chart clearly shows that in 1993 there were generally less grievances recorded across all forces and there has been a general increase over the three-year period. However, the increase in the number of grievances recorded in Cambridgeshire Constabulary clearly represents the most significant change. The force has gone from having the lowest ratio in 1993 to the highest number in 1995. The change has been significant and sustained. Force D experienced an increase in the number of grievances following the launch of its new grievance procedure in 1994, but this has not been sustained. Force A has experienced an increase in the number of grievances following the training of managers, but this by no means is as significant as that seen in Cambridgeshire. Of course, creating a climate where staff feel more confident in making grievances is only one part in bringing about sustained cultural change. I suggest that the change would not be sustained unless a significant number of grievances were being resolved as quickly as possible.

Figure four, overleaf, provides a comparison across all seven forces of the number of grievances resolved at the first stage during 1995.

Figure 4: Number of Grievances Resolved at Stage One (1995)

Force	Percentage
Cambs	69.5
A	68.3
B	12.5
C	10.3
D	29.5
E	40.0
F	20.0

During 1995 the level of grievances resolved at stage one was significantly higher in Force A and Cambridgeshire Constabulary compared to other forces. Force E, had only five grievances recorded in 1995, of which two were resolved, I, therefore, consider this figure to be too small to provide a reliable comparison. This comparison, whilst limited, does tend to suggest that how the grievance procedure was implemented in Force A and Cambridgeshire Constabulary, made a significant difference to the number of grievances resolved at the first stage. The fact that only these two forces had undertaken specific management training in dealing with grievances would appear to be the most significant factor in explaining the cause of the high level of resolution at stage one. This is an area for further research and, undoubtedly, requires a larger sample size before tests can be made for statistical significance. However, one cannot help draw the conclusion that specific targeted training can make a significant difference.

However, this does not explain why there is a such a significant difference in the number of grievances recorded between Force A and Cambridgeshire Constabulary in 1995. This thesis is not intended to be an in-depth comparative study between forces, rather an in-depth study of the process of change in one particular force. However, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions caused by the different approaches in that Force A's approach was one of a traditional training approach, whereas Cambridgeshire Constabulary's approach was of a far more radical re-socialisation process. This will be discussed in much greater depth in the next chapter.

Summary

Data from other forces who operate a similar grievance procedure has provided a context in which the change that occurred in Cambridgeshire Constabulary can be set. It

can clearly be seen that Cambridgeshire Constabulary has experienced a far more significant increase in the number of grievances than the other forces. Additionally, it can be seen that only force A has experienced a similarly high level of resolution at the first stage in the grievance procedure. The next chapter will, therefore, attempt to provide a more detailed explanation as to why such a significant change occurred in Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The title of this thesis is *'The Process of Cultural Change: A Case-study, with particular reference to the Grievance Procedure in Cambridgeshire Constabulary'*. This is an in-depth examination of the process of change in a particular type of organisation, the police service and within the police service one particular police force, Cambridgeshire Constabulary. This chapter, then, analyses the findings from this particular change programme and attempts to illuminate some of the underlying causal relationships. However, caution should be used, a causal relationship is established where a spatial and temporal contiguity exists between two events. One event precedes another event and without the first event the second would probably not occur. In a controlled laboratory environment it may be possible to measure such a process, but in the rich context of an organisation the number of uncontrolled variables is enormous. For this reason, drawing firm conclusions about causational relationships is extremely difficult. In addition, this case-study focuses on one organisation, and findings cannot safely be applied to all organisations. This analysis, therefore, attempts to illuminate possible causality and identify further areas for research, rather than establish specific conclusions that can be generalised across all organisations.

What Happened

The Equality of Service Project

Cambridgeshire Constabulary's 'Equality of Service Project' commenced in January 1994. As already explained, the initial stage of the project involved researching the current situation and identifying underlying problems, rather than manifesting symptoms. This was followed by the development of a new equal opportunity policy and new grievance procedure. A comprehensive re-socialisation programme was then designed and commenced in September 1994. There immediately followed an increase in the number of grievances. Between 1993 and 1995 the number of recorded grievances increased by **2375%** (see figure 1). Chapter 11 (findings and results) explains this in more detail, but this increase, together with **69.5 %** of grievances being resolved at the first stage in 1995, compared to **0%** in 1993, provides evidence of a significant and sustained cultural change. Following the re-socialisation programme, both managers and staff appeared more prepared to use the procedure. Indeed, when interviewed all aggrieved staff said they would make another grievance if they had to. The increase in the number of recorded grievances and the high number that were resolved at the first stage indicate a significant change has taken place, but what effect has this change had on the organisation? Changing an individual's behaviour, whilst important, does not necessarily mean that the organisation actually changes. The next section will examine changes in the organisation.

The New Grievance Procedure and the Affect on the Force

For organisational change to occur, it is necessary to affect the relationship people have within a complex human system we term culture. Failure to change organisational culture will almost certainly lead to slow organisational decay as the

organisation holds on to values, ideas, procedures and practices that will eventually cause it to cease to operate. One reason for this is that managers are captives of their past successes and experiences. They continue to do what they have done successfully in the past, even though, because of changed circumstances, they are now doing the wrong things (Wilson 1994)[340]. The new grievance procedure was designed to help address this phenomena by providing a feedback mechanism that staff could use if they felt aggrieved about a particular problem. This feedback mechanism, if effectively used, was designed to bring about changes to policies, procedures and behaviour.

Analysis of grievances made under the new procedure and subsequent outcomes provide evidence of changes to a number of different procedures. For example, one grievance related to the level of eyesight required to work in the firearms unit. The firearms unit insisted that no form of optical aid could be used, therefore this excluded officers with glasses or contact lenses. The grievance handler enquired as to the level of eyesight required in other organisations, such as the armed forces, and found that soft contact lenses were allowed. This brought about a change in force policy. Another example related to a criteria used in the selection of staff for specialist posts. High levels of uncertificated sick leave were used as a criteria to exclude staff. This had the affect of restricting the movement of staff to all posts, except for uniform patrol duties. The grievance resulted in this policy being withdrawn because of its potential discriminatory affect on uniform patrol. A number of other examples exist that have resulted in policy changes. The most significant of these concerned staff selection. A number of grievances were received in a very short period; the grievances indicated that there were major inconsistencies in the application of selection criteria across the force. The number of

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[340]   Wilson T., *Op.Cit.*, p xi, 1994.

grievances resulted in a major project to provide a comprehensive selection procedure for the whole force.

The above evidence suggests that a grievance procedure, if used effectively, can provide a mechanism to assist in organisational development. In essence, aspects of a bureaucracy's culture, such as that found in the police service, has been used to help change itself. Systems and procedures form the cornerstone of a bureaucracy, but they also help to create barriers to change because of their ridged structure, which also helps to create a mind-set that can be equally rigid. The new grievance procedure used this strict adherence to systems and procedures as a means of bringing about change. For example, the staff selection procedure required managers to select staff based on their skills and abilities, rather than nepotism. In many ways, this represented a considerable change to existing practices by exposing previously undiscussible negative policies and behaviour.

In support of the above view, evidence from this research suggests that the new grievance procedure would appear to have provided some control over managers who had, in the past, been particularly autocratic and dogmatic in style. As one senior manager said:

> "Its biggest benefit is to modify mismanagement...........
> forget sexual harassment the existence of the grievance
> procedure modifies behaviour and members of staff are
> now much more willing to use it".

As previously argued, police culture was traditionally highly militaristic and macho in nature. Staff were not encouraged to question established practices, which led to a culture of secrecy, particularly between junior and senior ranks. This is known as

'canteen culture' within the service. This culture led to a management style that demonstrated little accountability for the decisions made regarding staff's treatment. However, as cases were brought before industrial tribunals for alleged sex and race discrimination, management were forced to become more accountable. As one equal opportunity manager from another force said during interview:

"Most grievances involve poor management"[341].

This aspect of police culture, a reluctance to question, or challenging management's decisions, certainly helped to mask some aspects of poor management. As one member of staff who had made a grievance said:

> *"Three and a half years ago something happened to me regarding selection ...... there wasn't a grievance procedure and nobody took any notice, so for the next 12 months I did bugger all, that's why I'm so in favour of the grievance procedure now".*

This comment is particularly important, as it deals with the issue of motivation and illustrates how perceived unfair treatment can be a powerful de-motivating force. Even though the aggrieved might be wrong in their assertion, unless they have an effective way of expressing this frustration they will continue to be de-motivated. Another interesting point comes from this comment, in that the aggrieved thought no grievance procedure existed at the time, when in fact a procedure did exist. Another view from an aggrieved member of staff reinforces the earlier comment about the grievance procedure modifying negative aspects of management procedure:

> *"There's too much off-loading of responsibility by managers in this force; ultimately the grievance procedure will help to equip managers to manage better".*[342]

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[341]   Fieldnotes, 1995.
[342]   Fieldnotes, 1995.

Providing a system and a supportive culture that allows the exposure of poor behaviour appears to be an important first step in bringing about significant change in behaviour. While this may be viewed as a positive development, some managers expressed concern that the procedure would go too far; for example:

> "People would be making grievances about all kinds of things".

> "It will produce a defensive management style".

The re-socialisation programme tried to give managers the confidence and knowledge to make positive and informed decisions, but some managers seemed to feel that other managers, not themselves, would make weak and uninformed decisions. This view was balanced by other managers who had dealt with grievances and had grievances recorded against them:

> "As a senior manager I don't feel the least bit threatened by the grievance procedure".

The consensus appeared to be that as a manager if you had acted in good faith and your decision was well thought out you had nothing to fear.

Quality of Service

Traditionally the police service had a culture that depended on discipline and conformity. There has, undoubtedly, been an attempt to move away from this culture by some senior managers (Reiner 1991[343], Walker 1994[344]), to a culture where more emphasis is placed on responsibility and self-discipline. Evidence from this research suggests that a grievance procedure, effectively implemented, can be complementary to this change. As one senior manager said:

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[343]   Reiner, R, *Op.Cit.,* 1991.
[344]   Walker, N. *Op.Cit.,* 1994.

> *"I strongly support the new grievance procedure, it's a*
> *very positive step forward in our management".*

Developing a more participative management style requires managers who listen and value staff's opinions. The increase in the number of grievances could easily be seen in a negative light, rather than a substantial and positive step forward in improving the internal quality of service. However, I consider this development to be closely allied to the recommendations made in the ACPO (Quality of Service Committee) document *'Getting Things Right'* (1993)[345]. This document clearly indicates the importance of dealing with internal quality of service at the same time as improving external quality of service. The document contains the following suggestion to achieve this aim:

> *"Managers need to encourage their staff to question the*
> *accepted way of doing things, and must show that they*
> *value the views of others by acting upon them .... every*
> *team member has an equal right and a duty to say what*
> *they think, without fear of recrimination".*

This document also suggests that creating a culture where staff can question and express concerns without recrimination is a key component in developing a culture where quality of service predominates. The document also describes some aspects of what police culture should be like:

> *"The first thing to be said is that we must firmly maintain*
> *high standards of business ethics and honesty. These will*
> *not be compromised. We do, however, need a culture*
> *which acknowledges that our major strength is our*
> *people: they must be openly valued, not only for skills*
> *they bring to the job, but as individuals too ...."* [346].

Emphasis is placed on honesty and business ethics, although this is not explained further. Chapter two discusses at some length the importance impartiality and fairness are to

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[345]   ACPO Quality of Service Committee, *Op.Cit.,* 1993.
[346]   *Ibid.,* p 9, 1993.

police work, *'Getting Things Right'* (1993)[347] places considerable emphasis on managers role modelling this behaviour and staff having the confidence to question decisions without fear of recrimination. However, the document does not make it clear as to how these changes in culture should be achieved. By the time the re-socialisation programme was complete (March 1995) the document had received the minimum of attention, indeed hardly any manager attending the courses had seen a copy. This provides further evidence of a well-intentioned change initiative floundering upon implementation. The document does, however, link an internal grievance procedure to the development of quality of service; this is an important point that many in the service seem to have lost.

The rise in the number of grievances is evidence of both an increased level of confidence in the procedure and a willingness to actually use the procedure. It also provides evidence of a change in culture in that staff are willing to question management's decisions. Grievances for 1995 can be broken down in the following way to illustrate this point:

Table Seven.

Grievances Were Recorded Against:	
Policies and Procedures	61.0%
Management Decisions and Behaviour	25.3%
Peers' Behaviour	13.7%

Most grievances were directed against management polices, procedures, decisions or behaviour. This provides clear evidence that staff had become more willing to challenge aspects of management. A number of people interviewed also thought the procedure provided a quality control system for the way that staff are treated by management and peers As one aggrieved person said:

"The glory of it is it won't be buried".

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[347]   *Ibid.*, p 12, 1993.

The inference is that sometimes awkward issues are swept under the carpet, rather than being addressed at the time. In any organisations this can be a serious problem, and it was clear that prior to the re-socialisation programme decisions regarding grievances were continually passed up the organisation, instead of empowering more junior managers to act to improve a situation, or procedure.

A Learning Organisation and Modifying Behaviour

Finally, organisational development largely depends upon the use of feedback to determine the need for change. The grievance procedure provided a system of feedback which the organisation can make use of to stimulate formal and informal learning. As one manager put it:

> *"The grievance procedure helps the organisation learn and grow".*

The informal learning process is harder to measure, but some evidence can be found of change at the psycho-social subsystem (Stacey 1993)[348]. Readers will remember the evidence presented in earlier chapters that sex discrimination and harassment were a widespread problems in the police service (Brown *et. al.* 1993)[349]. Research conducted in Cambridgeshire Constabulary also confirm the force suffered the same problem (Kelly 1993[350], Auton 1993) [351]. In 1996 an independent researcher conducted an ethnography into police culture in Cambridge (Muston 1996)[352] . This research found that:

> *"The Grievance Procedure, introduced in the city in 1994 was also perceived to have a modifying effect on the overt display of sexist attitudes or behaviour ..... ".*

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[348]   Stacey, R. D., *Op.Cit.*, p 134, 1993.
[349]   Brown, J., *et. al.*, *Op.Cit.*, 1993
[350]   Kelly, J. *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[351]   Auton, M. *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[352]   Muston, J., *Op.Cit.*, p 45, 1996.

> *"Quoting a female officer: .... 'no one will stand for it, certainly in Cambridge, because you know you'll lose your job .... and we've got a good grievance procedure, which can be used from a grievance like banter to someone touching you ...... It's been used on several occasions and heavily at times'".*

Muston (1996) concludes:

> *"It is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion on the issue of sexual discrimination in the city police. Doubtless there are ingrained sexist views amongst some officers, but overt sexism was not seen as a mainstream element of the culture ......"*

This evidence suggest that the successful implementation of the new grievance procedure has been a major factor in influencing the informal psycho-social subsystem and has, at least, modified aspects of overt sexism. This is, perhaps, the most significant evidence available to suggest there has been a meaningful change in organisational culture, particularly when compared to Kelly's (1993) comments three years earlier:

> *"The majority of women interviewed, both police and civilian, believed that sexist behaviour and/or sexual harassment was an everyday occurrence which they or their colleagues had to tolerate from policemen".*[353]

> *"The grievance procedure as it stands at the moment (1993) was not thought a suitable procedure to follow".*[354]

The introduction of the new grievance procedure has, undoubtedly, brought about change in the force's culture, it has been instrumental in the introduction of a number of new policies and procedures and staff certainly appear to have more faith in the procedure. Determining what caused this change is more difficult; for example, are

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[353] Kelly, J. *Op. cit.*, p 27, 1993
[354] Kelly, J. *Ibid.*, p 13, 1993.

there now more grievances, or simply the same number of grievances, but now recorded as part of the new grievance procedure?

Alternative Explanations

I hypothesised earlier that staff would only make more grievances if they had more faith in the procedure and the people operating it. Another explanation to account for the rise in recorded grievances would be that conditions in the force had severely deteriorated between 1993 and 1995. For example, that management had become more aggressive or uncaring. There was no evidence to suggest this was the case. If anything the contrary view was true. Evidence of this can be found from a number of sources. For example, a group of sergeants (10) attending a management development course at the end of 1995, when questioned about this subject, shared the view the force was now a fairer place to work. Additionally, the force circulated a questionnaire to 600 members of staff randomly selected in July 1995. Whilst only 238 (39.6%) responses were received, it does provide some useful information concerning staff's perception about issues of management style in the force.

Q. Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the force is more or less open?

Response: N =
Thought it was more open	29%
Thought is was about the same	61%
Thought it was less open	7%
Did not answer	3%

Q. Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the force is more or less supportive?

Response: N =
Thought it was more supportive	20%
Thought is was about the same	63%
Thought it was less supportive	14%
Did not answer	3%

The responses to this questionnaire appear to indicate there has been little change, if anything the questions suggest that staff perceived there has been a slight improvement in management style. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the increase in grievances is due to a significant worsening of management style in the preceding three years.

The evidence from Muston (1996), discussed earlier, seems to preclude the possibility that the increase in recorded grievances was caused by a sudden increase in sex discrimination / harassment. If anything, her evidence suggests that there has been a considerable decline in overt sexist behaviour, which is, at least, partly due to the new grievance procedure.

Culture Did Change

All the people interviewed, after the implementation of the new grievance procedure, shared the opinion that there had been a significant shift in the culture of the force, particularly with people having more confidence in the grievance procedure. Whilst this is always difficult to measure and quantify, a number of comments highlight this trend. One of the major criticisms made in the Gender Culture Audit (Kelly 1993)[355] was that staff did not have faith in the grievance procedure:

> *"People don't use the grievance procedure because they*
> *are frightened of the consequences".*

Whilst it would be wrong to say staff now have total faith in the procedure, there has certainly been a significant improvement. The following comment made by a member of staff who has made a grievance illustrates this point:

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[355]   Kelly, J., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

*"People realise now they are not going to be cut off at the
knees if they make a grievance".*

There have been many factors involved in the change of culture in the force.

These include the appointment of a new deputy chief constable in 1994, the promotion of

the previous deputy chief constable to chief constable at the beginning of 1994 and the

appointment of a civilian head of Human Resources. As one senior manager said during

interview several months after the re-socialisation course:

> *"The new grievance procedure is complementary to a lot
> of cultural change taking place in the force, for example,
> a more open management style, more questioning, better
> communication .... I can't imagine working without it".*

Finally, evidence was obtained from a member of staff who had made a grievance

under the old procedure (see page 209) and found the process extremely arduous. This

person made a further grievance towards the end of 1995. He/she said during interview,

following this second grievance, under the new procedure:

> *"I started to speak to 'Z' he /she explained to me about
> their training that they had done about the grievance
> procedure. I was up in the air and he / she gently brought
> me back to earth, at this stage I was still prepared to go to
> an industrial tribunal. 'Z' decide there should be a
> meeting of all the managers involved, I trusted 'Z' to
> argue my points for me and it was being taken seriously.
> ....* "*

> *"The grievance procedure worked because of 'Z' but the
> procedure had to be there. A year ago we both would have
> ended up walking the beat at March or Wisbech, those
> were very bad days".*

> Question: *"On a scale of one to seven, one being totally
> dissatisfied and seven being totally satisfied how was it
> resolved to your satisfaction"?*

Reply: *"Five or six, I would have liked an apology but didn't push for it, 'W' (alleged perpetrator) had not done the Training (the re-socialisation course) and should have gone. It's substantially different now compared to when I joined, because more managers have sensitivity to deal with these issues".[356]*

This interview is unique in that it is from some who had experienced making a grievance under both grievance procedures. It indicates that the individual on this occasion had a far more positive experience compared to the previous incident (see page 209). Of course, this is only one example and it would have been far better if the individual had not had to make a grievance at all. Nevertheless, in an area where it is extremely difficult to get data because of individual's understandable reluctance to discuss what is often very personal and distressing, it does provide evidence of a positive change in organisational culture.

The above evidence, combined with a rise in the number of recorded grievances and the high level of resolution at the first stage, certainly suggests a significant change has occurred. The next section discusses how this change was brought about.

Why The Culture Changed

Analysis - Prior to Change

Undoubtedly an important first step was the analysis of the state of the current culture. Wilkins and Dyer (1988)[357] argue that a major flaw in many cultural change programmes is that they fail to take account of the nature of the culture to be changed.

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[356]   Field notes December 1995.
[357]   Wilkins, A. L. and Dyer W. G. 'Toward culturally sensitive theories of cultural change', *Academy of Management Review*, 13 (4), pp 522-33, 1988.

Often research is superficial and relies too heavily on quantitative methods which only measure superficial aspects of culture, such as attitudes and opinions (Frost 1985)[358]. A major aspect that is often missed is the role that rituals, theatre, artefacts and core assumptions play in maintaining culture, as Bate (1994)[359] argues:

> *"Comments about the culture to be changed are often*
> *clichés and superficial, revealing little actual research*
> *and little appreciation of its internal 'atomic' structure".*

Here the police service faces a major challenge that is rooted in its culture and seriously affects attempts at cultural change. Chapters two and three contains arguments that the police service places little value on research or knowledge of cultural change. Additionally, evidence from other research (CPTU 1993)[360] suggests that the police service makes little actual use of research where it is conducted. Young (1993)[361] shares his personal experience:

> *"I was well aware that regardless of any protestation*
> *about the role of the HQ researcher, it is one of*
> *ambivalence and holds little kudos in a world where*
> *concepts of 'real' work consistently home in on life on the*
> *division".*

Brown (1996)[362] considers that research has questioned the very legitimacy of police powers. She argues that herein lie some of the reasons behind the hostility that has developed between the police and academics. She adds this combined with an inherent anti-intellectualism from within the police service (quoting Brewer 1991; Bradley, Walker and Wilkie 1986), has led to the police service's defensive stance in response to

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[358]   Frost, P. J., *et.al., Op.Cit.*, p16, 1985.
[359]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.*, p 139, 1994.
[360]   CPTU, *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[361]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, pp 65-66, 1993.
[362]   Brown, J., Police Research: some critical issues, in *Core Issues in Policing*, pp 177 - 190, Longman, 1996.

or rejection of research. Clearly, then, there is a wealth of evidence that suggests that the police service places little value on research and, indeed, this is part of its culture. However, evidence from this thesis and others (Bate 1994[363], Howard 1994[364], Schein 1988 [365]) indicates that research that accurately assesses the current culture is an essential element in implementing a successful cultural change programme. Howard (1988)[366] argues that organisational diagnosis is a critical step in the change process and an essential part of a competent practitioner's role. He considers that embarking upon cultural change without adequate organisational diagnosis is akin to (quoting Bray 1993):

> *"Venturing into a strange country with no map and no facility in the language. Failure is not always inevitable, but diagnosis would make success more likely and more complete".*

Stacey (1993)[367] also emphasises the importance of research and analysis as the first stage in a planned social change programme. He considers that the first step in planned cultural change is that of analysing the forces that exist at any one time in a specific organisation. This includes identifying what are the driving forces and what are the resisting forces.

The police service's negativity to research and the view that suggests that reliable and accurate research is vital for cultural change provides evidence of the existence of an organisational vicious-circle. Simply because the police service does not place value on research, it either does not conduct research, or where research is carried out it is largely superficial in nature. Inevitably, this means the research tends to identify symptoms rather than underlying problems. Additionally, where research is conducted of a suitable high

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[363]   Bate, P. *Op.Cit.*, 1994.
[364]   Howard, A. *et.al, Diagnosis for Organisational Change*, Guildford Press, p 9, 1994.
[365]   Schein, E. H., *Op.Cit.*, pp 239 - 252,1988.
[366]   Howard, A. *et.al.*, *Op.Cit.*, 1988.
[367]   Stacey, R. D., *Op.Cit.*, p139, 1993.

standard little actual use is made of it (e.g. Holdaway and Barron 1993)[368]. It then

follows that many attempts at change either fail or end up addressing the symptoms,

rather than the underlying problems. An example of this aspect of police culture was

provided by a sergeant about to retire:

> *"How come when we have a public order operation that*
> *lasts only one day we have a debrief that lasts for about*
> *one day, but when we change in a fundamental way how*
> *the whole organisation investigates crime and that lasts*
> *for two years we don't debrief that at all"* [369]?

This is symptomatic of a culture that rightly places immense importance on issues

of day-to-day policing, but seemingly places little importance on organisational

development, organisational learning or analysis of the causes of poor performance. As

one senior manager said:

> *"What worries me is that performance doesn't seem to*
> *matter"*[370]

This organisational viscous circle provides part of the answer as to why the police service

and I suspect many other organisations, are relatively poor at implementing

organisational change. The next section examines how the Equality of Service Project

tried to avoid this error.

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[368]   Holdaway, S. and Barron, A-M., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[369]   Fieldnotes, 1996.
[370]   Fieldnotes, 1996.

Analysis for the Equality of Service Project

With the above argument in mind the change programme commenced (January 1994) with an analysis of the current culture in Cambridgeshire Constabulary, with particular regard to fairness and equality issues. The thoroughness of this analysis was balanced against time constraints and the dynamic and fluid nature of culture. A number of issues were examined; for example, how grievances were handled, the level of confidence staff had in the existing grievance procedure and management's attitude.

A number of different methods were used to obtain a representative picture of what amounted to a major aspects of the force's culture, for example, questionnaires, interviews, critical incident analysis, and participant observation. A review of previous research carried out in the force and elsewhere also provided significant additional information. Because of the complexity and richness of culture within an organisation (see chapter five), it was essential to use multiple sources of evidence to expose the interaction and nature of the culture. The triangulation[371] (Dezin 1970)[372] of this data, both quantitative and qualitative, helped to provide a convergence of information from different sources. This process was vital in identifying a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behaviour issues (Creswell 1994)[373], essential if culture is to be changed. Yin (1994)[374] argues that to achieve the necessary appreciation of the complexity of the organisational phenomena, a case-study may be the most appropriate research method. The eclectic nature of research methods used in a case-study provides a suitable vehicle

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[371]   Triangulation of research methods is carried out in the belief that the employment of a number different techniques offers the best chance of achieving validity. Dezin (1970) suggests that, whenever possible, social research should seek to 'triangulate' different research methods. In this research, normally at least three separate sources of data were used to confirm an issue's validity.

[372]   Dezin, N. (ed.) *Sociological Methods: a Source Book*, Chicago: Aldine, 1970.

[373]   Creswell, J. W., *Op.Cit.*, p178, 1994.

[374]   Yin, R. K., *Op.Cit.,* p xv, 1994.

to capture the richness and complexity of organisational culture. The police service currently places an over-reliance on quantitative methods of data collection, such as questionnaires, performance indicators and crime figures. These largely miss the complexity of organisational life which comprises its culture, therefore factors that have a significant impact on efficiency, such as underlying assumptions, beliefs, values, and rituals are not identified.

The use of multiple sources of research helped to illuminate *Meta-Problems* that existed, as opposed to manifesting symptoms. For example, the research identified that it was manager's knowledge, skills and *Meta-Directions* that would act as a barrier to effective implementation of the new grievance procedure. It identified that managers were generally unwilling to take on a potential grievance when a member of staff approached them. This was because they lacked a belief in the procedure and feared they would personally suffer as a result of being involved in the grievance. Identifying these issues helped in the formulation of a development strategy to bring about change. For example, it became apparent that it was essential to, in essence, re-socialise managers before implementing the new grievance procedure. A significant part of that re-socialisation had to focus on changing managers belief's and *Meta-Directions* about staff with grievances and about the grievance procedure itself. The research identified that not only did managers not understand the procedure, but often assumed that there was little substance to a potential grievance, even before looking into it. There was also a strong assumption that it was better not to raise issues of a potentially threatening nature, or that critically reflected on established organisational practices. As I explained earlier, it also indicated that managers when looking for evidence from a potential complaint operated on a burden of proof that was the criminal standard of 'beyond all reasonable

doubt'. This was largely an unconscious process and seriously affected how they dealt with complaints from staff.

This analysis also provided evidence of a lack of understanding on the part of most managers concerning what an organisation actually is and the degree of control they have over it. Interviews with senior managers provide evidence to suggest that they largely conceptualised organisations as structures, systems and procedures, rather than societies consisting of relationships that are continually being constructed and reconstructed. This can be seen in the management of many change programmes in the police service that tend to focus on changing structures and procedures. This view of an organisation also meant that most seemed to think that conceptualised change meant changing these systems, structures and procedures, rather than what people actually do.

The 'Equality of Service Project' used the concept of 'action-research' espoused by Kurt Lewin (1952)[375] and explained in chapter nine (Methodology) to assist in the identification of barriers to successful implementation. A major problem with traditional research models is how they place implementation at the end of the process, thereby ignoring how the process of implementation itself inevitably alters the original concept. An example of this is given later in the chapter, but briefly the original intention was to train senior managers separately from more junior managers; but this had to be changed rapidly because of developing events during implementation.

To summarise, research using an eclectic approach was essential to identify the different components that needed to be changed. These components existed at all three

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[375]   Lewin, K, *Op.Cit.*, 1952.

levels (performance, directions and Meta-Directions). Table 10 provides a breakdown of some of the key areas.

Table Eight.

Performance	Listening Skills
	The mechanics of using the grievance procedure
	Number of grievances and the level of resolution
Directions	Principles behind the grievance procedure
	Understanding Legislation
Meta-Directions	Assumptions about people who make grievances
	Looking for hard facts
	What change involves
	Could not deal with a grievance that involved a senior manager

Qualitative methods of research offered the most useful information, particularly when it came to understanding how people within the organisation interpreted what was, to them undeniable truths. They helped to expose rituals, ritual blocking, cultural containment and boundary maintenance. An example of the latter point is that junior managers did not believe they were empowered, or expected, to deal with grievances involving more senior managers. Generally they avoided these delicate staff issues and passed them up the management hierarchy as quickly as possible.

Quantitative methods of research provided a useful benchmark to measure change against, for example, the number of recorded grievances and at what level they were

resolved. The questionnaire provided a useful bench mark, but some of the information proved to be highly unreliable. For example, nearly half of staff responding stated that they had adequate knowledge and understanding of the force grievance procedure; this proved to be highly inaccurate. However, as facilitators, it was important to know, that most participants did not realise, they did not have adequate knowledge and understanding. By using multiple sources of data and triangulating the data before and throughout the implementation process, as a feedback loop, constant amendments could be made in line with changing environment demands.

Stacey (1993) implies that force fields for or against change operate externally to the individual, rather than both internally and externally. Some of the powerful force fields operated internally to the individual, but were often the most difficult to expose. Changing these internal force fields is the subject of discussion in the next section.

The Re-socialisation Programme

The evidence from participants who attended the re-socialisation courses was extremely positive. This was confirmed at the end of the course and during interview several months after the course had been completed. Indeed, as a member of one of the staff associations commented two years after the re-socialisation programme commenced:

> *"The grievance procedure sticks out as being the last real change in the force that has worked"* [376].

Following the re-socialisation programme, there was evidence that managers were explaining the new grievance procedure to their staff and had done this in such away that

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[376]   Fieldnotes October 1996.

staff had increased confidence in the new procedure. Evidence of this was found when an ex-trainer, sought out the project team to report what he/she had observed. This occurred about four weeks after the re-socialisation programme began. He/she said:

> "I was present at a shift briefing, not as part of my shift but as an observer really, when the sergeant explained the new grievance procedure to the shift. I was very surprised because I thought this particular sergeant would have been very negative, but he appeared quite enthusiastic. He told the shift if they wanted to make a grievance or were unhappy about anything they could go to him and he would try to resolve the matter, or they could go to any other manager. I thought this was really significant so I thought I better tell you".

Some months later, a serious incident occurred where a member of that shift reported a grievance; they did not go to this particular sergeant, but went to another manager. During interview, the aggrieved explained that they did not feel they could go to this particular sergeant, but nevertheless the sergeant having heard about the incident, had assured the aggrieved of his/her support. This evidence helps to explain how staff became aware of the new grievance procedure. When interviewed, all aggrieved said they had heard about the new grievance procedure by word of mouth. The fact that the person who explained the procedure to them was generally someone they had considerable contact with also appears significant. This person was normally their direct line manager, (sergeant, inspector or civilian department manager) or possibly one above that person. Nevertheless, this person was probably well known and perceived as a 'significant other'. This appears to have helped to convince staff that they should have faith in the new procedure, thereby helping to change their belief in the grievance procedure.

In April 1995, when the re-socialisation programme was complete, the new grievance procedure (Appendix 13) and equal opportunity policy (Appendix 12) were

launched. Posters (Appendix 15 and 16) were placed in every police station in the Force;

every member of staff received a personal leaflet (Appendix 11) explaining the new

policy and procedure; an item was placed in 'General Orders' and all managers received

an up-to-date version of the grievance procedure. However, during interview I found

that the use of written methods of communication, for example newsletters, leaflets and

posters were widely disliked and received widespread criticism from nearly everybody

interviewed. Additionally, there was no evidence to suggest that these methods of

communication resulted in any positive change. There would appear to be a number of

reasons for this, one being simple overload of information. At the same time as the

'Equality of Service Project' the Force Review was taking place and a number of

newsletters were used for that purpose. Some leaflets were posted directly to staff's

home addresses, to ensure personal issue; however, a number of staff were angry about

this and saw it as a waste of money. Another possible explanation for the low impact of

written communication on organisational culture in this area was put forward by

someone involved in equal opportunities from another force:

> *"I was in my office when the sergeant came in with about*
> *500 of these leaflets [concerning equal opportunities and*
> *the grievance procedure]. I asked him what they were*
> *about and he said he didn't really know, but I was the*
> *inspector and they were supposed to be circulated to*
> *everyone. I was really busy, but nevertheless I started to*
> *read them. I got a quarter of the way through and thought*
> *'what a load of bollocks, what's that got to do with*
> *everyday policing?' and threw them in the bin, so no one*
> *in my district got a copy. I understand the issues now, but*
> *these are emotive issues and can't be treated like this".*

This evidence tends to suggest that when dealing with emotive issues, such as equal

opportunities, leaflets and newsletters seem to have little positive impact. The concept of

'Selective Exposure' would appear to provide something of an explanation to this

problem, in that we tend to expose ourselves to things that fit our value and belief system. We read newspapers and watch television programmes that reinforce our value system; if they do not we simple change channels, or in the case of newspapers we do not buy them. The above quote from the inspector illustrates this phenomena and indicates that unless these issues are dealt with carefully the issue will be marginalised and change may be made even more difficult.

Following the circulation of the personal leaflets (Appendix 11) and the displaying of posters (Appendix 15 and 16), in March 1995 the number of recorded grievances rose by **25%** during the next quarter. This should be compared to a **228.6%** increase when the re-socialisation programme commenced in September 1994. It would appear that the increase through the re-socialisation of managers was far more significant than through the written media. The re-socialisation of managers, which in essence is a very special form of training would appear to have been the most significant factor in bringing about change. This view is supported in the following quotes from a manager who had attended the course:

> *"It was one of the most impactive events of my career".*
>
> *"The course has re-motivated me, it's been a real turning point and made me consider my management style".*

However, it would be inappropriate not to consider alternative explanations that could explain the increase in the number of recorded grievances. One explanation could be that staff anticipated the launch of a new grievance procedure and this anticipation caused an increase in recorded grievances. If this was the case, why did no other force experience a similar increase when they were about to introduce a new procedure? It

could be argued that any training programme would have had a similar effect and grievances would inevitably increased. If this was the case why did Force 'A' not experience a similar increase following their training programme? Also nearly all the forces questioned had carried out equal opportunity training of some description, most based upon the SSU's phase one package and none saw a similar increase. Equally, if publicity was a major factor in the increase of grievances, why, when nearly every other force in the comparative group provided the same level, if not more publicity, did they not experience a similar increase? If the increase in the number of recorded grievances was caused by an increase in staff movement, following reorganisation, why did no other force experience a similar increase when they themselves were nearly all going through the same restructuring exercise? Additionally, why has the increase been sustained when the reorganisation has largely stopped? The conclusion must surely be that this particular re-socialisation programme was the primary factor in bringing about this change in police culture.

The next section provides an analysis of what it was about this particular form of training that I have termed re-socialisation that caused such a significant change in culture.

Analysis of the Re-socialisation Programme

Bate (1994)[377] proposes that changing *Meta-Directions*, has a proportionately greater impact on changing culture than changing either *Directions* or *Performance*. He considers that *Meta-Directions* represent the frame within which reality is defined. He considers changing these alters the whole definition of reality. Louis (1989)[378] argues that

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[377]   Bate. P., *Op.Cit.*, 1994.
[378]   Louis., *Op.Cit.*, 1989.

culture cannot be taught on 'simple information' giving lines, rather it has to be sought by the individual. Bate (1994) further argues:

> *"To engage with it, they must be switched into an active receptive mode; they need to participate in the kind of independent, self-directed, exploratory responsible and active learning process that is absent from most indoctrination programmes".*

These principles largely underpinned the approach the re-socialisation programme tried to follow. Emphasis was placed upon participation and self-directed exploration, rather than a pedagogical approach. As one participant said when interviewed some months later:

> *"Discoveries were made by individuals themselves, rather than imposed".*

Bate (1994) proposes that intervention at a level of the organisation's *Meta-Directions* seems to offer one of the most promising routes for achieving cultural change. However, he considers that the field is still waiting for an approach that is capable of doing just this. The re-socialisation programme attempted to achieve this goal through the style of training proposed by Rogers (1983)[379] combined with a number of other developments.

Rogers argues that the facilitation of significant learning largely rests upon certain attitudinal qualities that exist in the personal relationship between the facilitator and the learner. The facilitators of the courses tried very hard to build this relationship. This approach, which stems from the field of psycho-therapy, is designed to encourage self-initiated, significant experiential learning that involves feelings and cognitive processes, but as Rogers (1983) argues:

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[379]   Rogers C. R., *Freedom to learn for the 80s*, Ohio, Merrill, pp 263-291, 1983.

"We do not frequently see these conditions put into effect because they mean a real revolution in our approach to education ......"

This approach to training was used, but was combined with an attempt to use aspects of organisational culture to ensure that participants would both consciously and unconsciously recognise the relevance of the learning to their working environment, the end goal being to change their beliefs and commitment to the grievance procedure. In other words their *Meta-Directions*. The next section analyses this process in more detail.

Knowledge

The initial part of the course was designed to equip participants with the necessary knowledge to deal with grievances. Success of this is evident in the questionnaire completed by people who had made a grievance (chapter 10). Of the 13 people interviewed who completed a questionnaire, 10 either agreed or strongly agreed that the grievance procedure had been explained to their satisfaction. Of the 13 people interviewed who had dealt with a grievance, 12 either agreed or strongly agreed that they felt confident in explaining the grievance procedure. One person answered in a neutral way, and that person had not received the training.

The knowledge components of the course can be broken down into different areas. Knowledge of legislation and codes of practice; burden of proof; reasonable inference from primary facts; the actual grievance procedure and how unfair treatment can manifest itself. The earlier research had indicated these were all areas that were problematic and had caused difficulty when dealing with grievances. They were addressed in a progressive way, commencing with the Distance Learning Package (DLP - Appendix six). This was produced on high-quality paper using two colours, which was

contrary to the normal ritualistic distribution of official materials. Normally training materials would be circulated in black and white and simply stapled together. The DLP was designed to reinforce the point that this was an important training event and to signify by the use of a symbol that it represented a change in the dominant culture. The DLP used extensively police-related case-studies. These were designed to help participants see a direct relevance between the knowledge it contained and their day-to-day work.

Following an introductory lecture, a knowledge test (Appendix eight) was used. The test was followed by a debrief and short lecture to clarify points. The course then moved to written and video case-studies. In essence, this was putting into practice the taxonomy of educational objectives in the cognitive domain developed by Bloom (1956) [380]. This consisted as follows:

Taxonomy	**Method used to achieve level**
Knowledge	= Distance Learning Package (definitions) and Knowledge Test (Overheads used in the debrief to reinforce the definitions).
Comprehension	= Distance Learning Package and Knowledge Test (Examples provided)
Application	= Case-studies and role-play. Participants were asked individually and in groups to identify what the issues were in each case-study. This process was then debriefed by group discussion.
Analysis	= Participants were asked to identify what they would do to deal with the situation and actually dealing with the situation verbally and in role-play. Debriefing this process led participants to form a new and deeper level of understanding.
Synthesis	= A number of participants experienced a new understanding and applied this to previous sets of circumstances.

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[380]   Bloom, B. S., (ed.), *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Book 1, Cognitive Domain,* Longman, N Y, 1956.

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Evaluation   = Here the adequacy of the knowledge was used to develop the new grievance procedure. Ideas were put forward based upon a greater understanding and applying in different ways to new sets of circumstances.

It can be seen that knowledge was developed in a structured and progressive way throughout the course. A number of different methods were used gradually taking participants from the simple to the abstract. This, I believe, should be standard practice for any well-structured training programme. The next section, I believe, represents something that is quite different.

Linking to Previous experience and Using Rituals to Gain Acceptance

The development of the knowledge base was carried out logically. Specific police case-studies were used to assist participants to move from the, *'known to the unknown'*, from the *'simple to the complex'*. These principles are suggested by Davies (1971)[381] and appeared to have the effect of putting participants at ease. A test was used to assess the knowledge level, but also used because it was a method that participants had previously experienced. Earlier training in equal opportunities in the force had been targeted at awareness raising and the evidence suggested[382] that it was of limited success. It involved the use of paradigms that explained the interaction between prejudice and discrimination and abstract critical thinking exercises. Managers in the force had largely experienced training that focused on the acquisition of knowledge, particularly knowledge of the law, that is what they were use to and liked. There had been attempts in recent years to move away from this approach to training, particularly for probationers, but most managers had received their initial training in a different era, where definitions of the law were used and weekly knowledge tests were commonplace.

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[381]   Davies, I. K., *The Management of Learning*, McGraw-Hill, London, 1971.
[382]   Cambridgeshire Constabulary, *Evaluation of Equal Opportunities Training*, Op.Cit., 1993.

Young (1993)[383] argues that rituals play an important part in sustaining culture, particularly in hierarchical organisations, such as the police service. At a cognitive level rituals help to filter perception and dramatise reality. They represent a familiar feeling and cognition which brings to the fore a prepared attitude or idea about the right way of doing and thinking. This is often why what is of paramount importance is not what is done, but how it is done. Meaning and value are drawn from the process and the content is often lost. The implicit message, often represented by 'how it is done', is frequently the most powerful. In my submission, for change to be successful the explicit message, the 'content,' has to use this phenomena to achieve what, in essence, is implicit learning. Experiencing how something is done is a process with a rich mixture of sensory stimulants, the content is normally a singular sensory stimulant; for example, written or oral communication. Because of this richness, we tend to remember the process far more effectively than the content. This is prosaically explained by Squires (1987)[384] in the field of education:

> *"When one goes back into a school building as an adult after a long absence, there is a sudden rush of recognition, a hundred sensory cues which constitute 'school'. It is these, rather what one learned, which come back suddenly; and it is these, and the memory of these, which in many people's minds constitute the experience of education".*

I would suggest the same holds just as true for the police service as in education. A deliberate attempt was, therefore, made to use the power of rituals to create unconsciously a sense of relevance in the minds of participants. A ritual was used at the start of the course that was similar to those that participants had first been exposed to in police training. A positive attempt was made to engage staff and use the concept of

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[383]   Young, M., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[384]   Squires, G. *The Curriculum Beyond School*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1987.

'regression to first learnt response'. This concept suggests that we are more likely to revert to what we were primarily exposed to; we are, in essence, more comfortable with the past's most powerful cultural experiences. Most managers attending the course experienced their initial recruit training as a didactic input; lectures on the law were the norm with little attention paid to attitudinal or skills training. Weekly tests of the law forced participants and instructors to concentrate on knowledge acquisition. The re-socialisation programme was not voluntary, participants had to attend. Additionally, participants found earlier equal opportunity training to be somewhat negative. It was, therefore, not unusual at the start of the first day for some participants to be very hostile to the training. For example, several participants walked into the course and said quite openly:

"This is a bloody waste of time".

By concentrating on the law at the beginning of the course and using methods participants were familiar with (Knowledge Test, Lecture and Discussion on the law), an attempt was made to demonstrate implicitly that this course was relevant to them. Interviews with participants several months after the course suggested that this strategy worked. One comment captures this:

"Travelling to the course on the first day everybody was taking the piss out of the course and grievances, travelling to the course on the second day people were talking about the grievance procedure and things that had happened".

This also links to the principles suggested by Davies, (1971) moving from the *'concrete to the abstract'* . Participants generally considered the law to be the 'concrete', as it consisted of hard facts and not abstract concepts. Managers saw law-based training as relevant and I consider it was essential to build on this before moving into more

abstract concepts, such as aspects of discrimination and how to deal with a grievance. This process was a deliberate attempt to get as close to participants' *'zone of proximal development'* (Vygotsky 1981[385]) as possible. I considered this particularly important when considering changing attitudes, values and beliefs. As Eiser (1994)[386] argues, attitudes involve selective information processing and I consider that, unless participants saw a direct relevance to them, they would not even begin to consider looking at issues from a different perspective. In essence, they would simply decide the training was irrelevant and would not begin to engage in the learning process. The process of attitudinal change proceeded over the whole two days, and other training methods were used to facilitate this process. But engaging with participants' *'zone of proximal development'* at the beginning of the course by implicitly using rituals was essential to the course's success. The next section builds on the type of environment that was necessary to facilitate this process.

Safe Learning Environment

To achieve a reasonably safe learning environment, a number of strategies were used. First, as already mentioned, the attitude and behaviour of the facilitators was crucial to this process. The facilitators tried to behave in a non-judgmental, caring and prizing way. Rogers (1983) uses the term *'unconditional positive regard'* to capture these attributes, where people are valued for their comments, not judged by them and, as far as possible, behaviour is divorced from the person. Second, all participants attended in plain clothes to minimise obvious differences in rank. Third, the training was carried out away from police premises, in private training accommodation and, finally, the facilitators tried to minimise the use of judgmental statements by participants. This was

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[385]   Vygotsky, L. S., *Op.Cit.*, 1978.
[386]   Eiser, J. R., *Op.Cit.*, p 182., 1994.

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done by role modelling and intervening when necessary, as one course participant said later during interview:

"The facilitators were non-judgmental".

Additionally, the use of familiar artefacts, symbols and rituals, such as the knowledge test and brief lectures at the beginning of the course, appeared to help provide a familiar and comfortable feel to the course and appeared to put people at ease early on. This was noticeable during the first break in the morning of day one; people were talkative, but appeared relaxed. These factors allowed the facilitators gradually to take participants further away from the concrete and known to the more abstract and threatening aspects of the course. The next section will focus on one of the most threatening parts of the course, role-play.

Role-play

A number of case-studies were used during the course. They were real, but made anonymous. All were police related. When case-studies were distributed and other individual or group exercises were completed, a discussion took place concerning the issues contained within the case-study and how it should best be dealt with. Emphasis was placed upon debriefing during group discussion, examining what had happened and possible consequences of a particular course of action. This process allowed participants to voice their opinions and state what they would do and how they would do it. While this, in itself, was a very useful exercise, what people do in practice can be quite different. Even though they had assimilated knowledge about legislation and the grievance procedure and had discussed how they would deal with the matter, in reality this does not mean they would actually put this into practice. As Argyris and Schon

(1974)[387] argue, the trouble people may have in learning new theories originates from the existing theories people have that are already determining action. Argyris and Schon call these operational theories of action *theory-in-use* and the theories used to justify or predict their behaviour *espoused-theories*. This is explained in more detail in chapter eight. The course exposed participants *espoused-theories* during small group work and large group discussion, but it was considered that exposing *espoused-theories* represented only part of the learning process. I, therefore, hypothesised that if the training was left at this point little learning would transfer to the workplace, which meant organisational change would probably not occur. I considered that by exposing individuals' *theories-in-use* in a real situation, or close to one, and then debriefing, the process would assist individuals with change. I considered role-play to be an essential tool to expose this phenomena and, through effective debriefing, facilitate a deeper level of learning. Additionally, role-play provided a vehicle to explore the complexities and certainties contained in situations that represent difficult social interaction. This process was designed to consolidate the experience that participants had so far had in practice.

Feedback from participants was essential in this learning process For example, if we think we are giving the impression of listening to what someone has to say, but others have the impression we are not because we keep looking at our watch, then we have discovered something in our *blind-spot* (Luft 1970)[388]. Our *espoused-theory* may be that 'we do value what others have to say', but, in reality, we give the impression of not valuing what is being said. If we receive feedback to this effect we can reduce our *blind-spot* and move our *theory-in-use* closer to our *espoused-theory*.

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[387] Argyris, C. and Schon, D., *Op.Cit.*, 1974.
[388] Luft, J. Group Processes: *An Introduction to Group Dynamics*, National Press, 1970.

As much *free choice* was given as possible during preparation and during the role-play. A scenario was used from the DLP (Appendix 6, page 25), but participants were given no guidance on how they should deal with the matter. They chose who were to play the different roles and what course of action they should take. The debriefs were carried out by the facilitators, whose prime role was to help expose aspects of behaviour that could have possible negative consequences. This process was facilitated in as a supportive way as possible and most participants added contributions during these sessions, including all role players.

The role-plays more than anything else, seemed to provide participants with a model to base future action upon. They gave participants the confidence to deal with grievances; this included dealing with the aggrieved, perpetrator and more senior managers. When the use of role-play was discussed, the atmosphere in the classroom changed; people, although nervous to begin with, became excited and enthusiastic. There was a high level of humour, but this was constructive and helped individuals deal with their fear of performing in front of peers. The debriefs were led by the facilitators, but participants could, and normally did, join in. Strategies were discussed during the debriefs for dealing with the aggrieved, perpetrator and senior managers. The role-plays were specifically designed to target areas of police culture that threatened successful implementation of the grievance procedure *(organisational defence routines)*. Research had shown that in police culture it was frowned upon to challenge senior management, but managers would have to do this if the grievance procedure was to operate successfully - for example, dealing with a senior manager who was the alleged perpetrator. Also, role-play seemed to create enthusiasm and a sense of togetherness brought about by experiencing the same difficult, but exciting, experience. Managers of

all ranks played different roles; for example a sergeant would play the role of a superintendent, a superintendent would play the role of a constable wishing to report a grievance. This appeared to have the benefit of each rank understanding each other's perspective and problems. Sergeants could see that senior managers wanted the same thing as they did and, indeed, behaved as they would in a given role. Moreover senior managers could appreciate the difficulties that junior ranks could have in approaching them. A consensus that every group seemed to reach following the role-plays was that the best thing for everyone concerned was to resolve the grievance as soon as possible; this seemed to have been a commonly held and genuine belief. Traditionally, in both criminal and disciplinary enquiries, officers would be very guarded in making any comment. If this stance was followed under the grievance procedure, the grievance would probably simply move to the next stage and be dealt with by a more senior manager. The role-plays exposed this phenomena for all to see and, in this way, challenged aspects of *'Recipe Knowledge'* (Sackman 1991)[389] by replacing one set of beliefs with another.

The role-plays provided a powerful learning experience for all participants, even those experiencing them vicariously. They consolidated knowledge of the law and grievance procedure and helped participants understand more fully how it applied in real situations. The role-plays helped to develop skills, change attitudes and allowed participants to question assumptions about the best way to deal with a situation. They also allowed possible negative consequences of behaviour to surface and be discussed. They provided participants with a sense of camaraderie through the shared experience and this seemed to develop a sense of ownership in the grievance procedure. The

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[389]   Sackman, S. A., *Op.Cit.*, p34, 1991.

following comments were made during interviews several months after participants had attended the course and were typical of those interviewed:

> *"It's been an excellent course, the best course I've ever done, the test is it held my interest to the very end ..... the role-plays were what our own group did, they were our own role plays".*

> *"As a trainer I've attended lots of courses, but this one is the only one I've found that has been a real challenge".*

Re-socialising All Managers

When the courses commenced in September 1994, superintendents and above were not included in the training programme, the intention being to train them separately using a private consultant, but this cost proved prohibitive. As the number of grievances began to rise, trained grievance handlers began to experience problems with senior managers wanting to interfere in the procedure. Confidentiality was vital to many aggrieved members of staff and pressure was sometimes put on grievance handlers to breach this. As one grievance handler said:

> *"I had pressure from the superintendent to know what was going on, he reminded me we were a disciplined service and I should go to him before going to the deputy chief constable".*

Changes in culture depend upon changing the beliefs of members of staff, and positive developments can easily be undone by poor management. This phenomena was observed during the re-socialisation programme where some managers, who had not attended the course, were openly espousing views about the grievance procedure which were extremely negative and inaccurate. Whilst these views were not typical, they could clearly be very influential with more junior staff. It was noticeable that these comments

were almost exclusive to managers who had not attended the re-socialisation programme. This was, in many ways, the consequence of an unintentional *bottom-up* approach to change which resulted in some senior managers becoming suspicious and trying to interfere with grievances. It was evident that there was a need to intervene in this process before these incidents became widespread and destroyed the successful implementation of the grievance procedure. This also underlines the importance of the concept of *'action-research'* in changing organisational culture. As Bate (1994)[390] argues:

> *"A strategy for the unpredictable is one of the most important, if not the most important, tasks in managing cultural change".*

Therefore, in October 1994 I made a presentation to the FEG to explain the problem and offer different options as solutions. It was decided to included senior managers in the re-socialisation programme.

Senior managers were quickly integrated into the programme and, as they became acquainted with the procedure and the philosophy that underpinned it, the situation rapidly improved. This also tends to supports Manning's (1993)[391] view that there are at least three levels of police culture; command, middle management, and lower participants. Until superintendents and above were included in the training only two levels of culture were being targeted by the re-socialisation programme, middle management and lower participants by managers explaining the procedure to them once they had attended the course. The command level was left out of this process and subsequently presented a barrier to successful change. Once this situation was recognised it became possible to intervene rapidly and rectify the problem..

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[390]   Bate P., *Op.Cit.*, p147, 1994.
[391]   Manning, P. *Op.Cit.*, 1993.

The course and the role-plays in particular appeared to help to obtain

commitment from managers. Most participants questioned felt they had contributed to

the formulation of the grievance procedure; they felt involved and consulted and as one

manager said:

"For the first time I really felt consulted".

Role of the Equal Opportunity Manager

It was recognised that even though managers had received training, they still

needed ongoing support. Evidence from a number of managers who had dealt with

grievances confirmed this during interview. For example:

> *"There still needs to be the oracle to consult, you need
> someone to give a different opinion, particularly when
> confidentiality applies".*

The project team performed this role during the intervention process. They also

co-ordinated grievances, filed finished grievances and monitored the procedure. The

equal opportunity manager took over this role when the project finished in March 1995.

Because a strong emphasis was placed upon the need to maintain confidentiality, this

restricted those to whom grievance handlers could turn to for advice. This made the role

of the equal opportunity manager even more important. As another senior manager who

had dealt with a grievance said during interview:

> *"It's important to have the ability to ring the equal
> opportunity manager and ask what they think; this would
> have been seen as a weakness in management before
> this".*

The course support package, given to all participants at the beginning of the course contained the contact number of the equal opportunity manager. Additionally, the equal opportunity manager transpired to be a member of the project team, so had co-facilitated most of the courses. This had the benefit of building up a relationship with managers so they knew personally who was offering that advice and support. All the evidence suggests that ongoing support was an important component to the successful implementation of the new grievance procedure.

Personal Communication and the Grievance Procedure

.   A major criticism people made, both on courses and during interview, was the perceived lack of personal communication between management and staff. A number of grievances revolved around this issue and on a number of occasions led to the aggrieved making a grievance where, had they been in possession of all the facts, they may not have done so. As one senior manager, who was fully aware of this problem, pointed out:

> *"Sometimes when rumours are widespread around the police station and you know they are incorrect, at least if someone makes a grievance you get opportunity to put the record straight".*

Prior to the training, aggrieved staff, when interviewed would nearly always say, *"nobody listened to me"* or, *"I just wanted someone to listen"*. A more in-depth example is provided in chapter ten (page 198) which provides an example of a manager dealing with a grievance under the old procedure and actually making the matter worse from the aggrieved person's point of view. Generally prior to the re-socialisation programme managers dealing with grievances appeared to give the impression of not listening to aggrieved staff, or in the aggrieved person's opinion not placing adequate value on what

they said. This was the subject of discussion during the training programme and role-play was used as a vehicle to develop effective listening skills. This theme seems to be summed up in the following comment made by an aggrieved member of staff when asked what advice they would give to grievance handlers:

"Remember the personal side of things all the time".

Interview with a number of equal opportunity managers from other forces revealed that they also considered that poor communication was a major cause of grievances, as one manager said:

"The grievance procedure is a communication tool when all else fails".

This seems particularly important during a period of intense organisational change when anxieties are higher among staff. The grievance procedure provides a vehicle that staff can use to voice their concerns and provides managers of change with vital feedback which they can base future decisions upon.

Selection of Grievance Handlers

This section, in a sense, builds on the explanation given above concerning the importance of personal communication. Most people who had made a grievance said they had heard about the grievance procedure for the first time by word of mouth. The new procedure allowed staff for the first time to approach any manager with a grievance rather than their own inspector, which was a requirement under the previous procedure. When asked how they selected their grievance handler, nearly all answered, *"by word of mouth"*. Most had heard of a person who had made a grievance and been treated fairly

by their grievance handler, so they, therefore, decided to approach the same person. Being able to select their own grievance handler was seen as very important to most aggrieved parties. This was seen as a benefit and helped to address the lack of trust staff had in the procedure that was identified in earlier research. However, it did place a burden on some managers who found themselves dealing with a number of grievances under the new procedure. In a sense, they were the victims of their own success; staff had heard that they had dealt with a previous grievance successfully, therefore approached them to deal with their grievance. This situation was monitored by the equal opportunity manager who has had to intervene, in individual cases, to help identify another grievance handler. However, most grievance handlers questioned did not find the system a major addition to their existing workload. This obviously varied depending on the location of the parties involved and the complexity of grievance. On occasions where a grievance had been particularly involved, it was referred to someone more suited to deal with a complex investigation. Again, this aspect of the procedure was monitored by the equal opportunity manager who intervened when necessary.

Summary

In Cambridgeshire Constabulary, many senior managers interviewed prior to implementing the new grievance procedure acknowledged that dealing with staff problems was time-consuming and difficult. However, managing internal staff relations were also seen as the *'soft'* side of the organisation; however, as Peters and Waterman (1982)[392] argue, the *'soft'* components of the organisation, human and cultural issues, are in reality the *'hard'* side of the organisation. The Equality of Service Project was designed primarily to change aspects of culture within the force, and all available evidence indicates that it has achieved this goal.

[392]   Peters and Waterman, *Op.Cit.*, 1982.

The re-socialisation programme was, undoubtedly, the most significant component of that project, and it was this programme, above all else, that influenced the successful implementation of the grievance procedure and equal opportunity policy. All the other forces in the comparative group introduced new polices and procedures, but none saw a similar change in the number of recorded grievances. The analysis must, therefore, conclude that this very special form of training was the most important factor in achieving cultural change. The next chapter, then, discusses the implications of this finding in more detail.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

DISCUSSION

Traditionally the police service, like many organisations, has concentrated upon changing structures, systems and procedures. Many conceptualise the organisation as solely consisting of these entities, probably because they tend to be more tangible and easier to understand than cultural components. However, research into organisations in the United States suggests that nearly 75% of all transformation programmes fail and between 50% -75% of re-engineering projects fail (Bulletpoint 1997)[393]. Attempts at organisational change fail upon implementation; this is true in the police service and other organisations. Evidence from this research suggests that, whilst developing structures, systems and procedures was relevant, changing organisational culture was far more important and impactive. Structures, systems and procedures form part of an organisation's culture, but this research suggests they are not as important as individuals' knowledge, attitudes, values, beliefs and assumptions. Attempts at change in the police service have all but ignored cultural components, yet again and again research (e.g. Holdaway and Barron 1993[394], Dixon and Stanko 1995[395], Maguire and John 1995[396]) has indicated that major initiatives are failing because of a fail-to-change police culture. The evidence from this research suggests that changing individual cognitions was the key element in successful implementation of the new grievance procedure. Bringing about this change in individual cognitions and actions is the subject of the next section.

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[393]   Bulletpoint p 1-4, vol. 2. 1., Bulletpoint Communications, 1997.
[394]   Holdaway, S. and Barron A-M., *Op.Cit.*, 1993.
[395]   Dixon, B., and Stanko, B., *Op.Cit.*, 1995.
[396]   Maguire, M. and John, T. *Op.Cit.*, p54, 1995.

People Change is essential for Organisational Change

I argued in chapter nine that this research did not commence with a specific theory to test or verify. Rather, the research would use *pattern and grounded theory* (Neuman 1991), in that systems of ideas designed to better inform would emerge from analysis of data. This research has, therefore, assisted in the development of such a system of ideas. It is, therefore, proposed that the change of systems and procedures; cultural components, for example, rituals and symbols; individuals' knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, values, assumptions and behaviour are all essential components in achieving successful change. Organisational goals are unlikely to be achieved unless all of these elements successfully reinforce each other. The following model (five) was developed to explain this hypothesis:

MODEL OF CULTURAL CHANGE

EVALUATION
Meta-Directions
Theories-in-use
Defence Routines

DIRECTIONS
Goals
Aims
Objectives
Policies

CULTURE
Rituals
Symbols

Theories-
in-use

Meta-
Directions

MICRO-ACTIONS
of
Change

Individual
Re-
Socialisation

Performance/
Directions

Structures

Systems

Procedures

ONGOING
Support
and
Evaluation

CHANGE

MODEL 5

The model shown at figure five commences with evaluation. The previous chapter provides evidence of how important accurate and reliable analysis of organisational culture is to successful organisational change. A multi-method approach will best expose components such as *Organisational Defence Routines* and *Meta-Directions* which are critical if culture is to change. The results of this process can help to better inform senior management's goals. For example, senior management wish to introduced *'process-mapping'* to an organisation. However, the evaluation may have exposed the fact that there is considerable mistrust between different layers of management and different departments. It would almost certainly be necessary to address these issues before a tool such as *process-mapping* could be successfully introduced. This may well have the effect of modifying the organisation's goals.

Having successfully identified the areas that need to change, it is then possible to produce a development strategy. This strategy should indicate how the proposed change should be implemented. Schein (1988)[397] argues, and I agree, that staff who are involved in implementation should be closely involved in the design process. The Equality of Service Project which involved senior managers and the staff associations, helped to achieve a certainly level of tolerance of the proposed changes, at an early stage, through the use of presentations. This tolerance, however, certainly did not amount to ownership or commitment. Analysis of the culture in Cambridgeshire Constabulary, prior to the change programme, suggested staff had no faith in the existing procedure and managers would not be receptive to the new grievance procedure. Therefore, introducing a new grievance procedure, no matter how well designed, would, in all probability, fail to achieve desired change, because the *micro-actions* of social interaction would prevent successful implementation. This research helped to illuminate and clarify this point. It

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[397]   Schein E. H., *Op.Cit.,* pp 239, 1988.

became clear that all six forces in the comparative study had implemented a new

grievance procedure; these procedures were sound in design, but as figure three shows,

little real change occurred. This tends to suggest that having organisational goals,

policies, systems and procedures are all secondary compared to staff having the belief,

willingness and ability to operate those systems and procedures. The development of

structures, systems and procedures that help to facilitate the desired change was the next

step in the implementation strategy; this took place at the same time as designing the

re-socialisation programme. The re-socialisation programme was specifically designed to

deal with many of the barriers to change that occurred at the micro level. This, then, is

the subject of the next section.

Micro-actions of Change

Argyris and Schon (1996)[398] propose that under conditions of embarrassment or

threat, *Model-One* behaviour distorts inquiry and prevents critical analysis of past and

present events, this is explained in more detail in chapter eight (page 163 -175). I have

adapted this theory, based upon the research contained in this thesis, to develop a model

(figure six) that explains the micro-actions of cultural change, and to try to explain why

so many cultural programmes fail. This model focuses on the *micro-actions* of social

interaction that prevent cultural change:

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[398]   Argyris, C. and Schon, D. A., *Op.Cit.*, p244, 1996.

MICRO-ACTIONS
OF
CULTURE CHANGE FAILURE

EMOTIONS

Anxiety
Embarrassment
Threat
Fear

DEFENSIVE REACTIONS

Mistrust
Interpersonal Conflict
Win/Lose Games
Undiscussibility of
Beliefs

THEORIES-IN-USE

Untestable
Lack Inquiry
Opinionated

MODEL 6

In essence, when something occurs, or is likely to occur, that is outside an individual's normal experience, which is usually dictated by the prevailing organisational culture, feelings of anxiety, embarrassment, threat and fear are generated. This is an unconscious process and may be stimulated through a number of means - for example, changes in rituals, symbols, artefacts, routine practices or a perceived change in status. These emotions trigger individuals' *theories-in-use* that are untestable, lack inquiry and are normally highly opinionated. These *theories-in-use* form an important part of an individuals *Meta-Directions* and an organisation's *defence routines*. These statements, in turn, lead to conditions where mistrust, interpersonal conflict, win/lose games and ambiguity exist. Many statements are untestable and even undiscussible. The end goal of individuals, albeit unconsciously, is to return to a state of *cognitive balance*. Herein lies the cause of so many failures in organisational change and development; the only solution is to change individuals' *Meta-Directions* which, in turn, change their *theories-in-use* and *organisational defence routines*. These, in turn, change the *micro-actions* of social interaction and culture changes.

An example in the case of the grievance procedure would be as follows. Assuming the new grievance procedure was introduced without the re-socialisation programme, what would a potential manager think about the following situation? A member of staff approached a manager with a grievance about a selection process that involved another, more senior, manager. What sort of reaction would the aggrieved be likely to get? The grievance handler would probably be anxious as to how the senior manager would react; he may wonder whether this would his ruin his career. He would probably be embarrassed about having to deal with the situation in front of other managers. He may say to colleagues the procedure is unworkable (untestable), or that it

is not his responsibility to deal these matters, particularly when it involves more senior

managers. He may fear that they will 'shoot the manager' (lacking enquiry). This leads

to other statements being made, not only amongst managers, but also in front of staff.

This happened during the Equality of Service Project from managers who had not yet

attended the re-socialisation course. An example is as follows:

> " *This grievance procedure is a load of bollocks*"

> "*It's just another Headquarters fad, they live in an ivory
> tower*"

> " *It's OK ,but in the real world it'll never work*".[399]

These statements were made to me whilst visiting one police station during the

implementation process. The comments were shouted to me by a chief inspector, in front

of office full of staff. However, none of these statements would be discussed openly with

the most senior managers in the force (FEG). This was undiscussible and the fact it was

undiscussible was undiscussible. It was unlikely that staff hearing these comments would

have any more faith in the new procedure than they did in the old one. Many of the

statements the chief inspector made were untestable and vague in nature. This reaction,

which showed the chief inspector's *theories-in-use*, create *defensive reactions* in others

that lead to mistrust, interpersonal conflict and win/lose games. For example, senior

managers, having heard various rumours about the chief inspector may describe the

individual as a *dinosaur*, or someone who cannot move with the times; but these

thoughts will not be discussed with the chief inspector. These reactions will probably

occur on both sides and generate further feelings of anxiety, threat, embarrassment and

fear. The cycle gradually degenerates into an extremely negative process and the change

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[399]   Fieldnotes (November 1994).

initiative is almost bound to fail. The only way to break this vicious circle is to change

individuals' *Meta-Directions* and *theories-in-use*.

This view of organisation life largely coincides with Silverman's (1984)[400] point

(chapter five). He argues that an alternative organisational theory needs to be developed

to what he considers to be the dominant system's theory. He considers a different

perspective should be considered; organisations should be seen as the product of actions

and interactions of motivated people pursuing purposes of their own. The evidence from

this research suggest that changing managers' *Meta-Directions* and *theories-in-use* was

the vital factor in achieving change in Cambridgeshire Constabulary. The next section

considers how this was achieved.

Changing Meta-Directions

The model of creating successful change shown in figure five indicates that a

number of steps are necessary before this will happen. First, as already discussed,

evaluation using a multi-method approach should expose *Meta-Directions* and

theories-in-use that need to change. Second, senior management, on receipt of this

information, can amend organisational goals accordingly. The third stage is to develop an

implementation strategy which probably runs in parallel with the fourth stage - to begin

to develop structures, systems and procedures that reinforce the organisational goals. I

emphasise the words 'begin to develop', because, as Schein (1988) argues and research

contained in this thesis confirms, those involved in implementing the new design should

be involved in creating the design. This brings us to, perhaps, the most difficult aspect of

the process, changing what people actually do, the *micro-actions* of change.

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[400]   Silverman, D., *Op.Cit.*, 1984.

For example, in the police service management may state they want to develop a culture where staff can express concerns openly; but these same managers are cited as one of the main reason why staff do not feel free to report wrong-doing or voice opinions openly. This is because, as already explained in figure six, when managers are placed in a set of circumstances that stimulates extreme emotions their *theories-in-use* come into play and they can be considerably different from their *espoused-theories* (Argyris and Schon 1996)[401]. This situation has led to management in the police service sending out a series of mixed messages that staff interpret as part of their construction of reality. On the one hand, equal opportunity policies and grievance procedures are publicised, (or quality of service, decentralisation, sectorisation or intelligence-led crime investigation) the rhetoric; but on the other hand, managers' *theories-in-use* do not change. The reality; inevitably staff remain afraid to express their concerns, little use is made of the grievance procedure and the culture remains static. This research shows that by changing managers' *theories-in-use*, which are behavioural manifestations of *Meta-Directions,* cultural change occurs. In a sense, to use Hofstede's (1991) analogy, the *'software of the mind'* has not been changed. In a way, it is like asking a computer software package, like Lotus 123 (version 1) for example, to do something it was never programmed to do. Unless the software is upgraded, change will simply not happen. Changing individuals' and group's *Meta-Directions* and *theories-in-use* in many ways is like upgrading the *'software of the mind'*.

In the case of the Equality of Service Project, managers were a target audience for upgrading the *'software of the mind.'* This was because it was managers who would inevitably be the people who dealt with grievances, whether formally or informally. Also, they would probably be the subject of most grievances and they would act as a

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[401]   Argyris, C. and Schon, D. A., *Op.Cit.*, pp 3-28, 1996.

significant other in influencing staff's opinions and changing their *Meta-Directions* and *theories-in-use*. Therefore, changing managers' *Meta-Directions* and *theories-in-use* was an essential prerequisite to changing staff's belief in the grievance procedure. This section, then, has tried to present some of the barriers to achieving cultural change that were present, not only in Cambridgeshire Constabulary, but also in the police service in general and has shown that unless the *software of the mind* is changed, non-trivial change will not occur. The next section examines some of the positive actions that can be taken to rectify this situation.

Multi-Dimensional Training

The re-socialisation programme operated at a number of levels simultaneously. The surface level involved the explicit teaching of knowledge of the law using methods that were familiar to participants. At a deeper, implicit level, participants were encouraged to see the importance of the subject matter; in essence they were taught a value. This was done by using aspects of organisational culture either to reinforce the relevance of the course, or to indicate significant change. For example, the use of external accommodation (not normally used) was designed to reinforce the importance of the course and to demonstrate the value the organisation placed upon participants. *Holism in course design*, as Heron (1989)[402] argues, is essential if attitude change is to be achieved. Course participants should be viewed as whole people who need to engage fully in the learning process. The re-socialisation course was, therefore, aimed at being multi-dimensional, dealing with knowledge, feelings, *Meta-Directions* and skills, almost simultaneously. Facilitating this process is both complex and difficult but, I suggest, essential if change is to be achieved.

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[402]   Heron, J. *The Facilitators' Handbook*, Nicholas Publishing, New York, p13, 1989.

The facilitators had to monitor individuals' behaviour and body language constantly to identify, as closely as possible, where individuals were within this process. If they appeared disinterested, the facilitators would be prepared to change direction and use a different intervention to re-establish the links with participants' *'zone of proximal development'*. Heron (1989)[403] uses the term *'effective switching'* to describe this process. This process is as much to do with feelings as it has to do with knowledge. If people are bored or uninterested, their body language will probably display this; if they are annoyed or angry, this will manifest itself. This process of monitoring the group and choosing the most appropriate intervention is vital if successful learning is to occur. Training facilitators to cope effectively with this process, which includes recognising their own emotional state, is both time consuming and difficult, but essential if Meta-Directions are to change. Having two facilitators present was also essential, because much of this process is based upon trying to perceive what is happening, seeing beyond the obvious, and reacting with an appropriate intervention.

'Live data' was also used. If a participant said or did something, this issue would be addressed there and then. This caused embarrassment, fear, threat and anxiety for all present. This created exactly the same emotions as those present during times of cultural change when *organisational defence routines* and *theories-in-use* are triggered. The strength of this approach is that the whole group experienced what was said or done; this offers a powerful *concrete experience* to debrief and draw learning from, particularly, as to possible negative consequences of action. It then becomes possible to examine issues such as *'rescuing'* and *'flight behaviour'* which prevent individuals achieving *double-loop learning*. Additionally, by addressing these issues at the time, facilitators role-modelled dealing with awkward and difficult aspects of behaviour, which they were

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[403]   Heron, J., *Ibid.*, p38, 1989.

asking managers to do when dealing with grievances; thus the implicit was used to reinforce the explicit. Facilitators took every opportunity to check out their perceptions with individuals, the group and with each other before changing direction. The course, therefore, had a basic design framework, but facilitators were prepared to change direction to use either *'live data'* generated by the group or introduced exercises that were more relevant at that particular time.

Free Choice

If participants are to change, they must do so of their own freewill; it is pointless for the facilitator to tell people what their values should be. They have to arrive at the decision themselves. As Eiser (1994)[404] argues in a review of relevant research, if you are forced to act in a given way you do not need to justify your behaviour as being something in which you personally believe. In other words, *flight behaviour* can allow individuals to attribute the cause of the behaviour to an external influence, not their own *theories-in-use*. What makes individuals re-appraise their attitude is if it is their freely-chosen behaviour that produced negative consequences, or created the risk of such consequences. This requires a view of attitudes in which people can reflect 'evaluatively' upon their own thoughts, emotions and behavioural decisions. There are a number of issues here that directly affect both the role of the facilitator, style of facilitation and the training method which will be explored in the context of the training provided for managers during the Equality of Service Project.

Freely-chosen behaviour is one of the first points raised by Eiser (1994). This may seem an obvious point, but in the training environment most people have been used to a child-adult relationship with their teacher or trainer. They consider the teacher to be

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[404]   Eiser, J. R., *Op.Cit.*, pp 17-19, 1994.

the 'fountain of all knowledge', because that is the role the teacher/trainer has traditionally played. Whilst this may be appropriate in the training environment for issues of hard fact, it is not for issues of opinion, values, beliefs, attitudes or assumptions. For example, if participants asked what the definition of direct discrimination was, or what page a definition was shown in the DLP, the facilitators would provide the relevant answer. If, however, a participant asked what was the best way to deal with a grievance, the facilitators would refer the question back to the individual and/or the group; this is a matter of opinion.

This requires the facilitator to decided constantly what is the best intervention to use. For example, whether to be informative, catalytic, or confronting, while still valuing contributions from participants. Above all, it means the facilitator should not impose his/her values on participants, which is extremely difficult because we are often unaware of our own biases and prejudices. Of course, this process is more complex than purely verbal communication. The facilitator has to maintain this approach throughout the training, in essence, it is a way of being. The implicit and the explicit have to send the same message, the facilitator has to 'walk the talk'. In all probability, this means the facilitator has to undertake a considerable period of personal development, particularly in developing critical thinking skills. Rogers's (1983) seminal work in this area provides a clear description of the qualities required of a facilitator to this process:

> *"First of all is a transparent realness in the facilitator, a willingness to be a person and live the feelings and thoughts of the moment. When this realness includes a prizing, caring, a trust and respect for the learner, the climate of learning is enhanced".*

These are qualities we would all like to possess, in reality we are often unaware when we are displaying more negative qualities. Therefore, the training of facilitators has to focus on the development of awareness of these issues, particularly being able to be in immediate touch with feelings, and recognising the effect they have on the facilitation role. Every effort was made by the facilitators of the re-socialisation courses to maintain this relationship on an 'adult to adult' basis with course participants. If participants were to change their attitudes and beliefs, it was considered to be essential that *free choice* in this matter must predominate. Rogers (1983) considers that this approach does not simply modify classroom methods, but rather revolutionise them. This approach was seen to be a key component in the change process. Evidence of this was provided in interview with course participants some months after the training, as one course participant said:

> *"People on my course responded brilliantly, nobody came*
> *away without believing in the sincerity of the facilitators*
> *and believing this is the next important step for the force,*
> *the next major change".*

These comments highlight the importance of the facilitator to this process and is supportive of Rogers's (1983) argument. To what extent the style of facilitation affects the learning process is unknown, but the impression from the re-socialisation programme was that it significantly affected learning outcomes.

Experiential Learning

The second component Eiser (1994) suggests is necessary for attitudinal change is to create a learning environment where people can reflect 'evaluatively' upon their own thoughts, emotions and behavioural decisions. For attitudinal change to occur, Eiser (1994) suggests that participants have to identify possible negative consequences of behaviour, or at least the risk of possible negative consequences. For the identification of

negative consequences to be possible, some form of action is necessary; people must do something and interact in some way so their behaviour can be observed. Traditionally, education has been very different to this. As Freiere (1974) argues, education is traditionally seen as an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the student patiently receives, memorises and repeats. This process denies the opportunity for participants to interact, it denies action and free choice on the behalf of the learner and prevents the identification of possible negative consequences of behaviour. Kolb (1984)[405] argues that new knowledge, skills, or attitudes are achieved through confrontation among four modes of experiential learning. He argues that learners, if they are to be effective, need four different kinds of abilities based upon a concrete experience - they are *reflective abilities, reflective observation, abstract conceptualisation* and *active experimentation*.

Kolb's (1984) approach to learning is similar to that proposed by Eiser (1994). Both of these approaches require action on behalf of the learner, and the re-socialisation programme was designed to facilitate this process. To obtain a *concrete experience* which generates action the re-socialisation course used a number of different methods, including case-study, large and small group discussion, and most significantly, role-play. These methods meant that participants had to do something, they could not simply be a recipient of knowledge, but had to interact with the learning event. For example, by using a case-study and asking participants to identify how they would deal with a grievance meant they had to expose their own *espoused-theories*. These were exhibited in small and large group discussion with peers where they were the subject of comment based upon the opinions of others. This process is the foundation of social learning that was

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[405]   Kolb, D. A., *Experiential Learning*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1984.

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discussed in more detail in chapter eight. When the case-study was debriefed in a large group discussion the facilitators could question and gently challenge assumptions that where being made. By engaging in this process, participants could develop their *reflective observational* and *reflective evaluative* skills. From here, *abstract concepts* could be developed and tested with other managers. This process helped participants to question and challenge their own and other's beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions, in other words *Meta-Directions*. As Argyris and Schon (1974)[406] argue, the role of the facilitator is not only to implant new ideas but also to dispose of, or modify, old ones.

Before these 'ideas' can be 'disposed of' they have to be identified. Therefore, every attempt was made to use a learning process, as Bate (1994) argues, that was participative, independent, self-directed, exploitative and active. Establishing an environment where this could take place was important for, as Brookfield (1986)[407] argues, some people have experience in other contexts of working in a self-directed manner and respond eagerly. Others, however, are threatened and intimidated by the prospect. Therefore, creating an environment where participants felt reasonable free to discuss issues in a non-judgmental way is an important prerequisite to this process.

Role-play was chosen to try to create a *concrete experience*, as close to the real situation as possible, where behaviour could be evaluated against outcomes. Kolb (1984)[408] argues that when the content of a concept changes by means of substitution, there is always the possibilities of a reversion to the earlier level of conceptualisation and understanding. There is also the possibility of a dual theory of the world where *espoused-theories* learned through substitution are incongruent with *theories-in-use* that

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[406] Argyris, C. and Schon, D., *Op.Cit.*, 1974.
[407] Brookfield, S. D., *Op.Cit.*, p 68, 1986.
[408] Kolb, D. A., *Op.Cit.*, 1984.

are more integrated with the person's total conceptual attitudinal view of the world. The first part of the course had explored many aspects of dealing with a grievance, such as knowledge of the law, an improved understanding of the procedure, discussions about ethical issues in relation to the parties involved. However, my concern was that this would create a *dual theory* where *espoused-theories* would be substituted by previous *theories-in-use* once participants returned to the workplace. There are several reasons for this. First, once back in the workplace, there are numerous cultural cues that would stimulate a return to the previous construct; for example, the hierarchical rank system where it was common to pass information and responsibility up to the next rank. The ritual and drama of a senior officer demanding to know what was going on sat juxtaposed to the aggrieved person's desire to maintain confidentiality. Also, there was the constant desire by some managers, who had not attended the re-socialisation courses, to revert to the traditional complaint or discipline route for perceived wrong-doing, when all the aggrieved wanted was the wrong-doing stopped. All these, and many other, cultural pressures would be applied to managers who had to deal with grievances under the new system. Role-play provided a vehicle where individuals' *theories-in-use* could be exposed and debriefed by their peers. This provided an extremely powerful learning event where *significant others* could expose possible negative consequences of behaviour. Role-play also offered an opportunity to explore many *organisational defence routines* with the managers who would be applying the routines. Indeed, as previously explained, experience very quickly showed that these pressures were being applied by managers who had not yet attended the training. In this way, negative consequences to these routines could be discussed and strategies developed to overcome them.

Second, role-play helped to expose individuals' incongruent theories that formed a blind-spot. The exhibited behaviour was explored during the debriefs for possible negative consequences. As Eiser (1994) argues, by examining consequences to action, participants could gain a greater understanding of the current validity of previously-held assumptions, values, attitudes and beliefs. Participants would offer their opinions, or explain how they felt about a particular course of action; in this way vicarious learning took place by *'scaffolding'* (Vygotsky 1981)[409] one idea upon another. This process of listening to the opinions of other managers (who appeared to act as a significant others) seemed to have the effect of modifying individual constructs and behaviour.

Third, by dealing with a grievance as part of a role-play, managers seemed to develop a *'mental representation'* of how to act in a new way in a new situation; without this they would only have a model based on past experiences. Role-play provides a multiple dimensional model on which to base future action upon; this model incorporated the whole person in the learning process. Thus learning occurred in the cognitive, affective and psycho-motive domains, which are, of course, the domains that would be used in the real situation.

What also became apparent was that this change programme depended upon a degree of trust among managers, who would, in all probability, be investigating each other. For this trust to be established, mutual understanding was first necessary; therefore all managers had to understand the grievance procedure. All managers participating in the role-plays appear to be pivotal to this process of creating mutual understanding. Additionally, not only did role-play provide a vital model to base future action on, but also appeared to act as a team-building exercise, uniting participants behind the grievance

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[409]   Vygotsky, L. S., *Op.Cit.*, 1981.

procedure and obtaining commitment to something they had created. Winning this commitment appeared to play an important part in the change process and helped to explain the rise in the number of recorded grievances. Managers appeared committed to the concept which they had helped to create and passed this message on to their staff, which confirms Stacey's (1993)[410] view that:

> *"Culture change programmes will only work if they are collaborative. The culture change programme is one that leads people to see for themselves why they should change their culture to a new desired state".*

The programme used by Force A to train managers to deal with grievances did not use role-play and, whilst there were many differences between the two training initiatives, this would appear to be one of the most significant. It is, therefore, hypothesised:

1. That Force A did not experience such a significant increase in the number of recorded grievances because managers were not as committed to the procedure, therefore did not convince their staff of the worth of the procedure.

2. That the main reason for this was the way in which role-play acted to change aspects of 'recipe knowledge' and, in so doing, obtain the commitment of managers.

3. It was essential if cultural change was to occur in Cambridgeshire that all managers shared this experience.

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[410]   Stacey, R. D., *Op.Cit.*, p 139, 1993.

4. The training of all managers helped to develop mutual understanding amongst managers which, in turn, helped to develop trust, both in the procedure and each others role within the procedure.

These are all areas that would certainly benefit from further research, also whilst the above is proposed, it is appreciated that there are undoubtedly many variables that could contribute to the difference between Force A and Cambridgeshire Constabulary, but the purpose of this analysis is to identify possible causal relationships.

In essence, a *'Psychological Contract'* was established between managers who consented and largely supported the concept of the grievance procedure. As Rousseau (1995)[411] argues, when employees interpret their commitment and obligations similarly, they are likely to share the same *psychological contract*. The role of the facilitator was to help participants explore experiences and develop a shared interpretation of events, in this way modifying their *Meta-Directions* and developing commonly-held beliefs that that helped to reconstruct individuals' social construction of reality. Rousseau (1995) also argues that sending people on a training event can help to establish such a contract. For example, if group members observe each other supporting each other and the concept in question, then a *normative contract* can be established. Evidence from the evaluation following the re-socialisation programme indicated that most managers interviewed did understand and support the philosophy behind the policies and procedure. This, I suggest, was essential in obtaining commitment for putting into practice what had been learnt.

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[411]   Rousseau, D. M., *Psychological Contracts in Organisations*, Sage pp 46 - 54, 1995.

Figure five indicates that changing *micro-actions* of change by individual re-socialisation is the third major component of the process of cultural change. The evidence from this research suggests that the re-socialisation of managers was the single most important element in the change process. However, this process did not stop following the course, but continued in order to consolidate learning. The next section will consider how this was done and the effect it had on the change process.

Ongoing Support

Bandura (1977[412] and 1986[413]) argues that *'cognitive mediating variables'* play a major part in the transference of learning. One of the most significant of these is *'self-efficacy'*. This can be defined as a self-assessment of how capable one is at performing and carrying out a certain course of action in a given situation. This depends on two key factors, one's assessment of one's knowledge and skills and the second, one's assessment of a given situation - in this case dealing with grievances in the workplace. Where there is a close match, learning will successfully transfer; where there is not it will probably not transfer. The re-socialisation programme appears to have achieved this, however, inevitably some individuals did not have such a high level of *'self-efficacy'*, or the situation in the workplace was perceived as being extraordinarily difficult. Where this is the case, Bandura argues little change is likely to occur. Therefore, developing a system that provided ongoing support was essential to the change process. The equal opportunity manager provides this ongoing support.

[412]   Bandura, A. *Social Learning Theory*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1977.
[413]   Bandura, A. *Social Foundations of Thought and Action*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1986.

It is, therefore, hypothesised that ongoing support, with a clear access point, is an important element in creating and sustaining cultural change.

The equal opportunity manager, in addition to being an independent reference point, also provides a vital monitoring role. This was designed to ensure that the force learns from grievances and that they are dealt with in an appropriate manner. Trends can be identified and feedback supplied to management, whilst maintaining confidentiality. This is an important point; without this, organisational learning does not occur. For example, a number of grievances were identified as emanating from the Human Resource Department (HR Dept) that concerned problems in selection, redundancy, and contracts. As each grievance was resolved, it was only to be replaced by another. What became apparent was the HR Dept was only changing a particular policy or procedure that that particular grievance referred to (*Directions*). The HR Dept failed to identify why it continued to receive grievances, in essence it was engaged in *single-loop learning*, but did not realise it. By identifying this trend it was possible to diagnose this *Meta-Direction* and intervene in the process.

Organisational Change

Ongoing support and monitoring form the final stages of the model shown in figure five. Culture is shown as a central component that influences and interacts with every stage. In many ways, culture is every stage and should be perceived not as either/or but as a both/and. To clarify this point traditionally, there are two major approaches to organisational change. The first, a *Rational* approach (Porter 1980)[414] proposes a top-down view which is grounded in managerial control and sees the senior management

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[414]   Porter, E., *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and Competitors*, New York: The Free Press, p 11, 1980.

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designing strategy and more junior managers implementing it. This is very similar to the traditional approach the police service has followed. However, the *natural* approach challenges this view and authors such as Mintzberg (1987)[415] have argued that, in reality, managers have to adapt and change overall strategy to deal with environmental pressures. In many ways, strategy development is emergent and natural. Argyris and Schon (1996)[416] are critical of both approaches for their failure to address the process of implementation. They argue that, by leaving out what actually happens during the implementation of strategy (within the rational view) or during the integration of emergent and deliberate strategy (within the natural view), both perspectives ignore a crucial element of the management of change. These are the real-time *micro-actions* through which managers respond to the challenges to implementation or integration that are likely to arise when the environment and strategy of an organisation undergo major change. This view correlates highly with the evidence found in this research - none of the six forces that introduced a new grievance procedure addressed the *micro-actions* of change, and none experienced any significant increase in the number of recorded grievances. Even the force (A) that did undertake a training programme did not experience a significant rise in grievances. The main difference appears to be that the re-socialisation programme used in Cambridgeshire focused upon the *micro-actions* of change. This appears to have helped managers understand the rich complexity of social interaction and provided them with a *mental representation* of how to act and behave in a new situation. In this way, a link was made between a strategy for change and the *micro-actions* of implementation. The role-plays, in particular, focused upon possible barriers to change; for example, dealing with a grievance that involved interviewing a

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[415]   Mintzberg, H., "Crafting Strategy", In *Harvard Business Review*, July - August, vol. 64, no. 4. 1987.
[416]   Argyris, C. and Schon, D. A. *Organisational Learning II*, Addison Wesley, p 255, 1996.

senior manager. In this way, managers were prepared as far as possible to overcome some of the possible barriers to change. Argyris and Schon (1996)[417] are also critical of the traditional approaches to implementation because of the failure to address the defensive routines, individual or organisational, that are prevalent during implementation of a strategy. It is, therefore, hypothesised that:

1. A strategy for cultural change should include a strategy to address the *micro-actions* of social interaction that act as barriers to successful implementation.

2. It is important to identify what these barriers are.

3. Role-play provides the best vehicle to address *micro-actions*.

4. Addressing organisational defence routines with staff during implementation is also vital in achieving cultural change.

Summary

Cultural change was achieved in Cambridgeshire Constabulary by focusing on the *micro-actions* of change. This was possible because many of the *organisational defence routines* were identified during the evaluation process. Aspects of culture were used to help managers sub-consciously see the course was relevant to their needs and engage them in the learning process. The power of this style of training has been demonstrated numerous times throughout the thesis. This process helped develop a positive *psychological contract* with managers who, in turn, acted in the role of a *significant other* and influenced staff's belief in the grievance procedure. This process was used in

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[417]   Argyris, C. and Schon, D. A. *Ibid.* p 255., 1996

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the context of a grievance procedure but could, in my submission, be used to influence any aspect of organisational culture in any organisation. Organisations are social worlds and in any social environment interactions between people create unspoken psychological contracts. They will always exist, indeed they are culture, they are the unspoken beliefs and assumptions that underpin many aspects of behaviour. Any change initiative that fails to engage in this phenomena would appear to be doomed to failure.

Finally, Bate (1994) argues that changing *Meta-Directions* appears to offer the best prospect to changing organisational culture. This research confirms this view. He also states that as yet there is no learning theory to accompany this view; whilst this thesis does not provide such a theory, perhaps it does show that one does exist.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions are divided into three main headings, the grievance procedure, cultural change and the police service.

The Grievance Procedure

1. Evidence of Cultural Change

Following the implementation of the Cambridgeshire Constabulary's Equality of Service Project, there was a significant increase in the number of recorded grievances, (2375% between 1993 and 1995). Additionally, 69.5% of grievances in 1995 were resolved at the first stage, compared to 0% in 1993. This indicates that managers are taking responsibility and successfully dealing with grievances as they arise. Also, there was no evidence from any member of staff interviewed, who had made a grievance, of receiving any adverse treatment. These factors provide quantitative data to support the qualitative evidence that indicates a considerable change in culture.

Relevance of the Grievance Procedure

2. If the police service is to move to a more participative management style then having an effective grievance procedure is essential. This research showed that an effective grievance procedure formed an essential element to the overall management philosophy of the force. It is, as one person said, the last communication channel when all others have failed.

3.   **Improved Internal Culture**

The new grievance procedure was a substantial and positive step in improving the internal culture of the force. In particular, evidence suggests that it helped to modify sexist behaviour and negative aspects of management.

4.   **Selection of Grievance Handlers**

Staff having the facility to select any manager to deal with a grievance proved an important component in the successful introduction of the new grievance procedure.

5.   **Confidentiality and Updating all Parties**

Maintaining confidentiality was particularly important to aggrieved staff. Also all parties to a grievance identified being kept abreast of developments was important to dealing and resolving an issue successfully.

6.   **Monitoring and Recording Grievances**

Recording grievances was essential in identifying trends and patterns. It also helped ensure the force learnt from grievances.

Cultural Change

7.   **Understanding Organisations**

This research found considerable evidence to show that managers in the force made a number of assumptions about what constitutes the organisation. Organisational culture was not understood, or seen to be a major component in organisational development; this view supports other research conducted in the police service.

8. Research

Research played an essential part in identifying the cultural components that act as barriers to change. A multi-method approach seemed to offer the best form of research because of its eclectic nature, exposing multiple layers of culture and finally exposing *theories-in-use, organisation defence routines* and *Meta-Directions*. The evaluation should be ongoing throughout the change process and the concept of *action-research* best allows for changes in direction to be made as problems emerge.

9. Holism in Cultural Change Strategies.

The research exposed multiple aspects of the organisation that need to change, for example, structures, systems, procedures, *micro-actions* of social interaction and managers' *theories-in-use*. All of these areas need to reinforce each other before effective cultural change will occur (see figure five).

10. Re-socialisation

All the available evidence indicates that the re-socialisation programme was the most significant component in achieving cultural change. This programme helped to replace one set of commonly-held beliefs with another. It facilitated intellectual growth and helped managers to deal with the complexities and uncertainties of a potential grievance. It did this in a number of different ways which are explained below.

11. Holism in Training

Re-socialising individuals to change culture involves all three domains of learning, *cognitive*, *psycho-motor* and *affective*, plus many cultural components that implicitly define reality, *i.e., Meta-Directions*. All of these areas underpin the *micro-action*s of the organisation, and it is essential that these are addressed during implementation if staff are to actually behave differently.

12.   The Use of Culture in Training

The re-socialisation programme implicitly used aspects of organisational culture. This appeared to have the affect of helping to engage participants in the learning process. Also, identifying aspects of organisational culture that would hinder successful implementation and designing training events to overcome them helped in transference of learning to the workplace.

13.   Consultation

The new grievance procedure was initially produced in a draft format and acted as a probe into the organisation. The facilitators encouraged managers to comment on it and amend it, which had the effect of developing ownership and producing a procedure that evolved and developed to better fit the working environment.

14.   The Style of Training

This research confirmed Rogers's (1983)[418] view regarding the type of characteristic facilitators of learning should try to emulate. This style of facilitation was essential to a participative, self-directed, action-orientated and reflective learning programme. This research also confirms Bate's (1994)[419] and Louis's (1989)[420] view regarding training programmes necessary to facilitate cultural change. The use of this style of facilitation, combined with implicit use of cultural cues, helped to reach participant's *zone of proximal development*, and engaged them into an active receptive mode.

15. Changing Attitudes and Free Choice

Whilst managers had to attend the course and a general structure was designed, participants were allowed *free choice* regarding their chosen course of action in response to the various case-studies and role-plays. These were carefully worded to avoid indicating any particular desired course of action. In a sense, the exercises merely posed a dilemma; participants exercised *free choice* in responding to this dilemma which appeared to be important when they reflected evaluatively on possible negative consequences of action. In essence, it meant they could not attribute blame to others for negative consequences of action; learning was, therefore, described as *self-discovery*.

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[418]   Rogers, C. *Op.Cit.*, 1983.
[419]   Bate, P *Op.Cit.*, 1994.
[420]   Louis, D. A., *Op.Cit.*, 1989.

16. Live Data

Using *'Live data'* generated by individuals in the group exposed individuals' *theories-in-use*. Debriefing these instances proved to be a powerful learning experience, not only for the individuals concerned, but also by others who vicariously experienced the process.

17. Role-play

Role-play appeared to be one of the most important components in the learning process. It helped to expose the complex nature of *micro-actions* present during social interaction. It also helped to expose *theories-in-use*, *Meta-Directions* and negative consequences of behaviour. Additionally, it consolidated experience in practice and provide participants with a new *mental representation* of behaviour. This helped overcome barriers to change and assisted in the transference of learning to the workplace.

18. Bottom-Up, Top-Down, Emergent Approach to Change

Senior managers were not initially included in the training programme which had the unintentional effect of a 'bottom-up' approach to change. Evaluation of the consequences of this course of action indicated that intervention was necessary to rectify the problem and it was agreed that all managers should be incorporated in the training programme. This rapidly improved the situation, as mutual understanding and trust developed between managers. This provided evidence to support the view that different cultures operated at different levels. Therefore, cultural change was better achieved by training groups of managers from each layer together, in essence providing a bottom-up, top-down and emergent approach to cultural change.

19. Psychological Contract

Managers experiencing the re-socialisation programme together, especially role-play, seemed to develop a sense of camaraderie and ownership in the grievance procedure. This process helped managers to interpret their commitment and obligations similarly, thereby developing an implicit shared *normative contract*.

20. Significant Other

Managers returning from the re-socialisation programme, who had close contact with staff, acted as important sources of influence in changing staff's belief in the grievance procedure.

21. Communication

Written forms of communication, such as newsletters, posters and leaflets appeared to have very little positive influence in changing beliefs.

22. Ongoing Support

Successful cultural change is not a single event but an ongoing sequence of changes. To maintain this process, ongoing support was vital and was initially provided by the project team and then by the equal opportunity manager.

23. Support of Top Management

Support demonstrated by senior management to this project was vital, especially in terms of obtaining resources. This situation has been maintained by the equal opportunity manager having direct access to the deputy chief constable which has been necessary, on occasions, to resolve issues rapidly.

24. Divisional Action Groups

The original structure of the project placed emphasis on central co-ordination and monitoring with 'Divisional Action Groups' being given as much scope for local initiatives as possible. However, there is little evidence to suggest they have been particularly effective.

25. Meta-Directions

Bate's (1994)[421] argument appears confirmed by research - namely that changing *Meta-Directions* changes the frame in which reality is defined and thus promises hope for altering organisational culture. This, however, should be the subject for further research.

The Police Service

The above conclusions could arguable apply to any organisation: this section provides conclusions that particularly affect the police service.

26. An overall cultural change strategy has been woefully absent from a nearly all attempts at organisational change in the police service and this has been a significant factor in the failure of a number of change programmes.

27. Vicious Circle

The police service is in danger of remaining in a 'vicious circle' that prevents successful change unless the value of research, particularly qualitative methods, is recognised and, more importantly, acted upon. This form of research is essential before, during and after any attempt at organisational change.

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[421] Bate, P., *Op.Cit.*, pp 198-200, 1994.

27. Understanding the Process of Change

Successful organisational change will probably not occur in the police service until more senior managers recognise the complexity of the organisation and the role culture has to play in organisational development and change.

28. Train Managers of Change

There is an urgent need to train at least a small number of senior managers from every force in the management of change. Additionally, it is vital for all managers to understand organisational change and begin to learn to 'think culturally'.

29. Undervaluing the Role of Training

The police service, like many organisations, undervalues the role of training, particularly the type of training that, in essence, amounts to re-socialisation. This, undoubtedly, was the most important vehicle for bringing about significant cultural change in Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

30. Grievance Procedure as an Agent of Change

The grievance procedure has the ability to act as an agent of change. It is particularly suited to the police service because it uses adherence to systems and procedures, which are aspects of a bureaucracy, to bring about change in a bureaucracy.

SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Police Specific

1.   Further research could be undertaken to examine the number and types of grievances made in all police forces. The effects that the process of implementation has had on the number of grievances and the level of resolution could then be examined.

2.   Further research could be undertaken into the implementation of strategies for development and change in the police service.

Organisational Change

3.   Research could be undertaken to ascertain the suitability of using a grievance procedure, or something similar, as a vehicle for bringing about change, particularly within a bureaucracy.

4.   Further research could be undertaken to examine the effects of re-socialising staff to overcome cultural barriers and the effects this has on the process of cultural change.

5.   Further research could be undertaken to examine the part role-play has in the transference of learning from the classroom to the workplace and subsequent effects on cultural change.

6.   Further research could be undertaken to examine whether changing *Meta-Directions* has a disproportionately greater effect on cultural change than other approaches.

7.   Further research could be undertaken to examine the role that a *'significant other'* has in changing beliefs and whether this is disproportionately greater than other methods of influencing attitudes and beliefs.

8.   Further research could be undertaken to examine the use of cultural stimulants in training and the effect on learning.

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APPENDIX 1

TEXT BOUND CLOSE TO

THE SPINE IN THE

ORIGINAL THESIS

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

Staff Selection and Appraisal Questionnaire

questionnaire is designed to assist in the development of Equal Opportunities for all staff in bridgeshire Constabulary.   **Please take the time to complete it.**   The questionnaire is designed to be ymous and will be treated in a way to preserve the individuals anonymity.

ction 1

ase answer this section by placing a tick in the box that you feel is the most appropriate response to the lowing questions.

> **Questions 1 to 4 should be completed by all staff.**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree, nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
believe the methods used to ct staff for posts in this force fair and objective.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
believe the methods used to ct staff for promotion in this e are fair and objective.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ll vacancies for posts, pt in exceptional cases, ld be advertised.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
believe the force is mitted to Equality of ortunity.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

> **estions 5 and 6 only relate Police officers, if you are ivilian member of staff ase go to question 7.**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree, nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
onsider the appraisal system for Police officers (when they completed their probation), es an accurate assessment of erson's performance.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
onsider the appraisal system for Police officers (during their tion), provides an accurate sment of that person's mance.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree, nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
I think there should be an appraisal system available to all civilian members of staff.	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑
I consider the new civilian appraisal system being piloted provides an accurate and reliable measurement of performance.	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree, nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
I consider that I have adequate knowledge and understanding of the force grievance procedure.	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑
I would value having an informal and confidential source of advice and support on fairness related issues.	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑
If I made a Grievance I would be confident of receiving a fair hearing.	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

Section 2

Please indicate which staff selection method you would prefer. Please grade the options from 1 to 6, 1 being your first choice and 6 being your least favoured option :

Interview only ⊔

Assessment centre including interview ⊔

Selection by a senior person without an interview and without an assessment centre ⊔

Assessment centre only ⊔

Using past appraisals only ⊔

Other (please specify below) ⊔

_____

_____

_____

_____

Please briefly explain why you made your first choice :

_____

_____

_____

Have you any other comment you would like to make concerning Selection and Appraisals in
Cambridgeshire Constabulary ?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

	Not Important				**Very Important**

How important do you feel the issue of
Equal Opportunities is to the Police Service ?
Please tick as appropriate :

1 ☐   2 ☐   3 ☐   4 ☐   5 ☐

Question 3

> It would be helpful and assist in the analysis of the
> questionnaire if you would complete the following section.

Please indicate your gender :   Male ☐
                                          Female ☐

Please tick one of the boxes that best describes you.

White	☐	Pakistani	☐
Black-Caribbean	☐	Bangladeshi	☐
Black-African	☐	Chinese	☐
Black Other	☐	Other	☐
Indian	☐	(please describe below)	

_____

**Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire, please
return it NOW in the envelope provided to Inspector C. Speechley,
Equal Opportunities Project Manager, (extension 2555)
Cambridgeshire Police Headquarters.**

APPENDIX 2

MANAGING CONFLICT
AND GRIEVANCES

COURSE FEEDBACK

1. How valuable was the workshop to you?

    Low   Moderate   High

    1   2   3   4   5

2. How would you rate the calibre of training?

    1   2   3   4   5

3. How would you rate the content of the workshop?

    1   2   3   4   5

4. What subject would you like more information on, if any?

5. What will you do differently in your role now, than you did before the workshop?

6. The pre-course workbook was:-

	Agree		Neither Agree or Disagree		Disagree
Clean and Concise	1	2	3	4	5
Easy to work through	1	2	3	4	5
Aim at the right level	1	2	3	4	5

7. The support package provided has/will be very useful?

Not very
useful

Very
useful

1   2   3   4   5

8. What further support material (if any) would you like?

9. The length of the workshop was:-

Too Long   About Righ.   Too Short

(Please Circle)

10. Any other comment.

....

....

....

....

....

....

APPENDIX 3

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

Equal Opportunities Policy Statement

Employees and applicants for employment of both sexes and of all racial groups have a right to equal opportunities of employment. The purpose of the following statement is to re-inforce the awareness of all employees of their duty to comply with the law on sex and race discrimination, and to encourage a positive attitude towards fairness of treatment and opportunity. The Cambridgeshire Constabulary has adopted policies in order to prevent unlawful discrimination and promote equal opportunity in employment. The following statement of policy should be read carefully and fully observed at all times.

Statement of Policy to Promote Equal Opportunity

1. The Cambridgeshire Constabulary is determined to ensure that no job applicant or employee receives less favourable treatment by reason of sex or marital status, colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins, or is disadvantaged by conditions or requirements which cannot be shown to be relevant to performance.

2. All personnel policies and procedures will be administered so as not to discriminate and the main ones relate to recruitment, selection, payment, conditions of employment, training assessment, transfer, promotion, discipline, dismissal, health, safety and welfare. These policies and procedures will be monitored and periodically reviewed to ensure that the equal opportunity policy is being properly implemented, to maintain a system whereby individuals are selected, promoted and treated solely on the basis of their merits and abilities which are appropriate to the job.

3. The Cambridgeshire Constabulary seeks to give all employees equal opportunity and encouragement to progress within the Force through the development of their skills and abilities through training and development programmes which will also enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Force Service provision.

4. Individuals who feel they have grounds for complaint in relation to discrimination within the scope of this policy should raise the matter through the grievance procedure.

5. The Deputy Chief Constable and Personnel Manager have overall responsibility for monitoring the effectiveness of this policy and for implementing programmes of action to make the policy fully operative. Specific responsibility falls on management, supervision and staff professionally involved in recruitment, training and personnel administration, for which training and guidance will be provided. This policy statement will be distributed and published throughout the Force and elsewhere as is appropriate.

6. Eliminating discrimination and providing equality of opportunity depend on the personal commitment of all members of the Force to give it full effect. All members of the Force without exception must observe the requirements of the equal opportunities policy and apply its principles.

FORCE STATEMENT

It is Force policy that racist and sexist language is unacceptable and will not be tolerated under any circumstances, in line with our Equal Opportunities Policy. If someone does not oppose racist or sexist language it does not mean that they consent to it.

This statement takes immediate effect and will be promulgated through General Orders, Sub-Divisional/Departmental communication channels and every other channel of the Quality of Service programme.

APPENDIX 4

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES POLICY - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

1. INTRODUCTION

In furtherance of the Force Equal Opportunities Policy and in
common with other Forces, a grievance procedure has been designed
and agreed. Eliminating discrimination and providing equality of
opportunity depend on the personal commitment of all members of
the Force to give it full effect. Any suspected discriminatory
acts or practices should be drawn to the attention of supervisory
officers.

The Sex Discrimination Act, 1975 renders unlawful certain kinds of
sex discrimination and discrimination on the grounds of marital
status whether applied to women or men.

The Race Relations Act, 1976 renders unlawful certain kinds of
discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, nationality of
ethnic or nation origins.

Advice may be obtained from the Personnel Department, Supervisory
Officers and Staff Association representatives and if necessary
either from the Equal Opportunities Commissioner, Overseas House,
Quay Street, Manchester or the Commission for Racial Equality,
Elliot House, 10-12 Allington Street, London SW1.

Discrimination is not always obvious or overt, and neither is it
always intentional, but however it occurs there must be some
means by which an aggrieved person can seek proper redress within
the Force.

In regard to civilian employees, any complaints of discrimination,
victimisation, or harassment will be pursued through the civilian
staff grievance and disciplinary procedures. Copies of these have
been separately circulated and are available from Sub-Divisions,
Departments and the Personnel Department.

The Sex Discrimination Act and Race Relations Act apply equally to
all Officers and Staff and the following grievance procedure is
open to all Police Officers.

2. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

2.1 The Purpose of the Equal Opportunities Grievance Procedure is to
ensure that complaints from Officers who feel they have been
unfairly discriminated against are dealt with justly, quickly and
in a manner which complies with legal requirements. Invoking the
grievance procedure does not preclude the complainant from
instituting legal action at an Industrial Tribunal under the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 or the Race Relations Act 1976. It is
intended that the Force procedure should enjoy the confidence and
support of all members of the Force and thus obviate the need to
seek redress from outside bodies and minimise the risk of the
Force being taken to an Industrial Tribunal.

The following principles apply to the Force Grievance Procedure -

(i)   The complainant shall have the right to pursue a grievance, in stages, to the highest level of the Force.

(ii) The complainant shall have the right at any stage, to be accompanied by a Staff Association Representative, or by a colleague.

(iii) The complaint shall, unless otherwise agreed with the complainant, be treated as confidential.

(iv) The investigation of a grievance should be treated as a matter of urgency at all stages. The Acts (SDA/RRA) impose a time limit of 3 months from the date of the act complained against to the institution of proceedings. The grievance procedure is designed to obviate the necessity for legal proceedings but its application should not put an Officer out of time in exercising their right to take a case to an industrial tribunal. If for any reason the time limit is likely to expire before the internal procedure has been exhausted, the complainant is reminded the onus is on him or her to institute legal proceedings within the specified 3 months.

(v)   A complainant who has invoked the Force Grievance Procedure should not be _victimised_ in any way. Such victimisation is itself an offence under the relevant legislation.

(vi) The grievance procedure does not of itself provide for any form of sanction. The investigation of a grievance may, however, indicate that an individual officer has contravened the legislation and thus give grounds for the institution of disciplinary proceedings. The Force Complaints and Discipline Department should be contacted and the guidance at Appendix 1 followed.

STAGES OF PROCEDURE

STAGE (i)

The complainant should initially go to the first line manager, of at least Inspector Rank; except where the complaint is against the officer's immediate supervisor and progress should be made direct to stage (ii). The complaint can be made verbally unless the complainant wishes to put it in writing, or the complaint relates to Force policy.

The grievance should be dealt with immediately. If the complaint can be resolved there and then it may not be necessary to commit the facts to paper other than completion of the monitoring report; and the complainant should be told what action if any is to be taken.

If not satisfied with the outcome, the complainant has the right to proceed to stage (ii) after 7 days from the date of making the initial complaint.

STAGE (ii)

The Complainant should go to the Sub-Divisional Commander or
Departmental Head if the grievance has not been resolved.

The Officer in charge will, as soon as practicable interview the
complainant and, the person complained of.

The complaint may be made verbally or in writing and the Officer
in charge should consult the Force Personnel Officer. A written
note of the outcome and any action taken should be made.

If the grievance is resolved, the complainant should be told what
action (if any) is to be taken. If not satisfied with the
outcome, the complainant has the right to proceed to Stage (iii)
after 14 days from the date of instituting this Stage.

STAGE (iii)

The complainant shall have the right to take the matter to a
higher level i.e. the Area Chief Superintendent or Departmental
Chief Superintendent.

At this stage the complaint must be in writing, any previous notes
of action referred to, and advice sought from the Force Personnel
Officer. Appropriate notes of interviews and action taken should
be made. If the grievance is resolved, the complainant should be
told what action (if any) is to be taken. If not satisfied with
the outcome, the complainant has the right to proceed to Stage
(iv) after 14 days from the date of initiating this Stage.

STAGE (iv)

If the grievance cannot be resolved at Stage (iii), a complainant
shall have the final right to an interview with The Deputy Chief
Constable who has overall accountability for implementing and
monitoring the effectiveness of the Force Equal Opportunities
Policy .

In requesting the interview, the complaint should be submitted in
writing to the Officer who conducted the Stage (iii) process
who will minute the complaint, give an opinion and state the
action taken to date. This will then be forwarded to the Force
Personnel Officer who will arrange for an interview with the
Deputy Chief Constable as soon as possible.

The Complainant will be told what action (if any) is to be taken.
If still not satisfied, the complainant will be informed of the
right to take the case to an industrial tribunal.

2.4   All Officers are reminded of the need for urgency in the
      procedure, as complainants have only 3 months from the date of the
      act complained of to start proceedings at the Industrial Tribunal.
      Where it becomes clear that the matter will not be resolved at an
      early stage e.g. because the complaint relates to a matter of
      Force policy which may take some time to resolve, the whole
      procedure should be accelerated to ensure it comes before the
      Deputy Chief Constable as soon as possible.

2.5   Monitoring of Complaints forms a necessary part of the Force Equal
      Opportunities monitoring procedures.   A separate grievance record
      will be kept for this purpose and will be separate from records of
      discipline and discipline procedures.   This record will be
      maintained centrally in the Personnel Department in line with the
      grievance procedure.   A Monitoring Report, attached at Appendix 2
      shall be completed by the Officer in Charge at each stage of the
      procedure.

2.6   A summary of the grievance procedure is attached at Appendix 3.

Guidance regarding Instituting Disciplinary Procedures

a. Where at any stage of the investigation of a grievance it appears that an offence against discipline may have taken place, the normal disciplinary procedures, including the service of a notice under Regulation 7 of the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985, will be invoked.

b. The grievance procedure will then be held in abeyance until the disciplinary aspect has been investigated and, if appropriate, pursued to a charge and hearing.

c. The grievance procedure will be resumed only if the disciplinary proceedings did not result in a finding of guilt and the complainant still wishes to seek redress for the grievance.

d. Regulation 7 of the 1985 Regulations makes it clear that a personal explanation is to be given only under caution. A statement made in other circumstances, for example in response to an allegation or complaint made under the grievance procedures, will not be admissible as evidence, save in exceptional circumstances (i.e. where an officer has given inconsistent accounts at different times and it is desirable to question the officer about the discrepancies).

APPENDIX 2

Equal Opportunities - Grievance Procedure
Monitoring of Complaints

In line with the Force Equal Opportunities Policy Monitoring Procedures
the following information is submitted in regard to invocation of the
Force Grievance Procedure.

1. Date   Male/Female

2. Department   Sub Division

3. Nature of Allegation

4. Stage of Procedure   1   -
    (Please date)   2   - -
                         3   -
                         4   -

5. Reference to the Industrial Tribunal

6. Result of Stage/Action taken/Date taken

This form is to be completed by the relevant Officer in charge
dealing with the Complainant and returned to the Force Personnel
Officer under Private cover.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary - Equal Opportunities Policy Grievance
Procedure for Police Officers - Summary

STAGE (i)

The complainant should make initial complaint to the first line
manager (of at least Inspector rank).

Complaint can be made verbally unless the complainant wishes to
put it in writing or it relates to Force Policy.

If not satisfied with the outcome, the complainant has the right
to proceed to stage (ii) from the date of making the initial
complaint.

STAGE (ii)

The complainant should go to the Sub Divisional Commander or
Departmental Head where he or she works. The complaint may be
made verbally or in writing. The Officer in Charge will, as soon
as practicable interview the complainant and, the person
complained of.

If not satisfied with the outcome, the complainant has the right
to proceed to stage (iii) after 14 days from the instituting stage
(ii).

STAGE (iii)

The complainant has the right to take the matter to the Area or
Departmental Chief Superintendent.

At this stage the complaint must be in writing, previous notes of
action referred to and appropriate notes of interview and action
taken should be made. If not satisfied with the outcome, the
complainant has the right to proceed to stage (iv) after 14 days
from the day on instituting (stage (iii).

STAGE (iv)

The complainant shall have the final right to go to the Deputy
Chief Constable. The complaint should be submitted in writing
through the Chief Superintendent who conducted the stage (iii)
process.

The Personnel Department and Staff Association representatives can
be contacted at any time before and during the procedure for
advice.

All Officers are reminded of the need for urgency in this
procedure. complainants have only three months from the date of
the act complained of to start proceedings at the Industrial
Tribunal.

APPENDIX 5

MANAGEMENT CHARTER INITIATIVES

AND

POLICE SPECIFIC COMPETENCIES

Competencies managers should be able to perform:-

1. Deal seriously, sympathetically and promptly with any complaints.

2. Demonstrate their role and responsibility in relation to Grievance Procedure and performance problems.

3. Explain the workings of the Grievance Procedure and alternative courses of action.

4. Record details of proceedings and outcomes that are accurate and complete.

5. Investigate Grievance, Discipline and performance problems.

6. Handle information with the appropriate level of confidentiality.

7. Seek advice from appropriate individuals if statutory and organisational requirements appear to conflict.

8. Use corrective action for handling behavioural and performance problems.

9. Provide an "access point" of information regarding Equal Opportunity Policy, Harassment Policy and Grievance Procedure.

10. Identify and prevent victimisation occurring.

APPENDIX 6

"Managing Conflict and Grievance"

Managers Pre-Course Workbook

"MANAGING CONFLICT AND GRIEVANCE"

Overall Aim:-

To create, maintain and enhance productive working relationships ensuring efficiency and fair treatment for all.

MANAGEMENT CHARTER INITIATIVES

AND

POLICE SPECIFIC COMPETENCIES

Competencies managers should be able to perform:-

1. Deal seriously, sympathetically and promptly with any complaints.

2. Demonstrate their role and responsibility in relation to Grievance Procedure and performance problems.

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6. Handle information with the appropriate level of confidentiality.

7. Seek advice from appropriate individuals if statutory and organisational requirements appear to conflict.

8. Use corrective action for handling behavioural and performance problems.

9. Provide an "access point" of information regarding Equal Opportunity Policy, Harassment Policy and Grievance Procedure.

10. Identify and prevent victimisation occurring.

"Managing Conflict and Grievance"

Introduction

Equal Opportunities, are not only legal rights for all staff but, are compatible with good and efficient management practice which, in turn, enhances internal and external quality of service. There is a direct link between the way people are managed and relate to each other inside the organisation and the quality of service they deliver to the public.

The police service is not exempt from the provisions of the relevant legislation and therefore its implications need to be understood by all managers.

This pre-course workbook has been prepared in order to give you some information about the legislation, force policy and procedures.

The course is designed to comply with a Unit of National Management Charter Standards (MCI) which are based on "competencies". Competencies are less about what you know and more about what you can actually do in the workplace. Nevertheless, having a basic knowledge of a subject gives all of us more confidence when it comes to dealing with a difficult situation.

With this in mind it is essential that you work through this book prior to attending the course and make additional notes of areas that concern you.

There will be a knowledge check on the first day of the course concerning the material in this workbook.

If you have any difficulties with the material or any practical issues please contact the Equality of Service Project Team at HQ's, Ext 2555.

Equal Opportunities Law:- an overview

The relevant Acts of Parliament are:-

Legislation	Aim
Sex Discrimination Acts 1975 and 1986	To eliminate discrimination in employment on grounds relating to sex or marital status
Race Relations Act 1976 (replaces an Act of 1968)	To eliminate discrimination in employment on grounds relating to race or nationality
Equal Pay Act 1970 (amended in 1983)	To ensure that men and women in a particular workplace receive equal pay for the same or similar work, or work of equal value
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, Employment act 1980, and the Social Security Act 1986	To give pregnant women or those on, or returning from, maternity leave certain rights relating to pay and jobs
The Disabled Persons (Employment) Acts 1944 and 1958	To set up arrangements for training disabled people, and to place a duty on employers to give employment to a minimum percentage of disabled.

3

Equal Opportunities Legislation

Whilst the law relating to equality in employment is quite complex it is important for supervisors and managers to know what their legal responsibilities are within this area.

The Main Legislative Acts are:-

The Sex Discrimination Act 1975

The Race Relations Act 1976

Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944 & 1958

The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and The Race Relations Act 1976

Are based on the principle of equal treatment. It is unlawful to:-

*   discriminate against a person the grounds of sex, marital status, colour race, nationality or ethnic origin (recent decisions by the European Court have established that it is also unlawful to discriminate against women on the grounds of pregnancy).

*   to positively discriminate in favour of a person or group of persons.

*   to have a quota system for particular ethnic or gender groups

in the AREA of

EMPLOYMENT:- including training, promotion, transfer, dismissal, terms and conditions, recruitment and selection.

The area of employment is specific to the police force however, other areas where discrimination is unlawful is in Education, the Provision of Goods Facilities and Services as well as the Disposal and Management of Premises.

NB   Under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 married persons are covered against unlawful discrimination in the area of employment only .

FORMS OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION

We have identified the GROUNDS and AREAS in which discrimination is unlawful under the Sex Discrimination Act and Race Relations Act but we now need to look at exactly HOW discrimination may occur.

Both Acts recognise and forbid several types of discrimination. An understanding and awareness of these will help you to identify and possibly prevent cases of unlawful discrimination in the workplace.

The two main types of discrimination are DIRECT and INDIRECT

DIRECT DISCRIMINATION

This occurs when a person receives less favourable treatment directly on the grounds of their gender, marital status, race, colour, nationality or national or ethnic origins. It is perhaps the most easily recognisable form of unlawful discrimination.

An Example of Direct Sex Discrimination

Would be where a woman officer was not posted to an area car because her supervisor felt it was too dangerous for her as a woman to be first on the scene of violent incidents.

An Example of Direct Racial Discrimination

Would be where an employee is deliberately refused a course or opportunity for job enrichment and the reason was purely on the grounds of the individuals race, nationality, colour or ethnic and national origins.

5

INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION

This occurs when a condition or requirement is applied which, on the face of it applies equally to all but, which in reality can be met by fewer people of a particular group, is detrimental to that group, and cannot be shown to be justified.

Even if the discrimination is unintentional it can still be unlawful.

> ### An example of Indirect Sex Discrimination
>
> Would be where a specialist police support group specifies a weight requirement of 11 stone, which although equal in respect of both sexes, nevertheless, precludes more women from applying and which cannot be justified.

> ### An example of Indirect Racial Discrimination
>
> Would be where an organisation imposed a rule that all employees wear company caps which has the effect of precluding potential Sikh employees (who through religious or cultural necessity wear turbans) and which cannot be justified in order to perform the job.

Let us look at some cases:-

Case One

John is a Police Officer with 6 years service, he has
a good record of work in that time and is highly
respected. He applies to join a divisional crime
team which is being formed to deal with robberies
and thefts from the person in his division. Although
he is the best qualified candidate, he is not
appointed to the team since the Divisional
Commander feels it would be a good idea to have a
woman on the team. A woman is appointed.

- Has John been Discriminated against? If so, on what
  grounds has discrimination taken place?

A) --

- What type of Discrimination has taken place?

A) --

Answer

Yes. This was found to be a case of Direct Sex Discrimination. John was the best candidate but, because he was male he did not get the post he wanted.

Case Two

Anne is an officer with 12 years service in the
Police. She is currently posted to the traffic
department of her force where she works with a
permanent partner who is a male officer. The two
are amongst the hardest working and most
productive officers in the section.

A new departmental Commander is appointed who
feels that it is unsafe to allow mixed sex crews in
cars because of the temptations which he feels are
present for the officers to become sexually involved
with one another. For this reason Anne is posted
out of the car and is posted to the Administration
Unit of the department.

- On what grounds has Anne been discriminated against?

  A) --

- What type of discrimination has taken place?

  A) --

Answer

If you said that this was direct discrimination against females you are right. It's clearly unfair for the commander to treat people this way without some sort of substance to support his fear. Not only has Anne been treated unfairly on a personal basis but the section has suffered from the splitting up of a hardworking pair.

Remember that the same would apply if the <u>male officer</u> was posted out for the same reasons without good cause.

Alan is a civilian employee of the Police service and wants to become a civilian scenes of crime officer. Interviews are held and Alan does well, he is not given the job however because he has a young family and the interviewers were concerned that it would be unfair to ask him to work the irregular hours which the job would entail. The post instead went to Dave who is a single man.

- On what grounds has Alan been discriminated against?

  A) ———————————————————————————————————————

- What type of discrimination has taken place?

  A) ———————————————————————————————————————

<u>Answer</u>

Again the discrimination applied is direct. It is clearly unfair to make assumptions about Alan's ability to work unsociable hours, simply because he has a family of young children.

Note that this is an instance where a person has been discriminated against not because of their sex, but because of their **marital status**.

In a workforce, an employer made it a condition of promotion to senior grades that employees should have at least ten years of continuous service with the firm. The employer was not able to prove that the ten years' service constituted the experience needed for the higher grade of work.

Mrs X applied for promotion and was fully qualified for it apart from having given up work for a year or so to take care of her baby. She did not get the promotion because of the ten-year-service rule, and reported her employer to an Industrial Tribunal for unlawful discrimination.

- On what grounds was unlawful discrimination carried out by the employer?

  A)————————————————————————————

- Was the discrimination direct or indirect?

  A) ————————————————————————————

Answer

Here, indirect unlawful discrimination on grounds of sex occurred. The firm set conditions for promotion that were not relevant to the needs of the work and therefore not justifiable. The proportion of women able to comply with these conditions was in practice likely to be considerably smaller than the proportion of men, because women could have their service interrupted by having or raising children. Mrs X suffered a disadvantage because she could not meet the conditions.

However, if 10 years of service had proved essential to the job, then discrimination would have been lawful because the discrimination would be justifiable.

OTHER FORMS OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION

The Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts go further than making Direct and Indirect discrimination unlawful in that they make acts of victimisation, instruction to discriminate and pressure to discriminate by an employer or anyone else unlawful.

VICTIMISATION

This occurs when someone is treated unfavourably because they have truthfully and in good faith:-

1.   reported or alleged unlawful discrimination.

2.   given information or evidence in a discrimination case.

3.   won a case for unlawful discrimination.

An example (1 above)

where a female officer who alleges sexual harassment by a male colleague on her relief, and starts the grievance procedure available, could well also allege victimisation if the matter is dealt with by transferring her off the relief against her will.

INSTRUCTION TO DISCRIMINATE

This occurs where someone uses their position to order unlawful discrimination to be carried out or when someone obeys such instructions.

An Example

A shift which runs a 4 monthly rota system shows it is a female officers turn to be allocated gaoler duties in the custody office. However, the inspector on shift tells his Sergeant that whilst he is running the shift no female will take on those duties. The Sergeant, to avoid confrontation with the inspector, avoids placing female officers in the custody office.

PRESSURE TO DISCRIMINATE

This occurs where one person or group put pressure on another to discriminate unlawfully.

NB

1. Pressure or Instruction to discriminate are no excuse for unlawful discrimination. All parties involved in all aspects of the discrimination are liable.

2. Pressure or Instruction to discriminate unlawfully are offences even if no discrimination take place.

An Example

A group of male officers on a support team tell their supervisor they do not want a female on the team and will refuse to work or talk with any, that are selected. In what he believes to be the best interests of any female officer none are selected.

Considering the above definitions look at the following cases where unlawful discrimination has taken place and identify instances of victimisation, pressure and instruction to discriminate (each case may include more than 1 type).

Case 1

A West Indian control room operator applied for a
job with a police force. He was well qualified for the
job, and management wished to appoint him. Both
the force and his trade union had a policy of equal
opportunity for all workers, regardless of colour, race
or sex.

All the other workers in the control room, where the job
was located, were white. A meeting was held amongst
civilian workers and a decision was made that the white
workers would not work with a black person. As a result
Management then decided not to appoint the black
applicant. One white worker disagreed with the action.
He reported the force for inequality at work.

It was subsequently found at the Industrial Tribunal that
unlawful discrimination had occurred. Thereafter the white
worker was 'sent to Coventry' by his co-workers and found
that he was given no opportunities for overtime, even
though before all this happened he used to do several
hours overtime a week.

- Apart from the direct discrimination that occurred in this
  case, against the West Indian on grounds of colour,
  what other kinds of unlawful discrimination occurred?

A _____

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<u>Answer</u>

Two kinds of discrimination occurred here:

- pressure to discriminate - by the workers

- victimisation - of the white worker, because he reported the case, which he did so truthfully and in good faith.

Case 2

A Superintendent made it clear to the operational Chief Inspector that no new female Sergeant is to be appointed to a certain relief because:-

"Old Pete Nightingale is Inspector on that relief and he's hopeless with women constantly pestering and touching them. It will cause more trouble than it's worth".

There was no other reason why the Superintendent thought females should not be appointed. Pete Nightingale has not been consulted.

- What kinds of discrimination have occurred here and then decide who they have been committed by?

A ————————————————————————————

<u>Answer</u>

I hope you decided that direct discrimination on the grounds of sex was carried out by the operational Chief Inspector. There was no victimisation. Nor was there indirect discrimination.

That leaves us with 'pressure to discriminate' and 'instruction to discriminate' Did either of these occur?

The answer is that the offence ' instruction to discriminate' took place. The offence was committed by the Superintendent, who made it clear that the Operational Chief Inspector must not appoint a female, **and** by the Operational Chief Inspector, who obeyed and unlawful instruction.

You may well have thought the Superintendent was also guilty of **'pressure** to discriminate'. However, there's an important distinction which makes it clear that the Superintendent was guilty of **'Instruction** to discriminate'.

The distinction is that **anyone at all** can be guilty of pressure to discriminate if, by any means whatsoever, they put pressure on someone else. However, the offence of instruction to discriminate occurs only when a formal order to discriminate (or something which will clearly be understood as an order, as happened in this case) is given by somebody in a position to do so.

Genuine Occupational Qualifications

Whilst we have so far looked at the grounds for Unlawful Discrimination and the types of Discrimination Under the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts there are, however, some jobs where, because of the nature of the work , it is justifiable to specify a particular sex or race as being suitable for a particular post.

This is known as a GENUINE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION and applies to the following areas:-

Under Race Relations Act:-

Where membership of a particular racial group is a Genuine Occupational Qualification (GOQ) for the job, in these cases only:

a)   for reasons of authenticity e.g..

-          acting
-          artist's or photographic model
-          where food and drink is provided and consumed in a particular setting

b)   where welfare services for persons of a racial group can most effectively be provided by a member of that group.

c)   employment in a private household;

d)   employment outside GB; and

e)   acts done under statutory authority or for the purposes of safeguarding national security.

Under Sex Discrimination Act:-

Where membership of a particular sex is a GOQ for the job:

a)   for reasons of authenticity relating to physiology e.g.. modelling, acting;

b)   where considerations of decency or privacy require the job to be held by a man (or women) e.g.. changing room attendant; and

c)   where welfare services for persons of a particular sex can most effectively be met by someone of the same sex e.g.. women counsellor in a Rape Crisis Centre.

However, whilst discrimination is lawful where it is carried out because of the need for a GENUINE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION, the law treats each case individually. A GOQ is not an automatic exception for various types of jobs. It must be shown to apply to the particular job in question and to be justified.

In police terms there are very few occasions where a GOQ might apply. Some examples are given below but they have not been tested at law and are provided merely to illustrate the type of situation for which it is envisaged the exceptions were intended.

(a)   Male officers searching male prisoners and women officers searching women prisoners, in the interests of privacy and decency. (This would have applied before the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984).

(b)   Male officers being sent into all - male clubs for surveillance purposes, in the interest of authenticity.

(c)   Women officers dealing with women victims of rape and other serious sexual offences, where the victim prefers to speak to a woman, and it is in the interests of her welfare.

The exceptions would not cover such matters as requiring a woman sergeant/inspector or above at a particular station, etc., in the interests of the welfare of women constables, or for their supervision.

Physical strength or stamina is not a 'genuine occupational qualification', and is specifically excluded by the Act.

Individual And Vicarious Liability

An employer is responsible for any act of discrimination done by an employee in the course of his/her employment, whether or not it was done with the employers knowledge.

It would, however, be a defence in proceedings for the employer to prove that such steps* were taken as were reasonably practicable to prevent employees from unlawfully discriminating and as such the individual employee may then be personally liable for acts committed by themselves or knowingly aiding another to commit an unlawful act of discrimination.

*   such steps may include the publication of E/O policy documents grievance procedures and harassment policies in addition to training etc.

Proof of Discrimination

The Standard of Proof

Whilst in criminal cases the police service works under the burden of proving "beyond all reasonable doubt" in the civil cases of Sex and Racial Discrimination the required standard of proof is no greater than the balance of probabilities. As such tribunals are therefore able to find sex and racial discrimination even when they are unsure about it, if the applicant has established that it more probably happened than not.

The Burden of Proof

The burden of proof is distributed as follows in discrimination cases:

1.   In direct discrimination cases it falls upon the party alleging discrimination.

2.   In indirect discrimination cases it falls upon the party alleging discrimination however, where a respondent is attempting to justify a requirement or condition or alleging a Genuine Occupational Qualification they assume the burden of establishing these facts.

However, in terms of its treatment of the burden of proof a Tribunal reaches a decision by considering the available information and drawing conclusions as to where, on the balance of probabilities, the truth lies. This is called "drawing inferences from the primary facts". If an employer is unable to account for their decision adequately, the Tribunal is prepared to draw the inference that discrimination occurred.

The subject of the burden of proof can be a difficult and complicated one to understand and can seriously affect how such issues are dealt with. With this in mind it is an area that will be explained further during the course.

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Enforcement of the Legislation

The National Commissions

The Commission for Racial Equality and the Equal Opportunity Commissions are statutory bodies established by the government to work towards eliminating discrimination, promoting equality of opportunity and assisting individuals to press claims of discrimination at Industrial Tribunals.

They have considerable powers and will exercise their authority, even within the police service, when internal grievance procedures fail.

Codes of Practice

THE RACE RELATIONS CODE OF PRACTICE published by the Commission for Racial Equality for the elimination of racial discrimination and the promotion of equality of opportunity in employment and the EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES CODE OF PRACTICE published by the Equal Opportunity Commission for the elimination of discrimination on the grounds of sex and marriage and the promotion of equality of opportunity in employment whilst not imposing new legal obligations, provides recommendations of good practice and procedure, often referred to at Industrial Tribunals, that if followed could prevent acts of unlawful discrimination from occurring.

A Case

"A" Division of a Police Force is dominated by a large housing estate and in the Centre, a small complex of shops which serve the local community. The area around the shops has been plagued by a number of bag snatches, for the past few months.

The Crime Manager, Superintendent BROOKS and his deputy Ch Insp. BANKS have decided to set up a small crime team of officers to try to make some arrests and address the problem. Sgt HARVEY will be in charge of four officers in this squad which will work in plain clothes. Three of the squads number have been selected already and today the fourth member will be selected.

Here is a quick "Factfile" of each of the two candidates.

<u>Jayne Preston</u>
8 yrs Service
Foot Patrol
4 Week attachment to the
stolen car squad
Studying for sergeants
examination

<u>Dave Gilbert</u>
6 yrs Service
Foot patrol
Community Beat
6 months crime Patrol
recently commended
for good arrests
Interview skills
Qualified.

On paper it looks as though Dave is marginally the better candidate, although you would probably be happy to work alongside either of them.

In the interview they both performed well and there was nothing about either of them which made them unsuitable for this job. However, Dave performed slightly better than Jayne and two of the board members, the sergeant and the Chief Inspector both wanted to select him.

The Superintendent, while recognising that he is probably a slightly better candidate was determined that Jayne should get the job.

Here's what he had to say:-

> "...there's not a lot to choose really. I tend to go for Jayne I suppose personally. I can see her fitting better into the group. I'm not saying there's anything wrong with Dave, he's fine. I see Jayne performing rather better than Dave would although you know I can see that you're quite right, the street credibility of Dave is very good, but looking at the group that you've already got which is all male, I'd tend to go for a woman and Jayne fits the Bill so she will be selected.

Jayne is appointed to the crime team.

> **Dave's response**
>
> "I had a good idea that this would happen. Jayne is a good bobby but I think I deserved to get this job and I know it was her sex which clinched it for her. I'm not trying to take anything away from her but I feel so aggrieved I want to make a complaint.

As his first line supervisor Dave comes to see you about his grievance.

What are the issues to be considered?

What advice are you going to give Dave at this stage?

◆ ---

◆ ---

◆ ---

There will be an opportunity to discuss Dave's case on the course in addition to other cases of a more complex nature.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES POLICY

Cambridgeshire Constabulary is committed to providing equality of opportunity and fair treatment both in delivery of its service to the community and in its management of staff.

The policy of Cambridgeshire Constabulary seeks to ensure that no job applicant, employee or other person receives unfavourable treatment on the grounds of sex, marital status, race, (including: colour, nationality, ethnic or national origins), sexual orientation, religion, disability, age, creed, trade union membership/activity, social position, social disadvantage or any form of unfair discrimination. Similarly all conditions and requirements will be justified and job related*.

All members of staff, Police, Civilian and members of the Special Constabulary are advised that the following principles will be applied:

All members of Cambridgeshire Constabulary have personal responsiblity for the practical application of the Equal Opportunities Policy.

Managers and supervisors have particular responsibilities to ensure that practice and policies operate fairly and effectively.

All forms of harassment and unfair discriminatory acts including racist and sexist language, will be treated as misconduct. Disciplinary action may be taken where it is established that such conduct exists.

Anyone who believes that he or she has been harassed or unfairly discriminated against may pursue a complaint through the grievance procedure without prejudice to their rights under Equal Opportunities Legislation.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary will appoint, select, train, develop, deploy and promote on the basis of merit and ability.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary is determined to ensure that this Policy is implemented in conjunction with the development of systems for information recording, training and monitoring. The Policy will be regularly reviewed and amended to keep pace with legislation and Codes of Practice. The policy is designed to be fully in keeping with best personnel and management practice.

Statutory Regulations impose certain requirements regarding such matters as eyesight, physical fitness, nationality and character.

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE - MANAGERS GUIDE

KEY ELEMENTS FOR RESOLUTION
- Deal from perception of aggrieved;
- Find out what the aggrieved wants;
- Show Commitment to resolve - take it seriously;
- Speed - observe time limits - any variation to be agreed with the aggrieved person;
- Communication - keep all parties aware of progress.

STAGE 1 - INITIAL RESOLUTION
- Aggrieved to raise matter of concern either verbally or in writing with a local supervisor;
- Action by local supervisor to resolve grievance to be completed within 7 days;
- Interview with all parties concerned and give notes for guidance to aggrieved;
- Written record on form 66 made detailing all action taken.

STAGE 2 - NEXT APPROPRIATE MANAGER
- Action by officer to whom the Grievance Handler reports to, to be completed within 10 days.
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and interview all parties concerned.
- Take action to resolve grievance and make record on form 66a.

STAGE 3 - DIVISIONAL/DEPT RESOLUTION
- Action by Divisional Commander/Departmental Head to resolve grievance to be completed within 14 days of completion of Stage 2;
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and interview all parties concerned;
- Take action to resolve grievance and make written record on form 66b.

STAGE 4 - CHIEF OFFICER RESOLUTION
- Action by Deputy Chief Constable to resolve grievance to be completed within 21 days of completion of Stage 3;
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and interview all parties concerned;
- Take all appropriate action to resolve grievance and make written record on form 66c.

- Grievances remain confidential to the parties concerned, unless otherwise agreed with the aggrieved person.

- Transfer of all paperwork must be under confidential cover.

- If unresolved, forward details to next appropriate manager.

- Register grievance with Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If resolved, forward original paperwork to the Equal Opportunities Manager for retention via the Divisional Commander.

- If unresolved forward details to Divisional Commander/HQ Departmental Head;

- If resolved, forward orignal paper to Equal Opporunties Manager, via Divisional Commander.

- If unresolved, forward relevant papers to Deputy Chief Constable.

- If resolved, forward all relevant papers to the Equal Opportunities Manager for retention.

- Forward relevant papers to the Equal Opportunities Manager for retention.

Individuals must register with the Industrial Tribunal within 3 months less 1 day of the date of the last Act complained of. The aggrieved person should be made aware of this fact at the outset and reminded of it at each stage of the procedure particularly if, for any reason, the time limit is nearing exhaustion.

SUMMARY

The grievance procedure adopted by Cambridgeshire Constabulary is intended to resolve matters internally and provide **all staff, Police, Civilians and members of the Special Constabulary** with the ability to question how they have been treated by management or colleagues and to have their grievance examined justly and fairly.

This document gives guidance on the revised grievance procedure, based on the model of good practice contained in Home Office Circular 16/1993.

The revised grievance procedure comprises **four stages** and replaces the procedure currently in use. It is intended to provide a greater emphasis on resolution and encourage managers to take personal responsibility for resolving issues.

The key principles within the procedure centre on early resolution and confidentiality and places a responsibility on supervisors and managers to act impartially and show commitment to resolution. The procedure is not intended to establish guilt or provide punishment.

An aggrieved person has the right, at any stage, to be accompanied by a representative of a Staff Association, recognised Trade Union, a colleague or a friend. At each stage the supervisor must ensure that the aggrieved person, if dissatisfied, is given the opportunity to put their reasons in writing.

All grievances, and actions taken should be recorded; at the conclusion of the procedure, all records and relevant papers will be retained by the Equal Opportunities Manager. **No other record of a grievance will be retained, and under no circumstances should any forms or copies be placed on an individual's personal file,** except where discipline or criminal proceedings have occurred.

In cases alleging breaches of the Race Relations or Sex Discrimination Acts, which may also become the subject of legal proceedings, it is important to be aware that a time limit of three months less one day is imposed by the Acts where industrial tribunal proceedings are initiated. The time limit commences from the date of the last act.

This Procedure is intended to be a flexible method of resolving grievance. If staff have confidence in the system and the people who operate it, it will not only serve this purpose, but will also provide senior management with information to improve the working environment for all staff, thereby improving the quality of service to the community.

NOTES

APPENDIX 7

EQUALITY OF SERVICE NEWSLETTER

Issue 1   August 1994

WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?

This newsletter is to bring you up-to-date with what is happening in the Force with regard to Equal Opportunities and Quality of Service.

UPDATE

Cambridgeshire Constabulary has had an Equal Opportunity Policy since 1987, but a policy is never a substitute for action, and in order to bring about significant development in this area the Chief Constable appointed **Inspector Chris Speechley** to manage a Project on Equality of Opportunity and Quality of Service.

Chris developed his expertise in this area when he was seconded to the Home Office for three years and had responsibility for the development of Equal Opportunities and Quality of Service on national training courses for Probationers, Detectives, Sergeants and Inspectors.

Since his return to Force in January this year he has managed a range of key initiatives. Firstly an examination of the current practices was necessary to ascertain the accuracy and reliability of key areas such as selection, appraisal and grievance procedures. Then he began a review of a actual grievances so that we could highlight lessons to be learned by ALL parties .

Work had already been undertaken by **Jean Kelly** in areas such as sexual harassment, and Peterborough District and Fenland Sub-divisions have undertaken additional research.

Deputy Chief Constable Mr Moore Says...............On 3 August I chaired the first meeting of the new **Equality of Service - Project Group** . This project group is designed to really make Equal Opportunity and Quality of Service work in Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

Together we can ensure that the Force maintains its commitment to Quality and Fairness both in the way we work together and in the way we serve the public. As chairman of this group I am keen to ensure that the group fully represents a true cross section of the Force. A membership list is included below, but if you feel that it does not represent a particular interest group please contact the project group on Ext. 2555 with your suggestion.

Police Federation   Unison
Special Constabulary   Support Services
Supt's Association   Crime Support
Complaints   Media Services
Strategic Policy
Personnel , Training, &Career Development
A representative who acts as a co-ordinator for each Division

came clear that whilst a lot of good
`k has been done the Force could
ove in the way it's people were selected
treated.

ASURING PROGRESS

you don't keep score, you are only
rising" is a principle that underpins true
ality of opportunity. Monitoring selection
thods, appraisals and other issues is as
ortant in this area as in any other field.

assist in the monitoring process a
estionnaire was distributed to a
domly selected group within the Force. It
s designed to provide a starting point and
measure opinions on equality issues.
alysis of the questionnaire, which enjoyed
ery high response is still at an early
age, but it does indicate that people are
ry concerned about equality issues.

W DEVELOPMENTS

he autumn, following the completion of
nsultation with Staff Associations, a new
qual Opportunity Policy and Grievance
ocedure will be launched. For the first
ne there will be a single policy and
ievance procedure for Police, Civilians and
e Special Constabulary. The new
rievance Procedure should ensure that if
ou feel aggrieved about the way you have
een treated, either by management or by
our colleagues, you are given every
opportunity to have your grievance dealt
with fairly and promptly.

MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE

Making Equality of Opportunity work is a
complex issue. Moreover many managers
who sincerely want to be responsive to a
changing workplace hesitate because they
are unaware of the scale of the problem.
They also know that many organisations
unconsciously practice a 'code of silence'
when it comes to fairness and equality
issues, making it hard to even talk about
them in other than superficial ways.

To many, Equality of Opportunity relates
only to minorities, but of course it is a major
**Management and Quality of Service
issue.** Establishing a working environment
where equality issues are openly addressed
not only is more pleasant to work in but also
more efficient.

MANAGEMENT TRAINING

All managers will receive training to enhance
their knowledge, understanding and skill in
dealing with these issues, but there is a
difference .... For the first time training
will be designed to equip managers up to
the *"Management Charter Initiative"* (MCI)
standard. This will be in line with new
national developments in police training and
will form one of a series of modules
designed to equip managers with training up
to recognised MCI management standards.
The training will be carried out by **Insp
Chris Speechley, Ps Maggie Auton** and
Pc Jean Butera-Morris and will be locally
based. It will start in September 1994.

FINALLY........ A NEW STRUCTURE

To co-ordinate the development of 'Equality of Service' a new structure has been
introduced. Each division will have an **"Action Group"** tasked with developing these
issues and the group will have a named co-ordinator. The **Force Project Group** will
offer support and assistance to these groups as well as offering individual advice and
can be contacted on **Headquarters extension 2555.**

FORCE PROJECT GROUP
Insp Chris Speechley
Ps Maggie Auton
Pc Jean Butera-Morris

DIVISIONAL CO-ORDINATORS
Northern - Insp Dave Auton
Central - Ps Ross Howes
Southern - Ms Tricia McMaster

APPENDIX 8

MANAGING CONFLICT AND GRIEVANCES

KNOWLEDGE CHECK

NAME .... DATE ....

1.   Under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 & Race Relations
      Act 1976 it is unlawful to discriminate on the grounds of
      Sex, Marital Status and Race in the areas of:-

      a)   Employment

      b)   Education

      c)   The provision of goods, facilities and services

      d)   All of the above.

2.   Under the afore-mentioned Acts the two main types of
      discrimination are Direct and Indirect.

      Give an example of each.

3. VICTIMISATION is a separate offence under the legislation. Which of the following would be evidence of victimisation?

When someone is treated unfavourably because they have truthfully and in good faith:-

i)   Reported or alleged unlawful discrimination.

ii)   Won a case for unlawful discrimination

iii) Given information or evidence in a discrimination case.

a)   i and iii

b)   i, ii and iii

c)   ii and iii

d)   i and ii

4. Circumstances where a supervisor has been instructed to discriminate by a Senior Manager may provide a defence in law for the discriminatory act having taken place by the supervisor.

a)   True

b)   False

5. Under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, employers commit an offence if they discriminate against employees or applicants for a particular job. However, an employee is allowed to specify the sex of a person for a particular job where the sex of a person is a genuine occupational qualification.

Which of the following would be considered a genuine occupational qualification?

Tick

i) A store advertising for a female lavatory assistant to look after the 'ladies room'

☐ Yes
☐ No

ii) A bus company refusing to recruit female drivers because they would not have the Physical strength needed to drive and manoeuvre a bus.

☐ Yes
☐ No

iii) A firm advertising for an engineer to work in a Muslim country and specify only men could apply.

☐ Yes
☐ No

iv) Advertising for a female Sergeant for a particular station in the interests of the welfare of woman Constables or for their supervision.

☐ Yes
☐ No

6. In police terms give an example of an occasion when a genuine occupational qualification may be applied.

7. The Chief Constable is responsible for any act of discrimination done by an employee in the course of their employment.

   However, under which of the following circumstances may there be a defence for an employers vicarious liability:-

   i) That the employer was not aware of the act of discrimination by an employee therefore was not responsible for that act.

   ii) That the employer provided his employees with the necessary training to avoid discrimination in the workplace.

   iii) That the employer has a vicarious responsibility under all circumstances and has no defence.

   iv) That the employer had published policy statements to prevent discrimination eg, Equal Opportunity and Racial and Sexual Harassment Polices.

   a) i, iii, iv

   b) ii, iii, iv

   c) ii and iv

   d) All of the above.

8. "Beyond all reasonable doubt" is the required standard of proof in criminal cases. What is the standard of proof required in civil cases of Sex and Racial Discrimination?

9. Discrimination in selection to achieve "gender" balance is lawful under the Sex Discrimination Act.

    a) True
    b) False

. 10. If an individual chooses to register a complain of unlawful discrimination with an Industrial Tribunal they must do so within a certain time limit of the last Act complained about. How long is that time limit?

    a) 3 months

    b) 6 months

    c) 9 months

    d) No time limit

11. Under which of the following circumstances can the New Grievance procedure be invoked:-

    i) When someone is treated unfavourably because of their Marital Status, Sex, Race, Sexual Orientation, Religion, Age and Social Position.

    ii) When someone, on applying for a job, is refused it on a condition that is unjustified and not job related.

iii)   When a member of the public makes a complaint
        against a police officer.

iv)   when someone receives any form of unfair
        discrimination.

a)   i, ii, iv

b)   iii, iv

c)   i, ii and iii

d)   All of the above.

12. The key principle within the New Grievance Procedure
     centres on Supervisory and Managerial responsibility for
     confidentiality, impartiality and early resolution as
     opposed to establishing guilt or providing punishment.

     a)   True

     b)   False

APPENDIX 9

EVALUATION OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
AGGRIEVED PERSON'S QUESTIONNAIRE

se questions are designed to seek your opinion of how the person dealing with your Grievance
ally dealt with it.

se tick the appropriate box in response to the two opposite statements.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
They dealt with the evance promptly.						They did not deal with the Grievance promptly.
They treated the evance seriously.						They did not treat my grievance seriously.
They seemed interested ne as a person						They did not seem interested in me as a person.
They dealt with me pathetically and itively						They did not deal with me sympathetically and sensitively
he explained the kings of the Grievance edure to my faction						They did not explain the workings of the grievance Procedure to my satisfaction.
hey handled my vance with an opriate level of dentiality.						They did not handle the Grievance with an appropriate level of confidentiality.
believe they enquired my Grievance oughly.						I do not believe they enquired into the Grievance thoroughly.
hey were judgemental in ng with my ance.						They were judgemental in dealing with my grievance.

	Low						High
what level of ction was your nce resolved (Please the appropriate er).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Have you suffered
y adverse treatment as
result of making a
grievance.

Yes serious adverse treatment	☐
Yes minor adverse treatment	☐
Unknown	☐
Not to my knowledge	☐
No	☐

Do you consider the
grievance procedure
be a positive asset to
Force?

Strongly agree	☐
Agree	☐
Neither Agree/Disagree	☐
Disagree	☐
Strongly disagree	☐

Would you make
ther Grievance?

Yes	☐
No	☐

Any advice you would give to people dealing with Grievance?

....
....
....
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Any advice you would give to people making Grievances?

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APPENDIX 10

Evaluation of Grievance Procedure

Grievance Handlers Questionnaire

1. Have you dealt with a grievance   Yes ☐
                                        No ☐

Please tick the appropriate box in response to the two opposite statements.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	
2. I feel I dealt with the grievance effectively.						I do not feel that I dealt with the grievance effectively
3. I felt confident when dealing with the victim						I did not feel confident in dealing with the victim
4. I felt confident in explaining the Grievance procedure						I did not feel confident in explaining the Grievance Procedure
5. Maintaining confidentiality when dealing with the Grievance was not problematic						Maintaining confidentiality when dealing with the grievance was very difficult
6. I believe I remained objective and nun-judgemental when dealing with the grievance						I do not believe I remained objective and non-judgemental when dealing with the grievance
7. I felt confident in dealing with the alleged perpetrator						I did not feel confident in dealing with the alleged perpetrator
7a. I feel the 2 day training course equipped me to deal with the grievance						I do not feel the 2 day course equipped me to deal with the grievance
8a. The support package handed out on the course was useful						The support package handed out on the course was not useful

8.   What else would have been helpful in preparing you to deal with this grievance?

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9.   What was the hardest part about dealing with the grievance?

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10.   Do you feel you dealt with the   Strongly Agree   ☐
      grievance as promptly as you   Agree   ☐
      could have?   Neither Agree/Disagree   ☐
                                             Disagree   ☐
                                             Strongly Disagree   ☐

11.   Do you consider the new   Strongly Agree   ☐
      Grievance Procedure to be a   Agree   ☐
      positive asset to the force?   Neither Agree/Disagree   ☐
                                             Disagree   ☐
                                             Strongly Disagree   ☐

12.   Did you seek advice when   Yes   ☐
      dealing with the procedure?   No   ☐

13.   Any other comment

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27/2/95 TLH

APPENDIX 11

The launch of this procedure has been deliberately delayed to ensure that *all* managers and supervisors have had the opportunity to receive training to help them deal with grievances. However, since the training started in September 1994 the procedure has been widely and successfully used in its draft format.

What can you do if you believe you are being treated unfairly?

- **Don't put up with it.**
- **Speak to a manager/supervisor**
- **Consider the Grievance Procedure**

The procedure comprises up to four stages and is intended to provide emphasis on early resolution and confidentiality. It encourages managers to act impartially and take personal responsibility for resolving issues. **The procedure is not intended to establish guilt or provide punishment.** Part of the role of the Equal Opportunity Manager is to oversee the Grievance procedure, but not to deal directly with grievances, this is the role of managers/supervisors, although not necessarily your direct manager.

The procedure is intended to be a flexible method of resolving grievances. If staff have confidence in the system and the people who operate it, it will improve the quality of service to staff and the community.

A GUIDE TO THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

- 14 days are allowed for the completion of each stage - any variation to be agreed with the aggrieved;

Stage 1 - Initial Resolution

- You raise the matter of concern either orally or in writing with a manager/ supervisor;

- The manager will register grievance with Equal Opportunity Manager

- The manager will attempt to resolve grievance within 14 days, bearing in mind the need to maintain confidentiality.

- Form 66 completed and retained by Equal Opportunity Manager.

If Stage 1 is unsuccessful there are 3 other stages available for your grievance to be resolved, ending with the Deputy Chief Constable.

The Grievance Procedure does not affect an individual's rights to any other forms of redress.

Further Information and Advice
Equal Opportunity Manager - Ext. 2555

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY POLICY

AND

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

FOREWORD

The commitment to equality, in the way we treat our staff and the service we provide our community, is of paramount importance to Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

The new Equal Opportunity Policy and the Grievance Procedure have been introduced to re-affirm and reinforce that commitment.

However, we cannot be judged by our words alone, and therefore all our managers have had an opportunity to receive training to ensure the successful implementation of these new initiatives.

It is the responsibility of all staff to extend the policies we have adopted as good practice in everything we do.

Chief Constable

Cambridgeshire Constabulary is committed to providing equality of opportunity and fair treatment both in delivery of its service to the community and in its management of staff.

POLICY

The policy of Cambridgeshire Constabulary is to ensure that no job applicant, employee or other person receives unfavourable treatment on the grounds of sex, marital status, race, (including: colour, nationality, ethnic or national origin), sexual orientation, religion, disability, age, trade union/Staff Association membership, social position, or any other form of unfair discrimination. Similarly all conditions and requirements will be justified and job related.*

PRINCIPLES

- All staff have personal responsibility for the practical application of the Equal Opportunity Policy.

- Managers and supervisors have particular responsibilities to ensure that practices and policies operate fairly and effectively.

- All forms of harassment and unfair discriminatory acts including racist and sexist language will be treated as misconduct and disciplinary action may be taken.

- Anyone who believes that they have been harassed or unfairly discriminated against may pursue a complaint through the grievance procedure without prejudice to their rights under legislation.

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary will appoint, train, develop, promote and deploy staff fairly using justifiable selection criteria.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary will ensure that this Policy is regularly reviewed, monitored and amended to reflect current legislation, Codes of Practice and best management practice.

Statutory Regulations impose certain requirements regarding such matters as eyesight, physical fitness, nationality and character.

Why have an Equal Opportunity Policy?

Having an Equal Opportunity Policy helps everyone to understand what is not acceptable behaviour. This will help to incorporate good equal opportunity practice into our culture and working environment.

Alongside our commitment, there is also a framework of legislation which regulates our actions. Cambridgeshire Constabulary has invested in a comprehensive training programme so that its staff are not only aware of the legislation but understand the spirit in which it should operate.

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

Ideally no member of staff would ever feel that they were treated unfairly, but in an organisation the size of the Cambridgeshire Constabulary it is realised this is unlikely to be the case. We have therefore developed a new Grievance Procedure designed to provide Civilian Staff, Police Officers and members of the Special Constabulary with a means to safely express concerns about the way in which they have been treated.

APPENDIX 12

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES POLICY

Cambridgeshire Constabulary is committed to providing equality of opportunity and fair treatment both in delivery of its service to the community and in its management of staff.

The policy of Cambridgeshire Constabulary seeks to ensure that no job applicant, employee or other person receives unfavourable treatment on the grounds of sex, marital status, race, (including: colour, nationality, ethnic or national origins), sexual orientation, religion, disability, age, trade union Staff Association membership, social position, social disadvantage or any form of unfair discrimination. Similarly all conditions and requirements will be justified and job related*.

PRINCIPLES:
All members of staff, Police, Civilian and members of the Special Constabulary are advised that the following principles will be applied:

- All members of Cambridgeshire Constabulary have personal responsibility for the practical application of the Equal Opportunities Policy.

- Managers and supervisors have particular responsibilities to ensure that practice and policies operate fairly and effectively.

- All forms of harassment and unfair discriminatory acts including racist and sexist language, will be treated as misconduct. Disciplinary action may be taken where it is established that such conduct exists.

- Anyone who believes that he or she has been harassed or unfairly discriminated against may pursue a complaint through the grievance procedure without prejudice to their rights under Equal Opportunities Legislation.

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary will appoint, select, train, develop, deploy and promote staff fairly using justifiable selection criteria.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary will ensure that this Policy is regularly reviewed, monitored and amended to keep pace with Legislation, Codes of Practice and best management practice.

* *Statutory Regulations impose certain requirements regarding such matters as eyesight, physical fitness, nationality and character.*

03.04.95

APPENDIX 13

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE - GUIDE

KEY ELEMENTS FOR RESOLUTION
- Deal from perception of aggrieved;
- Find out what the aggrieved wants;
- Show Commitment to resolve - take it seriously;
- Observe time limits - any variation to be agreed with the aggrieved;
- Communication - keep all parties aware of progress.

STAGE 1 - INITIAL RESOLUTION
- Aggrieved to raise matter of concern either orally or in writing with a manager;
- Action by local manager to resolve grievance, to be completed within <u>14 days</u>;
- Discuss with all parties concerned and give notes for guidance to aggrieved;
- Written record on form 66 detailing all action taken.

STAGE 2 - NEXT APPROPRIATE MANAGER
- Action by manager to whom the grievance is taken, to be completed within <u>14 days</u> of completion of Stage 1.
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and discuss with all parties concerned.
- Take action to resolve grievance and make record on form 66.

STAGE 3 - DIVISIONAL/HQ DEPT RESOLUTION
- Action by Divisional Commander/HQ Departmental Head to resolve grievance to be completed within <u>14 days</u> of completion of Stage 2;
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and discuss with all parties concerned;
- Take action to resolve grievance and make record on form 66.

STAGE 4 - CHIEF OFFICER RESOLUTION
- Action by Deputy Chief Constable to resolve grievance to be completed within <u>14 days</u> of completion of Stage 3;
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and discuss with all parties concerned;
- Take action to resolve grievance and make record on form 66.

- Grievances remain confidential to the parties concerned, unless otherwise agreed with the aggrieved.

- Transfer of all paperwork must be under confidential cover.

- Register grievance with Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If resolved, forward paperwork to the Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If unresolved, forward paperwork to next appropriate manager.

- If resolved, forward paperwork to Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If unresolved forward paperwork to Divisional Commander/HQ Departmental Head;

- If resolved, forward paperwork to the Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If unresolved, forward paperwork to Deputy Chief Constable.

- Forward paperwork to the Equal Opportunities Manager.

SUMMARY

The grievance procedure adopted by Cambridgeshire Constabulary is intended to resolve matters internally and provide **Civilian Staff, Police Officers, and members of the Special Constabulary** with the means to question how they have been treated by management or colleagues.

The grievance procedure comprises **four stages.** It is intended to provide emphasis on early resolution and confidentiality, and encourages managers to act impartially and take personal responsibility for resolving issues. The procedure is not intended to establish guilt or provide punishment.

An aggrieved person has the right, at any stage, to be accompanied by a representative of a Staff Association, recognised Trade Union, a colleague or a friend. At each stage the manager must ensure that the aggrieved, if dissatisfied, is given the opportunity to put their reasons in writing.

All grievances, and actions taken should be recorded. At the conclusion of the procedure, all records and relevant papers will be retained by the Equal Opportunities Manager.

In cases alleging breaches of the Race Relations or Sex Discrimination Acts, which may become the subject of legal proceedings, it is important to be aware that a time limit of **three months less one day** is imposed by the Acts to enable Industrial Tribunal proceedings to be initiated.

This Procedure is intended to be a flexible method of resolving grievance. If staff have confidence in the system and the people who operate it, it will not only serve this purpose, but will also provide indicators and Force trends to improve quality of service to staff and the community.

NB   **Throughout this document where manager is used it is intended to be a generic term describing any member of staff who has a supervisory or managerial function.**

PAGE NUMBERING AS

ORIGINAL

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

1. ## INTRODUCTION

1.1 An effectively <u>used</u> grievance procedure demonstrates the commitment of Cambridgeshire Constabulary to the strategic principle of valuing all staff.

1.2 This document sets out the procedure for dealing with grievances arising from internal working practices, and is for use by any member of staff in progressing any perceived grievance against Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

2. ## PURPOSE OF THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

2.1 The grievance procedure is for use by all **civilian staff, police officers and members of the special constabulary.** The main purpose of the grievance procedure is to ensure that individual members of staff who feel aggrieved about the way they have been treated, either by management or by their colleagues, are given every opportunity to have their grievances resolved in a fair and just manner. The grievance procedure is intended to resolve issues as quickly as possible and not to establish guilt or provide punishment. It is an informal and flexible means of resolving problems at work.

2.2 The procedure is intended to deal with all types of grievance. It may include claims of apparent unfairness, interpretation or implementation of personnel policies and conditions of service, and actions that contravene the equal opportunities policy. The grievance procedure may also be invoked in cases of alleged personal harassment, including sexual and racial harassment. The Grievance Procedure is not intended to prevent staff querying any issue with a manager, or another department, but rather where they have done that and not received a satisfactory answer, they may then wish to register a grievance. In some circumstances they may not feel it is appropriate to raise this issue other than by making a grievance and this would also be appropriate.

2.3 The grievance procedure is not a method of making an allegation under the Police Discipline Code or the Civil Staff Discipline procedure.

2.4 It should be noted that only allegations of unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, or marital status, and cases of unfair dismissal/constructive dismissal of civilian staff may be heard before an Industrial Tribunal.

3.   GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

3.1   The general principles of the grievance procedure are:-

Early resolution, confidentiality and impartiality.   If the matter cannot be satisfactorily resolved at any one stage, the aggrieved person has the right to proceed to the next stage.

4.   REPRESENTATION

4.1   The aggrieved person and all other parties to a grievance has the right, at any stage, to consult and be accompanied by a representative of a Staff Association, recognised Trade Union, a colleague or a friend. In addition any person may wish to take advice from the Equal Opportunities Manager on any matter relating to a grievance or operation of the grievance procedure.

5.   CONFIDENTIALITY

5.1   All cases dealt with under the grievance procedure will be conducted confidentially, unless otherwise agreed with the aggrieved or in circumstances detailed in Paragraph 20.

6.   BURDEN OF PROOF

6.1   A grievance will often focus on the word of one person against another, with little or no supporting evidence. Each case will, therefore, be decided on the basis of the **balance of probabilities**, which is the standard of proof used by Industrial Tribunals. The procedure is intended to provide fairness to all parties, including the person against whom the grievance is directed.

6.2   Discrimination and /or unfair practices are not always obvious, overt or intentional but, however they occur, the grievance procedure is a channel by which an aggrieved person can seek proper redress within the organisation. It is the intention of Cambridgeshire Constabulary to resolve all cases promptly, fairly and sympathetically, and to redress the grievance and/or take remedial action as appropriate.   The existence of the grievance procedure does not remove an individual's right under law to take a case to an Industrial Tribunal.

7.0   GRIEVANCE HANDLER

7.1   The person responsible for enquiring into a grievance will normally be at least one level above the aggrieved. However, there may be circumstances where this is inappropriate and where this is the case, the aggrieved should consult with the Equal Opportunities Manager.

8. VICTIMISATION

8.1 Victimisation of a person who invokes the grievance procedure, or who provides any form of assistance to someone who in invoking it, may amount to a breach of discipline, and in discrimination or harassment cases may constitute unlawful conduct under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976.

8.2 Any person who feels that they are being victimised in any way should at once consult their Grievance Handler, Equal Opportunities Manager, and/or Trade Union/Staff Association representative for advice.

8.3 The transfer of an aggrieved could be regarded as an act of victimisation, and this course of action should never be resorted to simply to resolve the grievance. In some cases, a move may be helpful and welcome, or operationally necessary, but before any action is taken, care should be exercised to confirm that this is the case and that any move will not be misconstrued as discreditable to the aggrieved. In any such cases the reasons for the move must be thoroughly investigated and recorded.

9. TIME LIMITS

9.1 Grievances should be investigated as promptly as possible. The Race Relations and Sex Discrimination Acts impose a time limit for the lodging of cases with an Industrial Tribunal.

9.2 Individuals must register with the Industrial Tribunal within 3 months less one day of the date of the last act complained of. The aggrieved should be made aware of this fact at the outset and reminded of it at each stage of the procedure.

9.3 In all cases the time limits contained in the grievance procedure can be extended with agreement of the aggrieved.

10. STAGES OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

10.1 The Grievance Procedure comprises four separate and distinct stages, as set out below. Only after all avenues to resolve a grievance have been exhausted at one stage should the matter be referred to the next appropriate stage. In most cases it should be possible to resolve a grievance at stage 1 or 2.

10.2 At the beginning of each stage in the procedure, the manager should ascertain and record how the aggrieved wishes their grievance to be resolved. During stage 1 the manager should contact the Equal Opportunities Manager who will allocate the next consecutive reference number, which will then be endorsed on subsequent papers. Whilst the four stages of the procedure are set out in a logical sequence, there may be circumstances where the aggrieved and manager feel the stages should be pursued in a different sequence, it is intended that the procedure will be flexible enough to allow this.

11   STAGE ONE - INITIAL REPORT

11.1   The aggrieved should initially bring a grievance either orally or in writing by reporting it to their immediate manager. Where the grievance is against the persons line manager, or where for any other reason they feel it more appropriate to report it to another manager, they may do so. If there is doubt who is an appropriate manager then advice should be sought from the Equal Opportunities Manager.

11.2   Where it appears to the manager receiving the grievance that, on the facts related, consideration should be given to criminal or disciplinary proceedings, he/she should consider the issues in accordance with the guidance set out in paragraph 20.

11.3   Where the criteria in paragraph 20 are met, the grievance handler should report the matter to the Divisional Commander/HQ Department Head.

11.4   In all other cases the grievance handler must make all relevant enquiries within **14 days** with a view to resolving the grievance at this stage, paying due regard to the need for confidentiality and ensuring that the following steps are taken where appropriate:

12.   STAGE 1 - INITIAL RESOLUTION

a) Discuss the matter with the aggrieved and give him/her a copy of the notes for guidance. Contained within form 66;

b) Undertake a thorough and detailed enquiry into the matter, seeking to obtain an early resolution;

c) If necessary whilst maintaining confidentiality, seek advice and assistance, from the Equal Opportunities Manager;

d) If appropriate, discuss the matter with the respondent, unless paragraph 20 applies;

e) Make a record and detail action taken on form 66.

f) If the grievance is resolved ensure that all parties are told of the outcome of the enquiry personally, what action (if any) is to be taken, and the reason for the decision, form 66 should be forwarded with all papers to the Equal Opportunities Manager.

g) If the aggrieved is not satisfied and wishes to pursue the grievance it will proceed to the next stage, with their consent. There should be an opportunity for the aggrieved to identify in writing:-

> i) what is the behaviour that is subject of the Grievance;
>
> ii) what has been resolved.
>
> iii) what has not been resolved.

h) Form 66 should be forwarded under confidential cover with any other relevant papers to the person who is to conduct the next stage of the grievance procedure.

i) No record of a Grievance will be retained on the aggrieved person's personal file, unless the grievance is of a false and malicious nature that it amounts to a proven disciplinary offence.

j) No record will be kept on the respondents personal file, except where there are criminal or disciplinary proceedings, or the behaviour complained of amounts to a serious poor performance problem.

13. STAGE 2 - NEXT APPROPRIATE MANAGER

13.1 Normally this stage of the Grievance Procedure involves consideration of the grievance by the manager to whom the stage one grievance handler reports. However, the identification of this person may involve some flexibility and should be carried out in consultation with the aggrieved.

13.2 The Stage Two Grievance Handler should seek to resolve the grievance within 14 days .

The Stage Two grievance handler should follow the Procedure (a) to (j) at Stage One.

14. STAGE 3 - DIVISIONAL COMMANDER/HQ DEPARTMENTAL HEAD

14.1 This stage of the procedure involves full consideration of the grievance by the aggrieved person's Divisional Commander or Headquarters Departmental Head. The Stage Three grievance handler should:

Seek to resolve the grievance within **14 days.**

The Stage Three grievance handler should follow the procedure (a) to (j) at Stage One.

15. STAGE 4 - DEPUTY CHIEF CONSTABLE

15.1 This stage involves full consideration of the grievance by the Deputy Chief Constable, who is then responsible for attempting to resolve the grievance within **14 days** .

The objects of this stage are two-fold:-

a) to enable the aggrieved to see a senior manager who is unconnected with his or her place of work, and;

b) to enable wider options for resolution to be tested.

15.2 The Deputy Chief Constable should ensure that all parties are told of the outcome of the enquiry personally, what action (if any) is to be taken, and the reasons for the decision. Written confirmation will follow as soon as possible thereafter. The Equal Opportunities Manager will be made aware of any matters dealt with under this stage, and will then file **all papers.**

16. GRIEVANCES - UNRESOLVED

16.1 On completion of Stage Four, the grievance procedure is exhausted, albeit exceptionally the grievance may not have been resolved to the satisfaction of the aggrieved. All staff have the right to request an interview with the Chief Constable.

17. GRIEVANCES RESOLVED OR WITHDRAWN

17.1 When a resolution is achieved, or the aggrieved decides to withdraw the matter, the grievance handler must ensure that the aggrieved confirms this in writing. The aggrieved should be advised that before doing so, they may find it helpful to discuss the decision with a colleague, a representative of a Trade Union, Staff Association or a friend. If the aggrieved so wishes, seven days should be allowed to elapse to facilitate this.

18 RETENTION OF RECORDS

18.1 At the conclusion of the Grievance Procedure all records and relevant papers should be forwarded to the Equal Opportunities Manager for retention.

19 DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE

19.1 On occasions a grievance may amount to an act which is in contravention of the Terms of Employment or Disciplinary Code and demand action within the employee or police disciplinary procedures. Managers dealing with grievances should at every stage exercise discretion and take into consideration the wishes of the aggrieved. Should the grievance appear to amount to a serious disciplinary offence, or one that should be dealt with under the employee's disciplinary procedure then guidance will be sought from the Divisional Commander/HQ Departmental Head, or Equal Opportunities Manager and the correct procedures be adopted.

20 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE, DISCIPLINE OR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

20.1 Procedures for dealing with alleged criminal or disciplinary offences reported by staff are well established. These procedures are **entirely separate** from the grievance process. Occasionally, however, a grievance will involve allegations of criminal or serious disciplinary offences. The following paragraphs provide guidance on the handling of such cases.

20.2 **Criminal Conduct**

Under normal circumstances, criminal conduct, especially conduct involving either dishonesty or serious assault must be reported directly to the divisional, 'on-call', senior officer. He/she should notify the officer in charge of Complaints and Discipline for police officers and the Authorised Officer for civilians (Civilian Discipline Procedure). It must be explained to the aggrieved that the nature of the allegation makes this necessary. The grievance procedure should run in parallel with the discipline procedure. This may involve extending the first stage of the Grievance procedure until the discipline procedure is completed. By doing this the Grievance Handler can continue to provide support, monitor possible victimisation and provide an 'access point' for further information.

20.3 **Minor Discipline**

In some cases, a grievance may indicate that minor disciplinary offences have been committed, which the aggrieved may pursue if he/she wishes.

20.4 Except in the circumstances described in 20.5, it will not be appropriate for the manager to make a report to the officer in charge of Complaints and Discipline, or Authorised Officer if the aggrieved does not wish to make disciplinary allegations against the person concerned. The reluctance of the aggrieved would be likely to render any discipline investigation untenable. Under normal circumstances, an aggrieved should not be forced to give evidence, nor should any action be taken against the aggrieved as a consequence of a refusal to give evidence.

20.5 **Serious Discipline**

There may be exceptional circumstances, however, where despite the aggrieved person's unwillingness, the manager believes a disciplinary case will be reported. Examples include:

a) where the allegation is very serious, or there are compelling issues of public or organisational interest;

b) the matter has worsened since the original report was made, such as if the person concerned persists with the alleged misconduct;

c) the matter is only one of a series of incidents.

20.6   The reason for this decision will be fully recorded on Form 66. A manager who needs to take further advice on the handling of any case may also consult the Equal Opportunities Manager on a personal basis so that the confidentiality of the grievance is maintained.

20.7   When deciding whether to refer a matter to the Divisional Commander/HQ Departmental Head or officer in charge of Complaints and Discipline, or the Authorised Person, the Grievance Handler should first consult the aggrieved, and then take into account all the circumstances of the case including the following points:

a). The need to maintain confidentiality:

b). The effect on the aggrieved, who may then be put into the position of being a complainant in disciplinary proceedings against a colleague;

c). **For Police Officers only** - any document concerned with the grievance procedure and statements made by officers in the course of grievance procedure will normally not serve as evidence in disciplinary proceedings. There may be circumstances, however, in which such statements might properly be taken into account in the disciplinary context; for example, if an officer gave inconsistent accounts at different times or made unsolicited admissions in relation to a matter which does not fall to be resolved through the grievance procedure, it might be appropriate for the officer to be questioned about such discrepancies or admission within the provisions of the Discipline Regulations.

20.8   Attempts to find a resolution to the grievance may prove difficult until the outcome of any discipline enquiry is known. Therefore the grievance procedure should run **concurrently though separate from, the discipline enquiry.** However, resolution of the grievance may be deferred pending the outcome of the discipline enquiry with the agreement of the aggrieved.

21   **INITIATING A DISCIPLINE ENQUIRY**

21.1   Grievance procedures are a staff management function and concerned with the rights and responsibilities of all members of staff, and the procedures and people involved in them should reflect this. It should be remembered that grievance procedures are not and must not be seen to be, in any way adjunct to discipline procedures.

21.2   The final decision to **initiate** a discipline enquiry will always remain with the Deputy Chief Constable (the recognised discipline authority for the force), to whom matters will be referred in the event of it becoming apparent that such action is required. It remains open to the Deputy Chief Constable, however, having regard to all the circumstances, to decide that a matter should remain within the grievance procedure, in which case it will continue to be dealt with at the appropriate stage of the procedure.

22   ROLE OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES MANAGER

22.1   The Equal Opportunities Manager is responsible for registering and monitoring **all** grievances but otherwise performs a non-executive role in relation to the grievance procedure. He/she is available to provide confidential advice, support and guidance to **all** parties involved in a grievance or anyone who is considering making use of the grievance procedure. Similarly, the Equal Opportunities Manager is available to advise managers on policy and procedure for grievances.

22.2   **The Equal Opportunities Manager is not responsible for the investigation or resolution of grievances which is a management function, but is responsible for evaluating its effectiveness and reporting these matters to senior management.**

22.3   Written records of grievances and **all papers** will be retained by the Equal Opportunities Manager in a confidential file for a minimum of 6 years, in case it is needed for an Industrial Tribunal.

Before papers are filed, they will be examined to discover outstanding issues such as training needs and policy development. If necessary a report should be prepared for the Divisional Commander/HQ's Departmental Head by the Equal Opportunities Manager, outlining any further action which may be required. **Confidentiality must be maintained in respect of the grievance in general unless there is an agreement not to do so.**

23   ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

23.1   At the conclusion of the grievance procedure, all records and relevant papers should be forwarded to the Equal Opportunities Manager for retention.

22.2   The Equal Opportunities Manager can be contacted on extension 2555.

01.03.95

APPENDIX 14

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURE

Ref No ....

Form 66

KEY ELEMENTS FOR RESOLUTION

- Deal from perception of aggrieved;
- Find out what the aggrieved wants;
- Show Commitment to resolve - take it seriously;
- Observe time limits - any variation to be agreed with the aggrieved;
- Communication - keep all parties aware of progress.

- Grievances remain confidential to the parties concerned, unless otherwise agreed with the aggrieved.

- Transfer of all paperwork must be under confidential cover.

STAGE 1 - INITIAL RESOLUTION

- Aggrieved to raise matter of concern either orally or in writing with a manager;
- Action by local manager to resolve grievance, to be completed within 14 days;
- Discuss with all parties concerned and give notes for guidance to aggrieved;
- Written record on form 66 detailing all action taken.

- Register grievance with Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If resolved, forward paperwork to the Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If unresolved, forward paperwork to next appropriate manager.

STAGE 2 - NEXT APPROPRIATE MANAGER

- Action by manager to whom the grievance is taken, to be completed within 14 days of completion of Stage 1.
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and discuss with all parties concerned.
- Take action to resolve grievance and make record on form 66.

- If resolved, forward paperwork to Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If unresolved forward paperwork to Divisional Commander/HQ Departmental Head;

STAGE 3 - DIVISIONAL/HQ DEPT RESOLUTION

- Action by Divisional Commander/HQ Departmental Head to resolve grievance to be completed within 14 days of completion of Stage 2;
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and discuss with all parties concerned;
- Take action to resolve grievance and make record on form 66.

- If resolved, forward paperwork to the Equal Opportunities Manager.

- If unresolved, forward paperwork to Deputy Chief Constable.

STAGE 4 - CHIEF OFFICER RESOLUTION

- Action by Deputy Chief Constable to resolve grievance to be completed within 14 days of completion of Stage 3;
- Consult with Equal Opportunities Manager and discuss with all parties concerned;
- Take action to resolve grievance and make record on form 66.

- Forward paperwork to the Equal Opportunities Manager.

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE - NOTES FOR GUIDANCE

The grievance procedure is designed to resolve matters internally and to avoid the necessity for legal proceedings. It provides individuals with the ability to question how they have been treated by management or colleagues, and to have their grievance examined justly and fairly. The grievance procedure is not designed to punish individuals or apportion blame.

The following principles apply:-

REPRESENTATION
The aggrieved person has the right, at any stage, to be accompanied by their staff association representative, recognised trade union representative, or a colleague or friend.

EARLY RESOLUTION
Grievances should be recognised and dealt with at an early stage by mangers.

CONFIDENTIALITY
Grievances remain confidential, unless otherwise agreed with the aggrieved, or serious disciplinary or criminal offences are disclosed.

ACCEPTANCE OF GRIEVANCES
Managers must accept a Grievance and act impartially.

RECORDING & MONITORING
Grievances and actions taken must be recorded. At each stage the Manager must ensure that the aggrieved, if dissatisfied, is given the opportunity to put their reasons in writing.

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS

All Staff

Only cases that involve discrimination on the grounds of sex, race or marital status may be referred to an Industrial Tribunal.

Civilian Staff

In addition to the above, cases of unfair or constructive dismissal may be referred to an Industrial Tribunal under certain circumstances.

COPY OF THIS PAGE TO AGGRIEVED

In order to commence Industrial Tribunal proceedings a form IT1 has to be served on the Industrial Tribunal (see time limits below). The form IT1 and advice and guidance on the procedure can be obtained from the Citizens Advice Bureau, Equal Opportunities Commission, Commission for Racial Equality, and Department of Employment.

Once form IT1 is served, the Industrial Tribunal can defer the case until the outcome of any internal procedure. This is a discretionary option, and there is no mandatory requirement for a Tribunal to defer the case.

TIME LIMITS
A time limit of <u>three months less one day</u> is imposed by the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (as amended) and this time limit commenced from <u>the date of the **last** act complained of</u>.

<u>NB</u>: Throughout the Grievance Procedure the term manager is used and refers to anyone who supervises or manages staff.

COPY OF THIS PAGE TO AGGRIEVED

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

STAGE 1

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

A copy of this page must be forwarded in a sealed envelope, marked 'In Confidence' to the Equal Opportunities Manager within 48 hours.

Nature of grievance

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AGGRIEVED:...

STATION/DEPT ....

RESPONDENT ....

STATION/DEPT..

GRIEVANCE HANDLER:...

STATION/DEPT ....

DATE ....TELEPHONE NUMBER:...................................

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

To be completed within 14 days by the first manager to whom the grievance is made known.

Action taken by the Grievance Handler:

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(attach a continuation sheet if necessary)

Was the grievance resolved? Yes ☐   No ☐   tick ✓ box

1.   If "Yes", how was the resolution achieved?

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If not resolved go to section 2.
If resolved go to section 3.

5

2. If the grievance has **not** been resolved the grievance handler must include reasons why the aggrieved person is dissatisfied. If the aggrieved wishes they should be given the opportunity to put in writing below, the reasons why they are dissatisfied.

i) What aspect of the grievance has been resolved?

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(attach a continuation sheet if necessary)

ii) What aspect of the grievance has not been resolved?

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(attach a continuation sheet if necessary)

ii) What action is required to resolve the grievance?

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....

(attach a continuation sheet if necessary)

The aggrieved has been notified that if the grievance refers to a discrimination case which may appear before an Industrial Tribunal they must register the case with the Tribunal within 3 months less than one day of the date of the last act complained of.

Yes ☐   No ☐   tick ✓ box

wish the grievance to proceed to the next stage.

Yes ☐   No ☐   tick ✓ box

The next grievance handler will be...

Signature (aggrieved) .... Date ....

Signature (grievance handler) .... Date ....

6

Please note:

The form is repeated for each of the other three stages.

APPENDIX 15

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY POLICY

Cambridgeshire Constabulary is committed to providing equality of opportunity and fair treatment both in the delivery of its service to the community and in its management of staff

The policy of Cambridgeshire Constabulary is to ensure that no job applicant, employee or other person receives unfavourable treatment on the grounds of sex, marital status, race, (including colour, nationality, ethnic or national origin), sexual orientation, religion, disability, age, trade union or staff association membership, social position, or any other form of unfair discrimination. Similarly all conditions and requirements will be justified and job related*.

PRINCIPLES:

All members of staff, Police, Civilian and members of the Special Constabulary are advised that the following principles will be applied:

- All staff have personal responsibility for the practical application of the Equal Opportunity Policy.

- Managers and supervisors have particular responsibility to ensure that practices and policies operate fairly and effectively.

- All forms of harassment and unfair discriminatory acts including racist and sexist language will be treated as misconduct and disciplinary action may be taken.

- Anyone who believes they have been harassed or unfairly discriminated against may pursue a complaint through the grievance procedure without prejudice to their rights under legislation.

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary will appoint, train, develop, promote and deploy staff fairly using justifiable selection criteria.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary will ensure that this policy is regularly reviewed, monitored and amended to reflect current Legislation, Codes of Practice and best management practice.

* Statutory regulations impose certain requirements for some posts, including eyesight, physical fitness, nationality and character.

APPENDIX 16

Do you have a

GRIEVANCE?

If you have been
offended, harassed or treated unfairly
by any member of staff
you should consider using the grievance procedure.

REMEMBER

There is no acceptable level of
discrimination or harassment.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary will not accept
discrimination or harassment in any form.

Language, jokes, banter or other actions
that affect the dignity of people in
the workplace are all unacceptable.

IF IT HAPPENS TO YOU - DO NOT PUT UP WITH IT
Speak to any manager / supervisor

The Equal Opportunities Manager is available for confidential advice
Ext 2555

APPENDIX 17

| June 1994 | July 1994 | August 1994 | September 1994 | October 1994 | November 1994 | December 1994 | January 1995 |

5/22 | 5/29 | 6/5 | 6/12 | 6/19 | 6/26 | 7/3 | 7/10 | 7/17 | 7/24 | 7/31 | 8/7 | 8/14 | 8/21 | 8/28 | 9/4 | 9/11 | 9/18 | 9/25 | 10/2 | 10/9 | 10/16 | 10/23 | 10/30 | 11/6 | 11/13 | 11/20 | 11/27 | 12/4 | 12/11 | 12/18 | 12/25 | 1/1 | 1/8 | 1/15 | 1/22

Critical Path Analysis

Consult with
Staff Associations

Write Grievance Procedure

Report
to DCC

Consult
Per/Train

Print
Questionnaire

Distribute
Quest

Analyse Data

Role of
EO Unit

FEG
4 7 94

Produce and Distribute Newsletter

Design and Admin Training for Managers

Produce Training
Materials

Pilot

Distribute
Distant
learning

launch

TRAIN MANAGERS

Select
Counsel

Design Training for
Counsellors

Deliver Training for
Counsellors

Evaluation

Final Report