THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

AGAINST UNJUSTIFIABLE INDOCTRINATION:

PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRIMARY SCHOOL

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

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Please note that the personal pronoun 'he' is used in the text to refer to 'he' and 'she'.

'The foundation of every state is the education of its youth.' Diogenes

'And what is the use of a book,' thought Alice, 'without pictures or conversation?'

Carroll, L., *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, Puffin Books, London, 1984, p. 11.

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Introduction

An essential aim of primary education is to promote effective thinking in young children. To argue that 'Teachers should educate for thinking'' is to make a statement which is somewhat akin to 'Primary education should be child-centred', or 'Primary school teachers should encourage children to be creative': what is suggested seems to be manifestly worthwhile.[2] Many people make a more contentious claim. Not only is it desirable that children should be encouraged to think, they argue, it is also the case that primary schools are presently discharging their responsibilities in this area to the fullest possible extent. I wish to argue that this view is both complacent and misconceived. Indeed, were it true, this thesis could not have been written.

The National Curriculum promises to bring about a revolution in primary schools. As with most radical initiatives in the educational domain, it would not be surprising if the proposals made by Kenneth Baker, former Secretary of State for Education, were to undergo a period of intellectual rejection in many quarters, even if compliance with their implementation is achieved. For example, during a recent in-service course, I asked a group of teachers to discuss the following question: 'The National Curriculum: traditionalist straitjacket or path to progressivism?' The vast majority, with regret, argued for the former stance. My purpose in this thesis is to suggest that the present educational climate offers teachers an opportunity to engage in curriculum innovation of a kind not envisaged by most proponents of a National Curriculum. I want to argue that the development of thinking (or reasoning) skills should be a central focus of

primary education. In short, primary school children should be introduced to philosophy.

Before outlining how this might be attempted, two questions must be answered. The first and most basic of these is: what is philosophy? Accordingly, in chapter one, 'What the Philosophy of Education Must Do', I offer a particular conception of the nature and purpose of philosophical thinking. The philosopher, I would suggest, must neither keep his eyes fixed on the stars, nor must he focus them overmuch on the pages of the *Oxford English Dictionary*. His vision must be neither telescopic nor microscopic.[3] This is especially important when the tools of philosophy are applied in the educational domain. One of the most common complaints made against philosophers and *pari passu* against philosophers of education is that the fruits of their labours are of no practical *use* to 'the person in the street', or indeed to 'the teacher in the classroom'. Given this, it is necessary to attempt to rehabilitate the philosophy of education, especially since the importance of 'theory' in the educational preparation of teachers is now increasingly being questioned.[4]

The second question is: what obstacles exist which may hinder the emergence from primary schools of critical, reflective pupils who are moving towards autonomy? Perhaps the greatest stumbling block here concerns the indoctrinatory nature of much of traditional schooling. Some years ago, Ian Gregory[5] remarked that despite the 'highly embryonic state' in which the philosophy of education then found itself, one of the concepts which had received most attention from philosophers of education was 'indoctrination', about which, even at that time, much had been written. Three years earlier, Gregory and Woods[6] had noted the 'voluminous literature' devoted to

'indoctrination' and had expressed doubt that anything new could be said on the subject. Yet, twenty years later, we find that contributions on the topic (from both within and outside academic circles) are as numerous as ever; indeed discussions of indoctrination are at the present time very much in vogue.

My purpose in chapter two is to offer a qualified justification for the use of indoctrination in schools. I shall proceed by examining current conceptions of 'indoctrination' and by arguing for a new conception. Implicit in my arguments will be a rejection of the view which finds widespread acceptance nowadays, namely that 'indoctrination' is necessarily a pejorative term. Having distinguished between justifiable and unjustifiable indoctrination, I conclude by examining the implications of my analysis for primary education.

When I was appointed to a lectureship in the School of Education at Hull University in 1986, part of my brief was to establish a 'Thinking Skills for Children' programme. This involved both the preparation of courses in 'Thinking Skills' for students and the pursuit of practical research in schools. My theoretical work focused on Matthew Lipman's 'Philosophy for Children' programme which I had taught at the primary level since 1984. While my course for PGCE students proved to be very popular, I came to realize that a broader approach to the teaching of philosophy to children was required. Accordingly, during the Spring term 1988, I taught philosophy at three primary schools in the Hull area using my own materials. The main part of my thesis is concerned with an examination both of this work and of the theoretical foundations which underpin it.

In chapter three, I offer a number of arguments for the introduction of philosophy into primary schools. Principally, I suggest that the teaching of

philosophy to children may act as a possible antidote to unjustifiable indoctrination in that it can do much to counteract the prejudices and uncritical thinking which are a fact of adult life. Having examined the work of two well-known advocates of children's philosophy, Matthew Lipman and Gareth Matthews, in chapter four, I offer a philosophy curriculum which differs in certain important respects from that suggested by Lipman. There follows a detailed analysis of the implementation of my programme with two Fourth Year classes and a class of Second, Third and Fourth Year pupils.

The main argument which I advance in chapter six is that, in order to promote critical thinking in schools, teachers must themselves be able and willing to think critically. To assist in this process, I make two recommendations. Firstly, I suggest that teacher education courses should provide opportunities for students to reflect on and to discuss the theory of education. This proposal is preceded by an examination of the arguments of those who are opposed both to courses of teacher education *per se* and to the educational theory component within such courses. Secondly, in the final chapter, I argue that students should be introduced to the nature and purpose of logical and ethical reasoning. This is essential if they are to help children to become exponents of philosophical skills. Also, in chapter seven, I focus both on the management of philosophical discussions in the classroom and on the supervision of teachers of children's philosophy. In addition, several obstacles to the successful introduction of philosophy into primary schools are examined.

The claim that primary school children should study philosophy is, at first glance, a remarkable one. Such a claim, it might be thought, could only be made by someone who either overestimates the intellectual powers of young

children, or who underestimates the complexity of philosophical discourse. I wish to argue that 'children's philosophy' is a coherent notion, the currency of which does not depend on a misunderstanding either of subject matter or of children's capacities. The best way to demonstrate the truth of this contention is to show in considerable detail that young children are capable of engaging, in a competent and often skilful manner, in philosophical debate. This is especially important when one considers that a major difficulty which protagonists of children's philosophy face is to convince the sceptical reader that what is taking place in the classroom deserves the appellation 'philosophy'. This can only be accomplished through a careful examination of children's dialogues, a number of which are included in chapter five. Given that the philosophical nature of these conversations is central to my argument and, indeed, to the thesis as a whole, I do not wish to adopt the unfortunate (but, alas, all too common) practice of situating them in an appendix. A thesis the central aim of which is to demonstrate (and celebrate) the sophistication of young children's thinking on the one hand, cannot be seen to marginalize it by depicting it as somehow separate from the 'main argument' on the other. It is no accident, therefore, that the conversations in which I was proud to take part, lie at the centre of this work.

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CHAPTER ONE

What the Philosophy of Education Must Do

This thesis is written at a time of educational restructuring. The Education Reform Act, which became law on 29 July, 1988, brings with it radical proposals to reshape primary, secondary and tertiary education. Issues concerning a National Curriculum, testing and assessment for children at seven, eleven, fourteen and sixteen years, the eligibility of schools to apply for grant-maintained status, the introduction of city technology colleges etc., are presently the subject of keen debate. The central question with which this chapter is concerned is: what is the role of the philosopher of education in the formulation and discussion of educational policy? Before this can be answered, some preliminary comments must be made about the nature and purpose of philosophical thinking.

A popular conception of the philosopher is encapsulated in Rodin's *The Thinker*: a person who forms and contemplates the so-called 'eternal questions'; someone who attempts to give us information about 'the universe as a whole',[1] about reality in its ultimate nature. Although this view may somewhat flatter the philosopher, it does not accurately represent what philosophy is nowadays taken to be. Many contemporary philosophers (at least those in the analytic tradition) are a good deal more modest in their endeavours; they have been concerned, on the whole, to elucidate and to clarify concepts.

While this dramatic shift in emphasis has had many beneficial effects (principally it has led to a greater concern with making our thinking clear),

many philosophers have merely substituted one form of extremism for another. They have moved from considering practical issues imprecisely (i.e. without paying due attention to the logic of their utterances), to treating these issues in an altogether abstract (i.e. theoretical) way, without showing sufficient concern for the end result of their theorizing, which should be *activity*: a persistent attempt to find a solution to the problem which made conceptual analysis necessary to begin with. Indeed it would appear that a number of philosophers view such analysis as an end in itself.

The aridity of much of contemporary philosophy and its increasing irrelevance to the problems which confront us in everyday life, is evident both to many of its practitioners and, more importantly, to those who hitherto had looked to the philosopher for some sort of guidance in a world of ever-increasing complexity.[2] *Against Unjustifiable Indoctrination: Philosophy in the Primary School* represents an attempt at a compromise between the two approaches outlined above; in it I attempt to put conceptual analysis to good use: to throw light on a particular problem in educational philosophy.

In an article entitled 'What (if anything) to expect from today's philosophers', published in the magazine *Time*, the author refers to the killing of Socrates and Giordano Bruno and goes on to quote the historian Will Durant who declared that nowadays no one would think of taking such drastic measures against philosophers - 'not because men are more delicate about killing, but because there is no need to kill that which is already dead'.[3] We must now ask: what is it about the nature of contemporary philosophy which gives rise to the charge that it is 'dead'? Two factors which have contributed to this verdict need to be considered.

The first concerns the subject matter of the discipline. Nowadays, the worth of an academic subject in institutions of higher education tends to be assessed, to a considerable extent, by its ability to attract large sums of money in the form of grants. One consequence of this is that only those disciplines which are capable of solving practical problems, of 'getting something done in the world', are successful in generating such income. In this respect, philosophy has never been competitive with its peer subjects. Its detractors point out that while philosophers have been reflecting for over two thousand years about issues concerning body and mind, logic and language, the nature of metaphysics, the problem of perception, etc., this extensive deliberation has not resulted in any definite progress being made towards the resolution of philosophical problems. A.J. Ayer, sums up the difficulty in this way: 'I think that one always has doubts about [philosophy] just because you don't get clear advances. I mean science isn't by any means always a bed of roses, but still in science you do put up a hypothesis and you get a test and the test is positive or negative. And then if its positive you're pleased, and if it's negative you try again. In philosophy...one never quite knows when one has got a problem solved.'[4]

The second factor which has contributed to the devaluing of philosophical inquiry, is the way in which philosophers have conducted their work. For much of the twentieth century, the dominant philosophical paradigm was that known as 'linguistic analysis'. This approach to the discipline arose as a result of a general dissatisfaction with traditional philosophical activity which had been mainly of a metaphysical nature. Since the problems which exercised the minds of metaphysicians were not deemed to be capable of being solved, the 'analytic'

philosophers, as they came to be known, declared them to be 'pseudo-problems' which arose simply because of the way human beings misused language. The main advocate of this approach to philosophy was Wittgenstein, who declared that 'Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.'[5]

According to Wittgenstein, the job of the philosopher is to extricate us from our bewitchment, by demonstrating how language functions. In showing 'the fly the way out of the fly-bottle',[6] philosophers strive to rid us of our linguistic misconceptions. Foremost among these is the view that language operates in a uniform fashion, governed by one set of rules. In arguing that this is not so, Wittgenstein makes use of a comparison between 'language' and 'games'. In the same way that we are unable to identify a single feature which all games have in common, so it is not possible to delineate one attribute which is evident in all forms of language. He offers the following examples of 'language-games' to illustrate the variety of uses to which language is put:

> Giving orders and obeying them—
> Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—
> Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
> Reporting an event—
> Speculating about an event—
> Forming and testing a hypothesis—
> Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—
> Making up a story; and reading it—
> Play acting—
> Guessing riddles—
> Making a joke; telling it—
> Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
> Translating from one language into another—
> Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.[7]

Wittgenstein believed that philosophical problems present themselves when propositions or concepts are taken from one language-game and applied within

the context of another. For example, the term 'proof' might be said to operate in one way within the language-game of science, while it functions differently within the language-game of religion. To attempt to apply the former within the context of the latter is unwarranted, says Wittgenstein. Rather, philosophers should examine the role which concepts play *within* individual language-games, in order to gauge exactly what they contribute to the 'forms of life' of which they are a part.

Thus, Wittgenstein identifies what he considered to be a crucial part of the philosopher's remit, namely analysis and clarification. Once a concept has been clarified, philosophical problems are solved (or, as is often said, dissolved). This is achieved 'not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known'.[8] It should be noted that Wittgenstein's approach to philosophizing restricts its scope severely. 'Philosophy,' he suggests, 'may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it... It leaves everything as it is.'[9]

This examination of the later Wittgenstein's outlook is necessary for two reasons. To begin with, his views have had a pronounced effect on subsequent practice both in general philosophy and in the philosophy of education; indeed his influence is still in evidence today. Secondly, his conception of philosophy, and the method of philosophizing which was derived from it, have been widely criticized. It is important for us to understand the background to, and indeed to engage in, the debate which is taking place at the present time concerning the nature and purpose both of philosophy and of its constituent branches, since our practice will no doubt be closely related to the views which we hold on these matters. It is therefore incumbent on me to articulate a conception of

philosophy and of the philosophy of education, against which the approach taken and arguments presented in the following chapters may be viewed. In order to do this, we must ask: what were the distinctive characteristics which Wittgenstein and the other linguistic philosophers believed philosophy to possess?

To begin with, philosophy was deemed to be a 'second order' activity, whose job it was to examine those concepts which were central to other, 'first order', disciplines such as mathematics, science, and religion. For example, rather than entering as a full participant into a debate about whether God exists, the analytic philosopher seeks merely to clarify what the disputants meant by the term 'God'. As Michael Matthews explains: 'Other disciplines do the running; philosophers do the watching and the analysing.'[o]

Secondly, it was claimed that linguistic analysis was value-neutral. In other words, it was thought to be both possible and desirable for a philosopher, engaged in examining the language of political discourse, to offer an analysis which was not affected in any way by his own political beliefs. Similarly in the fields of education, religion, ethics, etc.

A number of criticisms of linguistic philosophy must be made. Before outlining these, however, it is necessary for us first to examine the development of the philosophy of education which, influenced by the paradigm of linguistic analysis, espoused a number of tenets which were central to general philosophy. To censure the parent discipline with regard to these tenets is, therefore, to fault its offspring also.

What is the relationship between general philosophy and the philosophy of education? According to Robert Dearden: 'the philosophy of education just is general philosophy when it takes the theory and practice of education as a more

narrowing criterion of relevance. The methods of argument employed, and many of

the problems which they are employed upon, are common to both'.[11] Exponents of

analytic philosophy of education[12] were concerned both with the analysis of

concepts and with the justification of beliefs. In this they differed from

certain 'pure' philosophers who believed that it was possible to view conceptual

analysis simply as an end in itself, which might be engaged in with no

extrinsic aim in mind. For example, Geoffrey Warnock writes:

> So far the scrutiny of the concepts we employ... has been envisaged as
> being undertaken for a particular purpose – the purpose, namely, of
> breaking the cramping rigidities which generate some philosophical
> difficulties. But... our examination need not always be undertaken for this
> particular purpose; we do not *have* to begin with an existing philosophical
> knot, and stop as soon as it seems to have come untied; we may examine
> language in the spirit of pure research, describing and ordering its
> features with no other essential aim than to do just this.[13]

A number of analytic philosophers of education declared their opposition

to this view. They argued that the chief importance of conceptual analysis lay

in the role it played in the justification of educational theory. As James

Gribble notes: 'the logical mapping of concepts in education is not done simply

for its own sake. The philosopher of education is not content, for example,

simply to point out that the concept of "equality" may imply treating people

differently – it is his job to go on and examine the implications of his

analysis for the content of education'.[14]

However, an approach which combined analysis with justification, while

adhered to by such prominent philosophers of education as Richard Peters,[15] was

by no means unanimously welcomed by his colleagues in the field, some of whom

(perhaps in sympathy with philosophers such as Warnock) saw their task as

often involving analysis alone. The concept of 'need' provides a good example of

this approach. Michael Matthews berates John White for arguing that the proper activity of the analytic philosopher of education is to analyse this concept, not to engage in debate about which and whose needs are to be satisfied in schooling.[16] Similarly, although Robert Dearden rigorously explicates the logic of the concept, one is left wondering exactly what benefits (in terms of insights or guidelines for practice) will be gained by the teacher who follows the arguments presented to their logical conclusions. Indeed, Dearden also admits that he is not concerned directly with '... who it is that is in need, or [with] the fact that this is a case of *need*, or [with] what it is that is asserted to be needed'.[17]

In fairness to White and Dearden, it should be noted that both have produced a good deal of philosophical work which has at its root a concern not only for clarification but for evaluation also. White, for example, in his more recent *The Aims of Education Restated*,[18] redresses the analysis-without-justification imbalance by articulating some recommendations concerning what the aims of education *ought* to be. In the same volume in which his '"Needs" in education' appears, Dearden not only provides us with analyses of the concepts 'happiness' and 'autonomy', but also evaluates these as educational aims.

Nevertheless, this piecemeal approach to the analysis of educational concepts was a prominent characteristic of APE. Philosophy of education also derived two other tenets from general philosophy, namely the view of philosophy as a 'second order' activity, and the belief in linguistic analysis as a value-neutral activity. All three stances may now be criticized. Let us begin by examining the argument that both philosophy, and therefore philosophy of education, are second-order activities.

As Kevin Harris points out, those who support this contention are committed to the view that philosophers of education necessarily take on the perspective of detached spectators with regard to the subject matter which they examine.[19] This notion of the 'philosopher as spectator' is important in understanding the view of philosophy and philosophy of education advocated by Richard Peters. In *Ethics and Education*, Peters argues as follows: 'The image of the spectator is an appropriate one; for just as a spectator, to a certain extent, detaches himself from the activities of which he is a spectator in order to watch and comment on them, so also does a philosopher detachedly ponder upon and probe into activities and forms of discourse in which he and others engage.'[20]

For Peters, it is the practice of conceptual analysis which helps the philosopher both to become detached from the objects of his investigations and also to gain a 'clear-sighted' perspective with regard to those objects. However, 'a detached and clear-sighted view of the shape of issues and institutions is all that conceptual analysis provides. It cannot of itself determine the lines of practical policy'.[21] Thus it is clear that philosophers are to take no active part in the formulation of policy in so-called 'first-order' disciplines. Like linesmen at a football match, they can only 'sit on the touchline policing the match, clarifying other people's vagueness and exposing [those who] inadvertently display a little sleight of hand'.[22]

Harris introduces what he calls the 'theory-ladenness thesis' in order to argue that the idea of detachment is one which is impossible to achieve. He suggests that:

> all investigations of the world (including philosophical investigations, of course) are theory-laden; that we inevitably approach objects in a theory-

laden way; that theory does not arise secondarily out of neutral investigations (although investigations might result in modifications to theory); that theories have an essential socio-historic element to them; that theories, being expressed through language, necessarily embody further historical-cultural factors; and that it is simply impossible to produce an a-theoretic, a-historic, a-social account of anything.[23]

Michael Matthews cites the work of philosophers of science such as Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, who have concerned themselves with issues relating to the theory-ladenness (or 'theory-dependence') of our observations. Karl Popper has also argued for the theory-ladenness thesis. According to Matthews: 'Popper is aware that observation itself is something in which the observer plays a very active part. We don't just observe, we observe something. He notes that an observation is always preceded by a particular interest, a question, or a problem - "in short by something theoretical".'[24] To illustrate this let us imagine two people who are observing a game of chess being played. The first, a grandmaster, foresees checkmate in two moves for the player with the black pieces. His judgement is based on the positions of the black queen and rook, the inability of the white king to escape to safety, the relative strengths of the two players, etc. The second observer, knowing little about the game, believes that the player with the white pieces is winning since he possesses more pawns than his opponent. This clearly demonstrates that we do not simply perceive the world with a *tabula rasa*, our observations are always evaluated in terms of our previous experiences.

I offer the following personal example of this. In 1988, I visited the British Virgin Islands to lecture to teachers taking the Hull University B.Phil. degree. During a free afternoon, I visited a nearby beach. After fifteen minutes, I noticed that the sky was beginning to fill rapidly with dark clouds. Within

seconds it began to rain very heavily. I collected my belongings quickly and made a hasty retreat to a nearby shelter. I was surprised that no one else on the beach moved from his or her position. The reason for this became apparent immediately, as the clouds disappeared as quickly as they had arrived, and the sun returned to shine brilliantly once more. Having had no previous experience of this part of the world, I had made two assumptions about torrential rain: firstly, that it would last for a long time; secondly, that it would bring an end to my planned activities on that afternoon. As the behaviour of those with whom I shared the beach showed, neither assumption was justified.

Consequently, it should be clear that the idea of 'detaching' or 'distancing' ourselves from the objects of our investigations, although considered by some to be an attractive proposition, is nonetheless impossible to achieve in practice. As Harris suggests: 'A key feature of any investigation is the theoretic stance of the investigator (which is inextricably tied up with historical, political, and social factors), not distancing or detachment; and philosophers who claim they are being a-theoretical, a-social and a-historical (or objective, impartial, balanced and distanced) are deluding at least themselves.'[25]

In conversation with Bryan Magee, one of the foremost of linguistic philosophers, Bernard Williams, admits that a fundamental weakness of linguistic analysis was that it underrated the significance of theory, both within philosophy and within other disciplines. Philosophers in the linguistic tradition had a tendency to analyse concepts without giving due consideration to their historical, political and social backgrounds. As Williams openly admits: 'I think that what we tended to do was to pick up some distinction or

opposition, and go very carefully into it, and into the various nuances that might be attached to it, and order them, or state them, without enough reflection on what background made this set of distinctions, rather than some other, interesting or important.'[26] When philosophers scrutinized concepts in a piecemeal fashion, they made no reference to, nor did they take account of, those explanatory theories which provide a backcloth against which such terms ought to be viewed. In other words, what was missing from such scrutiny was 'a frame of reference. And that frame of reference is a theory'.[27]

One consequence of this piecemeal way of doing philosophy was that it engendered a decontextualization of the subject-matter under discussion.[28] This, in turn, is related to two other elements which were held to be constitutive of linguistic analysis: (a) the view that it is possible to make a clear-cut distinction between philosophy and those disciplines which are the subject of philosophical analysis; (b) the belief that this putative distinction lends itself to the pursuit of neutral investigations by philosophers.

With regard to (a), it should be pointed out that any attempt to distinguish between 'first-order' and 'second-order' activities is nowadays regarded by most philosophers as open to dispute, and by many as extremely dubious. As Williams suggests:

> I think that people are now once more very conscious that there are parts
> of science which are themselves the philosophy of science; parts of
> linguistics which are the philosophy of linguistics; a good deal of
> psychology which is the philosophy of psychology. There are areas where
> you need both philosophical skills and also knowledge of the sciences or
> other relevant subjects. The dichotomy between philosophy and everything
> else cannot ultimately be made.[29]

As far as (b) is concerned, we have already seen that any hope which the philosopher has of conducting a neutral investigation of subject-matter is

shown by the theory-ladenness thesis to be illusory. As Brenda Cohen observes: 'There are no neutral perspectives, whether in politics, morals or education.'[30] Helen Freeman correctly asserts that any piece of philosophical work which has reached a conclusion concerning whether or not certain social practices are justifiable, is not neutral. However, she prefaces her remark by saying that philosophy of education, as a branch of general philosophy, *is* neutral 'only in the sense that as an activity, it has no bias'.[31]

Yet this point cannot be allowed, since, as Ruth Jonathan declares: 'Philosophy of education seeks to avoid bias by remaining second order, but it cannot escape its development in a particular theoretical context, and its focus on a particular practical context.'[32] Furthermore, in arguing against the view that linguistic analysis is value-neutral, Robert Dearden asks: 'Why has *this* concept been chosen for analysis?... Will the historic act of analysing not itself be a help, a hindrance, or a distraction to some cause?'[33]

Although disagreeing with philosophers of education like Peters that a dichotomy can be established between first-order and second-order activities, Michael Matthews argues that even if such a distinction could be made, philosophy (as conceived of by analytic philosophers of education) would not be neutral. He says: 'if the first-order discourse embodies political choices, class interests and political prejudices, then the role of [the] philosopher as portrayed by Peters cements these distortions. Far from being neutral, philosophy on the APE model is guaranteed to be political, at least to the extent that the first-order discourses are not value-free'.[34] As I have already suggested, the theory-ladenness thesis indicates that such discourses are not (and cannot be) value-free.

Arguments have been offered which purport to show that linguistic analysis is trivial,[35] irrelevant,[36] and necessarily conservative.[37] Unfortunately, it is not possible to examine these criticisms in detail here. However, it should be noted that, although the first two charges are certainly persuasive, the recommendations which I am about to make concerning how philosophy and philosophy of education ought to be conducted will serve to show that they are not necessarily decisive. As regards the third indictment, my own view is that it is rather overstated. It certainly seems to be the case that, historically speaking, linguistic analysis has tended to wed itself to conservative practice.[38] However, if I am correct in this, the proposition I have advanced merely expresses a logically *contingent* truth, since conservative practice is not something which follows *necessarily* from the activity of analysing itself. For, as Freeman rightly asserts:

> philosophical work may justify, and thus, on my account, implicitly prescribe, either the maintenance of the *status quo* (by claiming that social practices which are widely engaged in are justifiable) or change (by claiming that social practices which are widely engaged in are not justifiable, or that social practices which are not widely engaged in are more justifiable than the practices which are engaged in). So philosophy of education, as philosophy, is neither essentially and necessarily conservative, nor essentially and necessarily radical, nor essentially and necessarily liberal, nor anything else. [39]

Our discussion may be further advanced by taking a closer look at Freeman's article, two aims of which are: (a) to show that *pace* Wittgenstein, neither philosophy, nor consequently philosophy of education, 'leaves everything as it is'; (b) to argue that 'much work in philosophy of education has prescriptive implications for practice'.[40] Freeman details three different types of prescriptive implication which may follow from philosophical work: contextual implication, logical implication, and conditional implication. We

shall here be concerned with the first two of these. As an example of contextual implication, Freeman notes that since philosophers such as P.S. Wilson and R.S. Peters offer different accounts of 'education',[41] it is possible that those to whom such accounts are addressed may change their minds about what is actually involved in educating as a result of accepting a particular analysis. Consequently, they may alter certain aspects of their classroom performance, and this, says Freeman, suggests that 'the analysis of key educational terms may not leave everything as it is'.[42]

Freeman argues that the prescriptive implications involved here are not (and cannot be) logical implications, since nothing concerning the justifiability (or otherwise) of educational practices follows necessarily from an analysis of educational terms. Rather, such implications are *contextual*. Given certain beliefs about the nature of the enterprise in which they are engaged, which it is thought that most teachers have (e.g. that their central task in schools is to educate their pupils), and given also the relationship thought to exist between the concepts which a person has and his behaviour, it follows that the prescriptive implications, 'arise both from the nature of [conceptual] analysis and the assumptions about... educating... which prevail in the context within which the analysing is done'.[43]

As examples of logical implication, Freeman cites instances where social practices have been justified. She notes that 'the claim that an adequate justification has been offered for a social practice (clearly delineated by analysis) or a social role, implies the claim that, all other things being equal, these practices should be engaged in'.[44] This is because there would surely be something contradictory about any argument which maintained that an adequate

Justification for a social practice had been given, but that no one ought to engage in it.

The prescriptive implications involved in arguments which attempt to justify social practices (or, for that matter, in those which purport to show certain practices to be unjustifiable) are *logical* implications: 'If students consider the discussions, accept the premises or assumptions, and accept the arguments, here, if they are rational, they must accept the conclusions, including the prescriptive implications.'[45] In the next chapter, the significance of both contextual and logical implication for my analysis of 'indoctrination' will become evident.

Freeman points out that not all philosophical work which has to do with the justification (or otherwise) of social practices necessarily has implications of a prescriptive sort, since a philosopher may be concerned only to set out various arguments without drawing any conclusions about their relative merits. Prescriptive implications arise from the formulation and expression of opinions and conclusions. Therefore, according to Freeman:

> As long as it is considered to be part of philosophy to draw conclusions
> of this type (and it might be argued that to fail to draw a conclusion at
> all is to fail to complete one's philosophical investigation) then, on my
> argument, such philosophical work is necessarily prescriptive, in a
> particular sense which does not imply that it was the intention of the
> philosopher to prescribe... it is part of the nature of the philosophical
> activity of investigating the justifications for social practices that it
> has prescriptive implications.[46]

Now it is no doubt true that a philosopher may engage in a piece of work which has prescriptive implications while at no time intending to prescribe for others, or indeed, being aware that he is prescribing. It may also be the case that some philosophers need to be made aware of the implications which may be

derived from their work. What is at stake here, however, is an issue of greater importance, namely: given that a philosopher understands the prescriptive implications which much of his work may have, ought he consciously to engage in such work and thereby to prescribe for others?

Pace Ruth Jonathan, who argues for 'an active but non-prescriptive role for philosophy of education in the required reappraisal of educational programmes',[47] my answer to this question is 'yes'. As I argued earlier, all our investigations of the world are theory-laden. Consequently, it is necessary for the philosopher who undertakes such an investigation to ensure that he does not fall prey to the illusion of neutrality. Rather, he must acknowledge the theoretical standpoint he has adopted. In doing so, he is, in effect, declaring that '"this is how the object appears from this particular perspective"'.[48] However, the philosopher of education should not be satisfied simply to *describe* objects from his own perspective. This is because, 'Part of the business of philosophy of education... should be theorizing about and developing theories.'[49]

Harris asserts that a further function of the philosopher of education is to assess 'the status of evidence or objects (this is in contrast to describing or mapping them)'.[50] In addition, and most importantly, since it is worthless to investigate the world from a faulty theoretical perspective, 'it becomes incumbent on the philosopher to establish... a position of *critical preference*; that is a theoretical perspective which can be shown to account for the world better than its preceding or contemporary rivals can'.[51]

For example, Brenda Almond advocates a form of what she calls 'positive liberalism',[52] which is intended to be a synthesis of liberal analytic philosophy of education and the criticisms of it offered by scholars such as

Harris. It is clear that Almond's account has much in common with the radical critique enunciated by Harris. Principally, there is a mutual concern to make a definite contribution to the solution of practical educational problems; an acknowledgement that neutrality in education is impossible; and a determination to reconsider judgements 'in the light of new argument and new development'.[53] It is to these tenets that I wish to adhere in this thesis.

Rather than making a futile attempt to disguise my standpoint with a veneer of neutrality, I believe that it is preferable to offer open commitment to a point of view.[54] While welcoming such an approach, Almond acknowledges that it is not unproblematic: 'Admittedly, there may be a price to be paid for conscious commitment to particular values. This is the risk of making a contribution which is ephemeral rather than permanent... But it is worth taking this risk in order to become responsive to the issues exercising those who must make practical decisions as to what to do within defined time limits and in particular circumstances.'[55].

While educational theorists are no doubt keen to make contributions which will prove to be longstanding, to distinguish between the possible ephemerality or permanence of their offerings on the basis of 'conscious commitment to particular values', is surely mistaken. Plato's theory of education, as evidenced in his *Republic*, is certainly not characterized by a lack of commitment. Yet, the general thrust of Almond's argument must be accepted, especially since, in the domain of educational theory, the need for committed voices has never been greater than at the present time. Indeed, such voices are essential if educational theory is finally to throw off the shackles of benign detachment and emotional coldness which have bedevilled it for so long, and which have

been apt to make it unattractive to those for whom it is intended - practising teachers.[55] In acknowledging the importance of this argument, I offer *Against Unjustifiable Indoctrination: Philosophy in the Primary School* as a contribution to an on-going debate.

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36. See Pratte, R., *ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

37. For arguments against the innate conservatism of linguistic analysis, see: Adelstein, D., *op. cit.*, p. 123; Jonathan, R., *op. cit.*, p. 16; Matthews, M., *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165; Dearden, R.F., 'Philosophy of education 1952-1982', *op. cit.*, p. 63; Wertheimer, A., *op. cit.*; Freeman, H., *op. cit.*; and Kleinig, J., *Philosophical Issues in Education*, Croom Helm, London, 1982, chapter one.

38. See Kleinig, J., *ibid.*, p. 5, and Harris, K., *op. cit.*, p. 31.

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40. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

41. See Wilson, P.S., *Interest and Discipline in Education*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971; Peters, R.S., *op. cit.*; Peters, R.S., 'Education and the educated man', *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*, Vol. 4, 1970, pp. 5-20.

42. Freeman, H., *op. cit.*, p. 40.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*

47. Jonathan, R., *op. cit.*, p. 24.

48. Harris, K., *op. cit.*, p. 32.

49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*

52. Almond, B., *Moral Concerns*, Humanities Press International, New Jersey, 1987, p. 60.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

54. It is for this reason that I have called this chapter 'What the Philosophy of Education Must Do', in contrast to John Wilson's *What Philosophy Can Do* (Macmillan, London, 1986). Wilson refers, mistakenly in my view, to the notion of 'non-ideological philosophy of which conceptual analysis is one kind' (p. 2).

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CHAPTER TWO

Indoctrination in the Primary School

In the previous chapter, I suggested that an important task to be undertaken by
the philosopher of education is to formulate educational theories. Here, my aim
is to do this by offering a qualified justification for the use of
indoctrination in schools. Having examined several popular conceptions of
'indoctrination', I shall argue for a new one. I believe that it is necessary to
adopt the perspective which I advance below in order to circumvent a difficulty
encountered by many contributors to the 'indoctrination debate'. This arises as
a result of regarding the concept simply as a term of abuse to describe the
practices of others. By viewing 'indoctrination' in this way, one is 'rendered
unable to differentiate between various kinds of teaching activities.

I begin by making some introductory comments about the notion of
'indoctrination', which has been the subject of a number of songs, poems and
novels. For example, in their book *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*, Neil
Postman and Charles Weingartner quote the lyrics of a song by Tom Paxton:

> What did you learn in school today,
> Dear little boy of mine?
> What did you learn in school today,
> Dear little boy of mine?
> I learned that Washington never told a lie,
> I learned that soldiers seldom die,
> I learned that everybody's free,
> That's what the teacher said to me,
> And that's what I learned in school today,
> That's what I learned in school.
>
> What did you learn in school today,
> Dear little boy of mine?
> What did you learn in school today,

Dear little boy of mine?
I learned that policemen are my friends,
I learned that justice never ends,
I learned that murderers die for their crimes,
Even if we make a mistake sometimes,
And that's what I learned in school today,
That's what I learned in school.

What did you learn in school today,
Dear little boy of mine?
What did you learn in school today,
Dear little boy of mine?
I learned our government must be strong,
It's always right and never wrong,
Our leaders are the finest men,
And we elect them again and again,
And that's what I learned in school today,
That's what I learned in school.

What did you learn in school today,
Dear little boy of mine?
What did you learn in school today,
Dear little boy of mine?
I learned that war is not so bad,
I learned about the great ones we have had,
We fought in Germany and in France,
And someday I might get my chance,
And that's what I learned in school today,
That's what I learned in school.'

In 1980, the popular music group 'Pink Floyd' reached the top of the hit parade in Britain with a song which began as follows: 'We don't need no education. We don't need no thought control. No dark sarcasm in the classroom. Hey, teacher! Leave them kids alone!' According to Brenda Cohen, this song is an example of what she calls 'the extreme thesis in respect of education and indoctrination: the thesis that *everything* that goes on in the ordinary classrooms of apparently liberal societies is in fact indoctrination'. Furthermore, the song 'suggests, as do more philosophical exponents of the position, that this indoctrination is carried on by subtle strategies - dark

sarcasm for instance - rather than by overt means: so that while one curriculum is put forward and discussed by school boards and authorities, another, hidden curriculum is actually being more subtly projected.'[2]

In a poem entitled 'Graduation Address', R.D. Laing applies Cohen's 'extreme thesis' to tertiary education:

> We want to help you keep your innocence
> As long as possible. Not just because
> We want you to believe in Santa Claus
> Or even to imagine that your life makes sense.
>
> We're not naive. It's simple self-defence.
> If you always obey our God-sent laws,
> And never once suspect their many flaws,
> You'll never look to us for recompense.
>
> We simply had to have it understood,
> Beyond all proof, that you are bad and we are good.
> We simply had to compromise your mind
> To save being cruel and to be kind.
>
> You need not worry about destiny.
> You are deep programmed machinery.[3]

This poem suggests only too clearly that if indoctrinatory teaching has taken place successfully and unchallenged in primary and secondary schools, it is likely also to thrive in institutions of higher education.

James Clavell's novel *The Children's Story*,[4] presents a disturbing account of such teaching. In writing it, Clavell had in mind an educational experience undergone by his young daughter. He had been surprised to witness the vigour with which, on returning from school one day, she had chanted the Pledge of Allegiance for him, and had then claimed a dime in return. Clavell ascertained from his daughter that, according to her teacher, this was the appropriate

payment which should be made by parents when the Pledge had been successfully recited.

He was disturbed to discover that although her memorization had been perfect, she was unable to tell him what certain key words such as 'pledge' and 'allegiance' meant. As Clavell states: 'The Children's Story came into being that day. It was then that I realized how completely vunerable my child's mind was - any mind for that matter - under controlled circumstances.'[5] This novel, dealing with the indoctrination of a group of children which took place in exactly twenty-five minutes, gave the author much satisfaction because it forced him persistently to ask certain questions, such as: 'what's the use of "I pledge allegiance" without understanding? Like why is it so easy to direct thoughts and implant others? Like what is freedom and why is it so hard to explain?'[6]

These questions evoke a popular conception of the term 'indoctrination', which sees its application solely in the context of the political situation in Eastern Europe. Recently, a number of countries in this part of the world have been subject to dramatic change. As a result, several graphic accounts of the indoctrinatory practices utilized within these countries' educational systems have come to prominence. For example, in the Soviet Union, the advance towards greater academic freedom has led to university students becoming 'acquainted with the full volume of social science in the world at large'.[7] In addition, they are being made more aware of the works of Western philosophers such as Russell and Sartre. This is in contrast to the unambiguous emphasis on Marxist ideology which has dominated Soviet education for decades. From now on, students 'no longer have to study Marxist-Leninism or the development of the Communist

Party and some schools have been allowed to follow their own history programme'.[8]

In Mongolia, the desire for political reform became evident when citizens of the capital city, Ulan Bator, voted for a statue of Stalin to be replaced by a memorial to Genghis Khan. Subsequently, it was announced that the statue would be removed 'in accordance with demand for the restoration of historic truth, justice and democracy'.[9] In keeping with this aim, scholars are attempting to rewrite the history of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Accordingly, they are seeking to 'fill in the "blank spots" caused when the founders of the Mongolian People's Republic were purged under the Stalin-inspired terror of the 1930s. More than thirty meetings between historians and surviving activists from the revolution have been held. On the basis of these talks, a two-volume *Who was Who of Mongolian State and Party Personalities* is scheduled to appear at the beginning of the next academic year'.[10]

The overthrow of the Ceausescu regime in Romania, has led to a number of accusations being made against those who were responsible for educational provision. According to a British teacher who left the country during its revolution, both staff and students at Cluj University 'had to attend political indoctrination sessions - literally called that - every Friday afternoon'.[11] Meanwhile, elsewhere in the country, the dominant theme being discussed in schools is 'change'. Traditional curricula had been heavily politicized, and while many teachers proved to be quite skilful at circumventing this bias, some have found it necessary to apologise to their pupils for misleading them. According to Chris Stephen: 'Like history and politics, biology's function was to legitimize the system. Rote learning was the instruction to teachers, and there

was no room for debate about conflicting theories. Biology teacher Lucia Cojocariu Damsa said: "The animal was not shown as interacting with the environment. The books only taught anatomy. The purpose of this was to cut nature off from reality."[12]

Following the reorganization of the educational system in Czechoslovakia, it is no longer obligatory for university students to study either Marxism or Russian. Furthermore, a number of subsidiary courses have been withdrawn, for example, the Marxist approach to mathematics, linguistics, and music.[13] Many students have bemoaned the political bias which existed in their courses. Two pertinent examples of this trend should be mentioned. The first concerns a psychology student who was not made aware of the work of Freud during her period of study. When asked by a reporter, 'What about Jung?', the student replied: 'Who is he?'[14] A second instance involves a student teacher who, having been inducted both into the Marxist approach to pedagogy and into the didactics of pedagogy declared: 'I am now in my fourth year and I haven't had anything at all about how to teach Czech or English'.[15]

Finally, let us consider some of the changes which have taken place recently in East Germany. Perhaps the most important of these concerns the reform of teacher training. In an article entitled 'Propaganda is purged from class', Paul Bendelow notes that: 'Under the Communist regime, all teachers were required to undergo approximately forty hours of in-service training within a five-year period, which included political indoctrination. Now this obligation has been abandoned, the demand for training is greater than ever before."[16] Teachers now seek to acquire strategies for devising and implementing new teaching methods, for introducing novel ideas into the classroom, and for

encouraging ideological pluralism. A number of subject areas are being reorganized, particularly history, social studies and language teaching. It was thought necessary to replace civics with social studies, since the former was considered to be 'one of the main channels of Communist propaganda in schools'.[17]

The new social studies curriculum introduces pupils to philosophy, comparative religion, and 'global issues of conscience and politics'.[18] This is an interesting initiative, given that, as we shall see presently, the idea that global education and philosophy should be taught in British schools has received a hostile response from many people. Indeed, this observation leads me to offer a thought which has motivated and informed my work on the concept of 'indoctrination', the results of which are presented below. I want to argue that the accounts given above, while symptomatic of what many people believe to be the essence of indoctrinatory teaching, are, in reality, only partly constitutive of it. In short, I shall suggest that the spectre of indoctrination is all too evident within our own educational system.

To see that this is so, one has had only to open a daily newspaper, or a copy of *The Times Educational Supplement*, to reveal headlines such as: 'Left warns of ideological control',[19] 'Thatcher has her way over school history',[20] 'Why state education is bad for children',[21] 'Call to outlaw preaching of politics in schools',[22] 'Tories declare war on indoctrination',[23] '"History" course is bunk, say teachers',[24] '"Political danger in our schools"',[25] 'Schools rapped in "politics row"',[26] 'Warning on propaganda posing as peace studies',[27] 'World Studies "propaganda" - Scruton',[28] etc.

This latter article refers to a pamphlet by Roger Scruton,[29] Professor of Aesthetics at Birkbeck College, London, in which he argues that World Studies teaching is indoctrinatory rather than educational. A second pamphlet, of which Scruton is co-author, makes a similar attack on Peace Studies, and takes a passing swipe at 'Women's Studies', 'Black Studies', 'Gay Studies' and 'Sports Studies'.[30] A third pamphlet, again co-written by Scruton, offers a Draft Amendment to the 1944 Education Act, which recommends stern action to be taken against those teachers who seek to indoctrinate their pupils.[31]

Now it should not be thought that misgivings about indoctrination have been expressed only by right-wing politicians and university lecturers. Teachers and pupils alike have added their voices to the protest. Ray Honeyford, former Headmaster of Drummond Middle School in Bradford, in a newspaper article entitled 'The Blackboard Bungle', writes that 'an increasing number of teachers are not prepared to distinguish between education and indoctrination.'[32] More recently, an article called 'Lessons in a New Class Struggle',[33] gives details of a newly-formed group called 'CHOIS' (Children Opposed to Indoctrination in Schools), which was founded by Myfanwy Robson when she was fourteen years old.

We must now ask whether the numerous accounts of 'indoctrination' which have been offered over the years by philosophers of education have contributed anything to the above discussions. A charitable answer to this question is 'very little'. Indeed it seems to me that many suggested conceptions have succeeded only in blurring vital distinctions, an appreciation of which would lead to a long overdue reappraisal of the term.

Gatchel[34] has argued that viewing 'indoctrination' with opprobrium is a comparatively recent development in the world of education. Historically the

term simply meant 'teaching doctrines', and was not looked upon as what philosophers call a 'boo' word, i.e. something to be given a negative value. Nowadays, however, 'indoctrination' is seen as a term to be compared unfavourably with, for example, 'education', which is seen as having positive value in itself. Thus, while 'indoctrinating' is thought to be the concern of Communists,[35] Roman Catholics,[36] pacificists,[37] and certain other proponents of political education,[38] 'educating' is said to be what we 'good' teachers are engaged in.

This myopic view of indoctrination is safeguarded, to some extent, by the arguments of philosophers who assert that 'indoctrination' is a matter of the methods used by the teacher, or the subject matter he conveys to his students, or his intention to indoctrinate. Various combinations of these features have also been suggested as providing the 'essence' of the term. A fourth alternative, which views 'indoctrination' in terms of the *outcome* of a teaching transaction, has been ignored by many authors, and where it is mentioned, it is often treated briefly and summarily rejected. I shall argue that this notion is central to the concept.

In some recent educational writings, a disturbing trend has become evident. The term 'indoctrination' is used to refer to the inculcation of those values with which the writer disagrees, while 'education' is said to involve inducting into values of which he approves. A good example of this tendency can be found in *Education and Indoctrination*, in which the authors suggest that there are five elements which constitute 'indoctrination':

(1) Conclusions are foregone...
(2) The conclusions form part of a constellation, whose meaning is to be found in a 'hidden unity', based [on an] emotional or political attitude.

(3) The conclusions are premises to action, and form the fundamental starting-point of a political 'programme'.

(4) The conclusions are part of a closed system of mutually confirming dogma, which serves to consolidate and validate the emotional unity from which it springs.

(5) They are typically established not by open discussion, but by closing the mind to alternative viewpoints, and perhaps even by vilifying or denouncing opposition.[39]

An examinaton of the pamphlet reveals that the term 'indoctrination' has been used to denote those values which Scruton *et al.* do not wish to see introduced into educational institutions. However, it is significant that religious education, which has traditionally been viewed as a paradigm case of indoctrination,[40] is not included for censure. Indeed we are told that religion forms 'an ineliminable part of our constitution as rational beings'.[41] It should also be noted that the authors themselves, while arguing for values which they believe to be the very antithesis of 'indoctrination', employ the five criteria which they suggest are central to the term.

One thing is clear from this brief explication. We need to do more than to use the term 'indoctrination' simply to indicate those values which we do not share, if it is to function meaningfully within the realm of educational discourse. We must have a criterion which we are able to apply without fear or favour to *all* values. In what follows, I shall attempt to provide such a criterion.

In looking for a plausible characteristic (or set of characteristics) in terms of which 'indoctrination' might be defined, philosophers of education have sought a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept. Those who have posited a particular content as being central to the term, have pinned their arguments on a supposed conceptual link between 'indoctrination'

and 'doctrines'.[42] This approach has been summed up in Antony Flew's bold statement, 'No doctrines, no indoctrination!'[43] However, Flew's claim cannot be sustained, since it has been argued convincingly that: (1) there is merely a causal connection between 'indoctrination' and 'doctrines'; (2) it is possible to indoctrinate not only doctrines but also true and false propositions.[44] In short, content of a doctrinal nature is not a necessary condition of 'indoctrination'.

Let us now turn our attention to another criterion which, it is argued, is constitutive of 'indoctrination', namely intention. A number of philosophers have given support to the view that for indoctrination to be taking place, for example in a classroom, the teacher must *intend* to indoctrinate.[45] On this argument, unintentional indoctrination is ruled out by definition. To rebut such an inference, we may invoke a well-worn but effective epigram: 'The road to indoctrination is paved with good (as well as bad) intentions.' This, I believe, precisely locates the major weakness in arguments supporting the intention thesis, since it is possible for teachers to indoctrinate · their pupils *unintentionally*.[46]

For example, Cooper[47] argues that unintentional indoctrination may be engaged in by indoctrinators whom he terms 'sincere'. A 'sincere' indoctrinator is defined as 'one who himself believes the propositions he is teaching, and who thinks it important that his students should believe them precisely because, according to him they are true'.[48] While it should be noted that it is not only 'sincere' indoctrinators (as defined by Cooper) who can unintentionally indoctrinate,[49] the existence of such a group poses a problem for Ivan Snook, a leading proponent of the 'intention' criterion. Snook argues, on the one hand,

for a 'strong' sense of 'intention', so that someone is indoctrinating if 'in his teaching he is actively desiring that the pupils believe what he is teaching regardless of the evidence'.[50] However, this can be criticized because a sincere indoctrinator, believing the propositions he teaches to be true, and not being aware of any evidence which he would consider as sufficient to count against them, therefore cannot intend for his students to believe such propositions 'regardless of the evidence'. Indeed, he might well state that, were satisfactory evidence to be provided against a proposition p, he would not wish his students to believe that p is true.[51]

Snook[52] also offers a 'weak' sense of 'intention' so that a person is indoctrinating if he foresees it as 'likely or inevitable' that, as a result of his teaching, his pupils will believe what he teaches regardless of the evidence. This attempt to expand the meaning of 'intention' has also been shown to be unsatisfactory, and its demise brings with it the collapse of the 'intention' criterion.[53] Since convincing arguments can be adduced to support the view that one can indoctrinate unintentionally, we must conclude that attempts to establish 'intention' as a necessary condition of 'indoctrination' have been unsuccessful.

Several writers have argued that 'method' is essential to an understanding of 'indoctrination'.[54] On this view, whether a teacher is engaged in indoctrinating his pupils depends on *how* he teaches them. Thomas Benson[55] has argued that there are two main forms of indoctrinatory method: the persuasive presentation and the engineering of assent. Each form has two sub-categories. The biased argument and the dogmatic presentation are illustrative of the persuasive presentation, while deprivation of the ability and of the opportunity

to withhold assent from a proposition, belong to the engineering of assent. Patricia Smart suggests that 'to talk of indoctrination is to suggest that the teacher uses unfair means to induce the child to come to conclusions which he himself intends him to make, but which the subject matter does not necessarily demand.'[55] Finally, according to Hepburn, 'to be indoctrinated is to be prompted non-rationally to a belief or attitude or other state of mind: without, that is, being given or encouraged to seek good grounds.'[57]

　　We must now ask: (1) Is 'method' a necessary condition of 'indoctrination'? (2) Is 'method' a sufficient condition of 'indoctrination'? In one sense, the answer to the first question is 'no' since, as I shall argue presently, a child may become indoctrinated by *rational* methods. Indoctrinatory (i.e. non-rational) methods are, however, both necessary and justifiable in early childhood education.[58] Now if my analysis of 'indoctrination' is acceptable, it will become clear that such methods are not a *sufficient* condition of 'indoctrination'. To see that this is so, we need do no more than than to imagine a young child with whom we have employed indoctrinatory methods, but who remains uninfluenced by them, and who therefore does not end up in an indoctrinated state of mind.

　　The idea that it is necessary to use indoctrinatory methods with young children is one which many writers are unwilling (or unable) to accept. However, the arguments which they offer against this thesis are unconvincing. The tactic usually adopted is to suggest that no part of early childhood education can be called indoctrination if the teacher *intends* that the child will be able to reflect critically, at a later time, on the beliefs into which he has been inducted.[59] 'Intention' has already been shown to be inadequate as a criterion of 'indoctrination'. Brenda Cohen is correct when she asserts that 'if Snook is

right and these methods are in fact necessary where very young children are concerned... then it may be preferable to concede that there is an area where indoctrination is acceptable.'[60]

In examining a fourth criterion of 'indoctrination', I propose to concentrate on two articles by Paul O'Leary.[61] He is concerned to remedy a deficiency in previously written work on 'indoctrination', namely a tendency to concentrate on analysing statements such as 'X is indoctrinating Y' rather than 'Y is indoctrinated'. He offers two descriptions of the indoctrinated state of mind, both of which, I shall argue, while contributing something to an adequate understanding of 'indoctrination', are ultimately unsatisfactory.

O'Leary begins his first article by suggesting that according to Ivan Snook:

> there appear to be three general conditions which conjointly are
> necessary and sufficient to claim that someone is indoctrinated.
> These are: (1) the belief condition - the indoctrinated person
> believes a proposition or set of propositions; (2) the epistemic
> condition - the indoctrinated person believes a proposition or
> set of propositions 'regardless of the evidence'; (3) the causal
> condition - the belief condition and the epistemic condition have
> been brought about because of certain teaching activities.[62]

O'Leary reformulates the belief condition to include the notion of 'doubting that p', and includes a dispositional condition, so that his first description of the indoctrinated state of mind is as follows: 'S believes that p or doubts that p regardless of the evidence and is disposed to reject any q which is offered as a counter-instance to believing that p or doubting that p.'[63] By 1982, O'Leary's definition has undergone certain important changes. His second formulation is: 'Because of T's teaching, S believes that p, regardless of

the evidence; and is disposed to reject any q that is offered as a counter-instance to believing that p.'[54]

The following points should be noted: (1) the notion of 'doubting that p' has been left out in the second definition; (2) O'Leary offers a causal condition which is absent in his earlier article. As far as the belief condition is concerned, I can see no reason to reject O'Leary's earlier view that belief and doubt are disjunctively necessary for an adequate understanding of the indoctrinated state of mind. O'Leary himself offers us no reasons as to why he has decided to dispense with the notion of 'doubting that p'. It would seem that just as a teacher may teach for unquestionable belief, so too may he teach for unquestionable doubt. On the traditional view of indoctrination, a teacher can only be accused of indoctrinating if he wishes his pupils to *believe* something unshakably. This would surely allow a teacher who is concerned only to *discredit* certain views, while perhaps offering nothing in their place, to escape the charge of unjustifiable indoctrination.[55] He teaches for unquestionable doubt, not for unquestionable belief. So widening the belief condition to include the notion of 'doubting that p' will allow us to bring what this teacher does within the purview of indoctrination, and so within the realm of culpability.

Turning to the epistemic condition, O'Leary argues that the phrase 'regardless of the evidence' can be interpreted in two ways, since a person can believe or doubt a proposition *without* evidence, or *despite* the evidence.[56] Now while it is no doubt the case that indoctrinated people often believe propositions without or despite the evidence, this is surely not a *necessary* condition of their being in an indoctrinated state of mind. If I teach a child

to believe that 2x2=4 in such a way that he rejects all counter-instances to believing it, does this necessarily imply that he believes it *without* evidence?

Certainly it may be the case that the child has come to believe it as a result of learning it by rote, and so has no evidence for it. But, equally plausibly, he may have come to believe it as a result of a practical demonstration using four cubes. Similarly with a whole host of propositions from all academic subjects. A child may be indoctrinated with regard to a proposition although he has come to believe it not without evidence, or despite the evidence, but simply *because of* the evidence..

As we have seen, O'Leary's causal condition features only in his second formulation of the indoctrinated state of mind. The inclusion of such a condition is considered necessary in order to distinguish between a person who holds a view in a fixed way because of someone's teaching, and a person who exhibits a similar tendency due to having been in a motor accident,[67] or because of stupidity or an unwillingness to think for himself.[68] Yet even if we agree with Degenhardt that 'indoctrination does have to be the result of human agency or action',[69] it still seems to be the case that O'Leary's causal condition ('Because of T's teaching') is too limiting.

To begin with, it is not always the case that a charge of indoctrination can be levelled at a *particular* teacher. As Nancy Glock suggests, '"indoctrination" need not apply only to the... actions of individuals. It can refer... to such policies and practices of *institutions* as do tend to produce indoctrinatory outcomes.'[70]

If the central aim of a certain school is to produce religious conviction in its pupils, it may be impossible to attribute a child's indoctrinated state

of mind to an individual teacher. Rather, it is more likely that the school's ethos is responsible for producing a child who responds in a certain way to the inculcation of religious beliefs. Mr. Smith or Miss Jones may do very little as individuals to promote such beliefs, and yet children may become indoctrinated as a result of a particular lesson given by them. Such indoctrination may have very little to do with the lesson itself – it is possible that teaching received from previous teachers, or at school assemblies, etc., may have contributed substantially to the formation of fixed religious beliefs.

Similarly, outside agencies such as parents, friends, television and newspapers, may all combine to produce a child who is 'ripe' for indoctrination. It may therefore be unjust (as well as misleading) to accuse a particular teacher of unjustifiable indoctrination, simply because some of the children in his class end up in an indoctrinated state of mind as a result of a particular lesson. As William Hare notes, 'We cannot, of course, *infer* from the fact that pupils emerge from school with closed minds that their teachers failed to teach in an open-minded way. There may be many forces at work in the homes of students, and in society at large, which make the open-minded attitudes of teachers ineffective.'[71]

However, this is not to suggest that those outside influences which exert themselves on the child may always serve to exculpate a teacher accused of unjustifiably indoctrinating his class. Such a teacher cannot refute the charge simply by reminding us that children are subject to such influences, and by maintaining that it is these influences, and not his teaching, which have led to their developing an indoctrinated state of mind. To determine whether or not the teacher in question has indoctrinated his pupils unjustifiably, we need: (1)

to determine whether his pupils are in fact indoctrinated and (2) to examine his conduct during the lesson(s) in question. It is at this point that content, method and intention are likely to provide us with vital clues in our enquiry. We need to ask whether the teacher's input into the lesson(s) is of the sort which tends to lead to indoctrinatory outcomes.[72] We also need to examine the ethos of the school itself, and such external factors as have already been mentioned. Everything will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. It is on the basis of these considerations, taken together, that we can make a judgement about the teacher's culpability.

To ascertain whether or not indoctrination has taken place during a particular lesson or series of lessons and, if so, what (if anything) it is about those lessons which was indoctrinatory, is by no means easy, and it is not my intention to examine the issue in any depth. Rather, I am concerned to argue that to attribute a child's indoctrinated state of mind to a particular teacher as O'Leary does, is not always justifiable. It is of little use to achieve simplicity at the expense of cogency. Therefore, I propose to adopt a modified causal condition, which is 'due to the teaching or influence of Y'. This has the advantage of attributing indoctrination to factors outside a particular classroom, and therefore outside the control of a particular teacher. 'Y' will include institutions, teachers, parents, friends, the media, etc.

O'Leary's first formulation of the dispositional condition is as follows: 'S... is disposed to reject any q which is offered as a counter-instance to believing that p or doubting that p'. Now 'q' is ambiguous here, since it is open to two interpretations: (1) a counter-instance which appeals to a present state of affairs or knowledge (for example, 'Paris is the capital of France not of

Italy'); (2) a counter-instance which appeals to a putative future state of affairs or knowledge (for example, a possible response to someone who maintains that a Labour government would improve the state of the National Health Service might be: 'But what if a Labour government actually closed down more hospitals than its predecessor?').

Further implications now ensue, since we must ask whether the term 'indoctrinated' can be said to apply to either or both of the following: (1) someone who rejects counter-instances to his believing that p or doubting that p at the time at which they are offered to him, but who later accepts such counter-instances; (2) someone who rejects such counter instances at the time at which they are offered to him, and at all times in the future.

White[73] maintains that only a person who falls into the latter category can be called 'indoctrinated', since his beliefs are 'unshakable'. However, I wish to argue (along with Callan[74]) that we can call someone 'indoctrinated' even though this state of mind may only be a temporary one. Furthermore, for us to be able to refer to someone as 'indoctrinated', it is only necessary that he rejects any *present* counter-instance at the time at which it is offered to him. It is not necessary that such an individual rejects any putative future counter-instance. For example, let us say that I attempt to indoctrinate a child with a proposition such as 'There are ten rings around the planet Uranus'. In order for me to be able to say that I have succeeded (i.e. that the child has become indoctrinated), it is necessary only that the child rejects present counter-instances to the proposition (for example, 'Uranus has nine rings around it'). It is not incumbent upon him to reject a putative future counter-instance (for example, 'What if an eleventh ring were to be discovered in 1990?') This is an

important distinction of which O'Leary's analysis fails to take account. Accordingly, 'any q' in his schema must be amended to 'any present q'.

My definition of the 'achievement' aspect of 'indoctrination' can now be stated thus:

> X is indoctrinated with respect to p (a proposition or set of propositions) if, due to the teaching or influence of Y, X believes that p or doubts that p, in such a way that X is disposed to reject any present q which is offered as a counter-instance to believing that p or doubting that p.

Looked at from the point of view of the indoctrinator, the formula becomes:

> Y indoctrinates X with respect to p (a proposition or set of propositions) if Y teaches or influences X to believe that p or doubt that p, in such a way that X is disposed to reject any present q which is offered as a counter-instance to believing that p or doubting that p.

This formulation also implies the achievement of an indoctrinated state of mind. Rather than to suggest that that a teacher who failed to bring about such a state of mind in his pupils was engaged in indoctrinating them, it is preferable to say instead that he was *attempting* to indoctrinate them.[75] Or, in cases where we suppose that no intention to indoctrinate is involved on the part of the teacher, we might say that the teaching or influencing of his pupils was such that it *tended towards* an indoctrinatory outcome.[76]

In discussing whether or not being in an indoctrinated state of mind is desirable, O'Leary borrows a phrase from Gilbert Ryle[77] and suggests that when a person is in such a state he is not 'prepared for *variable* calls within certain ranges'. He continues:

> Whether being in a state of mind appropriate to indoctrination is educationally harmful, depends upon (1) whether knowing how to engage in a given activity is thought to be important and (2) whether we construe the activity that students are being taught

as subject to variation... suppose that knowing how to engage
in a given activity is regarded as important, but that the beliefs,
skills, and dispositions required for its performance are perfectly
suited to all circumstances and not subject to alteration. If we
knew that a given activity would require no modifications
in belief in order to perform it with a minimum degree of competence,
then there would be no educational objection to bringing about that
state of mind that is characteristic of being indoctrinated.[78]

O'Leary's discussion concentrates on the teaching of *activities* to
students. While engaging in such activities necessarily involves the acquisition
of certain beliefs, skills and dispositions, I see no reason why Ryle's passage
cannot be used to refer to the teaching of beliefs seen as ends in themselves.
Thus it becomes possible to say that when a given belief is not subject to
'*variable* calls within certain ranges' (i.e. when there exists, to the best of
our knowledge, no warrantable alternative to it), it is justifiable to
indoctrinate a child with that belief. The following is a representative sample
of beliefs with which children, on this criterion, may justifiably be
indoctrinated:

Les Demoiselles d'Avignon was Picasso's first Cubist painting.

The green pigment contained in the leaves of plants is called
chlorophyll.

The chemical symbol for copper is Cu.

The balance of visible trade is said to be in surplus if exports
exceed imports.

The poem 'Days' was written by Philip Larkin.

In French, 'lundi' means 'Monday'.

Rome is the capital of Italy.

The Lateran Treaty of 1929 established the Vatican City as an
independent sovereign state.

All triangles have three sides.

A minim is a musical note that equals two crotchets in time value.

Trotskyism is a form of Communism supporting the views of Leon Trotsky.

The Koran is the sacred book of Islam.

Ohm's Law is expressed in the equation: electromotive force (in volts) = current (in amperes) x resistance (in ohms).

Some comments must be made about the above list. To begin with, it will be noted that the propositions offered cover a wide range of topics. Indeed it is possible to indoctrinate beliefs (as expressed by propositions) in all school subjects, both at the primary and secondary level. Secondly, the beliefs to be indoctrinated are all *true* beliefs (i.e. they represent knowledge in various fields). Consequently, such counter-instances as may be offered (expressed as propositions) will be *false*. Thirdly, therefore, these (what I shall call category 'A') beliefs do not admit of justifiable alternatives (for example, one would not be warranted in maintaining that some triangles do not have three sides, or that acid will turn red litmus paper blue 'one day'). Category 'A' beliefs represent the state of knowledge as it is (or as we believe it to be) at the time we are engaged in indoctrinating them.

Let us now contrast the above propositions with a list of statements which express value judgements. For example:

Art is imaginative expression.

One should never steal under any circumstances.

The Labour Party offers the most credible alternative to a Conservative government.

The Pope is infallible when he speaks *ex cathedra* to define a doctrine concerning faith or morals.[79]

How are these two categories of statement to be distinguished? To begin with, one should say that as regards the latter set of beliefs (which I shall include in category 'B'), it is possible for two people who are both equally well-informed about the nature of aesthetics, morals, politics and religion, to disagree about them without either party necessarily being regarded as mistaken (or, at least, not mistaken in the sense in which someone who asserted that 'Rome is the capital of France' would be mistaken). In other words, each of the above statements expresses a value judgement to which a warrantable alternative may be offered.[80]

One might therefore suppose that to indoctrinate a child with a belief that expresses a value judgement represents an instance of unjustifiable indoctrination, since the child will be disposed to reject all counter-instances to it, some of which may be equally commendable. In short, he will not be 'prepared for *variable* calls within certain ranges'. With regard to the fields of aesthetics, politics, and religion, I would agree with this argument. In the moral domain, however, the question of whether it is justifiable to indoctrinate beliefs which express value judgements is more complex.

I want to argue that, as far as the child's early moral education is concerned, indoctrinating such beliefs is unavoidable. For example, Derek Wright notes that, according to Piaget, 'the child encounters rules from adults. The source confers a semi-mystical authority upon them; his inability to conceive of other points of view means that once he has accepted the rule into his own thought it cannot be changed or modified'.[81] In other words, a child's early moral development begins by his being inducted into the state of mind which I have characterized as 'indoctrinated'. Furthermore, as O'Hear suggests:

> surely, in all subjects, we begin by simply telling children
> things. Only later do they come to understand the reasons for
> what they are told, and to accept or reject things for them-
> selves on their own merits. In morality, as in other areas, there
> is nothing inconsistent or paradoxical in first laying down
> things that have to be accepted and later leading pupils to
> see and evaluate the reasons for what they have been told.
> Indeed, it is hard to see how reasons could be appreciated
> for what they are unless they were seen as supporting or
> justifying propositions that were already understood and
> (provisionally) accepted.[82]

The moral beliefs with which a child is indoctrinated in his early years come

under a third category, which I shall call category 'C' beliefs.

Whether it is justifiable to indoctrinate children with moral beliefs in

the later years of their childhood is a difficult question, and one to which I

cannot do justice here. Nevertheless, some brief comments are required. It may

be that there are certain moral beliefs concerning which we might want older

children (and indeed adults) to have closed minds. For example, having

attempted to indoctrinate a group of children with a belief such as 'torturing

animals is morally wrong', with the result that they accepted the belief, we

should not be happy if those children considered that 're-opening the issue

[was] a permanent possibility'.[83]

Whether indoctrinating a particular moral belief in this way is

warrantable will depend on the arguments which are, or can be, brought forward

to support or refute it.[84] These will include considerations such as the non-

viability of possible counter-instances to the belief. With regard to beliefs

such as 'torturing animals is morally wrong', it may be thought that there are

no counter-instances which we would wish a child to countenance. Such a belief

may therefore be allowed to remain in category 'C' and a teacher can justifiably

indoctrinate it. But in the case of a belief such as 'one should never steal

under any circumstances', it may be possible (and desirable) to make children aware (at least those who have achieved a certain level of intellectual maturity) that warrantable counter-instances to that belief may be offered. At this point, such a belief no longer belongs in category 'C'. Rather it must be regarded as a category 'B' belief, with which the children referred to above must no longer be indoctrinated.[85]

Casement[86] considers that moral education cannot avoid being indoctrinatory. Faced with this, he suggests that we ask a number of questions of any approach to such education. The most important among these are: '"With what beliefs are students indoctrinated?"' and '"How undesirable is it if they are indoctrinated with these beliefs?"'[87] Casement acknowledges that 'there will be disagreement about what constitutes a more undesirable case of indoctrination'.[88] However, this 'seems to be something we have to live with. Indoctrination is a complicated matter, and for dealing with it there are no easy answers.'[89]

At this stage, it is necessary to make some comments about the consequences for primary education which follow from the above analysis. It is evident that the advent of the National Curriculum will provide opportunities for teachers to engage in both justifiable and unjustifiable indoctrination. In order to illustrate this argument, I shall concentrate on the proposals which have so far been made for the teaching of history.[90]

Towards the beginning of this chapter, I examined 'indoctrination' in the context of the political restructuring which has taken place across Eastern Europe. Several of the countries mentioned have reorganised their history syllabuses to encompass the study of a broader range of subject matter. This

has been interpreted by Western observers as constituting a significant shift in emphasis - away from the ills of indoctrination and towards the benefits of education. How paradoxical it is then to see British Government Ministers welcoming undoubted advances which are taking place abroad, while at the same time seeking to exercise control over the teaching of history in their own schools.

That this is so is indicated by the delay which attended the publication of the final report of the working group. Apparently, this was due to the dissatisfaction with it expressed by the Prime Minister. According to Ian Nash and Lindsay Darking: 'The chief bone of contention remains the apparent lack of emphasis on specific historical knowledge, such as dates, events and people. The working group has consistently resisted pressure from Ministers to make this a dominant feature.'[91]

Although the final report 'contains a long list of facts for children to learn',[92] and suggests that pupils should devote fifty per cent of the allotted time to the study of British history (whereas the interim report recommended only forty per cent), the Prime Minister has remained critical. Consequently, the Education Secretary, John MacGregor, has asked the School Examinations and Assessment Council to offer its own view on the proposals which have been made for assessment. Not surprisingly, this has led to an attack being made on MacGregor by members of the working group.[93]

As a result of the political influence which has been exerted by the Government in this matter, a debate about the nature and purpose of history teaching has begun in earnest.[94] For example, Jack Straw, Labour's Education spokesman, has written to professors of history and to heads of history

departments in schools, suggesting that Mrs. Thatcher was attempting "'to make [the history curriculum] much more a vehicle for indoctrination than for education"'.[95] In Straw's view, the Government's demand that children should be tested specifically on facts is central to 'the nature of history itself, and whether there is a single truth about the past or a number of truths'.[96] That selecting facts to be taught can be an arbitrary and, indeed, a dangerous matter, is shown by Straw's choice of the following as being the most important in the nineteenth century: 'the Six Acts, The Tolpuddle Martyrs, the Reform Act of 1832, the Secret Ballot Act, the Match Girls' Strike and the foundation of the Labour Party in 1900'.[97] Mrs. Thatcher's choice, suggested Straw, might be: 'the battle of Waterloo, the Peterloo massacre, the repeal of the Corn Laws, the Crimean War, Disraeli's Public Health Act and the Boer War'.[98]

It is clear from the above account that history teaching can result in both justifiable and unjustifiable indoctrination taking place in the classroom. As I argued earlier, to acquire facts which properly belong in category 'A' is both necessary and desirable. This should take place in history as well as in all other subjects. However, to offer children a one-sided diet of historical events is to make them susceptible to bias and to unjustifiable indoctrination. When children are presented with a course on 'The British Empire in Africa, 1880-1905', during which they will learn about Cecil Rhodes, Paul Kruger and the Boer War, the onlooker may not be worried initially. When he discovers that 'by restricting African history almost exclusively to the nineteenth century,' the suggested curriculum 'contains nothing about the roots of modern African nationalism',[99] he may begin to worry.

Complacency about the nature of 'indoctrination' and a presumption that it is the preserve of those whose beliefs we do not share, can only lead to the intellectual impoverishment of our children.

In conclusion, I suggest that if we see indoctrination in the classroom in terms of the *results* of particular teaching transactions (including reference, where necessary, to the notion of 'influence'), then our perception of 'education' is likely to be altered radically. For now, not only will Communists, Roman Catholics, and pacificists be labelled as 'indoctrinators', but also teachers of mathematics, science and history. The debate will then shift to the discussion of *which sorts* of indoctrination are acceptable. Much of traditional schooling is indoctrinatory, and we must face up to this. It is a testimony to the 'success' of this schooling that many people believe indoctrination to be exemplified in Communism, or pacificism, but not in their own beliefs. .

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45. Hare, R.M., *op. cit*; White, J. P., 'Indoctrination and intentions', in Snook, I. A. (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 117-130; Snook, I. A., *Indoctrination and Education*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1972; Beehler, R., 'The schools and indoctrination', *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1985, pp. 261-272.

46. Cooper, D. E. 'Intentions and indoctrination', *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1973, pp. 43-55; Beehler, R. 'The schools and indoctrination', *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1985, pp. 261-272.

47. Cooper, D. E., *ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

49. For example, it seems possible for a teacher with no religious convictions (and who therefore lacks the requisite intention), to indoctrinate his pupils with a belief such as 'Jesus is the Son of God', during a history lesson on the founding of Christianity. Since we should also call such a teacher 'sincere', I propose that the term be understood hereinafter to incorporate examples of this sort.

50. Snook, I. A., *Indoctrination and Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

51. Cooper, D. E., *op. cit.*, p. 45. According to P. T. O'Leary ('Indoctrination and the indoctrinated state of mind', in Cochrane, D. B. and Schiralli, M. (Eds.), *Philosophy of Education: Canadian Perspectives*, Collier-Macmillan, Ontario, 1982, p. 75), the phrase 'believing regardless of the evidence' can be interpreted in two ways: (1) believing without evidence; (2) believing despite the evidence. When Cooper (p. 45) speaks of believing 'in the face of the evidence', he is referring to (2). The 'sincere' indoctrinator would, I suggest, be as unwilling for his students to believe that p is true *without* evidence (here interpreted as 'good reasons') as he would were they to believe that p is true *despite* the evidence.

52. Snook, I. A., *Indoctrination and Education, op. cit.*, p. 50.

53. Cooper, D. E., *op. cit.*; Kleinig, J., *op. cit.*

54. Atkinson, R. F. , 'Indoctrination and moral education', in Snook, I. A. (Ed.) *op. cit.*, pp. 55-66; Moore, W., 'Indoctrination and democratic method', in Snook, I. A. (Ed.) *op. cit.*, pp. 93-100; Barrow, R., *Moral Philosophy for Education*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1975; Mitchell, B. G., 'Indoctrination', in *The Fourth R: Durham Report on Religious Education*, Appendix B, S.P.C.K., London, 1970; Benson, T. L., 'The concept of "indoctrination": a philosophical study', Ph. D Thesis, The Johns Hopkins University, 1975.

55. Benson, T. L., *ibid.*

56. Smart, P., 'The concept of indoctrination', in Langford, G. and O'Connor, D. J. (Eds.), *New Essays in the Philosophy of Education*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, p. 37.

57. Hepburn, R. W., 'The arts and the education of feeling and emotion', in Dearden, R. F., Hirst, P. H. and Peters, R. S. (Eds.) *Education and the Development of Reason*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1972, p. 496.

58. Mitchell, B. G., *op. cit.*; Moore, W., *op. cit.*; Wagner, P. A. Jr., 'Indoctrination and moral education', Ph. D Dissertation, University of Missouri, 1978.

59. Hare, R. M., *op. cit.*; Kilpatrick, W. H., *op. cit.*; Thompson, K, *Education and Philosophy: a practical approach*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1972.

60. Cohen, B., *Education and the Individual*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 51.

61. O'Leary, P. T., 'The indoctrinated state of mind', *Philosophy of Education 1979*, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, Normal, Illinois, pp. 295-303; O'Leary, P. T., 'Indoctrination and the indoctrinated state of mind', *op. cit.*

62. O'Leary, P. T., 'The indoctrinated state of mind', *ibid.*, p. 295.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 299.

64. O'Leary, P. T., 'Indoctrination and the indoctrinated state of mind', *op. cit.*, p. 77.

65. My aim will be to show that indoctrination is not necessarily indefensible.

66. See reference 51.

67. Snook, I. A., *Indoctrination and Education*, p. 40.

68. Degenhardt, M. A. B., 'Indoctrination', in Lloyd, D. I. (Ed.), *Philosophy and the Teacher*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976, p. 26.

69. *Ibid.*.

70. Glock, N. C., '"Indoctrination": some pejorative senses and practical proscriptions', Ed. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1975, p. 11.

71. Hare, W., *Open-mindedness and Education*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1979, p. 66.

72. Beehler, R., *op. cit.*; Glock, N., *op. cit.*.

73. White, J. P., *op. cit.*

74. Callan, E. 'McLaughlin on parental rights', *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1985, pp. 111-118.

75. Kleinig, J., *op. cit.*, p. 59.

76. Compare with Beehler, R. *op. cit.*, p. 266.

77. Ryle, G., *The Concept of Mind*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983, p. 141.

78. O'Leary, P. T., 'Indoctrination and the indoctrinated state of mind', *op. cit.*, p. 80.

79. I do not wish to suggest that value judgements are made only in the fields of aesthetics, morals, politics and religion. Rather, my list is meant to serve as an illustration of the sorts of belief which are to be included in this category.

80. The question arises here as to whether a viable differentiation can be made between statements of fact and statements of value. Since a discussion of this problem lies outside the bounds of my thesis, suffice it to say that I believe that the drawing of such a distinction is possible, and indeed warranted, in primary and secondary education. See, for example, Warnock, G. J., *Contemporary Moral Philosophy*, Macmillan,

London, 1967, pp. 63-64.

81. Wright, D., *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971, p. 158.

82. O'Hear, A., *Education, Society and Human Nature*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, pp. 123-124.

83. Hare, W., 'The open-minded teacher', *Teaching Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1976, p. 30. Hare has italicized 're-opening'.

84. Such is also the case concerning those beliefs with which the very young child is indoctrinated.

85. Also included in category 'B' are those beliefs which it is unjustifiable to indoctrinate since they are expressed by propositions which are false. Examples are: 'Oscar Wilde was born in 1859', 'New York is situated on the west coast of the United States of America', 'the sun revolves around the earth', etc.

86. Casement, W. R., 'Indoctrination and contemporary approaches to moral education', Ph. D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1980.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

89. *Ibid.*

90. This thesis was submitted shortly after the publication of the final report of the National Curriculum History Working Group. As I have not yet received a copy of the report, my comments on it are based on summaries given in national newspapers.

91. Nash, N. and Darking, L., 'Thatcher's disapproval holds up history report', *The Times Educational Supplement*, 30 March, 1990, p. 1.

92. Judd, J., *op. cit.*

93. Crequer, N., 'Minister attacked on history lessons', *The Independent*, 6 April, 1990, p. 6.

94. See Clark, J., 'Is our history unteachable?', *The Daily Telegraph*, 26 March, 1990, p. 19; Jenkins, P., 'Ways to satisfy the examiner', *The Independent*, 10 April, 1990, p. 19; Hackett, G., 'Let's not mess with history', *The Independent*, 22 February, 1990, p. 21.

95. Judd, J., *op. cit.*

96. *Ibid.*

97. *Ibid.*

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER THREE

Arguments for the Introduction of Philosophy into Primary Schools

Although in recent times philosophy has made a welcome appearance in certain A-level syllabuses, no systematic efforts have yet been made to encourage the development of philosophical thinking in primary schools.' In this chapter, I shall offer a rationale for such an endeavour.

However, before doing so, I offer the following conception of 'philosophy' which will inform the arguments provided below. Philosophizing, I suggest, involves a thorough attempt to develop, clarify, justify and apply our thinking. However, a sceptical teacher might ask: surely this is already going on in schools? What can philosophy possibly add to improve existing practice? To this it might be replied that two subjects which come under the 'umbrella' term 'philosophy', namely logic and ethics, are not studied in any systematic way in primary schools, or indeed in the vast majority of secondary schools. I believe that the time has now come to remedy this deficiency.

I begin by endorsing the view shared by a number of reports, namely that children's thinking and valuing processes should be fostered within existing curricula. For example, the Schools Council Working Paper *Primary Practice* suggests that children should acquire 'a reasoned set of attitudes, values and beliefs'.[2] The HMI report *The Curriculum from 5 to 16* refers to the need for schools 'to help pupils to develop lively enquiring minds [and] the ability to question and argue rationally'.[3] Finally, the Discussion Paper *Education 10-14 in Scotland* argues that 'pupils should be encouraged to discuss moral issues

appropriate to their age and stage of development, to offer relevant reasons in support of what they judge to be right and to attend to reasons offered by others'.[4]

While these documents and others recommend that children's reasoning skills should be promoted, scant regard is given to suggesting ways in which this might be accomplished. One might suppose (as the last quote above suggests) that classroom discussion is the most appropriate medium through which to foster such skills. Yet this is precisely what the authors of *The Curriculum from 5 to 16* suggest is being 'squeezed out' of the curriculum.[5] In order to remedy this deficiency, I wish to suggest that we need look no further than to philosophy itself.

However, before curriculum innovation of the kind which I outline below can be countenanced, it is necessary to answer an important question: how is it possible to introduce philosophy into primary schools given that no mention is made of this subject in National Curriculum documents? While it is true that the importance of philosophical thinking is not acknowledged in these publications, nevertheless it is possible to argue that the need for such thinking is *implied* therein. I shall examine this issue in greater depth in chapter five. However, in order to illustrate my general argument, I propose to focus on one important educational issue: the role of the schools in educating pupils for responsible citizenship. The idea that schools should prepare children to live as future citizens is one that is now becoming increasingly prominent. In what follows, I shall elucidate the notion of 'education for citizenship' and shall argue that an adequate conception of such education must include the explicit teaching of thinking and valuing.

A concern that schools should provide children with the knowledge, skills, attitudes and dispositions which they will require in order to play a full part as citizens in the society to which they belong and, indeed, in the wider world, is not recent in origin. As the authors of *The National Curriculum 5-16: A Consultation Document* suggest: 'Since Sir James Callaghan's speech as Prime Minister at Ruskin College in 1976, successive Secretaries of State have aimed to achieve agreement with their partners in the education service on policies for the school curriculum which will develop the potential of all pupils and equip them for the responsibilities of citizenship... in tomorrow's world.'[6]

Nevertheless, an increasing emphasis is now being placed on the importance of citizenship,[7] allied to calls for a return to 'traditional values'. Such is the importance given to this theme that several Government Ministers have added their voices in its support. For example, the former Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, has called for 'lessons in how to be a good citizen... to be made a GCSE exam subject'.[8] Mrs. Angela Rumbold, the Minister of State for Education, has asked 'the national curriculum subject working groups to pay attention to cross-curricular themes that [are] "important in ensuring that citizenship and awareness of other people's needs are part and parcel of the lessons which are given to children"'.[9] At the 1988 Conservative Party conference, Hurd suggested that 'The challenge of the 1990s is to rekindle our strong tradition of citizenship,'[10] and Kenneth Baker, formerly the Education Secretary, urged the need for 'a moral code in schools to bring back traditional values'.[11]

Now it might be thought that arguments which suggest that teachers should accord a greater importance to a consideration of moral matters are by no means novel or controversial. Surely, the reader will suggest, schools have a

duty to foster this important aspect of human experience. However, it is regrettable that the recent emphasis on 'citizenship' and 'traditional values' is not indicative of a desire by their proponents to promote effective moral *education*. Rather, the goal aimed at is efficient moral *training*. No doubt the survey of *British Social Attitudes* which revealed that 'More than four out of five people believe schools should teach children to obey authority, while two-thirds now believe young people today do not have enough respect for traditional British values,'[2] might be adduced in support of a return to 'moral traditionalism'.[3] In the present educational climate, it came as no surprise to teachers who had obtained their copy of *The Times Educational Supplement* on 28 August, 1987, to read the front-page headline: '"Assess schools by behaviour," says DES'.[4]

At this point, one must ask: Are advocates of 'citizenship' and 'traditional values' merely proposing that children should be inducted into certain prevalent modes of behaviour and belief? If this is what is required, the moral educator becomes redundant, since it his job to develop those reasoning skills which are a necessary prerequisite for the making of sound moral judgements. Method rather than content should be uppermost in the mind of such an educator.[5] The teaching of reasoning (or thinking) skills becomes obsolete when *behaviour* is the focus of a teacher's attention, simply because successful behaviour modification does not require the person being modified to have developed reasoning abilities at all. Indeed, as all good generals know, an army performs more successfully when the required thinking is undertaken by certain key (and usually senior) personnel.

This observation is relevant in discussing Anthony O'Hear's contribution to the debate on education for citizenship which is now taking place. In commenting on the view that such education might involve 'learning about one's civil, political and social entitlements, and about such things as the European Convention on Human Rights',[6] O'Hear argues as follows: 'The free men of Athens who fought for their city and their country at Marathon and at Salamis did not have their heads filled with notions of their entitlements or their armour bursting with charters outlining their rights. They did have a love of their city and its laws and traditions which make them even today models of true citizenship.'[7] He concludes his article by warning readers that they should be aware of the indoctrinatory possibilities which citizenship education may provide for teachers of different political persuasions.

Once again, it can be shown that adopting a myopic view of 'indoctrination' can seriously damage the credibility of those arguments which are advanced against it. O'Hear fails to note that the Athenian 'models of true citizenship', whom he cites, were themselves a product of indoctrination. This is so precisely because, as O'Hear acknowledges, they lacked the critical, reflective dispositions which he wishes to discredit and which education for citizenship should seek to promote.

I want to argue that teachers cannot concern themselves simply with children's behaviour and the formation of certain fixed beliefs for two reasons. Firstly, it sells pupils short, since it robs them of their intellectual right to think things through for themselves. Secondly, such a policy is unlikely to achieve the goal at which it is aimed. Conformity of behaviour depends upon the overt influence of the teacher, in whose absence a child's conduct is likely

once more to be regulated by his or her own impulses. Since the code of behaviour (and accompanying beliefs) which were imposed have not been adopted voluntarily by rational means, we must not be surprised if they are rejected by pupils at the first available opportunity. Therefore, I suggest that a minimal condition of any adequate notion of 'education for citizenship' is that it must incorporate the teaching of thinking and valuing. In short, young children should be introduced to philosophy.

Before outlining how this might be accomplished, we need to counter the argument which proponents of World Studies may offer, namely that existing materials are adequate to promote effective teaching about values issues. In order to refute this claim, I shall focus on Fisher and Hicks's *World Studies 8-13: A Teacher's Handbook*, which enjoys a good deal of popularity in many schools. In a section entitled 'Questions and Values', the authors suggest that:

> If pupils are to grow more aware of their own values and
> priorities they... should be provided with opportunities
> [to] *choose, prize and act*, that is: (a) choose freely;
> (b) choose from alternatives; (c) choose after thoughtful
> consideration of the consequences of each alternative;
> (d) cherish and be happy with their choice; (e) be willing
> to affirm their choice in front of others; (f) do something
> as a result of their choice; (g) do this repeatedly, as
> part of their everyday life.[18]

In evaluating a particular action, children are enjoined to ask themselves three questions: 'Who gains and who loses? Is it wise or unwise? Is it just or unjust?'[19]

While Fisher and Hicks are to be commended for encouraging pupils to engage in discussions which require them to clarify and develop their values, nevertheless it is the case that before children can be expected to make informed value judgements they must be able to recognise what, in fact, is to

count as a *moral* argument. However, materials promoting a consideration of the nature of morality are conspicuous by their absence in *World Studies 8-13: A Teacher's Handbook*. An unfortunate consequence of failing to provide pupils with a grounding in moral philosophy is that advocates of World Studies leave themselves open to the popular charge of 'indoctrination'. Far from seeking to rebut this charge, some teachers are only too keen to admit to it. David Bridges summarizes their approach thus:

> 'Why should teachers not advocate, proselytise, argue,
> persuade with all the skill at their command on behalf of
> those convictions which they themselves believe to be so
> important? If some want to call such an approach
> indoctrinatory, let us not be put off by its overtones
> of disapproval but seek plainly and expertly to secure
> firmly in children's consciousness principles which we
> believe to be for the ultimate good of themselves and
> of the world community.'[20]

It seems to me that there are two main arguments which may be advanced against this stance. Firstly, it is difficult to see how it differs (except in content) from the approach advocated by the moral traditionalists. In neither case are children likely to be encouraged to engage in a critical appraisal of *all* values.[21] Secondly, teachers who are convinced that World Studies can be taught in a non-indoctrinatory manner are unlikely to be given an opportunity to demonstrate this, since those who suggest that such teaching necessarily constitutes indoctrination may win the debate by default (i.e. without offering, to begin with, a convincing analysis of the concept of 'indoctrination'). It would be a pity, for example, if the critique of World Studies made by Roger Scruton and his colleagues was allowed to pass without careful scrutiny, since, as I have argued earlier, it is clearly unsatisfactory.

In chapter two, I offered a criterion of 'indoctrination' which can be applied to all values and I suggested that, in certain circumstances, it is justifiable for teachers to indoctrinate their pupils. However, given that this is acceptable, I would argue that proponents of World Studies should eschew any attempt to indoctrinate children who have achieved a certain level of intellectual maturity whereby they are able to appreciate that warrantable alternatives to value judgements may be offered.[22] For example, once a capacity to recognize competing moral claims has become evident, it is necessary to replace the moral indoctrination which is a necessary element in the upbringing of young children,[23] with an introduction to moral *reasoning*.

A discussion of the nature of ethical discourse focuses on questions such as: what is a moral judgement? How can a moral judgement be distinguished from, for example, an argument motivated by self-interest? The rationale for this approach is that while teachers often encourage children to 'choose, prize and act' in the moral domain, very seldom do these activities arise from any explicit consideration of what is involved in making *moral* judgements. I shall examine this issue in some depth in chapter seven. Suffice it to say here that if World Studies is to make the greatest possible impact in our classrooms, and if moral *education* is to be promoted through its activities, then there is a need for pupils to be able to make *informed* value judgements. The development of philosophical thinking is central to this task.

However, before advocating the introduction of philosophy into the primary school curriculum, the arguments of those who assert that philosophy is for adults and not for children will have to be countered. This view is by no means recent in origin, having been espoused by both Plato and Aristotle. In the

Republic Plato argues that dialectic [philosophy] can only be introduced to those who have completed many years of training and study and who have reached the age of thirty.[24] He suggests that to introduce philosophy at an earlier age is fraught with difficulties:

> And there's one great precaution you can take, which is
> to stop their getting a taste of [philosophical discussions]
> too young. You must have noticed how young men, after their
> first taste of argument, are always contradicting people just
> for the fun of it; they imitate those whom they hear cross-
> examining each other, and themselves cross-examine other
> people, like puppies who love to pull and tear at anyone
> within reach.[25]

Aristotle argues that the young lack the necessary experience of life to profit from his lectures on politics (to which ethics is a kind of introduction).[26] In their contributions to philosophical discussions, the young merely echo the pronouncements of others. This is in contrast to their ability to become competent in mathematics, the truths of which are derived without recourse to experience:

> One might further ask why it is that a lad may become a
> mathematician, but not a philosopher or a natural scientist.
> Probably it is because the former subject deals with
> abstractions, whereas the principles of the two latter
> are grasped only as the result of experience; and the
> young repeat the doctrines of these without actually
> believing them, but in mathematics the reason why is
> not hard to see.[27]

More recently, the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, in arguing that children are egocentric, seems to suggest that they are incapable of engaging in philosophical discourse.[28]

At the present time, several well-known professional philosophers have argued against the possible inclusion of philosophy in the curricula of schools. For example, in her book *A Common Policy for Education*, Mary Warnock suggests

that philosophy is properly the preserve of the university undergraduate. Her comments are at times both Platonic and Aristotelian in flavour. To begin with, we are told that philosophy is not 'an appropriate subject for study by pupils at school.'[29] Warnock offers the following statement to support this thesis: 'I do not think it possible to study philosophy profitably without entering fairly deeply into the history of the subject, and for this there is not time at school, nor could it be a subject that would interest more than a few pupils. Instant philosophy, philosophy that springs into being in the bath or on the television screen, is fun, but it can hardly be serious.'[30] Rather than being introduced to philosophy at school, Warnock says it is preferable for pupils to acquire a thorough grounding in and sound understanding of traditional subjects such as mathematics, literature, history and so on, to which the tools of philosophy may be applied at a later date.

What are we to make of Warnock's arguments? It seems to me that they are unconvincing because they contain assumptions which are both unargued and untenable. We need to ask Warnock the following questions:

(1) In order to engage in philosophy, why is it necessary to enter 'fairly deeply into the history of the subject'?

(2) Why should philosophy be thought to be of interest only to a few pupils?

(3) Must philosophy be *serious* to the exclusion of *fun*?

With regard to the first question, I see no reason to assert that children who are being introduced to philosophy must imbibe, at the same time, a deep knowledge of the history of the discipline. Indeed, I can think of nothing which is more likely to provoke disinterest in the neophyte philosopher than this approach. On the one hand, the pupil is asked to engage in a discussion of

ideas which are both new and exciting. On the other, he or she is to be given a history lesson involving a 'roll-call' of famous names accompanied by a résumé of their main texts and theories. This is not to denigrate the importance of the history of philosophy. It is simply to indicate that philosophy is first and foremost an *activity* - it is something one *does*. Furthermore, as we shall see later, children are fascinated initially by philosophical inquiry precisely because it is so different from anything else which they are offered in the school curriculum. To identify this new subject too closely with a more familiar (and perhaps unpalatable) discipline is to run the risk of the former being rejected by the pupil along with the latter.

An undue emphasis on the history of the subject raises one further difficulty which is likely to hamper the successful introduction of philosophy into the classroom, namely that teachers may believe they are teaching philosophy when, in fact, all that is taking place is that pupils are passively acquiring facts. As a sixth-former, I took a General Studies course in 'Philosophy' which turned out to be little more than a study of ancient Greek history coupled with a single lecture on Plato. At no time was I asked to read a text or to evaluate an argument.

Protagonists of 'children's philosophy' believe that it is possible (and indeed desirable) to engage in philosophical discussions with young children without requiring them to be imbued with an historical knowledge of the discipline. According to Lipman and Sharp:

> Having observed few children eager to browse through Kant or even to
> peruse the livelier passages of Aristotle, having met with little
> success in our efforts to convey directly the impact and urgency of
> the greatest happiness principle, we have been led to draw the
> irresistible inference that there is an unbridgeable chasm between
> the disciplined reflection, which is philosophy, and the unbridled

wondering characteristic of childhood. It is clear that the
plausibility of this inference is now under attack.[31]

While I shall examine Matthew Lipman's 'Philosophy for Children' programme

in the next chapter, the essence of his approach can be described thus:

> there are ways of engaging children in philosophical activities long
> before they are competent to read anything in the traditional
> philosophical repertoire. The paradoxes of appearance and reality,
> permanence and change, unity and diversity, are enchanting to them
> from early childhood, perhaps a decade or two before they are
> prepared to tackle Heraclitus or Parmenides... Children for whom the
> formal presentations of philosophy are anathema may find hints of
> the same ideas entrancing when embedded in the vehicle of a
> children's story.[32]

Turning to the second question, Warnock offers us no evidence to support

her contention that philosophy will be of interest only to a small minority of

children. Indeed the entire history of 'Philosophy for Children' serves to

refute this argument. One has only to witness young children discussing

philosophical issues to see how keen they are to talk, to debate, to reason, in

short, to particpate in what Matthew Lipman and his colleagues refer to as a

'community of inquiry'.[33]

On the other hand, one might understand all too well how only a few

children might become attracted to 'philosophy' as articulated by Warnock. On

her view, whatever else one is doing when one is discussing philosophical

issues, one is certainly not having *fun!* Yet, one of the reasons why most of the

children to whom I taught philosophy looked forward to our sessions is

precisely because they enjoyed themselves so much. In arguing for the existence

of a dichotomy between those activities, which are serious and those which are

'fun', Warnock reminds one of the stern elementary school teacher who

demarcated rigidly between 'work' and 'play', and who saw the latter as

important only insofar as it enabled children to engage in the former with renewed vigour. Froebel's epithets 'Play is the child's work' and 'Play is a serious business' should be remembered in the context of this debate.

In conclusion, it should be noted that what Warnock offers us is simply her own conception of what the study of philosophy should involve. This view must stand or fall on its ability to compete with alternative conceptions such as those offered by Matthew Lipman and myself. The purpose of the rest of this thesis will be to show that Warnock's standpoint is both narrow and restrictive. It encapsulates neither what philosophy can be nor what children can achieve.

Let us now examine the views of another professional philosopher, Roger Scruton, who also argues that philosophy should not be taught in schools. In an interview with representatives of the journal *Cogito*, Scruton argues as follows:

> I am against teaching philosophy in schools... It is fine to teach people to question, but first you must give them some certainties. Without certainties the whole point of intellectual endeavour would never be grasped. Unfortunately, and in our time increasingly, . school subjects are not being taught as hard fact but as areas of discussion and opinionated vagueness: that is to say, introducing into the classroom issues which can only be understood properly at the level of postgraduate research.[34]

To this it might be argued that a great many subjects are capable of being understood properly only at postgraduate level. Presumably, however, Scruton would not wish to see them removed from the curricula of primary and secondary schools.

Despite the views of those discussed above, it is by no means universally accepted that children are incapable of 'doing philosophy'. In describing what was perhaps his first experience of philosophical thinking, Leo Tolstoy shows

that pondering the so-called 'eternal questions' does not belong exclusively to

adulthood:

> I can scarcely beleve what were the favourite and
> most constant subjects of my meditations during my
> boyhood - they were so incompatible with my age and
> position. During the course of the year... all the
> abstract questions concerning the destination of man,
> the future life, the immortality of the soul...
> presented themselves to my mind with such clearness,
> and in such a striking light, that I even tried to
> apply them to life, fancying that I was the *first*
> to discover such great and useful truths.[35]

The best way to refute arguments such as those offered to us by Plato,

Aristotle and Piaget, is to show in some detail that children are able to

engage, in a competent fashion, in philosophical debate and argument. This I

attempt to show in chapter five. Presuming for the moment that children are

capable of thinking philosophically, we must now ask: what arguments are there

for introducing philosophy into primary schools?

To begin with, it has been suggested that while much has been done to

teach children to think about mathematics, history and so on, little attempt has

been made to teach them to think about their own thought processes and about

those of others.[36] Such reasoning as the child performs is taught through

traditional subjects, but, as Lipman asserts: 'While reading and mathematics are

disciplines that contribute usefully to good thinking, they cannot *suffice* to

produce it. Something more is needed.'[37]

Before examining what this 'something' might entail, we should note that

omitting to offer children explicit teaching which is aimed at fostering their

thinking and valuing processes, may have serious implications for their

intellectual development. For example, we might ask why it is that children who

enter school at four or five years of age questioning many things, often emerge from a period of compulsory schooling questioning very little.[38] One consequence of limiting the study of philosophy to secondary schools, colleges and universities, is that the thought processes of students will already have been formed by the time an introduction to critical thinking becomes possible.[39] According to Levine, such thought processes are 'the standard constructs of the social community'.[40]

Although in recent times philosophy has made a welcome appearance in certain A-level syllabuses, no systematic efforts have yet been made to encourage the development of philosophical thinking in primary schools. Why? Answers to this question are, I believe, twofold. To begin with, as Gareth Matthews suggests: 'Most adults don't like their natural advantage over children [being] subverted. So they discourage a child from pursuing questions to which neither they, nor anyone they know, can give definitive answers.'[41] Secondly, Matthew Lipman asks why it is that we give our children sex education (i.e. discourse on their bodily functions) and yet we are not concerned to teach them about their own thoughts (i.e. discourse on their mental functions). His answer is clear: 'One cannot help suspecting the reason: mindlessness does not threaten the established order; thoughtfulness might. An irrational social order is threatened far more by rationality than by irrationality.'[42]

Further arguments may be advanced in favour of the introduction of philosophy into primary schools. The protagonists of such arguments point out what they see as being the academic, personal and social benefits derived by children who have been exposed to philosophy in the classroom. For example, Bruce Burnes[43] and Barry Curtis[44] both report in some detail on research which

shows that children who had studied *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* made significant improvements in reading and critical reasoning. Additionally, Burnes states that teachers involved in his project noticed an 'improvement in the children's social skills, particularly in respect to other children's rights'.[45]

Al Thompson has argued that philosophy can improve children's performance in 'reading, mathematics, science, language arts, and the social studies'.[46] Eileen Kenna writes that a philosophy course is being used in a district of Pennsylvania to help children to make important moral and social decisions: 'School officials hope that if kids feel good about themselves and use the reasoning skills they develop in philosophy class to figure out the consequences of drug use, they'll be less likely to consume alcohol, marijuana or other drugs.'[47] Glen Ebisch, a trainer of teachers in Lipman's 'Philosophy for Children' programme, notes that inner-city children, who are often lacking in basic educational skills, did not find the logic sections in *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* to be especially difficult. In fact, 'some individuals who otherwise rarely participated in class on any subject were the most capable at solving the logic problems and enjoyed doing so'.[48]

We live in a world in which, perhaps more than ever before, there is a need for people to think clearly. Politicians, religious authorities, advertisers and the media constantly tell us what we should buy, think and even hope for. While arguments offered to us are often of a moral sort, they are sometimes simply logical. Consequently, children must be able to recognise and assess examples of moral and logical reasoning. This can best be achieved through the teaching of logic and ethics, which should begin in the primary school.

Philosophical training must be given to children at an early age, since without it they will merely appropriate the standard (and often unreasoned) beliefs and opinions prevalent in their immediate environment. The teaching of philosophy to children can do much to counteract the prejudices and uncritical thinking which are a fact of everyday adult life. In this respect, such training is likely to act as an effective antidote to unjustifiable indoctrination. It is the responsibility of the philosopher, to initiate this teaching.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Philosophy for Children in the United States of America

In recent years, in the United States, there has emerged what has been called 'a new branch of philosophy'[1]: philosophy for children, which has established itself as an important part of the curriculum in American elementary schools and elsewhere. The main pioneer of this new field of philosophy is Matthew Lipman, who, with others, was responsible for founding the 'Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children' (IAPC) at Montclair State College, New Jersey. My purpose in this chapter will be to offer a critical examination of Lipman's 'Philosophy for Children' programme. I shall also be concerned to evaluate the work of Gareth Matthews, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, who has also done much useful work in this area.

To begin with, we should note that, according to Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan, the central aim of 'Philosophy for Children' 'is to help children learn how to think for themselves'.[2] How is this to be accomplished? How are children to be introduced to philosophical thinking?

Lipman's programme consists of a number of philosophical novels, which are accompanied by teachers' manuals. One such novel, *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*, has been introduced as a classroom text for many ten-to-eleven year old American children. In what was known as the first British consultation with Matthew Lipman, held at Edge Hill College of Higher Education in July 1989, the

author described *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* as the 'pivotal' novel in the following schema:[3]

Philosophy for Children Programme (IAPC)

Age	Children's novel	Instructional manual	Philosophical area	Educational area
5/7 yrs	Elfie	Getting our thoughts together	Reasoning and thinking	Exploring experience
7/8 yrs	Kio and Gus	Wondering at the world	Philosophy of nature	Environmental education
8/9 yrs	Pixie	Looking for meaning	Philosophy of language	Language and arts
10/11 yrs	Harry	Philosophical inquiry	Epistemology and logic	Thinking skills
12/13 yrs	Lisa	Ethical inquiry	Philosophy of value	Moral education
14/15 yrs	Suki	Writing: how and why	Philosophy of art	Writing and literature
16+ yrs	Mark	Social inquiry	Social philosophy	Social studies

In *Philosophy in the Classroom*, the following rationale for the novels is given:

> The books are works of fiction in which the characters eke out for
> themselves the laws of reasoning and the discovery of alternative
> philosophical views that have been presented through the centuries.
> The method of discovery for each of the children in the novels is
> dialogue coupled with reflection. This dialogue with peers, with
> teachers, with parents, grandparents and relatives, alternating with
> reflections upon what has been said, is the basic vehicle by which
> the characters in the stories come to learn. And it is how real
> students likewise come to learn - by talking and thinking things
> out.[4]

The purpose of *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* is to introduce children to logical reasoning. The setting for the story is a classroom where Harry and his classmates embark upon what might be called an intellectual adventure, which begins when Harry fails to answer correctly a question posed by his teacher, Mr. Bradley. His failure to offer an appropriate response prompts Harry to give the question a good deal of thought. Suddenly, he has an idea:

> A sentence can't be reversed. If you put the last part of a sentence first, it'll no longer be true. For example, take the sentence, "All oaks are trees". If you turn it around it becomes "All trees are oaks". But that's false. Now it's true that "All planets revolve about the sun." But if you turn the sentence around and say, "All things that revolve about the sun are planets," then it's no longer true - it's false!"[5]

Having successfully tried out his idea on two sentences beginning with 'All', Harry asks his friend Lisa to offer him a sentence so that he can show her that his rule is valid. However, Lisa's sentence, 'No eagles are lions', shows Harry that his rule is unsatisfactory as it stands. He amends it and formulates a new rule: 'If a true sentence begins with the word "No", then its reverse is also true. But if it begins with "All", then its reverse is false.'[6] The chapter concludes with Harry offering a practical application of his rule to the faulty reasoning of one of his mother's neighbours.[7]

A second novel, *Lisa*, which focuses on ethical reasoning, is intended for children of twelve-to-thirteen years of age.[8] The first chapter is concerned with the question of animal rights. In an episode entitled 'Can We Both Love Animals and Eat Them?' Lisa articulates the central problem which faces her: 'it's horrible the way we slaughter animals all the time. But in order to eat them, we have to kill them first. I don't understand - how can I be against

killing birds and animals, when I love roast chicken and roast beef so much? Shouldn't I refuse to touch such food? Oh, I'm so confused!'[9]

Lisa engages in discussions with her father and school friends on topics such as vegetarianism and whether animals and children have rights. At the end of one such debate, Lisa insults another boy in her class. Feeling guilty, she is determined to make amends for her behaviour, denying herself one of her favourite dishes - roast beef, which had been prepared for supper. Lisa alludes to the chasm which often exists between moral thinking and moral action when she concludes: 'I wish I could resolve to make what I do agree with what I think. But it would mean giving up roast beef and roast chicken! What's the sense of making a promise to myself that I don't intend to keep?'[10] Here Lipman restores the *status quo ante*, while Lisa is depicted as feeling pleased that she has given up her supper. Nevertheless, on the same evening, before going to sleep, she eats everything she can find in the fridge.

While some students and teachers to whom I have introduced this story have criticized Lipman for refusing to allow Lisa thoroughly to embrace vegetarianism, it seems to me that this decision is in part motivated (and rightly so) by political expediency. Lipman's desire to have philosophy included in the curricula of schools would hardly seem to be a realizable aim if the children who were exposed to it were apt to refuse home cooking on the grounds that '*Lisa* doesn't eat roast beef, so neither will I.' Parents might understandably complain that it is the job of the schools to educate, not to influence the dietary regimen of the home. Since protest of this sort would hardly constitute an auspicious beginning for the fledgling subject, it is only

to be expected that Lipman should exercise caution in the episode's concluding paragraph.

How, then, does Lipman conceive of philosophical discussion taking place in the classroom? A typical session would have the following pattern. First of all, children are asked to read aloud an episode or chapter from one of the novels. Although pupils are each asked to read a paragraph, they are allowed to exempt themselves at any time by saying 'Pass'.

In preparing teachers to teach philosophy, Lipman believes it is necessary that they should be introduced to the novels by reading them aloud in the same way that children are asked to do. As Lipman suggests:

> This gives them experience in hearing the language of the text as well as in listening to one another. Taking turns is an exercise in moral reciprocity, and the collective effect of the ensuing discussion is a sharing of the meanings of the text through their appropriation by the group as a whole. Thus, even in the very first stage of exploring the curriculum, the members of the seminar begin to experience themselves as members of a community of shared experience and shared meanings, the first step toward becoming members of a community of inquiry.[12]

The notion of a 'community of inquiry' will be examined later in this chapter.

When the designated episode or chapter has been read, children are asked for their comments on it, which are written on the blackboard. The questions which teachers ask, in order to elicit children's responses, will differ according to the pupils in the classroom. For example,

> With older students, one might ask, "What *puzzles* (or perplexes) you about this passage?" so as to focus attention on what is problematic in the subject matter rather than on that which is settled. With younger students, one might ask, "What *interests* you about this passage?" so as to ensure that questions and comments emerge out of genuine student involvement with the issues. With very young students, these ways of issuing the invitation may be unsuccessful, because small children are unused to being asked for their opinion by adults and may be somewhat bewildered. It is better simply to ask, "What do you *like* about this paragraph (or page)?" and move from

there into the discussion.[12]

Such discussion can be facilitated in a number of ways. The teacher might ask the children to vote on which question should be discussed first of all. Alternatively a child who has contributed little to the session might be asked which question he or she would most like to discuss. The manuals which accompany the novels contain numerous exercises and discussion plans which will enable both the teacher and the children to focus on those philosophical issues which are raised by the stories. The job of the teacher is to introduce these exercises at an appropriate point in the discussion. Ideally, it seems to me that there should not be slavish adherence to the material contained in the manuals, since this would probably lead to a disregard for those thoughts or ideas which pupils would themselves like to contribute to the dialogue. Neither should there be an undue emphasis on the children's initial comments, as this might result in a failure to address a number of important philosophical issues. To achieve a balance between open-ended and structured discussion is by no means easy. In chapter seven, I shall mention a number of factors associated with promoting and sustaining philosophical discussions.

At this stage, it is necessary to consider a number of criticisms which may be made of Lipman's 'Philosophy for Children' programme. The first of these must be set within the context of general American work in the domain of children's philosophy, much of which has involved small groups of (often 'gifted') pupils. One of the best examples of this tendency to offer philosophy to a small number of academically able children can be found in the work of Gareth Matthews. Matthews spent the academic year 1982-1983 at the School of Epistemics, University of Edinburgh, where he worked on a project involving

'research into conceptions of childhood and into models of human development, especially cognitive development'.[13] At the beginning of the year, Matthews obtained permission from the headmaster at St. Mary's Music School, which caters for musically gifted children, to work for one period a week with a group of eight pupils aged eight to eleven years. During this time, Matthews engaged in discussions with the children, and used their comments to help him to write philosophical stories.

The outcome of this research was a book entitled *Dialogues with Children*. In the prologue, Matthews suggests that:

> What has not been taken seriously, or even widely conceived, is the possibility of tackling with children in a relationship of mutual respect, the naively profound questions of philosophy. I hope that what follows will convince my readers that children can help us adults investigate and reflect on interesting and important questions and that the children's contributions may be quite as valuable as any we adults have to offer.[14]

Matthews' book does indeed achieve his stated aims. That the children in his class succeed in engaging in philosophical discussion is not in doubt. For example, the following passage is extracted from a debate about whether flowers can be happy:

> 'Why don't you think flowers can be happy?' I asked.
> 'They haven't got a mind,' said Daniel, quickly, clearly and decisively. At eight and a half, Daniel was, by a day, the youngest member of the class.
> 'Any other reason?' I asked.
> 'They have no feelings,' he added.
> David-Paul, who was ten, then entered the discussion.
> 'There is a plant,' he said, 'which is constructed so that its leaves can come together and catch flies.'
> I asked if anyone knew what the plant was called.
> 'A flytrap,' someone said.
> We discussed Venus's flytrap for a while.
> 'You touch it and it curls up,' said Ise (pronounced 'Eese'), nine and a half.
> 'That's like a butterfly,' Esther put in. At eleven, Esther was the oldest member of the class.

'But isn't it like a reflex?' David-Paul asked. 'It's like a spring; when you touch it, it curls up.'
I asked whether, if what the sensitive plant does is like the action of a reflex, that means the plant doesn't have any feelings.
'Well, it's got to be sensitive anyway,' said Esther. 'If it can curl up, it's got to be sensitive.'
A discussion developed as to whether flowers can communicate with each other.
'Plants might be able to talk to each other by, you know, radio waves or something like that,' suggested David-Paul. 'Or by dust that goes from one plant to another.'
I asked why it is important, in determining whether something can be happy to find out if it can talk. It seemed clear to the kids that language could reveal mood. But perhaps, they suggested, mood could be revealed in other ways.
'In a sort of way the plant shows that it's happy by blooming,' David-Paul said. The kids then discussed gestures as the expression of mood and feeling. Ise worried about the idea that flowers must be unhappy whenever they bow down. 'It doesn't necessarily mean you're unhappy if you're bowing down,' she pointed out. 'You could be in a bad mood just standing up straight.'
'Does a plant have a brain?' asked Daniel.
I said that his question was a good one and asked why knowing whether a plant has a brain might help us determine whether plants can be happy.
'Without a brain you couldn't be sad or happy or anything like that,' said Martin, who was almost ten. 'Without a brain you wouldn't [even] exist.'[15]

I have quoted this rather lengthy extract for two reasons. Firstly, one of the criticisms which can be made of Matthews' previous book, *Philosophy and the Young Child*[16] is that much of the 'evidence' which he offers to support his thesis that young children are capable of philosophical thinking is anecdotal, consisting for the most part of all too brief examples of their reflection. In *Dialogues with Children*, Matthews moves some way to overcoming this criticism by offering longer transcripts of conversations. However, as I shall argue in chapter five, in order to convince parents, teachers, local education authorities and central government that philosophy should be taught in primary schools, it

is necessary to offer much more substantial transcripts of philosophical dialogues.

These transcripts should convey, as much as possible, exactly what takes place in the classroom during a philosophy session. Consequently, editing should be minimal, and teachers should not succumb to the temptation to 'tidy up' the dialogue since to do so is to give a false impression of what might reasonably be achieved by both teachers and pupils. Furthermore, by seeking to approximate to a more 'ideal' conception of children's philosophy, one is likely to undervalue what *has* been accomplished in the classroom.

Secondly, the above extract successfully illustrates the fact that academically able children are likely to prove to be enthusiastic and adroit participants in philosophical discussions. However, on being told this, it is probable that primary school teachers would react by saying that it is hardly startling news. Such children are precisely those who are most likely to be able to take part in, and to profit from, philosophical debate. What primary school teachers require is not simply material with which to 'stretch' their brighter pupils. Rather, what is needed is a programme which can be used with large groups of mixed-ability children. While it is certainly the case that Lipman's 'Philosophy for Children' course has been used with such groups, nevertheless, many articles published in the IAPC's *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* report on research which has been conducted with much smaller classes, many of which are composed of very able pupils.[17]

This brings us to a major problem with the material which has been produced by Lipman and his colleagues - philosophy is conducted entirely through the medium of children's stories. Therefore, teachers using these novels

have two choices. They can ask children to read portions of them aloud, or they can read the stories themselves. Neither approach is without its difficulties, but the former may be more problematic, since poorer readers are likely to be discouraged at the outset, and may come to look on philosophy as one more subject in which they are unable to 'shine'. To suggest that this problem is circumvented by a procedure which allows a child to 'pass' when it is his or her turn to read aloud is surely mistaken, as this is likely only to reaffirm the poor reader's inability to perform as well as his or her peers. On the other hand, should teachers decide to read the material themselves, this may become a laborious task and so may lead to boredom for pupils. In chapter five, I suggest that one way to obviate this difficulty is to offer children a number of media through which to study philosophy.

Since the idea of a 'community of inquiry', mentioned above, is central to the IAPC's 'Philosophy for Children' programme, we must now examine this notion. In *Philosophy in the Classroom*, the authors argue that 'When children are encouraged to think philosophically, the classroom is converted into a community of inquiry. Such a community is committed to procedures of inquiry, to responsible search techniques that presuppose an openness to evidence and to reason. It is assumed that these procedures of the community, when internalized, become the reflective habits of the individual.'[7] Furthermore, we are told that in order to create a community of inquiry certain prerequisites are necessary. There should be a 'readiness to reason, mutual respect (of children towards one another, and of children and teachers towards one another), and an absence of indoctrination.'[8]

Lipman and his colleagues are only too aware of the problems posed by indoctrination. Indeed, this topic is referred to on several occasions in various publications written by members of the IAPC. For example:

> There is no study that can more effectively prepare the child to combat indoctrination than philosophy.[20]

> [A philosophical] education is the antithesis of indoctrination as it aims to give children the intellectual tools that they need to think autonomously about moral issues, to explore the metaphysical, logical and aesthetic dimensions of these issues and eventually move toward the formation of their own answers.[21]

> Non-indoctrinational moral education involves teaching children to engage in ethical inquiry.[22]

> When philosophy for children is mentioned one occasionally hears the response, "whose philosophy?" - implying that philosophy is defined as a set of dogma held by a particular person or group. Perhaps it is this usage that is responsible for fears of indoctrination. It need scarcely be pointed out that philosophy as open inquiry is on the contrary a safeguard against any such danger.[23]

Two comments must be made about the above quotations. Firstly, each writer conceives of 'indoctrination' as, of necessity, a pejorative term, and consequently as something undesirable which has no place in the classroom. Secondly, the writers are united in their belief that their 'Philosophy for Children' course is non-indoctrinatory. Having already argued at some length against the first contention in chapter two, I wish to suggest that the second assertion is mistaken also.

In advancing the view that their programme is not susceptible to the charge of indoctrination, Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan make a distinction between 'procedural' and 'substantive' values.[24] For example, a central tenet of 'Philosophy for Children' is that participants in philosophical discussions should attempt to be 'coherent, consistent, and comprehensive in their

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thinking'.[25] In reply to the criticism that these qualities are simply expressions of personal values, Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan argue as follows: 'coherence, consistency and comprehensiveness are values only in the sense that they are standards for effective communication and criteria for effective inquiry. They are appropriate to *the way* a person should think, not to *what* he should think. Therefore, they are *procedural* considerations, not *substantive* ones'.[26] According to the authors, it is only when advocating substantive values that teachers can be accused of indoctrinating their pupils.

In rebutting this argument, it should be acknowledged that a number of scholars have sought unsuccessfully to avoid the accusation that their moral education programmes may lead to indoctrinatory outcomes.[27] The disclaimers offered by Lipman and his associates are also unconvincing. Even if a distinction between procedural and substantive values can be maintained (which is itself a contentious issue), it is possible to show that Lipman's notion of a 'community of inquiry' espouses substantive values. To advocate, as we have seen, a 'readiness to reason, mutual respect... and an absence of indoctrination', is surely to do more than to support 'procedural considerations'.

In conclusion, I refer once again to the arguments which I offered towards the end of chapter two. Rather than maintaining that it is possible to avoid indoctrination in the moral domain, it is preferable to offer open commitment to certain substantive values. To do otherwise is to adopt a simplistic view of 'indoctrination'. A possible consequence of this is that one's views on the moral education of children may fail to be as persuasive as one would wish.

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between knowledge and emotions: transcript of a philosophy for children session in St. Paul, Minnesota', *Thinking*, Vol. 3, Nos. 3 and 4, 1982, pp. 84-91; Toxey, K., 'Analytical thinking in a community of two', *Thinking*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1981, pp. 32-33; Saunders, M., 'Children discuss knowledge, belief and reality', *Thinking*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985, pp. 46-47; Martens, E., '"Pixie" for fourth graders', *Thinking*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1984, pp. 15-18.

18. Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M. and Oscanyan, F.S., *op. cit.*, p. 45.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

21. Sharp, A.M., 'Philosophical teaching as moral education', *Journal of Moral Education*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1984, pp. 3-8.

22. Lipman, M., 'Ethical reasoning and the craft of moral practice', *Journal of Moral Education*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1987, pp. 139-147.

23. Whalley, M.J., 'Unexamined lives: the case for philosophy in schools', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1987, p. 277.

24. Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M. and Oscanyan, F.S., *op. cit.*, p. 86.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. See, for example, Casement, W.R., 'Indoctrination and contemporary approaches to moral education', Ph. D Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1980; Wagner, P.A. Jr., 'Moral education, indoctrination and the principle of minimizing substantive moral error', *Philosophy of Education 1981*, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, Normal, Illinois, 1981, pp. 191-198.

CHAPTER FIVE

Philosophy in the British Primary School

My central purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate that young children are capable of engaging in a competent and often sophisticated manner in philosophical discussion. To this end, six dialogues are offered for consideration. In an earlier part of this thesis, I proposed that philosophizing at the primary level should be conducted principally through discourse. Consequently, before outlining my project, it is necessary first to examine the role which traditionally has been allotted to speaking in the curricula of schools. I shall then discuss National Curriculum proposals for the teaching of English, in which 'speaking' is an important component. In addition to the arguments for the introduction of philosophy into primary schools which were offered in chapter three, I shall suggest that such proposals provide an excellent rationale for the teaching of philosophical reasoning. I conclude by discussing some of the findings of a questionnaire which children completed at the end of the course.

A central tenet of child-centred education is that children should be encouraged to talk about their work, their play, their interests, and so on. Yet the prejudice against speaking still holds sway in many quarters. The most common manifestation of this tendency is evidenced by the fact that many parents tend to equate academic progress with 'what is in the books'. Student teachers (and many of their more experienced colleagues) often place an undue emphasis on activities which involve writing, in the belief that such work will

provide the necessary evidence that something worthwhile has taken place in the classroom.

Furthermore, in promoting the role of speaking in the classroom, one has to counter a view which is often expressed by children, namely that activities which do not comprise a written component 'are not real work'. I encountered this perspective myself during the Spring Term of 1988, when I taught philosophy to children at three primary schools in the Hull area. I informed the groups that, for my sessions, they would not require pens, pencils, books, paper, etc. Although I managed to elicit from each class that what would be required was some careful thinking, this was greeted with enthusiasm partly because no writing was involved. It was only after several weeks that my pupils began to realize that while philosophizing could be fun, it also involved a good deal of mental effort.

The idea that young children should engage in the systematic discussion of philosophical ideas is, I have suggested, a new one in British education. Whether this enterprise will be successful will depend, in part, on the importance which teachers and others accord to classroom dialogue. Indeed, it is a curious anomaly that while talking is regarded as an important aspect of infant education, its importance is seen to decline as children get older, until, in the Sixth Form, pupils are once again imbued with the right (and the ability) to engage in discussion and debate. Philosophy provides an ideal means by which teachers may reassert the importance of speaking.

At the present time, where the primacy of written expression appears to be unassailable, the National Curriculum Council's Consultation Report *English 5-11* was most welcome, especially since, with regard to assessment, it called for

equal weighting to be given to the three profile components, reading, writing, and speaking and listening, in primary schools.' Since the then Secretary of State for Education, Mr. Kenneth Baker, had been in favour of a greater emphasis being given to reading and writing, some doubts were raised as to whether the NCC's proposal would be accepted. However, in a later document, *English for Ages 5 to 16*, we find the following statement: 'We believe that all three profile components are equally important and should therefore receive equal attention in the classroom. For the purpose of reporting assessment, we also believe that the profile components should have equal weighting at key stages 1 to 3.'²

An examination of the speaking and listening profile component reveals the extent to which the activities stipulated are essential to a philosophical discussion. For example, at Level One, children should be able to 'Listen attentively, and respond, to stories and poems'.³ I have already argued that children's stories are an important medium through which philosophy may enter the primary school curriculum. Essential to the success of ensuing discussions is the disposition of pupils to listen to each other's contributions.

At Level Two, children are required to be able to 'Participate as speakers and listeners in a group engaged in a given task.' Also, they should demonstrate an ability to 'Talk with the teacher, listen and ask and answer questions.'⁴ As we shall see, these activities are fully catered for in philosophical discussions. As pupils become more accustomed to, and consequently more confident about, participating in extensive dialogue and debate, one would expect their speaking and listening abilities to improve accordingly. Therefore, at Level Three, we are told that they should 'Listen with an increased span of

concentration to other children and adults, asking and responding to questions and commenting on what has been said.'[5]

By the time pupils arrive at Levels Five and Six, they are expected to exhibit behaviours which are more specifically associated with philosophizing. They should 'Contribute and respond constructively in a discussion or debate, advocating and justifying a particular point of view.'[6] It will be remembered that my definition of 'philosophy' incorporates the notion of 'justification' as one of its constituent elements. In addition, pupils should 'Contribute considered opinions or clear statements of personal feelings to group discussions and show an understanding of the contributions of others.'[7] At this stage a shift away from egocentricity and towards empathy is the goal aimed at. This is essential if children are to be thought of as engaging in a *philosophical* discussion.[8] This is characterized, in part, by an ability and a willingness to understand another person's perspective, as well as subjecting one's own and others' views to critical scrutiny.

Several of the requirements outlined in Levels Seven to Ten are relevant to children's ability to engaging in and to profit from philosophical discussion. For example, in Level Seven, pupils should be able to 'Express a point of view cogently and with clarity to a range of audiences and interpret with accuracy a range of statements by others'.[9] The following Level requires a capacity to 'Take part in group discussions, actively and critically, showing an ability to summarize and evaluate arguments effectively.'[10]

The final two Levels require quite sophisticated behaviours from children. At Level Nine one would expect them to 'Give a presentation involving a personal point of view on a complex subject cogently and with clarity,

integrating talk with writing as appropriate, *e.g. using hand-outs or visual aids*, and respond appropriately to the presentations of others.'[1] As part of Level Ten, pupils should 'take a leading role in group discussion, *e.g, by taking the chair*, listening with concentration and understanding, noting down salient points, summarizing arguments and, where appropriate, formulating a consensus.'[2] Introducing children to the skills of reasoning is, I wish to argue, a necessary prerequisite for the successful accomplishment of the activities suggested in the speaking and listening profile component. In examining the dialogues which are presented below, it will become evident that many statements of attainment for speaking and listening mentioned above have been met. This should provide an additional and weighty argument in favour of the introduction of philosophy into the primary school curriculum.

Should further theoretical justification be required for this educational innovation, one need only note the following stipulation which is made in *English for Ages 5 to 16*. In producing programmes of study to enable children to acquire an increasing competence in speaking and listening, all the activities which teachers offer should 'help to develop their grasp of sequence, cause and effect, reasoning, sense of consistency, clarity of argument, [and] appreciation of relevance and irrelevance'.[3] It is difficult to see how children can attain this important goal without being exposed to the study of philosophy. Indeed, when I showed this last excerpt from *English for Ages 5 to 16* to a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Hull University recently, he declared that a central aim of an undergraduate course in the subject was to produce graduates who had developed the abilities outlined therein.

In chapter four, I outlined a major difficulty which may be encountered in using Matthew Lipman's programme in schools namely that it is conducted entirely through stories which children are asked to read aloud. This approach, I argued, is likely to create serious difficulties for poor readers. *Pace* Lipman, such obstacles are not overcome by allowing pupils to 'pass' when it is their turn to read. I wish to suggest that one way to alleviate this problem is to offer primary school children a number of media through which to study philosophy.

My own approach conceives of philosophy being taught in three ways. Firstly, children's short stories can be used as vehicles for the introduction of philosophical ideas. I have written a number of such stories involving three children: Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing. These characters inhabit a fantasy world, making visits to the Snow Queendom, and to the kingdoms of King Extrawork and King Eversonice etc., in the search for a domain where there are some good rules by which to live (see appendix 8).[14] With regard to storytelling, such a setting allows more flexibility than is permitted to Lipman,[15] and so creates the maximum potential for the writing of stories which are capable of capturing children's attention and interest. Once this has been achieved, the philosophical themes which are embedded in the text can be discussed more readily.

The importance of fantasy in the lives of young children has been argued for by a number of scholars. Perhaps the best known of these is Bruno Bettelheim whose celebrated book, *The Uses of Enchantment*, is aptly subtitled: *The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales*.[16] In discussing the importance of children's stories, Bettelheim declares that: 'For a story truly to hold the

child's attention, it must entertain him and arouse his curiosity. But to enrich

his life, it must stimulate his imagination; help him to develop his intellect

and to clarify his emotions.'[17] According to Bettelheim, fairy tales are the

most appropriate medium through which to accomplish these goals. 'True,' he

argues, 'on an overt level fairy tales teach little about the specific conditions

of life in modern mass society; these tales were created long before it came

into being. But more can be learned from them about the inner problems of human

beings, and of the right solutions to their predicaments in any society, than

from any other type of story within a child's comprehension.'[18] In suggesting

that children find fairy stories more appealing than other kinds of children's

literature, Bettelheim believes that this is because such stories 'in a much

deeper sense than any other reading material, start where the child really is in

his psychological and emotional being.'[19]

A second method of engaging children in philosophical reflection is to

offer them samples of reasoning (embedded in logical, ethical and more general

philosophical problems) to discuss (see appendices 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13). As

with children's stories, formal and informal (also called 'non-formal') logical

rules and principles can be displayed in, and appealed to in discussing, such

samples.[20] At the primary level, these examples of reasoning should relate

initially to a child's immediate environment and experience. Finally,

diagrammatic representation (e.g. overhead projector transparencies) may be used

to initiate discussions. This is particularly important for children who are

poor readers but whose reasoning ability may be as good as, or better than,

that of their peers (see appendices 14 and 15).

The three primary schools in which I conducted my research were chosen at random from a number of schools where I had supervised students on teaching practice. The classes I taught contained children of mixed ability. One Fourth Year class had thirty-one (later thirty-two) pupils, another Fourth Year class had twenty-two pupils, and the third class, in a small village school, comprised fifteen, Second, Third, and Fourth Year children. These schools I shall call 'Summerside', 'Riverhill' and 'Claythorpe' respectively (see appendices 16, 17 and 18). I visited each school twice a week and taught for an hour on each occasion, using the same materials and teaching methods with each class. The discussions which followed were all recorded on tape.

A typical philosophy session had the following format. Where the medium used was a children's story, I began by reading it to the class. The benefits which accrue from using short stories are threefold. Firstly, the teacher can read them quite quickly without pupils becoming bored. Secondly, the problem encountered by Lipman's approach, namely the possible alienation of poor readers, is avoided. Thirdly, the salient points of the story are more likely to remain fresh in children's minds if there is not a great number of details to remember.

Having read the story, I would either ask questions to the class as a whole, or I would divide the class into smaller groups asking them to determine what they considered to be the most important or interesting issues for subsequent discussion. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. As far as the first approach is concerned, the main advantage is that children are offering their own thoughts and not those which may have been gleaned from peers in small-group discussion. The disadvantages are that pupils have to

offer a point of view without much reflection. In addition, some children, either through personal inclination or lack of time, may not speak at all during the session.

Many teachers would adopt the second approach because, at least in the initial part of the lesson, children have an opportunity to contribute to the discussion. Also, this practice encourages pupil-pupil interaction as opposed to teacher-pupil interaction. In terms of the definition of philosophy which I advanced in chapter three, this method gives children time to begin to develop, clarify, justify, and perhaps apply their thinking. While speaking to the whole class might be a rather daunting task for some pupils, they may be quite unperturbed about expressing their opinions to a small number of classmates. In so doing they are likely to acquire the necessary confidence to address a larger audience. As noted above, the main problem with this method of engaging children in discussion is that the thoughts which are eventually expressed by an individual in a larger forum may have been articulated earlier by someone else.

When offering children samples of reasoning to discuss, the methods described above were adopted again. In order to maximize children's contributions, I sometimes asked them to work in pairs initially. This is a particularly useful strategy when dealing with diagrammatic representation, especially as, to begin with, the only input which I usually make here is to ask pupils to discuss what is taking place in the picture being considered.[21]

My aim during the course of my school visits was to adopt as many teaching strategies as possible for two reasons. To begin with, such an approach provides much-needed variety for children and so helps to forestall

any criticism that philosophy sessions are predictable and therefore dull. This consideration is important throughout children's experience of philosophy in school, but it is even more important at the beginning of their exposure to the discipline. Initial reactions to a subject can be long-lasting (indeed life-long). Consequently, teachers should try to ensure that philosophy sessions are as interesting as possible. Secondly, I wished to be able to make some comments about which methods were most successful in producing philosophical discussions in which as many children as possible participated to the maximum of their ability.

In my introduction to this thesis, I alluded to a problem which is often faced by those who are concerned to explore the nature of children's thinking, namely that the conversations which are the product of such reflection are often dismissed as 'mere talk' (or worse, 'mere children's talk'). The prejudice against speaking in the educational domain has already been referred to above. My purpose here is to offer arguments to support the inclusion in this study of those dialogues which follow below.

Let us begin by examining one of the most important books published in recent times on the nature of effectiveness in schools, namely *School Matters: The Junior Years* by Peter Mortimore and his colleagues.[22] It has been suggested that one of the hallmarks of an exceptional literary work is its timeless quality: its ability to offer a view of the world which the reader can recognise, perhaps centuries later, as having some application to, or relevance for, his contemporary concerns. While reading *School Matters*, I was reminded of the dominant theme of Voltaire's philosophical novel *Candide*,[23] the appropriate sub-title of which is *Or Optimism*. The central thesis advanced by Peter

Mortimore and his colleagues is indeed an optimistic one. In short, it is that the *quality* of a school is of fundamental importance: a good school can do much to counteract the negative consequences of a child's background, social class or race.[24]

As the authors note in chapter one, most of the British research into effectiveness in schools has been undertaken in the secondary sector (Rutter's *Fifteen Thousand Hours*[25] perhaps being the best known study). Hence the need for a systematic examination of the junior school years. In order to accomplish this, fifty schools from the Inner London Education Authority were chosen at random for study.

The researchers had four principal aims:

(1) ...to produce a detailed description of pupils and teachers, and of the organisation and curriculum of the schools;
(2) ...to document the progress and development, over four years of schooling, of nearly 2000 pupils;
(3) ...to establish whether some schools were more effective than others in promoting pupils' learning and development, once account had been taken of variations in the characteristics of pupils in the intakes to schools;
(4) ...to investigate differences in the progress of different groups of pupils.[26]

Consequently, the major part of *School Matters* is descriptive. In chapter two, the reader is offered an in-depth examination of the fifty schools. This is followed by an analysis of the role of headteachers, deputy heads and classroom teachers, and a survey of the curriculum observed in junior classrooms. The notion of pupil *progress* is essential to the study. Mortimore and his colleagues decided to measure not only children's attainments in various areas but also the degree of progress which they each made during given periods of time.

Accordingly, in chapters six and seven, both the overall progress of the pupils and the development of different groups of children are examined.

Three central questions were addressed by the project: 'Are some schools or classes more effective than others when variations in the intakes of pupils are taken into account? Are some schools or classes more effective for particular groups of children? If some schools or classes are more effective than others, what factors contribute to these positive effects?'[27] Having answered 'Yes' to the first question and 'No' to the second, Mortimore and his team set out to examine those factors which are of greatest importance in facilitating children's progress. These are :

> Purposeful leadership of the staff by the headteacher.
> The involvement of the deputy head.
> The involvement of teachers.
> Consistency amongst teachers.
> Structured sessions.
> Intellectually challenging teaching.
> The work-centred environment.
> Limited focus within sessions.
> Maximum communication between teachers and pupils.
> Record keeping.
> Parental involvement.
> Positive climate.[28]

At this stage, having journeyed for two hundred and fifty pages, teachers might be forgiven for asking, in the words of Bob Geldof, 'Is that it?'[29] Certainly the book's central recommendations are plain common sense, constituting for the most part what is considered to be good primary practice. Yet to advocate (on the basis of empirical research) educational strategies which are already widely supported is itself a worthwhile endeavour. In the educational domain, common sense is all too often sacrificed on the altar of opportunism and expediency.

One of the most important conclusions reached by the authors in *School Matters* concerns the nature of assessment in primary schools. Having collected data concerning children's performances in regard to oracy and practical mathematics, Mortimore and his colleagues suggest that a relationship exists between the two. Accordingly, they conclude: 'Such results indicate the value of educational assessments which do not require pupils to possess high levels of competence in reading and writing. These forms of assessment may reveal children's strengths in cognitive areas which are not always apparent in reading and writing-based tasks. Our findings clearly have important implications for the ways in which pupils are assessed in school.'[30]

What are these implications? First of all, I would suggest that the *oral* assessment of pupils should be given much greater prominence than is afforded to it at present. Let me cite a common (non-philosophical) example with which primary school teachers are very familiar. At the end of each school year, it has been customary in many schools (prior to the advent of the National Curriculum) for pupils to be given tests in reading, mathematics, and so on. These are deemed to provide useful (and accurate) information both about the progress which pupils have made during the year and about their present levels of competence in various subjects. How disheartening it is then to see pupils who fail examinations in mathematics, not because they are poor mathematicians, but simply because they are unable to cope with *written* questions. A test in mathematics should, in my view, be exactly that; one's ability to read well should not be a necessary prerequisite of success. One way to circumvent this problem would be for teachers to read questions to children and to involve them in a dialogue to elicit exactly what they know, understand and are able to do.

A second important implication concerns Mortimore's finding that, in assessing pupils, teachers tend to be influenced mostly by their written work and standard of reading.[31] If this is the case generally (and my own experience of primary schools bears it out), then educators are faced with the damning criticism that traditional schooling fails to cater adequately for the full range of children's abilities and *ipso facto* does not offer an adequate assessment of those abilities.

This is particularly true when one considers the capacity which young children have to engage in philosophical discussions. I noted in chapter three that American research has indicated that many pupils who performed poorly in traditional subjects were as competent as (and in some cases more proficient than) their peers in coping with philosophical problems. My own work in Summerside, Riverhill and Claythorpe schools was qualitative in nature, that is to say I was concerned to show that young children are able to engage competently and confidently in philosophical debate. Nevertheless, while I believe a quantitative piece of research is a secondary task (and one in which I hope to engage in the near future),[32] it should be pointed out here that several children to whom I taught philosophy and who proved to be adroit participants in discussion, were low achievers in reading, writing and mathematics. Therefore, one important reason for the inclusion of children's dialogues in this thesis is that to highlight children's abilities in this area may go some way to redress the neglect which this important aspect of pupils' educational experience has suffered.

Whether the recommendations offered in *School Matters* will be translated into classroom practice remains to be seen. The teaching of philosophy to

children is certainly in keeping with the authors' suggestion that teachers should have high expectations of their pupils and should offer them intellectually challenging teaching. One of the most heartening aspects of the book is its emphasis on the need for teachers to be valued as professionals. As the authors realize, it is more likely that teachers will be effective if they are made to feel that their efforts are being both appreciated and rewarded. After all, *pace* successive Secretaries of State for Education, optimism takes one only so far.

Perhaps the most important reason for the inclusion of extensive dialogues in this thesis is that this is the only viable means whereby a protagonist of children's philosophy can convince the sceptic that what is taking place in the classroom is genuinely philosophical. In this respect, much of the work produced by American philosophers is unconvincing, since even when children's dialogues are included, these are usually brief and often anecdotal. A forceful critique of such an approach to the analysis of children's philosophical abilities is offered by Richard Miller.[33] In a review of Michael Pritchard's book, *Philosophical Adventures with Children*,[34] Miller attempts to counter the most potent criticism which has been made of the 'Philosophy for Children' movement, namely that it fails to refute the popular view that 'children are utterly incapable of real philosophical thinking'.[35]

In order to do this, he catalogues the means by which advocates of Lipman's 'Philosophy for Children' programme can seek to convince others that they are successful in enhancing philosophical thought in their students. He suggests that: 'Previous evidence for the success of the programme can be roughly divided into three categories: (1) the testimony of those who have used

the programme, (2) tapes and transcripts of actual sessions, (3) the results of objective tests by children exposed to the programme.'³⁶

Miller discusses the third category only briefly, since, as he says, there are no objective tests to assess the quality of philosophical reasoning. A number of tests in other subjects, e.g. reading, mathematics and critical reasoning, may be offered to children, both before and after they have studied philosophy, in order to indicate the extent to which this study has improved their performance in other academic subjects. However, such tests tell us little about children's progress in *philosophy* itself. ·

The obvious difficulty with teachers' testimony as a means of demonstrating children's philosophical ability is, as Miller recognizes, that such testimony can be based on selective bias. This may be true in as much as teachers, either wittingly or unwittingly, succumb to the temptation to include only that evidence which is conducive to the fulfilment of their expectations. Indeed, in the absence of further proof, teachers become susceptible to the charge that many, if not all, of their findings are, at least, exaggerated. Consequently, it is incumbent on protagonists of children's philosophy to offer substantial transcripts of *taped* discussions. Such an approach is important for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates that the dialogues actually took place. Secondly, the difficulties associated with selective bias are minimized. They may not be avoided completely, since it is possible, and indeed necessary, to offer transcripts of *selected* tapes. To circumvent this problem, the researcher, should be expected to provide a wide selection of children's dialogues.

One familiar problem remains. This concerns the possibility that, having examined the transcript of a philosophical discussion, the sceptic may simply

dismiss it as 'children talking'. In other words, the philosophical nature of many of the comments made may pass unnoticed. As Miller points out: 'Pritchard is well aware of the probability that someone who does not quite know what to look for, and/or doesn't want to see it, will not find genuine philosophical insights in the children's conversations without help.'[37]

In order to provide assistance in this matter, Pritchard punctuates children's dialogues with his own commentaries, indicating where philosophical problems are being examined. Thus, it becomes extremely difficult for the sceptic to assert that the subject matter of philosophy is not central to the discussions. Miller's comment is apposite here: 'A sceptic could be exposed to examples of good philosophical discussions by children and come away unconvinced. She could fail to see the philosophical content of an actual conversation due to her own prejudice and/or lack of training... By providing plenty of commentary Pritchard minimized the likelihood that the philosophical content of the transcripts he reproduced will not be seen.'[38] This is the approach which I have adopted below.[39]

References

1. National Curriculum Council, *Consultation Report English 5-11*, National Curriculum Council, York, 1989.

2. DES/Welsh Office, *English for Ages 5 to 16*, HMSO, London, 1989, paragraph 1.8.

3. *Ibid.*, paragraph 15.24.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. A distinction must be made between engaging in a philosophical discussion and making a philosophical comment. The latter, I would suggest, does not require an ability or a willingness to understand or empathize with the views of another person. Unlike Gareth Matthews in his *Philosophy and the Young Child*, I am concerned to show that young children are capable of both activities.

9. DES/Welsh Office, *English for Ages 5 to 16*, *op. cit.*, paragraph 15.24.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*, paragraph 15.27.

14. See my 'Philosophy in the primary classroom', in Costello, P.J.M. (Ed.), *Primary Education into the 1990s*, No. 38 of *Aspects of Education*, University of Hull Press, 1988, pp. 43-81; '*Akrasia* and animal rights: philosophy in the British primary school', *Thinking*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1988, pp. 19-27; 'Primary school philosophy: open to discussion?', *Links*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1988, pp. 11-14; 'Philosophy goes to primary school', *Thinking Skills Network Newsletter*, No. 5, 1988, pp. 5-10.

15. Lipman's stories, of necessity, are restricted in scope, focusing as they do on the lives of a number of American children. Although it has proved possible to translate these stories into a number of other languages (including an Anglicized version of *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*)

nevertheless the characters in such novels operate within clearly defined parameters. For example, many of the episodes in *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* take place in Harry's school. As an examination of my own stories reveals, no similar restrictions are evident. While the early adventures of Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing do take place in schools, the children quickly move outside this setting.

16. Bettelheim, B., *The Uses of Enchantment: the meaning and importance of fairy tales*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1976.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, p. 6. The notion of fantasy in children's literature is discussed in Brann, E., 'Through Phantasia to philosophy: review with reminiscences', *Thinking*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985, pp. 1–8; Levine, S., 'The child-as philosopher: a critique of the presuppositions of Piagetian theory and an alternative approach to children's cognitive capacities', *Thinking*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1983, pp. 1–9; Ende, M., 'Literature for children?', *Thinking*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1984, pp. 2–5. See also, Schachtel, E.G., 'The child and the story', *Thinking*, Vol. 2, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 31–32; Matthews, G., 'Philosophy and children's literature', *Thinking*, Vol. 4, Nos. 3 and 4, 1983, pp. 15–19; Matthews, G., 'Thinking in stories', *Thinking*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1985, p. 1.

20. I shall develop this point in chapter seven.

21. An exception which requires some initial explanation by me is the exercise involving the cities of Truth and Lies (see appendix 14). Children are asked to imagine that they are walking towards these cities. People from the former always tell the truth; citizens of the latter only tell lies. At the point marked X, they meet someone who has travelled from one of the cities, and they are allowed to ask him or her one question in order to ascertain from which city that person has come. What might that question be?

22. Mortimore, P., Sammons, P., Stoll, L., Lewis, D., and Ecob, R., *School Matters: the junior years*, Open Books, Wells, 1988.

23. Voltaire, *Candide: or optimism*, translated by John Butt, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1976.

24. See St. John-Brooks, C., 'Shedding light and optimism on the class of the future', *The Sunday Times*, 27 March, 1988, p. B12.

25. Rutter, M., Maughan, B., Mortimore, P., and Ouston, J., *Fifteen Thousand Hours*, Open Books, London, 1979.

26. Mortimore, P., *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

29. Geldof, B., *Is That It?*, Collins, London, 1987.

30. Mortimore, P. *et al., op. cit.*, p. 113.

31. Attainment in mathematics is also included here. See Mortimore, P. *et al., op. cit.*, p..124.

32. This research will focus on the question 'Are thinking skills transferable?' and will examine the extent to which children's ability to reason philosophically can lead to an improvement in their powers of reasoning in other subjects. I shall also be concerned to ask whether, and to what extent, pupils considered to be performing poorly in traditional subjects are capable of philosophical reasoning and reflection. On the question of transferability of thinking skills, the reader is referred to Fisher, R., *Teaching Children to Think*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990; and Fisher, A., 'Critical thinking', in Coles, M.J. and Robinson, W.D. (Eds.), *Teaching Thinking*, The Bristol Press, Bristol, 1989, pp. 37-45.

33. Miller, R.B., 'How to win over a sceptic', *Thinking*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1986, pp. 46-48.

34. Pritchard, M.S., *Philosophical Adventures with Children*, University Press of America, Lanham, 1985.

35. Miller, R.B., *op. cit.*, p. 46.

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

38. *Ibid.*

39. In 1988, I offered an article, '*Akrasia and animal rights: philosophy in the British primary school*', *op. cit.*, to Matthew Lipman's journal *Thinking*. In accepting it, he indicated that 'it is the very sort of thing which can best convince the sceptics'. A copy of the letter is given in appendix 19.

Dialogue 1: Claythorpe Primary School

This dialogue discusses issues raised by my story 'The Land of Youth' (see appendix 8).

PC   Knownothing says this... 'The sun must have heard you, Knowlittle, it's smiling at us.' What do we think about that statement?... Richard?

Richard   If you look at the sun, it makes your eyes go real funny. It makes you sneeze.

PC   Why does it make you sneeze?

Russell   It doesn't make you sneeze.

Richard   Brightness.

PC   [Does] brightness make you sneeze?

Richard   It makes *me* sneeze.

PC   Does it? What do you think about this statement, Michelle?

Michelle   You have no proof or evidence that the sun *was* smiling at him.

COMMENT   In a previous session, the children had suggested two terms, 'proof' and 'evidence', which might be adduced in support of one's arguments. Their tendency to refer to both terms at once is a consequence of my having adopted this practice for mnemonic purposes.

PC   Do you think the sun can smile at us?

Chorus   No.

Melanie   Yes.

PC   When does the sun smile at us, Melanie?

Melanie   When it's bright.

Russell   I used to think when the sun comes out, it was going to come down and play with me and when it goes back in a cloud it was going to go for his dinner, and then it came back out again and go for its tea and then go for its supper and then go to bed!

----------	Laughter
PC	Well, I think the children in the story were having thoughts like that weren't they? What do you think, Timothy, about this idea of the sun smiling at us?
Timothy	When you look at it, really stare at it, it looks as though there's a big grin on its face.
Melanie	Yes it does.
PC	So, does the sun come out when it's happy...?
----------	Matthew Parker shakes his head.
PC	No, Matthew?
Matthew P.	No... it's just amongst clouds what cover it up and then the clouds go.
PC	Doesn't it have something to do with whether or not the sun's happy?
Matthew P.	No, it's because of a cloud.
PC	So, what do you think about this statement... 'The sun must have heard you Knowlittle, it's smiling at us'?
Matthew P.	They have no proof or evidence that the sun come out just because they said something.
COMMENT	Matthew spots the fallacy in a *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* argument.'
PC	Let's say the sun had gone behind a cloud... and we said the words 'magic dust' and, all of a sudden, the sun came out and shone down on us again.
Mathew P.	That would just be... luck and timing.
PC	What if I said 'magic dust' and the sun came out, then it went in again, a little bit later, and I said 'magic dust' and the sun came out again. Wouldn't that give us the proof we require to say that what we said *caused* the sun to come out, Matthew?
Matthew P.	No, it would be the same - luck.

PC	What if I said it fifty times and each time the sun came out?
COMMENT	I am attempting to ascertain whether the children will find the fallacy more plausible if there are a greater number of instances to consider. Russell remains sceptical.
Russell	Still be luck.
PC	Why would it still be luck, Russell?
Russell	Because you've just got no proof or evidence that you *are* doing it, because you don't know, and if it's a real cloudy day, like it more or less is now, it'll probably just be luck.
PC	What about this statement... 'The sun can't hear you, it hasn't got any ears. The sun can't smile at you, it hasn't got a mouth.' What do you think about those statements?
Caroline	You have no proof or evidence that it hasn't got a mouth or ears.
PC	How would we get some proof about whether or not the sun has got ears and a mouth? Russell?
Russell	We can't.
PC	So does that mean we believe that the sun *does* have ears and it *does* have a mouth?
Chorus	No.
PC	Why do we not believe it then, if we can't prove that it doesn't?
Russell	We just can't, because we can't get to it. Well, we might be able to get to the sun, but we can't go on it.
PC	Well, why isn't that a reason for us saying: 'Well, the sun does have ears'?
Russell	You don't know whether it has.
PC	But you've just said to me you don't think the sun *has* ears... If I said to you: 'Well the sun does have a pair of ears and it does have a mouth', what would you say to that?
Russell	I'd think it would be stupid because you've got no proof or evidence that it has got ears or a mouth.

PC	So, what do you say to a person who says to you... 'The sun has two ears... and a mouth and you have no proof or evidence that it doesn't'?
Timothy	They have no proof or evidence that it does.
PC	So, are the two arguments as good as each other?
----------	Some children say: 'No' and some say: 'Yes'.
PC	Why not, Russell?
Russell	Because it can't have ears or things, it can't.
PC	Why can't it?
Russell	Because it can't.
PC	Well now, watch this. I'm going to write on the board. I've said to Russell: 'Why can't the sun have ears?'...
Melanie	Oh, yes.
PC	... and Russell said... 'Because it can't.' [I write this on the board.] And I said to Russell: 'Why can't the sun have ears?' and Russell said: [I write 'Because it can't' on the board.] Have we met an argument like this one before?
COMMENT	In a story called 'Miss Frost Sets a Challenge', Miss Frost offers Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing three samples of reasoning to evaluate. The first involves two children, John and Sarah, who go to different schools. John says: 'My school is better than yours.' 'Why is it better?' asks Sarah. 'Because we are given homework to do.' 'Why are you given homework?' 'Because I go to a better school.' See appendix 8.
Matthew P.	Yes, a round argument.
PC	No, it's not called a round argument... Melanie?
Melanie	A circular.
PC	A circular...
Melanie	Argument.
PC	Why do we call it a circular argument, Melanie?

Melanie	Because it just goes round and round and round.
Michelle	It's just repeating itself.
PC	What do we think about circular arguments? Are they good arguments, do you think?
Chorus	No.
PC	Why are they not good arguments, Michelle?
Michelle	Because they just carry on and carry on and they don't give you a good statement.
PC	They don't give you a good statement. They don't give you what?
Jayne	A good argument.
Caroline	Proof or evidence.
PC	Of what?
Caroline	Whether the sun has got two ears and a mouth.
PC	Excellent. Now let me ask you this... Knownothing says this: 'You've upset the sun and now we're *all* going to get wet!' What does he mean by that do you think?... Matthew P.?
Matthew P.	He's trying to say that they are all going to get wet, even though it wasn't him who said it.
PC	What do we think about that statement then?
Russell	Not very good because you can't upset the sun, because the sun can't hear you. It must be about sixty-eight million miles away.
PC	Ninety-three million miles away.
Russell	Has to have good ears, if it has got ears, to hear us!
----------	Laughter
PC	Knowless says: 'Eating too many sweets is bad for you' and Knownothing says: 'I know, but I can't help it.' What do we think about that statement from Knownothing?
Russell	He's got no proof or evidence that he can't stop, because he might be able to stop, but he's got no proof or evidence that he can't.

PC	What did he do immediately after he had said this... Trudelle?
Trudelle	Went and swallowed the whole sweets.
PC	So, do you think he was trying very hard to stop... Melanie?
Melanie	No.
Russell	Yes.
PC	You do, Russell?
Melanie	He wasn't even trying.
Russell	Yes, because... if he swallows them, he won't taste them. So if he doesn't taste them, he'll get fed up of them and then he'll stop.
COMMENT	Russell argues that swallowing the sweets is an exculpating circumstance, not an extra-inculpating one. This is something of which I had not thought when I wrote the story.
PC	Do you think that was his intention when he swallowed the whole bag of sweets - not to taste them?
Chorus	No.
PC	Why do people usually eat things rather quickly, in that sort of way?
Caroline	Because they can't help it.
Samantha T.	Because they're greedy!
----------	Laughter
Jon	It might be their dinner.
PC	Kelly?
Kelly	Could be hungry.
PC	Jayne?
Jayne	I eat my sweets fast, before my dad comes in, because he always pinches them all.
PC	Oh, your dad has one sweet tooth. A bit like me: I have a sweet

set of teeth.

----------	Afternoon break

PC   Immediately after Knownothing has emptied the bag of sweets into his mouth, Knowless says: 'Some people just have no self-control'... What do we mean by 'self-control'?... Michelle?

Michelle   It means that if you see something and you want it, your mind's telling you one thing to do and the rest of your body is telling you another thing to do.

COMMENT   An excellent formulation of the dilemma facing a weak-willed person.[2]

PC   And if you've got self-control, what happens?

Michelle   If you've got self-control, you listen to your mind and if you haven't got self-control, you just go and get that thing that you want.

PC   Can someone give me another expression for 'self-control'? Two words...

----------   After several unsuccessful attempts, I say:

PC   Well, we'll have a game of 'Hangman' then, as we usually do.

COMMENT   When the children are unable to give me the word or expression I am looking for, we play a game of 'Hangman'. This involves writing a dash on the board for each letter of the word or expression. I then give clues by inserting certain letters.

PC   [I'll] give you the first letter of each word. Trudelle?

Trudelle   Will-power.

PC   Superstar!... What does it mean if you have a lot of will-power, Jon?

Jon   Say if you... had one of those telephone 'phones.

Russell   Telephone 'phones!

Jon   Like those radio 'phones what you carry around.

PC	Oh, yes.
Jon	You'd be making calls just for anything, but you could stop doing it; or when you're smoking, you could give up.
PC	In what sorts of situations do you think we would need to have will-power?...
Matthew H.	Stop eating sweets.
PC	Why would we need will-power to stop eating sweets?... Do we like to eat sweets, Kirsty?
Kirsty	Sometimes.
PC	What's my favourite sweet, Jayne?
Jayne	Toffee?
PC	Well, I like toffee, but it's not my favourite... Caroline?
Caroline	Chocolate?
PC	Bullseye! Chocolate. I like 'Mars' bars. Now, when would I need some will-power, do you think, Samantha, concerning 'Mars' bars?
Samantha G.	Before you eat it.
PC	Why will I need will-power, Tim?
Timothy	Say you've gone on a diet and you couldn't eat one single 'Mars' bar, then you'd need will-power.
PC	Caroline?
Caroline	You could be walking down the street and your friend just walked up to you and said: 'Here, do you want my 'Mars' bar?'
PC	Why would I need will-power there, Caroline?
Caroline	To stop you from saying: 'Yes'.
PC	What other sorts of situations require us to have will-power?
Michelle	Drinking.
PC	Drinking what?
Michelle	Wine, beers and spirits and things like that.

PC	Why do we need will-power when we think about wine and beer? Matthew P.?
Matthew P.	Because you can get addicted to it.
PC	What do we mean by 'addicted'?... Kirsty?
Kirsty	Always wanting some.
PC	Now, say you're addicted to cigarettes...
Russell	My sister.
PC	Your sister's addicted to cigarettes is [she]?
Russell	Not *addicted* but, not actually addicted, she's tried to stop.
PC	She tries to stop. Does she succeed?
Russell	Sometimes.
PC	Let's say she was never able to stop. Would she be addicted?
Russell	Yes.
PC	Is Knownothing addicted to these sweets?
Russell	Yes.
PC	Melanie?
Melanie	He might not be because he hasn't even tried to stop.
Russell	That means he's addicted then, if he hasn't tried to. He doesn't intend to try, so he's addicted.
COMMENT	According to Melanie, someone is addicted to something only if he or she has tried unsuccessfully to give it up. As Knownothing has not made such an attempt, he might not be addicted. However, Russell argues that since Knownothing has made no attempt to give up sweets, one might justifiably suppose that he does not intend to do so and that, consequently, he is addicted.
Richard	Oh, yes.
PC	Any other thoughts? Matthew?
Matthew P.	When I go shooting, and say it's Sunday and I'm shooting for

	rabbits and a pheasant gets up, I need loads of will-power not to shoot the pheasant.
COMMENT	Matthew provides us with a philosophical 'gold nugget' to be explored: the question of animal rights.[3]
PC	Why do you need lots of will-power there, Matthew?
Matthew P.	So I don't shoot it.
PC	And is your will-power strong enough?
Matthew P.	Yes, most of the time.
PC	But sometimes it isn't strong enough?
Matthew P.	... I haven't shot, I've always missed.
----------	Laughter
PC	Is that because you're a bad shot, or is it because you intended to miss?
Matthew P.	Oh, it's because I'm a bad shot.
PC	So, on those occasions when you fired at the pheasant... what would you say about your will-power?
Matthew P.	It wasn't very strong.
PC	What do you think about that question of shooting pheasants...? Is that something that we should all be doing, do you think...?
Russell	No.
PC	Who says: 'Yes'?
----------	No one raises a hand.
PC	Who thinks it's something we shouldn't do?
----------	Fifteen children raise their hands. Richard does not put his hand up.
PC	Does this mean, Richard, that you think shooting pheasants is a good thing?
Richard	... if you like chicken, you could shoot one and then you might

	like it, so you carry on.
PC	So, you think it's quite a good thing... to do?
Richard	Yes and no.
PC	Why 'no' then?...
Richard	Because if it's out of the season, you're shooting them, you're not allowed.
PC	So, does that mean when it's out of season, it's a bad thing to do?
Richard	Yes.
PC	But when it's not out of season, it's a good thing to do?
Richard	Yes, because you can go and farmers...
PC	What about farmers?
Richard	They sometimes shoot them.
COMMENT	Richard equates what is morally right/wrong with what is lawful/unlawful.[4]
PC	What do you think about farmers shooting pheasants... Melanie?
Melanie	I think whoever shoots pheasants are cruel.
PC	Why is it cruel?
Melanie	Because, well how would Richard, or whoever shoots pheasants, like a pheasant, or somebody, to come up and shoot him?
-----------	Laughter
COMMENT	Melanie alludes to what might be called 'the universal aspect of ethics'.[5] For example, the 'Golden Rule' enjoins us to treat others as we would have them treat us. The first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative is: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.'[6] In suggesting that the purview of our universalizing should extend to non-human animals, Melanie shows herself not to be a supporter of contractual theories of ethics.[7]

PC	But the pheasants can't shoot us can they, Melanie?
Melanie	No, or whatever - a giant came and shot him. I mean, you know Richard, he's bigger than a pheasant, so... to the pheasant he's a giant.
PC	What's wrong [with] shooting pheasants then... Sally?
Sally	It's cruel and you shouldn't shoot anything because they have a life the same as us.
PC	Why do farmers shoot pheasants then? Russell?
Richard	To get food.
Russell	Because if a pheasant went... in a farmer's field and ate all the crops, they'd have a good right to kill the pheasant.
PC	Why would they have a right to kill the pheasant...?
Russell	Because it ate all the crops.
PC	Let's say you went to the farmer's field and there were some... potatoes there and you thought: 'Yes, I'm going to have some potatoes for my tea tonight. I'll have some'. The farmer comes along... and takes out his shotgun and shoots you, Russell. Is he entitled to shoot you?
Russell	No.
PC	Why is he not entitled to shoot you but he's entitled to shoot the pheasant...?
Russell	Because it's a law not to kill. Like, say if he came up to me and shot me, he'd probably be put in prison. But if he came up to a bird and shot the bird, he wouldn't.
PC	But you said to me, the reason why the farmer is entitled to shoot the bird is because the bird ate his crops. Now, I'm saying to you, if you came along and took some of the farmer's crops, wouldn't he be entitled to shoot *you*?
Russell	No.
PC	Why not?
Russell..	Because we're... he needs a law to shoot us.
PC	O.K. Jon?

Jon	Well, it's illegal to shoot people but it's legal to shoot a pheasant.
PC	The only reason I asked Russell that was because... he didn't say to me the farmer could shoot the bird because it's legal. He said... the farmer could shoot the bird because the bird took the farmer's crops.
Russell	Yes.
PC	So, I'm giving him another example where someone takes the farmer's crops.
Russell	Yes, but the farmer... probably wouldn't shoot us because he'd know he would get ten years hard labour or something like that.
PC	If the pheasant... swoops down on the farmer's field and makes off with a potato... is the pheasant... stealing?
Chorus	Yes.
PC	Matthew P., why is the bird stealing?
Matthew P.	Because the farmer's grew it and done everything to it, and the pheasant just comes and takes it.
PC	O.K. Is the bird stealing, Matthew Hayton?
Matthew H.	No.
PC	Why not?
Matthew H.	Because [the farmer] doesn't know that it's the pheasant... It could be someone coming in the village.
PC	Let's say the pheasant actually takes the potato. Does this mean that the pheasant has *stolen* the potato?...
Russell	Yes.
PC	Trudelle?
Trudelle	No, because it's what it's supposed to eat. A pheasant can't read... so if there's a sign or something up with the growing potatoes, he can't read that.
Russell	You don't know whether a pheasant can read.
Richard	They're allowed to read a cartridge!

----------	Laughter
PC	They can read a cartridge.
Richard	If it hit them!
----------	Laughter
PC	Trudelle says the pheasant can't read. Why would that mean, for you, Trudelle, that the pheasant isn't stealing the potato?
Trudelle	Because it's what he's used to eating. It doesn't know that you're not supposed to...
Russell	*We're* used to eating.
Trudelle	He's used to eating things like that.
PC	When we were discussing the example of the lady who takes the loaf of bread from the shelf in the supermarket... we were discussing all sorts of reasons as to why we might be able to say: 'This person is stealing or has stolen the loaf of bread.' For us to be able to say we had enough proof that she stole it, we needed to prove something about what we called her state of mind. We needed to prove that she _____ to steal it... What's the word I'm after?
Caroline	Intended.
PC	Superstar! We needed to prove that the lady *intended* to steal the loaf for us to be able to say that, in fact, she stole it, or she was engaged in stealing it. Now, if we could prove that the bird intended to steal the potato - the bird... swoops on to the potato... up and away. That bird has intended to steal the... potato, hasn't it?
Richard	While it's flying, it'll get shot.
PC	What do you think, Jon, has the bird intended...
Jon	It's their way of life. How do they know that you're not allowed to pinch potatoes...? They just think that they're there to eat.
PC	O.K. What if there was an adult who couldn't read? ... And let's say the sign in the farmer's field said this:
-----------	I write 'No Stealing' on the board.
PC	What does the sign say, Michelle?

Michelle	'No Stealing'.
PC	Now, let's say this adult, who comes along to the farmer's field, sees this sign. And this person isn't a very good reader, Caroline, and he thinks it says: 'No Sunbathing'.
----------	Laughter
PC	And I say to myself: 'I am starving and *there* are some potatoes.'
----------	I take some conkers from a nearby box.
PC	'Now, what did that sign say again? "No Sunbathing". Yes, I must be all right. [I'll] take these potatoes.' Does this mean the adult hasn't stolen these potatoes?
----------	Some children say: 'Yes'.
Richard	He's stolen them.
Russell	He *has* stolen them!
PC	Russell?
Russell	He has stole them because he still knows that people aren't allowed to steal from farmers.
Matthew P.	He didn't use his common sense.
PC	Matthew?
Matthew P.	He should use his common sense because all people know not to steal from fields or anything.
PC	Now, let's go back to this question of shooting birds... Let's say we see a pheasant in a field and we have our shotgun with us... and we aim at the pheasant. Is that justifiable... Tim?
Timothy	No, because you should preserve wildlife, not destroy it.
PC	Why should you preserve wildlife?
Timothy	Well, because people are always moaning about there's hardly any trees and there's hardly any birds... around, but they're always shooting them.
Russell	Yes, it's their fault.
PC	Why do we need to preserve wildlife, do you think? Aren't these

	animals just put there for us to eat? After all... do we all have a Christmas dinner?
Chorus	Yes.
PC	What do we have for our Christmas dinner?
Matthew P.	Duck.
PC	What do you have, Caroline?
Caroline	Chicken or turkey.
Russell	Chicken.
Sally	Pheasant.
PC	Who has chicken? Yes, you two... I have a chicken.
COMMENT	At this point, it is important not to let it be thought that I am opposed to the idea of eating animals, since this is likely to inhibit children's responses.
PC	Why do we eat turkey and chicken and duck, do you think?
Richard	Because that's your main meal on Christmas.
PC	Do we ever eat chicken at any other time of the year?
Chorus	Yes.
PC	Why do we eat it?
Matthew P.	Because it tastes nice.
PC	But,... you've all been telling me: 'I don't think it's right to shoot a pheasant.'
Timothy	Yes, but there's hundreds of chickens in the world; there's not that many pheasants.
PC	Oh, that's the reason why we don't shoot the pheasant, is it?
Timothy	Because they've got loads of chickens in captivity and they keep breeding them and breeding them, so there's hundreds and thousands of chickens.
Russell	There's hardly ever any pheasants.

PC	So, if there were a lot more pheasants, would that mean that it would be justifiable to shoot the pheasant?
Richard	Yes.
Timothy	Not if they were wild.
PC	Why not?
Timothy	Because it's like, say you were Tarzan and someone came up and shot you. You're wild, so, it's not really justifiable to shoot you.
PC	Well, wasn't there a time when the chickens were wild...?
Russell	Not all of them.
PC	Russell?
Russell	You might have got some in captivity and then them bred. And them ones what they bred... them wouldn't have been in the wild.
Matthew P.	But pheasants are bred in pheasant farms. Last weekend we went to a pheasant farm in Welton.
Richard	There's millions of pheasants.
Chorus	Not as many as chickens.
PC	So, you're saying to me Tim, that if a bird is in captivity, it might be all right to kill it and have it for your dinner. But if it's in the wild, then it's not right to kill it. Is that what you're saying?
Timothy	Yes.
PC	What do we think about that, Sally?
Sally	If, at Christmas, you eat a pheasant or a turkey, *you* might not have shot it - someone else might have, and you might have bought it.
PC	Now, what's the difference?
Jon	A lot.
PC	What's the difference, Jon?
Jon	You haven't gone out and shot it, so it's not your problem.

PC	Is it not?
Jon	It's there for you to eat; it's shot now and you can't do anything about that.
COMMENT	Jon wishes to argue that in instances where one might ascribe moral blame for the killing of an animal, such an ascription should be directed to the killer alone and not to the consumer.
PC	Imagine the situation in the supermarket, where there are fridges full of chickens... Why do you think these chickens are lying there in the supermarket?
Richard	They've been strangled, not been shot.
Russell	Because they're dead!
PC	Why are they there? What's the purpose of them lying in the shop, Caroline?
Caroline	For us to eat them.
PC	Let us say we all decided today: 'Well, I don't think it's really right to strangle chickens'... Would there be a lot of chickens in the shops in the next few weeks, if everyone in [this village] decided that they weren't going to eat chickens any more, because they didn't like the way chickens are strangled?
Matthew P.	Other people... not from [this village], would go and get them.
PC	Let's say the whole of North Humberside decided that they weren't going to eat chickens any more...
Melanie	But... people might come for a holiday.
PC	But, if a lot of people decided that they weren't going to buy the chickens, would there be much point in killing them and bringing them to the shops?
Russell	No.
Matthew P.	Yes.
Melanie	No.
Richard	If you let them wild and then people might say: 'There's a good bird, I'll shoot it,' and then they'll shoot it, start eating it

	and then they'll buy it from the shop.

Matthew P.   But, even if we never ate them, they would still be in the shops, because they'll just keep them until you did want them...

PC   What do you think of this argument, Tim, because you said to me: 'It's not really our problem - we didn't shoot the chicken'? What do you say to this: the person who shoots the chicken... or strangles it, is shooting or strangling the chicken because he wants to sell it to a store, to a supermarket, [which] wants to sell it to us...? Let's say we decided we weren't going to eat chicken any more because... we didn't agree with chickens being killed for us to eat. Would there be much point in going around strangling chickens, or shooting them?

Timothy   No.

PC   If you say to me: 'It's not my problem - someone else has shot the chicken or strangled it,' [someone] might say to you: 'Well, if you weren't so intent on having chicken for your Christmas dinner or your Sunday lunch, then these people would never bother shooting chickens or strangling them, and so chickens would just be allowed to live.' What do you say to that argument?...

Timothy   It's a good argument.

PC   Why is it a good argument?

Timothy   Well, because there's nothing really that I can answer back.

PC   Is there something you can answer back, Richard?

Richard   It would spoil Christmas dinner.

PC   Why would it spoil Christmas dinner?

Richard   Because you won't have a chicken or something like that.

PC   What do you think about that, Jon?

Jon   Rubbish!

PC   Why is it rubbish?

Jon   There's thousands of more things what you could have without meat.

PC   Like what?

Jon	You could have real fancy salads and things.
Russell	Yes.
PC	Let's now go back to this question of when we need a lot of will-power. Have we ever been in a situation where we said to ourselves: 'I know that I shouldn't do this...' and then later we say to ourselves: 'Well, I did it after all'... [Has] anyone ever been in a situation like that, where you thought something wasn't the right thing to do, but you did it anyway? Matthew P.?
Matthew P.	I have two [grandmothers]. One lives in Hull and one lives here. And my [grandmother] who was here was ill, so I really should have gone to my [grandmother's] in Hull... I thought: I'll go to my [grandmother's] in Hull,' but I never [did].
PC	Where did you go?
Matthew P.	My [grandmother's] here.
PC	Why do you think you did that?
Matthew P.	Just because I could play with all my friends here.
PC	Who was it who... gave me an excellent definition a while ago, who said: 'My head is telling me to do one thing...' Was that you, Michelle?
----------	Michelle nods her head.
PC	Would you say that again? 'My head is telling me to do one thing and...'
Michelle	'...the rest of me is telling me to do another thing.'
PC	Now what was happening to *your* body, Matthew, at the time of this problem you had? Was your head telling you one thing?
Matthew P.	Yes.
PC	What was your head telling you – your brain?
Matthew P.	Not to do it, but my body was getting ready to do it.
PC	Matthew's head was telling him he should go and stay with one grandmother but his body was packing his bag...
----------	Laughter

PC	... to go and stay with his other grandmother. Now, do you think the reason for that is that your body was stronger than your brain?
Matthew P.	Yes.
PC	Has anyone ever been in a situation where they've needed some will-power and their brain was telling them one thing and their body was telling them something else, and they decided to do what their *head* was telling them?... Russell?
Russell	My garage roof isn't that high but... I was going to try and jump off it... but I thought: 'No'.
PC	Why did you think: 'No'?
Russell	Because I could have broke my neck!
PC	So you decided not to do it?
Russell	Yes.
PC	So what your... brain was telling you was stronger than what your body was telling you?
Russell	Yes.
PC	Why do you think sometimes people feel that they should not do something... but they go ahead and do it anyway?.
Matthew P.	Because, though deep down they want to do it... the body doesn't want to do it.
PC	Oh, I thought you were telling me it was the body that wanted to do it but the brain didn't.
Matthew P.	It depends what it is.
PC	So, you can change these around can you?
Matthew P.	Yes.
PC	Sometimes it's the brain telling you to do it, sometimes it's the body... Well, if you really wanted to do something, why do you tell yourself to stop? Why don't you just go ahead and do it? Jon?
Jon	Well, in food matters, your eyes are too big for your belly!
PC	What do you mean by that?

Jon	There'll be a big trifle and you go: 'I'll have a bit of that,' and you don't eat it all.
PC	Do you sometimes think to yourself: 'Well, there's an enormous trifle on the table. I should really only have one portion'? But what happens, Jon?
Richard	It's all gone.
PC	Why is it all gone?
Richard	Because you ate it all.
PC	Why did you eat it all?...
Caroline	Because you didn't have any will-power.
PC	Now, are there any other situations that you can think of... where it would be important to have some will-power?... Melanie?
Melanie	Sally's sister and I go to gymnastics and it was our first time on the big bag, because we'd only been going on the little one.
PC	Yes.
Melanie	My head was telling me, I was scared to do it and don't do it, and in the end I did it. It wasn't so bad after all.
PC	So, are there times when it's right to ignore what the brain is telling us?
----------	Three children answer: 'Yes' and one answers: 'No'.
PC	Let me ask you another question... in the story, Knownothing says: 'What's the use of trying, if I *know* that I'm not going to succeed? I may as well enjoy the sweets and save my energy.' What do we think about that?
Timothy	He's got no proof or evidence that he's not going to succeed.
PC	What would count as proof and evidence for us there, Tim?
Timothy	If he throws all his sweets away.
PC	What else might he have done with the sweets, if he wasn't going to give them away?
Timothy	Give them to his friends.
Richard	Put them in his socks!

PC	What use would they have been to him in his socks?
Richard	If he wanted them, he wouldn't like to eat them because they'd be all smelly!
----------	Laughter
PC	Sally?
Sally	When [Knownothing] said he was going to eat the sweets and when he did, then he said: 'I wish I didn't do that now.' His friends said...why didn't he put them in their mouths?
PC	Yes. What do you think about that?
Sally	They would have done the same.
PC	So, what do you think about them telling him off?
Sally	Not very good.
PC	Why not, Sally?...
Sally	Because they'd have done the same.
PC	Melanie?
Melanie	It's the same as biting your finger nails though. Why doesn't he put vinegar on them? Put vinegar on them to stop biting your nails - you can put vinegar on the sweets to stop him eating them.
Chorus	Uggh!
Jayne	I like vinegar!
PC	Caroline?
Caroline	What if you like vinegar though?
Russell	Vinegar on sweets!
PC	If you haven't got any vinegar, Caroline, you're going to need a lot more what?
Russell	Salt and pepper!
----------	Laughter
PC	Caroline?

Caroline	Will-power.
PC	That's when you're going to need even more will-power. Now, one last question on this story. Knownothing says this to Knowless, when the sun comes out from behind the cloud: 'It seems as though the sun has forgiven you, Knowless.' What do you think about that?...
Richard	No, because the sun can't hear you or see you.
PC	If you think that the sun can't hear you or see you, isn't it possible that the sun might be able to forgive you, Richard?
Richard	No.
PC	Why not?
Richard	Because it can't hear you or see you.
PC	Kirsty?
Kirsty	Just because it's come out again after going in, it doesn't mean to say it's forgiving. It could just have gone behind a cloud and come out.
PC	Yes it might. What would be the word we would use for that, Matthew, that you mentioned before? If a person said something and the sun went behind the cloud, you said that was an example of what?
Matthew P.	Luck.
PC	There's a longer word, as well, that that might be an example of. Can anyone think? Let me see how many letters there are in it. Eleven letters... It would be an example of something beginning with...
Matthew P.	Solution.
PC	We'll have another game of 'Hangman' then.
----------	I write eleven dashes on the board: -----------
PC	I'll give you the first letter: 'C'. Someone tell me without me giving any more letters. Caroline?
Caroline	Curiosity?
PC	No, it wouldn't be an example of a curiosity... Kirsty?

Kirsty	Coincidence?
PC	Excellent... can you spell it for me Kirsty, please?
----------	Kirsty shakes her head.
PC	Well, you don't know until you've tried. You're like Knownothing.
Matthew P.	You have no proof or evidence you can't do it.

COMMENT — This is an excellent example of how insights gained in a philosophical discussion can be applied in practical and non-contrived situations in the classroom. Hopefully, such discussions will also be of benefit to children in their lives outside school.

PC	What does she have no proof or evidence of, Matthew?
Matthew P.	She can't do it.
PC	That she can't spell it. Excellent.
----------	Kirsty spells the word with some help from one of her class-mates.
PC	Excellent. Not only a class of excellent thinkers but a class of superb spellers as well! Now, I've got something to say to you. That is the best discussion I have ever had with a group of children... Now, what do we think about these people – you remember I mentioned a famous person – what was the famous person's name, Jon?
Jon	Plato.
PC	Why did I mention Plato to you, Jon?
Jon	He said that you can't study philosophy if you're under thirty.

COMMENT — In the *Republic*, Plato argues that dialectic (philosophy) can only be introduced to those who have successfully completed many years of training and study and who have reached the age of thirty.[9] See page 73.

PC	What do we think about that, Caroline?

Caroline	It's not true because we... you can and he's not including you either.
PC	Jayne?
Jayne	You've got no proof or evidence that you can't do philosophy if you're under thirty.
PC	If I wanted to go and talk to some adults and to say to them: 'I have a group of children... who are capable of engaging in philosophy and they're Second, Third and Fourth Years', what would my tape provide for me, Melanie?
Melanie	Proof and evidence.
PC	So, what do we think of Plato's argument, Kirsty, that you can't study philosophy until you're thirty?
Kirsty	Wrong.
Matthew P.	He has not got no proof or evidence.
PC	He has no proof or evidence... This tape, in fact, provides evidence of the opposite... Thank you very much.

References

1. See Matthews, G.B., 'Thinking in stories', *Thinking*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1985, p. 1.

2. On *akrasia* (incontinence) see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Revised Edition, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976, Book 7; Matthews, G.B., 'Thinking in stories', *Thinking*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1979, p. 4; Mortimore, G.W. (Ed.), *Weakness of Will*, Macmillan, London, 1971.

3. See, for example, Singer, P., *Practical Ethics*, University Press, Cambridge, 1979; Singer, P., 'All animals are equal', in Singer, P. (Ed.), *Applied Ethics*, University Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 215-228; Clark, S.R.L., *The Moral Status of Animals*, University Press, Oxford, 1977.

4. For a discussion of levels of moral reasoning, see Kohlberg, L., *The Psychology of Moral Development: the nature and validity of moral stages*, Harper and Row, San Francisco, 1984, pp. 170-205; Modgil, S. and Modgil, C. (Eds.), *Lawrence Kohlberg: consensus and controversy*, Falmer Press, Lewes, 1986; Hersh, R.H., Paolitto, D.P. and Reimer, J. *Promoting Moral Growth: from Piaget to Kohlberg*, Longman, New York, 1979, pp. 63-82.

5. Singer, P., *Practical Ethics*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

6. Paton, H.J., *The Moral Law*, Hutchinson, London, 1969, p. 84.

7. Singer, P., *Practical Ethics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-71.

8. Plato, *Republic*, Second Edition (revised), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974, Book 7, 537d.

Dialogue 2: Riverhill Junior School

This dialogue discusses issues raised by the exercises entitled 'Inspector Clueless' and 'Any Girls for Football' respectively (see appendix 15). Comments made by pupils whom I have not been able to identify have been included without attribution.

PC	Now, with this diagram - who can tell me what's going on? What's going on Richard, please?
Richard	He's had something stolen. He's been burgled - the picture's not straight.
PC	O.K. What else is happening, Simon?
Simon	It looks as if someone's burgled the house and he's found something that he's dropped - 'cos he's holding it like that.
PC	O.K. Can anyone tell me what that looks like?...
Sarah	A sailor's cap?
PC	... It's like a sailor's cap but it isn't a sailor's cap.
------	Is it a flat cap?
PC	Yes. Now, can we think of... another word that we may use for a cap? Paul?
Paul	Is it a balaclava?
PC	No. Cassie?
Cassie	A beret.
PC	That's what it is. Now can you spell that for me? If you've all been doing some French, you may be able to spell this for me.
----------	Several children help to spell 'beret'.
PC	The French do not pronounce the 'T' on the end of this word 'beret'. So, we've determined [that] something has been taken. We've determined that the man in the picture is... holding a beret. Who can tell me what this man's occupation is? What does this man do for a living do you think, Stephen?
Stephen	Burgling houses.

PC	*He* might be the burglar. Yes.
Barrie	The cap might have been in the safe – he's unlocked the safe.
PC	O.K. Mark?
Mark	A detective.
PC	He may be a detective. James?
James	He might be the person who owns the house...
PC	O.K.... Nicola?
Nicola	Somebody like a plain-clothed policeman – CID.
PC	Yes, he might be. Well, I'll tell you who he is.
-----	He looks like a teacher.
PC	He is a famous French inspector.
David	Inspector Clouseau?
PC	Close.
----------	I write 'Clueless' on the blackboard.
Chorus	Clueless.
PC	Excellent. And this is what he says – now we're looking to see how good Inspector Clueless's argument is – this is what he says; listen carefully: 'Whoever robbed this safe was wearing a beret. All French men are people who wear berets.' The conclusion is: 'A French man must have robbed the safe.' Now, what do we think about this, Karen?
Karen	No. The first one might be true, whereas the second one is false.
PC	Whoever robbed the safe was wearing a beret. That might be true. Why is the second one false? All French men are people who wear berets?
Karen	Because not all French men do wear berets. 'Cos scouts wear berets don't they? So it's stupid.
----------	I write the following statements on the blackboard: Whoever robbed the safe was wearing a beret. All French men are people who wear berets.

Therefore a French man must have robbed the safe.
Pointing to the second statement, I ask:

PC   What do you think about that, Karen?

Karen   False.

PC   Anyone think that's true? Do you think it's true, Nicola?

Nicola   No, I don't think it's true because he hasn't got a beret on. And
                it wouldn't be true if that's his own beret - and it could be
                because he wears his own beret. Or, he could have just... it
                could have been that picture and that beret what was left out of
                the other thing - out of the man who got burgled. That's all
                that could be left.

PC   Cassie?

Cassie   I think it's false, 'cos not all French *men* wear berets. French
                girls might - or ladies. I've got one.

PC   Are you French?

Cassie   No.

PC   Stephen?

Stephen   I think that's false because the army wear berets as well.

Kristian   I was gonna say that.

------   Most people wear berets.

David   Yes, red berets.

PC   Richard?

Richard   I think he was fooled because different countries wear... like
                Scotland wear berets.

PC   Yes, they do. Damien?

Damien   I think the robber could have put all the stuff he's robbed out
                of the safe into a beret, and put all the stuff out of the beret
                ... into his pockets.

PC   Yes, Mark?

Mark   I think he might have robbed it, then he came back and the
                people had found out about the burglaries. And he was trying to

say that it wasn't... it was somebody else, and it was him really. And he picks the beret up and said: 'Oh, thank you, I wear berets.'

PC	O.K. Adam?
Adam	I think that he was investigating. He might have caught his beret on something, and he was just looking at it to see if he'd ripped it. He was, like, holding it in one finger to see where it was.
PC	Yes. Why would he be holding it with one finger, do you think?
-----	It might be wet.
PC	Karen?
Karen	Because if it has been stolen then he don't want to get his own fingerprints on it.
David	That's what I was thinking.
PC	O.K. Yes, Nicola?
Nicola	I think that - Inspector Clueless, because he looks so mad - I think it's his own house, and he's inspecting his own house.
-----	Well, I don't.
PC	He might be.
Nicola	Because he's mad.
PC	David?
David	He could be sleep-walking because he's got his eyes closed in his own house.
-----	Yeah, but he's looking down at the beret...
David	It looks like he's got his eyes closed. It looks like he has got his night clothes on.
PC	What is he wearing?
-----	A dressing gown.
-----	A coat like yours.
PC	A coat like...

-----	Yours.
-----	I know what it is.
PC	... mine. Yes, Kristian?
Kristian	An overcoat.
PC	Hmm. Well, if you've seen any of the 'Pink Panther' films...
Chorus	Yes. Inspector Clouseau wears a hat doesn't he?
-----	Yes.
David	And an overcoat.
PC	That's right. Now, this is what I want to ask you. We have a feeling that this statement on the board is false. What's the next thing we are going to do with this statement, Karen?
----------	I point to 'All French men are people who wear berets.'
Karen	Change the 'all' to 'some'.
COMMENT	Karen notes that the quantifier 'all' is not appropriate here. That an incorrect use of particular quantifiers may have serious consequences is evidenced by the resignation of the junior Health Minister, Mrs. Edwina Currie, over her comment that 'most of the egg production in this country is now infected with salmonella'.[1] Currie later acknowledged that she 'did not intend to say "most eggs" and did not say "most eggs". If I had covered myself more carefully', she argued, 'I would have said something like "many" or "some" or "a few"'.[2]
PC	No, we're not going to change 'all' to 'some' today. I'm going to come on to statements that begin with the word 'some'. I just want to stay with this statement beginning with 'all' and do something with it. What are we going to do with it, Leanne?
Leanne	All people who wear berets are French men or something like that.
PC	So, what have you just done?
Leanne	I seem to have reversed it.
PC	That's it. All... just say that again.

Leanne	All people who wear berets are French men.
----------	I write this statement on the blackboard.
PC	Damien?
Damien	My granddad ain't French and he wore one in the army.
-----	Yeah, so did mine.
PC	So, is this statement true or false, Damien?
Damien	False.
PC	Cassie?
Cassie	Well, this looks like a bank.
PC	Looks like a...?
Cassie	Bank. And the robbers have left that behind; but that is a safe, you know, where they keep the money.
-----	It looks like a safe.
PC	Yes, that's it.
-----	They have a bigger one than that don't they?
Cassie	Banks have pictures in.
PC	Yes they do - famous paintings. Nicola?
Nicola	That could be his beret because he might not want to put his own fingerprints, so it would look like he's stolen - he's been stealing -·to make it look like other people have. And the inspector remembered not to put all his fingerprints on, and that's his own beret. Or he could have just taken it out and he could be thinking.
PC	Now, we have said this first statement - 'All French men are people who wear berets' - is false. But Clueless believes it to be true. so, what am I going to put on the board here beside this 'F', Kristian?
Kristian	'T' in brackets.
PC	Now when we were discussing the 'Apple Pie' example,[3] I said to you: 'Just because the person in the picture... just because for that person: 'All girls are good cooks,' that doesn't mean

	that all [good cooks are girls]. Now, can someone do exactly the same for me with this statement... Nicola?
Nicola	I think it's... the two top ones are false – to us, and the man thinks it's true. And the two bottom ones are just false.
PC	O.K. Leanne? No?... Just because Clueless thinks that: 'All French men are people who wear berets,' that doesn't mean... What? David?
David	All people who wear berets are French men.
PC	O.K. Just because Clueless says: 'All French men are people who wear berets,' and he thinks that's true, that doesn't mean that all people who wear berets are French men. Now, when we come to discuss the last example, I want someone to be able to do that for me without me giving the first part. If you turn over the sheet...
----------	We now move on to the discussion of the exercise 'Any Girls for Football?'
David	Oh, football.
PC	Now, what's happening, Simon, with this...?
Simon	They are just having a game of football. It looks like the girl's the ref. and it looks like it's sort of 'girls v boys'.
PC	All right. Damien?
Damien	I think the girl's a goalie. Well, it might not be a girl. They might be shorts with a boy with long hair and he's in goal.
PC	Well, we'll say the person at the bottom of the picture here is a girl, and this is a skirt and not a pair of shorts. And so it's a...
-----	It looks as if she's a girl because she's a glove on.
-----	It could be a referee.
David	That's what I was thinking.
PC	Well, she may be in goal, which is the reason why I have given her a glove... Now, Stephen.
Stephen	I think that the person down here is a goalie and she's a girl, and the one up there is a girl. And the boy's coming in to tackle her and she's afraid of him.

-----	Ha!
PC	Yes, Leanne?
Leanne	I think that those two girls are just playing football and the boy comes over and spoils their game, like most boys do.
David	He wouldn't do that, he'd do summat nastier!
PC	... Nicola?
Nicola	I think that girl with the glove on... is the goalie and because they haven't got enough people... she's a ref. as well. 'Cos you can't see her other hand, so she could be blowing a whistle. And that boy is coming up to tackle her and she's laughing. And you can't see his face... he hasn't got any hands.
PC	It's round at the front. Now, let me ask you this. This is something I haven't asked the other two groups. It just occurred to me now. What sort of an 'all' statement do you think is going to be involved in an example of this sort? Rather than [for] me to give you the example and you to say whether you think it's sound or not, what sort of a statement beginning with the word 'all' do you think I'm going to use to describe the situation in this picture, Cassie?
Cassie	All boys are good at football. All good footballers are boys.
-----	No.
David	All boys are good at football.
PC	Let me tell you what Mr. Smith, the Games teacher, who's watching these boys and girls playing football... says. He says this: 'I must choose eleven players to play in the football team. I'm going to choose eleven boys because all boys are good football players.'
----------	I write 'All boys are good football players' on the blackboard.
PC	Now, what do we think about this statement, Leanne?
Leanne	False.
PC	He's going to choose eleven people to play in the football team, Kristian, and Mr. Smith is going to choose eleven boys because according to him: 'All boys are good footballers.' So, I suppose if you believe that, it doesn't matter who the eleven boys are. He could just say: 'One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven.'

David	It does if you are putting out a team though. If you know they're good, you've got to choose a better team.
PC	Richard?
Richard	I think it's false, because not all boys are good footballers.
PC	What's our next step going to be? Yes, Stephen?
Stephen	All good footballers are boys.
----------	I write this on the blackboard.
PC	What do we think about that, Adam?
Adam	True.
David	False.
----------	Several other children say: 'True' or 'False'.
David	It's true. It's just the same meaning.
------	It's false.
PC	All good footballers are boys. Why is it false, Adam?
Adam	Because the best footballers are men.
David	It's just the same meaning as like the other... the top one.
PC	O.K. Any other reasons why that might be false, Kristian?
Kristian	England has got a woman football team.
------	Yeah, they have.
PC	So, what does that tell us? Nicola?
Nicola	Girls are fast. Girls can be footballers as well.
PC	... Do girls play football at [Riverhill Junior School]?
Chorus	Yeah.
------	Some do.
Nicola	Mr. Costello, you could put: 'All boys and girls could play football.'

-----	All boys and girls are footballers.
PC	Would that be true?
Chorus	No.
Nicola	No, it'd be false, but if you put 'could' then it'd be like a choice. They could play if they liked because I didn't say they *could* play football...
David	Yes, but the school won't let 'em.
Nicola	... so that's true. It's true - the first one.
PC	So, do girls play football sometimes at break?
Nicola	Yeah.
-----	Yeah.
David	But it's 'field', that is.
Nicola	We started a girls' football team here.
----------	Laughter.
PC	What's funny about that?... Now, let me ask you this. We've said both of these statements are false but Mr. Smith believes this one to be true. Now, if you remember the situation with Inspector Clueless, I said: 'Just because for Inspector Clueless "all French men are people who wear berets," that doesn't mean that all people who wear berets are French men.' Now, I want someone to give me a formulation like that, involving both of these - without me saying anything at all - starting off with "Just because... " Yes, come on then, Simon.
Simon	Just because boys usually, mostly play football, doesn't mean that all good footballers are boys.
PC	Nicola?
Nicola	Just because French men wear berets, it doesn't mean to say that we can't wear it.
PC	No, it doesn't. David?
David	Just because boys are good footballers, it doesn't mean that all good footballers are boys.

PC	No, it doesn't, does it? So, what do you think of Mr. Smith's reasoning?
David	... you're right, they're both false.
-----	Rubbish.
-----	He's a bit of a ...
----------	Laughter
PC	Richard?
Richard	They just go on saying that because it's just like a saying: 'All boys are good footballers.'
PC	Why do you think people say: 'Well, girls can't really play football. It's a *boy's* game,' Karen?
Karen	Because it's a man teacher and they usually played football when they were younger. So, they probably didn't have girls playing it then...
PC	That's possible, isn't it? Nicola?
Nicola	I think that he thinks boys are better footballers than girls because girls get other things like dancing and that. They get stuff like that. Boys don't get that many games and most of what boys play, girls can play. And he thinks that, because we get more things, boys should have their own team, and he wont teach 'em.
PC	... What sort of activities might girls engage in, that you think boys often don't engage in?
David	Dancing. Dance class and that.
PC	Why do you think that is, David?
David	Because they haven't got the taste, boys really.
-----	They have.
-----	They have.
Nicola	My best friend's cousin goes and he's a boy.
Richard	I went to a dance-class.
----------	Laughter

PC	Say that again, Richard.
Richard	I'm interested in it.
----------	Laughter
PC	Why do people think that's funny?
Christian	Well, all good footballers go to ballet.
PC	Why do a lot of good footballers go to the ballet?
Christian	So they're nimbler on their feet.
PC	Cassie?
Cassie	On the 'Book Tower', he was complaining because: you know all the football-books, they've all got boys in and all the girls' ballet-books have got girls in.
COMMENT	This comment indicates that children are only too aware of the sexist nature of much of the literature to which they are exposed.
PC	Now, what do you think about that?
Cassie	Well, they should have boys in ballet-books and girls in football-books.
------	They have got boys in ballet-books.
PC	Nicola?
Nicola	According to boys, we can't play... football. So, why can't we go into ballet-books as well as boys going in... and football-books?
PC	Yes. Why do you think a lot of people write books, produce books, which portray these pastimes, these hobbies, interests, as being just for boys on the one hand, or just for girls on the other? What do you think the reason for that is, Damien?
Damien	They might be racist. It's like saying: 'All white people are good at everything. All black people are rubbish at everything.'
COMMENT	Damien acknowledges, both here and below, that one factor which sexist and racist statements have in common is that they

discriminate against certain groups of people. The 'tool' which is used to accomplish this is often the word 'all'.

David   Like in South Africa. They're all prejudiced.

Damien   It's just like being racist.

David   Like in South Africa. In South Africa there's that big swimming pool where everyone can go in it now. They wanted every swimming pool.

PC   Yes.

David   'Cos they aren't allowed to go on the same 'bus, and that... just in South Africa. There's a lot of prejudice.

PC   What do you think about that, David?

David   It's horrible. They're still normal people. They're still people. It's just the colour of their skin.

PC   So, since you've mentioned that example, what do you think about these statements that we've looked at, that begin with the word 'all'? How would you describe those... Nicola?

Nicola   I don't think it's right because in books people just take it for granted that boys play football all the time, and no girls. And girls do dance-classes, ballet and that. But, it's right in a way because most boys play football. More boys, and only some girls, and most of the girls don't compare to the boys you're teaching!

COMMENT   Nicola offers a rationale for the existence of books which show evidence of sex-role stereotyping. While not agreeing with the content of such literature, she understands that they have appeal because the majority of boys enjoy playing football, while fewer girls participate in this activity. This understanding is based on the correct use of the quantifiers 'most' and 'some'.

PC   So, Karen, to come back to something you mentioned at the start of the lesson, what might it be more appropriate to substitute for this word?

Karen   You could put 'some' down.

PC	And in situations where you think there are more boys playing football, or more girls going to dance-classes, which may or may not be true; what's another word we could use instead of 'some'?
-----	A lot.
Karen	Most
PC	Most, Karen.
David	I was going to say 'medium'.
PC	Well, the three important ones really are 'all', 'some' and 'no'.
David	Most means like sixty out of, seventy out of a hundred per cent, doesn't it? Like thirty per cent boys and seventy per cent girls...
COMMENT	David is aware of the cross-curricular applications which the subject matter under discussion may have. The teaching of logic, using the exercises which I have devised, can take place quite naturally within a mathematics lesson. Indeed, that this is so · constitutes a formidable argument for the introduction of philosophy into the primary school curriculum.
PC	Yes, it would be 'most'.
David	Like: 'Most girls go to dance-class.'
PC	Yes, that's right. Richard?
Richard	God says that all girls or whatever you are, what colour skin you are, there's not much difference.
David	They're still normal people.
PC	Why do you think people want to say...
Richard	All human beings are the same aren't they?
David	Yeah, like in South Africa.
PC.	Why do you think then, Richard, that some people want to say: 'That's not true... people are different,' because some of us are men and some are women; some are boys and some are girls; some are black, some are white. Why do you think people want to say that we're different in this sort of way? And often

	to support their arguments they use expressions beginning with the word 'all'?
David	Because they don't like each other really.
PC	That's a reason for it, isn't it, David?
David	Or you can get Iran and Iraq. They don't like each other because they keep bombing 'em, don't they? Like on the West Bank.
PC	Who?
David	The Palestinians.
PC	The Palestinians and the...?·
David	The rebel soldiers.
PC	No. The Palestinians and... Who are fighting with the Palestinians at the moment, Nicola?
Nicola	Is it the Gulf?
PC	I beg your pardon?
-----	The gulf is a sea.
PC ·	... Leanne?
Leanne	The Israelis?
PC	Yes.
David	They throwed a lot of petrol bombs... and the soldiers beat them up.
Kristian	Yeah, break their arms with rocks.
David	I know, they break their hands so they can't throw petrol bombs at 'em.
COMMENT	The children's comments indicate the extent to which they have already acquired some knowledge about world events. Given the prominence of news programmes such as *John Craven's Newsround*, and newspapers which have been produced especially for children, this is not surprising. However, since pupils are being exposed to such news coverage on an unprecedented scale, it is important that they should possess those philosophical skills

which are necessary for an adequate appraisal of it.

PC   Nicola?

Nicola   White people aren't fair to coloureds because they call them
            loads of different names; and they ain't got that many names
            to call us, really.

COMMENT   Nicola's contribution to the discussion is wide-ranging. She
            begins by considering unfairness on the part of white people.

Kristian   They call us 'Milky Bars'.

Nicola   If we spent a year in... a really hot place we could go real
            brown, but they can't go... white. We can call them names.
            We've got more names to call them than they have us because
            people call them...

-----   'Nogs'.

Nicola   Yeah.

PC   What do you think about this name-calling then?

David   It's horrible.

Nicola   It's stupid, it's not nice.

PC   Why is it not nice?

Nicola   'Cos they're all... everybody's human aren't we? We can't really
            put wars just for people calling names. They should just call
            them what they *are* called.

COMMENT   In the Herbert Read Memorial Lecture, *Is Nothing Sacred*, which
            he delivered on 6 February, 1990, Salman Rushdie recalls having
            attended a lecture by Arthur Koestler in which the latter
            'propounded the thesis that language, not territory, was the
            prime cause of aggression, because once language reached the
            level of sophistication at which it could express abstract
            concepts, it acquired the power of totemization; and once
            peoples had erected totems, they would go to war to defend
            them'.[4] Nicola is arguing that to adopt this course of action is
            not justifiable.

PC   O.K. Stephen?

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Stephen	Although they're coloured, we're coloured as well. Because pink is a colour.
-----	We aren't pink.
-----	I'm not pink,
PC	Leanne?
Leanne	They're only coloured because they live in a hot country and it's made them brown. So, I don't see what the difference is.
David	They was born coloured, weren't they? But... say a black man was married to a white man.
-----	A black man married to a white man!
David	Right... a white woman's married to a black man. They won't be black, they'll be in between. They'll be white and black. There's a name for it, isn't there? Half-caste.
PC	Yes, half-caste. Richard?
Richard	Some of the people, they come over here and they have children, and they're English. But they're still dark and it's not very hot here, so it can't be a hot [place which] gives them their colour.
PC	It can't be just the heat, can it? Kristian?
Kristian	I think we shouldn't call them names because they can say stuff like 'All, most of the best footballers in the world are black.'
-----	They are.
David	Yeah, they are.
Kristian	They're better at cricket than us.
PC	Damien?
Damien	You know someone said: 'You hardly ever see boys in ballet books,' and things like that?
PC	Yes.
Damien	Well, I've looked at loads of books, and I've only seen one book with a black person in.

COMMENT	This is another example of stereotyping which has not escaped the notice of members of the class. To overcome this problem, the Commission for Racial Equality suggests that teachers and others should provide 'dolls, jigsaws, posters, books and toys which reflect a multi-racial Britain... even if [one lives] in an all or mainly white area'.[5]
PC	Hmm.
Damien	Yes, there's a ballet-book there with a man on the front.
-----	And a woman.
David	On the top.
PC	So, what do you think about this, Damien?
Damien	Well, all the white people are loony in that case then, if they're just...
David	They're stupid really. they shouldn't call them names.
PC	What do you think about, say, text books where all the people are white?[6]
Damien	The people who write them probably are jealous of black people...
David	Prejudiced.
Damien	... and don't want them to rule the books and things. They want white people to rule the world and not black people.
David	If they don't like white people they're called 'prejudiced', aren't they? If they don't like black people they're called 'prejudiced'.
Damien	Racist.
Kristian	Racist.
PC	Can you spell that?
David	Prejudiced?
----------	David spells the word 'prejudiced' with help from one of his class-mates.

PC	Now, who can tell me what this word means, if you are 'prejudiced', or you show 'prejudice', Damien?
Damien	When you don't like the black people and you 'have a lot off to them',* and things like that.
----------	* A colloquialism meaning 'to chastise'.
PC	That's an example of it, but that's not the only example of prejudice. When else might we show, or display, or exhibit prejudice, do you think?... David?
Kristian	When you're at war.
PC	Well, that's an extreme form of prejudice, isn't it? Damien?
Damien	If you're like deformed or something, you get called names and things.
PC	Yes.
Damien	Like if you've got... you may have Down's syndrome.
PC	Yes, if you have various illnesses, people may be prejudiced against you. Yes, Nicola?
Nicola	It was on the news... Some schools in England wouldn't let black people in their schools because they thought it was a disgrace or something. And then if they did, they'd have all the white people on one side and the black people on the other.
David	Some people... they all have diseases or something.
Nicola	Because they're black.
Richard	Black people get taught the same lessons as us as well...
-----	I know.
Richard	... don't they?
PC	So, what do you think about that, Richard?
Richard	I don't see why they should... I think that they've got a right to come in schools where white people are. There's no point just getting at them.
David	Yeah...
Richard	There's no point just getting at them.

PC	Richard?
Richard	Why did they come to our country in the first place?
COMMENT	Richard's contributions above are very different in nature. This indicates that he is exploring various aspects of the topic in the spirit of open inquiry. Discussion of this sort permits children to reflect on issues, to offer questions and to articulate opinions, without feeling that it is necessary to arrive at some predetermined 'right' answer.
Damien	'Cos they were used as slaves. If we were shipped to their country, they'd be having a lot off to us and it would be the other way round. We'd never be in books and things.
COMMENT	Damien is aware that historical (and other) accounts which seek to inform us about the world are written from particular perspectives. Such an understanding will be essential if National Curriculum proposals for the teaching of history are implemented in their present form (see chapter two).
PC	Kristian?
Kristian	In 'Grange Hill' there was a lot of black people in school.
PC	Nicola?
Nicola	When it was the Aboriginal thing... the Aborigines were black and we were shipped to their country. So... it's just because Australia was so far away from England... that we were shipped over there.
PC	Why were people shipped from this country to Australia?
David	They emigrated.
PC	James?
James	Were they convicts?
PC	Yes. Nicola?
Nicola	The black people come here and the white people go there because they might not like their own countries. 'Cos like in some black places they are used as slaves and here we don't really have slaves and that. If you emigrate to Australia, it

might be because you find that it's better than here and because it's warmer and it'd be much cheaper as well.

COMMENT   Some of the views about peoples and countries, expressed both here and by others below, are based on a lack of requisite knowledge. To help to alleviate this difficulty, a global education/World Studies perspective should permeate the curriculum offered to primary school children.[7]

PC   David?

David   John Barnes is black, isn't he? He's from Jamaica. They throw bananas at him when he's on the ball.

COMMENT   In an article entitled '...And the Crowd Goes Bananas', Dave Hill decribes the plight of a number of black footballers, including Barnes, who were subjected to racist taunts in Liverpool.[8] That young children are conscious of such racism is evident. Indeed, the Commission for Racial Equality has argued that 'in a society in which conclusive evidence from CRE studies and elsewhere has shown racial prejudice, discrimination and disadvantage to be widespread, there can be no racially 'neutral' environment'.[9] Consequently, 'even very young children will be influenced by ideas and attitudes which perpetuate [racial] prejudices, unless active steps are taken to prevent and counter this process'.[10] The present exercise provides one method whereby teachers can attempt to achieve this goal.

PC   What do you think about that?

David   It's horrible...

PC   Kristian?.

Kristian   Mr. Costello, it's weird, because Ben Johnson, who's the fastest man in the world, was born in...

David   Canada.

Kristian   ... Jamaica, and he runs for Canada.

PC   Canada, that's right.

David   'Cos Jamaica was Commonwealth, wasn't it, once? So was India.

PC   Right. Two more comments on this and I think I'll stop for this morning. Mark?

Mark	I don't think it's fair we're all picking on the black people because it might be us who are the wrong colour.
Richard	We're all the same colour though, aren't we?
PC	Why does anyone have to be the wrong colour?
-----	I know
-----	On the news it showed you where they were getting this priest, who was a black man, and taking him away...
David	Desmond Tutu. Yeah, in South Africa.
Mark	This was a black man and they're taking him away because he was...
David	Doing a protest. He was doing a protest and Desmond Tutu got arrested.
PC	Yes, one more then, Nicola, and then I want to say one last thing about 'all' statements.
Nicola	Loads of pop singers are black and we think that their songs are good...
Nicola	Black people should be grateful to us. Well, because we're helping all these black Ethiopians, and Bob Geldof is going over there and getting all them trucks and all the food. And we're helping all of them, so they should be grateful to us.
David	I bet you they won't help us if we starved.
Nicola	No, I think they would.
Cassie	They would 'cos they're starving.
COMMENT	Cassie implies that empathy is an important factor in promoting moral action.''
David	I bet they won't help us. I know they won't. But, if they had the money, they wouldn't help us.
PC.	Why not?
-----	Because they're selfish.
David	I don't know about the Africans.

Nicola	They are selfish. We're helping them to get more food.
David	They need it.
PC	How do you know, how do we know that they're selfish, Nicola?
-----	Because they keep fighting.
Nicola	They're being selfish to us, they're not really saying: 'Thanks'. I reckon the Ethiopians are quite grateful, but... all the other black people, they're just being selfish to us - they're not coming to help us at all... Half the country here could be starving and they don't care.
David	There's a war going on in Ethiopia.
Nicola	As long as they've got food in 'em, they don't care, do they?
PC	Karen?
Karen	There's the other countries in Africa, and they won't even help their own people. And if they get food-ships through for the Ethiopians, they take it and sell it on the black market. So, why should we feed them if they won't feed their own country?
COMMENT	Karen alludes to one of the basic problems facing those who are engaged in famine relief, namely that of ensuring that funds raised and foodstuffs acquired eventually reach those for whom they are intended.
PC	How do you know that they take this food and sell it on the black market?
Karen	It says on telly.
-----	And in the paper.
PC	Does that make it true then, Karen?
Karen	It must do 'cos they're saying it is true - all of it.
PC	Why must it make it true, if it's on TV?
Karen	Because it's called the 'news'.
COMMENT	Karen's contributions show how vunerable young minds are to the threat of unjustifiable indoctrination. They indicate clearly why

children must be introduced to philosophical thinking at a young age.

-----	All the news is great.
PC	Nicola, can I ask you something?... Several weeks ago you made a very interesting contribution concerning the difference between facts and theories, didn't you, in history?
Nicola	Yeah.
-----	Julius Caesar crossed the bridge.
PC	Now, let me ask you this. Are the news items that we hear about each evening on our news at a quarter to six, are they facts, do you think, or theories?
-----	Theories.
-----	Facts.
-----	Facts.
Nicola	Some of them are facts. Because like fires: they must be facts. But, if they said they found...
-----	They think there's a bomb what could go off.
Nicola	Yeah, a bomb was going to go off – that's only a theory. And people are dying: they'd say something like 'Another two million in Ethiopia have died,' and it'd be wrong. And they could say: 'Julius Caesar is coming back from the dead'.
----------	End of side one of the tape. While I am turning the tape over, Nicola mentions a recent accident in Hull involving a 'bus.
PC	Right, Nicola, just finish that point...
Nicola	In news bulletins... they'd say what *they* think happened to the 'bus going down home. But they could be completely wrong. The driver could have just been not looking where he was going.
Cassie	What, on the back bumper? Oh, I'm sure!
PC	So, can I just ask you this to finish with? Do you yourself believe that everything we hear in the news at a quarter to six on television is therefore true because it's on TV?
Nicola	No, I think there's a mixture of true and false.

PC   How do we work out which items are true and which are false?

Nicola   Because they could show you things like fires.

PC   Yes.

Nicola   And they'd say that a cigarette could have caused it, which is a
            theory. So a report is theories and facts in each report. You
            can't say for definite that it was a cigarette or someone set it
            on fire.

COMMENT   Nicola demonstrates quite a sophisticated grasp of the essential
            difference between facts and theories, since, as she
            acknowledges, the latter offer us 'a conception of the... causal
            connection between facts'. [12]

PC   O.K.... I want to stop there.

References

1. Brown, G., 'Currie explains remark on eggs', *The Daily Telegraph*, 26 January, 1989, p. 1.

2. *The Sunday Times*, 'Who said what?', 29 October, 1989, p. B20.

3. Another exercise in this series, 'The Apple Pie', is to be found in appendix 15.

4. Rushdie, S., *Is Nothing Sacred?*, The Herbert Read Memorial Lecture, Granta, Cambridge, 1990, p. 6.

5. Commission for Racial Equality, *From Cradle to School: a practical guide to race equality and childcare*, CRE, London, p. 35.

6. For a discussion of racism in children's literature, see Hare, W., 'Bias in stories for children: black marks for authors', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1985, pp. 99-108.

7. See, Fisher, S. and Hicks, D., *World Studies 8-13: a teacher's handbook*, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1985; Hicks, D. and Townley, DC. (Eds.), *Teaching World Studies*, Longman, London, 1982; Robinson, R., 'The National Curriculum; a place for development and global coverage?', *Teaching Geography*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1989, pp. 111-113; Hicks, D., 'Lessons from global education: avoiding a nationalistic curriculum', *Values*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1989, pp. 5-8.

8. Hill, D., '... And the crowd goes bananas', *The Independent*, 4 March, 1989, p. 27.

9. Commission for Racial Equality, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Bottery, M., *The Morality of the School*, Cassell, London, 1990, p. 30. See also, Chazan, B., *Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education: analyzing alternative theories*, Teachers College Press, London, 1985; Wakeman, B., *Personal, Social and Moral Education: a source book*, Lion, Tring, 1984; Settle, D. and Wise, C., *Choices: materials and methods for personal and social education*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.

12. *Pocket Oxford Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, p. 883. See also, Abel, R., *Man is the Measure: a cordial invitation to the central problems of philosophy*, The Free Press, New York, 1976, chapter 9; Ayer, A.J., *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1976, chapter 7.

Dialogue 3: Riverhill Junior School

This dialogue discusses issues raised by the exercise entitled
'Philosophical Pot Pourri' (see appendix 12). Comments made by
pupils whom I have not been able to identify have been included
without attribution.

PC	David, will you read out the problem I asked you to think about?
David	'Can a chess computer think?'

COMMENT	In his book, *Matter and Consciousness*, Paul Churchland suggests that the central concern of those working in the field of 'artificial intelligence' is 'to construct and configure a purely physical device so that it will possess genuine intelligence'.[1] According to Brenda Almond, 'Thought is, I may suppose, the capacity that intelligence displays. If some kind of intelligence can be created in a factory or laboratory I may look at the resulting artefact – computer, robot or device – and ask, does this machine think?'[2]

PC	'Can a chess computer think?' And what do you three think about that?
David	There used to be a television programme about chess... on BBC2. That [was] made with a chess computer. It must have been thinking.
Damien	Yeah, 'cos you played against it and it did all the moves by itself.
PC	And it...?
Damien	Did all the moves by itself, so it had to be thinking.
PC	O.K.... Adam?
Adam	And the moves that you've programmed into the computer.
-----	Yeah.
PC	Who programmes the moves?
Adam	You.
PC	I beg your pardon?

David	You, really.
Adam	The person who made the computer program.
PC	[Yes.] Usually a chess player called a... Does anyone know the name we give to a very good chess player?
David	Kasparov!
PC	We might call him Kasparov. Kasparov is an example of a...
David	Chess player. Champion.
----------	I write 'Grand' on the blackboard.
PC	Grand?
-----	Master.
PC	Excellent...
PC	Now, if a grandmaster programmes the computer, then is the computer thinking?
Chorus	No.
David	You've already got your brain to think, haven't you?
PC	Nicola?
Nicola	Not necessarily, 'cos if you found the one who'd programmed it, it's you who has done all the thinking. So the computer can't make it up. But, you could just make your own tapes and slot your tape in, and it puts different moves.
PC	Heather?
Heather	It's just obeying what you tell it to do, so it's not thinking. It's just doing what it's been told to do.
COMMENT	Brenda Almond asks: 'But is "artificial intelligence" a contradiction in terms? If the machine, perhaps a highly sophisticated computer, "thinks", in the way its inventor has enabled it to do, should I attribute the borrowed "intelligence" to it? Should I attribute the inventor's powers of thought to it? If someone programmes the machine with objectives, should I then say that the machine has goals and purposes of its own?'[3] Heather answers 'No' to the last question.

PC	Well, the grandmaster hasn't foreseen every move that you are going to come across in your game.
-----	He's told [the computer] what to do. If he keeps doing that, well [the computer has] got all the moves then.
PC	Nicola?
Nicola	... you can't really programme it to do a better move each time, 'cos then it will be thinking. So, it can think if you've said that. It wouldn't be you who's thinking.
COMMENT	Nicola argues that a necessary condition for a chess program to improve its performance (for example from game to game) is that it is capable of independent thinking. For a dissenting view which involves a discussion of how such programs may be said to *learn* (and thereby to produce better moves), see Churchland, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113).
PC	What about this? If I'm having a game of chess on my computer late at night, and all of a sudden I feel very tired and I want to go to sleep. I turn the machine off. The next morning, I wake up, I turn it back on and I can carry on [with] my game.
David	That wouldn't happen though.
PC	Because the computer has remembered...
David	Yeah, but you'd have to load it all again, wouldn't you?
-----	No, you wouldn't.
PC	The computer has remembered the position and we carry on where we left off. Now, if we say the computer has a memory, don't you think that that is evidence of the computer's ability to think?[4]
-----	No.
-----	Not really.
David	... When you switch it off, you have to load it again, don't you? When you want to have a go, say when you switched it off, right?
PC	Yes.
David	... Then you have to select a menu... Then you have to load it all again. It takes me a long... time.

PC	But, you don't always have to... load it all again. Adam?
Adam	On some of my computer games that I've got, it says: 'Save Game', and you can press 'Record/Play' and record all you want. So, the next day, you can just record it all back on and you can get up to where you finished.
PC	So, has the machine remembered it?
Adam	No, the tape has.
PC	Has the tape remembered it?
Adam	The tape will have it on.
PC	So, the tape has a memory?
Adam	No. It hasn't got a memory, it's just recorded on to the tape.
COMMENT	Adam resists the temptation to argue that the passive 'memory' which we attribute to computer software is in any way analagous to that which human beings possess.
PC	O.K. Let me ask you this. You are playing chess with your computer. Does your computer want to beat you?[5]
COMMENT	Thus far, the general feeling is that computers are capable of imitating the behaviour of human beings. I now ask a series of questions whose purpose is to ascertain the extent to which children believe that computers share human emotions.
Chorus	Yeah.
David	Yeah, by the way it's trying.
PC	Does your computer have a desire to win, Kristian?
Kristian	Right, you can have an easy level, a hard level, or like a really hard level.
PC	Yes.
Kristian	'Cos if you have a really hard level, you'll probably lose.
PC	So, when you turn it to the most difficult level, is your machine thinking to itself: 'He's put me on to the hardest level

now, I'm really going to win this time.'?

Kristian	No.
PC	Yes?
Kristian	No.
PC	Nicola?
Nicola	No, 'cos some tapes of chess have got just like helping you with the game, and some just play the game with you. So, you really, you've got to do the moves good. But, it's just helping you, it won't really win. 'Cos it's just showing you the cleverest moves.
David	'Cos you've to press a number and it says: 'Demo' – Demonstration.
PC	Sometimes... not only with chess computers but with other computer games, if you actually beat the machine, the machine plays a little tune.
Chorus	Oh, yeah.
PC	It might be 'Happy Birthday to You', or something like that. Now, Sarah, when the machine plays that tune, does that mean that the machine is happy that you have won?
Sarah	Yes.
-----	Yes.
-----	No.
-----	No.
David	Yeah, or it wouldn't have played the tune for you.
Kristian	They can't think.
David	'Cos the computer plays the tune for you, doesn't it?
-----	It's just programmed to...
PC	I beg your pardon?
-----	It's just programmed to do that when it reaches 'Stop'.
PC	Nicola?

Nicola	A computer doesn't have feelings.
COMMENT	This is the essential difference between minds and such machines. As Almond suggests: 'Just because it lacks an organic body, a computer is proof against sexual urges, cravings for food and drink or a desire to rest'.[6]
PC	How do you know that?
Nicola	Because when you... slap it, you go like that. And when you hit it and kick it, it won't cry.
PC	Well, if you kick a tree, a tree will not cry, and yet there are people in the world who want to say: 'Well, trees have feelings in exactly the same way as we have feelings.'
David	You hurt your foot though, don't you?
PC	Yes, you hurt your foot. What do you think about this, Nicola? Do trees have feelings, do you think?
David	I think they do.
Nicola	In a way, but they haven't got a mind.
COMMENT	Nicola understands that feeling pain is a mental process. Consequently, trees are not susceptible to it (at least not in the same way as are animals).
PC	How do you know that?
Nicola	Well... when you chop a tree down, you're not going to find a mind in it, are you?
COMMENT	Nicola's argument as expressed in her last two comments is echoed by Peter Singer: 'It is significant that none of the grounds we have for believing that animals feel pain hold for plants. We cannot observe behaviour suggesting pain – sensational claims to the contrary have not been substantiated – and plants do not have a centrally organized nervous system like ours.'[7]
Nicola	So, it's well if you kick the tree it...
PC	Yes?
Nicola	... it could damage the tree, it's roots... So, that's like

	feelings. But, you know when you said that when you win, some computer games do a song?
PC	Yes?
Nicola	Most of 'em do it anyway.
PC	O.K. We'll leave that one for the moment. Which was the problem I asked you three to consider?
-----	Were our noses made to help us wear spectacles?
COMMENT	This problem is taken from Voltaire's philosophical novel *Candide*, in which Pangloss, a teacher of 'metaphysico-theologo-cosmolo-nigology', argues as follows: 'It is proved... that things cannot be other than they are, for since everything was made for a purpose, it follows that everything is made for the best purpose. Observe: our noses were made for spectacles, so we have spectacles... And since pigs were made to be eaten, we eat pork all the year round.'[8]
PC	Yes. 'Were our noses made to help us to wear spectacles?'
-----	Yeah.
-----	No.
PC	What do you think, boys?
-----	... You know when you're meant to smell and if you never had a nose on, you put your glasses on, they'd just go right down on to your mouth and fall off.
-----	Yeah, but glasses were made after you get your nose.
-----	That's what we said.
Leanne	Glasses were made to fit on your nose, not the nose made to fit the glasses.
COMMENT	Leanne is not persuaded by Voltaire's deterministic thesis. According to Edwards and Pap: 'Determinism is the theory that everything in the universe is entirely governed by causal laws. It asserts that whatever happens at some specific moment is the outcome of something that happened at a previous moment, i.e. that the present is always "determined" by the past.'[9]

-----	Glasses were made so they would go on your nose... If you didn't have a nose, you'd probably rest them somewhere else...
PC	O.K. Leanne?
Leanne	Noses were made for smelling, glasses were made after noses. Glasses were made to fit on to the noses, not noses made so that they'd fit with the glasses.
PC	Well, what do you say to someone who says this, Leanne: 'Whoever invented the nose...
----------	Laughter
PC	... had at least two things in mind: one was to enable us to have something to smell with; and the other reason was, at some point in human history, there were going to be people who were going to wear spectacles. And this device here [I point to my nose] would be just right to balance our spectacles on. What do you say to that, Nicola?
Nicola	It's right, 'cos... not everybody needs glasses. So they won't be made just for people with glasses on, 'cos we wouldn't have a nose now, would we? So, if they were made to put glasses on, everybody would have to wear glasses. So... it's not true!
COMMENT	Nicola uses a deterministic argument to counter the view that noses were made to support spectacles.
PC	... O.K. Richard?
Richard	Noses were made before glasses, so there must have been a man who thought... 'cos there might have been a disease, that everybody was losing their sight. So, this man might have thought to make glasses, and he thought they could go on the nose.
Cassie	Binoculars.
PC	O.K. Well, what do you think of this, then? There is a very famous French philosopher called...
----------	I write 'Voltaire' on the blackboard.
PC	... Voltaire.
-----	Was he German?

David	French.
PC	And in one of his books he says this: 'Noses were made to wear spectacles. Pigs were meant to be eaten and so we eat pork all year round.'
-----	No.
-----	No.
-----	I don't.
-----	It's just stupid that is.
PC	What do you think about that, Heather?...
Heather	It doesn't really mean the same though, because they're both entirely different things. So, well, if you didn't have a nose...
PC	Yes.
Heather	... and you're breathing somewhere else, like through your ears, people couldn't make a little funny thing to stick on your face there so you could wear glasses, would they?
PC	Nicola?
Nicola	Well, just about all animals have got noses, so they are entirely different things. So... if you said *that*, pigs and like that would be wearing glasses...
COMMENT	In advancing a further argument to counter the Panglossian perspective, Nicola extends the deterministic thesis to include non-human animals.
David	Contact lenses.
Nicola	... and horses and dogs and cats and everything else - they'd all be wearing glasses.
PC	O.K. ... Kevin?
Kevin	We don't eat pigs all year round, because I couldn't stand them. I don't like pigs.
PC	Do you not like bacon sandwiches?
-----	Yeah. I like bacon.

PC	What do you think that's made out of?
-----	I like that but I don't like sausages and that.
PC	O.K. David?
David	Some people - well they might breed pigs for the manure and all that, to put on the gardens.
Leanne	It's horses' manure it comes from.
PC	O.K. Kristian?
Kristian	Contact lenses don't go on your nose.
PC	No, they don't.
Kristian	They just go in the eye and all that like.
PC	O.K. Leanne?
Leanne	Pigs weren't meant to be eaten. Pigs were meant to live just like us.
PC	So, why do we eat pork?
Kristian	We're vegetarian.
Leanne	We don't need it. We don't need pork and things. We could go vegetarian.
Karen	... I aren't allowed to eat it.
Leanne	We don't need pork.
PC	Right, David?
David	You could always wear contact lenses, not glasses.
PC	Right, we'll leave that one and move on to Nicola's problem. Will you read it out, Kevin?
Kevin	'Might it be possible for objects to disappear when no one is looking at them?'
COMMENT	This question derives from the theory of perception advanced by George Berkeley in his *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*.[10] Brenda Almond notes that: 'The participants in the dialogues are Hylas, representing the materialistic viewpoint

and Philonous, representing the idealistic view which is Berkeley's own. This view was summed up in the phrase *esse est percipi* ('to be is to be perceived') - a brief way of saying that all our descriptions of objects involve reference to our own ways of perceiving or experiencing them.'[11] According to A.J. Ayer: 'having argued that sensible qualities exist only so long as they are perceived, [Berkeley] avoids the paradoxical consequence that things like stars and trees and houses vanish out of existence when one ceases to perceive them, by assuming that they continue to exist as ideas in the mind of God'.[12]

PC	Now, imagine the situation where everyone is ... looking at me. No one is looking at the clock - are they, David? -
----------	Laughter
PC	... on the wall. Now, if everyone is looking at me, how do we know [that] the clock hasn't disappeared when no one is looking at it, and when you look, it comes back?
-----	If it wasn't there, then we could see it.
PC	And the same for everything else. For example, your houses may not be being looked at by anyone at the moment. Your parents might not be in. No one else is looking at your house, so that the house might have disappeared.
Chorus	No.
PC	And then, when someone looks at the house - imagine that it's round the corner there - I'm walking down. It's disappeared. As soon as I turn, it's come back. What do we think about that one, Karen?
Karen	It's obvious that it wouldn't be there, because you're not looking at it. So it would have disappeared from sight.
-----	Yeah.
Karen	So, you wouldn't look at it and it would have disappeared.
PC	O.K. What about saying this, then, that not only does it disappear from your sight, but it actually *disappears*; as in... the latest 'Star Trek' film...
David	'Star Trek Four'.
PC	Yes. The space ship actually disappears. It's in the middle of a park and they put the cloaking device on, and the machine

disappears. Now, what I want to ask you is: how do we know that my car is in the car park, because I'm not looking at it now? None of us [is] looking at it. Perhaps no one is looking at it. Heather?

Heather If I'm looking at you, well the same with your car. But, I can still see the blackboard, even though I'm looking at you...
You can still see the blackboard without looking at it.

COMMENT Heather suggests that our perception incorporates not only those objects at which we look directly, but also those which are encompassed by our peripheral vision.

PC Well, can you see that pot of... glue or paste?

----- Yes.

----- I can.

PC ... You can, so someone is looking at it. That's why it exists. But if none of us [was] looking at it - imagine now that we're all looking at me and I'm not even looking at it. I'm looking at the door. How do we know that it's there at all?

David There are two eyes at the back of your head!

PC ... Nicola?

Nicola You know that this is a ruler... I aren't looking at the ruler, but it's still there 'cos I can feel it.

COMMENT Nicola appeals to a so-called 'primary' quality, 'solidity', which enables her to assert that the ruler exists when she is not looking at it.[13]

PC Let's say it's something that you can't feel, like the daffodil there, which has just come back now because people are looking at it.

----------- Laughter

PC Heather?

Heather We're all looking at you.

PC Yes?

Heather	Mr. F. couldn't disappear could he?
----------	Mr F. is the class teacher who was sitting at the back of the room.
PC	Well, how do you know?
Nicola	Yeah, he could!
PC	Have a look.
-----	Because he's there.
PC	Well, he's come back!
----------	Laughter
-----	You're looking at him.
PC	I'm looking at him, that's probably why he's still here. Maybe if I turn to the board and we all look this way, he's going to disappear.
Chorus	Yeah!
PC	Nicola?
Nicola	He could have, and we could sneak out. 'Cos, say if we were in a discussion and we was all looking that way, Mr. F. could sneak out or he could hide somewhere. So then the next time we turn round, he wouldn't be there.
PC	... Cassie?
Cassie	Well, if Mr. F. is reading us a story and we all turn this way, we can still hear him.
COMMENT	Cassie refers to a 'secondary' quality, 'sound', as a means of showing that Mr. F. exists.[14]
-----	Yeah.
PC	Well, let's try it then. Come and face this way...
----------	All the children face towards the front of the room. After a few moments silence, Mr. F. says:
Mr. F.	Is that the time?

----------	Laughter
PC	That's our proof! All right. Well, we'll leave that one. You can have a think about that one. Now... Nicola and Heather.
Nicola	'What do we mean when we say that a person is courageous?'
COMMENT	Aristotle offers an account of the concept of 'courage' in his *Nicomachean Ethics.*[15]
PC	'What do we mean when we say that a person is courageous?' Now, this might seem an easier problem than the one we've just discussed. What do we mean when we say a person is courageous, Richard?
Richard	It means that he's big and... It means that he can do something really well.
PC	It means that he can do something really well. O.K. Paul?
Paul	He's been brave or something.
PC	He's been...?
Paul	Brave or something. Like he's gone and fought for his country, or something like that, you know.
-----	The one who has a house burning down, or something like that, and you've gone in to save somebody.
David	You've got courage. That's what he's got. Courageous.
PC	If a house is burning down and he goes in to save someone, we say he is...?
-----	Courageous.
PC	Courageous.
-----	A hero.
-----	Or he's got guts.
PC	Leanne?
Leanne	Someone like...
-----	Terry Waite.

PC	Yes, go on.
Leanne	Something which quite a few other people wouldn't dare to do in case they got hurt themselves or something, but he would.
COMMENT	According to Aristotle: 'The courageous man... is undaunted, so far as is humanly possible; he will fear what it is natural for man to fear; but he will face it in the right way and as principle directs, for the sake of what is right and honourable; for this is the end of virtue.'[16]
David	He's real fearless as well.
PC	O.K. Nicola?
Nicola	It's like if it could be a boy and he could have jumped in to save her - that girl in the story in the swimming pool.
COMMENT	See 'The Moral Talent Competition' (appendix 11).
PC	Yes.
Nicola	So, he could have jumped in. He could have done more than one good thing. He should have done lots.
------	Risking his own life to save somebody else's.
PC	O.K. Let me ask you this, then. If someone - say take the swimming pool example that we discussed last time - someone sees someone else who looks to be drowning in the deep end of the swimming pool, and this person jumps in and saves the [other] person. And we say afterwards: 'That was a very courageous thing to do.' And this person says to you: 'You know, I was frightened *all* the time. Before I jumped in I was scared. When I jumped in I was scared. And even now that I've brought this person out safely, I'm still shaking.' Would we still say that person is courageous?
------	Yeah.
PC	Even though...
Chorus	Yes.
PC	... that person admitted to being afraid, Paul?

Paul	It would make him even more courageous if he was afraid and he went in and saved them.
PC	Why would it?
Paul	Because he was afraid to go in, but he still went in and saved him. So, he'd be even more courageous.
-----	Just to save a life.
PC	Well, let me ask you this then, Paul, since you've given me that. Let's say someone jumps in to save the person in the swimming pool, and comes out and says: 'Ha! That was nothing at all. I wasn't afraid for one moment!'
-----	Still courageous.
Paul	That's not.
PC	Why not? What's the difference?
Paul	The other person was afraid and like, he was frightened to go in, but he still went in. But, the other person wasn't really afraid, but he still went in. The other person *was* frightened.
COMMENT	Paul's account of 'courage' is very similar to that offered by Aristotle. The latter suggests that 'courage... is a mean state in relation to feelings of fear and confidence'.[17] Consequently, to exhibit behaviours which are indicative of cowardice or rashness is not to be courageous.[18] Initially, Paul argues that a person who performs an action having felt fear beforehand is 'more courageous' (than someone who undertakes the same action without fear, presumably). Subsequently, however, he suggests that an element of fear is a necessary condition of being called 'courageous'.
PC	O.K. That's excellent. Good lad. Nicola?
Nicola	If he wasn't frightened and he said that it was nothing, then he's not courageous, because he knew he could do it. But if that other person was still frightened... of going in the deep end, well then, he was courageous because he dared do something. But he could have died. But the other person knew he wouldn't, 'cos he knows what it's like.
PC	Excellent. That's a super explanation. Let me tell you this. There's another famous philosopher who I'll tell you about now.

----------	I write 'Aristotle' on the blackboard.
PC	A famous Greek philosopher called...?
Chorus	Aristotle.
PC	... Aristotle talks about courage and he says: If a person – imagine a swimming pool situation – if a person jumps into the swimming pool to save someone else and that person doesn't feel... some fear, then that person isn't courageous. Like you say, Paul and Nicola: in order to be courageous, for Aristotle, you've got to say to yourself: 'Well now, this isn't an easy thing I have to do, but I'm going to do it anyway.' And [you] feel a little bit afraid, [you] do it and then you're called courageous. Now, if you do it and you are not afraid, Aristotle says you're not courageous at all. You are...
----------	I write 'Rash' on the blackboard.
------	Rash.
-----	Rash.
PC	Rash... Which is to say you do something with no thought at all about it. You just do it instinctively, or you do it without any fear. And he says... Have you met – I think you have, because... we've discussed them before...
----------	I write 'Celts' on the blackboard.
David	Celts, yeah.
PC	... the Celts?
Kristian	Yeah.
David	They came from Austria, didn't they?
Kristian	Switzerland.
PC	... They were extremely well known, because Aristotle mentions them. And he says... these Celts were not courageous at all because, when they were sailing on the seas, they feared – and this is exactly what he says – they feared 'neither high winds nor swelling seas'. That is to say, no matter what the conditions were [like] on the seas, the Celts would go out and sail. These people were not courageous, they were rash.[19]

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13. For a discussion of 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities, see Berkeley, G., *op. cit.*, pp. 143-171; Abel, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

14. See Berkeley, G., *ibid.*, p. 145.

15. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Revised Edition, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1976, Book 3, 6-9.

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Dialogue 4: Summerside Junior School

This dialogue discusses issues raised by the exercise 'What Makes You *You*?' (see appendix 13). Comments made by pupils whom I have not been able to identify have been included without attribution.

PC	'What makes you *you*?' is the question we are going to discuss, and the first thing Ian said was what?
Ian	The personality.
PC	The personality. What do you mean by that, Ian? Can you say a little bit more to me about that?
Ian	What makes you *you* is there's a decision, and the decision you make on that, that's your personality. That's what *you* would say. That's what that person would say.
PC	O.K.
Ian	That's their personality.
PC	Excellent. Michael?
Michael	Your soul.
PC	Your?
Michael	Soul.
PC	What's a soul, Michael?
Michael	The personality, you, what makes you *you*.
PC	It's your soul. That's a very interesting thought. Any other thoughts? What were you going to say, Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	I was going to say that myself.
PC	You were going to say 'soul' as well?
Christ. Ss.	Shall I tell you why?
PC	Yes. I want to know why.
Christ. Ss.	Because we were doing topic-work about Aidan and Miss G said 'What does... '. Well, actually, it was St. Cuthbert, but he saw

the soul of St. Aidan. So Miss G asked us what the soul was and we eventually came up with that your soul is what makes you *you*.

COMMENT   In his article, 'The myth of the soul', Clarence Durrow offers a dissenting view.'

PC   Oh super. So I've... come upon a subject that you've already touched on before. Did Miss G ask you what the soul looks like?

Chorus   Yes.

Terry   Yes, but you can't see it.

PC   Terry?

Terry   You can't see it.

PC   Well, I can't see my liver either, can I, Eve? But I have a good idea what my liver looks like.

-----   It's invisible.

PC   It's invisible.

----------   Laughter

PC   What do you think, Helen?

Helen   It's a ghost-like figure that you can't touch.

PC   A ghost-like figure that you can't touch. Christopher?

Christ. Ss.   Nobody actually knows what it looks like because nobody has seen one.

Nobody has seen one. Well, Cuthbert saw one, but he didn't... He thinks he saw one. But he didn't actually explain what it was. Well, he did, but...

----------   Laughter

PC   But what? I've lost that bit.

-----   There's lots of different stories. There's some stories... Some books say he saw this and some books say he saw something else. So, you don't actually know what he saw.

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PC	So, let me ask you this: if we don't know what the soul looks like and if Cuthbert thinks he saw one, but we're not sure whether he did, how do we know that what makes you *you* is your soul? How do we know that? What's our... what am I looking for?
------	Explanation.
PC	Explanation or...?
------	Argument.
PC	Argument or...?
------	Reason.
PC	Reason or...?
------	Proof.
PC	What's our proof that, in fact, we have a soul? What's our proof? Because you just said to me... 'What makes you *you* is the soul.' And I'm saying to you: 'Well, no one has seen that.' Have you seen your soul, Sarah?
----------	Sarah shakes her head
PC	Not at all? Not even once? No?
----------	Sarah shakes her head
PC	Have you seen your soul, Louise?
Louise	No.
PC	No? Have you seen your soul, Scott?
Scott	No, because no one knows what it looks like.
PC	Well, if no one knows what it looks like, how do we know we have a soul, Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	I don't know, but I think I've heard of 'soul' meaning...
PC	Meaning?
Christ. Ss.	Like you were sort of on your own.
Ian	That's 'solo'.
----------	Laughter

PC	Oh, that's 'solo'. Yes, excellent, Ian. Now 'soul' in the sense...
-----	No, it's not 'sole'. That's the...?
-----	That's the sole of a shoe.
PC	That's the sole of a shoe. Soul... What makes you *you*? Well, let's leave this idea of a soul for a moment. What other answers might we give to this question: 'What makes you *you*, Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	How tall you are, the colour of your eyes, how big your ears are, how big your nose is.
COMMENT	Christopher subscribes to the philosophical view that the problem of personal identity can be resolved by referring to an individual's bodily features.
-----	How big your mouth is.
PC	O.K., Jenny?
Jenny	Heritage.
PC	Heritage. Say something about that to me, Jenny.
Jenny	It makes you look how your mother and father look.
PC	Say that again.
Jenny	It makes you look like your mother and father.
PC	What does?
Jenny	Heritage.
COMMENT	Reuben Able asks: 'Is ancestry part of the person? The genes you inherit from your parents, and which were fixed at the moment of your conception, will normally be transmitted unchanged to your descendants.'ᵡ
PC	O.K., Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	Well, I think it could be your brain, because your brain makes you do things, and your brain makes your decisions.

PC   All right. Any other thoughts on what makes you *you*? Come on,
                    Carl, you are usually the first with the good ideas. Ben?

Ben   Your bones.

PC   Pardon?

Ben   Your bones, because if you didn't have any bones, you'd be
                    floppy.

PC   Your what?

Ben   Your bones.

PC   Your bones. Yes. And some people... say: 'I've got large bones,'
                    and some people say: 'I've got small bones.' O.K. what else? Let
                    me ask you this, then. Let us say you decided this evening:
                    'Oh well, I've had enough wearing the same old clothes that I
                    always wear. On Saturday, I'm going to go into town and I'm
                    going to buy myself some new clothes.' And you go into town and
                    you spend a fortune buying some new clothes. But the thing
                    about these new clothes is they are not at all like any other
                    clothes that you previously liked. Let's say your favourite
                    colour used to be blue; you decide: 'Everything I buy is going
                    to be black.' Let's say your favourite fabric was silk; you say
                    to yourself: 'No more silk for me - leather.' And you put your
                    new clothes on and you're walking in the city centre, and you're
                    feeling very happy with yourself. And then you say to yourself:
                    'I know. I am going to have a new hair-do. Lots of people
                    compliment me on my ginger hair, but I'm going to have a
                    change. I'm going to go blonde. Lots of people have complimented
                    me on my curly hair. I'm going to have a change and I'm going
                    to have it all straightened out. I don't want to be blonde
                    anymore. I'm going to go dark. Now, imagine that you went into
                    town and you bought a lot of new clothes, you went into the
                    hairdresser's and you got a new hair-do, a new hair-style. Would
                    you be the same person?

COMMENT   In discussing personal identity, John Hospers asks: '"Under what
                    conditions is X the *same* self, or the same person as before?"
                    That is, what mental or physical changes can occur in Mr. X
                    without his ceasing to be Mr. X?'[3]

-----   Yeah.

-----   Yeah.

-----   No, you wouldn't have any money left.

----------	Laughter
PC	That would be one difference. You would have no money left, but would you be the same person, do you think, Jenny?
Jenny	Inside you would but outside you wouldn't.
PC	Inside you would but outside you wouldn't. Can you say a little bit more to me about that?
Jenny	Well, say you were a very nice person.
PC	Yes.
Jenny	You'd still be a very nice person, but you've just had a new hair-do and got new clothes.
COMMENT	Jenny suggests that the notion of 'personal identity' incorporates both mental and physical aspects.
PC	So, you are a different person on the outside, for you. What do you say, Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	Well, if... you took everything off and cut all your hair off, if you did it with your new image and your old image, you'd still look the same.
PC	Except for the hair...
Ian	You wouldn't have any hair, would you?
PC	Let's say I go on a diet. I say to myself: 'No more sweets for me.'
-----	No more 'Mars' bars.
PC	I like sweets, so it's very unlikely I'm going to do that. But let's say I do, and come into you in a month's time and I say: 'I've lost two stones. I feel like a new person.' Am I?
-----	No, you're not.
PC	Am I a new person, Abigail?
Abigail	No, because you can't change what you are inside.
PC	What can't you change then? Give me some examples. That's a very good comment. Give me some examples of what you can't

change. Because you've said I can change my hairstyle, I can change my figure, I can change my clothes. What can't I change, Abigail?

Abigail   You can't change your personality.

PC   Can you not?

Ian   You could because you could stop doing what you used to do and do other things.

PC   Can you give me an example of that?

Ian   Well, say you never ever took white sugar, you always have brown sugar in your tea or whatever.

PC   O.K.

Ian   And you hated coffee.

PC   Yes.

Ian   Then you started having coffee and never have tea, or always have white sugar...

PC   Yes.

Ian   ... that would be changing your personality, in a way.

PC   O.K. Carl?

Carl   I thinks what makes you *you* is your philosophy of the world. The decisions you make.

COMMENT   Carl argues that a person's mental functions are central to his or her personal identity.

PC   ... Is the philosophy of the world... Is *your* philosophy of the world?

Carl   I mean the decisions you make.

PC   O.K. So, it's your personal philosophy of the world that makes you *you*. Well, let's say, talking about Abigail's point that you can't change what's inside, let's say I'm a liar, and let's say I'm a thief, and let's say I'm a bully. And, consequently, I'm not very popular, as you can imagine. But one day I go home and I say to myself: 'From now on I'm not going to be like that

anymore.' I'm never going to tell any more lies. I'm never going to steal things that do not belong to me, take things that do not belong to me, and I'm not going to bully anyone any more.' Have I not changed inside and therefore become a different person, Carla?

Carla   In a way it is inside, those feelings of kindness, instead of being just like a bully.

PC   So, have I become a different person, Carla?

Carla   Not entirely a different person.

PC   O.K.

Carla   Because on the outside you have changed, though on the inside you've probably changed.

COMMENT   Carla distinguishes between one's overt behaviour and one's disposition to act in a particular way, which may be motivated by a number of different considerations. As Richard III notes wryly: 'Nor more can you distinguish of a man / Than of his outward show, which, God he knows, / Seldom' or never jumpeth with the heart.'[4]

PC   O.K.

Christ. Sk. You're not an entirely different person unless you're born again.

PC   Unless you're...?

Christ. Sk. Born again. Because you're always you, aren't you?

COMMENT   Christopher suggests that bodily activity is constitutive of personal identity. As Anthony O'Hear notes, this view concurs with that adopted both in law and in everyday life.[5]

PC   O.K. I'll come back to that point. A very good point. Christopher?

Christ. Ss. Well, I couldn't say to myself: 'I want to be like Paul R'...
             And anyway, even if you stopped being a bully and was really nice, you've changed what you do but you haven't changed how you speak and what your eye-colour is, and things like that. So, you've just sort of changed a bit of you.

PC	Well, let's say I decided one day I was going to have – just as you change your car, every now and then you get a little bit bored with your car and you swap it for a different one. Let's say I said to myself: 'Not only am I going to change my hairstyle and my clothes, but I'm also going to change my personality. I am going to behave differently towards people from now on.' So I've made some outward changes and some inward changes. Am I now a totally different person, Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	No, because... It's hard to explain really but you are not a new person because you're still you. You're still you aren't you?
PC	Right. Well, let me push you a little bit more. Imagine that I'm poorly... my heart isn't working very well... Let's say I need a new heart. And the surgeon at the Hull Royal Infirmary rings me up and says: 'Mr. Costello, we have a new heart for you. I am going to perform the operation tomorrow morning.' Tomorrow evening I wake up, open my eyes, look around me, see familiar sights. I feel quite well. On the other hand, I've got someone else's heart inside me, haven't I? So does that mean, Terry, that I'm a different person?[6]
Terry	You're yourself.
PC	I beg your pardon?
Terry	You're the same person, except you've got a different heart.
PC	But I might have Mr. Smith's heart. I've got a part of Mr. Smith inside me. Doesn't that mean I'm a different person?
Terry	No.
PC	Jill?
Jill	You're still the same.
PC	O.K.
Abigail	Well, you can't change your brain.
COMMENT	The notion of brain transplantation has, in fact, been the subject of much philosophical discussion.[7]
PC	Go on. You can't change your brain. I'm interested in that line. Right, have a think about that and I'll come back to you. Helen?
Helen	Well, even if you have got Mr. Smith's heart, all your heart does

is pump blood round your body. So, in a way, you can't change your personality from that.

COMMENT   Unlike a number of patients who have received transplanted hearts, Helen does not believe that the recipient of such an organ is likely to acquire certain personality-traits of the donor.[＠]

PC   O.K. Carl?

Carl   Your attitude makes you different. Like yesterday, when we were doing those votes, not everybody got the same answer. People had different views on what was good and what was bad.

PC   That's right... Christopher?

Christ. Ss.   Well, Michael Jackson is still the same Michael Jackson except he looks a lot different. But he's still Michael Jackson.

PC   Even though he's had a lot of...?

Ruth   Plastic surgery.

PC   Plastic surgery. Ruth, good girl. Christopher?

Christ. Ss.   Even if you did have your heart changed, you'd still have your skin the same, so you'd still be the same person. And you couldn't really change all of you. You couldn't get all the rest of somebody else's body because your body would be somebody else.

----------   Laughter

PC   Right, let me give you this example. Let me see who I'm going to choose. Joanna, you're a star. Stand up. Joanna goes out to afternoon break and she's playing. She falls over on the yard and bangs her head on the concrete, and is knocked unconscious. When she wakes up, she can't remember who she is, what her name is. She can't remember any of you. She doesn't know who Miss G is. She doesn't know who I am and, what's more, she cannot even remember anything about her past life. Now, Roddy, is she the same person?

COMMENT   Memory has also been advanced as a criterion of personal identity.[＠]

Roddy	Yes.
PC	So, if I said: 'What's your name?' She says: 'I don't know.' How many brothers and sisters have you got?
-----	She wouldn't be able to speak.
Joanna	None.
PC	None. Any sisters?
Joanna	One.
PC	Right, let's say, I'll ask her: 'How many sisters have you got?' And she says 'I don't know.' And say her mum comes to pick her up in the evening. [And she says:] 'Come on now, Joanna, it's time to go home.' [Joanna says:] 'I don't know you, who are you?'
----------	Laughter
PC	Is she still the same person? Because now... something [has] happened to the brain. You were saying to me before: 'If something happens to the body... if I get a new heart, I'm still the same person.' But now her attitudes are going to change. Let's say she previously liked vanilla ice-cream and I offered her some. She says: 'No, I can't stand that, I'll have some of that red stuff.' 'What's that?', I say, 'Oh, strawberry, oh yes.' Whereas previously she'd really disliked strawberry. So, Carl, her attitudes have changed as a result of this fall. Is she not now a different person, Kristian?
Christ. Ss.	No, because all that's happened is she's been knocked unconscious and she can't remember anything. The rest of her is still the same. It's just that the brain is not working that well.
----------	Laughter
PC	Jenny?
Jenny	Well, in about thirty or forty years' time they will be able to change your whole body.
PC	So, what point are you making there?
Jenny	So, you won't have to be the same person.
PC	O.K. Ruth...

Ruth	Well, this girl fell down this drain and she went blind, but she was still the same person. But... just the same it wasn't very nice, and in the end the brain was telling her not to look, and like, her eyes, sort of...
PC	Where did this...
Chorus	In 'Neighbours'.
PC	In 'Neighbours', someone fell...
Ruth	Fell down this drain.
PC	Yes. She fell down into a drain.
Ruth	And when she came out, she couldn't see where she was. They took her to the hospital and did some tests on her. And what happened was she passed out, and it was real horrible, and it was really horrible along this drain. So her brain was telling her not to look, and her eyes had, sort of, switched themselves off, and so, she couldn't see. And it was just that they hadn't come back on, really. And she couldn't see for a lot longer.
PC	While she couldn't see, was she a different person?
Chorus	No.
Terry	And then, next time, she was stupid, because she pretends that she can't see because she wants everybody to .do things for her.
PC	Oh well, let me take that example up.
Christ. Ss.	She wants somebody to stay. It's a real pretend she's blind. Because this woman has said: 'I'll stay as long as you are blind.'
PC	Yes.
Christ. Ss.	So, she pretends to be blind when she can really see.
PC	Well, isn't that an example of her personality having changed?
-----	Yes.
PC	Because she now wants this person to stay and look after her and so she pretends to be blind.
-----	She's cheating.
PC	And so therefore, hasn't she become a different person, Ian?

-----------	Ian shakes his head.
PC	Why not?
-----------	Ian does not reply.
PC	Well, why do you say 'no'? I want a reason. Her attitude has changed. She wants someone to look after now. She didn't need anyone looking after her before... she had the accident. Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	Well, going back to the Joanna argument, she wouldn't be able to say: 'I don't like this' or 'I don't like that', because she wouldn't be able to speak either; because she would have forgotten.
-----------	Laughter
	And she wouldn't be able to walk either, would she? Because she would have forgotten how to walk.
------	She wouldn't know how to spell.
------	And ride a bike.
------	Which she can't already do that much!
-----------	Laughter
PC	Helen?
Helen	Well, in 'Neighbours', her personality hasn't changed because she didn't want Lisa to get a divorce. So... her personality hasn't changed.
PC	O.K. Jenny?
Jenny	She might have been a cheater before she went into hospital.
PC	She might have been...?
Jenny	A cheater.
PC	Before she went into hospital?
Jenny	Yes.
PC	O.K. Ben?
Ben	In 'Neighbours' again, Charlene and Wal were going to this party

	and they got a bit drunk, and someone hit Wal across the head. And then, someone took Charlene home. And then, the next morning, she couldn't remember anything because she'd been drunk.
PC	During that period, when she couldn't remember anything, did she become a different person?
Chorus	No.
PC	Let me ask you this, then. Right, let me see who I can choose this time. Roddy, you're a star. Stand up. Listen to this example. Roddy also decided he is going to go out and play on the yard this afternoon, and, would you believe it, he falls over, like Joanna, and bangs his head on the concrete? Now, his condition is a little bit different. When he wakes up, this is what he says: 'My name is Thomas.'
----------	Laughter
PC	How many brothers have you got, Roddy?
Roddy	Two.
PC	Two brothers; and how many sisters?
Roddy	None.
PC	None. Two brothers. 'My name is Thomas,' he says, 'and I have four brothers.'
-----	And a sister.
-----	And two cats.
PC	And three sisters.
-----	And a dog.
PC	And, of course, Christian, [who] is a very sensible boy, says: 'You must be joking. Your name is Roddy. You sit next to me in class. This afternoon we were discussing philosophy with Mr. Costello.' He says: 'Who? Oh, I don't remember any of that.' Anyway, I thought philosophy was something that you did at university. It can't be true [that] I've been learning philosophy all term with Mr. Costello.' Now he believes his name is Thomas. He thinks he's got four brothers and three sisters. Johanna, hasn't he surely now become a different person?
Johanna	No.

PC	No? Why not? ... He names the brothers for me: Adam, Bill, Charlie and Dave. 'You should meet them. They're such nice fellows,' he says. Where do you live, Roddy?
Roddy	65, High Street.
PC	65, High Street. He says: 'I live in 108, New Street, and what's more, Jenny, you can come round for tea tonight.' Now, surely at this point, we would want to say, Ben... that Roddy has become a different person?
Roddy	No.
-----	No.
PC	Ruth?
Ruth	If he couldn't remember anything, he wouldn't know that Jenny's name was Jenny.
PC	No. That's true.
Kristian	He could say: 'I'll invite Gertrude round to my house.'
PC	Yes, he could. Ben?
Ben	You know before, when you said that, when he woke up, he was a bit different? He was dead.
PC	... Christian?
Kristian	He was an idiot in the first place.
-----	He was a what?
Kristian	Idiot.
PC	Why?
Kristian	[Inaudible]
Christ. Ss.	Mr.Costello?
PC	Yes, Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	If Roddy hit his head on the concrete, the concrete would probably shatter, because I once got accidently 'nutted' by Roddy, and it was horrible. I had a real big headache all day.
PC	Now, let me ask you one... Yes, go on then, Scott. Something

sensible now, I hope.

Scott   It would knock a bit of sense into him.

PC   That wasn't sensible. Now, one more experiment. Let me see who
             I'm going to get to be in this experiment. Michael, stand up,
             and Katie, stand up. Now, let's say someone performed an
             experiment on these two... And this is what happened as the
             result of the experiment. Katie's memories and attitudes, and, as
             you might say, Carl, philosophy of life, all transferred to
             Michael. Michael's attitudes and values and his philosophy of
             life transferred to Katie.

-----   That happened in 'Laurel and Hardy'.

PC   Now, listen, listen carefully. Yes it did happen in 'Laurel and
             Hardy', I remember that. Yes, now, what's your favourite colour?

Michael   Blue.

PC   That's your favourite colour now. And what's yours?

Katie   Pink.

PC   Yours is pink. And what's your favourite chocolate bar?

Michael   'Dairy Milk'.

PC   'Dairy Milk'. What's yours?

Katie   'Kit-Kat'.

PC   'Kit-Kat'. So, yours is 'Kit-Kat' and yours is 'Dairy Milk'. Now,
             if that had happened, and, say, someone was capable of swopping
             these persons' memories and attitudes and values and so forth.
             Would it not be now the case, that, although this person, to all
             of you, looks like Katie, she is really Michael because she
             thinks like Michael. She acts like Michael. [At] playtime,
             Michael is [usually] out there playing football. Katie [goes]
             straight out there, [she] wants to play rugby today. She says:
             'Yes, I fancy a game of rugby. That will be super.' ... And let's
             say she likes... What might you like to do?

Katie   Netball.

PC   Netball. And [Michael] goes out there. 'Has anyone seen the
             netball? I fancy some practice,' [he says].

PC   ... Now if that was the case, I know it's an hypothesis, it's not
             really factual. But if that could take place, would they not now

	be different people; do you not think, Chrit.?
Chrit.	The brains would be different, but they'd still be the same... They'd still look the same but they'd have different ways of thinking and different brains.
PC	So, would they be the same person? This is what I want to know.
Terry	They won't have different brains.
PC	I beg your pardon?
Terry	They won't have different brains. The brains won't move like that.
PC	No, it won't...
-----	Well the thoughts won't either.
PC	Well, let's say we could have an experiment that would transfer these thoughts. Let's just say it was possible. Christopher, would they not now be different people?
Christ. Ss.	Well, I'd say: 'Yes', because, well, they've both been changed round, so Katie would be Michael and Michael would be Katie.
PC	You think that. What do you think, Jenny?
Jenny	Their DNA won't have changed.
COMMENT	Jenny's argument also recognizes the importance of the physical aspect in determining a person's individuation. However, in being concerned with the basic biochemical structure which causes such individuation, she focuses on the absolute determinant of external characteristics.
PC	Their what?
Jenny	DNA.
PC	What's DNA?
Jenny	It's the genetics inside your body.
PC	Excellent. Superstar! And what difference would that make, Jenny?
Jenny	They'd still look the same.

PC	They'd still look the same. So, even though we had to get used to the fact that Katie's favourite chocolate bar was 'Kit-Kat' now, and that her favourite colour was blue, when we look at her we'd still say: 'Well, that's Katie. That doesn't look at all like Michael... And vice versa. O.K. sit down both of you. This is one last question I want to ask - a very important question - this is something I want you to consider: Is Clark Kent the same person as Superman?
----------	Some children say: 'Yes', and some say: 'No'.
PC	... Ben?
Ben	No, 'cos Superman doesn't wear glasses.
PC	I beg your pardon?
Ben	Superman doesn't wear glasses.
-----	He does.
-----	He does.
Terry	He can't because there's no such thing as Superman. It's just made up.
PC	Well, if we just took this story as factual for a moment. Are they the same person, Ian?
Ian	I don't agree with Ben because with my glasses on, I'm Ian; with my glasses off, I'm still me - but I still can't see.
----------	Laughter
Ian	I can't see now, but I can see with my glasses on, though.
PC	What do you say to that, Ben? ... Are they the same person, do you think? Who is going to give me a sensible answer on this one? Carl?
Carl	They're both the same except for one of them wear's a fool's costume.
----------	Laughter
PC	But is that the only way they're different?
Carl	Probably.
-----	Yeah.

-----	Yeah.
PC	[In] what other ways are they different, Michelle?
Michelle	Well, somebody else told me that he can lift heavy things.
-----	Clark Kent can do that as well.
	Yeah.
Ian	Yeah, but you see, it's just a disguise, that's all. Superman doesn't need Clark Kent. It's just a disguise. Superman has a licence to fly.
----------	Laughter
PC	... Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	You know, Mr. Costello, they're both the same person except they either wear one lot of clothes or they wear a different lot of clothes; and they're called by two names. But when they're wearing one lot of clothes, they're called Superman, and when they're wearing the other lot of clothes, they're called Clark Kent.
PC	But Clark Kent and Superman are the same person?
Christ. Ss.	Yeah.
-----	Yeah.
PC	Right, O.K.... One last question needs very careful thought. If a witch came along or a warlock - what is a warlock?
-----	Is it just like a little man?
-----	A creature in the shape of a man?
PC	Perhaps. Eve?
Eve	A male witch.
PC	A male witch. You see them in fantasy stories. If one of them came along, a warlock or a witch, and turned you into a frog, would you be the same person?
COMMENT	At this stage, the presumption is that the frog still displays the thought patterns of a human being. John Hospers discusses a similar example concerning a man who turns into a monkey.[10] In

addition, Franz Kafka's story *The Metamorphosis*, focuses on someone who changes into a beetle while retaining his original personality-traits.[11]

Chorus	Yeah.
PC	... Carl?
Carl	Yeah, it's just like when you changed your hairstyle and your clothes. You just changed into a frog.
-----	Yeah, it don't matter. You've just turned into a frog.
PC	But you jump like a frog, don't you, Carl?
Carl	That's because your muscles have changed.
PC	I beg your pardon?
Carl	That's because your muscles have changed.
PC	That's because your muscles have changed. But you're still the same person?
Mark	You're the same person. It's just that you've shrunk, changed the colour of your skin, lost all your hair and...
PC	What else?
Mark	... don't wear any fancy clothes.
PC	Now, after all of those changes, Mark, you tell me that you're still the same person?
Mark	Yeah.
PC	What do you think, Jenny?
Jenny	Your thoughts haven't changed.
PC	Your thoughts haven't changed. Let's say that not only did this witch turn you into a frog, but she also gave you the thought patterns of a frog.
-----	Oh no!
PC	Whatever they might be. Chrit.?
Chrit.	I think you are completely different, then.

------	I don't.
PC	What if she has given you the thought patterns of a frog, but left you physically exactly as you are - so you are thinking like a frog but you look like yourselves? Chrit.?
Chrit.	I don't think...
PC	You don't think?
Chrit.	I don't think you're different then.
PC	So, you need physical change and mental change. Jenny?
Jenny	If she gives you the thought of a frog and you're still as you are, *you* haven't actually changed - just your insides.
PC	O.K. Paul?...
Paul	Right, well just say, like if you... take everything out of my body and put it into, say, Dean's body? ...
PC	Yes.
Paul	... and take all his things, and put it into mine. We'll be completely different people, but we'll be under the same name.
PC	O.K.
Scott	Mr. Costello.
PC	Yes, Scott.
Scott	When you've changed your personality into a frog, but you're still human, all it does, it makes your brain think that that's a frog. But you're still the same person.
PC	Last comment from Jenny.
Jenny	Well, to change the whole of you, you'd have to get your DNA out, and work out all the patterns and what they mean, and then stick it back in in a different way.
PC	O.K. And now we will end on that note.

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2. Abel, R., *Man is the Measure: a cordial invitation to the central problems of philosophy*, The Free Press, New York, 1976, p. 188.

3. Hospers, J., *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, Second Edition, Routledge, London, 1989, p. 410.

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5. O'Hear, A., *What Philosophy Is: an introduction to contemporary philosophy*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1985, p. 244.

6. The relationship between organ transplantation and personal identity is discussed in Lamb, D., *Death, Brain Death and Ethics*, Croom Helm, London, 1985, pp. 89-90.

7. See, for example Shoemaker, S., *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1963; O'Hear, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 246-253.

8. Lamb, D., *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

9. See Abel, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192; Hospers, J., *op. cit.*, pp. 413-415; O'Hear, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 243-253.

10. Hospers, J., *op. cit.*, pp. 410-411.

11. Kafka, F., *The Metamorphosis*, in Glatzer, N.N. (Ed.), *The Collected Short Stories of Franz Kafka*, Penguin Books, London, 1988, pp. 89-139.

Dialogue 5: Claythorpe Primary School

This dialogue discusses issues raised by the diagrammatic representation exercises given in appendix 15. Comments made by pupils whom I have not been able to identify have been included without attribution.

PC	... We were discussing statements beginning with the word...
Chorus	'All'.
PC	'All'. Who can give me an example of a statement beginning with the word 'all'?... Matthew?
Matthew	All people have a nose.
PC	All people have a nose. Is that true or false?
-----	False.
PC	Who says false? Jon, have you ever seen a person without a nose?
Jon	No, but you could if you went in an accident.
PC	Russell?
Russell	All people have heads.
PC	All people have heads. Is that true or false?
-----	False.
-----:	False.
Matthew H.	Chop it off.
Russell	Yeah, I know, but then they'd be dead, they would.
Matthew P.	So? What's a person is still a person without a head.
COMMENT	Matthew P.'s remark allows us to embark on a discussion of the philosophical question: what is a person?'
PC	Is a person still a person even though [he or she is] dead?

Chorus	Yes.
Matthew H.	Except when it's a skeleton.
COMMENT	Matthew H. argues that the point at which it is no longer possible to call someone a 'person' is when all that remains of him or her is a skeleton. We shall return to this point below.
Matthew P.	Nothing's changed.
PC	Nothing's changed?
Matthew P.	No, you're without a head.
Russell	It will though, eventually.
PC	Has anything changed, Russell?
Jayne	No.
Richard	Yeah.
PC	What's changed, Richard?
Richard	Some people have long necks and some people don't.
PC	Some people have what?
Richard	Long necks.
PC	Long necks and some people...
Richard	Don't.
PC	Does that change when you die?
Russell	No.
Richard	No.
PC	Matthew?
Matthew P.	It depends how long you leave him there and if he goes to a skeleton.
PC	O.K. Are you still a person when you're dead, Matthew, do you think?

Matthew P.	Yes.
PC	What has changed about us when we die? As soon as we die, what changes are there in us, Russell?.
Russell	That we're not living no more.
PC	Richard?
Richard	That your heart stops beating.
PC	Matthew P.?
Matthew P.	Your skin goes a funny colour.
PC	Your skin goes a funny colour. Russell?
Russell	You stop breathing.
PC	You stop breathing. Jon?
Jon	After a bit you go into a skeleton probably.
PC	You turn into a skeleton. Richard?
Richard	Your blood stops moving around your...
PC	Moving around your...?
Richard	Stomach and...
PC	And?
Richard	Arms and legs and...
PC	Your?
Melanie	Body.
PC	Body. So, if we have all those changes in us, how is it that we can say that we are still people? There's a person lying over there but that person isn't breathing. That person isn't moving. That person's skin is starting to change colour. Don't we use the word 'person' usually for someone who is alive, Samantha Groom?
----------	Samantha does not reply.
PC	I might say to you 'How many people [are there] in the hospital?' And let's say there are forty people in there. Twenty

visitors and twenty people sitting up in bed. And ten other people have died in that hospital today. How many people are in the hospital altogether, Russell?

COMMENT   The purpose of this question is to ascertain whether Russell's conception of 'people' encompasses only those who are alive.

Russell   Ten.

PC   No... Matthew, how many people are sitting up in bed?

Matthew P.   Twenty.

PC   And how many visitors?

Matthew P.   Twenty.

PC   And how many people had just died today?

Matthew P.   Ten.

PC   How many altogether?

Matthew P.   Thirty.

PC   Thirty. Is that the answer?

Russell   Yeah.

PC   Melanie?

Melanie   Yes.

PC   Let's count again then. Matthew Hayton, there are twenty people sitting up in bed. They've just had their tonsils taken out. Twenty more people come to visit them and ten people have died in that hospital today. Not the people who... obviously are sitting up in bed. You don't normally die when you have your tonsils taken out, do you, Matthew?

Matthew P.   No.

PC   Not usually. Richard, how many people altogether?

Richard   Forty.

PC   Forty, we think. Anyone disagree with that?

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Richard	Ten just died, so you must have forty.
PC	Russell?
Russell	Thirty.
PC	Why thirty?
Russell	Because twenty and twenty is forty, and if ten died that means thirty.
PC	O.K. Melanie?
Melanie	Twenty.
PC	Matthew?
Matthew P.	Ten.
PC	Let's look at this then. Twenty people have just had their tonsils taken out. Are they alive or dead?
Jayne	Alive.
----------	I write '20' on the blackboard and place a tick beside it.
PC	That [the tick] means 'alive'. Twenty more people come to visit them. They just walk in the door when it's visiting time. Are these people alive or dead?
Chorus	Alive.
----------	I write '20+' on the blackboard and replace the tick above with a plus sign.
PC	In fact, what we'll do is we'll give a plus sign for 'alive'. How many alive people have I got at the moment, Matthew?
Matthew	Forty.
PC	Good boy. Now, in some other part of the hospital, ten people (not including any of these) have died today. They just died.
----------	I write '10-' on the blackboard.
PC	So, I'll put a minus sign there. The ten who died did not belong to the group of people who had just had their tonsils taken out. Nor did they belong to the group who came to visit them. Ten completely different people. How many people now do we have in the hospital altogether, Richard?

Richard	Forty.
PC	Forty. Anyone disagree with that? Matthew?
Matthew P.	Fifty.
PC	Why do you say fifty?
Matthew P.	Because you've got forty there and if they just died, they've still got all their heads, legs and everything. So you can still count them as people. You can still see the people.
COMMENT	Matthew argues that the persistence of recognizable bodily features in the ten who have died is sufficient for us to be able to attribute to them the term 'people'. In his *Death, Brain Death and Ethics*, David Lamb offers an analysis of 'person' which goes beyond that suggested by Matthew. 'The concept of a person,' he argues, 'belongs to a different logical space to that of living human beings... A person can be an object of misfortune, betrayal and ridicule, long after the termination of his or her bodily existence. Cromwell was humiliated and disgraced when his body was gibbbeted at Tyburn long after putrefaction had set in. The benefits and harms that may befall a person are not necessarily dependent upon that person's experiential state.'[2]
PC	O.K. Let's say I take the same count tomorrow, and when I go in the next day there are twenty people there with their tonsils out who are alive, twenty visitors, and these ten people who died yesterday. How many people do I have in the hospital now, Russell?
Russell	What sort...
PC	Twenty who had their tonsils taken out yesterday. They're still in there and they get another visit from twenty more people. And there are ten people in there who died yesterday.
Russell	Fifty.
PC	Fifty, we think. What do you say, Matthew?
Matthew P.	Forty.
PC	Why have you changed your mind now?
Matthew P.	Because there's ten people who have been taken away to be buried.

PC	No. I said they're still in the hospital...
Matthew P.	Still fifty.
PC	Fifty. Now, you said to me that one of the reasons that we call these ten 'people' is because their bodies haven't started to change yet...
Matthew P.	They've changed but they've still got all their main features.
PC	When do we think they start to lose these features then?
Matthew P.	About two weeks.
PC	About two weeks. All right, so I go back in two weeks. There are twenty people in there with broken legs now. All the people with... removed tonsils have left the hospital. Twenty people with broken legs, twenty people visiting them, and these ten are still there a fortnight later. How many persons do I have now, Melanie?
Melanie	Fifty.
PC	Matthew?
Matthew P.	Forty and ten skeletons.
COMMENT	Matthew attempts to demarcate between 'persons' and 'non-persons'. The latter are distinguished by the lack of any familiar external features.
PC	Forty and ten skeletons. So... when did that time come, can you pin-point it precisely, when those ten changed from being people to non-people?
Matthew P.	It's from when they get all their hair and skin and everything.
PC	Right.
Matthew P.	Until they're just bones.
PC	So, they're slightly different to how they were when they were alive?
Matthew P.	Yes.
PC	Why don't we say that someone who has had their tonsils out becomes a non-person, because they've changed, haven't they,

Matthew?

COMMENT   I offer Matthew an example of a minor bodily change in order to
             ascertain whether he considers that the term 'person' is still
             applicable.

Matthew P.   Yes.

PC   How have they changed?

Matthew P.   Because they haven't got no tonsils.

PC   So, they're different aren't they...

Matthew P.   Yes.

PC   ... to how they were before they went into hospital? Why do
             we call them 'people' still?

Matthew P.   Because they're still living, and a tonsil isn't very big and
             you don't see them.

COMMENT   Matthew justifies the continued use of the term 'people' in this
             case. His argument derives from the insignificance of the organ
             in this context, and the fact that, regardless of its removal,
             the patient is still alive.

PC   Let's say they lost a leg. They wake up the next morning, [they
             have] had an accident and they've only got one leg... Are they
             still people?

Chorus   Yes.

PC   And they're still people when they die?

Matthew P.   No. Well, they're still people for about a week, or whatever.

PC   Let's say that everyone in the world was blind. No one could
             see. And so when someone died, we would be unable to detect
             the changes in their body - by looking anyhow. So, you wouldn't
             be able to see that their hair has fallen out, or their blood
             stops circulating, or they're not breathing, or any of these
             things. How would we know that these are no longer people,
             Russell?

Russell   By the smell.

PC	Oh, or by, Jon?
Jon	Feel the pulse.
PC	You would still be able to use two senses. Melanie?
Melanie	Listen.
PC	Listen for what?
Melanie	For listening to the breathing and the heart beat.
PC	Matthew?
Matthew P.	You'd tell them to say something and if they don't say something, you give them a good shake and if they go 'Oh!', they're still alive...
----------	Laughter
PC	Russell?
Russell	Touch.
PC	How would that help you?
Russell	You should be able to feel the skin and if it's warm, they might be alive, and if they're cold they might be dead...
PC	Have you heard of a situation where someone has an accident, say in a car, and they get put on a special machine in a hospital to help them to...
Chorus	Breathe.
PC	... breathe. And at a certain time, the doctor comes along and he says: 'Now, we'll have a test to see if there is any life in this person.' And they take a test... to see if there is any activity going on in the brain. And if they find there's no activity going on in the brain, they suggest to the relatives, sometimes, that this machine is turned off. Why do you think they do that, Matthew?
Matthew H.	Some are dead. It's a waste of electricity.
PC	Why is it a waste of electricity? Because the machine is allowing these people to breathe. Matthew?
Matthew H.	They may have [been] on there so long... until it's O.K. to breathe yourself. Then you take him off and turn it off.

PC	What if you knew that this person was never going to be able to breathe for himself or herself again, that the machine was going to have to do it all the time? Melanie?
Melanie	Well, if the machine was going to have to do it all the time... and they found out that they weren't alive... they'd take them off, because if there was no life in them, or no brain 'thingy' in them, they'd take it off because - they wouldn't - there was no point in keeping them on.
COMMENT	The central notion involved in the definition of death, concerns the absence of activity in the brain.[3] Without such activity, and regardless of attempts artificially to maintain his or her life functions, it is currently accepted by the medical profession that the patient is in fact dead.[4]
PC	But, they're breathing, aren't they?
Melanie	No, but that's with the machine. If you take them off, they won't breathe. They only breathe with the machine.
PC	So, are they still persons when the machine is helping them to breathe?
----------	Some children say 'No': and some say: 'Yes'.
PC	Who says: 'Yes'? One, two, three, four, five, six. Why do you say 'No', Jon?
Jon	'Cos they're not alive to - the machine's helping them. They can't, they won't on their own. They're helping the blood to circulate and everything, and if you turn it off, then the person isn't doing anything.
PC	So, while this machine is working for the person, are they alive, Russell?
Russell	Yes, 'cos they might not be able to breathe, but they might come round with the machine breathing for them.
PC	Right. So, would it be right to still say that that human lying in the bed there is a person...
Chorus	Yes.
PC	... while the machine is breathing - helping him to breathe?
Chorus	Yes.

Russell   And if he was dead, he'd still be a person.

PC   Until...

Russell   He becomes a skeleton.

PC   ... That's excellent.

References

1. See Abel, R., *Man is the Measure: a cordial invitation to the central problems of philosophy*, The Free Press, New York, 1976, chapter 17.

2. Lamb, D., *Death, Brain Death and Ethics*, Croom Helm, London, 1985, p. 86.

3. *Ibid.*, chapter 6.

4. This view is not, however, universally accepted. See, for example, Browne, A., 'Defining death', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1987, pp. 157-158.

This dialogue discusses issues raised by the exercise entitled 'The Moral Talent Competition' (see appendix 11). Comments made by pupils whom I have not been able to identify have been included without attribution.

PC   Now then, we've heard seven statements... and we've given them a mark. What was the first statement, can anyone remember?... Scott?

Scott   Because she was my friend, I'll jump in and save her.

PC   ... I'll jump in and save her because she [is] my friend. What do we think about that argument? How many marks would we give that?

-----   Seven.

-----   Six, I think.

PC   ... How many?

-----   Six.

PC   Six.

-----   Seven.

PC   Seven.

-----   Five.

PC   Five.

-----   Four.

PC   Four.

-----   Six.

PC   Six.

-----   Seven.

PC   Seven.

-----   Five.

PC	Five.
Kristian	One.
PC	Why one, Kristian?
Kristian	Well, because if someone was drowning, you wouldn't just save them just because they're your friend.
PC	Why would you save them then?
Kristian	Well, you'd save them anyway.
-----	Yeah, you'd save them anyway, even if you didn't like them.
PC	O.K. Helen?
Helen	Putting it a different way to Kristian, you could say, well if she wasn't your friend, you wouldn't just stand there and say: 'Oh, I'm not going to save her, she's not my friend.'
PC	O.K. Yes, Mark?...
Mark.	I gave it three.
PC	Why three, Mark?
Mark	Because if you just said: 'I'll save her because she's my friend,' if it wasn't your friend, it's just like you saying: 'Oh, it's all right, you can drown.'... And that's not a good argument really.
PC	O.K. What do you think, Jenny?
Jenny	I gave it nine.
PC	Why did you give it nine?
Jenny	Because I thought it was very good, because it didn't even say that if she wasn't your friend you wouldn't go in and do it.
COMMENT	Jenny offers an accurate analysis of the statement under discussion in terms of possible consequences which may be derived from it.
PC	No, it didn't. It just gave a reason as to why you would do it. O.K. Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	Mr. Costello, I gave it six...

PC	Yes, carry on.
Christ. Ss.	... because it would be better to save... at least he was actually saving her, even if it was just because [he] was saving a friend. But I didn't give it any more than six because of what Kristian said, that it's just like saying: if it wasn't your friend, I won't save you.
COMMENT	Christopher is aware both of the main strength and of the essential weakness which are inherent in making utilitarian moral judgements. The former relates to the fact that, irrespective of the agent's motive, he or she proposes to perform an act which, if successful, will have benificial consequences. A utilitarian perspective is problematic precisely because it does not *require* a morally worthy motive. It is this latter consideration which Christopher acknowledges in awarding only six marks to the argument.'
PC	O.K. Who read out argument number two? Ben, what was it?
Ben	'I'll jump in because I'm sure my teacher will give me a reward.'
PC	I'll jump in because I'm sure my teacher will give me a reward. Now imagine you've got a very generous teacher like me, and you feel sure that if you jump in (and remember you're a very good swimmer) and you save your class-mate, I'm going to give you a reward. How many marks would you give that one, Abigail?
Abigail	I didn't give it any points.
PC	Why not, Abigail?
Abigail	Because that's being selfish.
PC	That's being selfish. How many, Lindsey?
Lindsay	One.
PC	Why one?
Lindsay	Because you're supposed to save her because you want to, not just because you want a reward or anything.
PC	... O.K. Carl?
Carl	Zero.
PC	Why zero, Carl?

Carl	Well... you don't just jump in and get them for the sake of a reward, but for the sake of a life.
COMMENT	Carl successfully distinguishes between a moral judgement and an argument which is motivated by self-interest. Indeed, his view is very much Kantian in flavour. Tom Beauchamp offers an account of the essential difference between utilitarian and Kantian morality. Kantians, he suggests, 'emphasize that the value of actions lies in motives rather than in consequences. (Utilitarians generally agree that motives are significant, but they insist that right motives are determined by the agent's intent to maximize good consequences.)'[2]
PC	For the sake of a life... Terry?
Terry	Four.
PC	Why four?
Terry	Because it's being greedy just because of a reward and really you should be saving them because of the life.
PC	All right. Eve?
Eve	None.
PC	None. Why none, Eve?
Eve	Well, it's not right getting a reward for the sake of a life. Saving his life just so you get a reward.
PC	O.K. Ruth.
Ruth	I'd give it none because I'd rather save a person's life than get a reward.
PC	You gave it how many?
Ruth	None.
PC	None at all. You'd rather save a person's life than get a reward. O.K. Scott?
Scott	I'd give it none.
PC	Why none?
Scott	Because a life's more important than a reward.

PC	Right. O.K. Does anyone give it nine, or ten, or eight? How many did you give it, Jenny?
Jenny	Seven.
PC	Why did you give it seven?
Jenny	Because it's doing something good, but in the wrong way.
PC	It's doing something good, but in the wrong way. Can you say a little more about that?
Jenny	Well, he shouldn't really give that reason, there should be a different reason.
PC	What should the reason be, do you think? What would count as a good reason, for you, for jumping in?
Jenny	Because I want to save that person's life.
PC	O.K. ... You're a star... I'm looking for another word which we might use instead of 'reason'. Jenny says: 'Something good has been done but not for the right reason.' And I am thinking of another word there. We might say the person's *something* wasn't a worthy *something*, or a worthwhile *something*. Another word instead of 'reason'.
----------	I write six dashes on the board.
PC	We'll have a game of 'Hangman'. Six letters. Ian?
Ian	'Argument'?
PC	No, Ian. There are more letters than six in 'argument'. Eve?
Eve	Is it 'excuse'?
PC	No, but you've got the right number of letters.
-----	'Stupid'.
PC	No, not 'stupid'. Terry?
Christ.	I was going to say 'excuse'.
Terry	'Answer'.
PC	Not 'answer'. That's another one with six letters. I'll give you the first letter then... M.

-----	'Moral'.
PC	No. You've got one letter too few there.
Ian	'Motive'.
PC	Excellent, Ian - 'motive'. What Jenny's trying to say and what she more or less has said is that something good has happened, but the person's *motive* wasn't a worthwhile one. What was his motive?
Jenny	Because I'll get a reward.
PC	Because I'll get a reward. O.K. Who read out argument number three? Chrit, can you tell us again, in a loud voice, what number three was, please?
Chrit	'I'll jump in because she might drown.'
PC	'I'll jump in because she might drown.' How many marks would we give that one, Vivian?
Vivian	Well, I gave it ten out of ten.
PC	Why did you give it ten?... What's your reason for giving it ten? I mean, why didn't you give it one?... Have a think. Jenny?
Jenny	I gave it ten because it's doing exactly the opposite to what the last person said.
PC	Is it? But in both examples the person jumps in... and saves the life. So why do you give one zero and you give the other ten, because they are both doing something good, aren't they?
Jenny	Yes.
PC	If I say: 'I am going to jump in and I'll pull that person out because my teacher is going to give me a reward,' that person's life is still saved. And then if I jump in and I say the reason is because this person is my friend, and I pull that person out, I've still saved a life, haven't I? So why give one zero and the other one ten?
Jenny	Because it's actually doing it... not for any prize or anything like that, just because it's your friend.
PC	O.K. Terry?
Terry	Ten.

PC	Why ten, Terry?
Terry	Because on number one, they're wrong, because it's doing it because of greed. It's just wanting a reward. But, this one, he is just thinking of the life which is being lost if he doesn't do something.
PC	O.K.... David?
David	I'd give it six, because I think it is a very good comment.
PC	Yes.
David	But I think I would raise the alarm first, not dive in, to see if an adult comes, if you want an adult or something. Because they'll know more than you.
PC	O.K.
David	And then if the adult doesn't come in the next fifteen seconds, I would go in myself.
PC	O.K. Let's see who else hasn't spoken to me. Eve?...
Eve	Ten.
PC	Why give it ten, Eve?
Eve	Well, in the last one, the person's thinking more of the reward than the person's life and he shouldn't, he should think of the person's life.
PC	O.K. Louise?...
Louise	I gave it ten, because it showed that you cared for someone and you didn't just do it for a reward.
PC	O.K. Ruth?
Ruth	I gave it ten, because well the person wanted to save a life and not just for to get a reward...
PC	O.K. Who read out argument number four? Christopher Sellers. Can you say it for us again in a nice loud voice?
Christ. Ss.	'I'm not going to jump in because I'll get wet.'
----------	Laughter.
PC	'I'm not going to jump in because I'm going to get wet.' What do

	we think about that argument, Ian?
Ian	Minus ten.
PC	Minus ten. Why minus ten, Ian?
Ian	Well, it's a stupid answer because someone really stupid'd say that.
----------	Laughter.
PC	Well, imagine a situation then, Ian, where, although I'm a good swimmer, I don't really want to jump in just yet. Maybe I want another five minutes on the side before I jump in. I mean, isn't it a good argument? I want to jump in at twenty past ten and not at quarter past. Why should I jump in just because this person is silly enough to have fallen in at the deep end? What do you say to that?
Ian	Stupid.
PC	Why?
Ian	Because...
PC	It's your reason I'm after.
Ian	I can't really think of a reason, but it's obviously stupid.
PC	Well, if it is obviously stupid, you should be able to give me an obvious reason... Well, you have a think then. Ben?
Ben	I gave it none because he was thinking more of himself than the other person.
PC	O.K. Helen?...
Helen	I gave it nothing, because it's like saying: 'I'm not going swimming if it's raining.' You're going to get wet anyway.
PC	O.K. That's a good example. Mark?
Mark	I gave it minus ten as well, because if he did want to wait another five minutes on the side, by that time the person could have drowned.
PC	Right. Jenny?
Jenny	I gave it nought, because he might have already been in swimming and got wet already.

PC	... No, he hasn't been in. He's been standing on the side. And he doesn't want to jump in just yet because he's not quite ready.
----------	Laughter
PC	What do you think about that?
Jenny	It's pretty daft.
PC	Why is it pretty daft? I mean, imagine if, you know, sometimes your mum calls you for your tea and you say: 'I'm just not ready yet mum. Just another five minutes'... and you say: 'Well, I'm quite entitled to do that.'
Lindsay	He's not going to die - the other person might.
PC	O.K. Kristian?
Kristian	... Absolutely nothing.
PC	Why?
Kristian	I think it's stupid.
PC	Why?
Kristian	Because when you're ready to get in, you'll get wet. And you shouldn't just think about yourself, all the time, getting wet.
PC	Jenny?
Jenny	It doesn't really matter anyway if you get in five minutes early.
PC	Not really, does it?
PC	Right, last comment on this one from Terry.
Terry	Well, I'd give it zero, because what's the point of going to the swimming baths when you don't want to get wet?
PC	Well, it's not that he doesn't want to get wet. He just doesn't want to get wet *yet*. He wants to wait another five minutes. What do you think about that?
Terry	Well, it's stupid still.
PC	Right, let's move on to the next one. Were you going to make a comment on that one? Go on then, Chrit.

Chrit.	The person who's been saved, his mum might have given [the person who jumped into the pool] some money anyway, so he could buy some more clothes.
PC	Would that be a good reason to do it?
Chrit.	No... it wouldn't be a good reason but there's still no reason for... well there is a reason because you get wet like. I mean, who worries about a bit of water anyway? If you were a really strong swimmer, you must have had some practice, so you must have been under water loads of times. So you wouldn't be frightened of it or anything, so you could just dive in again.
PC	O.K. Who read out comment number five? Sarah.
Sarah	'I'll jump in and save him because he owes me one pound and I want to be paid back.'
PC	'I'll jump in because that person owes me one pound and I want to be paid back.' What do we think about that argument, Jill?...
Jill	Well, I think it's wrong, because she is going to jump in and save somebody, but...
PC	But what?
Jill	But, she's being greedy because she doesn't need one pound.
PC	She's being greedy because she doesn't need one pound. O.K., that's very good. Mark?
Mark	Well, that one's more or less just the same as number two, because they're getting something when they've saved her anyway. So, I gave it two, because whatever you do you're going to get the,... if the person drowns they might not get it, but if the person doesn't drown, they've saved their life and they might not want that.
PC	O.K. Jenny?
Jenny	The person might decide not to give him it back anyway, after he'd saved him.
PC	So, would that be something to take into consideration before you jump in, that you might not be given the one pound back?
Jenny	Yeah.
PC	So... imagine it was me and I said: 'I'll jump in because that

	person owes me a pound. Oh, wait a minute, that person might never pay me back that pound. I won't jump in.' What do you think about that?
Jenny	You should jump in anyway.
PC	O.K. Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	Well, I was going to say... what they've just said as well, *and* if you wanted... if your motive was to get the pound off them, why don't you just let them drown and go and get it out of the bag when they're finished?
PC	O.K.... Comment number six. Jenny?
Jenny	'I'm not jumping in because I don't like her.'
PC	'I'm not jumping in because I don't like her.' How many would we give that one, Sally?...
Sally	Five.
PC	Five. Why would you give five, Sally?
Sally	... I'd jump in anyway.
PC	O.K. Eve?
Eve	I wouldn't give anything.
PC	Why, Eve?
Eve	Well, just because you don't like them, doesn't mean to say you don't jump in. It's for the sake of a life, not friendship.
PC	All right. Jenny?
Jenny	You might make friends with them once you've saved them.
PC	Perhaps you might. Ben?
Ben	Well, I gave it four, because it's all right to pose, but you might want to get rid of her.
----------	Laughter
Ben	If Jenny didn't like her and she was getting on her nerves, she might want to get rid of her.
PC	How many would you give it, Helen?

Helen	I gave it nothing because if she died, then I'd feel very guilty because I didn't save her, even if she wasn't my friend.
COMMENT	Helen offers an argument which is motivated by self-interest.
PC	O.K. Last one... Kristian?
Kristian	Well, I gave it nothing.
PC	What was the last one? Who read out the last statement?
Mark	Michelle.
PC	Michelle?
Michelle	I'm not allowed to jump in. The teacher will go mad for me going in the deep end without permission.
PC	Oh yes. 'I'm not going to jump in because my teacher will tell me off for going up to the deep end without permission.' What do we think about that argument, Abigail?
Abigail	Well, I gave it nothing, but that person wouldn't have drowned because, if you weren't allowed to go up to the deep end, why did that person go?
PC	Well, the first person went up because that person was a silly person [who] went up and fell in. And now he's drowning and shouts out: 'Help! Help!' like that... And you have to decide, Abigail, whether or not you're going to go up to the deep end as well, like this silly person. And you decide, Abigail: 'No, I'm not going up to the deep end, because my teacher's going to tell me off for going up there without permission.' What do we think about that argument, Christopher?
Christ. Ss.	Well, I gave it five, because... Well, what they usually do if somebody is drowning, they tell everybody to get out of the pool and they don't want them in it.
------	Yeah, they do.
Christ. Ss.	I don't know why, but they do. And I didn't give it a full ten because the person was going to drown, and she could have lived if he had gone in.
PC	How many would you give that argument, Ian?
Ian	I'd give it about eight, because say... if they thought that the

teacher would tell them off, then the teacher most probably would tell them off, because they can't hardly swim either. So they might start drowning if they jumped in. So they'd not necessarily be able to save them.

PC   O.K. How many marks would you give it, Ben?

Ben   I gave it two, because... if the person wasn't allowed up to the deep end, the teacher would be pleased with him anyway for saving him.

PC   O.K. Eve?

Eve   I gave it nothing.

PC   Why, Eve?...

Eve   Even though the other person shouldn't have gone looking for them in the first place and walked right up to the deep end... if you'd saved her or anything... you might start at the other end, if it was the deep end or not.

PC   Your teacher might tell you off though. He might say: 'Did I ask you to go up to the deep end? No, I didn't.' Wallop!

------   Bang!

------   Well, he might be pleased that you'd saved a person's life.

PC   What would you do, even if you thought your teacher might be unhappy. What would you do?

COMMENT Here I am concerned to ascertain the extent to which pupils will accept arguments based on authority alone.

------   I'd still jump.

PC   You'd still go in? O.K. Carla?

Carla   Well, I gave it nothing because... if the teacher said you can't go up there and there was somebody drowning, I'd still go up there if there's such a pretty good reason for you going up there.

COMMENT When philosophical inquiry is seen as an essential feature of good primary school practice, behaviour and beliefs will be the product of critical reflection rather than being derived from

authoritarian directives.

PC   O.K. Jenny?

Jenny   Even if you weren't allowed to go and you did it anyway, you
          could always raise the alarm and tell the teacher.

PC   You could. But, let's say there was no time. Either you could go
          and raise the alarm, or you could jump in. And it looks to you
          as though it would really be better to jump in. What do you
          think, Johanna?

Johanna   I'd still go and jump in because the other person might drown,
          and I wouldn't bother about the teacher.

COMMENT   Johanna decides between two competing moral claims, namely that
          it is important both to save a life and to obey the teacher.
          According to Roger Straughan: 'the balancing of conflicting
          principles is itself a fundamentally moral activity... The
          doctor who has to decide whether or not to break the bad news
          to his patient may not subscribe only to the principle of truth-
          telling, but also to that of preventing unnecessary suffering.
          Logical deduction alone can do nothing to resolve this dilemma,
          yet it is undeniably a *moral* dilemma requiring a *moral*
          decision'.[3]

PC   O.K. What do you think, Katie? What would you do?

Katie   Jump in.

PC   Why would you jump in?

Katie   To save the person's life.

PC   Even if you knew that I was there and I was going to be most
          upset with you afterwards for jumping in against my explicit
          instructions not to go up to the deep end. What would you do
          now?

Katie   I'd still jump in.

PC   You'd still jump in. Let me ask you one last question on this...
          Yes, go on then Mark, because you looked as though you were
          keen.

Mark   Well... I'd jump in, because... when you get out, if the teacher
          told you off... if the teacher had any sense they wouldn't,

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	because you'd saved their life.
PC	O.K. Let me ask you one last question on this. Are you going to speak? Yes, Kristian?
Kristian	Well, the people who walk around the swimming baths, well they'd most probably jump in as soon as they saw him.
Christ. Ss.	Mr. Costello.
PC	O.K. Last one.
Christ. Ss.	You know Haltemprice, there's this notice near the door and that says: 'There are officials sitting in high seats next to the pool,' or something... 'These people will *not* jump in, they will just find somebody else to help.'
PC	Oh, I've never seen that sign. Well, I go to Haltemprice. I haven't seen that. But I have seen them in the high chairs.
Christ. Ss.	It's not in the swimming pool, it's outside on a noticeboard.
PC	Oh. Well, they've got their tracksuits on. Well, they might say: 'I'm not jumping in, I don't want to get wet.' Let me ask you this then, since you've raised this issue, Christopher. Let us say a life-guard at the swimming pool saw someone drowning and said: 'I'm not jumping in, I don't want to get wet.'... What would we think about that, Michelle?
Michelle	Well, I'd say it was silly really. That's what they're made for, their job's to jump in and save them.
PC	[It is] part of their job description, isn't it? Let me ask you one last question. This is an interesting one. Let us pretend for a moment that you are the closest to the person who's drowning... you are about three feet from the edge of the pool. But, let's change the example so that you cannot swim at all. Even in your bath at home you start to struggle.
----------	Laughter
PC	... Could you be blamed if you didn't jump in?
COMMENT	We now embark on a discussion of supererogatory acts.[4]
Chorus	No.
-----	Because you'd drown anyway, wouldn't you, with them?

----------	Laughter
PC	But, you might be able to save the first person... Christopher?
Christ.	Well, I've got two reasons. If you couldn't swim, there's no point in going in because there'd be two people drowned... And the other one is... I've forgotten it now.
PC	... Yes, Jenny?
Jenny	Well, I'd jump in anyway, because sometimes if you've had a shock, you can do it.
PC	Yes. If you've had a shock you can do it.
Jenny	Yeah.
PC	Well, let's say you didn't jump in. If I was the teacher and I came along and I said: 'Jenny, you saw this person drowning there. You heard this person shout: "Help! Help!" and you didn't jump in. I think that's really awful!' Would I be justified in saying that?
Jenny	Yes.
PC	Would I be justified for blaming Jenny for not jumping in, Scott, if she couldn't swim?
Scott	No.
PC	Why not?
Scott	Because if she couldn't swim, she might save the person but kill herself.
PC	Is there anyone who thinks Jenny would be blameworthy for not jumping in if she couldn't swim herself? Ben?
Ben	Anyway, if a teacher blamed her [for] not jumping, why doesn't the teacher jump in?
PC	Well, the teacher has been down at the shallow end and he's come running up. But, it's a long way up, you know, as in Haltemprice.
-----	You're not allowed to run the side.
PC	Oh well, in an emergency you can run. And he gets up there and he says to Jenny: 'Jenny, you've been standing here for thirty seconds. Why didn't you jump in? I think that's awful! I'm going

to ring your parents tonight!' Would that be justifiable Chris?

Christ. Ss.   Well, no, it wouldn't but what I was thinking of - I remember two reasons now.

PC   Yes.

Christ. Ss.   The first one is : if the teacher was down the shallow end, how come he didn't see that half his class was missing up the deep end.

PC   O.K.

Christ. Ss.   And there's another thing. If you couldn't swim, why would you be coming to the swimming pool?

-----   To learn to swim.

Christ. Ss.   Yeah, but why would you be at the deep end? Why...

PC   You thought it was the shallow end. And it looked so nice and blue, you thought: 'I'll just take a walk up there and see what happens.' And, of course, you know what silly people are like, and you just fell in. Jenny comes along. he can't swim. .

Christ. Ss.   What was Jenny doing coming along?

PC   Jenny heard the cry for help and walked up there to see what it was, and decided: 'I'm not jumping in.'

Christ. Ss.   But, how come the teacher didn't hear the cry for help at the same time as Jennifer?

Jenny   Because it's too far away.

-----   She's deaf.

PC   O.K. Is there anyone who thinks that Jenny should be blamed for not jumping in, even though she can't swim?... No. O.K. We'll end on that today.

References

1. Utilitarianism is discussed in the following: Beauchamp, T.L., *Philosphical Ethics: an introduction to moral philosophy*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1982, chapter 3; Frankena, W.K. and Granrose, J.T. (Eds.), *Introductory Readings in Ethics*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1974, chapter 3; and Garforth, F.W., *The Scope of Philosophy*, Langman, London, 1971, chapter 10.

2. Kant's ethical theory is discussed in Beauchamp, T.L, *ibid.*, chapter 4; Frankena, W.K. and Granrose, J.T., *ibid.*, chapter 2; and Garforth, F.W., *ibid.*, chapter 9.

3. Straughan, R., *Can We Teach Children to be Good? Basic issues in moral, personal and social education*, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1988, pp. 66-67.

4. See Urmson, J.O., 'Saints and heroes', in Melden, A.I. (Ed.), *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1958, pp. 198-216.

Evaluation of the Course

These dialogues are wide-ranging in scope and cover some well-known philosophical issues. It is clear that the children showed enthusiasm for the discussions and that many of their comments display philosophical insight. I was particularly pleased by the mature and serious way the children responded both to myself and to each other. These factors together indicate that to limit the study of philosophy to secondary schools, colleges and universities, is unwarranted.

At the end of the course, I gave the children a questionnaire to fill in, asking what they thought about our sessions.[1] The full details of their evaluation, as well as completed questionnaires, are to be found in appendices 20, 21, 22 and 23. In concluding this chapter, I shall make a number of observations about the data produced by the questionnaire. To begin with, it will be noted that many of the comments made by children indicate how much they enjoyed the course. For example, under the heading 'What I like about philosophy is:', the following remarks were typical:

You are free to say what you feel about situations.

The way the class can discuss things like stories and problems.

I like it because it is different to other subjects.

I like it because there is not a lot of equipment - all you need is your brain.

The way it's done.

It is very interesting and I like discussing things.

I like the puzzles and the arguments and the discussions.

Talking with each other.

That it is good listening to other people's verdicts and arguments.

I like it because I am good at it and because it is different.

Because we don't have to write and I am a slow writer. And we discuss
things more and don't just leave it at one answer.

I like it because it is exciting.

It has made me think more about things.

The way we discussed our discussions.

It makes you think.

Talking about everything around us.

We all do it together. You get a chance to speak.

Instead of recording your thoughts on paper, you do [it] on the tape.

You don't have to write and it's good fun.

However, not all assessments were positive. For example:

I would only recommend [the course] to the [children] who would benefit
from it, not the people that would sit around not understanding it.

After half of the second period it gets boring.

In answer to the question: 'Has philosophy changed you in any way?', these

comments in the affirmative were among those made:

Yes, because I know how to think and I can understand my feelings better.

Because at first I thought it wasn't very good but it is brilliant.

I think I am a bit cleverer after this course.

I can think better.

I can now think better and if there was [an] argument in the playground I could probably solve it... I could also probably have done it before but never got the chance.

Yes, because it [has] helped me to think and listen to people's views.

It has made me understand things better.

I enjoy philosophy more than I used to.

I think I can express my feelings better.

It changes me... instead of rushing into things, I'll think before I do it.

It has made me wiser.

Because instead of saying something aloud, you have to think about it first.

I think about something for longer than before we did philosophy.

Because it taught me to understand more.

Try and think about all the things which could have happened before making up my mind.

It has changed me because I used to take things for granted but now I don't.

Because I can work out problems easier.

Towards the end of the questionnaire, I asked the children to suggest ways in which the course might be changed. Many wrote that they would not alter it. However, some amendments were offered, including:

Give the students a problem and tell them to write the answers down. Then they could compare answers.

Have more stories and spend more time on them.

In the story with Knowless, I'd call it a 'snowtel' not a hotel.

Have more stories, and if I was Mr. Costello, I would stop going off the subject of philosophy and on to something else.

Do less stories and more diagrams. I would make the lesson longer.

Longer stories.

Make it a bit more lively.

Have the course in the afternoon.

Make it last for two hours.

Change stories into pictures.

Make everybody answer questions.

Let people take turns on what they are going to say.

Make it shorter.

It would be nice to have some more Inspector Clueless.

Children's responses to the questionnaire clearly show the extent to which they liked the philosophy sessions and believed themselves to have benefited from them. For example, in answer to the question: 'How much have you enjoyed the course?', thirty-eight responses (63.3% of the total) indicated 'a lot'; twenty-one replies (35%) favoured the statement 'it was all right'. While only one response (1.7%) indicated that the course had been enjoyed 'very little', no replies were received to support the view that it had not been enjoyed at all. Furthermore, most children felt that, as a result of the course, they were able to express themselves more clearly; to understand themselves and others better; and were better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others. Forty-two responses (76.4%) confirmed that children spoke about their philosophy sessions

outside the classroom. In addition, the question, 'Do you feel that you are better at thinking?', received thirty-six affirmative replies (65.5%).

The vast majority of children declared that they would welcome another philosophy course, while most pupils (65% of responses) would recommend it to most or all of their friends. To the question, 'How often each week would you like to study philosophy?', 86.1% of responses suggested that this should take place on two or more occasions.

Reference

1. This questionnaire is based on those found in: Reed, R. and Henderson, A.,
   'Analytic thinking for children in Fort Worth elementary schools',
   Thinking, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1981, p. 30; Jenkins, J., 'Philosophy for
   children programme at a Gloucestershire comprehensive school in Great
   Britain', *Thinking*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1986, p. 37.

CHAPTER SIX

Theory, Teacher Education and Thought Control

The main argument which I wish to advance in the penultimate chapter of this

thesis is that, in order to produce reflective, critical pupils who are striving

towards autonomy, it is necessary that teachers themselves should demonstrate

these qualities. I shall suggest that the role of educational theory within

initial teacher training (and in-service) courses is crucial in developing

teachers who are both desirous and capable of promoting rational thinking in

children.

In the Introduction to this thesis, I suggested that the advent of the

National Curriculum would bring about a revolution in primary schools. Given

that this is the case, it is only to be expected that such educational

innovation will result in dramatic changes in the nature of professional courses

of teacher education. Before examining what may be the most likely scenario for

developments in this field, and offering what I consider to be a more

acceptable alternative, some comments must be made about the role which

educational theory has occupied traditionally in teacher education courses.

Perhaps the most poignant account of the evolution of an educational theory

component in such courses is offered by Robin Barrow and Ronald Woods in the

second and third editions of *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*.

Towards the end of the Preface to the second edition of this book, which

was written in 1975, the authors write as follows: 'At the University of

Leicester, while preaching the importance of the [foundation] disciplines, we

have in fact moved from requiring students to study all four [philosophy,

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psychology, sociology and history] ten years ago, through a period of requiring that they study only one, to a state in which they study two. This is to be welcomed, I suppose, on the grounds that half a loaf is better than none." Writing the Preface to the third edition in 1988, Robin Barrow reflected sadly on contemporary provision of theoretical courses at the University. The loaf, we now learn, has disappeared completely. In the face of adversity, Barrow is both stoical and strident: 'Time passes,' he notes, 'and now Leicester, in common with many other departments of education, requires nothing in the way of disciplined academic study. Indeed, both Ron Woods and myself, in common with other theoretically inclined educationalists, have now left the University of Leicester, nor is it likely that we will be replaced.'[2]

In discussing the proper place of an educational theory component in courses of teacher education, it is necessary first to examine why it is that the foundation disciplines have fallen into such disrepute. In particular, we need to ask whether, and to what extent, their replacement by '"hands on" courses dictated by government'[3] is justifiable. Having attempted to rehabilitate the philosophy of education in chapter one, I shall focus mainly on this discipline. Rather than being the most dispensable element in teacher education courses, I wish to argue that a grounding in educational philosophy is essential to the preparation of teacher trainees. Furthermore, courses in the philosophy of education should also form an important part of in-service courses for experienced teachers.

Let us begin by noting that teacher education is, at the present time, subject to an attack of unprecedented ferocity. It is interesting to note that this offensive is being conducted both from within and without departments of

education. One prominent educationist who has argued for a radical reform of teacher education is David Hargreaves, Professor of Education at the University of Cambridge. In a series of articles in *The Times Educational Supplement*, Hargreaves suggests that schools and not teacher training institutions should be given responsibility for the training of teachers.[4]

The title of Hargreaves' first contribution, 'Out of B.Ed. and into practice',[5] suggests that he is in agreement with a view of initial teacher training espoused both by Anthony O'Hear and the Conservative Right which I shall examine presently. What it conveys to the reader is the idea that the B.Ed. degree (and by association the PGCE) fails to provide a rigorous course of study the benefits of which are made manifest in regular and systematic practice in the classroom. Rather, the impression given is of a degree which permits students to engage in several years of academic 'slumber'. The essential difference between teacher education courses and the notion of a 'training school' which Hargreaves would wish to see take their place, is the existence of a theoretical element in the former. Consequently, the reader might be forgiven for assuming that one focus of Hargreaves' disquiet is precisely such an element. This is unfortunate given the author's insistence, *pace* the Conservative Right, that the PGCE is *not* too theoretical.

Why, then does Hargreaves wish to abolish teacher education courses altogether? The B.Ed. is dismissed for two reasons. Firstly, Hargreaves argues that the most appropriate qualification for teaching is a 'normal degree course',[6] both at primary and secondary level. The National Curriculum, he notes, has already begun to reveal that many teachers have an inadequate grasp of various disciplines. Presumably to recruit subject specialists would solve this

problem. Secondly, Hargreaves believes that young people should not be asked to make a commitment to the teaching profession at the age of eighteen. In arguing that 'At that age [they] should keep their options as open as possible',[7] Hargreaves appears to be implying that, if prospective teachers wait long enough, something more tempting or more lucrative is sure to come along. While the latter is certainly true, it is rather unfortunate that such an interpretation can be placed on the words of such a well-known *educationist.*

Of course Hargreaves would, no doubt, reply that he has the best interests of young people, and indeed of the teaching profession, at heart. It is of little use to decide on a profession at an early age, only to regret one's choice later. Yet is this difficulty unique to eighteen year olds? In my present post, I have encountered a number of mature students who, having experienced life at 'the chalk face' during a teaching practice term, have decided that teaching is not for them. The relationship between wisdom, age and foresight if it exists at all, is at best only a contingent one.

At first glance, the demise of the B.Ed. would seem to suggest that PGCE courses should be expanded. Hargreaves's argument against this is that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the latter and the notion of a 'teaching school': 'The PGCE approach to initial teacher training creates a divide between the practitioners (the schoolteachers) and the educators (the lecturers). This divide remains even when, as in the articled teacher scheme, initial training becomes more school-based.'[8] Having articulated what he believes to be the essence of the problem, Hargreaves offers us the following alternatives: 'Either we believe in the value of the PGCE, with lecturers in charge, in which case we

cannot have genuine teaching schools. Or we believe in teaching schools, with practising teachers in charge, in which case we have to abolish the PGCE.'[9]

His arguments for the latter are as follows. Firstly, we are told that practising teachers are both willing and able to take on the task of training their future colleagues. Indeed, Hargreaves feels sure that such teachers will find their new responsibilities 'challenging' and 'rewarding'. Just what sort of (pecuniary and other) rewards lie in wait for the unsuspecting 'practitioner-educator'[10] remains to be seen. Of course, there would need to be adequate funding for such a proposal. Whence is this to come? Hargreaves now produces his *coup de grâce* - abolishing the PGCE would provide the necessary financial resources. An obvious question which arises from this scenario is: what is to become of university departments of education and other teacher education institutions? Hargreaves' response is clear and to the point. Most of them would simply cease to exist. However, a few institutions, with a much narrower remit, should be maintained within higher education in order to fulfil a number of functions:

> There needs to be a body of people to train the mentors, at least in the early years. In association with HMI, these lecturers would also establish the national curriculum for teacher training to ensure an agreed content and standards of training across what would be a much more diffused system of initial training. In addition, they would engage in educational research and development, and provide academic courses of advanced study for experienced teachers. This should be done in the closest association with the profession as a whole. To ensure this, at least half the staff of such surviving institutions should be seconded teachers and headteachers, especially those who have senior posts in teaching schools.'[11]

Hargreaves concludes by suggesting the reforms which he outlines would have two main beneficial consequences. To begin with, they would promote a high standard of teacher training. Secondly, educational research and scholarship

would improve (presumably because those teacher educators who remained would have more time to devote to these activities).

In his second article, 'Judge radicals by results',[12] Hargreaves is able to report on those responses which were made to his proposals. These were, he says, to be expected: enthusiasm from teachers, subject to adequate funding being made available; howls of protest from those working in teacher education establishments. As far as the latter are concerned, Hargreaves quickly came under fire from two colleagues at the Cambridge University Department of Education, Anthony Adams and Witold Tulasiewicz, who advanced two major arguments against his position.[13]

They began by questioning the analogy which Hargreaves used in comparing teaching schools with teaching hospitals. The latter, Adams and Tulasiewicz argue, are institutions in which doctors, nurses and medical students work as a team. Unfortunately, the majority of schools, however much they may pay lip-service to the notion of teamwork, (or even sincerely believe themselves to be paradigm examples of it) do not operate in a similar fashion. Student teachers are frequently expected to 'go it alone', relieving a practising teacher, who can be used as an additional resource at the discretion of the head.

Indeed, this is part of the attraction involved in taking students from teacher education establishments, which is why many heads are keen to accept several student teachers at one time. The advent of local management of schools (LMS), which involves schools taking responsibility for their own budgets, is likely to turn student teachers into an even more valuable commodity than they are at present. It will also increase the likelihood that they will be asked to persevere in the classroom to the best of their ability,

while the teachers with whom they are placed work elsewhere in the school, attend courses, or are absent altogether.

The second argument offered against Hargreaves concerns the need for student teachers to be exposed, in a systematic and not haphazard fashion, to educational theory. As we shall see, this is a recurring theme throughout this chapter. According to Adams and Tulasiewicz, one hallmark of a 'respected profession' is the theoretical component which is a central element of the training procedures associated with it. They note that 'Medical students receive this in the preclinical part of their courses, as do lawyers; however, Hargreaves suggests nothing of the sort for teachers - after their degree they are to be thrown into the school to rely exclusively on the spontaneous help and advice of mentor colleagues to induct them.'[14]

Two further reasons for the inclusion of a theoretical element in courses of teacher education are suggested. On the one hand, students need to be aware of the pedagogical foundations of their subject, At the present time, nothing of this kind is offered at the undergraduate level. Secondly, while Adams and Tulasiewicz agree that, as far as the PGCE is concerned, theory must be derived from educational practice, nevertheless they 'do not see this happening in a teaching school, unless the mentors are constantly able to reflect on their practice, and to compare theirs with that of other colleagues'.[15]

The PGCE course is to be commended in this respect, since the institutions which offer it 'act as initiators of new ideas and disseminators of good practice between schools'.[16] Furthermore, such institutions are a focal point for the discussion and evaluation of those many and varied experiences which both students and teacher-educators have undergone. To place students in teaching

schools would be to deprive them of an important *milieu* within which

educational theory can be distilled from a whole host of different practices.

Considering the general nature of this thesis and the arguments advanced

so far within it, I would like to draw attention to what I consider to be the

most disturbing aspects of the proposals advocated by Hargreaves. First of all,

if implemented they will be successful in preserving the *status quo*. As Adams

and Tulasiewicz point out: 'It is notorious how conservative the medical

profession is in its practice and this may be attributed, in part at least, to

the nature of its training.'[7] In schools where good practice exists, the

retention of those aspects of its performance which are commendable will be no

bad thing. However, even these schools should be capable of further evolution

and progress. Where maintaining the *status quo* is the order of the day, this

will rarely be possible. The situation in schools which are below par or 'merely

adequate will be much more dire. In this regard, it should be remembered too

that a great many schools would be required to train the country's teachers:

'Schools could only accommodate a limited number of student teachers. How many

students can be unleashed on a class, allowing for the fact that they will make

mistakes and include some who are absolutely unsuited for teaching?'[8]

Consequently, I would suggest that not all teaching schools will have

demonstrated excellence as a prerequisite for being selected to train student

teachers.

A second implication of Hargreaves' proposals arises from the first,

namely that the conservatism which would inevitably bedevil schools would be

sufficient to stifle originality and creativity in teachers. Students especially

might feel compelled to conduct themselves in the classroom in ways which are

inimical to their own sound judgement, simply to be accepted as 'one of us'. Where such discernment is not apparent in the student teacher, he or she will be compliant merely because the existing teaching model which the school has adopted is the only one of which he or she is aware. Whether the cause is ignorance of viable alternatives, or reluctant adherence to established practice, the result is the same - conformity of behaviour, often accompanied by conformity of thought. I wish to suggest that the only way to produce well-informed, open-minded, *thinking* teachers is to offer them opportunities within recognized teacher education courses, to reflect critically on what Michael Marland has aptly called 'the craft of the classroom'.[19] Exposure to educational theory is a vital part of this process.

Let us now examine the arguments of someone who argues strongly against the view that the theoretical study of education is a necessary element in the preparation of teachers. In a pamphlet entitled *Who Teaches the Teachers?*, Anthony O'Hear suggests that 'what is vital in teaching is practical knowledge combined with emotional maturity and not theoretical knowledge at all'.[20] In a subsequent article, O'Hear indicates the limited value which he attaches to the systematic discussion and evaluation of educational theories: 'the theoretical study of education, which I believe should be made available to those teachers who feel a need for it, might be more appropriately undertaken when one has gained some actual classroom experience'.[21]

Looking at the latter quotation, two images come to mind. One is of a philosopher of empiricist leanings who continually chides those of his colleagues who persist in writing books on metaphysics. 'Sheer nonsense, if you ask me,' says the philosopher, 'but I presume that a fascination with such

questions satisfies some emotional need'. The second image is of a doctor who sees a number of teachers each week who present at his surgery with stress-related illnesses. He dispenses sleeping pills, tranquilizers, etc., despite feeling that it would be best if the individuals concerned could get along without them.

However, the analogy between educational theory and either metaphysics or medicine cannot be sustained. In chapter one, I argued that one branch of such theory, the philosophy of education, stands or falls on its ability to be of some practical help to teachers in the classroom. This is sufficient to establish a clear distinction between: (a) the aspirations of a metaphysician and those of an applied philosopher; (b) the respective content of the disciplines with which they are concerned. Similarly, the medical analogy is unsuccessful, since educational theory is not something to which one turns when something has gone wrong. Rather, it should be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for informed and successful practice. If a medical analogy is relevant at all here, I would argue that educational theory should be seen as a form of preventative medicine: it is something which should be studied by teachers in order to minimize the risk that children will be provided with unsatisfactory or inadequate schooling.

It is precisely this contention that O'Hear seeks to repudiate. He asks:

> Is there any evidence that the theoretical studies of education undertaken in formal teacher training, as opposed to the studies of one's subject and the teaching practice, actually help to make better teachers?... Is there any evidence that the standards of teaching in the maintained sector in this country have benefited from mandatory attendance at theoretical courses in education, and that a knowledge of one's subject and teaching under the guidance of experienced teachers are not the only preparations really relevant to a person's becoming a good teacher?[22]

In answering these questions, O'Hear is keen to make clear that he is not seeking to cast doubt on the benefits which may accrue from the theoretical study of education. Neither would he deny that prospective teachers should have the right to engage in such study either before or (more appropriately in his view) after they have begun to teach. Rather, he wants to reject the view which suggests that all (or indeed most) teachers should be required to undergo theoretical study as a prerequisite for gaining licensed or qualified teacher status. According to O'Hear, many individuals who would no doubt make excellent teachers and who would otherwise be keen to join the teaching profession, for example, married women, retired people, etc., are prevented from so doing by the formal requirement to attend a course of teacher training. He might have added that such courses contain what many consider to be an irrelevant (not to say difficult) theoretical element.

So far, O'Hear's arguments look to be eminently reasonable. He is not attempting to undermine traditional routes into teacher training, he simply wishes to support an alternative measure which he feels will extricate the teaching profession from a difficulty which it is currently experiencing, namely its inability to recruit teachers in certain subjects. However, a close examination of O'Hear's objections to theoretical educational studies reveals that his reservations about educational theory are rather more complex than is at first apparent.

There are, he maintains, a number of deficiencies in education courses. Foremost among these is the subject matter which is studied by student teachers. The following statement sums up O'Hear's position on this matter succinctly: 'To judge by course syllabuses, it is not as if our students of

education are spending their time reading and studying thinkers of true stature who have addressed themselves to questions of education. Rather than examining Plato or Locke or Rousseau or Arnold or Newman or Durkheim or even Dewey, they are more likely to be reading some contemporary commentator from the teacher training establishment or a recent DES circular.'[23]

This remark recalls the halcyon days, to which Robin Barrow refers in *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education*, when the philosophy of education constituted an integral part of initial teacher training courses. In some institutions, what took place in lecture theatres under the title 'philosophy of education' were, in reality, lectures in the history of education. During these sessions, the views of those thinkers identified by O'Hear were presented at some length. What O'Hear seems not to realize is that such courses were considered by practising teachers to be largely irrelevant to their daily concerns in schools. In fact, advocates of such an approach were successful only in marginalizing their discipline.. Indeed, they must take their share of responsibility for the eventual demise of the philosophy of education.

It is also worrying that, as a philosopher, O'Hear should not wish student teachers to reflect upon contemporary legislation, since it is only by so doing that they will develop informed opinions about the nature of the profession to which they shall shortly belong. In these days of rapid educational reform, it is vitally important that prospective teachers should think seriously and carefully about the role which they are about to be given in schools. In fact, the Department of Education and Science has ensured that all student teachers have received a number of documents on the National Curriculum, of which it expects them to have a sound knowledge before taking up their posts. The

motivation for this may no doubt be that it is only through having an adequate grasp of the relevant documentation that teachers will be in a position, in the current jargon, to 'deliver' the National Curriculum adequately. Nevertheless, DES policy reveals O'Hear's thinking on this matter to be anything but current.

O'Hear's antagonism towards the discussion of contemporary educational issues being considered as an important part of teacher training courses is made manifest in his view that '"education" often looks like a field governed by fashion and fancy rather than by solid and enduring intellectual achievement'.[24] He suggests that two issues, in particular, are given far too much prominence by educationists, namely those of race and inequality. O'Hear argues that an emphasis on these notions 'is surely unhealthy in its implicit assumption that education is to be seen in terms of its potential for social engineering, rather than as the initiation of pupils into proven and worthwhile forms of knowledge. In undergoing such an initiation one will, for a time, prescind from the demands and contingencies of present social arrangements, and not be distracted or influenced by them'.[25]

There is something of a Platonic flavour about O'Hear's comments. He assumes that one can, as it were, step outside the world, in order to apprehend reality in its ultimate nature. However, as I have argued in chapter one, in criticizing the notion of 'the philosopher as spectator', this is not possible. Neither is it possible, I have suggested, to adopt a *neutral* stance with regard to educational matters. Education is primarily a *political* enterprise. Consequently, in seeking to convince others that a certain point of view is worthy of support, it is necessary to begin by acknowledging the values which one holds in an honest and open manner. To make an appeal to 'neutrality' with

respect to one's point of view, is to be susceptible to the charge of gullibility at the very least, and of dishonesty at worst.

What is most worrying about O'Hear's position is that he betrays a rather profound ignorance of the world of education today. How is it possible for children in schools (or, indeed, their teachers) to remain undistracted and uninfluenced by 'present social arrangements'? In a society in which racism and sexism are much in evidence, where unemployment, single-parent families, homelessness, alcohol and drug abuse, and general lawnessness are commonplace, is it tenable to suggest that children·will find it possible to 'transcend' these realities? While a fortunate minority may be able to do so, the majority cannot. Therefore, it is only to be expected that teacher education establishments should seek to prepare student teachers adequately to meet the difficult challenges which they will face in the 1990s. The discussion of issues relating to race and inequality are an essential part of this preparation.

The attack launched on initial teacher education by David Hargreaves and Anthony O'Hear is similar in many respects to that made by the Hillgate Group in their pamphlet, *Learning to Teach*.[26] Indeed, O'Hear is listed among those who indicate their support for the views expressed therein. Other well-known signatories include Baroness Cox,[27] Professor Antony Flew, Dr. Dennis O'Keeffe, Professor Arthur Pollard, Professor Roger Scruton,[28] and Stuart Sexton, a former adviser to Sir Keith Joseph. The authors begin, as one might expect, in classical vein, by offering a quote from Juvenal: *Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* (But who is to guard the guardians? (No source given.)) The authors quickly make it clear that they would be keen to be appointed to the post.

On the first page of the pamphlet, we are told that there are two questions which need to be asked in order to determine whether someone is suited to the teaching profession: 'Do they have the necessary knowledge and experience? Are they able and willing to put that knowledge across to others?'[29] If both of these questions are answered in the affirmative, then, according to the Hillgate Group, that person is to be considered competent to teach and should be granted Qualified Teacher Status. The authors propose that a new mechanism should be brought into being to enable such status to be granted to those who successfully serve an apprenticeship in schools working with experienced teachers. This licensed teacher scheme[30] should, in their view, become a prominent route by which to enter teaching. It should be placed alongside existing routes, the B.Ed. and the PGCE, and market forces should be the arbiter of its success or failure. In other words, if the licensed teacher scheme attracts a greater number of applicants than its more traditional rivals, then the demise of the B.Ed. and the PGCE is inevitable.

However, the Hillgate Group is not content simply to leave the matter to market forces: it seeks to offer a number of criticisms of contemporary initial teacher education courses which it believes will fatally weaken support for them. Three main failings are identified: 'their intellectual level is too low; ... some or even much of their content is inappropriate and in many cases has been susceptible to bias; ...they fail to give enough time or attention to classroom practice'.[31] Since those who are responsible for such courses have attempted to meet the third criticism by increasing the amount of time which student teachers spend in school, I propose here to focus on the first two criticisms.

The first can be dispensed with rather easily since it is not clear that the Hillgate Group has succeeded in articulating an objection at all. The authors seem not to be troubled in any way by the intellectual requirement to offer some form of *support* for their arguments. For example, they state that 'it has long been the experience of graduates that their Postgraduate Certificate courses are intellectually undemanding compared with their degree courses'.[32] Which graduates are being referred to here? Have the authors canvassed student teachers, or conducted a questionnaire, or asked for the views of more experienced teachers concerning their teacher education courses? If they have, the results are not offered in the pamphlet. The reader is informed that 'It is difficult to think of a single department of education in a British university or polytechnic which has genuine intellectual distinction; nor is it clear what intellectual distinction in this area would really amount to.'[33] To refute this statement, it is sufficient simply to note that in order to conclude that a particular quality is nowhere to be found, one must first have a clear conception of what is being sought. Without this, the search is worthless (as are the conclusions which are adduced at the end of it).

The second criticism once again concerns the content of initial teacher training courses. The authors suggest that:

> Knowledge about the theory, history, philosophy, sociology or even the psychology of education is rarely of any benefit to probationary teachers coping with the hurly burly of their first weeks and months in a school... Yet some of these topics, properly considered, may be of use to teachers later in their careers, when the first shock of the classroom has died down and they have the occasion to reflect on their experience in relative tranquility. However, even then, the topics must *be* properly considered, with an open mind and a desire for truth. In too many courses, we believe, these topics are presented in ways which are either intellectually feeble or biased.[34]

A number of points must be made about this statement. To begin with, if asked to define their job description, lecturers in education would be loathe to suggest that the extent of their remit is simply to prepare teachers for 'their first weeks and months in a school'. Certainly, much attention should be given to this formative period in a young teacher's career. However, to exclude the four foundation disciplines from teacher education courses for the reason given seems, to say the least, arbitrary, especially when one considers that, once again, no evidence is offered in support of the view that such disciplines are 'rarely of any benefit to probationary teachers'. Furthermore, given the authors' own acknowledgement of the possible benefit which being introduced to the history, philosophy, sociology and psychology of education may have for teachers with some years of service, one wonders why their more inexperienced colleagues are deemed to be able to do without it.

An excellent refutation of the arguments offered by O'Hear and the Hillgate Group is offered by Keith Swanwick and Clyde Chitty, in their *Teacher Education and the PGCE Course: A Research Report.*[35] As the authors suggest, those who are most vocal in their attack on educational theory, are themselves unable to avoid offering theories:

> It is tempting and currently fashionable in Britain to take up an anti-intellectual stance and complain of theorizing, an activity which can be seen as remote from practicalities, in our case classrooms. But no human mind is free from the impulse towards theorizing, any more than human physiology can get by for long without breathing... A teacher who believes that education should be fundamentally child-centred, or someone who holds that a knowledge and love of a subject is the essential requirement for teaching effectiveness are both working to theories about children, the curriculum and educational processes. Theories are not the opposite of practice but its basis.[36]

Considering both the use which O'Hear *et al.* make of educational theory and their subsequent attacks on it, I am reminded of a pertinent comment made by A.J. Ayer in the first volume of his autobiography. Reflecting on his book *Language, Truth and Logic*, more than forty years after its publication, Ayer declares himself still to be largely in agreement with the approach which he enunciated therein concerning the verification of statements. He notes wryly that much subsequent philosophical work also demonstrated an agreement with his general approach, although certain philosophers were reluctant to admit to this: 'The verification principle is seldom mentioned and when it is mentioned it is usually scorned; it continues, however, to be put to work. The attitude of many philosophers towards it reminds me of the relation between Pip and Magwitch in Dickens's *Great Expectations*. They have lived on the money, but are ashamed to acknowledge its source.'[37]

I do not believe that either O'Hear or members of the Hillgate Group would, if pressed, disagree with the point of view expressed by Swanwick and Chitty above. What they wish to argue against, it seems to me, is not educational theory *per se*; rather they concerned to denigrate a particular kind of theory, namely that which is 'biased'. The reader will not be surprised to discover that the bias which is being objected to is 'Marxist bias in particular'.[38] In order to demonstrate that a Marxist perspective has permeated teacher education courses, the authors of *Learning to Teach* cite the following: an Open University course entitled *Schooling and Society*; extracts from the B.Ed. syllabuses at Brighton Polytechnic; and several quotations from books by presumed Marxists. This is hardly the scientific, quantifiable analysis of education courses in the

country as a whole which certainly would be required if the authors expected their arguments seriously to undermine current teacher training provision.

In any case, as we saw earlier with the concept of 'indoctrination', in order for the term 'bias' to function meaningfully in educational discourse, we need to do some philosophical 'spadework' (of the sort to which the Hillgate Group is clearly opposed), in order to produce an account which can be applied to all perspectives alike, not just those that we happen to reject. This is an important point which I make both to students taking the PGCE course at the University of Hull and to their more experienced colleagues on in-service and higher degree courses. My aim is merely to prevent them from falling into the same trap as has the Hillgate Group, the members of which are unable to recognise the bias which exists in the following statement: 'We should also mention the growing attention paid both in schools and in education courses to the politics of race, sex, and class and even to "anti-imperialist education". The nature of these preoccupations - which appear designed to stir up disaffection, to preach a spurious gospel of "equality" and to subvert the entire traditional curriculum - is too well known to bear lengthy comment.' [39]

In 1989, I was very pleased to be asked to give the first two lectures which primary PGCE students receive at the start of their course in Hull. My first session involved a critical examination of the values which underpin the National Curriculum. I also encouraged students to explore the values of those who have commented on the new legislation.[40] I began by asking my students a question upon which I said I would like them to reflect throughout the year and, indeed, during the course of their future careers. The question was: 'Are you, as teachers-to-be, content to act as mere functionaries whose role is simply to

'deliver' the curriculum, or do you wish to be thinking, reflective agents of change?'

The existence of an educational theory component in programmes of teacher education can do much to counteract the biases to which teachers are likely to fall prey, both from the Left and Right of the political spectrum. The aim of such a component is to provoke thought, not to control or stultify it. Consequently, it is only those who are concerned with the latter who will fear educational theorizing and who therefore will seek to discredit it.

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31. The Hillgate Group, *Learning to Teach*, op. cit., p. 3.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

35. Swanwick, K. and Chitty, C., *Teacher Education and the PGCE Course: a research report*, University of London, Institute of Education, 1989. See also, Hill, D., *Charge of the Right Brigade: the radical Right's attack on teacher education*, The Hillcole Group/Institute of Education Policy Studies, Brighton, 1989.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

37. Ayer, A.J., *Part of my Life*, University Press, Oxford, 1975, p. 156.

38. The Hillgate Group, *Learning to Teach*, op. cit., p. 4.

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40. The text which I use is *Take Care, Mr. Baker!*, Fourth Estate, London, 1988,
    which is edited by Julian Haviland. The book contains numerous responses to
    the 1988 Education Reform Bill. An examination of these responses reveals
    the extent to which they are, like the Reform Bill itself, the product of a
    theoretical commitment. Consequently, part of the job of the philosopher of
    education is to clarify arguments presented and to determine on what
    grounds (if any) such arguments may be justified. An opportunity is
    provided for students to evaluate the statements found in *Take Care, Mr.
    Baker!* in tutorial discussions.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion: Introducing Philosophy into the Primary School Curriculum

In the concluding chapter of this thesis, my central purpose will be to discuss both the management of philosophical discussions in the classroom and the supervision of teachers of children's philosophy. Before attempting to do this, I must first acknowledge that there is a number of difficulties which must be overcome before the curriculum innovation for which I have argued becomes a reality. In order to emphasize the importance which I believe should be accorded to arguments for the early introduction of philosophy into primary schools, I shall examine three books which represent aspects of contemporary thinking about the purposes of education. While I shall suggest that many of the ideas contained in these books are to be welcomed, nevertheless each contains proposals which, if accepted, would lead inevitably to the demise of critical, reflective thinking both by children and by their teachers. Consequently, before advocating management strategies for conducting philosophical discussions, I must first attempt to counter such proposals.

However, it is necessary to begin by summarizing the arguments which have so far been made. In chapter one, I examined the nature of philosophy and of the philosophy of education. Philosophers of education, I argued, neither are, nor can they be, neutral with regard to substantive values. Rather, I suggest, they should eschew any attempt to remain, 'outside the world', by commenting on various issues as though they were not, themselves, bringing any value commitments to the discussions in which they are engaged. Two important tasks

to be taken on by the philosopher of education are to identify and to evaluate value judgements made by both himself and others.

Philosophers of education should seek to address themselves to those problems with which teachers are faced in educational institutions. While this endeavour involves clarifying the nature of such problems, this constitutes only part of the philosopher's remit. He should also be concerned to offer educational theories himself. This is my purpose in chapter two, where I subject the concept of 'indoctrination' to critical scrutiny. Various conceptions of the term are examined and rejected as inadequate. I suggest that any adequate analysis of 'indoctrination' must focus initially on the consequences of, for example, particular teaching transactions on the state of mind of the learner. Neither doctrinal lesson content, non-rational teaching methods, nor a teacher's intention provide necessary or sufficient conditions of indoctrination. .

In chapter three, I offer arguments for the introduction of philosophy at the primary level. One of the most important reasons for such an introduction is that the teaching of thinking (or reasoning) skills is likely to counteract the activities of either a witting or an unwitting indoctrinator, when the indoctrination in question concerns category 'B' beliefs. Chapter four examines the work of Matthew Lipman and Gareth Matthews. It is suggested that a number of criticisms can be made of this work and that any viable 'Philosophy for Children' programme must be both broad in presentation and capable of being offered to large classes of mixed-ability children. Accordingly, the fifth chapter of this thesis presents an account of my own work with primary school children in Hull schools. Several transcripts of children's dialogues are cited

as proof of my contention that young children are capable of engaging, in a thoughtful and serious way, in extensive philosophical discussion.

Philosophy as a subject in British secondary schools is in its infancy. Primary school philosophy has not even reached this stage of development. Furthermore, one might presume that the new National Curriculum constitutes a formidable obstacle to the inclusion of a philosophical dimension in the educational experience of primary school children. However, in chapter five I argued that certain proposals for English are not only compatible with the introduction of philosophy into primary schools, by implication, they actually advocate it. I shall suggest presently that recommendations made in the Elton Report on discipline in schools also support this initiative. Let us begin by examining three texts whose ideas are likely to impede the curriculum innovation which I have been concerned to advocate in this thesis.

In order to foster critical reflection in children, teachers must be both willing and able to think similarly themselves. Bearing this in mind, Joan Dean's *Managing the Primary School*[1] is, in some respects, a disturbing book. It is a companion volume to the author's earlier work, *Managing the Secondary School* which, we are told, 'was rightly acclaimed as a valuable contribution to school management practice'[2]. In the present educational climate, it would not be surprising if *Managing the Primary School* proved to be as popular as its forerunner.

The central purpose of the book is to consider the nature of primary headship. Accordingly, in chapter one, the author defines those tasks and skills which are essential to the post of head teacher. These are examined in some detail in subsequent chapters under headings such as 'Aims, objectives and

policies', 'Curriculum', 'The children', 'Organizing learning', 'Staff selection and professional development', 'Managing change', 'School administration', etc. Dean is to be commended for offering head teachers a work which is, as the Foreword promises, 'intensely practical'.[3] In no sense can she be said to suffer from the idealism of the long-distance inspector. Chapters typically begin with a list of management tasks which heads are to undertake and they conclude with a number of pertinent questions for consideration. Numerous sources are cited throughout the book to which the reader may refer in order to further his or her understanding of the arguments presented. Dean also offers much sound advice which will be welcomed by newly-appointed head teachers.

However, those teachers who are concerned to promote children's ability to reflect critically on matters moral and logical, may be perplexed by Dean's treatment of this topic. On the one hand, she suggests that 'perhaps the most important kind of preparation for adult life is the development of the ability to think for oneself'.[4] This thesis is to be welcomed, especially since it contradicts the author's earlier statement that, in promoting sensitivity to others, the teacher's role involves 'reflecting *for* children how other people react to different kinds of behaviour'.[5] [The italics are mine.] I would argue, *pace* Dean, that moral education should not be concerned primarily with teaching children *what* to think. Rather, as I argued in chapter three, it should attempt to foster those reasoning skills which are necessary if children are to make mature moral judgements.

Perhaps the most worrying aspect of *Managing the Primary School* is its portrayal of head teachers as being unable to bring about successful change in schools without the overwhelming support and benevolence of teachers, parents,

etc. For example, Dean argues that in introducing reforms, a head needs 'to carry everyone with [him or her]'.[6] This is not only impractical, but is clearly false. Her advice to head teachers concerning the implementation of a policy to which a number of people are opposed, is questionable: 'it may be better to leave the policy for the time being if you can, or leave the most controversial parts of it, if you can get by for a time without making a decision'.[7] Not only is this a denial of the head teacher's proper function (since he or she has been appointed to take decisions which may be unpopular), it is also a recipe for educational disaster in primary schools.

While it is certainly true that policies are more likely to be implemented effectively if they are supported wholeheartedly by members of staff, this should not be taken to imply that one should only advocate change when there is unanimous (or even substantial) support for it. Indeed, a number of head teachers have been successful in bringing about much-needed reform in their schools precisely because they did not engage in the consultation process advocated by Dean.[8] In this context, it is difficult to see the author as anything other than an apologist for the *status quo*.

One of the criticisms which has been made of the National Curriculum is that it is 'an exercise in thought control'.[9] If this argument is correct, it would seem important to engender conformity of thought at the highest level in schools. Dean's proposals, if adopted, would result in conformity of behaviour in head teachers – a vital precursor of conformity of thought. Once the former, at least, has been achieved, it becomes possible to induct children into certain prevalent modes of behaviour and belief.

The relationship between teacher expectation and pupil performance is problematic. It is to be hoped that the link between inspector expectation and head teacher performance will remain still more tenuous.[10]

The second text on which I wish to focus is *Education 10-14 in Scotland*, a discussion paper which was the culmination of six years of research by the Consultative Committee on the Curriculum (CCC). The authors' central thesis is that education for children in the ten-to-fourteen age-range should be 'coherent, continuous and progressive'.[11] To facilitate this goal, a number of proposals are made, the elucidation of which forms a substantial part of the document. Underlying these proposals are two important premises. Firstly, it is suggested that the present two-tier structure of primary and secondary schools should remain intact. Secondly, while there should be no general provision of middle schools in Scotland, teachers who possess 'middle school skills, attitudes and insights' are nonetheless a necessity.[12]

The CCC recognizes the importance of sound management if schools are to be successful in implementing its recommendations. Foremost among these is that a working partnership should exist between individual secondary schools and the primary schools associated with them. Each school within a partnership should select a curriculum co-ordinating team and from these groups a ten-to-fourteen co-ordinating team should be chosen. The primary function of this latter group should be 'to ensure that [the] partnership of schools offers learners a coherent, continuous, progressive education'.[13]

At first glance, the reader may presume that this repeated emphasis on 'progressive' education is indicative of a desire on the part of the authors to promote child-centred schooling, which is based on the needs and interests of

individual pupils. Unfortunately, such an assumption would not be warranted. That this is so can be shown quite easily by examining a number of criticisms which may be made of the discussion paper.

To begin with, according to the CCC: 'Learning is the process of acquiring skills and understandings for an effective life in society'.[14] While this statement has the unmistakable flavour of a political slogan and no doubt represents current orthodoxy, it must nevertheless be argued for and not merely asserted. Why, for example, should there be an emphasis on an *effective* life in society rather than on, say, a *happy* life?

In keeping with this concern to promote the teaching of skills, the authors propose a reweighting of the time allocated to certain subjects in secondary schools. Since nowadays the terms 'education' and 'training' are being regarded increasingly as synonynms, the reader may not be surprised to discover that it is such subjects as English and Modern Languages which are suffering contraction when the need is felt, as it is here, to 'rebalance' the curriculum.[15] So while we are told that acquiring a second language 'is a very special, and difficult, attainment',[16] the CCC nevertheless recommends that the time given to English and Modern Languages should be combined and reduced. One of the reasons for this is that 'there are already schools which allocate less... than the national mean time to [these subjects] without any reported ill effect upon their pupils'.[17]

However, education is not concerned with minimizing harm to children, but with promoting what is worthwhile. Those who would seek to deviate from 'established custom'[18] regarding curricular provision must be able to show that *children* stand to gain significantly from their proposals. A justification which

implies that the benefits to be gained by *society* are of paramount importance will not do.

The authors of *Education 10-14 in Scotland* inform us that computer assisted learning is now being accompanied by computer assisted reporting, in which teachers and advisers work together to devise 'comment banks'. Furthermore, 'individual teachers choose the comments most appropriate to an individual pupil, from a range of comments'.[19] Thus it becomes clear that creativity and spontaneity may soon be considered to be the hallmarks of failed teachers as well as of failed pupils. ·

Emphases on 'doing' rather than on 'reflecting', and on teaching children how to learn rather than on teaching them how to think in non-instrumental terms, combine to provide a stark preview of a possible educational future. Should our children inherit such a future, then the advent of training will indeed have brought about 'the death of education'.[20]

In recent times, a number of arguments have been offered for the introduction of problem solving into the primary school curriculum. In his *Problem Solving in Primary Schools*,[21] Robert Fisher offers both a rationale for such an input and a comprehensive description of how problem-solving activities might permeate the educational experience of young children.

A number of comparisons can be made between Fisher's book and *Education 10-14 in Scotland*. For example, in chapter one, he suggests that problem-solving skills are necessary if we are to lead *successful* lives (italics mine). Included among the skills of which he speaks are *'general thinking skills*, both creative and critical, and *specific strategies* such as observing, designing, decision-making, team-working, 'brainstorming', implementing and evaluating

solutions...'[22]. Fisher offers a further pragmatic justification in favour of a problem-solving approach, namely that it leads to pleasurable learning. Children who are asked to give reasons for liking problem solving suggest, for example, that 'It makes you think,' 'It gives you a chance to look and look for answers,' and 'You don't have to write everything, you can draw and make things.'[23]

In the chapters which follow, we are taken on a guided tour of the primary school curriculum, during which strategies for adopting a problem-solving methodology in writing, mathematics, science and technology, environmental studies, art and drawing etc., are suggested. The penultimate chapter offers a theoretical framework for the use of games in primary schools and suggests some specific games which might act as focal points for problem solving. The book concludes with a number of reflections by teachers involved in teaching problem solving.

While *Problem Solving in Primary Schools* is coherent, critical and considered, it leaves a number of questions unanswered. Important among these are the following: how does solving mathematical or scientific problems differ from 'solving' moral problems? Indeed, can moral problems be *solved* at all? Is not the emphasis on 'problem solving' largely a response to the increasing demands which are being made on schools to train pupils for life in a technological society? To what extent is such training justifiable? While it may be replied that the answers to these questions have their place in another text, nevertheless teachers must grapple with such theoretical considerations, and additional arguments must be offered in its support before problem solving can be regarded as a central focus of the primary school curriculum.[24]

Robert Fisher is a firm supporter of the notion of children's philosophy. Indeed, his latest book contains a chapter on the topic, including an excerpt from the dialogue on *akrasia* and animal rights cited above.[25] However, it seems to me that his desire to see problem-solving strategies permeate the curriculum may have precisely the opposite effect to that intended. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which an emphasis on Fisher's 'specific strategies' for problem solving is encouraged in schools (since the Government's educational policy is in broad agreement with them), while 'general thinking skills', including critical thinking, are either quietly passed over or else explicitly rejected. In this respect, 'problem solving' is very much like the notion of 'citizenship' which I discussed in chapter three. The danger is that both concepts may be used simply to achieve predetermined political ends, to the detriment of our children's education.

In examining the notion of 'education for citizenship', I suggested that any conception of such education which purports to be adequate must include the explicit teaching of thinking and valuing. This, then, is one route by which philosophy may be admitted into the primary school curriculum. Furthermore, as I have noted above, National Curriculum proposals for English constitute a second justification for such an innovation. As a preliminary to discussing the management of philosophical discussions, it should be noted that advocates of children's philosophy may draw on a further argument to support the introduction of philosophy into primary schools.

This derives from the recommendations made recently by Lord Elton and his colleagues in *Discipline in Schools*.[26] In November 1987, one of the smaller teacher unions, the Professional Association of Teachers, wrote to the Prime

Minister asking for the establishment of a committee of enquiry, whose task would be to examine discipline in schools. The Committee of Enquiry into Discipline in Schools came into being in March 1988 and had the following terms of reference: '"In view of public concern about violence and indiscipline in schools and the problems faced by the teaching profession today, to consider what action can be taken by central government, local authorities, voluntary bodies owning schools, governing bodies of schools, head teachers, teachers and parents to secure the orderly atmosphere necessary in schools for effective teaching and learning to take place."'[27]

The Committee of Enquiry began by asking four questions concerning the following:

    definitions of good behaviour and discipline (and their opposites)
    in the school context;

    the extent of any discipline problems in schools;

    the principal causes of these problems; and

    action which could be taken by relevant organisations and
    individuals to promote good behaviour in schools.[28]

The report, which was completed in approximately ten months, made a number of important recommendations. Let us look first of all at what was said about the National Curriculum. Members of the Committee declared that: 'Strong concerns have been expressed to us that the National Curriculum will make things worse for low achievers and will therefore lead to more disruption'.[29] While it was hoped that such misgivings will be shown to be unwarranted, they raised two important points. First of all, there is a relationship between pupils' behaviour and their motivation (or lack of it) to engage in the

schooling process. Secondly, curriculum content and teaching methods used can do much either to enhance or to stifle pupils' motivation. Consequently, Elton and his colleagues suggested 'that all parties involved in the planning, delivery and evaluation of the curriculum should recognise that the quality of its content and the teaching and learning methods through which it is delivered are important influences on pupils' behaviour'.[30]

Here we have a pragmatic justification for the introduction of philosophy into primary schools. If we take the children whom I taught as a sample group, it is clear that they found the philosophical content of the lessons to be new, exciting and stimulating. The methods by which philosophy is taught are also innovative. This is true insofar as most primary school children are unused, for example, to engaging in regular discussions which are seen to be meaningful in themselves, and which are not deemed to be valuable simply because they are a necessary first step towards a more 'important' activity - a *written* assignment. Indeed, the Elton Report supports the 'widespread use of "reasoning" with pupils, both in the classroom and outside it'.[31]

The means by which children are introduced to philosophical content are also varied. Stories, samples of reasoning, and diagrammatic representation are all used in an endeavour to promote open-ended discussion. These factors taken together are sufficient to indicate that, all other things being equal, philosophical content and methodology are highly unlikely to promote a classroom atmosphere in which discipline problems are evident.

This raises two issues, so far undiscussed, namely the management of philosophical discussions and the supervision of teachers of children's philosophy. As the idea that young children should study philosophy is a recent

one in British education, the success of this enterprise will depend crucially on the ability of teachers to initiate and sustain philosophical discussions in the classroom. Since encouraging children to philosophize is an activity with which most teachers are unfamiliar, the need to offer guidance in and supervision of their endeavour is evident. My purpose here will be to suggest ways in which teacher-educators may undertake this task.

In chapter three, I suggested that an appropriate definition of 'philosophy' is: a thorough endeavour to develop, clarify, justify and apply our thinking. Later, I referred to a sceptical teacher who might respond to the above definition by suggesting that teachers are already actively engaged in fostering children's thinking skills. Such a teacher might reasonably ask: what does philosophy offer us which is not already catered for by other subjects? My response to this was to suggest that neither logic nor ethics are studied in any systematic way in primary schools, or, indeed in the great majority of secondary schools.

Now it should be noted that the possibility of successful curriculum innovation is further impeded at this point, because teachers themselves have very little experience of these subjects. Undoubtedly, teacher training courses must take their share of the responsibility for this. The philosophical element in such courses often focuses on the ideas of 'the great educators'. The study of the works of Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, etc. should certainly be a feature of training programmes, at least to the extent that the relevance of such works for a teacher's classroom practice can be demonstrated. However, and more importantly, the supervisory role of the teacher-educator should also involve introducing students to the nature and purpose of logical and ethical reasoning.

In order to promote philosophy in schools, teachers must themselves become exponents of philosophical skills.

An essential prerequisite for the teaching of logical reasoning to children is that teachers should have a sound understanding of two different kinds of logic:

> One, exhibited through a progressive discovery of explicit rules, is that of formal deductive logic. This emphasizes the use of formal patterns of inference... and the importance of consistency, validity, and coherence for clear thinking. The second logic is a nonformal 'good reasons' approach that emphasizes seeking and assessing reasons for opinions, actions and beliefs, and the importance of using principles such as impartiality, objectivity, and respect for others in these searches.[32]

Once an easy familiarity with deductive and inductive logic has been gained, teachers can be introduced to materials for use in the classroom. Finally, they should be asked to devise their own materials.

As I noted in chapter three, a discussion of the nature of ethical reasoning focuses on questions such as: what is a moral judgement? How can a moral judgement be distinguished from, say, an argument motivated by self-interest? It is important to proceed in this manner because, while teachers often encourage children to discuss moral dilemmas, very seldom does this activity include any consideration of what is involved in making *moral* judgements. I usually introduce teachers to this topic by offering them a moral dilemma to discuss. For example:

A Problem Situation[33]

> A former pupil of mine told me that she had become secretary to a very rich man. She asked her employer what should be done with begging letters, and was told, 'Put them in the waste-paper basket. We have no time to verify them all, and you know the list of my charities, which I have thought out with care.' The employer had

a habit of stuffing a roll of bank notes into the pockets of any
suit he was wearing, and the secretary was constantly extracting
these bundles from suits being sent for cleaning. She handed them
to her employer, who always put them into his pocket, uncounted.
One morning, having nothing to do, my friend looked through the
begging letters before destroying them. One was a winner — fully
authenticated and making a good case for an immediate need of £700.
My friend had just fished a bundle of £50 notes out of a pair of
trousers. I said, 'Well, did you send the £700?' 'No!' 'Why not?'
'It wasn't my money.'

1. What would you do if you were in the secretary's place?

2. How would you justify your choice?

Opinion is usually divided about the course of action which the secretary

should take. This lack of unanimity indicates, as I suggested in chapter two,

that it is possible for individuals to disagree about moral judgements without

any participant in the debate necessarily being regarded as mistaken (or at

least not mistaken in the sense in which someone who asserted that "Rome is

the capital of France" would be mistaken).[34] However, while it may be argued

that there are no *right* answers in matters of morality, nevertheless it is

possible to distinguish moral arguments from those offered by people who act

from self-interest.

For example, someone answering the two questions above might have said: 'I

would return the money to the employer, because I do not believe that stealing

is justifiable under any circumstances.' Alternatively, that person might have

said: 'I would send the money, because the employer will not miss it and it will

improve the situation of the person who needs it.' These arguments derive from

two well-established traditions in moral philosophy, namely those of Kant and

the Utilitarians respectively.[35] They may be contrasted with statements such as:

'I would return the money, because the employer might give me a reward'; or 'I

would send the money to the needy person, because I would like him to do something for me in return'; which, motivated solely by a concern for personal gain, are not morally worthy arguments. It is this distinction to which we wish to draw children's attention when we discuss dilemmas such as the above.

As well as discussing examples of logical and ethical reasoning, children may also be introduced to more general philosophical problems. The teacher-educator must now allay the doubts of teachers who suggest that, lacking philosophical expertise, they may be unable to initiate and sustain discussions based on questions such as:

1. Were our noses made to help us to wear spectacles?

2. Can a chess computer think?

3. Do animals feel pain? How do you know?

4. Might it be possible for objects to disappear when no one is looking at them?

5. John says: 'I know that the sun will come up tomorrow.' Can John know this *today*?[36]

While it is certainly true that teachers will need to acquire from the teacher-educator knowledge of philosophical content and methodology in order to bring the best out of children in discussions, it should be noted that the questions which form the basis of such discussions are those which are asked by teachers in all areas of the curriculum:

1. Why?

2. If that is so, what follows?

3. Aren't you assuming that...?

4. How do you know that?

5. Is the point you are making that...?

6. Can I summarize your point as...?

7. Is what you mean to say that...?

8. What is your reason for saying that?

9. Doesn't what you say presuppose that...?

10. What do you mean when using this word?

11. Is it possible that...?

12. Are there other ways of looking at it?

13. How else could we view this matter?[37]

As has been suggested in chapter four, when we encourage children to think philosophically, we help them to become members of (and to participate in) a 'community of inquiry'. In introducing teachers to the notion of a 'community of inquiry', the teacher-educator should ask them to determine which of the following are characteristic of such a community:

1. Criticizing the person who makes a remark, rather than what that person said.

2. Giving reasons for opinions.

3. Readiness to provide the evidence on which a 'statement of fact' is based.

4. Ignoring other people's views when they are inconsistent with one's own.

5. Concern that inferences [do] not violate the principles of logic.

6. Concern that opinions [should] not be expressed if they

seem to be unpatriotic.

7. Offering to drop one's views if they are inconsistent
   with everyone else's.

8. Suggesting ways in which one another's hypotheses can be
   tested.

9. Avoiding the dragging-out of discussions by always
   insisting on a vote.

10. Welcoming fresh generalizations and hypotheses with which
    to explain the evidence, provided no one present is offended.[38]

In order to foster a community of inquiry in the classroom, certain practical considerations must be taken into account. In this regard, the role of the teacher-educator is an advisory one: he outlines certain scenarios and makes certain recommendations which teachers may accept or reject depending on their applicability to individual classroom settings. For example, teachers will have to consider factors such as children's seating arrangements, tolerable noise levels and possible interruptions from outside the classroom, etc.[39] Most importantly, they must decide what are to be 'the rules of the game', i.e. those regulations of which teachers feel it is necessary that children should be made aware *before* discussion begins.

One argument suggests that teachers should not enforce *any* rules prior to the beginning of a session. On this view, children who are not told by the teacher that it is inconsiderate to speak when someone else is speaking, or to interrupt someone who is making a contribution, will come to realize that such behaviour is unwarranted when they begin to speak and are prevented from continuing by others. While the rationale for this argument may be sound, the teacher faces the prospect of wasting much valuable time while children

'discover' what is appropriate/inappropriate behaviour. Rather, it may seem preferable for the teacher to introduce some simple rules, prior to discussions taking place, in order to circumvent this problem.[40]

In an article entitled 'The Practice of Philosophy in the Elementary School Classroom', Michael Whalley notes a number of factors which may help to determine whether teachers are successful in promoting and sustaining philosophical discussions.[41] Important among these are the qualities of 'flexibility' (e.g. not working from a rigid, pre-determined conception of how a session should progress);[42] 'patience' (e.g. allowing children sufficient time to reflect on and to articulate their ideas); and 'toleration'. On this latter quality, Whalley suggests that:

> It goes without saying that genuine inquiry can take place only in
> an atmosphere of intellectual freedom, where any point of view can
> be considered for which reasons are offered... It is very hard to
> do one's best thinking under pressure, and if genuine inquiry is
> taking place the children will appear at the same time relaxed and
> excited, rather than rigid or strained. To put it briefly, they
> will be enjoying themselves.[43]

We can ask no more of philosophy or of its teachers than to accomplish this.

In conclusion, we must ask whether philosophy is to be introduced into primary schools as a distinct subject, to be viewed as intrinsically worthwhile; or whether it is to be integrated into the curriculum and valued for its instrumental benefits: its ability to make children more reflective and critical about subjects such as history, science, etc. My own view is that one should regard the study of philosophy as having both intrinsic and extrinsic worth. If such study can lead to greater academic achievement in other subjects, then its integration into the curriculum should be welcomed. However, as Lipman and Sharp suggest: 'whatever the specific form [children's] philosophical activity

may take, not to encourage them to work with ideas and to cherish them for

their own sake is to be educationally irresponsible'.[44]

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Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery

Chapter One

It probably wouldn't have happened if Harry hadn't fallen asleep in science class that day. Well, he didn't really fall asleep either. His mind just wandered off. The teacher, Mr. Bradley, had been talking about the solar system, and how the planets revolve around the sun, and Harry just stopped listening, because all at once he had the picture in his mind of the great, flaming sun and all the little planets spinning steadily around it.

Suddenly, Harry knew that Mr. Bradley was looking directly at him. Harry tried to clear his mind so that he could pay attention to the words of the question: 'What is it that has a long tail and revolves about the sun once every 77 years?'

Harry realized that he had no idea of the answer Mr. Bradley expected. A long tail? For a moment he played with the idea of saying 'a dog star' (he had just read in the encyclopedia that Sirius was called the 'Dog star'), but he was afraid Mr. Bradley wouldn't find such an answer amusing.

Mr. Bradley didn't have much of a sense of humour, but he was extremely patient. Harry knew he had a few moments, which might be just enough time to figure out something to say. 'All planets revolve about the sun,' he recalled Mr. Bradley saying. And this thing with the tail, whatever it was, also goes around the sun. Could it also be a planet? It seemed worth a try. 'A planet?' he asked rather doubtfully.

He wasn't prepared for the laughter from the class. If he'd been paying attention, he would have heard Mr. Bradley say that the object he was referring to was Halley's comet and that comets go around the sun just as planets do, but they are definitely *not* planets.

Fortunately the bell rang just then, signalling the end of school for the day. But as Harry walked home, he still felt badly about not having been able to answer when Mr. Bradley called on him.

Also, he was puzzled. How had he gone wrong? He went back over the way he had tried to figure out the answer. 'All planets revolve about the sun,' Mr. Bradley had said, very distinctly. And this thing with the tail also revolves about the sun, only, it *isn't* a planet.

'So there are things that revolve around the sun that aren't planets,' Harry said to himself. 'All planets revolve about the sun, but not everything that revolves about the sun is a planet.'

And then Harry had an idea. 'A sentence can't be reversed. If you put the last part of a sentence first, it'll no longer be true. For example, take the sentence, "All oaks are trees." If you turn it around, it becomes "All trees are oaks." But that's false. Now, it's true that "All planets revolve about the sun." But if you turn the sentence around and say, "All things that revolve about the sun are planets," then it's no longer true - it's false!'

His idea so fascinated him that he decided to try it out with a few examples.

First he thought of the sentence, 'All model aeroplanes are toys.' I guess that's true, he reflected. Now let's turn it around: 'All toys are model aeroplanes.' When reversed, the sentence was false! Harry was delighted!

He tried another sentence: 'All cucumbers are vegetables.' (Harry was particularly fond of cucumbers.) But the reverse didn't follow at all. All vegetables are cucumbers? Of course not!

Harry was thrilled with his discovery. If he'd only known it this afternoon, he might have avoided that awful embarrassment!

Then he saw Lisa.

Lisa was also in his class at school, but somehow he didn't think she had been one of the kids who had laughed at him. And it seemed to him that if he told her what he'd found out, she'd be able to understand.

'Lisa, I've just had a funny idea!' Harry announced rather loudly.

Lisa smiled at him and looked at him expectantly.

'When you turn sentences around, they're no longer true!' Harry said.

Lisa wrinkled her nose. 'What's so wonderful about that?' she asked. .

'O.K.,' said Harry, 'give me a sentence, any sentence, and I'll show you.'

'But what kind of sentence?' Lisa looked doubtful. 'I can't just think up any old sentence offhand.'

'Well,' said Harry, 'a sentence with two kinds of things in it, like dogs and cats, or ice cream cones and food, or astronauts and people.'

Lisa thought. Then just as she was about to say something, and Harry was waiting impatiently for her to come out with it, she shook her head and thought some more.

'Come on, two things, any two things,' begged Harry.

Finally Lisa made up her mind. 'No eagles are lions,' she announced.

Harry pounced on the sentence the way his cat, Mario, would pounce on a ball of string that had been rolled towards him. In an instant, Harry had the

sentence reversed: 'No lions are eagles.' He was stunned. The first sentence, 'No eagles are lions,' had been true. But so was the sentence when reversed, for 'No lions are eagles' was also true!

Harry couldn't understand why it hadn't worked. 'It worked before...' he started to say aloud, but he couldn't finish the sentence.

Lisa looked at him wonderingly. Why had she given him such a stupid sentence, Harry thought, with a flash of resentment. But then it occurred to him that, if he had really figured out a rule, it should have worked on stupid sentences as well as on sentences that weren't stupid. So, it really wasn't Lisa's fault.

For the second time that day, Harry felt that he had somehow failed. His only comfort was that Lisa wasn't laughing at him.

'I really thought I had it,' he said to her. 'I really thought I had it.'

'You tried it out?' she asked. Her grey eyes, set wide apart, were clear and serious.

'Of course. I took sentences like 'All planets revolve about the sun,' and 'All model aeroplanes are toys,' and 'All cucumbers are vegetables,' and I found that when the last part was put first, the sentences were no longer true.'

'But the sentence I gave you wasn't like yours,' Lisa replied quickly. 'Every one of your sentences began with the word "All." But my sentence began with the word "No".'

Lisa was right! But could that have made the difference? There was only one thing to do: try some more sentences that begin with the word 'No.'

'If it's true that "No submarines are kangaroos",' Harry began, 'then what about "No kangaroos are submarines"?'

'Also true,' replied Lisa. 'And if "No mosquitoes are lollipops," then it's true that "No lollipops are mosquitoes".'

'That's it!' said Harry, excitedly, 'That's it! If a true sentence begins with the word "No," then its reverse is also true. But if it begins with the word "All," then its reverse is false.'

Harry was so grateful to Lisa for her help that he hardly knew what to say. He wanted to thank her, but instead he just mumbled something and ran the rest of the way home.

He made a bee-line for the kitchen, but when he got there, he found his mother standing in front of the refrigerator talking to her neighbour, Mrs. Olson. Harry didn't want to interrupt, so he stood there for a moment, listening to the conversation.

Mrs. Olson was saying, 'Let me tell you something, Mrs. Stottlemeier. That Mrs. Bates, who just joined the PTA, every day I see her go into the liquor store. Now, you know how concerned I am about those unfortunate people who just can't stop drinking. Every day, I see them go into the liquor store. Well, that makes me wonder whether Mrs. Bates is, you know...'

'Whether Mrs. Bates is like them?' Harry's mother asked politely.

Mrs. Olson nodded. Suddenly something in Harry's mind went 'CLICK!'

'Mrs. Olson,' he said, 'just because, according to you, *all people who can't stop drinking* are *people who go to the liquor store*, that doesn't mean that *all people who go to the liquor store* are *people who can't stop drinking.*'

'Harry,' said his mother, 'this is none of your business, and besides, you're interrupting.'

But Harry could tell by the expression on his mother's face that she was
pleased with what he'd said. So he quietly got his glass of milk and sat down
to drink it, feeling happier than he had felt in days.

From Lipman, M., *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*, The First Mountain Foundation,
New Jersey, 1982.

APPENDIX 2

Leading Idea 1: The process of inquiry

With the reading of *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*, the children in your

class are beginning to explore the world of ideas. This is not just a series of

intellectual adventures. Harry and his friends investigate the world of ideas in

a systematic fashion. They engage in forms of *inquiry*.

When you first read Chapter One, the methodical and systematic character

of what the children in the novel are doing may not be apparent to you. You see

them struggling and floundering. But what is happening is not haphazard. They

are going through a series of stages typical of a great many cases of discovery

and invention. These stages are the *process of inquiry*.

Inquiry often begins when problems arise regarding things which till then

had been taken for granted. With this begins the process of inquiry and it does

not terminate until a more satisfactory solution replaces the one that has

become unsatisfactory.

The procedure of the children in Chapter One outlines a process of

inquiry. The stages of this process can be characterized as follows:

The Process of Inquiry in Outline

1. Feeling of difficulty or frustation

   Mr. Bradley asks, 'What has a long tail and revolves about the sun once
   every 77 years?'
   Harry replies, 'a planet.'
   The class laughs. Harry is embarrassed.

2. Doubt (What went wrong?)

   Harry *knew* that the sentence 'all planets revolve around the sun' was *true*.

Therefore, he figured, this thing with a tail must also revolve about the sun. But this, he found out, was *false*. How come?

3. Formulation of the problem (or, 'defining the problem')

Harry: 'All planets revolve about the sun, but not everything that revolves about the sun is a planet.'
Harry realizes he had been assuming that just because all planets revolve about the sun, everything that revolves about the sun has to be a planet; in effect, he had been assuming that sentences are reversible.

4. Hypothesis (making up a theory)

Harry: 'A sentence can't be reversed. If you put the last part of a sentence first, it'll no longer be true!'

5. First efforts to test hypothesis (figuring out *logical* consequences)

Harry experiments with some sample sentences:

a. 'All model aeroplanes are toys' (true) when reversed becomes 'All toys are model aeroplanes.' (false)
b. 'All cucumbers are vegetables' (true) when reversed becomes 'All vegetables are cucumbers.' (false)

6. Discovery of evidence which contradicts hypothesis (counter-instance)

Lisa offers the sentence 'No eagles are lions' (true), which, when reversed, becomes 'No lions are eagles.' (also true)

7. Revising the hypothesis to account for contradictory evidence

Lisa suggests that sentences beginning with 'No' stay true when reversed; testing proceeds with sample sentences:

a. 'No submarines are kangaroos.'
b. 'No mosquitoes are lollipops.'

8. Application of revised hypothesis to life situation (finding *practical* consequences)

Harry intervenes in the discussion between his mother and Mrs. Olson, claiming that Mrs. Olson's reasoning about Mrs. Bates is incorrect.

From Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M. and Oscanyan, F. S. (Eds.), *Philosophical Inquiry*, University Press of America, Lanham, 1984, p. 4.

APPENDIX 3

DISCUSSION PLAN: The Process of Inquiry

1. What is Harry's first idea about reversing sentences?

2. What is the rule about reversing sentences that Harry and Lisa discover together?

3. How does Harry get his first idea about reversing sentences?

4. Can you remember the steps in Harry's reasoning that led him to this discovery?

5. On the blackboard, write down as many steps as you remember in their correct sequence.

6. Do you think any of the steps could have been eliminated or were all of them necessary for Harry's discovery?

7. How do Harry and Lisa come to make their discovery of the rule for reversing sentences?

8. Can you remember the steps in Harry's or Lisa's reasoning that led them to their discovery?

9. On the blackboard, write down as many steps as you remember in their correct sequence.

10. Do you think any of the steps could have been eliminated or were all of them necessary for Harry's and Lisa's discovery?

11. Now look at the two lists of steps on the blackboard. Can you make a discovery about making discoveries?

Lisa

Chapter One

Episode One - *Can We Both Love Animals and Eat Them?*

'Take it back!' Lisa wanted to say to her parents. 'Take it back wherever you bought it!' She sat in front of her new birthday gift, a dressing table with a row of little lights around the mirror, just like in theatre dressing rooms. 'They might as well have said to me, "Here, make yourself beautiful!"' Lisa thought. She was sure she'd never be beautiful, no way.

But she'd accepted the gift with a murmured 'Gee, thanks,' and now she found herself searching her face in the glass.

'Every feature's just wrong,' she groaned to herself. 'Nothing's right. The forehead's too high, the eyes are too far apart, the mouth's too wide, and the nose tilts up too much. And look at these teeth - spaced apart like pickets!' She was even annoyed that her ears were just the slightest bit pointed at the tops. Suddenly she grinned, as she remembered her father saying earlier that day, 'Y'know, Lisa, with your features, you should have been a fawn.' She was still amused by the thought when her mother entered the room. And Mrs. Terry smiled too, guessing that Lisa had been using the dressing table. 'Dinner's ready,' she said softly.

Lisa loved roast chicken, and this chicken was especially well roasted, so that the meat fell away from the bone while Lisa's father was carving. He knew how much she liked drumsticks, so he gave her one. It was wonderfully tender and juicy.

The thought crossed her mind of how Mickey had been trying to tease her the other day in school. 'Lisa Terry eats dead chicken,' he'd said. But Lisa hadn't gotten angry. She just laughed and replied, 'Anybody who doesn't like chicken - at least the way my mother makes it - must be absolutely crazy!' She passed her plate for another drumstick.

After dinner, Lisa went outside. She had hardly reached the sidewalk when Mr. Johnson came along with his dog on a leash. Mr. Johnson was new to the neighbourhood; Lisa really didn't know him at all. When he and the dog got in front of Lisa's house, the dog spotted a squirrel by a tree and started after it. Mr. Johnson pulled up on the leash and the dog went sprawling. Then it was up again, growling and straining after the squirrel which had disappeared behind the tree. Mr. Johnson started to walk on, but the dog stayed put. The more the leash was pulled and yanked, the more the dog resisted. Mr. Johnson called to his dog, he shouted at it, but the dog did not move. Finally he picked up a small switch from a nearby bush and began to hit the dog which crouched, motionless, absorbing the blows. Lisa stared at the two of them in horror. She couldn't even cry out. Suddenly she sprang forward and tried to grab the switch. 'You stop doing that!' she commanded furiously. Surprised, Mr. Johnson snatched the switch clear and turned, saying: 'What's it to you?' Beside herself with rage, she blurted out, 'I'm a dog too!' He shrugged his shoulders and began pulling on the leash again. Now the dog ended its resistance and began walking alongside Mr. Johnson; soon they were out of sight.

In school next day, Randy Garlock said, 'Boy, did I have a great time this weekend! My father took me duck hunting.'

'Takes lotsa guts to hunt ducks,' said Mark sarcastically. 'They're always so heavily armed.'

'Very funny,' Randy replied.

'You don't even eat those birds, so why do you kill them?' Mark persisted.

'There's too many of them,' Randy snapped. 'Unless hunters kill off the oversupply, there'll be ducks all over the place.'

'Sure, sure. I'll bet it's only the hunters who claim to have counted how many there are, and who've decided there are too many, just so they can keep shooting them. I'll bet the hunters will keep on killing animals until they're all wiped out.'

'So what?' put in Mickey. 'Good riddance.'

'People got a right to hunt,' Randy said to Mark. 'It's in the Constitution.'

'The Constitution doesn't say anything about hunting,' Mark retorted. 'It just says that men have a right to bear arms for purposes of defence. Next you'll be telling me that people have the right to hunt whatever they like, even other people. I once saw a movie like that, and I've never forgotten it.'

'That's ridiculous!' Randy retorted. 'Killing people is altogether different from killing animals.'

'But if we can exterminate animals because we say there are too many of them, what's to keep us from exterminating people because we think there's too many of them?'

Lisa had been listening to the conversation without saying anything. But now she remarked, 'Right, because once we get in the habit of killing animals, we may find it hard to stop when it comes to people.'

Randy shook his head vigorously. 'People and animals are completely different. It doesn't matter what you do to animals, but you just have to remember you shouldn't do the same things to people.'

The conversation drifted off to other topics, but Lisa was troubled. 'Why is it,' she asked herself, 'that everything looks so simple, and then when you start talking about it, it always turns out to be so difficult? Mark's right: it's horrible the way we slaughter animals all the time. But in order to eat them, we have to kill them first. I don't understand – how can I be against killing birds and animals, when I love roast chicken and roast beef so much? Shouldn't I refuse to touch such food? Oh, I'm so confused!'

Lisa's father was in his study, listening to his stereo. She sat down on a hassock alongside his lounging chair, waiting for the music to end. (When she would sit like that in class, with her knees drawn up to her chin and her long hair falling down straight behind her, she looked, Harry Stottlemeier once remarked, like the letter M.)

'Beethoven,' said Mr. Terry.

Lisa said nothing.

'String quartet,' said Mr. Terry.

Again Lisa said nothing. But she thought to herself, 'He knows I can't tell one piece of music from the next. But I remember everything he tells me; I just wish he'd tell me more.' Then she remembered her problem. 'Maybe I should become a vegetarian,' she concluded, after telling her father about the conversation with Randy, Mickey and Mark.

'And you've got two reasons, as I understand you. First, you feel sorry for animals. And second, you believe that if you can kill animals, you might think killing human beings is O.K.'

'That's right. But are my reasons any good? Randy said they weren't.'

'Oh? Why was that?'

'He said animals have to be killed off because there are too many of them. And he also said that if we didn't have animals to kill, we'd be even more likely to kill people than we are now.'

'Did Randy claim that animals have no feelings?'

'He didn't say one way or the other.'

'Do you believe that animals have a right to live?'

'Oh, daddy, how should I know? Animal rights? I never heard of such a thing.'

Lisa's father regarded her soberly. 'Your mother's calling you,' he remarked. Lisa twisted her arms in front of her and interlaced her fingers backwards, then undid them. She stretched and bounded out of the room, her father watching her mildly until she was out of sight, down the long hall into the kitchen.

*   *   *

'Hey, Fran,' Lisa called out, 'what d'ya think? Do animals have rights?

'You've got to be kidding,' Fran laughed. 'No one wants to admit that people have rights, so who's going to admit anything about animals? Besides, I can just

see myself some day as a lawyer in court representing a cat whose tail has been stepped on.'

'And what about kids?' put in Mark. 'Do they have rights?'

'Kids!' Fran laughed again. 'They're halfway between people and animals! That's the way some people think.'

'Kids get rights when they grow up,' commented Bill Beck.

'Naw,' said Mark. 'You've got rights the moment you're born. You've got a right to be fed and clothed. You've got a right to medicine and a right to an education. You've got a lot of rights if you're a kid.'

'But what about animals?' insisted Lisa. 'Do they have a right not to be killed and eaten?'

Bill replied, 'It's their right to kill us and eat us if they can catch us, and it's our right to kill them and eat them if we can catch them.' .

'Does the same go for killing people?' Harry asked. 'Is it just being able to catch them that gives us the right to kill them?'

'Sure thing,' answered Bill. 'And when it happens, we call it war, and then it's O.K.'

That evening, Harry cornered his father before Mr. Stottlemeier could unfold his evening newspaper.

'Dad, what d'you think? Should people eat animals?'

'Only when cooked. Raw, they're not too nice.'

'Dad, c'mon now. The guys at school today were talking about it. Wouldn't it be better if everyone stopped eating meat?'

'What's the matter? Is there a meat shortage?'

'No, but maybe it's wrong to kill animals just to eat them.'

'If you want people to stop eating fish and meat, you'd better be sure you have other kinds of food ready for them.'

'That's easy. Grow more grains and vegetables.'

'Easier said than done.'

'Maybe there are too many people.' The moment Harry said it, he was uneasy. He recalled Randy's remark about the need to kill ducks because there were too many of them. Harry shook his head. 'I don't understand. There are too many things to be taken into account.'

'Well,' replied his father, 'but you want to see the whole picture don't you? So you have to take everything into account.'

'Everything?'

'Sure, either you think it's O.K. to kill animals and eat them, or you don't. You've got to take all the facts into consideration: what happens if we eat them, and what happens if we don't?'

'So what should we do?'

Mr. Stottlemeier unfolded his newspaper. 'Wouldn't you say that what we are to do depends a lot on what sort of world we want to live in?'

'I guess so.'

'So that's my answer. Something may look wrong to do, but then when you take everything into account, it may look O.K. Or just the other way 'round: it may first look O.K., but then look wrong, all things considered.'

Harry looked out the window for a moment. Then he remarked, rather slowly, 'Y'know, there are drugs in school. Everybody knows about them. Everybody knows who has them and how to get them. The kids who get hooked are really in bad shape lots of the time. But the ones who provide the drugs don't feel they're

doing anything wrong.' Mr. Stottlemeier nodded agreement, and Harry continued, 'And the ones who supply the sellers, they can't see anything wrong with what *they* do, like carrying the stuff in their cars. And the ones who grow the stuff say why pick on me, I'm not doing nothin'.'

'They may not want to look at the whole picture.'

'But even if they did,' Harry wondered, 'would they act any different?'

'That's a good question,' replied Mr. Stottlemeier, and settled back to read his paper.

Harry wasn't satisfied. 'Dad, just one more question. Look, we're supposed to be generous, aren't we?'

'O.K.'

'Well, the other day a kid I know asked me to lend him some money, and I happened to have just the amount he needed. Should I have been generous and lent it to him?'

'What do you think?'

'Well, I happened to know what he wanted it for. It was to buy drugs.'

'So would you really have helped him out if you gave him the money?'

'I guess not.'

'And is giving always right, regardless of the circumstances?'

'I guess you've got to take the circumstances into account.'

'All things considered,' said Mr. Stottlemeier, settling back once again into his chair, 'I'm determined to read my paper.' From the way he said it, Harry knew he meant it.

*　　　　*　　　　*

'Maybe I don't really care about animals after all,' said Lisa.

'She's off again,' commented Fran.

'No, I mean it,' Lisa replied. 'If I really cared about them, I wouldn't eat them. But I do eat them. So I don't really care about them.'

'I wish the only problem I ever had was whether or not to eat a plateful of roast chicken,' laughed Fran.

'No, Lisa's got a point,' said Harry. 'How can she say one thing and do another? Shouldn't our thoughts agree with what we do? Shouldn't our actions agree with what we believe?'

'That's right!' exclaimed Tony. 'Everything should fit together - the way we think and the way we live - it should all connect.'

'I don't know,' said Harry, shaking his head. 'Maybe that's going too far.'

No one had anything to add, and in a few moments Fran and Lisa were whispering to each other.

Then Mickey came over with Bill Beck. Everyone tried to be humorous, but after a while the jokes began turning into a steady patter of friendly insults.

When Bill teased Fran, it was on the tip of Fran's tongue to say something sarcastic about Bill's sister. But then she caught herself with the recollection that Bill's sister was actually several grades behind other kids of the same age.

In Fran's behalf, however, Lisa said to Bill, 'Ah, go on, your mother takes in washing!'

Bill walked away. But Mickey was furious. 'Why did you say a thing like that to him?'

Lisa looked at Mickey wonderingly. 'Like what?'

'You know very well! About his mother taking in washing.'

'Nothing wrong with taking in washing,' said Fran. 'Lots of people I know do. It's a perfectly honest thing to do. You against people who work hard, maybe?'

But Lisa was aghast. 'I didn't know it was true!' she wailed.

'Aw, c'mon, Lisa,' Fran said consolingly, 'I don't think Bill really minded.'

'I'll bet he did!' Mickey insisted. 'How would you like it if some snob talked about what your parents do?'

Fran shrugged. 'I'd say let them. They'd be wasting their breath.'

But Mickey wouldn't let the matter drop. 'Isn't it bad enough that Bill's father got killed in the war? Sure his mother gets a pension, but it isn't a lot. She works in a hotel cleaning up, and to make ends meet she does laundry for some of the guests there. Boy, isn't it just like you to make fun of her, Lisa!'

Lisa was speechless. Nothing Fran could say could comfort her. 'If only I'd known,' she said to herself over and over again, 'I'd have taken it into account and I wouldn't have said what I did. It doesn't matter that he may not have felt hurt. I shouldn't have said it.' Yet, in the midst of her misery, a half-humorous thought crossed her mind – that next time she'd not speak until she was sure that what she had to say was totally false!

But she couldn't shake off the feeling of having done something shameful, even though she'd intended Bill no harm. Then she began to wonder if she might really have meant to hurt Bill. 'But why would I have wanted to do such a thing? He's always been nice to me. And he sure has enough troubles of his own already – he doesn't need me making any more for him.' Then it occurred to her

that these might have been the very same reasons for her having tried to wound him. The thought made her shudder.

That evening, Lisa wouldn't leave her room to come to dinner. Her parents insisted, but she refused so stubbornly that they finally left her alone. The aroma of roast beef mounted the stairs and managed to reach her where she lay face down on her bed. It smelled so delicious that it both added to her torment and to her satisfaction, for she felt that if she denied herself supper, especially a roast beef supper, she would somehow atone for what she'd done.

But it didn't seem to help very much, even though she writhed on the bed when she thought of the roast carrots and onions, and the gravy making a pool in the mashed potatoes. She felt a bit better only when she resolved to try, in the future, to be more considerate before she did or said anything that might hurt someone else's feelings. 'I wish I could also resolve to make what I do agree with what I think. But it would mean giving up roast beef and roast chicken! What's the sense of making a promise to myself that I don't intend to keep?'

She was proud of herself for not having the roast beef dinner. But that night, before she went to sleep, she really cleaned out the refrigerator.

From Lipman, M., *Lisa*, Second Edition, The First Mountain Foundation, New Jersey, 1983.

Leading Idea No. 1: How are we to live?

Very small children usually do not ponder the question, 'How are we to live?' They tend to deal with life on a day-to-day basis without feeling any need to develop a general strategy. However, by the time that some children reach the 7th grade [at twelve years of age], they begin to feel a need to plan a path of life for themselves. So many questions suddenly press upon them that they often find themselves bewildered and overwhelmed. Children perceive a great many examples of ways of life which they reject for themselves, but they're not sure what they do want for themselves. If they become despairing enough, they often turn to pat or superficial ways of resolving their perplexities.

Above all, children are fascinated by the very general question of what the good life is. To raise this question and to attempt to answer it in an impartial and objective fashion constitutes ethical inquiry. Inquiry, however, is seldom a solitary matter. It is generally pursued by groups of individuals with similar objectives, individuals who share information with one another, respect each other's views and opinions, offer reasons for their views, willingly consider alternatives and attempt to construct together a reasonable understanding of the ways in which human beings could be said to live well. When such a group reflects in a self-corrective manner upon ethical issues, it can be called a community of ethical inquiry. The formation of such a community should be the objective of each group which undertakes the *Lisa* programme and

to facilitate the formation of such a group is the primary role of a teacher of the *Lisa* programme.

To read and discuss *Lisa* with one's classmates is to have an opportunity to sort out the myriad of problems which make up ethics and to attempt to determine with some kind of coherence and consistency what the important issues are and how one may go about resolving them. One should not expect from *Lisa* a handbook of answers for young people. Rather, an exploration of *Lisa* in a dialogical manner enables one to recognize the factors which have to be taken into account in constructing one's own ethical outlook. A course in *Lisa* should also provide the student with an understanding of the procedures which have been found useful in analyzing and resolving ethical predicaments. To be able to identify these procedures is one of the major objectives of ethical inquiry. Nevertheless, real-life problems seldom yield to ready-made strategies. Consequently, it is up to each individual to decide eventually how and when to put these procedures into practice and thus to decide how he or she is to live.

From Lipman, M. and Sharp, A. M., *Ethical Inquiry*, Second Edition, University Press of America, Lanham, 1985, p. 1.

APPENDIX 6

DISCUSSION PLAN: How are we to live?

1. What are the things you like doing most?

2. What are the things that matter most to you in your life?

3. When you grow up, will you still like doing the same things?

4. When you grow up, will the same things seem important to you?

5. Are you happy?

6. Would you like to be happy when you grow up?

7. Are there things that matter more to you than happiness?

8. Is it possible to be perfectly happy?

9. Could you be perfectly happy in a world where everyone else was suffering?

10. Could you be happy, even though you did things that caused innocent creatures to suffer?

11. Would you rather do things that caused other people pleasure, or things that relieved other people's pain?

12. Would you like to live in a way that would help make the world better?

13. Could you be happy if you didn't have a single friend?

14. Could you be happy if everything around you was ugly?

15. Could you be happy if everyone you knew constantly lied and tried to deceive each other?

16. Could you be happy if you couldn't understand anything that happened to you?

17. Would you mind living in a way that seemed right to everyone else, but which seemed wrong to you?

18. Would you mind living in a way that seemed wrong to everyone else, but which seemed right to you?

From Lipman, M. and Sharp, A. M., *Ethical Inquiry*, Second Edition, University
Press of America, Lanham, 1985, p. 3.

DISCUSSION PLAN: When should we call things 'good'?

1. If you *like* something, does that make it good?

2. If a lot of people *like* something, does that make it good?

3. If you *prefer* apples to oranges, does that make apples better than oranges?

4. If you *want* something, must the thing you want therefore be good?

5. If you don't *want* something, must that thing be bad or worthless?

6. Is it possible to *like* something that's bad?

7. Is it possible to *know* something's bad, and still like it?

8. If something is good, does that guarantee people will like it?

9. If something is good, does that guarantee people will prefer it to something bad?

10. If people *know* that something is good, and know the reasons *why* it is good, is it possible they could still dislike it?

11. Can something be good, even though there are lots of things that are better?

12. Can something be bad, even though there are lots of things that are worse?

13. Do you think that, if you fully understood the reasons why one thing was better than another, you might still want the worse thing?

14. Could something be valuable, even though no one valued it?

15. Could something be desirable, even though no one desired it?

16. Could a person whom no one liked still be likable?

17. Which would you prefer, something worthless that everyone wanted, or something valuable that no one wanted?

18. Which things should we call 'good', those that are *desired*, or those that are *desirable*?

From Lipman, M. and Sharp, A. M., *Ethical Inquiry*, Second Edition, University Press of America, Lanham, 1985, p. 4.

Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing

There were once three children. They were called Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing. They lived in the kingdom of a very harsh king, King Extrawork.

Now, King Extrawork was always imposing rules on his subjects. For example, if they wore black shoes in public, he would remind them of his rule: 'No wearing of black shoes in public,' and give them a heavy fine and some extra work. If they made bubbles with their chewing gum, he would remind them of his rule: 'No blowing bubbles with chewing gum,' and give them a heavy fine and extra work. So it went on: 'No reading books on Saturdays,' 'No riding bicycles on Wednesdays' and 'No "quarter-pounders" or milk shakes on *any* day of the week.'

At last Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing got fed up and decided to leave the Kingdom of King Extrawork and to live on their own completely without rules. 'We won't have any rules whatsoever,' they said, 'and so we will always be happy.' So they set up home together in the kingdom of King Eversonice, where there were no rules whatsoever. When they went to Eversonice Primary School, there were no rules to be obeyed: the childen were not asked to study anything at all. Some children played marbles all week long. The teachers never gave tests, or extra work, and they never marked books. There were no exams because the children in the school said that they did not like them. In class discussions all the children shouted at once, and all the teachers smiled because there was no rule which said that children should be polite.

For a couple of days, Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing thought their school was a very good school but then they grew tired of playing marbles and longed for some real work to do. But, when they tried to tell the teacher this, they could not be heard because the other children were shouting. And all the time their teacher smiled.

One of the children in the class saw that Knowlittle had a big red apple, and he grabbed it and ate it in one mouthful. Knowlittle ran to his teacher and told him but the teacher said this was allowed because there was no rule forbidding stealing. When it came to lunch time, several children pushed in front of Knowless in the dinner queue. Knowless complained to the dinner lady but she told him that there was no rule which said that pushing in was forbidden. And when it came to home time and the school bell rang, all the children rushed for the door without waiting to be told, and Knownothing was crushed in the battle which took place to get out.

'That's a terrible school,' said Knowlittle. 'Everyone does what they want.' 'I think the kingdom of King Eversonice isn't as good as we thought,' said Knowless. 'To have no rules is as bad as having bad rules. I wish there was a kingdom where the people had *some* good rules to live by, so that they could live together sensibly.' 'But where can we find such a place?' said Knownothing. 'I know one thing,' said Knowless, 'I'm not going back to that school. Let's leave this kingdom and look for somewhere new to live right away.'

So they did. Do you think they found such a kingdom? What *good* rules would such a kingdom have?

The Snow Queendom

Having left the kingdom of King Eversonice, Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing began their search for a kingdom where people have some good rules by which to live. After many hours of travelling, they saw a sign which said: 'Snow Queendom: 1 mile.' 'I'm starving,' said Knownothing disgruntled. 'If we hurry,' said Knowless, 'we will arrive at the Snow Queendom in time for tea, I think.' 'You're right!' exclaimed Knowlittle.

So they began walking more quickly and very soon they were approaching the city walls, which glistened in the distance. As Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing walked up to the entrance of the Snow Queendom, they noticed that its walls were all made of ice. Suddenly, enormous snow-flakes began to fall gently from the sky. One snow-flake landed directly on Knownothing's head and melted instantly, soaking him to the skin. He seemed totally confused and stood quite still. 'Quick Knownothing, let's run before we all get wet!' said Knowlittle.

They ran through the gates, along the narrow streets, which were covered with ice, until they came to a large building which was made of snow. 'This looks like a hotel,' said Knowlittle. 'Perhaps we can get some tea here,' added Knowless. Knownothing touched an ice-cube on the front door and a ringing noise could be heard inside, which made him jump back in fright. 'I've never seen a door-bell made of ice before,' said Knowlittle.

After a few moments, a woman answered the door. 'Yes?' she asked, 'What can I do for you?' 'We have travelled a long way and we are very thirsty,' said Knowlittle. 'We were wondering whether you would be good enough to make us some

hot tea.' _Hot_ tea?" said the woman in amazement. 'What a silly child! Don't you

know that this is the Snow Queendom? We only serve _cold_ drinks at this hotel!'

'Well, a cold drink is better than no drink at all,' said Knowless cautiously.

'Very well. Come inside,' said the woman. 'Be sure to close the door. The heat is

making me shiver. If I'm not careful, I'll soon be getting a hot.' 'You mean a

cold,' said Knowlittle. 'No, silly child,' said the woman. 'In the Snow Queendom

we keep out the heat, otherwise we get a hot!'

Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing were all puzzled, and they followed

the woman into a large living room which was so cold that icicles were hanging

from the ceiling like chandeliers. Knownothing began to tremble uncontrollably.

'If you are warm, turn the icer on,' said the woman before disappearing through

a large door. 'I think she must mean the heater,' said Knowless, thinking out

loud, and he pushed the button at the front of what looked like an ordinary

electric fire. However, instead of giving out heat, the bars of the icer turned

white and sent out waves of freezing cold air. Knownothing shivered even more

and began to look unhappy. Before he could complain, the woman reappeared with

three iced-lollies. When he saw them, Knownothing smiled for a moment, before

realizing again how cold he was. 'Swallow these,' she said 'they will soon cool

you down.' 'Where we're from, we lick iced-lollies, or bite them; but they're too

cold to swallow,' said Knowlittle. 'Nonsense!' exclaimed the woman in a loud

voice. '_All_ children swallow iced-lollies. Everyone knows that!'

When they had finished the iced-lollies, the woman gave them iced-buns to

eat and some cold coffee to drink. 'Allow me to introduce myself,' said the

woman. 'My name is Miss Frost. Tell me, why have you come to the Snow

Queendom?' 'We are looking for a place where there are some good rules to live

by,' said Knowlittle cautiously. 'We have plenty of good rules here,' said Miss Frost. 'Our first rule is: "The Snow Queen is always right!"' 'Who is the Snow Queen?' asked Knownothing, still trying to eat one of the iced-buns. 'Why, our leader, of course,' said Miss Frost. 'She lives on top of a distant mountain in a castle made of the finest ice, well away from the heat. Although no one has ever seen her, we all know that she loves us and takes care of us.' 'If no one has ever seen her, how do you know she exists?' asked Knowlittle. 'Because she sends us the snow to keep us cold. Without the snow, we would have nothing with which to build our houses. She also sends ice so that we can build our roads. Roads are the very essence of civilization,' said Miss Frost in a firm voice. Knowless nodded nervously. 'How do you know it is the Snow Queen who sends the snow and ice?' asked Knowlittle. 'Because a friend of mine told me that each time the Snow Queen laughs, it snows. This is why we always do as the Snow Queen says, because this keeps her happy. When she is happy, she laughs. When she laughs, it snows, and so we are always cold. This reminds me of our second rule, which is: "To be happy, keep the cold in."' Knownothing shivered again. Knowlittle persisted: 'What proof does your friend have that it snows because the Snow Queen laughs?' he asked. 'You must go to a terrible school,' said Miss Frost sternly. 'Your teachers should have taught you that asking questions is a sign of stupidity! Surely you have heard of our third rule: "Ask no questions, the Snow Queen knows best."' 'That's news to me,' said Knowlittle, now shivering too. 'In that case, I'm not sure that we are going to be very happy here.'

Miss Frost Sets a Challenge

Miss Frost suggested that Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing might like to stay at her hotel for the night. 'I suppose your beds are made of ice,' said Knowlittle. 'Yes,' replied Miss Frost, 'and our pillows are made of the softest snow.' 'In that case,' said Knowless, 'I think we will continue on our journey. Would you be so kind as to give us directions to the nearest city?'

'Certainly,' said Miss Frost, 'But first you must answer three questions. If you do so, I shall give you the directions you require.' 'Very well,' answered the children together. 'I hope these questions involve thinking,' said Knownothing cheerfully. 'If they do, I know we will solve them easily.' 'I wouldn't be too sure about that,' said Miss Frost. 'I have asked these questions to many children who are older than you and no one has been able to answer all three successfully. I am sure that you will not succeed.' 'Just because no one has answered the questions until now, that doesn't mean that no one will *ever* answer them,' said Knowlittle firmly. 'Anyway, what are the questions?'

'I shall offer you three examples of reasoning,' said Miss Frost, 'and I shall ask you a question about each.' 'You must tell me whether the arguments are good or bad, sound or unsound, and why. The first involves two children, John and Sarah, who go to different schools. John says, 'My school is better than yours.' 'Why is it better?' asks Sarah. 'Because we are given homework to do.' 'Why are you given homework?' 'Because I go to a better school.' 'What do you think of that argument?' asked Miss Frost. Knowlittle began to think about this carefully.

'What is the second piece of reasoning?' asked Knowless. 'I hope it is ice and easy!' Miss Frost smiled briefly. 'Imagine that you are playing out one evening. Suddenly, a boy, whom you have never seen before, comes up to one of your friends and pushes her roughly to the ground. Can you explain his action?' '*I'll* think about this one,' said Knowless.

'That means that the third puzzle is mine!' said Knownothing. 'Tell me what it is.' 'Very well,' said Miss Frost. 'Ronald, a friend of yours, is going on a school trip. The cost of a trip is five pounds and today is the last day on which it can be paid. Ronald's mother gives him a five-pound note but he loses it on the way to school. At morning break, Ronald finds a five-pound note on the school yard. He puts it into his pocket. His friend Gerald comes up to him and says: "I've lost my five-pound note. If I don't find it, I won't be able to go on the school trip." What should Ronald do?'

Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing thought for a long time about the questions which they had been asked. Miss Frost gave them three ice-slates and ice-pens and they wrote out their thoughts with great speed. They returned the slates and pens to Miss Frost who examined them carefully. 'Why, you have surprised me,' she said eventually. 'You have all done very well. Usually, children just write what they think without bothering to give *reasons* for their opinions. But, you have offered arguments to support what you say, and now I shall give you directions to the nearest city. Now, let me see. If you turn left as you leave the Snow Queendom and walk for an hour, you will arrive in the Land of Youth. On the other hand, if you turn right as you leave the Snow Queendom and run for sixty minutes, you will arrive at the City of Books.' 'Which is the closest?' asked Knownothing looking puzzled. 'Why, the Land of

Youth, of course,' said Knowlittle. 'Come on, let's go.' With this, Knowlittle,

Knowless and Knownothing thanked Miss Frost for her hospitality and set off

for the Land of Youth.

The Land of Youth

Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing began their journey in high spirits. They

were looking forward to seeing the Land of Youth and they discussed what it

might be like. 'One thing's for sure,' said Knowlittle, 'it must be warmer than

the Snow Queendom!'

At that moment, the sun emerged from behind a large cloud and shone down

on the three travellers. 'The sun must have heard you, Knowlittle,' said

Knownothing cheerfully. 'Look, it's smiling at us.' 'Don't be silly,' said

Knowless, 'the sun can't hear you because it doesn't have any ears. It can't

smile at you either because it doesn't have a mouth.' Suddenly, the sun

disappeared behind a very black cloud. The sky quickly grew dark and raindrops

began to fall from the sky. 'Now look what you've done, Knowless!' said

Knownothing in a vexed tone. 'You've upset the sun and now we're *all* going to

get wet!' It began to rain more heavily and Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing

had to shelter behind a large oak tree. 'I'm hungry,' said Knownothing, producing

a large bag of sweets from his pocket. '*You're* always hungry!' shouted

Knowlittle. 'Eating too many sweets is bad for you,' said Knowless confidently.

'I know,' said Knownothing, 'but I can't help it. Each morning I tell myself that

I am not going to eat any sweets today but I always do. I really want to stop

but I just can't help myself.' Having said this, Knownothing swallowed all the

sweets in the bag in one go. 'If you had *really* wanted to stop, you wouldn't have emptied the bag of sweets into your mouth,' said Knowlittle. 'Quite right!' exclaimed Knowless, 'you could have emptied it into our mouths instead. Really! Some people have no self-control!' 'What's the use trying if I *know* I'm not going to succeed?' said Knownothing. 'I may as well enjoy the sweets and save my energy.'

At this point, it stopped raining and the sun reappeared from behind the cloud. 'It seems that the sun has forgiven you, Knowless,' said Knownothing, 'come on, let's go.' The three children resumed their journey and soon arrived in the Land of Youth. A boy of about their own age greeted them. 'Welcome to the Land of Youth!' he said warmly, shaking hands with each of them in turn. 'My name is Falgan. What brings you here?' 'We are looking for a land where there are some good rules to live by,' said Knowlittle. 'In that case, you will like it here,' said Falgan. 'In this city there are no grown-ups to impose rules on us.' 'That's a good start,' said Knownothing happily. 'Perhaps our journey has come to an end at last!'

Reasoning

1. I bought a tin of tomato soup. The next day I was ill. I will never eat tinned foods again.

2. The policeman said that playing near parked cars can be very dangerous, so, from now on, I shall play in the park.

3. My best friend says that *Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom* is a very good film, and I'm sure he is right because he always gets most merit slips in class.

4. That new girl is always causing trouble. Yesterday, the moment she walked into school, a fire extinguisher was let off upstairs. I bet she did it.

5. The school exams are taking place next week. I was going to revise for them but the Head Boy said that exams are always easy. So I shall play out instead.

6. I always stop at zebra-crossings to see if any traffic is coming. However, each time I came to a zebra-crossing this week, there was no traffic. Tomorrow, when I come to the crossing, I shall walk across without looking.

7. The dentist says that eating too many sweets is bad for my teeth. From now on I shall eat fewer sweets.

8. My father says that boys are more intelligent than girls. He went to university, so he must be right.

Numbers 1, 3 and 4 are based on arguments devised by Renee Sack. See Karras, R.W., 'Final evaluation of the pilot programme in philosophical reasoning in Lexington Elementary Schools, 1978-9', *Thinking*, Vol. 1, Nos. 3 and 4, 1979, p. 28.

Moral Dilemmas

1. Ronald is going on a school trip. The cost of the trip is five pounds and today is the last day on which it can be paid. Ronald's mother gives him a five-pound note but he loses it on his way to school. At morning break, Ronald finds a five-pound note on the school yard. He puts it into his pocket. His friend Gerald comes up to him and says: 'I've lost my five-pound note. If I don't find it, I won't be able to go on the school trip.' What should Ronald do?

2. There is to be a mathematics test on Friday. Eileen's teacher has suggested that her class should do some revision for homework. Eileen spends three evenings revising for the test, during which she gives up playing out with her friends and watching her favourite television programmes. On the day of the test, Eileen's best friend Emma tells her that she did not do any revision but played out instead. Emma then says that she intends to cheat in the test by looking at some notes which she made on the previous evening. What should Eileen do?

The Moral Talent Competition

You are a strong swimmer. During a visit to the swimming baths by your class, your classmate falls in at the deep end and shouts for help. You say:

1. I'm not jumping in – I'll get wet!

2. I'll jump in as X owes me £5 and I want to be paid back.

3. I'm not jumping in – I don't like X very much.

4. I'll jump in and help X, otherwise X may drown.

5. I'm not jumping in because my teacher will tell me off for going up to the deep end without permission.

6. I'll jump in because my teacher is sure to give me a reward.

7. I'll jump in and help X because X is my friend.

If you are *not* a good swimmer, what would you do?

Could you be blamed for not jumping in to help your classmate?

APPENDIX 12

Philosophical Pot-Pourri

1. John says: 'I know that the sun will come up tomorrow.' Can John know this *today?*

2. Do animals feel pain? How do you know?

3. Can a chess computer think?

4. What do we mean when we say that a person is 'courageous'?

5. Were our noses made to help us to wear spectacles?

6. Someone drives his car at thirty miles per hour with his eyes closed. He runs into two people on a zebra-crossing. He says: 'I didn't know that there was anyone on the crossing.' Does this mean that he is not to be blamed because he did not *intend* to injure those people?

7. Might it be possible for objects to disappear when no one is looking at them?

APPENDIX 13

What Makes You *You?*[1]

Would you be the same person if you changed your hairstyle/mode of dress?[2]

If you were given a new heart, would you be the same person?

If someone is a liar/thief and then changes for the better, is he/she still the same person?

If I decided to go on a diet and a month later I said: 'I've lost two stones, I feel like a new person,' am I?

Is Clark Kent the same person as Superman?

Robert falls over on the school yard and bangs his head on the concrete. When he wakes up, he is unable to remember who he is, or anything about his past life. Is he the same person?

If Robert wakes up and says his name is Thomas and that he has three sisters (whereas Robert has none) and goes to St. Paul's School (whereas Robert goes to St. Philip's School), is he the same person?

If someone performed an experiment on you and on your best friend, which resulted in you receiving your friend's memories, attitudes, likes and dislikes and *vice versa*, would you be the same person?

References

1. This exercise is based on ideas found in Reuben Abel's *Man is the Measure: a cordial invitation to the central problems of philosophy*, The Free Press, New York, 1976, chapter 17.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

APPENDIX 14

Diagrammatic Representation

The word 'all' is frequently used in arguments

to overstate a case. Sometimes these arguments

are of a sexist/racist nature. The purpose of

this exercise is to demonstrate the relevance

of the teaching of logic to the evaluation of

such reasoning.

Children should be made aware of the following

rule:

A statement beginning with 'all', if true, is

generally false when the subject and predicate

are reversed.

For example: **All boys are children   TRUE**

              All children are boys   FALSE

Ask children to think of further examples.

Are there any exceptions to this rule?

These are called **IDENTITY** statements.

For example: **All bachelors are unmarried men   TRUE**

              All unmarried men are bachelors   TRUE

Ask children to think of further examples.

APPENDIX 15

Diagrammatic Representation

Assess the following arguments:

1. Any Girls for Football?

Mr. Smith, the Games teacher, is watching some boys and girls playing football. He says: 'I am going to choose eleven children to play in the football team. I will choose eleven boys because all boys are good footballers.'

Point of example: Just because, for Mr. Smith, all boys are good footballers, this does not mean that all good footballers are boys. Therefore, girls should be eligible to play in the football team.

Similarly with the following:

2. The Apple Pie

'This apple pie looks delicious! It must have been a girl who baked it because all good cooks are girls.'

3. Inspector Clueless

Inspector Clueless says: 'Whoever robbed the safe was wearing a beret. All French men are people who wear berets, so a French man must have robbed the safe!'

4. The Broken Window

'An idiot did this! It must have been a child from Eversonice Primary School
who broke my window because all children from that school are idiots.'

City
of Truth

City
of Lies

X

Children From Summerside Junior School

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH
Ruth B.	7 May, 1977
Michael B.	10 November, 1976
Joanne B.	4 October, 1976
Jennifer C.	31 January, 1977
Abigail C.	6 May, 1977
Terry C.	5 June, 1977
Sally C.	4 August, 1977
Christopher D. (Chrit.)	28 May, 1977
Jill F.	4 January, 1977
Lindsay G.	9 September, 1976
Kristian G.	20 August, 1977
Roddy H.	29 March, 1977
Vivian H.	19 September, 1976
Carla H.	30 April, 1977
Angela J.	20 June, 1977
Helen J.	20 July, 1977
Karl J.	12 April, 1977
Scott J.	20 July, 1977
Michelle K.	5 December, 1977
Johanna L.	21 November, 1976
Eve M.	14 July, 1977
Ian M.	10 August, 1977
Sarah M.	21 September, 1976
Paul R.	29 March, 1977
Louise R.	15 July, 1976
Christopher Sk.	14 December, 1976
Christopher Ss.	28 February, 1977
James W.	23 September, 1976
David W.	24 September, 1976
Ben W.	19 July, 1977
Mark W.	11 October, 1976
Katie W.	19 March, 1977

APPENDIX 17

Children from Claythorpe Primary School

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH
Russell B.	20 January, 1979
Melanie B.	24 March, 1978
Kelly E.	11 September, 1976
Samantha G.	8 May, 1979
Matthew H.	25 February, 1979
Michelle H.	9 April, 1978
Timothy M.	6 January, 1978
Sally M.	13 April, 1978
Caroline O.	16 December, 1978
Jayne P.	9 July, 1979
Jon P.	7 September, 1977
Matthew P.	2 March, 1977
Trudelle S.	6 October, 1976
Richard T.	12 April, 1978
Samantha T.	1 March, 1977
Kirsty W.	5 November, 1976

APPENDIX 18

Children From Riverhill Junior School

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH
Cassandra D.	14 December, 1976
David F.	25 March, 1977
Nicola F.	13 July, 1977
Richard G.	20 March, 1977
Damien H.	2 June, 1977
Paul H.	13 August, 1977
Richard H.	4 August, 1977
Mark H.	23 November, 1976
Nicola M.	11 January, 1977
Adam M.	1 September, 1976
Karen M.	9 May, 1977
Heather M.	17 December, 1976
Daniel N.	10 August, 1977
Simon N.	29 September, 1976
Kevin P.	18 August, 1977
Kristian R.	27 April, 1977
Sarah S.	15 July, 1977
Kay T.	23 February, 1977
James T.	8 April, 1977
Stephen T.	23 June, 1977
Barrie V.	15 February, 1977
Leanne W.	11 October, 1976

March 29, 1988

Mr. Patrick Costello
Department of Educational Studies
The University of Hull
173 Cottingham Road
Hull, HU5 2EH
Great Britain

Dear Mr. Hull:

It was a pleasure as well as a surprise to get your letter and
accompanying transcript. Your account of all that you have been
doing—teaching, writing stories, giving papers abroad—is most
impressive. If you haven't already done so, I trust you will
before long get in touch with Dr. W. D. Robinson, Dept. of Philosophy,
Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, who is putting out a newsletter
with just such information. Your work should be better known in Great
Britain, as it is the very sort of thing which can best convince the
sceptics.

I found the little story you wrote excellent, and am also impressed
with the student discussion. It's a bit long for THINKING, but I
imagine we'll go with the whole of it anyhow, as it's a pity to cut
it. Thank you so much for offering it to us. It should be out in
midsummer, but you'll get proofs before then.

Sincerely,

Matthew Lipman
Professor of Philosophy
Director

APPENDIX 20

Questionnaire SUMMERSIDE

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

        A lot   16   59.3%
        It was all right   10   37.0%
        Very little   1   3.7%
        Not at all   0   0%

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly?

    Yes   15   55.6%
    No   4   14.8%
    Don't know   8   29.6%

    You understand yourself better?

    Yes   14   51.9%
    No   3   11.1%
    Don't know   10   37.0%

    You understand other people in your class better?

    Yes   11   40.8%
    No   8   29.6%
    Don't know   8   29.6%

    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others?

    Yes   19   70.4%
    No   3   11.1%
    Don't know   5   18.5%

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom?

    Yes   20   74.1%
    No   7   25.9%

4. Do you feel that you are better at thinking?

    Yes   16   61.5%
    No   4   15.4%
    Don't know   6   23.1%

5. Would you like to take a course like this again?

Yes	22	81.5%
No	5	18.5%

6. Would you recommend this course to:

All your friends?	7	25.9%
Most of them?	7	25.9%
Some of them?	10	37.0%
None of them?	3	11.2%

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

More than four times	2	7.4%
Four times	5	18.5%
Three times	9	33.3%
Twice	5	18.5%
Once	4	14.9%
Not at all	2	7.4%

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

Stories	20	74.1%
Diagrams	5	18.5%
Problems	2	7.4%

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way?

Yes	9	33.3%
No	8	29.7%
Don't know	10	37.0%

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects?

Yes	4	14.8%
No	6	22.2%
Don't know	17	63.0%

The figures above indicate responses expressed both numerically and as a percentage of the total.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_____ ✓
    It was all right____
    Very little_____
    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
    You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?____ ✓
    Most of them?_____
    Some of them?_____
    None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___
    Four times_____ ✓
    Three times_____
    Twice . ._____
    Once_____
    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____
    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
    Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___
    If YES, please say how: Yes because I know how to think and I can understand my feelings better

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: I like the puzzles and the arguments and the discusions.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: I wouldn't chance any-thing.

13. Any other comments: No Comments.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓

   It was all right ✗

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO ✓
              DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing ? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice   _____

   Once   ✓

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO___ Dont know ✓

   If YES, please say how:

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO
        DON'T KNOW___
    If YES, please give an example:
    English and Spelling

11. What I like about philosophy is:
    you don't have to write and its good fun

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:
    I would not change the course.

13. Any other comments:
    I wish we could have had mr costello and his philosophy all year.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_____
    It was all right ✓
    Very little_____
    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
    You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
            DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?_____
    Most of them?_____
    Some of them? ✓
    None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___
    Four times_____
    Three times_____
    Twice_____
    Once_____ ✓
    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
    Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO___ Don't know.
    If YES, please say how: -351-

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO ✓
       DON'T KNOW___

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: Because we don't have to do any writing and its Good

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

    I wouldn't Change it because its real Good the way it is

13. Any other comments:

    I have no futher comments

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_____✓_____

    It was all right____

    Very little_____

    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

    You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

    You understand other people in your class better? YES____ NO____ DON'T KNOW ✓

    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES____ NO ✓

        DON'T KNOW____

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO____

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES____ NO____ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO____

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?____

    Most of them? ✓

    Some of them?____

    None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times____

    Four times____✓_____

    Three times_____

    Twice_____

    Once_____

    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES____ NO____ DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_⋁
    DON'T KNOW___
    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: you do not have towirt

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: no cange at all

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right ✓
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
      DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO ~~NO~~

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them?_____
   Some of them? ✓
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_____
   Twice ✓
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO___ Don't know
   If YES, please say how:

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___
    If YES, please give an example: I am much better at English.

11. What I like about philosophy is: discussing things like the stories. because it is different

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: not change anythin

13. Any other comments: NO. Comments.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____

   It was all right ✓

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___

           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times _____✓_____

   Three times_____

   Twice _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _____

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___

   If YES, please say how: *Because at first I thought it wasn't very good but it is brilliant.*

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___

DON'T KNOW ✓

If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: *the discussions. Also I like the problems.*

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: *I wouldn't change any thing.*

13. Any other comments: *No comments.*

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right_____
   Very little ✓_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
            DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO ✓

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them? ✓_____
   Some of them?_____
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_____
   Twice   _____
   Once_____
   Not at all ✓_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓_____
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓ Don't know now.
   If YES, please say how:

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
        DON'T KNOW √

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:
                                        Nom chanch:

13. Any other comments:

        :no other coments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ___✓___

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES _✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___
           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them?____

   Some of them? _✓_

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times____

   Four times _____✓____

   Three times_____

   Twice _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ___✓___

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES_✓_ NO___

   If YES, please say how: I think I am a bit x cleverer after this course

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___
    If YES, please give an example: I think I have improved in my English work

11. What I like about philosophy is: ~~Because~~ you ~~have conversation~~. Instead
of recording your thoughts on papery ~~ondo~~ on the tape

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: Do more stories and
do more things that are going on like girls football

13. Any other comments: I would prefer this course if we did more things
that have actually happened ~~and~~ and find out the results
and dont do any poetry it is boring

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
          DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___ .

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them? ✓

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times ✓_____

   Twice _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)—

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___

   If YES, please say how: I can think Better.

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO___

    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: *discusing things.*

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: *Not change any thing,*

13. Any other comments: *No coment*

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right ✓
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO ✓
          DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO ~~✗~~

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO ✓

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them?_____
   Some of them? ✓
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_____
   Twice _____
   Once_____
   Not at all____ ✓ ____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ~~✗~~ Dont Know
   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO ✓

DON'T KNOW___

If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: ~~arguen I against eg~~

talking with each other (disgusing) things

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: Teach at older age More stories

13. Any other comments: No

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right_✓_____
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO_✓_ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___
            DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES___ NO_✓_ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them?_✓_____
   Some of them?_____
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_✓_____
   Twice_____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓_
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ___
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)___

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO___ don't know _✓_
   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO___

DON'T KNOW___

If YES, please give an example: I Think I'm a bit better a English.

11. What I like about philosophy is: that it is good lisserning to other peoples verdicts and augments.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: have more stories and if I was Mr. Costello I would stop going off the supjet of philosophy and on to some thing else.

13. Any other comments: No comment.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot __✓__

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
       DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them? ✓

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice _____

   Once_____ ✓

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES �✗ NO___ Don't know ✓

   If YES, please say how: I can now think better and if there
was argument in the playground I could probably solve it
but I could also probably have done it before but
never got the chance.

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO✓

   DON'T KNOW___

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

   I like it because I am good at it and because it is different.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: give the students a problem and tell them to write the answer answer down. Then they could compare answers.

13. Any other comments:

   On number 3. I do but not very much.

   On number 6. I would only recomend it to the ones who would benefit from it not the people that would sit around not understanding it.

   On number 7. After half of the second period it gets a bit boring.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___

        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better _at_ think _ing_ ? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to _take_ a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three ✓

   Tw_ice_ _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✗ NO___ DontKnow

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES $\cancel{X}$ NO___
    DON'T KNOW $\checkmark$

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: **all the questions**

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: **No change**

13. Any other comments: **Nothing**

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right_✓____
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO_✓_ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_
   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO_✓_ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing? YES___ NO_✓_ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO_✓_

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____
   Most of them?_____
   Some of them?_✓___
   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_____
   Twice   _✓_____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)✓
   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO_✓_
   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO✓
         DON'T KNOW___
     If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: *I like it because there is not a lot of equipment all you need is yo* *brains.*

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: *I would not change it.*

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___ Yes because it helps you to understand other peoples re views

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing ? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓_____

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times ✓_____

   Twice _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓_____

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___

   If YES, please say how: Yes because its helped me to think and listen to peoples
   Views

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__
     DON'T KNOW _√_
   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: that its different to other subjects

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:
   I wouldn't ~~wat~~ want to change it in any way

13. Any other comments: no comments.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right ✓
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
            DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO ✓

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them?_____
   Some of them? ✓
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times ✓
   Twice _____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓
   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__

    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

    ·/2/)

11. What I like about philosophy is:

    It is a help when you
    go to high school.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

    have more stories
    and spend more time on them.

13. Any other comments:

    no more comments

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
   DON'T KNOW ✓

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times ✓

   Twice_____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

    I like the stories

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

    I would not change any thing

13. Any other comments:

    No comesy

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot ✓

    It was all right____

    Very little_____

    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

    You understand other people in your class better? YES ✗ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
        DON'T KNOW ✓

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?____

    Most of them?_____

    Some of them?____

    None of them? ✓

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___

    Four times_____

    Three times_____

    Twice   ✓

    Once_____

    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓

    If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: The Stories and its a change from other Subjects,

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: I wold not change any thing

13. Any other comments: I thought the corse was Very Good and I hope there is ot another soon,

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot _____ ✓

    It was all right_____

    Very little_____

    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

    You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
        DON'T KNOW ✓

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?_____

    Most of them?_____

    Some of them?_____

    None of them? ✓

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times ✓

    Four times_____

    Three times_____

    Twice _____

    Once_____

    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

    Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO___ Don't Know

    If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO _v_
     DON'T KNOW___

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: The way its done

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: more Stories

13. Any other comments: no comments

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right ✓____
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them? ✓____
   Some of them?_____
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_____
   Twice   ✓_____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓
   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
        DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: I like the stories you do.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:
    IN the story with knowless I'd call it a
    ~~ Snowtel~~ Snowtel not a hotel.

13. Any other comments: No

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

A lot _____✓_____
It was all right____
Very little_____
Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
    DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

All your friends?____
Most of them?_____
Some of them? ✓
None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

More than four times____
Four times_____
Three times___✓____
Twice _____
Once_____
Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____
Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)✓
Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___
If YES, please say how:

It has made me understand things better.
and I feel I know

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__

    DON'T KNOW √

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

    You are free to say what you feel about situations.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

    Do less stories and more diagrams.
    I would make the lesson longer.

13. Any other comments:

    No further comments.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot___✓___
    It was all right_🗲_
    Very little_____
    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW _____
    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO_._ DON'T KNOW_✓_
    You understand other people in your class better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___
            DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better ᵃᵗthink ⁱⁿᵍ? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_

5. Would you like to ᵗᵃᵏᵉ a course like this again? YES _✓_ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?_____
    Most of them?_✓_
    Some of them?_____
    None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___
    Four times_____
    Three times___✓___
    Twice · _____
    Once_____
    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓_
    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES_✗_ NO___ Don't know.
    If YES, please say how:
        █████

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__
    DON'T KNOW ✓

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

The ~~explane~~ explaning in the stories.
and
Discussing things.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

longer stories.

13. Any other comments:

NO

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_____✓_____

    It was all right____

    Very little_____

    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

    You understand yourself better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

    You understand other people in your class better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___
            DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO_✓_

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO_✓_

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?____

    Most of them?_____

    Some of them?__✓__

    None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___

    Four times_____✗_____

    Three times_____

    Twice_____✓_____

    Once_____

    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓_

    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, 'Any Girls for Football?)

    Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO_✓_

    If YES, please say how: -391-

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__

  DON'T KNOW _✓_

  If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: I Like the stories

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: No change

13. Any other comments: Noting to Say

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO_✓_

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_✓___

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_✓_____

   Three times_____

   Twice   _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO_✓_

   If YES, please say how: -393-

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_
    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: It is very interesting. and I like discussing things.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: I wouldn't make any changes at all.

13. Any other comments: It is very interesting.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___

   DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO ✗

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them? ✓_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times ✓

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___

   If YES, please say how:

   I enjoy Philosopy more than I used to.

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__

       DON'T KNOW √

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

    The way the class can discuss
    things like stories.& problems.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

    I would not change the course.

13. Any other comments:

    The course was very interesting.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right ✓___
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
          DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are   better think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to ᵗᵃᵏᵉ a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them? ✓_____
   Some of them?_____
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times ✓_____
   Twice_____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You _You_?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___
   If YES, please say how: It has canged me like, it has heped me
                        to think more better.

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__
DON'T KNOW ✓

If YES, please give an example: No

11. What I like about philosophy is: I like it because it is different to other subblets.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: make it a bit mor lively if not i would not.

13. Any other comments: It was very intresing to know about and to learn.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right ✓
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO ✓
           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better ᵃᵗ think ⁱⁿᵍ? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to ᵗᵃᵏᵉ a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓
   Most of them?_____
   Some of them?_____
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_____
   Twice   _____
   Once ✓_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓
   If YES, please say how:
                              -399-

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
DON'T KNOW ✓
If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: Because you don't have to have a Pencil and write about Something.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: I would _Not_ change anything because its real good and I like the stories.

13. Any other comments:
_No_ other Comments.

APPENDIX 21

Questionnaire CLAYTHORPE

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

A lot	13	92.9%
It was all right	1	7.1%
Very little	0	0%
Not at all	0	0%

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

You can express yourself more clearly?

Yes	6	42.9%
No	0	0%
Don't know	8	57.1%

You understand yourself better?

Yes	4	28.6%
No	0	0%
Don't know	10	71.4%

You understand other people in your class better?

Yes	9	64.3%
No	3	21.4%
Don't know	2	14.3%

You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others?

Yes	8	57.1%
No	0	0%
Don't know	6	42.9%

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom?

Yes	9	75.0%
No	3	25.0%

4. Do you feel that you are better at thinking?

Yes	6	46.2%
No	0	0%
Don't know	7	53.8%

5. Would you like to take a course like this again?

Yes	12	92.3%
No	1	7.7%

6. Would you recommend this course to:

All your friends?	3	23.1%
Most of them?	7	53.8%
Some of them?	3	23.1%
None of them?	0	0%

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

More than four times	3	21.4%
Four times	4	28.6%
Three times	2	14.3%
Twice	4	28.6%
Once	1	7.1%
Not at all	0	0%

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

Stories	11	78.6%
Diagrams	2	14.3%
Problems	1	7.1%

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way?

Yes	4	28.6%
No	7	50.0%
Don't know	3	21.4%

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects?

Yes	3	21.4%
No	2	14.3%
Don't know	9	64.3%

The figures above indicate responses expressed both numerically and as a percentage of the total.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_____✓_____

    It was all right____

    Very little_____

    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

    You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO_✓ DON'T KNOW___

    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
        DON'T KNOW ✓

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓ NO_✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES_✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends? ✓

    Most of them?_____

    Some of them?_____

    None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___

    Four times_____

    Three times_____

    Twice _____✓_____

    Once_____

    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✗

    If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO
DON'T KNOW___

If YES, please give an example: French know mo
about Philosophy

11. What I like about philosophy is: the Problems

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: make it
Shorter

13. Any other comments: no

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot___✓___

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_

   You understand other people in your class better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___

         DON'T KNOW_✓_

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_ NO___ .

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them? _✓_

   Some of them?____

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times____

   Four times_____✓____

   Three times_____

   Twice _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓_

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES_✓_ NO___

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO

    DON'T KNOW ✓

   If YES, please give an example: ~~We Descas problemes~~.

11. What I like about philosophy is: We Descas problemes

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right _√_____
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_√_
   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW _√_
   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO_√_ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
        DON'T KNOW _√_

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO _√_

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing ? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW _√_

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO _√_

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them?_____
   Some of them? _√_____
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____√_____
   Three times_____
   Twice   _____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _√__
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO _√_

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO

DON'T KNOW___

If YES, please give an example:

French . know more
about philosophy.

11. What I like about philosophy is:

The problems

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: Shorter

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot ✓_____
    It was all right____
    Very little_____
    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
    You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
          DON'T KNOW ✓

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better ᵃᵗthink ⁱⁿᵍ? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to ᵗᵃᵏᵉ a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?____
    Most of them?____
    Some of them?____
    None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___
    Four times_____
    Three times_____
    Twice   _____
    Once   ✓_____
    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____
    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓   Dot no.
    If YES, please say how:

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO
    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: ~~it is good reason I like~~

We like philosphy ~~becaues~~ It is

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: ~~I have~~

13. Any other Comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot ✓
    It was all right____
    Very little____
    Not at all____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES~~✗~~ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
    You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think~~ing~~? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO____

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?____
    Most of them?____
    Some of them? ✓
    None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___
    Four times____
    Three times____
    Twice ✓
    Once____
    Not at all____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
    Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You _You_?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✗ DON'T NO
    If YES, please say how: KNOW ✓

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO.
    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: The storys of ~~Notittle, Note~~
    Knowlittle ←
    Knowles ←
    Knownbting ←

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: ~~▓▓▓▓▓▓~~ have
    more ~~start~~ storys about →

13. Any other comments: I would have liked some more ~~frent~~ ~~froft~~ frence and some German

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___ .

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them? ✓

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice   ✓

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✗ Dont Know .

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__

DON'T KNOW ✓

If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: all the stories that you read to us and the ones about. Know little, Know less and Know~~~~ ~~I liked the argument~~ I liked it when we listend to our selfs on the tape. listening to the other stories. the disgussing them.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: have more stories about Know little, Know less + Knownothing.

13. Any other comments: more French lessions I liked them

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓

   It was all right____

   Very little____

   Not at all____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

   You understand yourself better? YES____ NO____ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO____

   DON'T KNOW____

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO____

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO____

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them? ✓

   Some of them?____

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times ✓

   Four times____

   Three times____

   Twice ____

   Once____

   Not at all____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO____

   If YES, please say how: Because I can work out problems easyer

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO
   DON'T KNOW ✓

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: Solving all the problems

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

It would be nice to have some more Inspector cluelese.

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓

   It was all right____

   Very little____

   Not at all____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
           DON'T KNOW ✓

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them? ✓

   Some of them?____

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times____

   Three times ✓

   Twice ____

   Once____

   Not at all____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓ Don't know

   If YES, please say how:

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO
        DON'T KNOW___

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: We can have argum
                                     -ts with each other
                                     but if that was
                                     in public wewou
12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: get fisted.
                                     I would of

                                     lked some
                                     more of
                                     k now littl
                                     k now less
                                     and k no
                                     nothing
13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____

   Most of them? ✓

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times ✓

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice   _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO \

   If YES, please say how: Because   I can think alot bet
   with   problems.   -419-

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ N(
        DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: Solving problems.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

Make the lessons longer.

13. Any other comments: NO.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
         DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them? ✓

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times____

   Four times_____ ✓

   Three times_____

   Twice   _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___

   If YES, please say how:

   you can get out of things.

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO

    DON'T KNOW___

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: not change anything

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW____

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better ᵃᵗthink ⁱⁿᵍ? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to ᵗᵃᵏᵉ a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?__✓__

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times____

   Four times_____✓_____

   Three times_____

   Twice   _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓_

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ N

DON'T KNOW___

If YES, please give an example:

French   know   more about
    Philosophy

11. What I like about philosophy is: The   problems

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: Shorter

13. Any other comments: NO

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO✗ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___

   DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them? ✓____

   Some of them?____

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice ___✓___

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___

   DON'T KNOW ✓

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: If some one is in trubl you say what you would do. but if you say rong you don't rali get into trubl

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: don't know

13. Any other comments:

   No.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_NO___
           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing ? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them?____

   Some of them?____

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times____✓____

   Twice   _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓_

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO_✓_   Don't know

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
DON'T-KNOW ✓

If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: We all do it together you get a chance to speak. And I like hang man on the black board. We learn

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: like to have French more.

13. Any other comments: I like French and Philosoph

I like French the most.

- How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_✓_____

    It was all right____

    Very little_____

    Not at all_____

- Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓

    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓

    You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO_✓ DON'T KNOW___

    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
        DON'T KNOW_✓

- Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO___

- Do you feel now that you are   better~~at~~think~~ing~~? YES_✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

- Would you like to ~~take~~ a course like this again? YES_✓ NO___

- Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?_✓

    Most of them?_____

    Some of them?_____

    None of them?_____

- How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times_✓

    Four times_____

    Three times_____

    Twice   _____

    Once_____

    Not at all_____

- Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓

    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)

    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You _You_?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

- Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO_✓

    If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_

    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

French know more about
philosiphy

11. What I like about philosophy is: the problems

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: Make it
Shorter.

13. Any other comments: NO

Questionnaire RIVERHILL

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

A lot	9	50.0%
It was all right	9	50.0%
Very little	0	0%
Not at all	0	0%

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

You can express yourself more clearly?

Yes	12	70.6%
No	0	0%
Don't know	5	29.4%

You understand yourself better?

Yes	12	70.6%
No	1	5.9%
Don't know	4	23.5%

You understand other people in your class better?

Yes	12	70.6%
No	2	11.7%
Don't know	3	17.7%

You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others?

Yes	13	76.5%
No	1	5.8%
Don't know	3	17.7%

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom?

Yes	13	81.3%
No	3	18.7%

4. Do you feel that you are better at thinking?

Yes	14	87.5%
No	0	0%
Don't know	2	12.5%

5. Would you like to take a course like this again?

Yes	13	81.3%
No	3	18.7%

6. Would you recommend this course to:

All your friends?	4	23.6%
Most of them?	9	52.8%
Some of them?	4	23.6%
None of them?	0	0%

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

More than four times	1	5.9%
Four times	1	5.9%
Three times	9	52.9%
Twice	5	29.4%
Once	0	0%
Not at all	1	5.9%

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

Stories	12	85.8%
Diagrams	1	7.1%
Problems	1	7.1%

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way?

Yes	11	61.1%
No	6	33.3%
Don't know	1	5.6%

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects?

Yes	2	11.1%
No	5	27.8%
Don't know	11	61.1%

The figures above indicate responses expressed both numerically and as a percentage of the total.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right_√_____
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES_√__ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES_√__ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES_√__ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
         DON'T KNOW_√

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_√_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES_√__ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO_√

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____
   Most of them?____
   Some of them?_√___
   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times___√_____
   Twice_____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) √
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)√

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES_√_ NO___
   If YES, please say how:
   I think I can express my feelings better.

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__

       DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

                        I Like it because it is exiting

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: make them longer
and put in more Swbjects

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right ✓
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
            DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them? ✓
   Some of them?_____
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_____
   Twice   ✓
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _____
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___ .
   If YES, please say how: Its chages me in the way of
   instead of rushing into things I'll think
   one I do it.

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_
        DON'T KNOW✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: I n the way it mak̶ you think.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: I would not change it.

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot___✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___
           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing ? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____

   Most of them?_✓____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice   _✓_____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO✗ Don't know ✓

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__
    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: the arguing

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: ~~the~~ not change anyth

13. Any other comments: No

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right__✓__
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
         DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO ✓

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them? ✓____
   Some of them?_____
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times_____
   Twice _____✓____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___
   If YES, please say how:

   It has made me wiser.

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
DON'T KNOW___

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: It has made me think more about things.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: make it last for 2 hours.

13. Any other comments: No thankyou

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____
   It was all right ✓
   Very little_____
   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_____
   Most of them?_____
   Some of them? ✓
   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___
   Four times_____
   Three times ✓
   Twice. _____
   Once_____
   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___
   If YES, please say how: Because instead of saying something out aloud you have to think about it first.

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_

    DON'T KNOW___

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: The stories. And facts and theories

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: wouldn't

    Yes no ✓

13. Any other comments: No

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times ✓

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice   _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___

   If YES, please say how: I think about Something for longer than I
   We did philosophy

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: I like it because it is good fun and it is very intresting and usefull

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: I would not change anything

13. Any other comments: No Thankyou.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES✓ NO___
           DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them? ✓

   Some of them?____

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times____

   Four times_____

   Three times____✓____

   Twice_____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO✓

   If YES, please say how:

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__
    DON'T KNOW ✓
    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

That you can argue with your friends.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

Would not change

13. Any other comments:

Thanks for taking us.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO ✓
        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?_✓__

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times____✓_____

   Twice_____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓_

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)✓

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_✓
        DON'T KNOW___
    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: The way we discussed our disscussion

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: change stories into pictures

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_____
    It was all right ✓
    Very little_____
    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO ___ DON'T KNOW ___
    You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
          DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO ___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES___ NO ✓

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?____
    Most of them?_____
    Some of them? ✓
    None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___
    Four times_____
    Three times_____
    Twice_____ ✗
    Once_____
    Not at all_____ ✓

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
    Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO ✗
    If YES, please say how: in thinking

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_

   DON'T KNOW ✓

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

   It is not bad becos
   it makes you think.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

   I would not chanch.

13. Any other comments: No. Make it beter.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓
   It was all right____
   Very little____
   Not at all____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____
   You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____
   You understand other people in your class better? YES____ NO____ DON'T KNOW ✓
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO____
            DON'T KNOW____

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO____

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO____

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____
   Most of them? ✓
   Some of them?____
   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times____
   Four times____
   Three times ✓
   Twice ____
   Once____
   Not at all____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES____ NO ✓
   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_
        DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

It makes you think, and

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

Make everybody answer questions.

13. Any other comments:

Thanks

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot _____
    It was all right ✓___
    Very little _____
    Not at all _____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES _✓_ NO _✓_ DON'T KNOW ___
    You understand yourself better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand other people in your class better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___
        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES _✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends? _✓_
    Most of them? _____
    Some of them? _____
    None of them? _____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times ___
    Four times _____
    Three times _✓_____
    Twice   _____
    Once _____
    Not at all _____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) _✓_
    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?)
    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO_✓_
    If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___

    DON'T KNOW___

   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: (uoy) you have to think a lot to solve a problem

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: not change nothin

13. Any other comments: No

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_____✓_____

    It was all right____

    Very little_____

    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

    You understand yourself better? YES___ NO ✓ DON'T KNOW___

    You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___

        DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?____

    Most of them? ✓____

    Some of them?_____

    None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times____

    Four times_____

    Three times ✓_____

    Twice_____

    Once_____

    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) (✓)

    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓

    If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__
        DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

we work by thinking not all writing.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

come to do the co┬se more times with adults and drop the diagrams.

13. Any other comments:

I dont have any other coments.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot_____
    It was all right___✓__
    Very little_____
    Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand yourself better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand other people in your class better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW_✓_
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
            DON'T KNOW_✓_

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are   better at think ing? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends?_____
    Most of them?__✓___
    Some of them?_____
    None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times___
    Four times_____
    Three times_____
    Twice   _____✓____
    Once_____
    Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ____
    Diagrams ✓(Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?).
    Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?)

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES_✓_ NO___
    If YES, please say how: Because it tought me too understand more.

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10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO___
    DON'T KNOW___
   If YES, please give an example: It helped me with my English.

11. What I like about philosophy is: it explanes more facts and theories.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: be let people take turns on what they are going to say.

13. Any other comments: no.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

    A lot _____
    It was all right ✓_____
    Very little _____
    Not at all _____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

    You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand yourself better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
    You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES___ NO___
          DON'T KNOW ✓

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES___ NO ✓

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

    All your friends? _____
    Most of them? ✓_____
    Some of them? _____
    None of them? _____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

    More than four times _____
    Four times ✓_____
    Three times _____
    Twice _____
    Once _____
    Not at all _____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

    Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓
    Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓
    Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___
    If YES, please say how:

s it helped me a lot by thinking and looking at

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO_

    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: Talking about everything.

~~the past~~) around us.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: Talk about every

thing every body likes. and dorp some cule less

things we talk about.

13. Any other comments:

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ✓

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

   You understand yourself better? YES____ NO____ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO____

   DON'T KNOW____

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO____

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO____ DON'T KNOW____

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO____

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them? ✓

   Some of them?____

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times____

   Four times_____

   Three times ✓

   Twice _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) (✓)

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems(Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO____

   If YES, please say how:

Try and think about all the things which could have happened before making up my mind.

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES ✓ NO___
    DON'T KNOW___

    If YES, please give an example: Maths,

11. What I like about philosophy is: Because we don't have to write and I am a slow writer. And we ~~dear~~ discus things more and don't just leave it at one answer.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: have the course in the afternoon.

13. Any other comments:

    Thank you for taking us.

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot __✓__
   It was all right____
   Very little____
   Not at all____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand yourself better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You understand other people in your class better? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___
   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES_✓_ NO___
            DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES_✓_ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES_✓_ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES_✓_ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓
   Most of them?____
   Some of them?____
   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times____
   Four times____
   Three times____
   Twice ____✓____
   Once____
   Not at all____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) (✓)
   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓
   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES_✓_ NO___
   If YES, please say how: I think it has made me understand
   things more easily.

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO ⋎
         DON'T KNOW___
   If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: I like it because I think they are very intresting.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: Change nothing

13. Any other comments: No thankyou

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot ___✓___

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___
   DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO ←wron ←wron

4. Do you feel now that you are better at think ing? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends?____

   Most of them?____

   Some of them? ✓

   None of them?____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times_____

   Twice ✓ _____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) /

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ⊘

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES ✓ NO___

   If YES, please say how:

   It has changed me because I used to take things fo
   anted but now I don't

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO___
      DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is: You argue a lot.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would: change nothing.

13. Any other comments: no thankyou

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

   A lot_____✓_____

   It was all right____

   Very little_____

   Not at all_____

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

   You can express yourself more clearly? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You understand yourself better? YES___ NO___ DON'T KNOW ✓

   You understand other people in your class better? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

   You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others? YES ✓ NO___

          DON'T KNOW___

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom? YES ✓ NO___

4. Do you feel now that you are better at thinking? YES ✓ NO___ DON'T KNOW___

5. Would you like to take a course like this again? YES ✓ NO___

6. Would you recommend this course to:

   All your friends? ✓

   Most of them?_____

   Some of them?_____

   None of them?_____

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

   More than four times___

   Four times_____

   Three times____✓_____

   Twice_____

   Once_____

   Not at all_____

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

   Stories (Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing) ✓

   Diagrams (Inspector Clueless, The Apple Pie, Any Girls for Football?) ✓

   Problems (Ronald and the £5 note, What Makes You You?, Can Animals Feel Pain?) ✓

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way? YES___ NO ✓

   If YES, please say how:

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects? YES___ NO__

    DON'T KNOW ✓

    If YES, please give an example:

11. What I like about philosophy is:

    Argueing with other people.

12. If I could change the course in some way, I would:

    I think the course is good so I would not change it.

13. Any other comments:

    Thank you Mr Costello for taking us.

APPENDIX 23

Questionnaire CUMULATIVE TOTALS

1. How much have you enjoyed the course?

A lot	38	63.3%
It was all right	21	35.0%
Very little	1	1.7%
Not at all	0	0%

2. Do you think that as a result of this course:

You can express yourself more clearly?

Yes	33	56.9%
No	4	6.9%
Don't know	21	36.2%

You understand yourself better?

Yes	30	51.7%
No	4	6.9%
Don't know	24	41.4%

You understand other people in your class better?

Yes	32	55.2%
No	13	22.4%
Don't know	13	22.4%

You are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others?

Yes	40	69.0%
No	4	6.9%
Don't know	14	24.1%

3. Do you talk about the philosophy sessions outside the classroom?

Yes	42	76.4%
No	13	23.6%

4. Do you feel that you are better at thinking?

Yes	36	65.5%
No	4	7.2%
Don't know	15	27.3%

5. Would you like to take a course like this again?

Yes	47	83.9%
No	9	16.1%

6. Would you recommend this course to:

All your friends?	14	24.6%
Most of them?	23	40.4%
Some of them?	17	29.8%
None of them?	3	5.2%

7. How often each week would you like to study philosophy?

More than four times	6	10.3%
Four times	10	17.2%
Three times	20	34.5%
Twice	14	24.1%
Once	5	8.6%
Not at all	3	5.3%

8. Which method of doing philosophy do you prefer?

Stories	43	78.1%
Diagrams	8	14.6%
Problems	4	7.3%

9. Has philosophy changed you in any way?

Yes	24	40.7%
No	21	35.6%
Don't know	14	23.7%

10. Do you think that the course has helped you with any other subjects?

Yes	11	17.7%
No	13	21.0%
Don't know	38	61.3%

The figures above indicate responses expressed both numerically and as a percentage of the total.

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