THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

**The Role of Religion and Literary Art in the Development
of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Thought**

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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by

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To

Professor Fouad H. Zakaria

My Grandfather Abdullah Al-Kattan

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CONTENTS

Abbreviations

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus	(TLP)
Note Books 1914-1916	(NB)
Culture and Value	(CV)
The Brown and Blue Books	(BB)
Philosophical Grammar	(PG)
On Certainty	(OC)
Zettel	(Z)
Lecture on Religious Belief	(LRB)
Lecture on Aesthetics	(LA)
Lecture on Ethics	(LE)
Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough	(RFGB)

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

For many years, most of the literature written about Wittgenstein's philosophy tackled his philosophical ideas from the point of treating philosophical problems from a linguistic point of view. There were many books and articles focusing upon the analysis of Language and logic in the earlier thought, while others focused upon the philosophical notions which dominated the later thought. None envisaged that these ideas had been motivated by other factors. But with the publication, in the late sixties, of Paul Engelman's Memoir and his correspondence with Wittgenstein, some attention was paid to Wittgenstein's claim, in one of his letters, that the point of the 'Tractatus' is an ethical one[1], and some attempts were made to investigate this claim. In fact, the 'Tractatus' ends with mysticism and the number of remarks or pages devoted to ethics or mysticism are very few, making it difficult to investigate its ethical and mystical dimension. In addition, in the later thought there are some lectures and remarks such as 'Lecture on Religious Belief' or 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough', or the scattered remarks in 'Culture and Value' or 'On Certainty', and philosophical notions such as a background or a world-picture, reveal, so to speak a religious motivation behind some major philosophical ideas. Even 'Philosophical Investigations' was envisaged by Mickel Drury, from his conversations with Wittgenstein, as having been written from a religious point of view.[2] But still, there is nothing in the 'Investigations' which reveals its religious nature, nor do other philosophical books show that.

In a wider sense, this thesis is a contribution to the recent debate regarding the importance of religion in Wittgenstein's life and thought. For, the recent biographical publications of the philosopher's life such as Brian

McGuinness's book 'Wittgenstein A Life, Young Ludwig, 1889-1921' and Ray Monk's book 'Ludwig Wittgenstein The Duty of Genius' have brought to the surface the importance of religion in Wittgenstein's life. In addition, most biographical writings show the ethical dimension of the uncompromising character of the philosopher and the style of life he lived under the umbrella of his religious belief.

One important factor in studying the relation between Wittgenstein's religious view and his philosophical ideas can be taken from his later thought. In the later philosophical writings, the concept of meaning had changed from the arrangement of elements in a proposition depicting a fact in the world, to the use of words or propositions in a certain context. In other words, the interpretation or understanding of the meaning of a word or a proposition can be found in the way and the context in which it is used. And, in a wider sense, understanding linguistic expressions, gestures, emotions, etc. .... is a part of a way of life or a cultural medium. This way of interpreting words and ideas can be applied to the argument of the thesis from the following perspective. The religious motivation of Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas cannot be detected from the published philosophical writings, but it can be seen in the context of his life, in his attitude towards modern life with its social and political problems, the style of life he lived, and his conversations with his friends. Shortly before his death, Wittgenstein described his life to Dr Bevan's wife as wonderful.[3] Whether that was the case or not, what matters here is to examine the philosophical ideas in the context of his life. The degree of seriousness with which Wittgenstein took his belief was apparent in his style of life after World War One, when he abandoned his fortune, left the comfortable life of Vienna, worked as a school teacher to support himself, thought of becoming a monk, etc. All these reflect the importance of religion and how it transformed the

philosopher's personal life. Once he told M. Drury that "it is my belief that only if you try to be helpful to other people will you in the end find your way to God."[4] Moreover, in the introduction to 'Philosophical Remarks' he wrote that the spirit of the book should not be described in it and he dedicated it to the glory of God. So, since the religious motivation is either not clearly apparent, or barely mentioned, as in the final pages of the 'Tractatus', while, on the other hand, it is clearly apparent in Wittgenstein's personal life, then the religious motivation can be explained in a combination between the philosophical ideas and biographical sources and can be seen in the context of the philosopher's life. That is why, after two years of work on Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas, I became eager to read biographical materials, because I found them the most important source in presenting Wittgenstein's religious view.

So, since most of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings do not reveal that they have been written with a religious motivation or framework, the biographical materials provide the opportunity to investigate this motivation behind his philosophical ideas. Through his surviving notebooks, either those with philosophical notes or personal recordings, various conversations, letters, memoirs and diaries of the students and friends who surrounded him, the religious dimension can be shown. In addition, the way in which the 'Tractatus' was written made it necessary to go back not only to biographical sources, to interpret it from a religious point of view, but also to intellectual sources because Wittgenstein listed thinkers, critics, scientists and artists who exerted different degrees of influence which contributed to shaping the earlier thought.

Another significant source which helps in examining the religious motivation of Wittgenstein's thought is his artistic interest, especially as regards literature. There have been many attempts to investigate the relation between religious belief and ethics and ethics and aesthetics,[5] but none carried out a systematic investigation between the arts, literature specifically and religion. Thus, there are three main factors in investigating the religious motivation in Wittgenstein's philosophy. They are biographical sources, intellectual background and the artistic, especially literary, interest.

There are two fundamental reasons behind this biographical approach. The first is that the 'Tractatus' is the only book Wittgenstein had published during his lifetime, while all other books which we know now, around fourteen, were published after his death by his friends and students. They were written in the form of short notes, and did not follow a certain order. Thus, it is necessary to go back to some biographical sources to explain what Wittgenstein meant by these remarks or how they can be arranged in a certain order by relying either on recorded conversations or his friends' accounts.

The second reason which demands a return to biographical material is in the presentation of Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas and religious view, which includes a combination between his personal experience and the development of the philosophical ideas, for example, the way in which he converted to Christianity and the reasons behind that. Wittgenstein had lived, in his youth, in a cultural milieu characterised by the loss of many intellectual figures in Vienna whom he personally admired, such as Ludwig Boltzman and Otto Weininger. Those figures, and others, took an uncompromising view of life, which led them to kill themselves. Ray Monk was right in choosing the title 'The Laboratory for Self-Destruction' to describe this environment, in

which taking one's own life was a remarkable phenomenon. This phenomenon was particularly close to Wittgenstein's eyes, because three of his brothers committed suicide, at different times and in different circumstances. It was in this environment that the young Ludwig grew up, which explains the personal condition recognised by his closest friends while he was in Cambridge, of constant depression, fear of death, the desire to commit suicide, angst, feeling himself a miserable person, etc. which accompanied him and led to his conversion to Christianity. This gives a clue to one of three experiences in 'Lecture on Ethics', i.e. the experience of feeling absolutely safe, in contrast to the personal depression, fear and torment. In this context, I believe Brian McGuinness's book tackled the early years of Wittgenstein's life in depth and is far more profound than the part of Monk's book which tackled the same period. His account of the development of Wittgenstein's character and the change which took place in his view of life provides a good background for a coherent interpretation of the major ideas of the earlier thought, whereas Monk generalised this period and almost ignored the role of personal factors in the development of the philosopher's thought.

In the case of the arts, the importance of linking religion with literature springs from the deep influence which was exerted by the Russian novelists Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky on Wittgenstein's character, life and ideas. Both had presented religious ideas and teachings in their literary works and decisively shaped Wittgenstein's religious view in the earlier and later thought. One interesting point, which really attracted my attention and shows the depth of Wittgenstein's literary interest, is that the biography gives no indication that he recommended a single philosophical book, apart from the discussion of the 'Tractatus' and the draft of 'Philosophical Investigations', to any of his friends or students. Instead he always recommended and gave them, personally,

copies of Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's novels and stories and detective magazines, with an insistence that they learn from them and even discuss them, for once he said about the latter that there is a grain of wisdom in these magazines which is absent in a philosophical periodical such as 'Mind'.[6] In addition, it is well known that Wittgenstein expressed resentment of his profession as a university lecturer while teaching in Cambridge. The plan to emigrate to Russia and to work as a manual labourer in the mid thirties and the resignation from his post in 1947, after the Second World War, show that he had little interest in teaching philosophy, in contrast to his fond and deep interest in literary works and the arts in general. (He constantly urged many of his students to give up studying philosophy and look for manual or other work.)

Another point which adds to the significance of investigating Wittgenstein's literary interest in relation to his religious view, is the early and later attitude to the role of the arts. It is clear, in the earlier thought, that his literary interest had a decisive impact upon the religious view which ended with mysticism. At the end of the 'Tractatus' the claim that the mystical shows itself can be justified by examining the role which the arts play in the process of showing. One important feature in Wittgenstein's mysticism is the experience of wonder at the existence of the world as a world created by God, an experience which can be described by allegory (LE, p. 8). Another remark pointed out that the work of art forces us to see an object from a certain perspective (CV, p. 4). Furthermore, the connection between ethics, aesthetics and mysticism, which is described as 'what cannot be said', can be seen in viewing the world 'sub specie aeternitatis', i.e., to view the world from the point of eternity (NB, p. 83). Another point concerning this matter of the connection between the three is the language in which they are presented, i.e.

by considering religious language as a literary language through pointing out the features of this language. In other words, the distinction between the sphere of fact and value in the 'Tractatus' is in actuality a distinction between science on the one hand and religion, ethics and aesthetics on the other. Since this distinction is made manifest through the analysis of language the linguistic features of both spheres can be drawn. The separation between science and religion can be seen against the background of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries where the role of both in human life was under scrutiny. The advance of science had created a state of shock within the religious establishment because it questioned the basic principles of Christian faith. That led to the search for a new interpretation of religion to accommodate it in the age of science. The limits of scientific enquiry, which deals with objective facts and natural phenomenon, gave scope to reinterpret the role of religion in life and the religious content was considered as a form of artistic expression. One important aspect was to consider religious language as a poetic or literary language, and religious instructions and themes as being conveyed by artistic means. This way of treating religious content and the role of science can serve as a background to interpretation of Wittgenstein's earlier thought. For science can serve as a paradigm of the sphere of facts, since it deals with material and objective things and natural manifestations in the world.

In the intellectual background, the wonderful account of Alan Janik and Steven Tolmin in their book 'Wittgenstein's Vienna' provides a fascinating and valuable insight into the environment in which Wittgenstein grew up. By presenting the situation of Vienna in the second half of the nineteenth century as the city of dreams and contradictions, the book covered different social, economic and cultural aspects of the Hapsberg Empire. The intellectual atmosphere in the city was dominated by many areas of conflict concerning

various themes. The account which the authors gave of some cultural aspects focused upon the distinction between fact and value and the significance of the purity of language and its role in determining accuracy and truth. The influence of theViennese intellectual figures whose names appeared in the 'Tractatus', such as Heinrich Hertz and Fritz Mauthner, can be made clear by going back to their original writings to determine exactly what Wittgenstein meant by some remarks and to provide an overall interpretation of these remarks. That is also the case with Karl Kraus and Adolf Loos who, by Wittgenstein's admission, had influenced him. In addition, the ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer, Bertrand Russell and Leo Tolstoy serve to clarify some unclear ideas in the earlier thought. And this intellectual background gives us a clue to interpret the claim that the point of the 'Tractatus' is an ethical one within a religious framework.

As the earlier thought required a return to biographical sources, intellectual background and artistic interest, to investigate the religious dimension, a similar approach can be applied to the later thought, to show the religious framework or motivation underlying the main philosophical notions. To put it plainly, the consideration of religion as a way of life, not as a mystical experience, forced Wittgenstein to reconsider his earlier philosophical ideas about the analysis of language, logic, their relation to the world and the distinction between the sphere of fact and value or what can or cannot be said. The later concept of religion motivated the philosopher to investigate the relation between language and social activities, since religious activities are an essential part of social and daily life. As in the early writings, it is quite hard to justify this claim from the major philosophical works in the later thought, such as 'Philosophical Investigations', 'On Certainty', 'Philosophical Grammar', and 'Brown and Blue Books'. Apart from a few remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough', and the collected notes from his students, which formed the 'Lecture

on Religious Belief', there is nothing to reveal that the later thought was motivated by a religious impulse. To investigate this approach, it is necessary to go back to biographical sources, personal experience, intellectual influence and the attitude towards the arts.

But it is necessary to mention here that this task of relying upon biographical materials is not as easy as in the case of the earlier thought. A justification of this claim will be made at the beginning of the fourth chapter. Nevertheless, there are biographical and intellectual materials which help in clarifying and giving support to the line of argument of the thesis. Norman Malcolm, in his book 'Wittgenstein, A Religious Point of View', which was published three years after his death in summer 1990, highlighted the religious awareness of the later thought. In his account, he proposed four elements of analogy between the religious and philosophical ideas. The strongest analogy, which is obvious in the later writings, was the acceptance of forms of life without justification, while the others are not so significant. However, I believe he missed the notion of a world-picture which is at the heart of Wittgenstein's religious view and writings and the later interpretation of the arts, for these are very important factors in dealing with the religious motivation of the later thought.

There are three main points which need to be clarified through biographical and intellectual sources. The first is the opposition to building religion upon adogmatic basis; the second, the scattered remarks, in the later writings, about a child, pupil, teacher and bringing up a child; and the third, the connection between language and social activities, i.e. forms of life. All these points played a certain role in shaping Wittgenstein's later philosophical ideas, within the framework of his later religious view.

Wittgenstein's later religious view was based upon the refusal to build religious belief upon a theory or a doctrine; in essence, he conceived it as a group of social activities attached to actual life. This view was inspired by the writings of Leo Tolstoy, whose influence on Wittgenstein's character, personal life and the later understanding of religion is remarkable. Tolstoy expressed his disgust at religious belief being built and interpreted upon a doctrine and attacked those who did so and who separated it from what goes on in actual life. Moreover, Wittgenstein's scattered remarks about children and teaching can be seen in the light of his occupation. The contribution of his experience as an elementary school teacher in connection with his religious view and philosophical ideas is clear in the idea of a child being brought up and learning a form of life and the use of words according to a certain context and that is at the heart of the notion of a world picture or a background, which is a culmination of upbringing. For Wittgenstein had prayed and read the Gospel with his pupils, which gave an idea about how a child can be given religious instruction.

Moreover, the final element which shows the religious motivation behind the later ideas can be deduced from the shift in the artistic interest of the philosopher. It is a shift from the Schopenhauerian concept of art as a redeemer from the trouble of life, to realistic works of art, especially literary works, which depict real people and events in actual life. And the obvious claim that the work of art describes ways of living, without any doubt, is in line with the later concept of religion as a way of life. Even stories, expressions of emotions, gestures and figurative uses of language can be understood against a cultural background, i.e., a way of living. So, the examination of the role of the

arts is an important element, for it enhances the claim that the later philosophical ideas were motivated by a religious awareness.

Thus, the main objective of the thesis is to investigate the relation between Wittgenstein's religious view, philosophical ideas and the arts from two standpoints, first, as a mystical experience and second, as a way of life. As a result, the thesis is divided into two main parts. This division is connected with the development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical thought. The first is devoted to showing the rigorous distinction between religion and art on the one hand and science on the other. This distinction was due to the classical view which dominated the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries where both science and religion had a distinctive role in human life and knowledge.

The second will tackle the later thought, where Wittgenstein's concept of religion had changed and played an essential part in the development of his thought. For he considered religion as a way of life. That was due to the change in his philosophical ideas from the picture theory of meaning, as it appeared in the 'Tractatus', to language games, forms of life and meaning as use, which appeared in his later writings.

In order to provide a coherent investigation of the relation between religion, the arts and Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas, the thesis has been divided into four main chapters. The first serves as a brief background to Wittgenstein's earlier thought. It starts with a brief and general view of the advance of science and the retreat of religion. This scientific advance impacted on different aspects of human life and extended to human thought. It replaced the old religious view and the interpretation of the world which dominated the history of humanity until the sixteenth and seventeenth century.

Scientific theories and laws replaced the old teleological interpretation of nature and the universe. But despite that, there are people who still believe in different religions and ancient myths, irrespective of the new methods of interpretation of nature and life. I want to show in this chapter that there is a distinction between science and religion and this distinction will be shown through the limits of both science and religion. There are limits to science and scientific enquiry and through these limits the distinction between science and religion can be made clear. Religion and science operate in different fields. Science deals with nature, natural phenomenon and physical causes in the objective world, while religion is considered as a personal experience which provides a meaning of life and a moral guide. This distinction appeared in the writings of many religious thinkers and philosophers such as Matthew Arnold, Soren Kierkegaard and others. Arnold focused upon the role of language in his distinction between the two, i.e. religious language was treated as a poetic language which has the power to give examples of imaginative literary forms. In contrast scientific language describes natural phenomenon. Kierkegaard had set the same separation between the two by concentrating upon the role of the subject, and believed that religious ideas can be conveyed through 'indirect communication', i.e. through artistic means.

This brief background paves the way to examine Wittgenstein's aim in his earlier thought to achieve, the rigorous distinction between the spheres of fact and value which is, in fact, a distinction between science and religion.

In the process of investigating Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas I will emphasise the relationship between his personal experiences and the development of his thought. For this reason the second chapter will start with a very brief account of Wittgenstein's life and its important events, and the

personal interest in religion and literature in his earlier life. For Wittgenstein looked on religion with contempt in his adolescence. But in 1912 he attended a play in Vienna and from this play, he said, he saw the possibility of religion. This possibility turned into actuality when he fought in the First World War which prompted his conversion to Christian faith.

In addition, his personal interest in literature was linked with the writers who presented religious ideas and values, such as Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky. Those writers had a deep influence on Wittgenstein's thought and life. At the end of this chapter there is a brief review of Wittgenstein's personal interest in other arts.

The third chapter is devoted to a detailed examination of the earlier thought which started with the analysis of the world and language and ended with mysticism. At the beginning, an examination is given of the main ideas of the philosophers, critics, scientists and novelists who exerted a decisive influence in shaping Wittgenstein's ideas. The first three, Kraus, Hertz and Mauthner are seen in the context of the socio-cultural background of Vienna. There are two fundamental themes. The first is the importance of language as a means of clarity and truth, and the second is the distinction between the sphere of fact and the sphere of value. The ideas of others such as Russell and Schopenhauer, respectively, provided the analysis of the world and language, and of the subject and its relation to the world. Wittgenstein's engagement with Tolstoy's religious ideas during the war is also discussed. There follows a detailed explanation of the main ideas of the 'Tractatus', which includes the analysis of the world and language and the relation between them and the role of logic in that relation. Through this analysis, the limits of language can be seen according to the picture theory of meaning and the distinction between the

spheres of fact and value. As a result, the linguistic features of science and religion can be identified so as to establish clearly the distinction between them.

In addition, Wittgenstein's mysticism can be interpreted as a consequence of the process of the analysis of language, which means the 'Tractatus' should not be considered as a book dealing with logic and language only. What Wittgenstein preferred to stay silent about was described as the mystical, which shows itself. I believe it shows itself in art and action and that is compatible with Wittgenstein's claim, in a letter to Ludwig Ficker, that the point of the 'Tractatus' is an ethical one. In the light of this, the discussion of the mystical will present a combination between Schopenhauer and Russell's ideas, taking from the first his concept of the subject, ethics and the will and from the latter, the main general elements of mysticism which appeared in his article, 'Mysticism and Logic'.

Wittgenstein's conversion to Christianity was an important event in his life, which took a very different turn after the war. There are clear indications that his later view of religion had an impact upon his later philosophical thoughts and his attitude to the arts. That is the subject of the fourth and the fifth chapters. The fourth chapter will examine the main factors which played an important part in breaking the hold of the early ideas, with an emphasis, again, upon his personal experience. This can be seen in the direct personal influence of Tolstoy's ideas of living with the peasants, and how religion can be understood. Moreover, Wittgenstein's experience as an elementary school teacher are reflected in the consideration that the process of teaching a child the meaning of a word is, in fact, teaching its different uses. The use of a word is connected with social activities, i.e., forms of life. That will follow a discussion to the main philosophical notions in the later thought. The chapter ends with an account of how the treatment of philosophical problems from an

anthropological point of view led to connect meaning with the use of words in actual life. All that paves the way to show the religious motivations of the later ideas in the fifth chapter. It starts with the later view of religion as a way of life which is based upon the refusal to build religious belief on a theoretical or doctrinal basis and the impact of that understanding upon his philosophical ideas. As a result of the connection between religion and social activities, Wittgenstein posed the notion of a 'world-picture' or a background which derives from a certain upbringing. A careful explanation of this notion will show how the analysis of language started from a proposition as a picture and ended in connecting language with social activities and culture as a whole. Finally, it will be shown how the later interpretation of the arts adds to the significance of the religious awareness of Wittgenstein's thought.

Notes

1. Engelmann, Paul, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with A Memoir*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, p. 143.

2. Drury, M., Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein, *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections*, Edited by Rush Rhees, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, p. 94.

3. Malcolm, Norman, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir*, Oxford University Press, 1st ed., 1978, p. 100.

4. Drury, M., Some Conversations with Wittgenstein, *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections*, p. 129.

5. See, for example, Barrett, Cyril, *Wittgenstein's Ethics and Religious Belief*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, and Tilghman, B.R., *Wittgenstein's Ethics and Aesthetics*, The View from Eternity, Swansea Studies in Philosophy, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1991.

6. Malcolm, N., *Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir*, p. 36.

CHAPTER ONE

The Nineteenth Century Intellectual Background, Science and Religion

In order to have a clear understanding of the background of the distinction between science and religion in Wittgenstein's earlier thought, it is necessary to shed light, briefly, on the interpretation of the two in the nineteenth century, and this is the task of this short introductory chapter. It will start with a brief historical sketch of the development of modern science which led to the replacement of the old religious interpretations of nature and the universe, and the retreat of religious authority and establishment. On the other hand, the progress of science did not answer the questions of life, i.e. there are limits for scientific enquiries. These limits gave an opportunity to re-interpret religion and its purpose in life and to examine its content from an artistic point of view.

The roots of the development of modern science go back to five centuries ago when the authority of religion and religious establishment, almost everywhere in the world, was unquestioned. The religious view and interpretation of life and the world dominated every manifestation of people's life and culture. All ideas were subject to the prior agreement of the clergy, who represented the authority of God on earth. Any other opinion, idea or view which opposed or differed from that of religious authorities faced oppression and punishment. People who carried a different view or ideas faced torture, imprisonment and execution.

Under these circumstances, the conflict between science and religion emerged. It started in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which marked the early beginnings of modern science. The new scientific discoveries raised many questions as to the interpretation of nature and the universe, man's view

and thinking about life which was based upon Christian belief in Europe. In the middle ages there were many principles not open to question and people who tried to defy, reject or question these principles would face an unknown fate. These principles were built upon many of the Greeks' ideas and the Christian creed which provided an explanation of the origin of the universe, the creation of humankind and animals, the fate of the world, the implementation of God's instruction in life, the structure of the solar system, the relation between the earth and other planets and stars, etc. The religious establishment had adopted many Aristotelian ideas especially those which dealt with his cosmological view and its interpretations. One of the important ideas adopted by the Christian church was that the earth is the centre of the universe and all other planets, stars and satellites revolve around it. In addition, all heavenly bodies revolve around the earth in a circular way according to the concept that the circle is the noblest of all forms. These ideas and others, formed with the Christian religion the view of the medieval man towards the world and life. People had grown up according to this belief because Christianity and what supported it were the only source of knowledge.

The first real challenge appeared in the sixteenth century when Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) fired the first shot against the authority of the church and its teachings. He took the first step and inspired scientists after his death. In his book 'On the Revolution of the Heavenly Bodies', which was published shortly before his death, he turned the widespread view about the universe upside down. He claimed that the sun, not the earth, is the centre of the universe. That was a clear message of challenge to the church. Fortunately, he died and escaped from the revenge of the church in the same year when his book was published. But other scientists did not escape from the harassment and punishment of the religious authority.

It was Galilei Galileo (1564-1642) who followed and improved Copernicus' ideas about the universe and declared his new discoveries in clear defiance of the authorities. He became the most famous scientist of his time. His merit and great contribution to science lay in his ability to provide what Bertrand Russell called "a combination of experimental and mechanical skill with the power of embodying his results in mathematical formulae".[1] Moreover, the invention of the telescope gave Galileo a great advantage. Through observations he confirmed Copernicus' ideas that the earth revolves around the sun and is not the centre of the universe. Another two important discoveries through the telescope were that Jupiter has a satellite and that the sun has spots. The former contradicted the belief that there are only seven heavenly bodies: five planets, the moon and the sun. The latter was considered by theologians a blemish of the creator's work.[2] In the Bible we find "And God made two great lights, the greater light to rule the day and the lesser light to rule the night, he made the stars also".[3] As a result of his discoveries and defiance, Galileo was summoned to Rome and appeared before the Inquisition and forced to renounce his works. The deduction of the Inquisition was:

> The first proposition, that the sun is the centre and does not revolve around the earth, is foolish, absurd, false in theology and heretical because expressly contrary to Holy Scripture ... The second proposition, that the earth is not the centre, but revolves about the sun, is absurd, false in philosophy and, from a theological point of view at least, opposed to the true faith.[4]

Galileo's agreement to renounce his works was compelled by the belief that if he refused, he would face grave consequences. In 1600, Giordano Bruno had been burned to death because he stood by his opinions.

These new discoveries paved the way for other scientists who were inspired by the works of Galileo and Copernicus. In 1642, the year in which Galileo died, Isaac Newton (1642-1727) was born. Newton was a truly brilliant scientist. His achievements were considered to be the turning point in the history of science and humanity. He discovered the law of gravitation after a long and deep study of bodies and their masses, movements and the distance which separates them. The law of gravity is universal and it can be applied to all bodies everywhere in the universe. The discovery of this law was another blow for the church. It overthrew the Aristotelian teleological interpretation of the universe, in favour of a new mechanical explanation.

Furthermore, Newton's gravity law and his other laws showed that:

> Everything is made up of particles which obey mechanical laws; therefore, in principle, everything about the universe can be known, and if it were possible to know the position and velocity of every particle in existence, everything that ever happened or ever will happen could be predicted. The whole thing is a great machine.[5]

From this perspective, Newton had freed science from the authority of religion, the dominant philosophical view of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers and established its independence. Science and scientific enquiry started to deal with objective things, their characteristics, volume, shape, etc. according to mathematical calculations.

All the previous discoveries, together with the gradual emergence of science as a method deals with facts, natural laws and phenomena; and as a method to examine a set of hypotheses through experiment to reach certain results, had put the medieval view of the world and the place of man in it at

stake. The face of the universe had changed. Miracles could no longer be used to interpret natural phenomena, because these miracles contradict the laws of nature. The ancient Greek concept of harmony in the movement of heavenly bodies had been replaced by laws which explain how they relate together through natural causes. Natural phenomena were no more explained by external factors or powers but according to scientific explanations.

The progress of science became one of the most important factors in the history of humanity especially in contemporary life. The spread of scientific research and methods went beyond natural phenomena, industry and technology to social phenomena. It also influenced human thought, for many philosophical schools adopted scientific methods as tools for their enquiries. In addition, there are specialised fields of scientific enquiry.

First of all, modern science investigates the causes which lead to natural manifestations and formulates these causes and accounts in laws and equations. The study of natural phenomena is an objective search which depends upon the nature of the phenomenon and what caused it. In addition, it deals with objective facts and what actually happens, i.e. with the objective facts in the world as they are, independent from our view and will. In studying a certain phenomenon, a scientist may form a theory from a group of observed and collected facts to give an interpretation of this phenomenon. Moreover, one of the major characteristics of scientific knowledge and investigation is the search for valid generalisation and measurements such as shape, volume, numbers, quantities etc. and constants. Furthermore, scientific enquiry starts from some hypothesis which can be examined via experiments to reach precise results and determine the truth or falsity of them.

From the above we can draw some conclusions as to the nature of the scientific enquiry. The first is that it deals with objective facts and things in the world. The second is that, scientific hypotheses and claims are verifiable, i.e. they can be tested to determine their truth or falsehood. The third is that it is impersonal, i.e. it deals with objective facts which are independent from our point of view and excluded from our personal desire, values and emotions. As a result there are limits to the scientific investigation, which it cannot exceed. For example, human values such as good, evil, love, etc. are not subject to scientific enquiry or experiment because they are not facts or things which have a shape, quantity or size to be measured or counted. In other words, they do not exist in the world. In spite of the huge progress of science and technology it does not answer all the questions about life. It does not answer the questions of the meaning of life nor does it tell us how to behave and what is the right and the wrong behaviour. These limits of science provided the opportunity to re-interpret the role of religion in life, and subsequently, different ideas concerning the interpretation of religion and its role in life emerged.

As a result of the advance of science, religion and the religious establishment had suffered a great setback. The popularity of religion started to wane, in contrast to the appreciation of science and its development. Under these circumstances many theologians started to look for new ways to interpret religion. Since that time, many opinions and interpretations have been put forward. Some said that God revealed himself in Christ and that no concern should be paid to incidents in natural history and this should be the key to understanding the scripture. Others held that the scientific laws of nature were revealed by God and science in this perspective enhances the understanding of God's wisdom.[6] In addition, a new movement had established itself in theology in the eighteenth century. The basic principle of this movement was that a God

reveals himself in nature. It advocated and emphasised that the greatness of the universe and the preciseness of its organisation was due to the skilfulness of its Designer.[7]

The dispute about the accommodation of religion with scientific discoveries was endless. Different opinions and approaches were given, of which some survived and others were abandoned. But in the nineteenth century a new dimension was crystallised. Earlier in the century, a criticism had been launched of the views of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries which were based on the attempt by many theologians to apply the concept of truth in science to the subject matter of religion.[8] In other words, the content of any religion, for instance, the Bible should not be taken in its literal sense. In addition to that, step by step, religion began to take a personal dimension. First, since religious language was not to be taken literally, might not its content be more akin to art? The second, by connecting religion to the individual and departing from the old religious view which deals with natural manifestations and cosmological interpretation led to the emphasis on religion as mystical experience which provides a view of life and a commitment to a certain course of conduct. These two ideas about religion and its content dominated the intellectual argument in the nineteenth century and were recognised by philosophers, critics, scientists, novelists, etc. It was widely recognised that there is a distinction between science and religion which is based upon the role each plays in human life and knowledge, in that religion is related to the subject while science dealt with objective facts.

We have already seen the area of scientific investigation and now we turn to religion. The argument will focus upon two thinkers who tried to identify the subject matter of religion and its place in human life. The two are

Matthew Arnold and Soren Kierkegaard. Both had maintained in their writings the distinction between the two, linked religious context to the arts and emphasised the moral dimension of religion.

Although there is no evidence that Wittgenstein had read any of Arnold's writings, the latter's ideas are relevant in two main respects. The first is his treatment of religious language as a literary language, which is the case in Wittgenstein's earlier writings, while the second is the distinction between the features of literary and religious language on the one hand and scientific language on the other. This distinction will be helpful in the discussion of the linguistic features of religion and science in Wittgenstein's earlier thought. As regards Kierkegaard, Russell had mentioned that, in 1919, Wittgenstein had read Kierkegaard after his release from captivity and conversion to the Christian faith. Whether there is an influence of Kierkegaard on Wittgenstein's religious view, at that period, is not clear because the 'Tractatus' had already been completed. However, both Arnold's and Kierkegaard's ideas can usefully be viewed in the framework of the intellectual discussion of religion and science in the nineteenth century.

Matthew Arnold was one of the people who started to look for new interpretations of religion. In his view, to tackle the declining popularity of religion, the new way of interpreting religion should avoid the old style of explanations, teaching and preaching and should abandon the theological claims about the universe. In the light of this, any religious claims about miracles or an interaction from a supernatural power, should be set aside because this contradicts the laws of nature. So, to persuade people to religion in the age of scientific advance, new explanations were needed. There was a need for a revolutionary explanation to accommodate religion from the state of chaos

caused by science. It should not come from outside, it should come from Christianity itself. Christianity should present its content in an understandable way which has, at least, some actual aspects. From this point of view, Arnold proposed a way in which the Bible could be understood. He said:

> To understand that the language of the Bible is fluid, passing and literary, not rigid, fixed, and scientific, is the first step towards a right understanding of the Bible.[9]

To understand the language of the Bible, and religion as a whole, as literary language means that there are many affinities between them. To be more precise, religious language as a whole is considered to be literary language. Here is a direct claim for the content of religion to be considered in a literary form. That is the result of not considering religious language as literal, like scientific language. For religious language is full of figurative uses of imaginative language, such as lie at the heart of literary language.[10] For instance, God is represented as a figure of a super human being and if the description of Him is taken literally then God will be a human being with supernatural powers. So, there is a distinction between the terms which refer to religious matters from those which refer to scientific matters. Terms such as God, good, bad, evil, last judgement, etc. are of common discourse between people which can be used in poetic or eloquent form. On the other hand, terms such as metal, atomic weight, etc. can be used in scientific discourse. According to this view, to treat religious terms as scientific is to commit an error, because these terms cannot be subjected to the experimental methods of science.

In other words, the way of learning the word God differs completely from that of learning a tangible object such as a table or a pin; it can be learned

through a set of descriptions of a hidden power. Furthermore, another important feature which shows the literary nature of the religious context is that any religion is full of narratives. Religion attaches a special importance to narratives, which serve many purposes. For instance, the Qura'n is full of narratives which deal with different themes. Here is a passage which asserts that:

> We have sent it down as an Arabic Qura'n, in order that ye may learn wisdom. We do relate unto thee the most beautiful stories in that we reveal to thee this (portion of the) Qura'n: before this, thou too was among those who knew it not.[11]

There are narratives in the Qura'n which talk about the creation of the universe, the earth, human beings, about the prophets, moral behaviour and about different nations. I will give an example here of the prophets; the story of Joseph as it appeared in the Qura'n, and show later the affinity with an ordinary story. The prophet Joseph's brothers had planned a conspiracy to get rid of him because he was the favourite son of his father. Here is a part of the narrative:

> Surely, in the affair of Joseph and his brethren there are many sins for seekers after truth, when they conferred together and said: Joseph and his brother are dearer to our father than we are, though we are a strong party. In this matter our father is surely in manifest error. Therefore, let us put Joseph to death or cast him out to some distant land so that we may enjoy our father's favourite exclusively, and we therefore become a righteous band. One of them said: Do not put Joseph to death, but if you must do something, cast him into the bottom of a deep well, some of the travellers will pick him up and you will achieve your purpose.[12]

The narrative continued. They persuaded their father to take Joseph with them for a short picnic and then carried out their plan and threw Joseph in

a deep well. They pretended that a wolf had eaten their brother and brought his shirt, covered in blood, to their father. In fact, they had killed a small bird and spread its blood over their brother's shirt. Later on, Joseph was picked up by travellers and sent to the king's palace because he was so beautiful. He grew up there and later became a prophet of God, etc. etc.

Joseph's story shows how his brothers plotted to kill him. The narrative as a whole can be compared with a tale which can be told to children. It described some events in Joseph's earlier life. It has a beginning, a middle plot and an end. It contains different characters who participate in certain events, performing various actions in a manner compatible with the development of the purpose of the narrative. There are other narratives such as those pointing to ethical deeds or the process of creation etc. etc.

Furthermore, Arnold argued, in his book, Literature and Dogma, that "the object of religion is conduct".[13] And in this sense conduct brings religion to the sphere of morality. For people in any community engage in different activities every day and these activities are based upon social and ethical rules. They eat, drink, trade, seek pleasure, engage in sexual relationships, fulfil their instincts etc. etc. These activities require certain forms of conduct which can show what is right and what is wrong, i.e. what is good and evil, what is useful and harmful. Believers, in any religion, share their life with other people where they live. According to their religion there are many duties and practices to be observed. These practices ought to be carried out by believers, and if they are not, punishment will ensue. In other words, believers should commit themselves to a set of religious activities which form their style of life and this style of life includes certain moral activities which shape the moral dimension of the believer's life. Therefore, Arnold reached the conclusion that:

Ethical means practical, it relates to practice or conduct passing into habit or disposition. Religious also means practical, but practical in a still higher degree; and the right antithesis to both the ethical and religious, is the same as the right antithesis to practical: namely theoretical.[14]

The fulfilment of religious duties or instructions is accompanied with a sort of emotional state which reflects a sense of satisfaction due to the fulfilment of God's commands. In other words, religious ethical deeds are touched by emotions:

Religion if we follow the intention of human thought and human language in the use of the word, is ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling; the passage from morality to religion is made when to morality is applied emotion. And the true meaning of religion is thus, not simply morality, but morality touched by emotion. And this new elevation and inspiration of morality is well marked by the word 'righteousness'. Conduct is the word of common life, morality is the word of philosophical disquisition, righteousness is the word of religion.[15]

What Arnold wanted to emphasise is the emotional factor in religious belief, i.e. it is a part of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of a belief. In the case of performance of religious duties there is a sense of relief or even a happy feeling; in contrast, in the case of non-fulfilment there is a feeling of guilt or remorse.

The previous point brings us to the end of the presentation of Matthew Arnold's ideas about the subject matter of religion and how we can understand and interpret it. He summed up his ideas as follows:

The language of the Bible, then, is literary, not scientific language; language thrown out at an object of consciousness not fully grasped, which inspired emotion. Evidently if the object be one not fully to be grasped, and one to inspire emotion, the

language of figure and feeling will satisfy us better about it, will cover more of what we seek to express, than the language of literal fact and science. The language of science about it will be below what we feel to be the truth.[16]

The argument which Arnold had posed in his view of religion is a vital one. Its significance stems from drawing its focus on language, where religious language is considered as literary language and the distinction between science and religion can be made linguistically. Religious language is considered as a poetic language because it possesses the features of literary language; it is figurative, expressive and prescriptive. That is a very importance consequence of relating the context of religion to the arts, and it provides the possibility of drawing a distinction between science and religion by a demarcation between the linguistic aspects of both of them. This study of language is in the interest of many philosophers and philosophical schools in the twentieth century.

The distinction between science and religion and art can be seen in the works of the Dane, Soren Kierkegaard, who was one of the prominent figures in philosophy in the nineteenth century. He was a profound subjective thinker whose writings penetrate deep into the subjective side of the personal existence. Kierkegaard was another philosopher who maintained in his writings the distinction between science and religion. In fact, he posed a radical distinction between the two and any attempt by either to interfere in the other's sphere will lead to confusion. In 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript', he claimed that "when the different spheres are not decisively distinguished from one another, confusion reigns everywhere".[17] The spheres which Kierkegaard referred to are the objective facts in which science and scientific methods operate, and the other sphere is the subject and values, to which he related the arts:

> Almost everything that flourishes nowadays under the name of science (particularly natural science) is not science at all but curiosity ... . Scientific methods become particularly dangerous and pernicious when they encroach upon the spiritual field. Plants, animals and stars may be handled in that way, but to handle the spirit of man in such a fashion is blasphemy which only weakens moral and religious passion.[18]

Here is a clear warning of any endeavour to mix the scientific and the religious. The basis of this warning is that science deals with material things and investigates physical phenomena and has nothing to do with spiritual and religious matters. In addition, Kierkegaard distinguished between the methods of scientific and religious discourse. In the case of science, scientific knowledge can be communicated directly, while in religion the method had been described as 'indirect communications'. The direct communication of scientific knowledge is due to the nature of scientific enquiry which deals with facts in the world where they can be described and delivered objectively.

On the other hand, faith and ethics belong to the realm of the subject where science does not interfere. As an existentialist philosopher, Kierkegaard believed that morality does not depend on reasoning but is rooted in the individual: "the ethical reality of the individual is the only reality".[19] In addition, faith, also, follows the same pattern and it does not depend on the intellectual sphere:

> The realm of faith is thus not a class for numbskulls in the sphere of the intellectual, or an asylum for the feeble-minded. Faith constitutes a sphere all by itself, and every misunderstanding of Christianity may at once be recognised by its transforming it into a doctrine, transferring it to the sphere of the intellectual.[20]

Faith and morality take a social dimension in Kierkegaard's philosophy, because the individual is a social creature living within social groups and engaging in different types of activities varying from instinctive to moral, i.e. the personal dimension of the individual depends upon his willingness to carry on ethical deeds within his own most particular. In other words, faith and ethics can be placed on a practical basis by committing oneself to the cause of the infinite, i.e. God. In that sense, he refused any sort of doctrinal interpretation of religious belief.[21]

Kierkegaard devoted a large part of his writings to explaining what is the true meaning of Christianity; that was part of his striving to enlighten others about the truth. In order to achieve this goal, he undertook to fight against illusions and false understanding of Christianity. The method of fighting illusions is called 'indirect communication'. This method is in contrast to the direct communication of scientific knowledge. The reason for calling it indirect communication is Kierkegaard's belief that no "illusion can ever be destroyed directly, and only by indirect means can it be radically removed".[22] The indirect means of communication are artistic means. Through polemic, satire, irony and allegory the idols of illusion can be destroyed and another value can be created because "everything creative is latently polemical".[23] This concept lies at the heart of Kierkegaard's view of liberating the individual from false belief and understanding, especially of Christianity, to the right one:

> In all eternity it is impossible for me to compel a person to accept an opinion, a conviction, a belief. But one thing I can do: I can compel him to take notice. In one sense this is the first thing; for it is the condition antecedent to the next thing, i.e., the acceptance of an opinion, a conviction, a belief. In another sense it is the last - if, that is, he will not take the next step.[24]

What we can infer here is the importance of the arts in communicating religious values, instructions and teachings. For, by artistic means, a man can make a choice between some values and conceptual ideas. And this shows the importance of art in connection with religious belief and ethical deeds.

Kierkegaard's ideas can be summed up in the following. As an existentialist philosopher he maintained a radical distinction between the role which science on the one hand and religion, ethics and art on the other, play in human life. The distinction between science and religion was a sharp one and both spheres should be separated clearly because any mingling of the two will create confusion. For scientific knowledge deals with objective fact, i.e., the sphere of speculative reasoning, which can be communicated directly. It has nothing to do with spiritual, religious and ethical matters. In contrast, religion and ethics belong to the sphere of the subject, i.e., they are rooted in the individual. The religious and the ethical can be communicated by artistic means which can be described as 'indirect communication'. The purpose of this method of communication is to question illusions and defective ideas in order to stimulate the choice of true and genuine ones.

In the light of what has been said in this brief sketch of the distinction between science and religion in the nineteenth century, we can proceed in our investigations to the distinction between both spheres by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the early decades of the twentieth century. We have limited the discussion to just two figures of the nineteenth century because most of the philosophers, critics and scientists who exerted different degrees of influence upon Wittgenstein's earlier thought, made the same distinction in their writings and also, most of them were prominent figures of intellectual life in the nineteenth century. In addition, the distinction between fact and value was a dominant

theme in the intellectual life of Vienna, where Wittgenstein grew up and became acquainted with the ideas of prominent Viennese figures. So, this short introductory chapter gives us a brief background to the separation between science and religion which will be tackled in detail during the discussion of the influences. The rigorous distinction between science on the one hand and art, ethics, and religion on the other was achieved by the Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who became one of the most famous philosophers of this century. Wittgenstein distinguished sharply in his earlier thought between the spheres of objective facts and value. The distinction was made through the analysis of language and its relation to the world. This will be the subject of the third chapter while the next is devoted to a brief biographical sketch of Wittgenstein's life and how his personal interest in religion and the arts developed, since one of the main ideas of the thesis is to investigate the relationship between his thought and personal experience.

Notes

1. Russell, Bertrand, *Religion and Science*. Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London, first edition, p. 32.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

3. *The Bible*,

4. Russell, Bertrand, *Religion and Science*, Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London, p. 37.

5. Habgood, John, *Religion and Science*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1972, p. 36.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 49.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

9. Arnold, Matthew, *Literature and Dogma*, Thomas Nelson & Sons, London, p. 15.

10. Donovan, Peter, *Religious Language*, Sheldon Press, London, 1976, pp. 7-8.

11. *The Holy Qura'n*, Translated by A. Yousuf Ali, Amana Corp. USA, 1983, p. 550.

12. *The Holy Qura'n*, Translated by Muhammad Z. Khan, Curzon Press Ltd., first edition 1971, pp. 218, 219.

13. Arnold, Matthew, *Literature and Dogma*, pp. 39, 40.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 47.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

17. Kierkegaard, Soren, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Translated by David F. Swenson, Oxford University Press, London, 1945, p. 290.

18. Kierkegaard, Soren, *The Journals of Scientific Soren Kierkegaard*, A Selection Edited and Translated by Alexander Dru, Oxford University Press, London, 1959, no. 617, pp. 181, 182.

19. Kierkegaard, Soren, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 291.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 290, 291.

22. Kierkegaard, Soren, *The Point of View*, Translated by Walter Lowrie, Oxford, 1939, p. 24.

23. Kierkegaard, Soren, *The Present Age*, Translated by Alexander Dru and Walter Lowrie, London and New York, Oxford University Press, p. 56.

24. Kierkegaard, Soren, *The Point of View*, p. 35.

CHAPTER TWO

Wittgenstein's Life and Personal Interest in Religion and the Arts

One fundamental approach in the study of Wittgenstein's philosophy is to look for a linkage between his philosophical ideas and personal experience, because the development of events and his personal decisions led to a change in his thinking and view of life, and that personal change had a decisive influence on his philosophical ideas. What enhances this approach is Wittgenstein's limited interest in the writings of other philosophers. In other words, apart from his engagement with some of Bertrand Russell's philosophical ideas, which varied between some interest and dismissal, Schopenhauer's book, 'The world as Will and Representation' and some writings of Frege, there is no indication that he read much of the history of philosophy. In contrast, he showed a great interest in the literary works of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, scientists such as Hertz and critics such as Karl Kraus and Adolf Loos. It is from this perspective that the development of Wittgenstein's thought, whether in the earlier or the later period, will be tackled.

To achieve this aim, this chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first will give brief details of the personal life of the philosopher, which started in Vienna and ended in Cambridge. The second will trace the development of his personal interest in religion, from the contempt he expressed in his adolescence, to his later profession of Christianity. This conversion was the outcome of his seeking a change in a life full of personal torment and almost constant depression. The change occurred during the war when he confronted death and experienced dreadful circumstances. The third section discusses his literary interest and the writers whom he admired, in his early life, i.e., the spiritual and religious writings of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, which played an important role in the development of the earlier thought, especially that dealing with mysticism. In other words, the writings of the

Russian novelists, especially Dostoevsky, had led him to consider religion as a mystical experience. At the end of this section I will mention briefly other artistic interest and activities.

The Philosopher

Ludwig Wittgenstein is considered to be one of the most prominent figures in the intellectual life of the Twentieth century. The interest in his philosophical thought, personality and life is great. He is one of the few figures who attracted, and still attracts, the attention of many thinkers, writers and researchers from different disciplines.

The philosopher was born in 29 April 1889 in Vienna from a wealthy and cultured Austrian family. His father was a famous man who started the steel industry in Vienna. He had a forcible and respectable character. Wittgenstein's father had a great interest in the arts. One of his main interests was music. He and his wife were violin players and they were determined to teach their eight children music. Indeed, most of their children learned music and played, especially, on the piano and the violin. One of Wittgenstein's brothers, Paul, became a concert pianist and Wittgenstein himself, when he was young, had an ambition to be a professional conductor. Johannes Brahms and Gustav Mahler were close friends of Wittgenstein's family. In addition Wittgenstein's parents had close friendships with numerous writers, critics, thinkers and artists in Vienna, and it seemed that Wittgenstein was deeply influenced by some of their ideas.

Ludwig was educated privately in his home until the age of fourteen. He was later sent to a school in Linz. After finishing school he studied mechanical engineering in 'Technische Hochschule' (The Technical University)

in Charlottenbury, Berlin, where he studied from 1906 to 1908. Before his entry to the engineering college he had an ambition to study with the physicist, Ludwig Boltzman, having become interested in his ideas after reading his book, 'populãrc Schriften'. Unfortunately, Boltzman committed suicide in 1906, the year Wittgenstein left Linz. In his studies in the college he became familiar with Heinrich Hertz's book, The Principles of Mechanics. He was impressed with what he read and that helped him in shaping part of his earlier thought.

In 1908 he went to England to do research and from that time he became interested in different areas, such as mathematics and philosophy. At the age of nineteen he went to Manchester University and worked in designing a jet reaction propeller. In his work he found that many mathematical problems needed to be solved and that aroused his interest in pure mathematics and philosophy of mathematics. During that period he made few friendships in Manchester and concentrated upon his work, which resulted in some improvement to the propeller, and on 17 August 1911 he was awarded a patent for that development.[1] While he was studying in Manchester, one of his fellow students introduced him to Bertrand Russell's book, 'The Principia Mathematica'. The book was one of the most important events in Wittgenstein's life because his mind became occupied by many of Russell's ideas and his intellectual journey with Bertrand Russell started. In addition, he also read Gottlob Frege's book, "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik", and was impressed by it. From that time, Wittgenstein started to think deeply about mathematical and philosophical problems and that interest encouraged him to travel to Cambridge and Germany, to meet Russell and Frege. He finally settled in Cambridge. There he became a student and close friend of Bertrand Russell. The latter was impressed by Wittgenstein's talent and ability to discuss philosophical ideas. He began to study with Russell and made a remarkable

progress. In 1912 he wrote to Russell asking him whether he was a complete idiot or not! "If I am, I shall be an aeronaut, but if not I shall become a philosopher" Russell's answer was that he should write a paper dealing with philosophical matters and present it to him at the beginning of the next term. Later, when Russell read the paper his answer to Wittgenstein's previous question was he "should on no account become an aeronaut".[2] Moreover, Russell described Wittgenstein as the most intellectual adventure of his life.

Wittgenstein started to develop an unprecedented acquaintance with philosophy, logic and mathematics and soon he left others behind. He established a good reputation among fellow students and his lecturers in Cambridge and became something of a legend. When the first World War started in 1914, Wittgenstein volunteered for the Austrian Army. The experience of war had a great effect on Wittgenstein's life. He fought bravely and was awarded a medal for his role in combat. He was transferred to different fronts and shortly before the end of the war was captured by the Italians in 1918. He was put in a prison camp for several months and later released in 1919. During the war he read some of Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's works and the impact of this reading was obvious.

Another important event in the time of war, which may have been the most important event in his career, was the completion of his book, "Tractatus Logico-philosophicus', most of the ideas of which were written between 1914 and 1916. [These ideas appeared to the public in 1961 under the title "Note Books 1914-1916".] While he was in captivity he completed the final draft of his book and sent a copy to Bertrand Russell. When he was released he discussed his book with Russell who was impressed by many of its ideas. From 1919 Wittgenstein tried hard to find a publisher for the book but all his

attempts failed. However in 1921, with enormous help from Bertrand Russell, he finally found a publisher. It was Russell's introduction that encouraged the publisher to accept the book.

In the book Wittgenstein thought that he had found a definitive treatment for philosophical problems. For this reason he abandoned philosophical activities for nearly ten years, during which he stayed in Vienna, where he studied as a trainee teacher. After finishing the course he decided to teach in rural Austria's villages. He worked as a teacher from 1920 to 1926. During that period he worked in three villages, Trattenbuch, Hassbach and Otterthal. He experienced many difficulties and lived in austere conditions. His moves from one village to another were due to the problems he confronted with his pupils and their parents and his dissatisfaction with the performance of his pupils. Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to change the way his pupils thought. That led to extreme resentment from their parents. In these circumstances Wittgenstein decided to give up teaching and returned to Vienna again. He worked, for a short time, as a gardener's assistant. Later on he concentrated all his efforts and time on building a house for his sisters. He started the work with his friend Paul Engelmann, but shortly afterwards his friend gave up and he completed the house alone.

In the late twenties he started to think seriously of resuming philosophical activity after the long period of inactivity. In fact, he had attended a few meetings of Vienna circle and met occasionally some of its members and some students from Cambridge. He returned to Cambridge in 1929 and contacted his remaining friends. He published a paper in the Aristotelian society supplement under the title, "Some Remarks on Logical Form". In the

same year he delivered his famous lecture, "Lecture on Ethics" which was the only public lecture he delivered in his life.

In 1930 he was awarded a Ph.D. from Cambridge where his book was submitted as a thesis. During the thirties, Wittgenstein entered a period of gradual change in his philosophical thinking. He started to think about his earlier philosophical ideas with dissatisfaction and that led to a new development in his philosophical ideas. He abandoned the ideas which had appeared in the 'Tractatus', the only book he published in his life. His later ideas, which reflected his later thought, appeared in his book 'Philosophical Investigations'. All attempts to prepare it for publication during his lifetime had ended in failure. In his later thought, his philosophical ideas took an anthropological approach.

Wittgenstein worked as a lecturer in Cambridge during the thirties. Before the start of the Second World War he was elected to succeed G. E. Moore after his resignation from the Letter Chair in Cambridge. At the start of the war he left Cambridge to work in Guy's Hospital. Then, he went to Newcastle and worked at an ammunition factory. After the war he returned to Cambridge and worked there until his resignation in 1947. Two years later he developed cancer of the prostate, which put an end to his life on 27 April 1951. He spent the last few weeks of his life in the house of Dr Bevan, who was treating him for his illness. Shortly before his death, Dr Bevan's wife told him that his friends were coming to see him. He told her, "tell them I've had a wonderful life". He lost consciousness before their arrival and died a day later.

Wittgenstein and Religion

One of the main influences in Wittgenstein's life and thinking was religion. His view of religion varied from his earlier life to its end, changing with the development of his philosophical ideas. In his earlier thought, his view of religion was associated with mysticism or, so to speak, with a form of religious experience. But in his later thought, religion was considered as a way of life. Before giving any further details about his philosophical concept of religion, let us see how Wittgenstein's personal interest in it had developed.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born to Christian parents. His mother was a Roman Catholic and his father was a Protestant. He was baptized and instructed according to the Catholic faith in his mother's church. The first possible sign which refers to religion can be detected from Wittgenstein's records when he studied in Linz in his early teens. The records, which survived two wars, showed that the highest grades were in religious subjects. However, that was not evidence of Wittgenstein's real interest in religion, for in his adolescence he looked on religion with contempt. One event reported by Russell which shows Wittgenstein's contempt was when he met a student who was a monk at a tea. He argued with him fiercely when he knew that he was a monk. Russell saw Wittgenstein as more terrible towards Christians than him.[3] This sharp attitude started to change gradually later. In a conversation with his friend Norman Malcolm, he said his attitude towards religion had changed in his early twenties.

This change happened when he saw, in Vienna, the play, "Die Kreuzelschreiber", written by Ludwig Anzengrubu.[4] One of its characters describes how he had lived in misery and been left without hope. That led him to confront death. The confrontation with death had changed his life, so that

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the pain and misery disappeared and he became overwhelmed with happiness. He said:

> Nothing can happen to you! The worst sufferings count for nothing once they're over. Whether you are six feet under the grass or know you have got to face it all thousands of times more - nothing can happen to you! You are part of everything, and everything's part of you. Nothing can happen to you.[5]

From this play Wittgenstein said he saw the possibility of religion. This possibility turned to actuality when he served in the First World War. Wittgenstein's decision to go to war was to seek a change in his life and that change could happen when he faced death!! For there are two main ideas dominated Wittgenstein personal thinking in his youth. The first was the fear of death and the second was to end his life, i.e. to commit suicide. Wittgenstein was a worried person. He constantly thought about his mistakes and sins. Depression was a feature of his character. He spent long periods of time living in isolation and that increased his torment. This condition had been detected by his closest friends in Cambridge. Bertrand Russell mentioned, in a letter to Lady Ottoline, that:

> Wittgenstein is on the verge of nervous breakdown, not far removed from suicide, feeling himself a miserable creature, full of sin. Whatever he says he apologizes for having said. (31.10.1912).[6]

Another friend, David Pinsent, mentioned some moments of depression while he was with Wittgenstein: "it is curious considering how depressed he has been at times lately, but I suppose these fits of depression are always with him and nothing exceptional" (Diaries, 23.9.1913).[7] Wittgenstein, himself, sometimes described his psychological condition to his friends. Once he wrote to Russell in 1914:

Everyday I was tormented by frightful Angst and by depression in turns and even in intervals I was so exhausted that I wasn't able to think of doing a bit of work. It's terrifying beyond all means of description the kind of mental torment that there can be!!.[8]

This awful condition led him to think that there was no prospect in his life and it was pointless. One reason which led him to this thought was the influence of Otto Weininger. Weininger had published his book "Sex and Character" in Spring 1903 and in October, the same year, he committed suicide, after his book received bad reviews. In his book he showed his dissatisfaction with the decline of modern times He attributed this decline to the rise of science and business and to the deterioration of arts and music. In addition, he took a divided view of life, which was indeed bleak, for one had either to be a genius to deserve life or there was no point in living. It was for this reason, that when his book received bad reviews he decided to kill himself, which is what Boltzman and others had done in Vienna at that time.

The thought of suicide accompanied him for a long time, alarming his friends. Russell repeated many times the following about Wittgenstein:

Once I said to him: 'Are you thinking about logic or about your sins? 'Both', he replied, and continued his pacing. I did not like to suggest that it was time for bed, as it seemed probable to him and me that on leaving me he would commit suicide.'[9]

On the other hand, the fear of death accompanied his thought also. Several times he suggested to his friends that he would not live more than a few weeks or months. He was frightened that something might happen to him which could cost him his life. For no reason, he was convinced that he would shortly die. David Pinsent recorded in his diaries that:

> He talked again about his death - that he was not really afraid to die - but yet frightfully worried not to let the few remaining moments of his life be wasted. It all hangs on his absolutely morbid conviction that he is going to die soon - there is no obvious reason that I can see why he should not live yet for a long time. (Diaries, 20.9.1913).[10]

So, we have two main conditions influencing Wittgenstein personal experience, the fear of death and the desire to commit suicide. In these circumstances, he was seeking a change which could lead him to get rid of his mental stress and despair. The strange idea came to his mind, that if he faced death, he might be changed to a better person. The war provided this opportunity and he volunteered for the Austrian Army. When he started to engage in action with the enemy, he wrote in his diaries, "Now I should have the chance to be a decent human being, for I am standing eye to eye with death" (15.9.1914).[11]

The scenes of war had a deep effect on his personality because he experienced many decisive moments and horrible events. Sometimes he took steps to encounter death. He requested to be in the observation post, which is an easy target for the enemy's fire because of its location on the front line. He wrote:

> Tomorrow perhaps I shall be sent out, at my own request , to the observation post. Then and only then the war begin for me. And - possibly - life too! Perhaps nearness to death will bring light into my life. (Diaries, 4.5.1916)[12]

In that position he was in constant danger of death. He prayed during the bombardment and when the artillery was silent. An important point worth mentioning at this stage, is that during these days, to be exact, in June 1916, the first ideas about the mystical and the meaning of life started to appear in Wittgenstein's 'Note Books', after two years devoted to the analysis of the

world, language and logic. This shift coincided with his decisive moments in confrontation with death.

Another remarkable event in the war was Wittgenstein's engagement with the writings of the Russian novelists, Tolstoy and Dostoevesky . In a small Austrian village, Galicia, Wittgenstein bought Tolstoy's book "The Gospel in Brief". He kept this book with him throughout the war and spent considerable time reading it. He recommended the book to the soldiers and he was known to his friends in the service as the man with the Gospel. He said later that the book had a profound influence on him. In fact, not only the book, but also the author of the book had a profound influence on Wittgenstein's life. One example which shows how he was influenced by Tolstoy's book can be seen in a letter to his friend Ludwig Ficker. Ficker, who was in the war also, had sent a letter to Wittgenstein complaining of the psychological and mental impact of being at war. Wittgenstein's advice in his reply was the following:

> You are living, as it were, in the dark and have not found the saving word. And if I, who am essentially so different from you, should offer some advice, it might seem asinine. However, I am going to venture it anyway. Are you acquainted with Tolstoy's "The Gospel in Brief"? All this time, this book virtually kept me alive. Would you buy the book and read it? If you are not acquainted with it, then you cannot imagine what an effect it can have upon a person.[13]

Before the end of the war he was taken captive by the Italians. In his captivity he was compelled to attend services every Sunday and he said about that, "I was very glad for this compulsion".

In captivity he got in touch with numerous Austrian prisoners some of whom had different interests. One of these was Franz Parak whose interest was in literature. They became close friends and had many discussions on

various intellectual matters. They spent time reading Dostoevsky's novels, "The Brothers Kramazov" and "Crime and Punishment". As a sign of change in his thinking and view of life Wittgenstein told Parak that he had been reborn again, i.e. he became another person after the war.[14] He read to him the last paragraph of "Crime and Punishment":

> But now a new history commences: a story of the gradual renewing of a man, of his slow progressive regeneration, and change from one world to another - an introduction to the hitherto unknown realities of life.[15]

Without a doubt, the war was a unique experience to Wittgenstein. It transformed him into another person with a spiritual experience. For it brought him to the Christian faith, so fulfilling his desire for a change in his personality. Later in his life he told one of his nephews that the war "saved my life , I don't know what I'd have done without it".[16]

During the Nineteen Twenties Wittgenstein was under severe psychological pressure, due to his failure in his occupation as a teacher because of the peasants' attitude towards him. Again, he insisted that only religion would save him from his psychological torment. In one of his notes in "Culture and Value' he said:

> Christian religion is only for the man who needs infinite help solely, that is, for the man who experience infinite torment. ... The Christian faith as I seek it is man's refuge in this ultimate torment. (CV, p.46).

As a result of his personal despair, he thought many times to become a monk. He once contacted a monastery to ask the requirements for entry, but later gave up the idea.

Until the end of his life Wittgenstein was more passionate about religion more than anything else but this passion did not materialise into a practical belief. In other words, he did not practice any religious belief. In addition, Wittgenstein maintained, in his view of religion, the disapproval of building a belief in God as ordinary people do. This disapproval sprang from the refusal to build the existence of God on a proof of God as a creator or to build religion or belief on a theoretical basis. The belief in God should be built upon, to shape the believer's life. (CV, pp. 85, 86). Moreover, he admired many religious thinkers and writers such as St Augustine, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. The latter two had a deep influence on his understanding of Christianity.

In his later life Wittgenstein abandoned his earlier philosophical view which appeared in the 'Tractatus' and considered religion as a way of life. He connected religion with people's activities and their ways of living. To believe in God, for example, means to shape the person's life according to God's instructions (whether one is a Muslim, a Jew or a Christian). This way of life can be learned through the environment where life and belief can be taught from childhood.

Differences in ways of life can be determined by the total activities and traditions of any community and its cultural aspects. In a conversation with Drury, Wittgenstein said:

> .... But remember the Christian religion does not consist in saying a lot of prayers, in fact we are recommended just the opposite. If you and I are to live religious lives it must not just be that we talk a lot about religion, but that in some way our lives are different.[17]

It is clear that Wittgenstein's torment and depression had led him to seek refuge in religion and the religious works of the Russian writers had played an important role in his personal transformation. As a result of that, they influenced his literary interest, since their religious writings had a substantial share in the change of his view of life.

Wittgenstein and the Arts

Wittgenstein's interest in Literature was clear throughout his life. He admired many novelists and writers, some of whom had a deep influence on his personality, style of life, behaviour and view of life. In addition he had a deep interest in the Cinema. It is possible to draw a rough distinction between his interest in early and later life. In his early life he had been influenced by Leo Tolstoy. Moreover, he admired Dostoevsky's novels. After his return to Cambridge his interest shifted to detective stories, although his admiration for the Russian writers continued. By the time of the first World War, Wittgenstein's interest in Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's writings had deepened. He described both of them to M. Drury as the "only two great religious writers in Europe of recent times."[18] .

However, the writer who had the deepest influence on Wittgenstein's personality and thinking was Leo Tolstoy. In his biographical sketch of Wittgenstein, G. Von Wright stated that "Tolstoy exercised a strong influence of Wittgenstein's view of life, and also led him to study the Gospel".[19] In addition, Wittgenstein himself said about Tolstoy that "there is a real man who has the right to write."[20] As a sign of the direct influence of Tolstoy, Wittgenstein left for rural Austrian villages and worked as a teacher, in accordance with the Tolstoyan conception of living and working with poor and rural people. He also wanted to emigrate to Russia with his friend Francis

Skinner, to work there. It was obvious that the people who were portrayed by Tolstoy and Dostoevsky were in his mind. Moreover, Tolstoy's writings were concerned with morality and religion. In 'Twenty-Three Tales" of which Wittgenstein had a high appreciation, Tolstoy tried to show how to implement Christian moral values.

Wittgenstein also read Tolstoy's book "What Is Art" and agreed with a number of its conclusions. We find he later described art, in his 'Note Books', as a kind of expression (p. 83). This description was identical with Tolstoy's view of art and its purpose. He also shared with Tolstoy his view that art should express sincere feelings and his contempt for the art of the elite. In contrast, he disagreed with Tolstoy who denigrated most literary works according to his theory in which the value of the work of art depends on the extent to which it evokes emotions and feelings in the reader. He also disagreed with Tolstoy's consideration that only Christian writings are works of literature.[21]

From the above we can reach the conclusion that Wittgenstein's literary interest, in his earlier life, was in writers whose works have a deep and serious moral and religious content, and have a universal appeal. In other words, his interest was mainly in literary works and writers expressing religious ideas and values. Tolstoy's "Twenty-Three Tales" was a good example. The tales represent different religious ideas, from showing Christian values to Christian faith as a salvation from the personal depression and the troubles of life. In "Where Love Is, God Is". Tolstoy presented a case of a sad man who spent a long period of his life living in depression because he had lost his wife and all his children. In a conversation with an old pilgrim who worked in a Monastery

he said, "I no longer even wish to live, holy man"...... All I ask of God that I soon may die. I am now quite without hope in the world." [22]

The old man's answer was that he should live for God and:

> How one may live for God has been shown us by Christ. Can you read? Then buy the Gospels and read them. There you will see how God would have you live. You have it all there. [23]

He took the advice seriously and bought the Gospel. After he studied it, his life changed:

> He continued to read every night, and the more he read he clearly understood what God required of him, and how he might live for God. And his heart grew lighter .... From that time Martin's whole life changed. [24]

Christian faith was the solution. It was the refuge from the personal torment and the troubles of life, where the believer can feel safe by implementing the requirements of his belief. That was typical to Wittgenstein's case. Furthermore, Wittgenstein's interest was in the writers who represented ordinary people. This was part of Wittgenstein's personality and his ethical interest, reflected, as we have seen, in the abandonment of his fortune in order to teach peasant children, his application to work as a labour in Russia, etc. ....

We come now to Wittgenstein's interest in Cinema. For he was fond of seeing films and his desire to go to the cinema accompanied him throughout his life. The cinema for him was a place to relax and free himself from philosophical thinking or the problems of life. When he attended the cinema he liked to sit in the front near the screen and liked to concentrate on the film. He rarely took his eyes from the screen and he wished to be absorbed in the film. His favourite movies were Wildwest films.

Finally, he emphasized, continuously, the happy end of the work of art. He said "it was the essence of the work of art in general to lead to a positive conclusion."[25]

Before going on to discuss Wittgenstein's interest and activities in other arts, let us have a quick idea of his style of writing. One distinguished feature of Wittgenstein's style of writing is that it is presented in the form of prose or aphorism. None of his published books have the form of books with which we are familiar, but they consist of various numbered notes. He described his style of writing as follows:

> Just as I cannot write verse, so too my ability to write prose extends only so far, and no farther. There is a quite definite limit to the prose I can write and I can no more overstep that than I can write a poem. This is the nature of my equipment: and it is the only equipment I have.(CV, 1947, p.59)

The presentation of his ideas in this form led many commentators to describe his style of writing as literary, even though he never wrote a story or a poem in his life. That, according to Paul Engelmann, was due to his belief that his philosophical ideas come to him spontaneously and if he was to write a poem it should occur to him spontaneously.[26]

There were other artistic interests in Wittgenstein's life,[27] apart from his interest in literature: his interest in music and architecture. Wittgenstein's interest in music can be traced back to childhood when he contemplated becoming a professional conductor. His favourite music was classical, although his favourite musician was the Austrian, Josef Labor whose music was popular. In his opinion there were six great composers: Brahmns, Schubert, Beethoven, Mozart, Labor and Haydn. He described Mozart and Beethoven as

"the true sons of God" (CV). He had little admiration for music later than Brahmns. Even in Brahmns' music he said, "I began to hear the sound of machinery." Wittgenstein started to play the clarinet after his return to Cambridge. He always played Labor's music.

In addition, he produced a sculpture in his friend's Studio Drobil. It was a woman's head. The features of the sculpture were similar to Greek Sculpture of the classical period, which was Wittgenstein's favourite. Furthermore, he spent two years building a house for his sisters. Although he hadn't any architectural training he designed the house and obtained approval for building it. He was listed in the Vienna City Directory as a professional architect for many years. The house was without decoration and the best description of it, in my opinion, came from Von Wright who wrote, in his biographical sketch of Wittgenstein, "Its beauty is of the same simple and static kind that belongs to the sentence of the 'Tractatus'.[28]

This short survey of Wittgenstein's personal interest in the arts and religion gives a clear indication that the man, in his earlier life, had been under severe psychological and mental pressure. He was convinced that he might die soon. In contrast, the idea of committing suicide was part of his thinking. He wanted to face death because that could change him. The First World War provided this opportunity and his aim was achieved. He found in Christianity the refuge which saved him from this torment. This view was enhanced by the writings of the Russian novelists, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, which carry a religious dimension. He was deeply influenced by them and that led to a complete change in his view towards life, as a result of which he abandoned all his aristocratic privileges and worked hard to support himself.

However, the personal experience is not the whole matter because it accompanied with a socio-cultural background, i.e. the environment where he grew up in Vienna and his close friends in Cambridge. From this we can proceed in our aim, which is, to draw a clear distinction of the classical view of science, religion and art. The next chapter will explore this socio-cultural background.

Notes

1. Monk, Ray, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of a Genius,* Vintage, London, 1991, p. 34.

2. Russell, Bertrand, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1914-1944,* Volume II, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, p. 99.

3. Monk, Ray, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of a Genius,* Vintage, London, 1991, p. 44.

4. Heller, Erich, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Unphilosophical Notes,* Encounter, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 1959, p. 42.

5. Quoted from Brian McGuiness' book *Wittgenstein A Life, Young Ludwig (1889-1921).* Penguin Books, London, 1990, p. 94.

6. *Ibid* p. 156.

7. Pinsent, David H., *A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man.* (David Pinsent Diaries 1912, 1914). Edited by G. H. von Wright, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, 1st edition 1990, p. 79.

8. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore.* Edited with an Introduction by G. H. von Wright, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, p. 47.

9. Russell, Bertrand, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1914-1944,* p. 99.

10. Pinsent, David H., *A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man,* p. 77.

11. The quotation is from Wittgenstein's private diaries during the War which are not published. It is quoted from Rhees, Rush, *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollectios,* Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, p. 214.

12. Wittgenstein's unpublished diaries, quoted from McGuinness, Brian, *Wittgenstein A Life, Young Ludwig 1889-1921,* p. 240.

13. Wittgenstein's letters to Ficker published under the title *'Letters to Ludwig von Ficker',* Translated by Bruce Gillete, edited by Allan Janik, published in *Wittgenstein, Sources and Perspectives,* edited by Luckhardt, C. G., The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1979, p. 91.

14. McGuinness, B., *Wittgenstein A Life, Young Ludwig,* p. 273.

15. Dostoevsky, F. *'Crime and Punishment'*, Translated by Constance Harnett, London, William Heinemann, p. 493.

16. Quoted from McGuinnes, Brian, *Wittgenstein A Life (1889-1921)*, p. 204

17. Drury, M., 'Conversations with Wittgenstein', *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections.* Edited by Rush Rhees, p. 129.

18. *Ibid*, p. 101.

19. Wright, G, *'Ludwig Wittgenstein Biographical Sketch', 'Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir'* Malcolm, N., Oxford University Press, London, 1978, p. 10.

20. Malcolm, N., *Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir*, p. 42.

21. Barrett, Cyril, *New Literary History*, Vol.19, 1987,88, No.2 Winter 1988, p. 389.

22. Tolstoy, Leo, *'Twenty Three Tales'*, Translated by Mr. and Mrs. Aglmer Maude, Oxford University Press, 1928, p. 132.

23. *Ibid* p. 132.

24. *Ibid*, p. 133.

25. Engelmann, Paul, *'Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein and A Memoir*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, p. 93.

26. *Ibid* p. 89.

27. Since the thesis deals with Wittgenstein's religious view in connection with literature in the earlier and the later thought, I preferred to mention albeit briefly his other artistic interest and activities.

28. Wright, G, *'Ludwig Wittgenstein Biographical Sketch', Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir, p. 11.*

CHAPTER THREE

Science, Religion and Art, Two Distinctive Spheres

> "Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness of my life arises religion - science - and art. And this consciousness is life itself" (NB, 1.8, 2.8.1916, p.79)

The view which dominated the intellectual life in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century concerning the distinction between science and religion arrived at a decisive point earlier in this century. The task of a clear and rigorous distinction was achieved by the Austrian engineer who travelled to England to study engineering and then directed his attention to mathematics, logic and philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein, who came to England carrying in his mind some aspects of the cultural atmosphere of Vienna, the city of dreams and contradictions. How did Wittgenstein achieve this rigorous distinction between science on the one hand and religion and art on the other, in his earlier thought? The answer to this question is the subject of this chapter.

What is widely described as Wittgenstein's earlier thought has appeared in the only book published in his life, "The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". The main task of the book, in its author's words, was to put limits to language, i.e., limits to what can and cannot be said. He achieved this task by drawing a rigorous distinction between the sphere of fact and that of value. To show how Wittgenstein achieved his aim I have divided this chapter into four main sections. The first section will deal with the influences of different philosophers, writers and thinkers with whom Wittgenstein engaged, either personally or through their writings. The other three sections will be devoted

to discuss the 'Tractatus' or in general Wittgenstein's earlier philosophical ideas. In the second section a discussion of Wittgenstein's analysis of the world and language will be given. The third is concerned with the analysis of scientific language and its features. Finally, the fourth will concentrate upon what Wittgenstein described as the mystical. At the beginning of this section I will discuss the features of literary and religious language which states, in contrast to scientific language, what is figurative, indeterminate, expressive and prescriptive. Then an examination of Wittgenstein's notion of the mystical will follow. The division of this chapter into these sections will help to give a clear picture about the distinction between science and religion, and an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that the aim of the 'Tractatus' is an ethical one and how that can be shown from a religious dimension.

The influences upon Wittgenstein's earlier thought

This section will deal with the influences of a number of critics, philosophers, scientists and writers whose ideas were exerted a different degree of effects in shaping Wittgenstein's earlier thought. The discussion will be focused upon the following: philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Arthur Schopenhauer and Fritz Mauthner, critics such as Karl Kraus and Adolf Loos, physicists such as Heinrich Hertz and writers, or novelists, such as Leo Tolstoy. His engagement with their ideas had left a deep interest and a real development of some of their ideas, which produced his famous book, 'The Tractatus'.

Moreover, it is important to go back to some of the personal writings of Wittgenstein's friends to support some of his ideas. This is because of his style of writing, which is somewhat unfamiliar. He did not write according to the common rules of writing a book, but presented his ideas in short notes, many of

which were disorganised and did not follow a particular theme systematically. For example, remarks about a subject like religion are scattered throughout his writings. Sometimes a great effort is needed to draw together these remarks and form an argument. In addition, an explanation for some remarks can be obtained from biographical sketches, memoir and letters.

For instance, it is too hard to infer the aim of the 'Tractatus' was "an ethical one" without Wittgenstein's letter to his friend Ludwig Ficker, because anyone who reads the 'Tractatus' will find that most of it concentrates on the analysis of languages and the world. Furthermore, it is important to study some aspects of the environment in which Wittgenstein grew up, which means covering some aspects of Viennese culture.

Of course, there are many cultural aspects which can be shown, but I will limit my discussion to the ideas which are relevant to the thesis. One of the most important aspects of Vienna's culture which occupied a wide range of discussion between different intellectuals was language. The important thing to be mentioned at this point is that many questions concerning the nature of language and its limits were the focus of discussion among various prominent figures and groups.

So, understanding the environment in which Wittgenstein grew up is important to an understanding of his background. The 'Tractatus' was not brought to the philosophical world from a vacuum. It was the result of various interests which occupied the mind of its author. My interest in studying the sources which helped Wittgenstein to produce the 'Tractatus' is to try and interpret the 'Tractatus', not as a book dealing only with logic and language, but

as a book which drew the distinction between the spheres of fact and value and ended with mysticism.

Wittgenstein, himself, admitted that he had been influenced by many thinkers and this influence had shaped his philosophical thinking. In a remark in 'Culture And Value', he wrote:

> I don't believe I have ever invented a line of thinking, I have always taken one over from someone else. I have simply straight away seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification. That is how Boltzman, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me. (CV, p.14, 1931)

This admission shows the importance of studying other people's influences upon Wittgenstein. The study will focus upon Kraus, Loos, Russell, Schopenhauer, Mauthner, Hertz and Tolstoy.

The discussion will start with the four Austrian figures, because Wittgenstein engaged with their ideas in his adolescence. Hertz will be the first, because Wittgenstein came into contact with his ideas when he studied engineering in 1906. Karl Kraus will follow because he was a regular visitor to Wittgenstein's house and he engaged with his ideas in his early life. Mauthner will follow, for his ideas appeared in Vienna in the first decade of this century. Later, I will deal with Russell's influence, since Wittgenstein worked with him from 1911 to 1914, where he studied Russell's ideas and discussed with him many philosophical questions ranging from logic, language to religion. Schopenhauer comes next. It is reported that Wittgenstein read Schopenhauer at the age of sixteen. Finally, Tolstoy's obvious influence during the war will be the final influence to be tackled.

Heinrich Hertz

In 1906, during his study at the academy of "Technisiche Hochschule" (now the Technical University in Berlin), Wittgenstein studied Hertz's book, "The Principles of Mechanics". The book exerted an important influence on Wittgenstein's thinking. Wittgenstein's view of Hertz did not change all over his life and till the end of it, he talked about him with approval. In contrast, he was critical of almost everyone he had been acquainted with in his earlier life. So, what was the cause of that admiration, and how did Hertz influence Wittgenstein's thought?

One of the main aims in Hertz's book was to form a theory of mathematical models (or Bild). In this sense, he wanted to form a model as a kind of representation of different objects.

He said:

> We form for ourselves models* of external objects, and the form we give them is such that the necessary consequences of models in thought are always the models of necessary consequences in nature of the things pictured. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought. Experience teaches us that the requirement can be satisfied and hence that such conformity does in fact exist.[1]

The models which we form from external objects are built upon either a sequence in our thought or according to their nature, i.e., if the nature of objects or things permit a connection or forming a model. In addition, there is an essential requirement set by Hertz to the model. This requirement concerns the conformity between the model we make and the world. He wrote:

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* D. F. Jones and J. T. Walley translated the German word (Bilder) as 'image', but Janik and Toulmin rejected this translation and said that it meant a 'model' since Hertz wanted to set a theory of mathematical models. I prefer their translation which is compatible with scientific models. See Wittgenstein's Vienna pp. 139, 140.

The models (Bilder) which we have spoken of are our representation of things. With the things themselves they are in conformity in one important respect, namely in satisfying the above mentioned requirement. For our purpose it is not necessary that they should be in conformity with the things, in any other respect whatsoever.[2]

Models should have the ability to represent things. In fact, a model is a representation of things. This representation should conform with what it represents in the world. A model should fulfil this requirement, i.e., to be identical with what it represents, otherwise it will not represent real things in the world. Furthermore, Hertz worked to put three conditions for constructing a model. The three are: "logical consistency, correspondence with empirical data and simplicity or elegance of presentation".[3] Before any further explanation of the conditions let us quote what Hertz stated:

Various models of the same objects are possible, and these models may differ in various respects. We should at once denote as inadmissible all models which implicitly contradict the laws of our thought. Hence we postulate that in the first place all our models shall be permissible. We shall denote as incorrect any permissible model, if their essential relations contradict the relations of external things, i.e., if they do not satisfy our first fundamental requirement. Hence we postulate that in the second place our models shall be correct. But two permissible and correct models of the external objects may yet differ in respect of appropriateness. Of two models of the same object that is the more appropriate which includes in it more of the essential relations of the object - the one we may call the more distinct. Of two models of equal distinctness the more appropriate is the one which contains, in addition to the essential characteristics, the smaller number of superfluous or empty relations; - the simpler of the two.[4]

In the first of the three conditions concerning the model Hertz insisted upon Logical consistency. Any model, in order to have an exact representation of things or objects, must be built according to a logical relationship which forms it. This logical relationship should be consistent and prevents any kind of

self contradiction. Any contradictions will lead to false representation. This brings us to the second condition, which deals with correspondence with empirical data. A model should correspond to what it represents, i.e., to things or objects, and to the relations which connect them. In other words, the correctness of a model depends upon its correct depiction of things and objects and the exact relation which holds them together. The crucial factor of correctness will be the exact representation of the state of affairs in the world.

The final condition concerns the simplicity and appropriateness of the model. Hertz meant by that, that if there are two possible models which represent objects, the appropriate one, which depicts the exact relation between objects will distinguish itself from the other, if it possesses the essential relation of the model.

On the other hand, Hertz saw that although models have the ability to represent things and objects in the world, there are limits to that representation. He stated that clearly:

> Our fundamental law, although it may suffice for representing the motion of inanimate matter, appears (at any rate, that is one's first and natural impression) too simple and narrow to account for even the lowest processes of life. It seems to me that this is not a disadvantage, but rather an advantage of our law. For a while it allows us to survey the whole domain of mechanics, it shows us what are the limits of this domain.[5]

This paragraph presents a confession from Hertz that his concept of a model has a limited application. In addition to the limits of models in applications, there are limits for representation. These limits have been described by him as limits from within. In his attempt to form his theory about models, Hertz tried to use a mathematical formula. In other words, he built the

model of physical reality according to a logical structure. This logical structure determines the relationship between things or objects which form the model, i.e., it is the internal connection between things and objects. So, the logical structure of the physical reality cannot be determined externally but internally.

Moreover, the representation of mechanics is similar to that of language. A model can be expressed in language which represents its components and the relationship between them. In his words:

> Our representation of mechanics bears towards the customary one somewhat the same relation that the systematic grammar of language bears to a grammar devised for the purpose of enabling learners to become acquainted as quickly as possible with what they will require in daily life.[6]

Wittgenstein, without any doubt, found in Hertz's book the way in which actual facts can be modelled in the world. Because the world for him is the totality of facts not things, (TLP, 1.1) In other words, he found in the actuality of applying representational language on physical models of reality. This direct representation can free language from any kind of ambiguity. He also found the limits of these models and from this he discovered that there are limits to representational language. He took Hertz's conclusion that the limits of a model are set from within and applied it to language, by setting the limits of language from within.

In the 'Tractatus', Wittgenstein presented a theory of meaning, called the picture theory of meaning, in which he showed that language serves as a picture (or a model), of facts in the world. And from this notion he proceeded to determine what can and cannot be represented. The limits of representations

can provide the key to the separation between the sphere of fact from that of value. This separation can be found in Kraus's and Loos's writings.

Karl Kraus and Adolf Loos

Wittgenstein's family house was a place where many prominent figures of Vienna were regular visitors, (artists, critics, musicians, etc.). Two famous Viennese figures were among the visitors. The first was the critic Karl Kraus and the second was the architect Adolf Loos. Kraus was a famous critic. His criticism did not deal with language and literature only, but extended to many aspects of Vienna's community and culture. He expressed his opinions and criticism through his journal, 'Die Fackel' (The Torch) of which he was the sole editor. Wittgenstein got in touch with Kraus's journal through his sister, Margarete, whose interest in arts and sciences was acknowledged in the family. The issues of Die Fackel were kept in the family's library (a complete set). The first issue had appeared in 1899. Wittgenstein had read the journal in his adolescence.[7] Moreover, while he was staying in Norway in 1914, he asked his friend Paul Engelmann to send him the Journal regularly. Englemann believed that Kraus's ideas had exerted an important influence on some objectives of Wittgenstein's philosophical thinking.[8]

Kraus had an extraordinary talent in satire and polemic, making his works difficult to translate. His style of writing was distinct. He wrote many of his ideas in the form of aphorism. Wittgenstein was influenced by the Kraus style of writing. Kraus did not belong to any philosophical or critical school and considered himself as an independent person. One of the important tasks of Kraus's periodical, which was widely recognised in Vienna's intellectual life, was to criticize different aspects of Vienna's culture in order to accomplish a new foundation for a new one.

In his memoir Englemann stated that there were two themes which Kraus and Wittgenstein had in common. The first was their ability to separate with accurate division. He described them as "creative separators".[9] The second dealt with their emphasis on truth and clarity, notions which were missing from the culture of the age.[10]

In his efforts to establish truth and clarity, he used language as a means:

> Gradually, after 1905, it is borne in upon him that language - that is the way a statement is made - bears with in itself all the signs he needs to understand the moral and the ethical quality of that statement and of him who made it. Conversely, it is necessary to read a statement in a way that is supremely sensitive to all its linguistic qualities, in order to discover truth.[11]

And to accomplish his goal he attacked the corrupt media for not reporting the news in an objective way and for the language in which its content was presented. The aim of his attack was to preserve the purity of language and to direct people from superficiality and corruption back to original values, through which a new culture could be regenerated.[12]

Another important area in which Kraus was interested in was unity. According to him, there are two forms of unity. The first is the unity between feeling and reason, the second is the unity of the artistic creativity and morality.

Reason, for him, is a technique which in itself is neither good nor bad.[13] It deals with the objective knowledge which systematises by it. On the other hand, feeling deals with the subject and fecundates reason in giving it its direction.[14] In his view "the source of moral and aesthetic truth is, thus, unity between feeling and reason; these two are complementary sides of one and the same coin."[15]

Kraus maintained in his periodical the importance of the distinction between fact and value and argued that only through language could failure or success in grasping this distinction be manifested. That is what Englemann has described as the "creative separation", which can be implemented through language. It is the separation between "factual discourse and literary artistry."[16]

The second form of unity deals with art and morality. Kraus was fond of the theatre. He looked to the theatre as the place for social criticism of moral values. His admiration of the theatre was in the essence of his conception of art. That essence was "to teach moral values of aesthetics experience."[17] In addition, in his works, Kraus identified the importance of the moral content of the literary work. The moral and the aesthetic value of the literary are reflected in its language.

Kraus had many followers, because his journal attracted many prominent figures in Vienna. One of these was the architect, Adolf Loos. Wittgenstein was in personal contact with him for a long period of time as it appeared from his letters to P. Englemann. In a conversation with Wittgenstein it is reported that Loos told him "you are me", i.e., they shared the same ideas and areas of interest.

As an artist and critic his main aim was to make a clear distinction between art and artefact, i.e., to separate articles for use from artistic objectives. And that was the central idea behind his work. Loos' separation is based upon the following. In artefact, objects were designed for a certain use and that use should be purely factual. On the other hand, art can release man's mind from the dullness of life to the sphere of spiritual value and fantasy. It

can change man's view of the world and life and his relationships and attitude towards the others.[18]

In general, the nature of fact and value, the determination of the sphere of fact from that of value, were common themes in Vienna's intellectual life. These themes extended to various cultural aspects such as art, language, literature, philosophy etc. The part which Loos and Kraus played can be summarised by Kraus' words:

> All that Adolf Loos and I - he materially and I verbally - have ever meant to say is that there is a difference between an urn and a chamber-pot. But the people of today can be divided into those who can use a chamber-pot as an urn and those who use the urn as a chamber-pot.[19]

Wittgenstein engaged with ideas of these critics who worked to set a separation between fact and value. The most important idea here is that this separation should be carried out through language, i.e. by grasping the nature of the language which represents every sphere. The importance of language went another step with Mauthner, who claimed that philosophical problems are a result of misunderstanding language - so, what did he have in common with Wittgenstein?

Fritz Mauthner

Throughout the history of philosophy there have been problems concerning language, such as the problem of meaning, symbolism, thought and being, etc. But language as a problem in itself had not been considered until around the end of the nineteenth century, an Austrian philosopher, who started his career as a professional journalist and later turned to philosophy, considered

that all problems of philosophy are not philosophical problems but rather problems of language.

Fritz Mauthner considered language as a human activity and not an entity. It is a social phenomenon which is connected with the activities of the people. As a social phenomenon it is qualified to serve as a means of communication between individuals. From this perspective he started to examine language and developed his criticism of it (sprachkritk).

The critique of language was his answer to the purpose of philosophy. He wrote:

> Philosophy is a theory of knowledge. Theory of knowledge is critique of language. Critique of language, however, is labour on behalf of the liberating thought, that men can never succeed in getting beyond a metaphorical description of the world utilising either every day language or philosophical language.[20]

Mauthner's point of view was that philosophical language is a production of many uses of ordinary language and thus the task of the philosopher is to liberate language from the errors which result from its misuse. In this sense, he started to refute the common view of ordinary people which ascribes reality to abstract or general terms. This is, for him, the origin of the speculative confusion.[21] As an example he cited concepts which present a group of individuals. As words or general terms, concepts do not reveal a single entity. In his view, concepts must be identical with words , i.e. identical to what they point to, such as objects and, as a result of that, they must be identical with thought.[22]

In addition, Mauthner saw, as a consequence of his critique of language, that there are some limits to it. In fact he described philosophy as "the limit of language itself, the limiting concept, the limits; it is the critique of language of human language".[23] The limits of language are the limits of the sayable and silence. He said "as soon as we really have something to say, we are forced to be silent".[24] What we cannot speak about is the unsayable feeling. For him, the value of silence is greater than the value of the speakable, and he shared with some thinkers the "notion of the ultimate, that unspeakable feeling of mystical unity with the universe".[25] He wrote about this matter:

> For on one point monism and mysticism agree: in a feeling of yearning for unification, for becoming one of what? of one's own ego. With what? With the non-Ego. Such monism, such a feeling of unity would have nothing to do with the trivialities of a materialist explanation of the world and the world quite adequately coincide with what I call, just in order to have a word-symbol, godless mysticism.[26]

From the above discussion there are certain points which show the similarity between Wittgenstein and Mauthner. The first is the idea that the problems of philosophy lie in language. The second is that language is a human activity and a means of communication and third is the idea of silent and unspeakable feeling.

Mauthner's name appeared only once in the 'Tractatus':

> All Philosophy is 'a critique of language' (though not in Mauthner's sense). It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. (TLP, 4,0031)

Although Wittgenstein disagreed with the way in which Mauthner had carried out his critique of language, he agreed with him on one fundamental

idea. It is: philosophical problems lie in language, i.e., all philosophical problems are a result of our misunderstanding of language. As a result, Wittgenstein saw, as did Mauthner, that the sole task of philosophy is the analysis of language.

In addition, Wittgenstein claimed that language is a social activity and means of communication between people. That appeared in the 'Tractatus' when he mentioned that "man possessed the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, ... Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it."(TLP, 4.0002)

Finally, Wittgenstein's aim in the 'Tractatus' was to put limits for language, i.e., for what can we speak about and what we cannot. In other words, he set a clear distinction between the sayable and the unsayable, and the unsayable is connected with the mystical.(6.522)

Wittgenstein left Austria in 1908 to go to Manchester to study engineering. He left there and his mind occupied with some ideas from Vienna. The first was the models of science which represent objects in the world, a representation which is logical and carried out from within. The second, was the distinction between fact and value which can, according to Kraus, be shown by language, i.e. which distinguishes the factual discourse from that of value. The third concerns the problems of philosophy which lie in language, i.e., the task of philosophy is the analysis of language which shows its limits. So, how can that analysis be performed? The answer can be found in the influence of Bertrand Russell, who was the turning point in Wittgenstein's intellectual journey.

Bertrand Russell

No-one would deny that Ludwig Wittgenstein was Bertrand Russell's student. The two shared a mutual interest. It was "Principa Mathematica" which led Wittgenstein to make the trip from Manchester to Cambridge. And Russell's admiration for the young Austrian started when Ludwig criticized and corrected some of Russell's ideas in that book. Wittgenstein was a great hope for Russell. In a letter to his lover, Ottoline, Russell wrote:

> Wittgenstein has been a great event in my life - whatever may come of it ... I love him and feel he will solve the problems I am too old to solve - all kinds of problems that are raised by my work, but want a fresh mind and the vigour of youth. He is the young man one hopes for.[27]

Wittgenstein was the hope of a man in his middle age whose mind has been occupied with many philosophical problems which needed a fresh and young mind. In addition, it was Russell who answered Wittgenstein's decisive question about becoming an aeronaut or working in philosophy. Russell's answer was to work in philosophy and from that time, Wittgenstein's philosophical journey started.

I believe this brief introduction is necessary, because I will deal with Russell's influence from two directions. The first concerns language and logic and the second with mysticism. In the first there are many ideas which show a clear influence. They are as follows: logical atomism, the analysis of the world into facts, the analysis of facts into their components and the analysis of language into atomic propositions.

First of all, logical atomism. Russell's philosophical view of the world was believed that it is built up from a plurality of objects, not from a unified whole. He said:

> The philosophy which I wish to advocate may be called logical atomism or absolute pluralism, because while maintaining that there are many things, it denies that there is a whole composed of those things.[28]

This idea has an appearance in 'Tractatus', for Wittgenstein has divided the world into complex and atomic facts, where the world is made up from the totality of facts in which each fact is independent and does not depend on another fact.

In addition, as the world is composed of facts, or what can be described as a logical atomism, these facts are not the end of the matter, because they are made up from certain components. Russell said:

> Two facts are said to have the same 'form' when they differ only as regards their constituents. In this case, we may suppose the one to result from the other by substitution of different constituents.[29]

The word constituents refers to the components of a fact and Russell has described them as particulars which are independent from each other. He wrote "particulars have this peculiarity, ... that each of them stands entirely alone and is completely self-subsistent."[30] Similarly, in the second section of the 'Tractatus' we find Wittgenstein, in his analysis of the world, showed that atomic facts can be decomposed into their components. The component of a fact is described as things or objects which are independent from each other and can be used in a formation of different facts, i.e., a single object can be used, with others, in the formation of different facts.

Another point which shows Russell's influence is his notion of the "truth and falsehood" of a logical proposition. Russell maintained that the truth or falsehood of a proposition can be achieved through a comparison of with what it represents. For a fact is:

> the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false. If I say "It is raining", what I say is true in a certain condition of weather and is false in other conditions of weather.[31]

This notion is very clear in the 'Tractatus' Wittgenstein connected the existence or the non-existence of a fact to the truth or falsehood of a proposition. In other words, a proposition can be true if it represents a fact in the world and false if it does not.

Moreover, Russell's influence can be seen in the analysis of language. He analysed language into atomic propositions which cannot be analysed further. Each atomic proposition describes atomic fact in the world. He claimed:

> A proposition which expresses what we have called a fact ... will be called an atomic proposition ... Atomic propositions, although, like facts, they may have any one of an infinite number of forms, are only one kind of propositions. All other kinds are more complicated.[32]

In addition, the assertion of the relation between things can be formed in the atomic proposition. An atomic proposition "asserts that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation".[33]

The analysis of language into complex propositions, atomic propositions and their components was the central theme of the third and fourth sections of the 'Tractatus'. For Wittgenstein analysed language into

complex and atomic propositions and the components of a proposition are related together in a certain relation which determines meaning and whether the relation between names in a proposition corresponds to actual fact in the world.

The above points which show the influence of Russell upon Wittgenstein's earlier thought are very clear for people who consider the 'Tractatus' as a treatise of logic and language; those see the influence of Russell in these areas only. But I do not think this is the end of the matter. I believe Russell's influence extended from logic and language into mysticism, because when Wittgenstein met Russell between 1911 to 1914, the latter was examining some ideas about religion. He wanted to write a book about religion as a form of contemplation. He did not mean by religion a belief in immortality and God but "a mystical union with the universe in which our infinite selves are overcome and we become at one with infinity".[34]

In fact, Russell had published an article "The Essence of Religion" in "The Hibbert Journal" in 1912 but Wittgenstein disagreed with its content. Russell tried, in this article to stand against dogma in religion. In contrast, he posed three elements which should be preserved; they are worship, acquiescence and love. Wittgenstein disagreed with Russell's article and criticized it fiercely, because it was vague and lacked exactness. Russell recorded that in a letter to Lady Ottoline, "he felt I had been a traitor to the doctrine of exactness and wantonly used words vaguely".[35] (11.10.1912). On the other hand the argument from which I will proceed is based upon Russell's article, "mysticism and logic" which was published in 1914. In this paper Russell posed four general elements to mysticism. The first was the possibility of knowledge through an insight or intuition, the second, a belief in a unity and its refusal to admit any opposition or division anywhere. The third built upon

the denial of time. The fourth was concerned with happiness. I will trace the four elements in Wittgenstein's earlier thought with full details in the fourth section of this chapter, drawing on the 'Tractatus' and "Note Books 1914-1916" to show how the concept of religion in his earlier thought was connected with mysticism.

It is obvious, then, that Wittgenstein's engagement with Russell was an important step in the development of the ideas which occupied his mind from Vienna concerning language. He found in many of Russell's ideas on the analysis of language and the world and in logic, the clue which led to him advancing his own ideas about the analysis of language and the world and the role which logic plays in the analysis of language and its relation to the world.

The development of Wittgenstein's thought took another step in the war, the experience of which led to a personal change, to a mystical experience. The whole picture of the development of his thought will be complete with the influence of Schopenhauer and Tolstoy.

Arthur Schopenhauer

Religion in Wittgenstein's earlier thought, is connected with mysticism because of the remarkable influence of Schopenhauer. Wittgenstein had distinguished between 'showing' and 'saying'. What is shown includes ethics, religion and aesthetics which, according to the picture theory of meaning, cannot be put into words but show themselves. And what shows itself is the mystical. This view was due to the rigorous distinction, which he made, between the spheres of fact and value.

At the age of sixteen, G. E. Anscombe reported in her book 'An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus', Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer had been introduced to him by his sister Margrete, who had various interests, ranging from art to science. Without doubt Wittgenstein was a strong admirer of the author of 'The World as Will and Representation'. Although Schopenhauer's name is not mentioned in the 'Tractatus', it appears in the 'Note Books', connected either with the subject or with the will and ethics. The reason I have placed Schopenhauer's influence at this stage, although Wittgenstein read him in his adolescence, is due to the personal change in Wittgenstein's thinking. For the first ideas about God, the meaning of life and ethics, and even Schopenhauer's name, appeared in the 'Note Books' from June 1916. That was the period, as I showed in the last chapter, when Wittgenstein's confrontation with death led to the change in his personal thought, i.e. led him to the Christian faith. Before that time, his notes are full of ideas about logic, the analysis of language and the world. In addition, in my comparison between the two, the ideas are dated from June 1916 till the end of the year, and it would appear strange to place Schopenhauer's influence in another stage, especially in his teens. So, what was Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein's earlier thought?

One of Schopenhauer's main aims in his philosophy was to distinguish between the sphere of fact and the sphere of value. In his famous book, "The World as Will and Representation", Schopenhauer set his basic principles in which he showed that the world has two important aspects, 'Will' and 'Representation'. These two aspects are separated, "but related in a determinate way, that is, the representation stands for will as 'phenomenon' to thing in itself".[36]

Schopenhauer started from representation as the first obvious reality of our consciousness. He said:

> Now our method of procedure is *to genere* different from these two opposite misconceptions (i.e. attempting to deduce the object from the subject or vice versa), since we start neither from the object nor from the subject but from the *representation*, as the first fact of consciousness.[37]

Schopenhauer's preference to start from representation can help to overcome the problems which could arise if we start either from the object or the subject, because "representation" refers to the mental image of our perceptions.

In addition, due to previous ideas, he stated that the subject is a pre-condition to the existence of the world and it is not part of it. He claimed:

> That which knows all things and is known by none is the *subject*. It is accordingly the supporter of the world, the universal condition of all that appears, of all objects, and it is always pre-supposed; for whatever exists, exists only for the subject. Everyone finds himself as this subject, yet only in so far as he knows, not in so far as he is object of knowledge.[38]

Through the subject, objects can be known. The subject is the knower which knows about things and their existence. For example, imagine that a remote uninhabited island in the 'pacific ocean' has been discovered recently. Before the time of discovery, nobody knows about it and it has no place on maps. This illustrates that without the discovery by human beings of this island, it is unknown to anybody or, so to speak, to a subject through which its existence can be known.

The idea that the subject is a precondition to the existence of the world appeared clearly in Wittgenstein's 'Note Books'. He said about this matter that "the subject is not part of the world but a presupposition of its existence."(2.8, 1916, NB, p. 79). This statement is identical with Schopenhauer's conception. The similarity between Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer goes further. This, as we shall see shortly, supposes that Wittgenstein was reading Schopenhauer again at the time of writing the notes. There are many similar ideas between the two philosophers which suggests that.

To complete our comparison between Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer, let us start by the following. Schopenhauer described the self as "the eye (which) sees everything except itself".[39] This description corresponds to the following note, "I am placed in it (the world) like my eye in its visual field", "But you don't actually see the eye". (NB, 11.6.1916, p.73, 4.8.16, p. 80). In the visual field of the eye there is no spot or place to see the eye itself. No-one who views the world will see his eye. That corresponds to the self and the world. When someone views the world, he cannot see the self, because the self is not an object in the world which can be seen, rather, it is the limits of the world.

Since the subject is a precondition to the existence of the world and it is not part of it, where does its importance lie? Schopenhauer gave an answer to this question when he claimed that:

> The objective world, the world as representation, is not the only side of the world but merely (so to speak) its external side. The world has an entirely different side which is its inmost being, its kernel, the thing in itself ... i.e.. Will.[40]

..... every individual, completely vanishing and reduced to nothing in a boundless world, nevertheless makes himself the centre of the world.[41]

Although the objective side of the world is very important, there is another side which is more important that the first; it is the will. It importance lies in knowing things and acting.

The idea that the will (the willing subject) is the centre of the world appeared in a remark written by Wittgenstein in the fifth of August 1916, "If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I". (NB, p. 80)

Schopenhauer's influence can be shown further. This time through the consideration of man as the microcosm. He wrote about this matter:

> Everyone finds himself to be this will, in which the inner nature of the world consists, and he also finds himself to be the knowing subject, whose representation is the whole world; and this world has existence only in reference to the knowing subject's consciousness as its necessary supporter. Thus everyone in this twofold regard is the whole world itself, the miscrocosm; he finds its two sides whole and complete within himself.[42]

The idea that the individual is identified with the microcosm is a central idea in Schopenhauer philosophical thought. As we saw in his doctrine, there is a duality, between the world as representation and the world as will. In the first, the world is subject to the forms of representations imposed upon it by the transcendental knowing subject.[43] In the second, the world is pure will which is independent of the forms of representation. Thus, we find "the nominal reality with which we are acquainted through our knowledge of our own actions."[44] These ideas appeared clearly in Wittgenstein's note, where he saw

that the individual is the microcosm. "It is true: Man is the microcosm I am my world"(NB, 12.10.1916, p. 84) He also insisted that the will is independent of the world. "The world is independent of my will". (TLP, 6.373)

Furthermore, Schopenhauer in his interpretation of the will and action believed that they are identical. The action is not separate from the will.[45] In the note books Wittgenstein claimed, "the act of the will is not the cause of the action but the action itself. One cannot will without acting".(NB, 4.11.1916, p. 867)

We approach the final point which shows Schopenhauer influence upon Wittgenstein. It deals with aesthetics and mystical experience. The essence of Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetics conceives the work of art as a mean which can redeem the individual from the troubles of life. Through the work of art the individual can get rid of the bounds of the will. In his essay, "On Aesthetics" Schopenhauer stated that:

> ... when an aesthetics perception occurs the will completely vanishes from consciousness. But will is the sole source of all our troubles and sufferings. This is the origin of the feeling of pleasure which accompanies the perception of the beautiful. It therefore rests on the abolition of all possibility of suffering.[46]

Only aesthetics can free the mind from its disturbance and the problems which occupies it. In this sense, the subject ceases to be the mere individual and he becomes the 'pure Will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge."[47] He cited Spinoza's phrase "the mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things from the standpoint of eternity."[48] We arrive at an important idea in Schopenhauer's influence, which deals with the mystical. For the phrase "sub specie aeternitatis" appeared in Wittgenstein's 'Note Books' and the 'Tractatus'.

In the 'Note Books' it is connected with the work of art and the good life, which are the world seen from the view of eternity. And in the 'Tractatus', it refers to the mystical which is to view the world as it is and includes what shows itself, such as ethics and aesthetics. (A full examination of these ideas will be made in the fourth section which will be devoted to a discussion of the mystical.)

Wittgenstein found in Schopenhauer's writings the relation between the self and the world. For the former is a precondition to the latter's existence, it is placed in it like the eye in its visual field, it forms its limits and the individual is considered as the microcosm. The ideas that a work of art is a redeemer from the troubles of life and that it conceives the world from the standpoint of eternity, are also at the heart of Wittgenstein's mysticism.

Tolstoy is our next destination in Wittgenstein's intellectual journey. With him, our approach to the influences will be complete.

Leo Tolstoy

In the previous chapter we saw how Wittgenstein was deeply influenced by Tolstoy and the extent of his personal admiration for him. Here, I will examine in detail the dimensions of that influence in three main respects. The first deals with the distinction between science on one hand and ethics, art and the meaning of life on the other. The second concerns the connection between morality and religion. The third explains Tolstoy's view of art as a mean of expression, the purpose of which is to convey or communicate religious and ethical instructions.

In his fifties, Tolstoy started to write his personal view of life and its meaning which was published later in a book under the title "A Confession and Other Religious Writings". These confessions showed an important conclusion concerning the progress of science and its impact on life and its meaning. In his efforts to search for the meaning of life he found that the meaning of life and values lie outside space, time and cause. He wrote:

> I had asked: what meaning has life beyond time, beyond space and beyond cause? And I was answering the question: "What is the meaning of my life within time, space and cause?" The result was that after long and laboured thought I could only answer: none.[49]

Questions about the meaning of life, values, and how people can behave, cannot be answered like questions about matter or space. They lie outside this sphere.

Tolstoy presented his ideas through his literary works. He expressed his view in some of his novels and short stories. As an example of the nonfactuality of moral values, let us quote the following from one of his novels, "Anna Karenina":

> If goodness has a cause, it is no longer goodness; if it has a consequence - a reward - it is also not goodness. Therefore goodness is beyond the chain of cause and effect.[50]

> ... I used to say that in my body, in this grass, in this insect,.......... there takes place, according to physical, chemical and psychological laws, a change of matter...... And I was surprised that, in spite of the greatest effort of thought on that path, the meaning of life, of my impulse and my aspirations, was not revealed to me. [51]

In addition, in his search for the meaning of life and ethical values Tolstoy turned his attention to the rising star of his age, i.e., science, to which many people had turned their belief, directing their attention and interest towards scientific progress, ideas and laws. However, Tolstoy was not impressed by the progress of science, because during his search in scientific ideas he found that science does not answer questions about the meaning of life and values.

He said:

> The problem concerning experimental science is the sequence of cause and effect in material phenomena. Experimental science only has to be introduced to the question of final causes for it to turn into a nonsense. The problem facing speculative science is acknowledgement of the essence of life that lies beyond cause and effect.[52]

Tolstoy's ideas about the meaning of life and value are exactly similar to Wittgenstein's ideas, which shows the obvious influence of Tolstoy. For Wittgenstein stated that "the sense of the world must lie outside the world ... in it no value exist" (TLP, 6.41), and elsewhere "we feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched"(TLP, 6.52). We find here, Wittgenstein insisting on the non-existence of values in the world and also the meaning of life and the world. And if all the problems of science have been solved, problems about the meaning of life are untouched.

One of the main goals of Tolstoy's writings was to communicate ethical and religious values and instructions. Indeed, he considered that the purpose of art is to teach morality and religious precepts. That brings us to the second point, Tolstoy's connection between morality and religion. In an essay entitled

"Religion and Morality", written in 1893, Tolstoy saw that implementing the instructions of any religion means the believer should commit himself to a certain conduct. For faith is "man's awareness that his position in the world obliges him to perform certain actions".[53] The fulfilment of the belief requires certain actions and part of these actions deals with the relationship between the believer and other people. In this sense, the connection between morality and religion is unavoidable. Tolstoy said in this respect:

> Every religion is an answer to the question of the meaning of life. And the religious answer includes a certain moral demand which sometimes follows and sometimes precedes the explanation of life's meaning....
>
> Morality is included in the explanation of life given by religion and can in no sense be separated from religion.[54]

As a result of this conception, Tolstoy saw Christ as the perfect example to imitate because his moral behaviour showed the essence of Christian religion.

Another point worth mentioning here is that Tolstoy did not build his belief in God upon an argument or proof of God's existence, i.e., did not build his belief upon dogma. But he insisted that a belief can be built upon practical bases, i.e., upon the fulfilment of religious instructions through deeds. This view is similar to Wittgenstein who stood against any form of theory or proof which verifies the existence of God. Consequently, he considered religion as a commitment to do certain actions where religious belief can be fulfilled.

The conclusion which Tolstoy reached in his 'confessions' and view of morality and religion can be summarised in the following. Values and the meaning of life do not exist in the world and science cannot answer the

question of life and morality. In addition, ethical values and deeds are an essential part of any religious belief.

In the light of this we can go back to the 'Gospel in Brief' and show the clear influence of what Tolstoy said about ethics and religion on Wittgenstein's earlier religious view. The remarkable thing in the book is that throughout, it represents God in the figure of a father and talks about the fulfilment of the father's will. The description of God as a father appeared in the 'Note Books', "and connect with this the comparison of God to a father" (p. 73). In addition, Wittgenstein described the point of the 'Tractatus' as ethical and that can be seen in the detailed examination of the will in the 'Note Books'. But in order to display this influence, let us start with the following. Since Tolstoy's search in rational knowledge and science brought him no answers to the questions of the meaning of life, he considered religion as a metaphysical theme:

> Studying the teaching of Christ in that way the reader will convince himself that Christianity, far from being a mixture of the lofty and the low, or a superstition, is a very strict, pure, and complete metaphysical and ethical doctrine, higher than which the reason of man has not reached.[55]

This is a confirmation that in the physical world, there is no existence of ethical and religious values, because the sphere of scientific investigation and scientific knowledge has nothing to do with the meaning of life. According to this, Tolstoy attributed ethical and religious values to the exercise of the will: "Everyone has freedom to choose life or reject it. To choose life is to fulfil the will of the father by doing good to others; to reject it is to do one's own will and not do good to otheres".[56] The exercise of the will, from a religious point of view, means to fulfil what God had ordered, i.e. to do good and avoid evil.

That is the duty of every believer and through that exercise, happiness can be achieved.[57]

Wittgenstein devoted a good deal of attention to examination of ethics and the will in the 'Note Books' where he considered "ethics is transcendental" (p. 79). Furthermore, he spoke about the exercise of the will in the 'Tractatus', suggesting that through this exercise, good can be achieved, which is accompanied with happiness, and according to this exercise the worlds of the happy and unhappy man will be different (TLP, 6.43). This will be a crucial point in examining the religious dimension of the 'Tractatus'. With this we can move to the discussion of the third point which deals with Tolstoy's view of art and its function.

In his book, 'What is Art?' Tolstoy concentrated on one important feature of art which is expression. He saw that art had the ability to arouse feelings and that led him to the conclusion that good artistic works are works which evoke the maximum amount of feeling. He wrote:

> Speech transmitting the thoughts and experiences of man serves as a means of union among them, and art serves a similar purpose. The peculiarity of this latter means of intercourse, distinguishing it from intercourse by means of words, consists in this, that whereas by words a man transmits his thoughts to another, by art he transmits his feelings.[58]

Speech is the medium of communication between people and through it they acquire knowledge and experience. But, although art has a similar manner to speech, it communicates emotional feelings. He defined the activity of art as follows:

> To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced and having evoked it in oneself by means of movements, lines,

colours, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others experienced the same feeling - this is the activity of art.[59]

This insistence upon art as an expression led Tolstoy to give many examples to support his claim in 'What is Art?'.

> The feelings with which the artist infects others may be most various.........: feelings of love for one's own country, self-devotion   and submission to fate or to God expressed in drama, raptures of lovers described in a novel, feelings of voluptuousness expressed in a picture, courage expressed in a triumphal march, merriment evoked by a dance, humour evoked by a funny story, etc..... etc...... [60]

He went on further and posed a critical theory based upon expression. It states that the value of the work of art depends upon the maximum amount of feelings and emotions which it can arouse in the audience. What is important about this idea here is that as art is considered to be an expression and its main goal is to evoke feelings and emotions we can infer the following from Tolstoy's writings. It is well known that Tolstoy devoted his writings to serve moral and religious values. So, we can infer that moral values are based upon, or accompanied by feelings and compassion. A moral behaviour which can be carried out towards our fellow men can be accompanied by compassion. Someone could feel happy if he had helped his neighbour to overcome a certain problem, especially if helping one's neighbour is a religious duty, as in Islam. In 'What is Art?' there is a remark which might support our conclusion:

> This special importance has always been given by men to that part of this activity which transmits feelings flowing from their religious perception, and this small part they have specifically called art, attaching to it the full meaning of the word.[61]

In Tolstoy's search for the meaning of life he found that religion can provide a view and a meaning to life. And morality is an essential part of

religion which can be communicated through artistic means because, for him, morality accompanies compassion and feelings. In other words, the meaning of life, religious instructions and moral values can be conveyed and communicated through artistic means.

In the previous chapter I showed how Wittgenstein had a deep admiration to Tolstoy and how he was personally influenced by him. Here I have shown Tolstoy's intellectual influence. For Wittgenstein agreed with Tolstoy that art is a kind of expression.(NB, p. 83) In addition, there are other important ideas which show the connection between art, ethics and religion. In the 'Tractatus', Wittgenstein considered aesthetics and ethics are one and the same"(TLP, 6.421). And in his 'Note Books' he showed where the connection between the work of art and ethics lies. Furthermore, he distinguished between what can and cannot be said. What cannot be said can show itself and what shows itself is the mystical.(TLP, 6.522). Ethics and art are linked with the mystical because they cannot, according to him, be put into words.

With Leo Tolstoy our discussion of the influences comes to an end. It was a journey which started in Vienna where Wittgenstein had engaged with the intellectual problems and conflict of the Austrian culture. One of these problems was language and its limits. He engaged with Kraus's writings and Loos's friendship, studied Hertz and went over Mauthner's ideas. Moreover, the problem of the distinction between the sphere of fact and value occupied the mind of the young Austrian who travelled to England to study engineering. There, his interest in mathematics led him gradually to study philosophy and logic, and to travel to Cambridge where he became Russell's hope in solving the philosophical problems which occupied his (Russell's) mind. Wittgenstein showed a remarkable talent in dealing with philosophical problems and that

made him a distinguished figure in Cambridge. Lastly, his experience in World War One and engagement with Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's writings, and the apparent re-reading of Schopenhauer shaped part of his ideas. This whole journey resulted in his famous book, 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'.

The previous discussion of the influences which crystallised Wittgenstein's earlier thought poses an important question. What are the main ideas of the 'Tractatus' which led Bertrand Russell, in his introduction, to describe it as "an important event in the philosophical world", and G. E. Moore to describe the book, in his recommendation, when it was submitted for a Ph.D., as a "work of a genius"?

To answer this question we need to go over the main ideas of the book and to determine whether Wittgenstein, as he claimed in the preface, succeeded in drawing the limits of the expression of thought, i.e., drawing the rigorous distinction between the sphere of fact and the sphere of value, as he put it to his friend, Ludwig Ficker. The following section shows this distinction through the linguistic perspective.

The Analysis of the World and Language

Our aim in discussing Wittgenstein's earlier thought is to show how he succeeded in drawing the rigorous distinction between science and religion and art, i.e., the distinction drawn in the classical view which dominated the last century. This rigorous distinction was made according to a method; the analysis of language was that method. The aim of this section is to display this method in detail and show how Wittgenstein set the limits of language. In my argument, I will bear in mind two main ideas. The first is that, the 'Tractatus' should be considered as a whole and not just a treatise on logic and language.

In other words, the last few pages which talk about the mystical constitute a conclusion to the analysis of the world and language which has been carried on throughout the book. The second idea is that the point of the book is an ethical one. This section will pave the way for the argument concerning the second point which will take place in the fourth section. But now let us carry on our examination of the 'Tractatus' and show how Wittgenstein conducted his analysis of the world and language. As a result of this analysis, the distinction between what can and cannot be said can be drawn, and what cannot be said shows itself and what shows itself is the mystical, which includes aesthetics and ethics.

Wittgenstein's earlier thought appeared in the 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' in 1921. In the preface he said that the aim of the book is "to draw a limit to thought or rather not to thought but to the expression of thoughts".[62] And "the whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words, what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence."[63] To achieve the limits set in the preface, Wittgenstein focused on the analysis of language into its different aspects, its structure and its relation to the world. This prompted people who wrote about the 'Tractatus', such as G. E. Anscombe, to say, in one of the best comments about the book, "the principal theme of the book is the connection between language or thought, and reality. The main thesis about this is that sentences, or their mental counterparts, are pictures of facts."[64] It is obvious, then, that the central theme of the 'Tractatus' was to study language and its relation to thought, reality and the world. Wittgenstein said, "to give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and the essence of the world."(TLP, 5.4711)

Let us, then, start our explanation of the important ideas of the 'Tractatus' and find whether Wittgenstein achieved his aim by setting the limits of the expression of thought, or distinguishing between the sphere of fact from the sphere of value. From that, we can proceed to investigate the distinction between science on one hand and religion and art on the other. Wittgenstein opened the 'Tractatus' with the following:

1.   The world is all that is the case.
1.1   The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11   The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
1.12   For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
1.13   The facts in logical place are the world.
1.2   The world divides into facts.
1.21   Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.

Wittgenstein divided the world into facts, not things. What does he mean by fact? The use of the word fact is not the ordinary use in which, for example, we say that 'water boils at $100°$' is a fact. Wittgenstein used the word fact in a different sense. He meant "all such facts to be compounded out of 'atomic facts', into whose make-up no other facts enter."[65] Facts are complex and not simple and they are a combination of simple elements related in a proper way.

The term fact, in the 'Tractatus' is used in two senses. The first is a complex which combines simple facts, the second is simple and cannot be analysed; Wittgenstein called this type of fact the atomic fact. Although the latter cannot be analysed into simple facts it can be decomposed into its objects. "An atomic fact is a combination of objects"(TLP, 2.01).

Here is the detailed explanation of the analysis of the world into complex and atomic facts and objects.

Wittgenstein divided the world into facts but it seems, to many, that there is unclear use of the term "atomic fact". When he sent the draft of the 'Tractatus' to Russell, the latter replied by asking him about some terms. One of these terms was atomic fact. Russell asked Wittgenstein in a letter about the difference between facts and atomic facts. Wittgenstein's answer was that atomic fact is what corresponds to the elementary proposition if it is true and fact is what corresponds to the logical product of a number of elementary propositions if this product is true.[66] This distinction between facts and atomic facts must be completed by saying what both facts are. On the one hand, facts are complex. They consist of atomic facts. On the other hand, atomic facts are simple and cannot be decomposed into further facts. Atomic facts can be analysed into concatenations of simple objects or elements. "Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then there must be objects and atomic facts"(TLP, 4.2211). (I will depend, in this section (facts and atomic facts) on Ogden's Translation of the 'Tractatus'.) Wittgenstein considered the atomic fact corresponding to an elementary proposition as the simplest unit of a combination of objects, because when he divided the world, he divided it into facts, not into (complex) things.

Atomic facts, or elementary propositions, are independent from each other. We cannot infer the existence of one atomic fact from another atomic fact. "One elementary proposition cannot be deduced from another."(TLP, 5.134). And "... it is clear that the logical product of two elementary

propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction".(TLP, 6.3751). In addition, the independence of atomic facts means each elementary proposition can be either true or false, because the falsehood of an elementary proposition consists in the non-existence of the atomic situation and its truth in its existence.

Moreover, atomic facts have a structure and form. Any atomic fact is a combination of simple objects and this combination can be determined according to the relation in which objects are connected together. Then the structure of the atomic fact is the way in which objects can be combined together. "The determinate way in which objects are connected in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact" (TLP, 2.032). In contrast, the possibility of connection between things in a proper way is called form. "Form is the possibility of structure."(TLP, 2.033). In other words, the structure of atomic fact is concerned with the actual fact in the world and form is concerned with the possibility of connection between things or objects in a proper way. Furthermore, in the light of the previous discussion, if atomic facts consist of simple things or objects in the world it follows that these should be discernible. "In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality."(TLP, 2.223) At the same time the existence of the atomic facts should be prior to the existence of the proposition and that will enable us to examine the existence or non-existence of the atomic fact. "There is no order of things a priori"(TLP, 5.634), because the actual and specific character of the facts in the world is "found empirically and cannot be derived from an a priori discourse."[67] According to this view, there is an important question which arises when dealing with the nature of the existence of the atomic fact, and its components. What is changeable and the unchangeable in the analysis of facts

and objects? The answer to this question is: atomic facts are the result of change in structures of objects. On the other hand, objects are unchangeable. "Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable"(TLP, 2.0271). And "the configuration of objects produces atomic fact".(TLP, 2.0272).

In his analysis of the world into facts and atomic facts, Wittgenstein set the framework for his linguistic method, because this analysis paved the way for analysing language into complex and atomic proposition. In other words, it paved the way for the analysis of language into units. These propositional units can be applied to atomic facts to determine their truth value. The linguistic analysis culminated in the picture theory of meaning, through which the limits of the speakable language can be determined. Before any further explanation of the analysis of language, let us complete our analysis of the world by tackling the final element, which is objects.

As shown above, atomic facts are a combination of objects and any atomic fact can be decomposed into its components. Objects in Wittgenstein's earlier thought are the simplest elements in the process of analysis. There is no further analysis to objects. "Objects are simple"(TLP, 2.02).

The simplicity of objects according to the 'Tractatus' results from their being named by words which make reference to only one thing in the world. This reference is not achieved through any further sense. "Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak about them. I cannot put them into words, propositions can only say how things are, not what they are."(TLP, 3.221). And "A name means an object. The object is its meaning."(TLP, 3.203). Any possible sense can be found in a proposition

which is the smallest unit of language. Objects do not have the ability to determine what is the case but they are a necessary condition for what is the case. In this sense, objects are a prior necessity for any possible fact as they are a prior necessity in a theory of meaning for any possible sense.[68] Because for Wittgenstein facts are what make up the world not things. If objects are the constituents of facts and any sense can be found only in propositions asserting facts, then it can be concluded that objects are firm and facts are alterable. If objects are unalterable, they can be unfinishable and everlasting.[69] Since objects are unalterable and cannot be divided into things, Wittgenstein claimed that "Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite"(TLP, 2.021)   Although the idea of the substance is considered to be a metaphysical idea,[70] Wittgenstein justified it by claiming "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. in that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)" (TLP, 2.0211, 2.0212). In addition, objects can be considered independent and dependent. How?   Objects are independent because they exist in the world without any necessary connection or relation with one another. Objects can enter in or form different atomic facts and the ability of objects to form a number of atomic facts supports the view that they are independent. "Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connection with the state of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves, and in propositions) (TLP, 2.0122). The second idea which considers objects as dependent expresses this view by showing that objects are components of atomic facts and they cannot exist alone, so, in this sense, they do not have an independent existence. The ability of objects to form atomic facts or state of affairs depends upon the nature of these objects and their ability to form a fact. "In logic nothing is accidental: if

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a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself",(TLP, 2.012) and "In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another."(TLP, 2.031).

From this analysis of the world Wittgenstein proceeded to the analysis of language which is dominated by the picture theory of meaning.

The Picture Theory of Meaning

We arrive at the most important feature of Wittgenstein's earlier thought. In this theory he presented his main view of the nature of a proposition. In the following explanation of this theory there are many points which should be considered: the meaning of the proposition, the proposition as a picture and the internal relations between the components of the proposition.

First, in the 'Tractatus' Wittgenstein claimed that every proposition has a sense. The sense of a proposition is separate from its truth or falsehood. Any proposition carries its own sense, irrespective whether it is true or false. "Every proposition must already have a sense: it cannot be given a sense by affirmation. Indeed, its sense is just what is affirmed. And the same applies to negation, etc."(TLP, 4.064). When the proposition carries its own sense it will not be affected by its truth value. To determine the truth or the falsehood of the proposition we must first know its sense. If the proposition is false, that will not prevent us from understanding it. For example, if someone says 'John is black" and John in reality is white, this will not stop us from understanding the sense of the first proposition.

The second point to be considered about the picture theory of meaning is that the proposition serves as a picture. Before any elaboration of this point, here is a brief indication of how this idea came to Wittgenstein's mind.

Wittgenstein told his friend, G. von Wright, how the idea of a proposition as a picture or model of a fact came to him. During the first World War when he was serving in the Eastern front Wittgenstein read a report in a French magazine describing an accident which took place in Paris. The accident was presented to the court in a form of a model, corresponding to a real car, road and people. From this representation, Wittgenstein saw that a proposition can represent a fact or a possible state of affairs, i.e., a proposition can represent reality.[71] In the 'Note Books' he wrote:

> In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the law-courts in Paris a motorcar accident is represented by means of dolls, etc) (29.9, 14, NB, p. 7)

A proposition can represent a situation through the correspondence of its components with things and objects in the world. This is how the idea came to Wittgenstein and here are the details explaining this notion. He said:

2.1   We picture facts to ourselves.

2.11   A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

2.12   A picture is a model of reality.

2.13   In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.

2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are the representative of objects.

2.14   What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

2.141 A picture is a fact.

2.15   The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.

From the above quotation, a proposition serves as a picture, because it pictures objects in the world as they stand together in a certain relation. Any proposition can represent a possible state of affairs in the world by depicting what is the case.

As the proposition is a picture of fact, then, attention should be paid to the internal relations between the elements in the picture. Because any proposition which pictures a fact can represent the existence of this fact when the internal relation in the proposition depicts the same internal relation in the fact which it represents. Another point here concerning the internal relations in the proposition shows that it is something which cannot be said but it can show itself. "... It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant state of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects".(TLP, 4.122) This internal relation refers to logical form which I will tackle shortly with logic, but first, a quick look at thought and language.

It is obvious from the above discussion that the main purpose of the 'Tractatus' was to analyse language by explaining its structure, form and its limits. From this point of view Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, made no distinction between thought and language. He described thought as "a logical picture of facts".(TLP, 3) And "a thought is a proposition with sense"(TLP, 4). The expression of thought and forms of language has certain rules and grammar. Logic plays the most important role in any language, and any expressions of language should follow the formal requirements of logic. To Wittgenstein, logic is an important and central subject in his earlier thought. He used the word logic in a wider sense as "what follows from the rules of any

symbolism."[72]   To make things clear it is better to go straight to what Wittgenstein revealed about logic in the 'Tractatus'. Logic, according to him,is concerned with the rules and "grammatical determination"[73] of language and it is not concerned with the actual things in the world. "In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play any role. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign: only the description of expressions may be presupposed."(TLP, 3.33). In brief, logic deals with language which expresses things not with things themselves. Instead of that the relation between language and the world led to a relation between logic and the world. "Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The World has this in it, and this, but not that".(TLP, 5.61)

This is an essential consequence to the analysis of language and its limits because, since a proposition is a picture of objects in the world, the internal form of a proposition combines its elements together, i.e., combines names without itself being the subject of representation, for "Logic is transcendental". (TLP, 6.13) Then the limits of the process of representation of objects in the world means the limits of representational language, i.e., the limits of logic.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein said the following in the 'Tractatus' "... in order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world propositions cannot represent logical form: It is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent".(TLP, 4.12, 4.121). The logical form of any proposition can be found in the proposition itself. It can be grasped from the proposition. It shows itself in it. It is impossible to

express logical form in language, because according to Wittgenstein, anything that shows itself cannot be put into words, i.e., propositions. There is a wonderful example given by W. D. Hudson which can elucidate the logical form. It is the example of the artist and his way of painting. The artist who draws a picture follows a certain way or method. We can understand the elements of the picture easily and can know what the painter meant by them and sometimes to what school the artist belongs. At the same time, it is impossible for the artist to draw the way in which he painted the picture. The way in which the artist painted his picture can be shown and grasped by the picture itself or by the whole artistic works of the artist.[74] What remains for us in the interpretation of Wittgenstein's linguistic method is the notion of truth and falsehood and the mystical, and that will give a complete picture of the 'Tractatus'.

The notion of truth and falsehood which Wittgenstein introduced was a result of his analysis of the world and language. He showed in the picture theory of meaning how a proposition can depict a possible state of affairs in the world and determine what is the case or what can be said. In addition, any proposition has sense and this sense can be understood without the knowledge of whether it is true or false. "To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true. (One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true.) It is understood by anyone who understands its constituents"(TLP, 4.024). Anyone can understand any proposition if he knows its component, irrespective of its truth or falsehood. How can we determine the truth or falsehood of a proposition according to Wittgenstein? Understanding the meaning of a proposition is the first step to determining whether it is true or false. The knowledge of the proposition's constituents will lead, according to the picture theory of meaning to comparison of the

arrangement of the constituents with a situation in the worlds. If things stand in the world as the proposition describes, then the proposition is true and if not, simply, it is false. "What a picture represents is its sense. The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes it truth or falsity. In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality."(TLP, 2.221, 2.222, 2.223)

We come now to the final point in this section which deals with what Wittgenstein had described as what cannot be said. Earlier in this section it was said that the 'Tractatus' should be understood and explained as a whole i.e., the conclusion which Wittgenstein reached in the end cannot be understood without the first five sections, which showed the analysis of language and the world. As a result of that analysis, the last pages of the book are devoted to brief points concerning ethics and mysticism. This view is a clear consequence of the picture theory of meaning, through which we can determine what can and cannot be said. The first five sections showed how we can determine what is the case or what can be said. It is obvious that what we can talk about , in Wittgenstein's view, is facts or possible states of affairs, i.e., the propositions which show the representation of possible situations in the world.

On the other hand, there are propositions whose existence or non-existence, truth or falsehood, we are not able to determine, because they do not represent any possible state of affairs or possible fact. Wittgenstein considered them as nonsense. These propositions deal with human values, art and religious matters. And from here, the limits of language can be shown. For the aim of the 'Tractatus', as it appeared in the preface of its author, was to set limits for expressions of thought, i.e., for what can and cannot be said. What

can be said is the language which describes facts or a possible state of affairs in the world. He posed the general form of a proposition which shows the limits of language. These limits are based upon the expressions of sense by a proposition describing a possible state of affairs. He said:

> It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form: that is, to give a description of the proposition of any sign-language whatsoever in such a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description and every symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the meanings of the names are suitably chosen ...

> The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand. (TLP, 4.5)

The general form of a proposition contains everything that can be said in language, i.e. contains the possibility of expressing every sense: The possibility of expressing a sense is bounded by two things. The first is that propositions can only describe or deny the existence of a possible state of affairs and, as a result, determine the totality of the true and false propositions. For at the end of the previous quotation, Wittgenstein said that the general form of a proposition is "This is how things stand" and the word 'this' refers to a possible state of affairs.

The second point is that the extent of a proposition is limited to the existence of an elementary preposition. He wrote:

> Suppose that I am given all elementary propositions: I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all propositions, and that fixes their limits. (TLP, 4.5).

So, the limits of language, the expression of thought, are imposed by the existence of facts or possible state of affairs in the world. Because the world is "all that is the case"(TLP, 1). i.e. the totality of objects and the possible state of affairs. And propositions can be formed from the existence of objects in the world, i.e. language can represents objects in the world according to a certain relation, i.e. according to how they stand. Other than that cannot be represented. In other words, propositions cannot represent values or, in a wider sense, ethics. Because, terms such as good, bad, virtue, etc. ... cannot be found in the world. They do not correspond to things or objects, nor do they represent facts, and if there is any value it does not lie in the world but it lies outside it.(TLP, 6.41). In addition, he said "so it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics."(TLP, 6.42) The impossibility of putting ethics into words is due to the fact that propositions which point out or talk about ethics and moral values do not represent things in the world, because, according to Wittgenstein, ethics can show itself and what shows itself cannot be put into words. So, ethical values do not corresponds to objects in the world, instead they show themselves in actions. What shows itself is the mystical. "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical".(TLP, 6.522). Section four is fully devoted to interpreting Wittgenstein's mysticism.

This brings us to the end of this section. It contained the analysis of the world and language as it appeared in Wittgenstein's earlier thought. We found how he worked to set the rigorous distinction between the sphere of fact and the sphere of value. This rigorous distinction was made through the analysis of language. Linguistic analysis cleared the way to determine what exists and what does not exist in the world, through comparing language, i.e., propositions and their constituents with what corresponds to them in the world.

From this comparison, the truth and falsehood of the process of representation can be achieved. Apart from that, propositions which belong to ethics, religion and literature cannot represent facts or possible states of affairs and so are excluded from the sphere of facts; they belong to the sphere of value. This exclusion shows the rigorous distinction between the two spheres which has been achieved through the linguistic perspective.

In the light of this, we have now in hand the method which will enable us to accomplish one of the important goals of the thesis. i.e., to draw the distinction between the classical view between science on the one hand, and religion and art on the other. It will be carried out in a rigorous way through the linguistic method. The next section deals with the discussion of science by explaining scientific language and its different aspects.

The Common Features of Scientific Language

This section deals with the analysis of scientific language in the light of Wittgenstein's analysis of the world and language. It will deal with the common features of it which show how science is concerned with the sphere of fact and natural phenomena. The discussion will focus on scientific language as a model of facts, descriptive, determinate, factual and non-expressive. In the case of model Wittgenstein claimed that a proposition is a model of reality, i.e., a picture of reality. An interpretation will be given for how a proposition can serve as a model of reality by citing scientific models. This interpretation will extend to show how a model can be formed from within and how the components of a model (objects or things) correspond to the names which describe them in a proposition. The second feature of scientific language is its descriptive nature. Scientific propositions can describe facts in the world and through this description we can reach a conclusion about them, i.e., whether

they exist or not, i.e., whether these propositions are true or false. In addition I will give an explanation for why scientific language is not expressive.

Scientists use models in their studies and experimental works. They serve as a representation of their ideas and to clarify and help in some purposes in their scientific investigations. In addition, a structural engineer designs a model for a house or a big building. A mechanical engineer designs a model of a machine to explain, for instance, how it can be manufactured and worked. Generally speaking the use of models is common in scientific research and activities. Of course, these models are explained by scientific language. So, how can scientific language serve as a model?

Wittgenstein's conception of a proposition as a picture or representation of objects, i.e., facts, paved the way for the interpretation of scientific language as a model. In fact, Wittgenstein himself, as it appeared clearly in the 'Tractatus', described a proposition as a "picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it."(TLP, 4.01). We saw in the last section how the idea of a proposition as a model came to Wittgenstein's mind from the model of an accident presented to the court. The notion of a proposition as a model can be applied to scientific language.

Wittgenstein had engaged with the idea of models in his earlier life in Vienna. It was Hertz who mentioned that in his book "The Principles of Mechanics" when he presented his theory of mechanical models. These models have limits and their limits should be drawn from within. This idea is relevant to what Wittgenstein stated about models and propositions. In his analysis of language we saw that only a proposition has sense, and names correspond to objects only and do not carry any sense alone. What connects objects with a

proposition is the logical form, because in order for a proposition to model a fact it must have something in common with this fact or possible state of affairs, i.e., it must have a certain form. From this point we can proceed to show how the limits of a model or a proposition can be drawn from within by focusing upon the role of Logic.

In the process of modelling a fact through a proposition, there are some limits which can be seen in the following way. In order for a proposition to be a model of a fact or possible state of affairs, it must depict the exact form of relation between things as they stand in the world. Wittgenstein said, "a picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts."(TLP, 2.2) So, the logical form represents the possible structure of the combination of objects, i.e., the possible state of affairs. This structure is a logical one because spatial things and objects can be put together in a proposition through logical form. "The proposition is the logical picture of a situation"(NB, 3.11.1914, p. 25). In addition, a logical picture can depict things in the world. "Logical picture can depict the world." "A picture represents a possible situation in the logical space."(TLP, 2.19, 2.202). In this sense, logical form represents the internal relation between things or objects, in a possible state of affairs. It represents the relation aRb; "the students' union is opposite the car park", i.e., the students' union in the relation R to the car park.

On the other hand, there are limits of the process of representation which can be shown through the relation between logic and the world. In the 'Tractatus' Wittgenstein stated that "logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits".(TLP, 5.61), and in another situation, he described logic as the "mirror image of the world."(TLP, 6.13). The limits of logic and the world can be summarised in the language which represents the world. To

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represent a fact in logical space, the elements of the fact should exist in the same form which appears in a proposition. In case there is a proposition which does not represent a fact as its form shows, it will be considered as a false proposition. What we can infer here is that, there are limits for representational language, it is confined to the existence of a possible state of affairs. These limits can be detected from the logical form of a proposition, which shows the internal relation between things, i.e., the logical connection between things from within. Then, the situation of things allows them to be connected linguistically through logical form, and logic is the internal bond which connect things or objects from within. The limits of logic from within are the limits of the process of a true representation. That reminds us of what Wittgenstein said about objects and their configuration, where objects are unalterable but what alters is their configuration. And as logic pervades the world, then its limits, the limits of a **true** representation, are the limits of the world, i.e., the limits of representational facts in logical place from within "A proposition can construct the world with the help of logical scaffolding, so that one can actually see from the proposition how everything stands logically if is true."(TLP, 4.023).

Another important feature of scientific language is its descriptive nature. It can describe things, facts and natural phenomenon. According to Wittgenstein a proposition can serve as a description of reality or a possible state of affairs, "a proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no. In order to do that, it must describe reality completely. A proposition is a description of a state of affairs".(TLP, 4.023). For any possible situation can "be given by means of its description". (NB, 16.1.15,p.38). A situation can be described by means of a proposition, and a proposition can represent the internal relation of that situation. He wrote "as the description of an object

describes it by its external properties, so the proposition describes the fact by its internal proposition."(NB, 16.1.15, p.38).

Another step further which shows the descriptive nature of scientific language has been given by Wittgenstein, when he cited Newton's Mechanics. He said:

> Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description of the world. Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way I shall have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. .... The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world. Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions.(TLP, 6.341)

Wittgenstein cited a scientific theory, Newton's Mechanics, which can provide a form of description of the world. He compared this form of a systematic description with a network. This system or network provides a unified description[75] of the world through "a single plan".(TLP, 6.343) To clarify this idea he gave an example of a group of propositions form a network of a systematic description. It is the example of a white surface and black spots. We can form a network or a system of description describing that surface with the irregular black spots which scattered on it. Or, instead of black spots we can use, as he put it, a square mesh and determine whether the squares are black or white. We can give a system of description to this surface and point out clearly to the black and white squares to their situation and the

internal relation which connects them. The form or the system of description will lead to the consideration of truism of that network. As a network which is composed of propositions, the truth or falsehood of its constituents becomes an unavoidable necessity. In this sense, "mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true propositions that we need for the description of the world".(TLP, 6.343)

In order to complete our analysis of scientific language in Wittgenstein's earlier thought, we ought to include that it is determinate. This feature is an essential part of scientific language and compatible with its other aspects.

Scientific propositions, in order to be tested and accurately depict facts must have a determinate sense. It is so important for a proposition to have a determinate sense, because if a proposition does not carry a clear and accurate sense, that will lead to difficulty in understanding it, a possibility of more than one understanding and it might fail to deliver what it ought to tell. How, then, does a proposition, especially a scientific proposition, have a determinate sense?

There are three important points, the first deals with a proposition as a determination of a logical space, the second with a determinate structure and finally, as a result of the previous points, it should have a determinate sense.

First, in order for a proposition to represent a fact it must represent actual things or objects in the world. "A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents - by the existence of the proposition with a

sense."(TLP, 3.4). These objects and things have determinate names in the logical space or as they appear in a proposition.

In order for a proposition to carry a clear sense it must have a determinate structure, and that brings us to the second point. Wittgenstein said that "in a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another. The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs."(TLP, .2.031, 2.032). A determinate structure or form is a fundamental necessity to determine the sense of a proposition. It is hard for a proposition to have a clear sense without having a determinate structure or form. A proposition without a determinate structure will raise questions as to the state of affairs which it depicts.

The determinate state of affairs in the logical space which is represented in a determinate structure will lead to a determinate sense of proposition, and that is the third point. This point is a direct conclusion from the previous point. Wittgenstein insisted that a proposition must have a clear and determinate sense; a fragmented sense is not a sense at all. That appeared obviously in the 'Note Books':

> There are the propositions of physics and the propositions of ordinary life at bottom equally sharp, and does the difference consist only in the more consistent application of signs in the language of science? Is it or is it not possible to talk of a proposition having a more or less sharp sense?
>
> It seems clear that what we MEAN must always be "sharp"(NB, 20.6.15, p. 68)

Wittgenstein asserted here and elsewhere the exactness and clearness of the proposition's sense. For him "everything that can be put into words can be put clearly".(TLP, 4.116)

The previous argument concerning the aspects of scientific language provides us with an important conclusion. That is scientific language is non-expressive. Scientific language models, describes and provides a determinate sense for objects and possible states of affairs in the world. What lies outside the world, it cannot model or describe. Expressive language such as literary language can express the feelings and the emotions of any individual. It can express happiness, sadness, etc... On the other hand scientific language lacks this ability. It cannot point to the inner feeling or emotion of the individual. That is due to a fundamental reason. In his notes Wittgenstein conceived happiness as a non-objective mark in the world. He wrote:

> What is the objective mark of the happy, harmonious life? Here it is again clear that there cannot be any such mark, that can be described. This mark cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical one, a transcendental one.(NB, 30.7.16, p. 78)

A term such as Happiness does not correspond to things or objects in the world. I cannot point to an object and say 'this is happiness', or 'sadness is near the table'. There is no object or objective mark which can be described in the world. Consequently, scientific language cannot represent or point out happiness, because it can only represent what can be said, i.e., the possible state of affairs in the world. Happiness cannot be put into a relation with another object to form a fact.

The distinction between the sphere of fact and the sphere of value appears in the distinction between science on the one hand and religion and art on the other, because scientific propositions represent and describe facts in the logical space and, on the other hand, it lacks the ability to point to what lies outside the world. In the light of this, scientific language in Wittgenstein's earlier thought is conceived as independent propositions subject to the

conditions of truth and falsehood, which can model and describe possible states of affairs with a determinate sense. In other words, scientific language is the representational language of objective facts in the world. Those propositions, according to Wittgenstein, are all that we can speak about, i.e., in his words, what can be said or what can be put into words. And what we cannot speak about, according to the picture theory of meaning, can show itself and what shows itself is the mystical, which includes ethics, aesthetics and religion. How can the mystical show itself? The answer is in the next section.

The Mystical

In the second section of this chapter I mentioned that the 'Tractatus' should be understood as a whole. Some commentators have considered the book as a treatise of logic and language only. Others have not seen that the last part of it is a conclusion of Wittgenstein's earlier analysis of the world and language. But I believe the 'Tractatus' should be understood as a whole and that the final part, which deals with the mystical, is an essential conclusion of Wittgenstein's analysis of the world and language. How this understanding can be interpreted is the core of this section.

In this section I will focus upon Wittgenstein's concept of mysticism, starting with what he meant by the mystical and what it includes, and going onto the connection between ethics, religion and art. Thirdly, I will deal with Bertrand Russell's comments and ideas of mysticism which appeared in his article "Mysticism and Logic". I will trace the elements of mysticism which appeared in this article with what corresponds to them in Wittgenstein's earlier thought. After that, an explanation will be given of Wittgenstein's claim that the aim of the 'Tractatus' is an ethical one. This explanation will include ethics

and its relation to the world through the will and the metaphysical subject. From that the religious dimension of the 'Tractatus' can be shown.

In the closing part of the 'Tractatus' Wittgenstein started to express his ideas of what he describes as the mystical, or what cannot be said. He mentioned the word 'mystical' three times:

> It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. To view the world 'sub specie aeterni' is to view it as a whole - a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.(TLP, 6.44, 6.45)

> There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.They are what is mystical.(TLP, 6.522)

As a consequence of his analysis of language, Wittgenstein concluded that there are things that cannot be put into words. These things are, logical form, propositions of ethics, aesthetics, questions about the meaning of life, religious matters and value. What cannot be said or put into words can show itself or make itself manifest. And, except logical form, all the previous topics can show themselves or make themselves manifest through art and action.[76]

There are two main points I would like to mention before any explanation of how the mystical can show itself in art and action. The first deals with the aim of the 'Tractatus' as ethical. The second, is how art, ethics and religion are connected. In a letter to his friend 'Ludwig Ficker', who tried to help him to publish the 'Tractatus', Wittgenstein wrote:

> The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I haven't written. And it is precisely this second part that is the

important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just guessing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it.[77]

This letter was published in Engelmann's book "Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein" in 1967. It is quite hard to justify Wittgenstein's claim about the point of the 'Tractatus', because there are very few statements which mention ethics and ethical propositions. Thus, many thinkers and commentators dealt with the 'Tractatus' as a treatise of logic and language only, because almost all the book is devoted to the analysis of the world, language and logic. In addition, Wittgenstein mentioned in his preface that he is in debt to Bertrand Russell and Gottlieb Frege. Both philosophers are famous in the field of logic, language and mathematics. However, six years before the publication of Engelmann's book, Wittgenstein's notes, most of which were written during the war, appeared to the public. They had been published in 1961 under the title "Note Books, 1914-1916". These notes provide a great possibility to interpret the 'Tractatus' from ethical point of view and that will be a central theme in my argument.

The second point which I want to mention is the connection between art, religion and ethics. Wittgenstein claimed that there are no propositions of ethics and connected ethics with aesthetics, "ethics and aesthetics are one and the same"(TLP, 6.421). In addition, Wittgenstein held this view, nine years after the publication of the 'Tractatus' when he delivered his "Lecture on Ethics". In the beginning of the lecture he expressed his agreement with G. E. Moore's conception of ethics as the general inquiry into what is good and he added that it should include in a wider sense "what I believe to be the most essential part of what is generally called aesthetics"(LE, p. 4). In the same

lecture we find that the expressions of ethics and religion were described as allegorical. This description is a result of the striving of ethical and religious expressions to "run against the boundaries of language"(LE, p. 12). He said:

> I want to impress on you that a certain characteristic misuse of
> our language runs through all ethical and religious expression.
> All these expressions seem, *prima facie*, to be just similes. ....
> (LE, p. 9)

Religious and ethical propositions run against the limits of language, or the limits of what can be said, because they do not represent facts in the world. Instead they are full of figurative uses which convey, in the case of ethics, moral values and deeds, and in the case of religion, religious instructions and belief. The use of simile or allegory in religious and ethical propositions is part of the nature of the language which presents them. It is literary language. For we can read many stories which talk about ethical deeds. Many religions are full of stories which talk about the creation of life, the life of prophets and certain events which took place in the past. In contrast to the features of scientific language I will pose here some features of religious language which will show it as a figurative, indeterminate, expressive and prescriptive.

One remarkable thing in the nature of religious language is that it is full of figurative uses and contains imaginative literary forms. In 'Lecture on Ethics' Wittgenstein mentioned the following:

> Now all religious terms seem in this sense to be used as similes
> or allegorical. For when we speak of God and that he sees
> everything and when we kneel and pray to him all our terms and
> actions seem to be parts of great and elaborate allegory which
> represents him as a human being of great power whose grace we
> try to win, etc....... (LE, p. 9)

Religious terms, then, are part of a network of allegory in which these terms can be operated. He spoke about representing God in a figure of a super human being who knows and sees everything. Here is an example from the Qura'n:

> ......Allah who causes the day to enter into the night, and that Allah is All-Hearing, All-Seeing. That is because Allah is self subsisting and All-Sustaining .... Allah indeed is Beneficent, All Aware. To him belong all that is in the earth. Surely Allah is self-sufficient, praise worthy.[78]

The figurative nature of religious language leads to an important conclusion. It is that it should not be taken literally, otherwise it will lose its intended meaning. Because the way in which words were used differs from their ordinary use and this use can be understood by people who are acquainted with it. For instance, Muslims understand the intended meaning of the verse quoted above in an appropriate way, because it is part of their belief.

As a result of that conclusion, religious language should be treated as indeterminate, because it does not carry a single meaning; it can be understood in different ways and it will be subjected to many interpretations. Let us take an example to clarify this idea:

> Whenever you read the Qura'n, we place a hidden curtain between you and those who do not believe in the hereafter. We place veils over their hearts lest they comprehend it, and dullness in their ears.[79]

In this verse, words such as 'veils' and 'curtain' are used in a way which is different from their normal use. Here they are used as similes. For the word "curtain" does not refer to a normal curtain or, for instance, a window, but it is used to communicate a certain idea by using allegorical language. Wittgenstein said:

....In ethical and religious language we seem constantly to be using similes. But a simile must be the simile for something. And if I can describe a fact by means of simile I must also be able to drop the simile and to describe the facts without it. Now in our case as soon as we try to drop the simile and simply to state the facts which stands behind it, we find that there are no such facts. And so, what at first appeared to be a simile now seems to be mere nonsense. (LE, p. 10)

Earlier, in the last section, we saw how Wittgenstein insisted upon the determinate structure and sense of a proposition in order to determine its truth values. But that is not the case in religious language. Since this language does not represent objects in the world to form facts, it cannot carry a determinate sense which could enable its truth or falsehood to be detected. Thus, Wittgenstein considered it as nonsense.

Another feature of literary language is its ability to express feelings and emotions. The work of art is seen as a kind of expression. It is assumed that what the artist is doing is expressing his feelings. Wittgenstein held this view when he described art as a "kind of expression" (NB, p. 83). In the process of expressing emotions or feelings, people use metaphors to indicate what they feel. The use of metaphor appeared clearly in the 'lecture' when Wittgenstein stated that "I can only describe my feeling by the metaphor". (LE, p. 7). Suppose there is someone who suffers from a stomachache and he tells his friend that "the pain cuts my stomach like a knife". This expression shows the severity of the pain. Another can describe an expression of sadness; "her voice had broken as she talked...... And she burst into tears".[80]

The previous examples show how people express their feelings and emotions. These expressions, of sadness and pain, can be communicated by metaphorical language. For words such as 'knife', 'burst' and 'broken' are used

in our daily life to describe actual things or a state of actual things, such as a broken glass. The use of the previous words, in expressing emotions and feeling serves as an analogy to point out to a certain feeling.

The final point which ought to be tackled concerning religious and literary language is that it is considered to be prescriptive. Through literary language we can point to actions, i.e. we can express certain values and point to certain behaviours. In the case of religion, actions play an important role because religion is a commitment to a belief and this commitment must be carried out through actions. (That's why God on the last day will judge everybody according to what he has done in life.) In this sense, Wittgenstein spoke about action and religious language in a conversation with Waismann in 1930:

> I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrinal propositions, in which there is thus no talking. Obviously the essence of religion cannot have anything to do with the fact that there is talking, or rather : when people talk, then this itself is part of religious act (behaviour) and not theory. Thus it does not matter at all if the words used are true or false or nonsense.[81]

Any religious belief should be fulfilled through actions and religious language conveys the instructions of that belief. Religions are full of instructions which determine the behaviours of their followers in their daily life.

So, in contrast to scientific language, we saw the above features of religious language and this is an important aspect which shows the distinction between science and religion from a linguistic point of view. Scientific language deals with what can be said, i.e. what can be represented in the world.

On the other hand, religious and ethical propositions point to actions and values, express feelings and communicate certain ideas by using simile.

This introduction about the connection between art, ethics, and mysticism will be helpful when we proceed in our argument about the mystical, especially in the view that it shows itself in art and action. My discussion of the mystical will concentrate upon what Bertrand Russell has posed in his article "Mysticism and Logic" as the four general elements of mysticism. I will show first whether Wittgenstein had read this article or not and later the reasons which led me to connect his ideas of the mystical with Bertrand Russell.

From the biographical sketch available about Wittgenstein there is no evidence that he had read Russell's article "Mysticism and Logic". Indeed, there is a wide belief that he did not come across it, because by the time this essay was published in July 1914, Wittgenstein had already left England. When the first World War started in 1914 he volunteered to serve in the Austrian army and continued his service until he was captured and imprisoned. In addition, the first ideas about the mystical appeared in his 'Note Books' in June 1916 and since that date he developed his full ideas about the mystical. And we already know that Wittgenstein had completed his book during the war and sent a copy to Bertrand Russell while he was in captivity.

On the other hand, there are some comments and remarks from Bertrand Russell about Wittgenstein and his work which encourages an investigation into the connection between them. But first, its better to remind ourselves, briefly, about the friendship between the two and then proceed to Russell's remarks. Earlier, in the section on the influences, I mentioned Russell's hope that Wittgenstein would solve some philosophical problems which occupied the former's mind. One of the main philosophical interests of

Russell was to write a book about religion which focuses upon "the mystical union with the universe in which our finite selves are overcome and we become at one with infinity."[82] But his attempt did not produce what he hoped for and instead he wrote some short articles about religion. At that time, between 1911-1914, Wittgenstein and Russell discussed many philosophical matters and I can assume, with a high degree of confidence, that the two discussed religious matters. So, whether Wittgenstein had read Russell's article or not, at least they talked about these matters in their prolonged discussions which, sometimes, lasted several hours during the day.

Let us now turn our attention to Russell's remarks. The first remark appeared in his introduction to the 'Tractatus'. He wrote:

> .... Mr Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages ...[83]

This remark sounds somewhat strange for someone who had read the 'Tractatus', because Wittgenstein had devoted most of the book to discussing the analysis of the world, language and the role of logic, i.e., what can be said, and at the end he talked briefly about what he described as what cannot be said, i.e. the mystical.

Another remark written by Russell in 1919 in a letter to his lover, Lady Ottoline, about Wittgenstein and his book, shows his surprise that:

> I had felt in his book a flavour of mysticism, but was astonished when I found that he had become a complete mystic. He reads people like Kierkegaard and Angelus Silesius and he seriously contemplated becoming a monk. ... He has penetrated deep into mystical ways of thought and feeling ... [84]

These remarks were written after a week of lengthy discussion of the 'Tractatus' between Russell and Wittgenstein which took place in the Hague in Holland. Russell had discovered a remarkable change in Wittgenstein's attitude towards religion after the war. So, I can assume that when Russell wrote his introduction to the 'Tractatus', his mind was occupied with Wittgenstein's explanation of his book because he mentioned, in the same letter, that he came to think better of the 'Tractatus' than before when Wittgenstein explained the ideas of the book. In the light of this we can start our examination of the general elements of mysticism which appeared in Russell's article "Mysticism and Logic".

In his essay Russell identified four general elements of mysticism. The first is a revelation or an insight. The second, is a belief in unity with a form of reality. The third is the denial of time. The fourth is happiness. I will start my argument by comparing every element with what corresponds to it in Wittgenstein's ideas, bearing in mind that the mystical shows itself in art and action.

According to Russell, the first general element of mysticism is "the belief in insight as against discursive analytical knowledge".[85] He said:

> The first and direct outcome of the moment of illumination is a belief in the possibility of a way of knowledge which may be called revelation or insight or intuition, as contrasted with sense, reason and analysis, which are regarded as blind guides leading into the morass of illusion.[86]

Wittgenstein's notions of the mystical includes a view of the world, i.e., to view the world as a limited whole. This view is accompanied with feeling and the mystical is not how things are in the world but that they exist.(TLP,

6.44, 6.45) In order to clarify that and connect it to mysticism, let us first take a brief look at the word 'world'. The word 'world' is not taken as a reference to a simple element, it does not signify to any object or a state of affairs. The word 'world' is taken "as a complex term in order to be meaningful, must signify via other (simple) signs."[87] Wittgenstein said "every sign that has a definition signifies via the sign that serves to define it, and the definition points the way..."(TLP, 3.261) In addition, the world is seen or viewed from the point of eternity, i.e., seen sub specie aeternitatis.

In the 'Note Books' this view is asserted with another claim of connection between art and ethics, where the work of art and the good life, is the world seen from the point of eternity:

> The work of art is the object seen 'sub specie aeternitatis', and
> the good life is the world seen 'sub specie aeternitatis'. That is
> the connection between art and ethics,(NB, 7.10.16, p. 83)

We find here a direct claim from Wittgenstein of the connection between art and ethics. This claim can be expanded to include mysticism, because in the previous quotation about the mystical, Wittgenstein claimed that the mystical is to view the world sub specie aeternitatis.(TLP, 6.45). But this way of looking at things or objects is not the usual way because:

> The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from
> the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside.
> In such a way that they have the whole world as
> background.(NB,7.10.16, p. 83)

The work of art helps us to see objects or things from outside, i.e., to contemplate things. In a remark in "Culture and Value", written in 1930, Wittgenstein said that:

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> ... Only an artist can so represent an individual thing as make it appear to us like a work of art ... A work of art forces us - as one might say - to see it (object) in the right perspective but, in the absence of art, the object is just a fragment of nature like any other.(CV, p. 4)

The work of art can provide us with a certain perspective to see things, i.e. the work of art provides us with a certain insight which helps to contemplate an object or things from a certain point of view. In addition, in 'Lecture on Ethics' Wittgenstein spoke about three types of experience. What concerns us now is the first, which was described as the experience of wondering at the existence of the world. He said:

> allegory also describes the experience which I have just referred to. For the first of them is, I believe, exactly what people referring to when they said that God had created the world. (LE, p. 10)

This experience can be described by allegorical language, i.e. by, for instance, a literary work of art. A religious work of art can enhance and enrich the experience of looking at things or the world from a religious point of view. The experience of wonder means to look at the world as a world created and designed by God, for "God is how things stand". (NB, p. 74), i.e., contemplating the existence of the world or things by attributing their existence and the order of things and events to God. This is what Tolstoy, for example, was doing in his writings. He intended to show his reader how to view and deal with things, events and life in general, from a religious point of view.

Since the work of art help us to look at things from a certain perspective, it also has the ability to arouse our feelings and emotions. Earlier, I showed that Wittgenstein agreed with Tolstoy's view of art. Tolstoy's theory of art considers it as a kind of expression and a way of communicating religious

and moral teachings.   So, as it can force us to look at the world from a certain perspective, this look or view is accompanied with feelings, which may be of different kinds, of happy or sad. In one of his remarks Wittgenstein wrote, "for there is certainly something in the conception that the end of art is the beautiful. And the beautiful is what makes us happy."(NB,20.10.16, p. 86). Then, what I said about the first element of mysticism can be summarised in the following: To view the world as a limited whole is accompanied with feeling (TLP, 6.45). And the work of art is the world seen 'sub specie aeternitatis', i.e., from the point of eternity. In addition, it provides us with a perspective or an insight accompanied with feelings or intuition.

The second element of mysticism posed by Russell deals with "a belief in unity and its refusal to admit opposition or division anywhere."[88] This belief of unity is based upon a unity with a form of reality.[89] In order to establish a fair explanation of this element in Wittgenstein's earlier thought it is necessary to start with his concept of reality and then to show the relation between the self and the world.

The concept of reality is an essential part of Wittgenstein's analysis of the world and language. We already know that, according to the picture theory of meaning, what can be said is what represents facts in the world. From this analysis of the world and language we can show Wittgenstein's concept of reality. In the 'Tractatus' he said the following about reality:

> Reality is compared with propositions. A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.(TLP, 4.05, 4.06)

> The existence or non-existence of state of affairs is reality. The sum total of reality is the world. (TLP, 2.06, 2.063)

The approach to reality can be reached through linguistic analysis. For the analysis of propositions and the comparison of their components with objects in the world can lead us to conclude whether these facts exist or not and, as we saw in the quotations about reality, the existence of the state of affairs is reality.

As the world, in Wittgenstein's view, is the total sum of reality, it is important to focus upon the subject and its relation to it. The first remark about the subject appeared in the fifth section of the 'Tractatus', where he talked about two subjects. In fact he distinguished between two subjects, the thinking subject and the metaphysical subject. The first was described as a mere illusion, whereas the second exists and it is a necessity to the existence of the world. Here is how Wittgenstein made his distinction between the thinking and the metaphysical subject.

Wittgenstein conceived the thinking subject as a mere illusion or superstition.(NB, 5.8.16, p. 80). His view is reflected in the example of writing a book about the world, for that book will not include the thinking subject, (or the knowing subject). He said:

> There is no such thing as the subject that thinks and entertains ideas. If I wrote a book called The World as I found It, I should have to include a report of my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.(TLP, 5.631)

In writing this book about the world there is no possibility in it to describe the thinking subject, because as Wittgenstein pointed out, the thinking subject is the representational subject which represents facts in the world only and has nothing to do with my will or view towards the world.

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Let us now focus upon the metaphysical subject. The term 'metaphysical subject' appeared in the 'Tractatus' in the following question: "Where in the world is the metaphysical subject to be found?" (TLP, 5.633). The answer lies in the statement (TLP, 5.632) which is directly above the question. It states that "the subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world". Wittgenstein put the subject in a similar position with the eye and the visual field. In the visual field of the eye we can see everything in that field but we cannot see the eye and we cannot point to something in that field and claim it is the eye.

That is the case with the metaphysical subject. We cannot see or point to something in the world and say 'this is the metaphysical subject'. He wrote:

> The situation is not simply that I everywhere notice where I see anything, but also always find myself at a particular point of my visual space, so my visual space has as it were a shape. In spite of this, however, it is true that I do not see the subject. (NB, 20.10.16, p. 86)

According to the picture theory of meaning, what can be expressed in language is what represents a fact in the world. The self, according to that, cannot be represented in language because it is not an object or a fact. "The I is not an object. I objectively confront every object. But not the I"(NB, 7.8.16, .11.8.16, p. 80).

Furthermore, as the subject is the limits of the world and not a part of it, it is, then, a necessity for its existence. "As the subject is not part of the world but a presupposition of its existence."(NB, 2.8.16, p.79)

To complete our explanation of the subject we need to mention the claim that "I am my world (The microcosm)"(TLP, 5.63) First, Wittgenstein saw a thing, the body, etc. in the world lies on the same ground with other things. In the (NB) he mentioned that "a stone, the body of a beast, the body of a man, my body, all stand on the same level.(NB, 12.10.16, p. 84) Putting the human body on the same level with the stone, without any distinction, shows the role the self plays in the awareness of the world and its existence. Our bodies are physical entities composed of physical and biological properties. Second, the unity of the self with the world came from the unity between life and the world, for Wittgenstein saw that "the world and life are one and the same".(TLP, 5.621)

In the light of the above discussion of the concept of reality and the subject and its relation to the world, I can give an example from Wittgenstein's remarks which supports this explanation:

> If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but not all you know is the stove, my result indeed seems trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was contemplating the stove *it was my world*, and everything else colourless by contrast with it. For it is equally possible to take the *bare present image* as the worthless momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and *as the true world among shadows*. (NB, 8.10.16, p. 83)

In the process of contemplating the stove among many things or facts in the world, all the attention is concentrated upon it and other facts or things look like shadows. In this sense, I, as a self, am in a form of unity with the stove, because it is the only present image in my world. In other words, the proposition which represents it is a model or a picture of reality. So, in the process of contemplation all I see is the stove, i.e., my world. That presents a

form of unity between the self and the world, which is the total sum of reality, without any sort of division and opposition.

We move now to the third element of mysticism as it appeared in Russell's article, which is the denial of time. It is built upon "the denial of the reality of time. This is an outcome of the denial of division; if all is one, the distinction of past and future must be illusory".[90] The denial of time appears just once in the 'Tractatus'. We find the eternal life belongs to the people who live in the present:

> If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then the eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.(TLP, 6.4311)

The eternal life belongs to people who live in the present because they have the consciousness to live in eternity, as Wittgenstein presented it. But is the matter is simple as this? Of course, not. It is not just to live in the present, to live in eternity, but there are two important points worth mentioning. First, to live in the present means not to live or think about the future or the past. The person who lives in the present must not occupy his mind with the problem of life or think about the events of the past or worries about his future. Moreover, ignoring any kind of fear and death helps one to live in the present with happiness. To enhance this claim here are some remarks from the 'Note Books':

> But is it possible for one so to live that life stops being problematic? that one is living in eternity and not in time(6.7.16, p. 74)

> A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in the fate of death. Only the man who lives not in time but in the present is happy.(8.7.16, p. 74)

> Whoever lives in the present lives without fear and
> hope.(21.7.16, p. 76)

So, to live in the present means to live without fear and not in time, and those who do not live in time are happy.

The second point is connected with the example of the stove cited in connection with the second element of mysticism. In the process of contemplating the stove, Wittgenstein said that he was contemplating the "bare present image" as "the true world among shadows". This contemplation corresponds to the view 'sub specie aeternitatis', because, as I quoted earlier in the first element of mysticism, Wittgenstein saw that looking at things from their midst is the usual way of looking at them, but the view 'sub specie aeternitatis' is from outside. (NB, 7.10.16, p. 83). To view things or the world in this way is to view it form the point of eternity. i.e., to view something in the present moment, free from the captivity of time. I want to add here what Russell wrote about this matter:

> A truer image of the world, I think, is obtained by picturing
> things as entering the stream of time an eternal world outside,
> than from the view which regards time as the devouring of all
> that is.[91]

We come to the final element of mysticism which was proposed by Russell. It presents the culmination of the road along which the mystic travels. The insight which accompanies unity between the self and a form of reality, in the absence of time, will lead to happiness. Happiness is the fourth element. He wrote:

> But if we are not to be led into false beliefs, it is necessary to
> realise exactly what the mystic emotions reveals. It reveals a
> possibility of human nature - a possibility of a nobler, happier,

freer life than any that can be otherwise achieved. But it does not reveal anything about the non-human, or the nature of the universe in general.[92]

Happiness is not an object or a thing and there is no objective mark of happiness in the world. Happiness is a personal condition, which belongs to the subject. It cannot be put into words but it shows itself. It shows itself in art. In the "Note Book" we find that:

Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at things that it looks at the world with a happy eye?

Life is grave, art is gay.(NB,20.10.16, p. 86)

The work of art has the power to evoke our feelings, to arouse our emotions. It has the ability to free us from the troubles of life. It enlarges and reduces the person's world. "The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world. To it the amenities of the world are so many graces of fate."(NB, 13.8.16, p. 81). Here we find Schopenhauer's influence very clear, because he found in the perception of the beautiful the way in which people can get rid of their suffering and troubles. The work of art can help in redeeming people from their problems and free them from their suffering. It can make them happy.

In the beginning of this section I said that the mystical can show itself in art and action and this is an integral part of Wittgenstein's analysis of the world and language. I have already shown one part of how the mystical shows itself, i.e., by showing the role which art plays in mysticism. The work of art can provide us with an insight or help us to view things from certain perspectives. This insight or perspective is accompanied with feeling, because it has the ability to evoke and express feelings. In addition, the work of art helps to view the word 'sub specie aeternititas', i.e., to view the world from the point of

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eternity. This view provides a form of unity between the self and the world which is free from the authority of time.

Finally, it can free us from the suffering and the troubles of life and it helps us to see the world in a happy eye.   This is the role of art in the mystical, or, in other words, this how the mystical shows itself in art. What remains now is the second part which deals with action.

My discussion of how the mystical shows itself in action will include some of Russell's ideas about values which appeared in "Mysticism and Logic". Then, I will proceed to show Wittgenstein's ideas about ethical value. Later on I will concentrate upon the conception of the will and show how it is the bearer of Good and Evil. The discussion of the will includes an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim in his letter to Ludwig Ficker that the point of his book is an ethical one.

In the world, according to Wittgenstein, there is no existence of any kind of values. Terms such as good, bad, virtue etc. do not refer to anything in the world. They do not represent any facts and if there is any value, it does not lie in the world, it lies outside it. He said:

> In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists - and if it did exist, it would have no value.
>
> If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case.   For all that happens and is the case is accidental.(TLP, 6.41)

In the 'Note Books' he wrote "what is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world".(5.8.1916). Then the facts in the world can be represented by

descriptive language. This view about facts is compatible with Russell's when he argued that the world of the physicist "is merely concerned to find out facts, not to consider whether they are good or bad."[93]

Since ethical values have no existence in the physical world and they belong to the "I", then it is necessary to examine Wittgenstein's ideas of the subject in connection with values. Because doing good or evil depends upon the individual and his will to carry out an action. This corresponds to Russell's idea also when he mentioned that "'good' lies in our power to create the good in our own life and in our attitude towards the world".[94] Wittgenstein's ideas of the subject and value are, in fact, at the heart of his ideas about the will or the willing subject. For this reason I will start with the concept of the will and through that the subject as the bearer of ethics will be investigated. This paves the way for an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that the point of the 'Tractatus' is an ethical one.

Wittgenstein stated his view of the will as follows: "The world is independent of my will".(6.373) This statement gives us a clue to the relation between the world and human being's will. The will lies outside the world. It is not an object or a fact. Facts and objects in the world are as they are. Any change in objects happens in the world according to their nature. So it is obvious that whatever the will of the human being wishes to happen, that will not change the world, because objects are as they are in the world. "I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely powerless."(NB, 11.6.16, p. 3). This leads us to infer that there is no logical connection between the will and the world because any logical connection can take place between objects and the possibility of them to form a possible state of affairs or facts. Wittgenstein wrote:

Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connection between the will and the world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connection itself, is surely not something that we could will."(TLP, 6.374)

What I wish to happen depends totally on me and how I look at the world and life, and how I value things and events which happen to me through my life. If anything happens in the world which is compatible with my will or wishes, this thing will depend on fate.

Wittgenstein's ideas about the will are very important to our investigation as we shall see in our progress. I have already discussed some ideas about the will, concerning its independence from the world. The next part concerns two aspects of the will which appeared in Wittgenstein's earlier thought. The first is the connection between willing and acting and the will as the bearer of the ethical. The second is the relation of the will to the world.

But before that, a short elaboration is included here in order to have a clear view about values and actions, in other words, how values can be exemplified in actions. Moral values can be fulfilled through actions. If someone believes in any moral value he should translate this belief into actions. For example, if someone believes good should spread in his community he should show that by doing what is good to the people in normal and critical circumstances. In contrast, to believe in good without performing good actions will not make any difference. In other words, if someone believes in good without performing what is supposed to be good, it makes no difference whether he says he believes in it or not. Wittgenstein said that, "to love one's neighbour" would mean to will".(NB, 29.7.16, p. 77). And in another position:

Wishing is not acting. But willing is acting. The fact that I will an action consists in my performing the action, not in my doing something else which causes the action.

The wish precedes the event, the will accompanies it. (NB, 4.11.16, p. 88)

So, to believe in a certain value means to perform a certain act compatible with this belief and value. In this sense, I want to use P Engelmann's phrase about this matter, in his comment on the 'Tractatus' when he stated that "ethical propositions do not exist; ethical action does exist."[95]

Let us now turn to the first point. In the 'Note Books' Wittgenstein mentioned action in connection with the will. He said:

This is clear: it is impossible to will without already performing the act.

One cannot will without acting.

If the will has to have an object in the world, the object can be the intended action itself.

Wishing is not acting. But willing is acting. (4.11.1916)

It is obvious from Wittgenstein's remarks that there is a direct connection between acting and willing. The following can show where this connection lies. Wittgenstein said "the world is independent of my will."(TLP, 6.373) The will is not an object in the world. It is something connected with the subject. Wittgenstein distinguished between the willing subject and the thinking subject, the former exists and the later is mere illusion. Actions are not also objects in the world but they connect to the subject. To act is to will to do something. In addition, action is the way in which moral values and religious instructions can be fulfilled. Propositions which express ethical and

religious matters do not represent any fact in the world. From this point there is another connection between the will and action. Wittgenstein distinguished between two kinds of will. He said, "It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of the ethical attribute. And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology."(TLP, 6.423) Then there is a will which is the subject of the ethical attribute and the phenomenal will. Our concern is with the first because the second is in the interest of psychology. The ethical will is "first and foremost the bearer of good and evil".(21.7.16, NB). It is also subject to the rigorous application of the picture theory of meaning and as a result it is impossible to speak about it. This impossibility arises from the impossibility of talking about moral actions. So, there are two aspects of connection between action and the will. First, they lie outside the world and second, as a result, they cannot be expressed in descriptive language.

I will turn now to discuss the second point: the relation between the will and the world. In the 'Note Books' Wittgenstein wrote the following: "Meaning comes to things only through their relation to my will".(15.10.16) Meaning linked to the subject because fact and objects stay as they are and their meaning comes in language from the representation which is given through the subject, which is the ground of sense. But there is a question which arises from the previous quotation: the relation exists between the will and the world? The relation between the will and the world can be shown as follows. I mentioned earlier that Wittgenstein considered the subject as a presupposition to the existence of the world and not part of it. In other words, the subject, so to speak, is a condition to the existence of the world. And we already know that the metaphysical subject exists and the thinking subject is a mere illusion. The metaphysical subject is the willing subject and here is the proof. On the fifth of August 1916 we find these remarks:

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The thinking subject is surely merely illusion. But the willing subject exists.

If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I, and which is the bearer of ethics.(NB)

If there is no existence of the will there will be no existence for the I, i.e., for the subject, and the I, the willing subject is the bearer of ethical values.

It appears that the relationship between the subject and the world is an ethical relationship because the willing subject is the bearer of good and evil. In addition, Wittgenstein put ethics as a condition of the world. "Ethics do not treat the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world like logic."(NB, 24.7.16, p.77). The subject is a condition of the existence of the world because the metaphysical subject is the willing subject, and the willing subject is of necessity an ethical subject (see 5.8.16 above). As a consequence, ethics must be a condition of the world, or, to put it another way, ethics is a condition of the world because the willing subject is a condition of its existence. For that reason, Wittgenstein declared that "It is clear, so to speak, that we need a foothold for the will in the world. The will is the attitude of the subject of the world.(NB, 4.11.1916, p.87). Then, it is possible to say here that value enters the world through the subject, through the willing subject, and that claim can be supported by what Wittgenstein said in the 'Note Books': "Good and evil only enter through the subject. And the subject is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world."(2.8.1916, p.79) Then the I is the good and evil, not the world, because everything in the world is as it is and good and evil does not alter the world but it alters the limits of the world. The change in viewing or feeling the world happens in the limits of the world, not in it. And here we arrive at a very important point in the argument of the will which shows the religious dimension of the 'Tractatus'. Since ethics is a condition of the world

and the subject, which is a bearer of ethical values, is a presupposition of its existence, and the willing subject is the metaphysical subject, then through the exercise of the will we will find a complete picture of the ethical point of the book. In the 'Tractatus' the exercise of the will is connected to happiness which does not change anything in the world but can only alter its limits:

> If good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not facts - not what can be expressed by means of the language. In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must so to speak wax and wane as a whole. The world of a happy man is different from that of the unhappy man.(TLP, 6.43)

The religious exercise of the will appeared in the notes when he mentioned that "we have the feeling of being dependent on alien will". And "What we are dependent on we can call God". (NB, 8.7.16, p. 74) To connect the exercise of the will and happiness with religion, Wittgenstein conceived happiness as a part of fulfilling the purpose of the existence.

And here the influence of the Russian writers on the earlier religious view appears clearly. Tolstoy had attributed ethical values to the will of God:

> Evil can only be mastered by goodness, and that goodness is the will of the Father-spirit, common to all men. Every man knows what is good to himself, and if he does that for others - if he does that which is the will of the Father - he will do good.[96]

Through carrying on the will of the father, happiness will prevail, "to fulfil the will of the Father do not fear to be poor and despised, but rejoice that you can show men the true happiness".[97] Moreover, in a comment on Dostoevsky, "And in this sense Dostoevsky is right when he says that the man who is happy is fulfilling the purpose of existence".(67.16,NB.p.73). For every

religion gives a purpose in life to its followers, and that purpose is what they ought to do in life. Take the following from the Qura'n "Did you think that we had created you without purpose".[98] To fulfil this purpose will bring happiness to the believer because he is acting according to the will of God. In 'Brothers Karamazov', Dostoevsky wrote "men are made for happiness and anyone who is completely happy has the right to say to himself, I am doing God's will on earth".[99] He meant by that, that the person who carries out the duties and instructions of his belief, as demanded, for example, by God as a purpose of his existence will be a happy person. And that is what Wittgenstein described in 'Lecture on Ethics' as the experience of feeling absolutely safe. "The experience of absolute safety has been described by saying that we feel safe in the hands of God".(LE, p. 10). In this respect, whatever happens in this person's life, he is safe between the hands of God because he is fulfilling his religious duties. That reminds us about the play in Vienna in which Wittgenstein had claimed that he saw the possibility of religion, when the actor said "Nothing can happen to me". Nothing could happen to him because he was in the hands of God, because he was doing the will of God on earth. In 'Culture and Value' he wrote "What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics". (p. 3). On the other hand, the world of the unhappy man is different from the happy, it's the world of the man of guilt (from a religious point of view). This is the third experience which is that "of feeling guilty and again this was described by the phrase that God disapproves of our conduct". (LE, p. 10). That is the world of the believer who exercises evil or who does not carry out his religious duties, i.e., the world of unhappy man. In this way Wittgenstein's claim about the aim of the 'Tractatus' as an ethical one can be interpreted. This interpretation is based upon an understanding of his book as a whole.

The main ideas of Wittgenstein's earlier thought can be summed up in the following way. It is clear that there is a connection between the personal experience and the intellectual ideas. As regards the first, his personal torment, angst, fear of death and contemplating suicide forced him to seek a change for a life worth living. The idea of confronting death led to him volunteering for the Austrian army during the First World War, where he experienced decisive moments in confronting death. This confrontation provided what he was looking for, the spiritual change, i.e. the conversion to Christianity. The works of the Russian writers, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, had a decisive influence on his religious view and led to his ending his book with mysticism. In addition, his engagement with the ideas of philosophers, critics and scientists, played its part also. For Hertz's book provided the model with logical representation; Karl Kraus and Adolf Loos, the importance of language and the separation between fact and value, and Mauthner, the idea that the problems of philosophy lie in language. When he travelled to England, Wittgenstein's real philosophical interest crystallised, so to speak, with the supervision of Bertrand Russell, in whose ideas he found the analysis of the world and language. With Schopenhauer's ideas of the subject and its relation to the world and the role of the arts as a redeemer from the trouble of life; all of the above influences helped in his task of setting the limits of the expressions of thought which led to the rigorous distinction between the sphere of fact and value through linguistic analysis.

These limits are the limits of facts in the world, i.e., the limits of the representational facts. What lies outside the world, i.e., outside the sphere of fact, cannot be represented. It can show itself and what shows itself is the mystical. What shows itself is part of the sphere of value, where values are connected to the subject. In fact the subject, which does not exist in the world

but it is its limits, is the bearer of ethical values. In addition, it is a precondition of the existence of the world. So, as the subject is the bearer of values and it is a precondition of the existence of the world, then the nature of the relation between it and the world is an ethical relationship.

This relationship shows the importance of the will and its exercise in connection with religion, because the fulfilment of religious instructions and duties requires these duties to be performed through actions. So, through the exercise of the will the claim of the ethical point of the 'Tractatus' can be shown. Moreover, the distinction between the two spheres leads to the distinction between science and religion, which appears in the nature of language in which each is presented. Scientific language is considered as descriptive, determinate and non-expressive, and it depicts or models facts in the world. In contrast, religious language is considered as figurative, expressive, perspective, and indeterminate and points to values.

After his release from captivity, Wittgenstein entered a different world, personally and nationally. On the national front, the Habsburg Empire had collapsed and divided into smaller nations, after its defeat in the First World War, and Austria became a country which was struggling to rebuild and reform itself as a new entity. For Wittgenstein personally, it was a totally different world and life. It was a world viewed from a religious point of view, and a new life, a new way of life, shaped by his belief and the influence of Tolstoy's ideas of helping the poor and abandoning aristocratic privileges. Wittgenstein's decision to teach the peasant children in rural Austria and his conversion to Christianity were the preliminary steps to the change in his philosophical thinking. That will be the subject of the next chapter.

<u>Postscript</u>

There is a problem concerning the earlier religious view regarding Wittgenstein's consideration of what cannot be said as nonsense, i.e. "propositions" of ethics, religious matters and the meaning of life. However, he said about what he described as nonsense "I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it" (LE, p. 12). This attitude distinguishes Wittgenstein from other philosophers such as logical postivists where they consider religious and ethical matters as meaningless, therefore pointless.

On the other hand, since Wittgenstein considered religion as a mystical experience the use of allegory and simile can convey the personal attitude of the believer towards life and the world, the use of allegory or simile can express, for instance, the experience of wonder at the world or the experience of feeling safe although this feeling is not something which can be literally expressed in representational language. It must be emphasised that the point of these utterances is constituted by their religious application, i.e., by their role in expressing these attitudes and experiences. They do not have a literal meaning which is put to a secondary religious use, since they are literally nonsense.

Notes

1. Hertz, Hienrich, *The Principles of Mechanics, in a New Form,* Translated by D E Jones and JT Walley (New York, Dover, 1956), p. 1.

2. *Ibid.,* p.1, 2.

3. Janik, A, Toulmin, S, *Wittgenstein's Vienna,* New York, Simon & Schuster, 1973, p. 140.

4. Hertz, H, *The Principles of Mechanics,* p. 2.

5. *Ibid.,* p. 38.

6. *Ibid.,* p. 40.

7. McGuinness, Brian, *"Wittgensteina A Life", Young Ludwig 1889 - 1921,* Penguin Books, 1990, p. 37.

8. Engelmann, Paul, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir,* Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, p. 123.

9. *Ibid.,* p. 131.

10. *Ibid,* p. 132.

11. Stern, P. P., *"Karl Kraus's Vision of Language", Modern Language Review,* January 1966, pp. 73-74.

12. Janik, Alan and Toulmin, Stephen, *Wittgenstein's Vienna,* New York, Simon & Schuster, 1973, p. 70.

13. *Ibid,* p. 74.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid,* pp. 87,88.

17. *Ibid,* p. 85.

18. Janik, A, Toulmin, S, *Wittgenstein's Vienna,* 1973, p.100.

19. Quoted from Paul Engelmann's book, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein,* p. 129.

20. Since there is no English translation of Mauthner's original works, this paragraph was quoted from *Wittgenstein's Vienna*. The original source is: Mauthner, Fritz, *Wörterbuch der philosophie: Neue Beitrage zueiner kritik der sprache*, p. xi.

21. Janik, A, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, 1973, p. 123.

22. *Ibid*, p. 122.

23. Quoted from Gershon Weiler, *Mauthner's Critique of Language*, p. 291. The original source is: Mauthner, F, *Wörterbuch der philosophie*, vol III, p. x.

24. *Ibid*, vol I, p. 111.

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Period of Transition

"Words are deeds." (CV, p. 46)

In the wilderness of the Austrian countryside the new life of the newly converted Christian began. It was a truly new life. Wittgenstein's decisions after the war and his behaviour till the end of his life show how seriously he took his belief. He left the comfortable aristocratic life of the 'Alleegasse' (Wittgenstein's family house in Vienna) and became an elementary school teacher committed to teaching the peasants' children. During this period the deep influence, which von Wright had mentioned in his biographical sketch, of Tolstoy on Wittgenstein's character and life can be seen clearly. Moreover it appears his influence extended to Wittgenstein's understanding of religion. To have a clear understanding of the development of what is widely known at Wittgenstein's later thought and the religious motivation behind that, I divided the discussion into two chapters. The first discusses the factors which played an important role in the change in philosophical ideas and displays the gradual development of these ideas, while the second tackles the later concept of religion as a way of life and its implications on the later thought.

In comparison with the earlier thought, the task of clarifying the importance of religion in relation to the philosophical ideas seems a difficult one for many reasons. First of all, the earlier writings had been published in one book and most of the materials in the 'Note Books' were the draft of the

'Tractatus'. The task of focusing on a certain approach or ideas was relatively easy and in the 'Tractatus' there is a clear reference to mysticism which gave a great opportunity to interpret it from a religious point of view. In contrast, there are several books which display what is widely known as the later thought and none of them were published during Wittgenstein's life. Even 'Philosophical Investigations', none of Wittgenstein's attempts to publish which, came to fruition, would have appeared in a different shape, especially its second part, if Wittgenstein had published it. In it there is no appearance to the word of religion, or religious belief, nor is there anything to reveal it was written from a religious point of view. In addition, Wittgenstein's early life was full of dramatic events and the development of his ideas, the influences, and his personal condition were mentioned or recorded by his closest friends such as Russell, Moore and David Pinsent. That made the task of relying on their diaries and other biographical sources to interpret his ideas an easy one. Even the intellectual influences were obvious and to trace the ideas of the people who influenced him was possible.

However, the same task in the later thought faces some obstacles, for the years of isolation in rural Austria during the twenties and the rare contact with old friends in Cambridge do not give ground to show if there is a biographical background to explain the change in the later ideas. Even Sraffa's name, which appeared in the introduction to the 'Investigations', when Wittgenstein referred to him as the stimulus of the later ideas, was an Italian economist and did not write anything about philosophy or religion. Despite

that, there are some personal and intellectual factors which can be discussed concerning the religious approach in the later thought: most notably, Leo Tolstoy and Wittgenstein's experience of teaching. Each had a certain contribution to the later concept of religious belief. They will be discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, there are some biographical materials mostly from Wittgenstein's friends and students, which could be helpful in supporting some ideas or clarifying others. And there are some remarks written by Witgenstein which encourage us to investigate the significance of his religious view for the later philosophical ideas. Moreover, the later attitude and interpretation of the arts adds to the significance of that motivation. For there is a shift from the spiritual and moral literary writings to detective stories and realistic works of art. All this will be shown in the next chapter. However, I am well aware that the task of demonstrating the religious motivation in the later ideas is not an easy one. This forces me to present the later argument concerning religion and the later philosophical ideas in the form of questions with possible answers.

In order to give an adequate explanation of the development of the later ideas, this chapter has been divided into three main sections. In the first, I will emphasise the role of the personal experience and its impact on his thinking. There are two main factors: first, the conversion to Christianity, the way of life which he adopted after the war and the clear influence of Tolstoy on his understanding of Christianity and personal life; second, his experience as a school teacher and the role which it played in the development of his later ideas, especially in connection of the meaning of a word with its use, learning

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language and form of life; and the upbringing of a child in a certain belief. This paves the way to display the main ideas in the later thought, such as the notions of language-games, forms of life, meaning as use and the development of the notion of a proposition as a picture. That will be followed by a quick review of religious language in the light of the later philosophical notions, since it was considered as nonsense in the 'Tractatus'. At the end of this section an examination will be made of Wittgenstein's claim in the preface of "Philosophical Investigations" that the later ideas can rightly be seen in contrast to the earlier thought.

Many commentators who worked on Wittgenstein's philosophy and some of those who were interested in his personal life, look on the period in question, in which he stopped philosophical activities, as a waste of his genius or intellectual recession. It was during the 1920s, when Wittgenstein worked as an elementary school teacher for six years in rural Austria, and then as a gardener's assistant in Vienna and then built a house for his sisters. It is true that Wittgenstein did not write any philosophical ideas until his return to Cambridge at the end of the decade and his attendance at some meetings of the "Vienna Circle" did not provide a good indication of a resumption of philosophical activities. (Once he wanted in a meeting to discuss a poem of Tagore instead of philosophical questions.) But, on the other hand, he gained much on the personal level. I believe this period of philosophical quiescence played an important part in his personal development; represented, so to speak, the preliminary steps of change on the personal level which led later to the

change on the intellectual level. The argument from which I will proceed in this section will start with Wittgenstein's conversion to Christianity and the personal impact of that conversion on his life. Part of this argument will include a comparison with Tolstoy's understanding of Christianity and the influence of that understanding on Wittgenstein and his view of life. Then I will examine his experience as a school teacher and its relation to the development of his later ideas.

Wittgenstein, after the war, became a totally different person. The change which took place in his life was due to his conversion during the war to the Christian faith. After that time, he took many remarkable steps which astonished his family. First, he abandoned all his fortune. Second, he wanted to become a school teacher and to teach the poor in the Austrian countryside. Moreover, Wittgenstein's old friends recognised that change. For instance, Bertrand Russell, during their meeting in the Hague, recognised the change in Wittgenstein's attitude towards Christianity and religion as a whole, for Wittgenstein had a fierce argument with him because Russell was not a believer. Russell recorded in his diaries that Wittgenstein "became for a time very religious, so much so that he began to consider me too wicked to associate with".[1] Wittgenstein's new life was a commitment to an ethical approach and I believe this commitment was inspired by the writings of Leo Tolstoy. For Tolstoy had exerted a deep influence on Wittgenstein's understanding of Christianity. In addition to the deep interest during the War,

in 'The Gospel in Brief', where he was known as the man with the Gospel, what prompted me to consider this influence is what Wittgenstein once said when urging one of his students, John King, to read Tolstoy's short stories, 'Twenty Three Tales', that "there you have the essence of Christianity".[2] (He mentioned specifically, What Men Live By, Two Old Men, The Three Hermits and How Much Land Does A Man Need?) This statement is an important factor in drawing a comparison of the religious views of Tolstoy and Wittgenstein. The comparison will include similarities between the two on the personal level and their view of religion.

There are many remarkable points which serve our purpose. I will start by dealing with Tolstoy's ideas and then compare them with Wittgenstein's. One remarkable thing, to start with, are the circumstances which led Tolstoy to become a believer in Christianity. Tolstoy was experiencing a personal torment and his mind was occupied with the questions of the meaning of life. He searched in different branches of knowledge but his search led to nothing. That led him to contemplate committing suicide. This psychological state directed his attention to religion and there he found the answer. He wrote in his confession:

> Rational knowledge had led me to recognise that life is meaningless. My life came to a halt and I wanted to kill myself. As I looked around at people, at humanity as a whole, I saw that they lived and affirmed that they knew the meaning of life. I looked at myself. I had lived as long as I knew the meaning of life. For me, as for others, faith provided the meaning of life and the possibility of living.[3]

Faith, then, was the refuge from his personal torment and is the answer to the question of the meaning of life. This conversion from non-believer to Christianity led him to devote his writings and a considerable amount of his fortune to the cause of his faith.

It appears that Wittgenstein's interest was in the later writings of Tolstoy, not the earlier. Tolstoy's later writings had religious, ethical and social dimensions and that was due to his conversion to Christianity[4]. For there is no indication that Wittgenstein read 'War and Peace' or showed any interest in the early Tolstoy. On the other hand, there are numerous anecdotes by Wittgenstein's close friends which revealed that Tolstoy's later writings such as 'Twenty Three Tales', Hadji Murat and others had a deep interest for him. Once, in a letter to Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein mentioned that:

> I once tried to read "Resurrection" but couldn't. You see when Tolstoy just tells a story he impresses me infinitely more than when he addresses the reader. When he turns his back to the reader then he seems to me more impressive. Perhaps one day we can talk about this. It seems to me his philosophy is most true when it's latent in the story.[5]

It is clear, then, that Wittgenstein was attracted to Tolstoy's writings because they <u>show</u> the ethical and religious aspects of actual life, rather than because they try to speak of them.

But in which way had Tolstoy understood religion? For people differ in their understanding of religion and that understanding provides the way in

which certain beliefs are maintained. Some stick to dogmatic understanding and interpretation, and others understand religion on a practical basis. The latter is what Tolstoy believed in and to what he devoted his writings. In the first chapter of his confession, he expressed his dissatisfaction with religious doctrines:

> ... religious doctrine plays no part in life, or in relation between people, neither are we confronted with it in our personal lives. Religious doctrine is professed in some other realm, at a distance from life and independent of it. If we encounter it, it is only as an external phenomenon, disconnected from life.[6]

Tolstoy's understanding of religion does not depend upon a doctrine, but rather upon a practical basis. What matters to him is what people do on earth, not what religion promises them in the future. Those who tie themselves to doctrines will be absorbed in intellectual arguments which are distanced from the realities of life. On the other hand, what matters in faith is its fulfilment, i.e. its fulfilment through actions. He wrote:

> A person acts according to his faith, not as the catechism says because he believes in things unseen as in things seen, nor because he wishes to achieve things hoped for, but simply because having defined his position in the world it is natural for him to act according to it.[7]

A religious belief, according to Tolstoy, is a commitment to certain actions which is an important requirement of any religion. This is the essence of any religious belief because attending a church or a mosque, praying or

asking God for help are things dealing with the personal side of the belief, not with the relation between the believer and other people, i.e. not with participation in social life.

Religious activities are part of social life and the core of those activities is ethical. For believers engage with their fellow men in their daily activities and that imposes the ethical dimension of their belief. In other words, religious activities are forms of social life, wherever they exist. The social context is the right place for religious belief, not religious services or doctrine; and that was the essential part of Tolstoy's understanding of religion:

> Morality proceeds from religion in just the same way. Only when the result of religious influence, namely morality, is made a part of people can social forms of life lead to morality.
> ...
> In exactly the same way social forms of life may contain morality and then morality influences society, or they may not contain morality and society remains without any moral influence.[8]

Tolstoy's conception of religious belief, as a fulfilment of a set of actions was based upon his refusal to build religion on a dogmatic basis, which led him to consider religion as a part of the social activities of daily life.

As a man who found the meaning of life in Christian faith, Tolstoy found it hard to live the life of an aristocrat. He found it difficult to accommodate the values of his belief with the aristocratic way of life, because

as a committed Christian he had a purpose in this life and he must practice "the rules of conduct that follow from this purpose".[9] His belief imposed a style of life attached to the poor and those in need of help. For this reason he abandoned the style of life of his class and lived and worked with the peasants. He recorded the following in his confessions:

> What happened was that the life of our class, the rich and learned, became not only distasteful to me, but lost all meaning. All our activities, our discussions, our science and our art struck me as sheer indulgence. I realised that there was no meaning to be found here. It was the activities of the labouring people, those who produce life, that presented itself to me as the only true way. I realised that the meaning provided by this life was truth and I accepted it.[10]

Here is a man who left the pleasures and the values of his class behind and lived with the working people. He saw the perfect example as being Christ's deeds. For him, that is what it meant to be a believer in Christianity and that is the true meaning of life.

The previous ideas concerning religion and the meaning of life are well presented in Tolstoy's 'Twenty Three Tales'. The collection includes stories for children, folk tales and popular stories. They contain religious features and are devoted to showing Christian ethical values and instructions. In general, the stories talk about co-operation, patience, forgiveness, love between people, stand against evil deeds, contempt for striving for money and show that man should gain his money by his own work. Moreover, there are stories which

directly reflect some of the above ideas about Tolstoy's understanding of religion. For instance, the story of 'Two Old Men', which Wittgenstein mentioned to King, shows that a moral religious action is far better than implementing a religious service. It talks about two elderly men who wanted to go on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. On their way to Palestine one of them stopped to rest in a village and the other continued. The one who did not continue found poor people, starving to death. He stayed and spent his money, which was intended to cover the cost of his pilgrimage, to feed them and to restore their normal life. The other, who went to Jerusalem, saw there the image of his friend hover before those praying. When both met at home later, the latter had already discovered what his fellow man had done for the villagers, on his way back, and realised that: "... the best way to keep one's vows to God and to do his Will, is for each man while he lives to show love and do good to others."[11] That is to say, doing good to others is far better than attending a service.

Another story spoke about the importance of work to earn a living. It is 'A Grain As Big As A Hen's Egg' which shows how the past generation earned their living by their own work, while the present generation is dependent on others. The story ends with praise of the old days:

> These things are so, because men have ceased to live by their own labour and have taken to depending on the labour of others. In the old time men lived according to God's law. They had what was their own and coveted not what others had produced.[12]

In 'How Much Land Does A Man Need' Tolstoy contrasted favourably the life of the peasants with that of the city-dwellers. The peasants' life is a simple life, without anxiety, while those in the cities suffer from different kinds of anxiety. In an argument between two sisters, one living in the city and the other in the countryside, the latter replied "I would not change my way of life for yours".[13] Nevertheless, her husband was ambitious to live as a rich man and started to think about gaining money through buying and selling land. He started with a small piece of land and ended up with a big estate. But he was not satisfied with that and wanted more land. He went to another kingdom where the rulers gave land for a very cheap price. They asked him how much land he needed. His reply was as much as possible. They told him to go over the hill and mark a point and then decide how much land he needed. He should walk and put marks on the size of the land. He took this opportunity and walked miles. In every direction he put a mark as a limit of the land. About half way he started to feel tired, but he forced himself to continue, despite the heat of the sun and his condition. On his way back he was completely exhausted but he was determined to reach the point where he had started. When he reached his destination he collapsed and died. Some people took his body and buried it in a six foot grave. And that is how much a man needs, whether he is very rich or poor.

Without any doubt, Wittgenstein had a deep admiration of Tolstoy's writings. These examples from the collection point to some aspects of

Wittgenstein's personal life after the war and even his understanding of religion. For the author of 'The Gospel in Brief' exerted a decisive and deep influence on Wittgenstein's thought and life and in his 'Tales' he found the essence of Christianity.

During the war, he wrote in his 'Note Books' that "the meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God ... To Pray is to think about the meaning of life" (p. 73, 11.6.16). He spent time praying to God at the combat, and this new meaning which he discovered at a time of confrontation with death and personal crisis required him to be another person because, in Tolstoy's words, "when it happens that the understanding of the meaning of life, having become more precise and definite, demands a code of conduct that differs from before".[14] And that was the case to the volunteer who risked his life for the sake of change.

After the War, Wittgenstein became a totally different person. One of the first steps he took was abandoning his fortune after the death of his father. He abandoned all the aristocratic privileges he had enjoyed during his childhood, adolescence, left all types of luxury, comfort and amusement behind him and started to look for work to support himself. This uncompromising attitude exerted by Tolstoy who expressed this in the Gospel in Brief, "Jesus said to his pupils: As you see, it is quite impossible to be rich and to fulfil the Fathers will".[15] This attitude repeated many times, because the true believer is

the one who devotes his life to the cause of his faith not to his personal desires. He left for rural Austria, where he lived in hardship and devoted years in teaching the peasants' children. He worked as a gardener's assistant and a builder when he built a house for his sisters. Later he wanted to emigrate to Russia with his friend Francis Skinner to work there as a labourer (that was while he was teaching in Cambridge). He advised many of his students to give up philosophy and work as a manual labourer. He lived sometimes as a hermit. For instance, he spent a whole summer vacation praying in Norway in 1931 and writing his confession (without doing any philosophical work).

What I want to emphasise here is that Wittgenstein lived a totally different way of life from his early youth. He believed in different values and had a different view of life, i.e. the religious view. In other words, he practised the religious way of life and that was the essence of his understanding of religion, because, as we shall see later, he built his view of religious belief on a practical basis, not as a doctrine or a theory. Once, he gave his friend, M. Drury, Dostoievsky's novels 'Crime and Punishment' and 'The Brothers Karamozov' and Tolstoy's 'Twenty Three Tales' to read in the summer vacation. After the vacation Wittgenstein asked Drury about his impression of them. His answer was that he found "Dostoievsky more to my liking than Tolstoy".[16] Wittgenstein's reply was "I don't agree with you. Those short stories of Tolstoy will live forever. They are written for all peoples".[17] With that we come to the second factor which contributed to the change in

Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas, on the personal level. It is his occupation as a teacher and its implications in the way in which he taught children.

Wittgenstein's decision to work as a teacher was one of two possibilities he considered, the first being, to be a priest. These options were part of the change in Wittgenstein's character during the War. Although he preferred to be a priest, he decided to work as a teacher. He told his friend Parak, before their release from captivity, "I'd most like to be a priest but when I am a teacher I can read the Gospel with the children".[18]

Moreover, his sister Hermine, in her biographical sketch of Ludwig, recorded that he was a born teacher, as he was "interested in all things himself and he knows how to sum up the most important aspects of everything and make them clear".[19] And, again, one of the things which Tolstoy had done was teaching the peasants' children, when he opened a school on his estate, to improve their knowledge. Later he wrote many articles concerning education, reflecting his experience of teaching.

It appeared, from Wittgenstein's career as an elementary school teacher and later as a professor of philosophy at Cambridge, that the former had an important impact on the development of his later ideas[20]. For Wittgenstein's later writings are full of remarks concerning teaching a child or bringing up children in a certain environment and words such as teacher, child and pupil are

scattered throughout the books which present his later thought. These remarks, surely, reflected his experience as an elementary school teacher, i.e. the way which he taught children or the way which he saw children understand their lessons. There are many examples concerning teaching children in connection with his later ideas. In Zettel, he wrote "Am I doing child psychology? I am making a connection between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning" (412). In 'On Certainty' we find:

> I should say "I know what this colour is called" if e.g. what is in question is shades of colour whose name not everybody knows.
> One can't yet say to a child who is just beginning to speak and can use the words "red" and "blue": "Come on, you know what this colour is called!" (OC, 546, 547)

When Wittgenstein attended 'The Teacher's Training College' in Vienna there was a revolutionary programme to improve the standard and methods of education which was adopted by the Social Democrat government after the war. Its main principle was to encourage pupils to participate actively in their lessons rather than feed them by ideas without active debate.[21] In one of the programmes, teachers were encouraged to relate teaching to the environment and the customs of the pupils, in order to remove ambiguity of their own usage in their local dialect.[22]

Wittgenstein started his new job with great enthusiasm in Trattenbuch village in 1920. His career as a teacher lasted until 1926 when he moved to

another village, Puchberg in 1922 and finally moved to Otterthal in 1924. His way of teaching was based upon the implementation of the reform programme, and he encouraged his pupils to participate actively in the lessons. He used different types of illustrations such as models of engines, diagrams, bottles, flasks, symbols, a mammal's skeleton, designing some shapes and, sometimes, imitating the movement of human figure etc.[23] In the 'Brown Book', the connection between his method and language games appeared as follows: "When the boy or grown up learns what one might call special technical languages, e.g. the use of charts and diagrams, descriptive geometry, chemical symbolism, etc. he learns more language games" (p. 81). Furthermore, he devoted all his time to teaching and gave, free, afternoon lessons to some exceptional pupils, and tried to send them to Vienna to continue higher education, though most of his attempts ended in failure, due to the opposition of their parents.

In addition, he showed a deep interest in improving the knowledge of his pupils. For example, once he took a group of pupils, at his family's expense, to Vienna and toured with them different museums and cultural places. He used to give them lessons in history and literature and read poems with them. Once he wrote to Paul Engelmann, "The one good thing in my life just now is that I sometimes read fairy tales to children at school. It pleases them and relieves the strain on me".[24] Every day he used to pray with his pupils, although praying was discouraged at that time.[25]

In the light of this it is necessary to point exactly to the contribution of teaching to the development of the later religious view. It is obvious, from the above sketch, that Wittgenstein's interest of teaching his pupils was not confined to the classroom but he also developed other interests outside the official education. One of these was religion, since he prayed and read the Gospel with the children. What lies at the heart of Wittgenstein's later thought is forms of life which can be presented in language games. The scattered remarks, concerning learning or bringing up a child, in the later writings, show how a child can be brought up with certain forms of life which are part of his social environment and the meaning of a word is connected to its use in social life. In other words, the way in which a child learns language triggered questions of the concept of meaning of words which depends upon their use in different social contexts.

As a man who converted to Christianity and went to teach the children under this influence, he certainly instructed his pupils in the Christian faith. In the Gospel in Brief Tolstoy pointed out that "to understand the teaching of Jesus one must understand the life of the children and be like them".[26] And elsewhere he warned, "be careful therefore not to lead a child away from the Father and from true life; for he who leads a child away from purity does evil".[27] The process of teaching a child religious ideas implies acting or carrying on a form or forms of life which are required by any religious belief.

These forms are part of social life, since they contain ethical and social relationships and all together form the religious way of life. This claim will be made clear as we proceed in our examination of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in relation to learning language games and forms of life and how people become believers as a result of their upbringing.

The above sketch of Wittgenstein's activities after the war, in the period in which he ceased philosophical activities, is as important as any other period in his life. Many commentators who neglect this period ignored an important source which contributed, at least on the personal level, to the development of his later ideas. We shall see how his understanding of religion triggered the change from a representational theory of language in the "Tractatus" into connecting language with the rules of social activities. For religion was conceived as a mystical experience due to the obvious influence of Schopenhauer in the earlier thought, and then conceived as a way of life in the later thought.

This brings us to the end of this section. The next is devoted to the gradual development of the later philosophical notions which shows the shift from the consideration of a proposition as a picture of fact to the treatment of philosophical problems from an anthropological perspective.

Before any discussion of the later philosophical notions let us start with the following point. The change in Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas is not a

change from one philosophical school to another, such as from idealism to materialism, but it is a change or development to some of his earlier ideas. For Wittgenstein as a philosopher of language considered language in his earlier and later thought as the main domain of philosophy. His ideas about philosophy as a method of clarification of language in his earlier thought remained the same in his later thought. In "Philosophical Investigations" he said that "philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (PI, 109). However, there is a modification, for example, of the notion of a proposition as a picture of fact in the world, which appeared in his earlier thought, to another concept of picture in his later thought. This later concept will be discussed below. From this perspective, in this section I will discuss the main ideas in Wittgenstein's later thought, in so far as they are relevant to the aims of the thesis. I will begin by showing the steps which led to the change in his thought, and then show his notions of meaning as use, language-games, forms of life and his later concept of a picture.

A disappointed experience with the peasants led Wittgenstein to give up his occupation as an elementary school teacher. He left for Vienna and later, in 1929, returned to Cambridge and resumed his philosophical activities, nine years after the publication of the "Tractatus". In the same year he published in 'Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society' an article carrying the title 'Logical Form'; and delivered his famous lecture, "Lecture on Ethics". From what he published and delivered there is no sign of substantial change from his earlier philosophical ideas. In the 'Lecture on Ethics' he still considered

the language which is used in religion and ethics as nonsense or as going beyond the boundaries of language, i.e. beyond what can be described as facts in the world. But shortly after that period there are some signs of a change in Wittgenstein's ideas.

There are three common terms which characterise Wittgenstein's later writings, whereas in his earlier thought the picture theory of meaning was the sole characteristic. The three terms are language-games, forms of life and meaning as use. These terms took their formal shape and were subjected to intensive examination in what appeared as 'The Blue and Brown Books' and "Philosophical Investigations", of which the earlier is considered as a preliminary reading to the latter. The earlier is a manuscript written just before the mid 1930s while the latter was prepared for publishing, though that did not materialise during Wittgenstein's lifetime. So, in order to have a clear picture of the development of Wittgenstein's later ideas, there follows a detailed explanation of the three main notions which dominated his later thought.

The notion to start with is that of 'language-games', the most prominent notion in Wittgenstein's later writings. The first appearance of the term 'language-games' was in his book, 'Philosophical Grammar', though he did not give any precise definition of it. He said:

> The language game is still very simple and the ostensive definition has not the same role in this language-game as in more developed ones. (For instance, the child cannot yet ask "What is that called?") But there is no sharp boundary between

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primitive forms and more complicated ones, ... what I can and what I can't still call "definition". I can only describe language-games or calculi; whether we still want to call them calculi or not doesn't matter as long as we don't let the use of the general term divert us from examining each particular case we wish to decide. (p. 62)

Instead of giving a definition of language-games, he referred to games such as chess and tennis and the way in which these games can be described. The term language-games appeared in connection with forms, i.e. forms of life. That shows the connection of language with social activities and that is the trend which Wittgenstein advocated in his later writings. In the 'Investigations' he gave numerous examples of language-games in connection with forms of life:

Here the term "Language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them - Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements -
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) -
Reporting an event -
Speculating about an event -
Forming and testing a hypothesis -
Presenting the result of an experiment in tables and diagrams -
Making up a story; and reading it - play-acting
Singing catches - guessing riddles -
Making a joke; telling it - solving a problem in practical arithmetic -
Translation from one language to another -
Asking, thinking, cursing, greeting, praying.
It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the ''Tractatus' Logico-Philosophicus'.) (PI, 23).

Wittgenstein gave different examples of language-games and he cited the way in which children learn how to name things, whereby children do not ask why this thing has this name but they utter the name as their parents utter it. In this process children begin to engage with different language-games, with which their parents have already engaged. He gave an example in "Philosophical Investigations" about a teacher who teaches his pupils the word stone by pronouncing the word and pointing to a stone. He later describes the process as follows:

> And the process of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a roses. (PI, 7)

I will concentrate upon one example, that of prayer, since the main argument deals with the development of the philosophical ideas through a religious motivation, by showing how praying in Islam is a language game, how it follows certain rules and compare that with Tennis as a game. Praying in Islam is bound by certain rules. The person praying should prepare for prayer by washing his hands, face and feet:

> You who believe whenever you intended to pray wash your faces and your hands up to the elbows, and wipe your heads and wash your feet up to the ankles.[28]

Then he stands facing in the direction of Mecca and starts praying. In the beginning he should lift up both his hands as high as his ears and say 'God is

Great' and then put both his hands on his stomach. The person praying should bow and prostrate himself, and in every movement he should sit on his knees and say some words and end his praying by turning his head to the right and then to the left. Prayer, then, is dictated by the above rules, which should be followed strictly in order for God to accept it. Failing to abide by any of these rules makes the prayer void and unacceptable to God.

This may be compared with the game of tennis, which follows certain rules such as the size of the court, the size of the ball, the height of the net, where the player stands to play the serve, where the ball should be played in the serve, etc. These rules together form the game which we all call tennis. They distinguish the game tennis from other games. It can be taught to someone by describing for him how to play and according to which rules and, if any player breaks the rules, he will incur a penalty.

In both examples we find that what distinguishes between praying and playing tennis is the rules which govern both of them. These rules, also, can distinguish between one sport game and another and between Muslim and Christian ways of praying. These rules are presented in a certain language which is composed from the combination of definite expressions in a certain way. This is what Wittgenstein described as a language game. Each different part of praying, for instance, is a definite language game, i.e. a simple language-game and these simple language-games in aggregate form the language game of praying. Language-games are not groups of expressions only or a mere

description of rules. They are a product of network activities or forms of life, simple and complicated, i.e. language-games are actions and language together. In the previous quotation of the examples of language-games we found that speaking a language is "part of an activity or forms of life". The notion 'forms of life' refers to different activities which take place in any community. In every community, people engage in different daily activities; they go to work, visit each other, women look after babies, children go to school, they go shopping etc. These activities, of course, are presented and communicated by language and the multiplicity of activities or forms of life show the multiplicity of language-games. We can see the multiplicity of language-games in different aspects in any community. For example, there are different language-games referring to scientists and the scientific activities they perform in their experiments and research. These language-games differ from one branch of science to another, i.e. from physics to chemistry, from zoology to botany and so on. In contrast, there are language-games which refer to believers' activities when they practice their belief.

The connection between language and forms of life appeared many times in the 'Investigations'. And, again, Wittgenstein did not define what a form of life is. Instead he connected it to language: "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (PI, 19). Language, in this sense, is connected to people's activities or forms of life by representing these activities and forms. For every activity or form of life can be described in specific linguistic terms and these terms are connected to the way in which these activities or forms of

life are executed. As an example of the connection between language and actions and how that can determine understanding of a language, I will cite the following (from the Brown Book) about understanding the language of a tribe through translation:

> ... whether the word of the language of our tribe is rightly translated into a word of English language depends upon the role this word plays in the whole life of the tribe, the occasions on which it is used ... (p. 103).

In this example we can imagine how a language can be connected to the behaviour of the members of the tribe, which is based upon the whole way of life they live. To understand their language means to understand their activities and forms of life, because if the translator wants to understand the meaning of their words he should be acquainted with their way of life, i.e. what their activities mean. Moreover, the totality of these activities form the common culture which exists in any community. And the differences between cultures or communities are based upon the kinds of activities which take place in every community. In another position we find Wittgenstein claimed that "we could also easily imagine a language (and that means again a culture)" (BB, p. 134). So, as language represents different forms of life, then how can we understand the meaning of words? In other words, as forms of life vary from simple to complex, and from one community to another, and they follow certain rules, how can the meaning of language which represents them be understood? That is to say, what determines the meaning of a word? These questions bring us to the third notion in Wittgenstein's later thought which is "meaning as use".

The notion of 'meaning as use' has an early appearance in the early

thought.[29] The idea that the meaning of a word can be determined by the way

in which it is used appeared in the "Tractatus":

> In order to recognise a symbol by its sign we must
> observe how it is used with a sense. A sign does not determine
> a logical form unless it is taken together with its logico-
> syntactical employment. (TLP, 3.326, 3.327).

This idea was not prominent because the picture theory of meaning was

the dominant concept in the "Tractatus", for Wittgenstein concentrated upon a

proposition as a picture of reality where every name of its component

corresponds to a single object in the world and they are connected together by

logical form. Moreover, during his time as a teacher he was attracted by the

idea of how a word can have different meanings when it is used in different

circumstances. But the systematic development of this notion took place when

he returned to Cambridge.

In another remark, which appeared in a book carrying the title,

'Philosophical Remarks', which includes remarks written by Wittgenstein in

1930, he said, "A word only has a meaning in the context of proposition, that is

like saying only in use is a rod a lever. Only the application makes it into a

lever" (PR, p. 59). Here we find a preliminary shift from his position in the

'Tractatus' concerning the meaning of a word, i.e. the way in which the word is

used determined its meaning. People in their daily conversations sometimes used the same word to refer or to mention different things. That is to say the meaning of a word is determined by its rules of application.

'Meaning as use' took its formal shape in the 'Investigations' and the 'Brown and Blue Books' where it is connected to language-games and forms of life. To understand a word and what it means, it is essential to know in what context this word is used. For there are many words in our daily life carrying different meanings in different circumstances. Wittgenstein defined the meaning of the word as follows: "The meaning of a word is its use in language" (PI, 43). To determine the meaning of a word is to look to its use and from that use it can be understood. "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use"[30] is Wittgenstein's maxim in his later thought, in connection with meaning, because he did not impose a theory of meaning as a picture of reality but "one cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that" (PI, 340). Let us take an example. When someone says "John has read this play" and another says "John's shouting in the play ground". The word 'play' in the two sentences is the same word but the meaning of the word in both sentences is different. In the first sentence the word 'play' refers to a play which can be performed at the theatre, and the second refers to a place where sports can be held. The way in which the word play has been used in both sentences follows different rules which determine its meaning. In other words the word 'play' has been used in different language-games.

Thus, in order to have a clear understanding of the meaning of a word

we should look to its correct use in a definite context, and a failure to grasp its

meaning results from our failure to grasp its use. That appeared clearly in the

'Investigations':

> A main source of our failure to understand is that we don't command a clear view of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. (PI, 22)

> Once you know what the word stands for, you understand it, you know its whole use. (PI, 264)

As the meaning of a word is determined by its use, then, on what

grounds is this use built? The use of a word is built upon following definite

rules or grammar. By following these rules the meaning of a word can be

identified and understood. Wittgenstein said:

> All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. (PI, 81)

In the light of this, following a rule or certain grammar will bring us to

language-games and forms of life. Because language-games operate according

to rules and these rules determine the way in which a word can be used.

According to Wittgenstein, rules which operate in language are similar to rules

which operate in games " ... the meaning of a piece is its role in the game" (PI,

563). An analogy can be found in Chess, for a player can make a lot of

movements or move a chess piece according to the rules of the game. Similarly, a speaker must use the words according to their rules in language. As a result, the different meanings which a single word can carry depend upon the rules which it follows, i.e. the difference in the language game which is a representation of a form of life, i.e. the meaning of a word is connected with people's activities:

> We could imagine that the language game of 2 was the whole language of A and B; even the whole language of the tribe. The children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others. (PI, p. 6)

People describe their activities by using linguistic expressions, i.e. by using words according to rules which govern their activities, customs and traditions. For, as Wittgenstein put it, "the use of a word in practice is its meaning" (BB, p. 69).

The three notions which dominated Wittgenstein's later thought are connected together. That is to say, a language game represents a form of life; a form of life is governed by rules; and according to these rules the meaning of a word can be determined. In addition to these notions, Wittgenstein developed further the concept of a proposition as a picture of objects in the world. With this development we will have a complete picture of the main notions of his later thought and that will pave the way to examine his later view of religion.

One of the reasons which led Wittgenstein to change his philosophical ideas was his dissatisfaction with the picture theory of meaning, i.e. a

proposition as a rigid picture of reality. He abandoned this view with the development of his later ideas and the notion of a proposition as a picture took another dimension. In a remark in the 'Investigations' he mentioned that:

> Thinking of a description as a word-picture of the facts has something misleading about it: one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our own walls: which seem simply to portray how a thing looks, what it is like. (These pictures are as it were idle.) (PI, 291)

Wittgenstein is here criticising his earlier ideas about a proposition as a picture of fact, because it seemed to him later that the kind of a picture which he posed in his earlier thought is a static one. It is static because it only describes facts in the world and it does not describe or point to what lies outside the sphere of facts such as actions. The concept of picture, in his later thought which appeared in various books, of characterizing his later writings, is dynamic[31] rather than static. The main characteristics of this dynamic picture can be seen in the following paragraphs from "Philosophical Investigations" and 'Philosophical Grammar':

> How do I know that this line of thought has led me to this action? - Well, it is a particular picture: for example, of a calculation leading to a further experiment in an experimental investigation. It looks like this - and now I could describe an example. (PI, 490)

> In what sense can I say that a proposition is a picture? When I think about it, I want to say: it must be a picture if it is to show me what I am to do, if I am able to act in accordance with it. But in that case all you want to say is that you act in accordance with a proposition in a sense as you act in accordance with a picture. (PG, p. 163)

It is clear, then, that the picture which developed is concerned with actions or activities, for the previous picture in the "Tractatus" which describes facts in the world was not, as Wittgenstein realised, compatible with his new ideas. The idea that a picture of, for example, a certain action can show or guide someone how to act can be seen clearly through an example in the 'Investigations':

> Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular stance. Now this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself,, or how he should not hold himself, or how a particular man did stand in such-and-such a place, and so on. (PI, p. 11)

The picture which represents a boxer might guide another boxer to act in the same way, or to avoid acting like the boxer, or to understand what the boxer was doing and to react in one way or another to the kind of movement which was represented by the picture. This picture represents a form of action to be imitated or reacted to. This example can be applied to other actions or activities which represent any form of life. In other words, forms of life can be presented in pictures, i.e. a series of pictures can represent a form of life in order to carry it on. That appeared clearly in Wittgenstein's claim:

> Rules of life are dressed up in pictures. And these pictures can only serve to describe what we are to do, not to justify it. Because they could provide a justification only if they held good in other respect as well. (p. 29, 1937, CV)

As forms of life are presented in language-games and these games follow certain rules, then the rules of a form of life can be represented in pictures which describe it. One example which supports this claim can be given from the 'Investigations'. In his list of language-games and forms of life (PI, 23) Wittgenstein said that giving an order is a language game, i.e. a form of life:

> When we give an order, it can look as if the ultimate thing sought by the order had to remain unexpressed, as there is always a gulf between an order and its execution. Say I want someone to make a particular movement, say to raise his arm. To make it quite clear, I do the movement. This picture seems unambiguous till we ask: how does he know that he is to make that movement? - How does he know at all what use he is to make of the signs I give him, whatever they are? - Perhaps I shall now try to supplement the order by means of further signs, by pointing from myself to him, making encouraging gestures, etc.. Here it looks as if the order were beginning to stammer.
> (PI, 433)

The picture of the order can be shown to someone to carry on the order. The picture could show a particular action, a movement of, for instance, raising the arm but this picture alone is not enough to describe a complete order. Instead, a series of pictures, gestures and movements will describe a complete order. For one sign "by itself seems dead. What gives it life? In use it is alive" (PI, 432).

So, Wittgenstein's notion of a picture in his later thought is connected with actions, i.e. a picture can represent a particular action. This action can be understood within its context, i.e. a series of pictures can represent a form of

life and a particular picture gets its intended meaning within the framework of what has been represented as a whole. In other words, the notion of a picture in Wittgenstein's later thought has its meaning in the social context in which it is used.

The previous sketch of the influence and the steps which led to the intellectual change in Wittgenstein's ideas will provide us with an approach to examining the concept of religion in his later thought. We saw the gradual departure from his earlier philosophical ideas about the analysis of a proposition as a picture of reality in the world, to a new perspective; a connection between language and social activities and forms of life. That is due to Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical ideas and problems from an anthropological point of view. In addition, Wittgenstein's conversion to Christianity and his experience as an elementary school teacher played its role. The process of teaching a pupil the meaning of a word and its use in language influenced his thinking and led to a revision of the concept of meaning as it appeared in his earlier thought. The use of a word depends upon certain rules which are present in language-games and these are a representation of forms of life, i.e. words get their meaning from the social context in which they operate. The question which ought to be asked is how religious language can be interpreted in the light of the later philosophical notions, since it had been considered as nonsense in the earlier thought. In other words, as a consequence of the disappearance of the earlier distinction between the sphere of fact and value, what is the situation of religious language? The answer is in the first part of the final sub section of this section.

In any religious context, the words which are used to express religious belief do not differ from ordinary words. What is different is the way in which these words are used. In the 'Investigations' Wittgenstein compared words with tools which have different functions:

> Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a ruler, a glue-pot, nails and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.) (PI, 11)

The function of words is as diverse as the function of tools. In other words, many words and terms are used in different places and circumstances and the way they are used determines their meaning.

So, if someone says that religious language has a distinctive use, that does not mean or imply that it has different words or terms differing from ordinary language. Religious language uses the terms and words which we use in our daily life. What does distinguish it is the way in which these words are used. The way in which religious language is used is characteristically the language-games in which it operates. And these language-games embody certain ways of understanding, interpretation, viewing and responding to many manifestations in our life.

What distinguishes the religious use of language and the ordinary use of language is the rules which govern religious forms of life, i.e. religious activities which are carried out by believers in any religion. Because what distinguishes a

believer from a non-believer is the way of life each lives. Since forms of life are presented in language-games and these games follow certain rules, the meaning of a word, then, depends upon the rules which govern it, i.e. depends on its use in connection with religious activities. In this respect, the specific use of ordinary words in a religious context, in connection with the religious way of life, is what distinguishes it from the use in ordinary activities or circumstances. Through this perspective, many words such as God, the last judgement, Absolute Good, etc. have different use from many terms in our ordinary language. They belong to different language-games. For example, the way in which a child learns the word 'God' is quite different from learning the word 'chair'. The child's parents point to a chair and pronounce the word 'chair' which the child can learn directly by seeing the chair. On the other hand, the child learns the word 'God' in a different way. He learns it by different descriptions attributed to God and these descriptions follow certain language-games, in which the word 'God' is used in a different way from learning a factual object or thing. As a result, there is a certain understanding of religious language which can be determined by specific use according to rules. If someone wants to understand or to try to understand and interpret religious language out of its context, i.e. out of its language-games, he will not reach the same understanding as the believer and he might consider religious language as nonsense.

The previous discussion of the interpretation of religious language according to the later philosophical notions paves the way to discuss

Wittgenstein's claim that the later ideas can be seen rightly in contrast to his earlier thought, bearing in mind that the motivation behind this change was the consideration of religion as a way of life, i.e., as activities attached to social life.

In the light of this discussion, how can Wittgenstein's claim that his later ideas can be seen rightly in contrast to his earlier thought be interpreted? In the mid 1940s Wittgenstein wanted to publish his book "Philosophical Investigations" with his first book "Tractatus' Logico-Philosophicus'. He wrote in the introduction to "Philosophical Investigations" the following:

> Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (The 'Tractatus' Logico-Philosophicus) and to examine its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.[32]

So, what was the fundamental thing which drove him to change his earlier ideas?

The fundamental idea which had its impact on the development of the later ideas was the meaning of a word. This idea has a special place in Wittgenstein because one of his aims throughout his writings was to present a clear and sharp meaning of words. That notion appeared in his early "Note Books' 1914, 1916' and the "Tractatus", and when he returned to Cambridge in some of his conversations with his friends and some of his early writings

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after the period of philosophical inactivity. The argument from which I will proceed to discuss this matter will start with a remark in a conversation with M. Drury concerning the meaning of a word and then I will show Wittgenstein's insistence on the sharpness and clarity of meaning from his early writings and how he abandoned the early ideas of meaning for the later one, which depends upon the use of the word and its relation to activities in actual life.

In a conversation with Drury which took place in 1930, Wittgenstein mentioned that his mind was occupied with the meaning and the use of the word. The occasion was when Drury told him about a paper he had delivered to 'The Moral Science Club' under the title, 'Are There Degrees of Clarity?' in which he was trying to show that either a proposition has a meaning or it does not. Moore had attended that meeting and attacked the content of the paper vigorously. Wittgenstein asked Drury to read the paper to him and after he finished, Wittgenstein commented:

> You know I rather like it. You are doing the sort of thing I am working at, trying to see how in actual life we use words. It has puzzled me why Socrates is regarded as a great philosopher. Because when Socrates asks for the meaning of a word and people give him examples of how that word is used, he isn't satisfied but wants a unique definition. Now if someone shows me how a word is used and its different meanings, that is just the sort of answer I want.[33]

The comment shows that Wittgenstein, at that time, was thinking about another approach to meaning which differs from his early writings. For, in the

earlier, it was attached to the arrangement of elements or names in a proposition while in the later, it was attached to ordinary activities of daily life.

As we already know, the main task of Wittgenstein in his earlier thought was to accomplish the rigorous distinction between the spheres of fact and value. The result of the distinction was that there are propositions we can speak i.e., what can be said; the propositions which depict facts are the only propositions which carry sense. In contrast, there are propositions which cannot be said, properly speaking, such as propositions of ethics and religious matters which are considered as nonsense.

So, the only propositions which carry sense are those which depict facts in the world. That means the sole task of Wittgenstein's early work was to give an accurate analysis of a proposition. 'My whole task consists in explaining the nature of propositions' (NB, p. 39). This task led to the analysis of propositions into simple and complex and the decomposition of simple or atomic propositions into objects. Objects are the final part of the analysis. An object on its own has no sense. It has a sense only in an arrangement with other objects in a proposition. Objects do not alter. What alters is their configuration, i.e. the form of a proposition which puts them together (TL p. 2. 0231). From this point we can proceed to show how Wittgenstein's attempt to set conditions for sharp sense did not materialize, and that led gradually to the change to the later concept of meaning as use.

In his attempt to explain the nature of proposition Wittgenstein insisted upon the clarity of sense:

> ... the sense must be clear, for after all we mean something by the proposition, and as much as we certainly mean must surely be clear. (NB, p. 67)
> It seems clear that what we mean must always be sharp. (NB, p. 68)

In order to achieve that, every object in a proposition carries only a single name, and being the name of an object, or a thing, is its meaning (TLP, 3.203). So, the name of an object in the world, and the configuration of objects can produce a sense. But it is remarkable in this respect that Wittgenstein did not name any object or give any example of an atomic or elementary proposition. For the ultimate goal of the analysis of a proposition was to reach reality, which is the correspondence of the form of the proposition with the arrangement of objects in the world (2.17, TLP). This goal cannot be achieved in the process of analysis in the "Tractatus", because, for instance, if someone says 'the car is near the park', this statement, as a possible example of a possible state of affairs, can be analysed further. A car can be a fact such as it has four wheels, two doors, three main seats, etc., and these things, also, can be analysed further. (That also applies to the park, which has trees, flowers, gates etc.). There is no end to the process of analysis because everything can be analysed further and further (4.2211, TLP). In the 'Investigations', he cited a 'chair' as a thing which can be analysed further and further, "But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? What are the simple

constituent parts of a chair? The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the

molecules or the atoms? (PI, 47).

Wittgenstein recognized this idea later, which led him to criticise his

early view of the analysis of proposition,[34] because that analysis was not

sufficient:

> If you want to use the appellation "elementary
> proposition" as I did in the 'Tractatus' Logico-Philosophicus,
> and as Russell used "atomic proposition", you may call the
> sentence "Here there is a red rose" an elementary proposition.
> That is to say, it doesn't contain a truth-function and it isn't
> defined by an expression which contains one. But if we're to
> say that a proposition isn't an elementary proposition unless its
> complete logical analysis shows that it isn't built out of other
> propositions by truth-functions, we are presupposing that we
> have an idea of what such an 'analysis' would be. Formerly, I
> myself spoke of a 'complete analysis', and I used to believe that
> philosophy had to give a definitive dissection of propositions so
> as to set out clearly all their connections and remove all
> possibilities of misunderstanding. I spoke as if there was a
> calculus in which such a dissection would be possible. I
> vaguely had in mind something like the definition that Russell
> had given for the definite article, and I used to think that in a
> similar way one would be able to use visual impressions etc. to
> define the concept say of a sphere, and thus exhibit once for all
> the connections between the concepts and lay bare the source of
> all misunderstandings, etc. At the root of all this there was a
> false and idealized picture of the use of language. (PG, p. 211)

The clear and sharp sense which Wittgenstein was trying to achieve in

his earlier work, or which he thought had achieved, suffered a set-back when

he resumed his philosophical activities, because his determination that "A

proposition has one and only one complete analysis", (3.25, TLP), as he

discovered later, did not materialize and, as a result, the sharp and clear

meaning of words cannot be achieved in this process of analysis. This undermined his picture theory of a proposition, which was the culmination of his analysis of the world and language. Through this theory, the essence of language, the general form of proposition, and the distinction between the sphere of fact and value had been drawn. All that crumbled with the search for the way to determine the exact meaning of a word[35]. It was the use of the word, or proposition, which determined its meaning in a certain context. Eighteen years after the conversation in 1930, Wittgenstein gave the following answer to Drury when he asked him his opinion on Hegel:

> No, I don't think I would get on with Hegel. Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from King Lear: 'I'll teach you differences'.[36]

The differences which Wittgenstein was trying to show were that the different meanings of a word are a result of the different ways in which it is used. In other words, the differences in use give different meanings. In the 'Blue Book' he mentioned that "we ask: what do you mean? i.e. How do you use this expression?' (p. 65).

Wittgenstein's realization of his failure to determine exactly what is a simple object or an elementary proposition drove him to look for the use of these terms to determine their meaning. That appeared clearly in the following:

Imagine it were the usual thing that the objects around us carried labels with words on them by means of which our speech referred to the objects. Some of these words would be proper names of the objects, others generic names (like table, chair, etc.), others again, names of colours, names of shapes, etc. That is to say, a label would only have a meaning to us in so far as we made a particular use of it. (BB, 69)

It is clear then, that what occupied Wittgenstein's mind in the early years of his return to Cambridge was how to achieve an accurate and clear meaning of a word. For the first sentence in the 'Blue Book' was the following question: "What is the meaning of a word?" (p. 1). The answer was a departure from the old way of determining meaning, for the new one which connected meaning to the use of a word on different occasions. And the task of the philosophers is: ... to bring words back from their metaphysical to their every day use (PI, 16). That means in order to establish a clear meaning of words, it is necessary to look for the use of words in social life, in this context, words can be brought down from their metaphysical realm to earth, to everyday practices of human intercourse. He wrote in 'Zettel' that "Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning" (173, Z).

With that we have a complete picture of the elements which played a role in the process of the development of Wittgenstein's later philosophical ideas. Tolstoy's intellectual and personal influence can be seen in Wittgenstein's personal life and the concept of religious belief which is based upon a practical, not theoretical or doctrinal basis, and the experience of teaching with its implications for the concept of meaning and instructing a

child, serve as a background to some aspects of the later ideas. The connection between language and social activities forced him to abandon the picture theory of meaning and examine philosophical problems from an anthropological point of view. All this paves the way for an interpretation of the religious motivation behind the later philosophical ideas, and that is the main subject of the next chapter.

Postscript

In contrast to the earlier thought where religious language was considered as nonsense, the interpretation of this language in the later thought is less problematic, because the earlier distinction on which Wittgenstein considered religious language as nonsense had disappeared in favour of connecting language with social forms of life. Since religion is considered as a way of life and built upon practical activities, the sense of religious utterances is determined by their place in religious practices. As shown in this chapter, the meaning of words depends upon their use in language-games, then the meaning of religious utterances is constituted by their actual use in religious life which is a form of social life. As in the 'Tractatus', the religious use of sentences is not secondary and derivative from their primary, literal sense. Their religious use gives them a sense unintelligible outside of this particular social life form.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Religion, Art and the Later Ideas

> Perhaps what is inexpressible
> (what I find mysterious and am
> not able to express) is the
> background against which
> whatever I could express has its
> meaning (CV, p. 16)

This chapter examines the new perspective of religion which
Wittgenstein adopted in his later life. It starts with the shift in his consideration
of religion, from a mystical experience, or a form of contemplation, to a way of
life. In order to give an explanation of the later religious view and discuss the
religious motivation behind the philosophical ideas, it is divided into two
sections. The first will be divided into two sub-sections. I shall look at
Wittgenstein's understanding of religion as based upon practical activities, not
doctrines. That will be followed by the influence of this understanding upon
the development of some of his later ideas, such as the acceptance of forms of
life and the end of explanation. All these will be discussed in the first sub-
section. The second sub-section focuses upon the notion of a world picture or
a background, exposing the way in which it can be formed through bringing up
a child in a certain belief. This will be preceded by some biographical materials
and remarks which support the religious motivation of the later thought,
focusing a great deal upon the early thirties as the period which marked the
change in the philosophical writings. The second section deals with
Wittgenstein's attitude to the arts under the influence of the later religious
view.

We saw, in Wittgenstein's earlier thought, how the development of his philosophical ideas and personal experience led him to the Christian faith. His view of religion as a mystical experience derived, philosophically, from the analysis of language and, personally, from his own torment and despair. In his earlier writings, religious language had been considered as nonsense and it had been put on equal grounds with propositions of ethics, because they do not represent facts in the world. Of course, this stance was due to the strict application of the picture theory of meaning. On the personal level, Wittgenstein found in religion a refuge from the troubles of life. This is due to the influence of Schopenhauer's ideas, especially within the concept of art as a redeemer from the troubles of life.

In his later writings, Wittgenstein considered religion as a way of life. In 1946 he wrote the following remark in 'Culture and Value':

> I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life.) ...
>
> The point is that a sound doctrine need not take hold of you; you can follow it as you would a doctor's prescription. - But here you need something to move you and turn you in a new direction. - (I.e. this is how I understand it.) Once you have been turned round, you must stay turned round. (p. 53)

Religion is not just attending a service in the church or singing hymns or reading verses. It is not asking God for help or isolating oneself and praying to him. It is a whole way of life which embodies a network of actions which shapes the believer's life. It is to commit oneself to carry on religious deeds as

they are demanded by any religion. Again that corresponds to Tolstoy's view that:

> To believe in the teaching and to change our way of life and to fulfil that teaching, what is needed is not external proofs or promises of rewards, but a clear understanding of what true life is.[1]

The true life is the fulfilment of the Father's will. This fulfilment does not come from external factors or proofs, it must come from the person himself, from his attitude towards life and his fellow men. The new direction should be embodied in the believer's deeds and his ethical attitude which should be manifested in social life. It is the inner change of direction of a person in line with the practical requirement of his religious belief and the case of Wittgenstein from the way of life in his youth.

As a way of life, religion demands implementing religious activities which are part of social life, i.e., the social life is the medium of religious belief. That is the cornerstone of Wittgenstein's later view of religion. As a result, one fundamental point in Wittgenstein's understanding of religion is that he did not build religious belief on a theoretical or doctrinal basis, but upon religious activities which believers from different religions practice. Believers who practice their belief are implementing the instructions of their religions. In a conversation with F. Weisman in 1930, which I requote because of its importance, Wittgenstein said:

I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrinal propositions, in which there is thus no talking. Obviously the essence of religion cannot have anything to do with the fact that there is talking, or rather: when people talk, then this itself is part of a religious act and not a theory. Thus it also does not matter at all if the words used are true or false or nonsense.[2]

What distinguishes a believer from a non-believer is the way in which he acts and what distinguishes a believer in one religion from a believer in another religion are the forms of activities required by each religion. Religious activities in which believers engage form the context of their behaviour and this behaviour becomes part of the whole tradition and institutes of the community in which the believer lives.

Seven years later, Wittgenstein repeated his dissatisfaction with doctrine and theory as a method of interpreting and understanding religion:

> Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul but a description of something that actually takes place in human life. For 'consciousness of sin' is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith. Those who speak of such things (Bunyan for instance) are simply describing what has happened to them, whatever gloss anyone may want to put on it. (CV, p. 28)

This remark shows the importance which Wittgenstein attached to the role of religion in life. For religion can describe what 'takes place in human life', i.e. what sort of actions, relations and customs form the traditions of the people in any community. This shows that religious belief is based upon a

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practical basis, i.e. on the activities which take place in human life, not on a

theory or doctrine. That is what Tolstoy emphasised, for, "a belief must be

given not to words but to deeds".[3] These deeds are an essential part of life,

because "wisdom lies in recognizing life as the offspring of the Father's

spirit".[4] These ideas show the importance of attaching religious deeds to what

goes on in social life, because believers should carry on their belief through

deeds, not words and services.

In the light of this, the following question arises: Is there any relation

between Wittgenstein's religious and philosophical ideas since both are

considered from the social perspective? Which influenced the other? One

remarkable thing which deserves attention is the influence of Wittgenstein's

understanding of religion on the development of his philosophical ideas,

because there are some correspondences between his religious view and

philosophical ideas. That does not mean there is a complete similarity between

them, but there are some fundamental points. One of the reasons which

encourages us to investigate the religious motivation behind the later

philosophical ideas is some remarks from Wittgenstein concerning his works.

In the Foreword of Philosophical Remarks, written in 1930, he wrote:

> I would like to say This book is written to the glory of
> God, but nowadays that would be chicanery, that is, it would
> not be rightly understood. It means the book is written in good
> will, and in so far as it is not so written, but out of vanity, etc,
> the author would wish to see it condemned. He cannot free it
> of these impurities further than he himself is free of them.

Some of the remarks which were written show the first sign of change in Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas. However, there are no direct remarks which can be detected to explain the religious outlook of the book or even a direct explanation of religious themes. The reason behind the absence of direct religious themes can be seen in the sketch for Forward published in Culture and Value, which was not included in the introduction of the published book, where we find that:

> The danger in a long foreword is that the spirit of the book has to be evident in the book itself and cannot be described. For if a book has been written for just a few readers that will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. The book must automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. (CV, p. 7)

This is a very important remark, for the cryptic style of writing implies, by itself, the spirit in which these remarks were written, i.e., the character of the writings can be shown within the writings themselves without describing against which background they had been written, i.e., they were written for all the people, not just those who share the same religious view.

If we go back to the first paragraph of the Foreword, from that we can explain what Wittgenstein meant by the spirit of the book and the link with his religious view will be possible.

> This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it is written. This is not, I believe, the spirit of the main current European and American civilization. The spirit of this civilization ... is alien and uncongenial to the author. (CV, p. 6)

The spirit of the current European and American civilizations is manifested in industry, business, the loss of religious belief, the ethical decline of human values. This spirit is alien to the author who found his refuge in religion and did not hide his contempt for the progress of science and its impact upon the social and political aspects of modern life. (CV, p.63) It is the thought of a religious man who lived in an environment alien to him and his belief, an environment dominated by conflicts and wars. Once he told Drury, "my type of thinking is not wanted in this present age, I have to swim so strongly against the tide".[5] This and other remarks, such as, "It is impossible for me to say in my book one word about all that music has meant in my life. How then can I be understood?"[6], prompted Drury to think,

> Have I seen that the Philosophische Bemerkungen could have been inscribed to the glory of God? Or that the problems discussed in the 'Philosophical Investigations' are being seen from a religious point of view?[7]

This comment came from one of Wittgenstein's closest students and friends. Their friendship started in 1929 in Cambridge and lasted till Wittgenstein's death. Drury saw Wittgenstein whenever there was an opportunity, almost every year, and I believe his account, remarks and recorded conversations are very important, because during the transition to the later thought he was in touch with Wittgenstein. One of the incidents which shows how he was close to and influenced by Wittgenstein is that he took the advice of the latter and gave up philosophy and looked for another job.

There are other remarks and recorded conversations which show that Wittgenstein's work had been motivated by his religious awareness. In 1930, Philosophical Remarks were written to the glory of God, and we should not be surprised that, in 1949, he said, about his work,

> I have had a letter from an old friend in Austria, a priest. In it he says he hopes my work will go well, if it should be God's will. Now that is all I want: if it should be God's will. Bach wrote on the title page of his Orgelbuchlein, To the glory of the most high God, and that my neighbour may be benefited thereby. That is what I would have liked to say about my work.[8]

Another remark, written in 1947 implies that his work can be fruitful if it received a light from above.

> Is what I am doing really worth the effort? Yes, but only if a light shines on it from above. And if that happens - why should I concern myself that the fruits of my labours should not be stolen? If what I am writing really has some value, how could anyone steal the value from me? And if the light from above is lacking, I cant in any case be more than clever. (CV, pp 57, 58)

Norman Malcolm claimed that this remark has a religious meaning[9] according to the statement from James' Epistle, "Every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the father of lights with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change"[10] (James 1:17). In another situation Wittgenstein wrote, "God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone's eyes". (CV, p 63). These personal remarks and conversations encourage us to investigate some aspects of analogies between

central philosophical ideas in Wittgenstein's later thought and his religious view. There are also other remarks which will be helpful when we proceed in our discussion, but before that it is important to go back to some points from the philosophical writing and identify them to enhance our argument.

The early thirties was a period of intensive intellectual activity, where Wittgenstein's writings were confined to religious and philosophical ideas. The religious writing and activities can be recorded as follows. In 'Culture and Value', the period from 1930 to 1937, there are intensive religious writings and remarks about God, Christ, Christianity and religion in general. In addition, in late 1930 Drury reported that Wittgenstein had asked him if they both could read James Frazer's book 'The Golden Bough'. They read some parts of the multi-volume edition and, according to Drury, Wittgenstein started to write his remarks about the book, which was published by Rush Rhees after Wittgenstein's death under the title 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough', on 19th June 1931. The essence of the remarks was that Frazer had committed a fundamental error when he applied the standards of the scientific view of the twentieth century to the primitive way of life of the savage. That led Frazer to consider their actions as stupid. Wittgenstein's view was that the savage actions should not be judged on a scientific basis, but according to the cultural context, the way of life, of that tribal community. And a single action should be interpreted through the network of activities, not in isolation from the totality of activities of a tribe.

On the other hand, in his philosophical writings, in that period, the early

signs of connecting language with social activities appeared in 'Philosophical

Grammar' and 'The Blue and Brown Books'; the latter are considered as the

preliminary writings for the 'Investigations'. In the latter, the emphasis upon

the use of a word in a context determining its meaning in connection with

practical activities, was clear. The remarkable thing in this book, which gives

the impression that it was written under a religious inspiration, is that there are

scattered remarks, specially in the 'Brown Book', about tribes and their belief,

which include their social activities, expressions of emotional gestures, the way

of teaching young members of a tribe, their linguistic communication system,

etc. One interesting thing concerning the Brown Book is what Von Wright

recorded about the origin of the 'Philosophical Investigations'. Wittgenstein

had started in 1936 to work on a revision of the Brown Book. As was the case

with the 'Tractatus', he, in 1937, isolated himself in Norway and worked on

improving the version of the book. In 1938 he prepared the manuscript of the

main parts of the book, and in 1939 added more remarks to it.[11] I have

already mentioned that the Brown Book is full of remarks concerning tribes

and their religious belief, and that gives support to our argument.

The second point with regard to the religious aspect in Wittgenstein's

later writings is the notion of a world-picture or background. (Sometimes he

called it a system.) The early appearance of this notion can be traced in Culture

and Value, which is used as a motto for this chapter, and the remarks about

Frazers Golden Bough. The remark, written in 1931, shows a shift in the concept of meaning from the earlier one, i.e., meaning can be acquired against an inexpressible background. And the world-picture can be found in Lecture on Religious Belief delivered in the late thirties and scattered remarks in On Certainty, written in the last two years of Wittgenstein's life. This world-picture or a background is a result of bringing up a child in a certain belief. So, what had been said in this part supports the notion that some of Wittgenstein's later ideas were written during a period of religious awareness.

The previous review will pave the way to determine exactly what are the main points which ought to be tackled to show the religious motivation in the later thought. There are four main points. The first is the acceptance of forms of life without justification; the second is the latter concept of philosophy, the end of explanation which is relevant to the earlier point; the third is, since Wittgenstein had stood against any sort of dogmatic or doctrinal understanding of religious belief, that correspondence also to the philosophical ideas. Finally, there is the notion of the world-picture which will be discussed in the second sub-section, while the others are discussed in the first.

With regard to forms of life and their acceptance without explanation or justification, there is a very important remark written in 1937, part of which has been quoted before:

> Rules of life are dressed up in pictures. And these pictures can only serve to describe what we are to do, not justify it. ...
> Religion says: Do this! - Think like that! - but it cannot justify this and once it even tries to, it becomes repellent; because for

every reason it offers there is a valid counter-reason. (CV, p. 29)

Rules of life which govern a certain form of life can be presented in pictures and these pictures are not subject to any sort of explanation or justification. Similarly, religious activities ought to be accepted without any explanation. Wittgenstein expressed his fear of giving any justification to religious belief when M. Drury told him he wanted to become a priest in 1929, and his reply was:

> I would be afraid that you would try and give some sort of philosophical justification for Christian beliefs, as if some sort of proof was needed. You have intelligence; it is not the best thing about you, but it is something you mustn't ignore. - The symbolisms of Catholicism are wonderful beyond words. But any attempt to make it into a philosophical system is offensive.[12]

And in a conversation with O. K. Bouwsma, in 1949, which shows the consistency of Wittgenstein's view, he said, "of course, a man need not argue his religious belief ... one may believe without argument".[13] In the second part of the 'Investigations' there is a perspicuous insistence from Wittgenstein to accept forms of life in this way. He said "what has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life" (PI, p. 226). Forms of life are the actual activities which take place in any community. These activities are part of the natural history of the people which take place in different times and generations. They continue as customs, traditions and institutes and form the cultural milieu of any nation. It is interesting here to recall Wittgenstein's

comparison of learning a language game with learning a game such as football or tennis. As a form of life is presented in a language game the process of learning a language game does not include an explanation of what is learnt, "the question is not one of explaining a language game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language game" (PI, 655). I.e. there is no explanation of a form of life but to observe it. For a tradition, for the individual, is "not a thread he can pick up when he feels like it; any more than a man can choose his own ancestors" (CV, p. 76). In comparison to football if someone asks why there is a goal and a goal keeper the answer will be, because that is what is called a football game; there is no explanation or justification for why there is a goal and a goal keeper, it is as it is.

The word which was repeated concerning this matter was 'describe' or 'description'. In other words, a form of life, a language game, a sports game can be learned by description, and that is the task of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein's later writings. He stated that "our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations" (BB, p. 125). He asserted this view in the 'Investigations': "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language, it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." (PI, 124). The task of the philosopher is not to give any sort of explanation for social phenomenon or forms of life, but to pave the way for the right description, in order to get accurate use of words. In other words, the description which philosophy provides for the use of the word is to clarify its meaning when it is used in

different contexts. This way of proposing the task of philosophy in the later thought is similar to his earlier ideas of looking to philosophy as a method of clarification (4.112, TLP). This method is adapted, with the development of the later ideas, to the consideration of meaning as use, not with a proposition as a picture of fact. So, the view that the method of philosophy is confined to description, not explanation, is part of the acceptance of forms of life as they are, because they are the given, without any justification. And that corresponds to the acceptance of religious forms of life, since those forms ought to be accepted and carried on without any justification or explanation, i.e. in belief that these actions are the right actions or forms through which the life of the believer can be shaped. They ought to be accepted because that is what God ordered, to do his will, and there is no explanation for that order and the reference to God ends all explanation or justification.

Since the task of philosophy is descriptive, not interpretative, that means this description is not based upon a theoretical ground and that brings us to the second point which shows the influence of Wittgenstein's understanding of religion on the development of his later thought. For he stood against any kind of dogmatic or doctrinal understanding of religion, which was reflected exactly in his philosophical ideas. The connection between language and daily activities does not require a theory to follow, because people act according to their needs, customs, traditions and social obligations. This way of acting does not spring from a theory. People's relationships and daily contact does not follow dogmatic principles. In one of his wonderful remarks he said:

You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there - like our life. (OC, 559).

The activities of the people are governed by social rules and the way of learning these rules is not theoretical. A child learns how to behave by practical instructions or training by following rules of conduct of a form of life. "The child learns this language from the grown-ups by being trained to its use. I am using the word trained in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things" (BB, p. 77). This way of learning does not require a theory or a doctrine, it requires an imitation of certain practices by means of description or portrayal.

Wittgenstein was opposed to any philosophical doctrine and expressed his dissatisfaction with any kind of dogmatic interpretation of different aspects of life. In 'Zettel', he said "A philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That's what makes him into a philosopher" (Z, 445). Rush Rhees' translation of the first part of the remark was "a philosopher is not a citizen of a thought-community".14 Whether it is a community of ideas or thought, this remark shows clearly Wittgenstein's disapproval of interpreting or justifying philosophical problems according to a theory or doctrine. Every problem has its own rules and in order to tackle such a problem we should look to any defect in its rules, which are rooted in actual life. In one of his finest remarks in 'Culture and Value', which displays how he looked at dogmatic explanation, he started with:

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The effect of making men think in accordance with dogmas, perhaps in the form of certain graphic propositions, will be very peculiar: I am not thinking of these dogmas as determining men's opinions but rather as completely controlling the expression of all opinions. People will live under an absolute, palpable tyranny, though without being able to say they are not free. (1937, p. 28)

As an example of this way of dogmatic understanding he cited, in the same remark, the Catholic Church and its way of explaining events, problems and religious issues. For its way of dealing with these matters takes the form of "an assertion and is unshakeable, but at the same time any practical opinion can be made to harmonize with it" (*Ibid*). This way of looking at things and its method of interpretation looks like an authority trying to keep everything under its control by dogmatic justifications of its authority, while in reality things on the ground are quite different. In other words, building a religious belief upon dogma is a misunderstanding of the way in which religion should be understood, because that will lead to engage in intellectual argument, and justifications for different religious matters which distance religion from real life. In fact, Wittgenstein claimed that life, not theory or doctrine, teaches a person to believe in God.. (This idea will be developed in the discussion of a world-picture.) He used the following metaphor, at the end of the previous remark, to describe how dogma affects thought:

It is not a *wall* setting limits to what can be believed, but more like a *brake* which, however, practically serves the same purpose; it's almost as though someone were to attach a weight to your foot to restrict your freedom of movement. This is how dogma becomes irrefutable and beyond the reach of attack. (*Ibid.*)

So, there is a clear influence of Wittgenstein's understanding of religion upon his philosophical ideas. The opposition to any kind of doctrine or theory and the acceptance of forms of life as they are, without explanation, which led him to limit the task of philosophy to description only, had a religious dimension in his thought. But that does not mean that all his later philosophical ideas had a religious dimension. Once he told Drury that he "cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view".[15]   With that this sub-section comes to its end. The next will show in detail, the notion of a world-picture or a background. That will give us a fuller picture of the religious motivation behind the later philosophical ideas.

This sub-section will give an explanation of one important notion in Wittgenstein's later thought. It deals with the notion of a picture, i.e. a whole picture. Wittgenstein described it sometimes as a world-picture or a background or a system. The notion of a world-picture is quite different from the notion of a proposition as a picture in his earlier and later thought. Both pictures were products of propositions, i.e. in the earlier it was a picture of an arrangement of elements in the world, and in the latter it is a picture representing social activities. The world-picture is a background or a system. It is not something which can be described or expressed in language; rather it is a world-picture which forms from the totality of activities and the general culture in any society. The first appearance of this notion can be tracked back in 1931 in a remark in 'Culture and Value', when Wittgenstein wrote, "perhaps

what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and I am not able to express) is

the background against which what ever I could express has its meaning" (p.

16). This remark serves as an entry to a full examination to how a religious

belief can be taught, in other words, how a person becomes a believer in a

certain religion.

The explanation will be based upon Wittgenstein's belief that people

become believers by the process of shaping their lives from childhood by a

certain upbringing which is part of their social environment and culture, i.e.

religion as a way of life is not taught according to a doctrine or a theory, rather

by learning a network of activities which form that belief, from childhood.

From this perspective we can proceed to discuss the notion of world-picture or

a background. We will begin with the way in which a child learns how to

behave, i.e. how he is instructed to do what is right and wrong. Then how

these actions hold fast with what surrounds them and how they form a system

or a background. Later, how through this background a person can view

things and interpret what happens around him. The way in which a child is

brought up, little by little will form his world-picture or background. So, how

can this background be formed? This is the subject of this sub-section.

Towards the end of his life, precisely in 1950, Wittgenstein wrote the

following remark which appeared in 'Culture and Value' in which he criticised,

at its beginning, the way some believers want to build their belief upon an

intellectual basis, because they become believers not according to intellectual teachings but, as he put it:

> Perhaps one could 'convince someone that God exists' by means of a certain kind of upbringing, by shaping his life in such and such a way. Life can educate one to believe in God. (pp. 85, 86)

To bring up a child in certain activities or a certain way of life does not mean to bring him up on a doctrine or a theory. For instance, children learn how to act not according to a theory, but by imitating their parents' behaviour or that of other adults, or being shown examples of the correct and the incorrect behaviour. I.e. children learn from the instructions of their parents and, in a wider sense, their environment. In addition, any person who grows up in any community will act according to the way of life of that community. For religion as a way of life includes definite instructions in order to be implemented through actions. It includes a view towards life, performing certain rituals and services, setting the basis of social life by, for example, arranging relationships between men and women, parents and children, helping people in need such as disabled, the elderly, orphans, etc.

The way in which a child starts to learn is, of course, accompanied by learning simple forms of language. In other words, a child starts to learn simple language-games, i.e. simple forms of life:

> A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training. (pI,5)

> I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language-games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language. Language-games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. The study of language-games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages ... We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive one by gradually adding new forms. (BB,p.17)

Language games are a product of forms of life which exist in any community, and a primitive language game represents a primitive form of life. From simple forms of life and language, complex language-games can be formed by the complication of forms of life. The meaning of a word and even a proposition is connected with these forms which are presented in certain language-games.

As a child learns simple forms of language or primitive language-games, he, in fact, learns words and their use in language-games. A child does not learn only how to pronounce a word, but also its use in daily life, in connection with activities in his community.

As a child is brought up, he starts to learn what is right and what is wrong. What is true or false in the later thought differs completely from the earlier thought. The earlier was the agreement or disagreement of the arrangements of elements in a proposition with what it depicts in the world. But in the later thought it is totally different. The truth or falsehood depends upon forms of life. Wittgenstein stated:

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinion but in form of life. (PI, 241)

This shift is due to his conception of philosophical problems from a social perspective. For what is true or false does not depend upon the arrangements of elements, but on social grounds. It depends upon the agreement of people and their view as to what is true and false in their daily activities, i.e. what people view as true or false is socially and culturally based. Truth and falsehood belong, then, to the language which represents forms of life. We find in 'On Certainty' the following:

> ... if I make certain false statements, it becomes uncertain whether I understand them. What counts as an adequate test of a statement belongs to logic. It belongs to the description of the language-game. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference. (OC, 81, 82, 83)

What is true and false, then, depends upon a 'frame of reference', i.e., it is the social frame where people hold their agreement to what are true and false, i.e. a special case of learning when a sentence is true is learning when a sentence saying that something is good is true i.e. learning when something is good.

This consideration of truth and falsehood marks a departure from Wittgenstein's earlier concept of the essence of language. It was through 'the general form of proposition', that the essence and the limits of language were achieved through regarding propositions as pictures of facts in the world, i.e.

"The general form of a proposition was: This is how things stand" (4.5, TLP), in the world. The important thing which ought to be mentioned is that sense was connected with representational language of facts and what lies outside the world; the language which does not represent facts, was considered as nonsense. The change of Wittgenstein's concept of meaning led him to abandoning this form as the essence of language, because it is not compatible with connecting meaning with language games and social activities. The link between the meaning of a word or proposition with practical activities requires a new perspective on the essence of language. The new perspective relates the essence of language to the language game. In the 'Investigations', Wittgenstein started a remark by confessing that he did not define what is a language game, then he posed the following question: "What is the essence of a language game and hence of language, i.e. what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language?" (PI, 65). These questions show that the essence of language means the essence of a language game, which is part of a whole language, i.e. a form of life is part of a whole social life. But there is nothing in common with what we call language, such as a unified form, the general form of proposition. Instead, language games are "related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all language" (*Ibid.*). Since the essence of language can show what is meaningful and not, and meaning, in later thought, is a result of the use of words according to rules governing the language game, i.e. the form of life, then there is no one common form according to which meaning can be acquired, but it is embodied in the different forms of life and the multiplicity of

language games. That is an essential consequence of Wittgenstein's refusal to build his later philosophical ideas upon a doctrine or a unified theory, such as the picture theory of proposition in the "Tractatus". Because every language game, or form of life, has its own rules which determine the meaning of its words; since there are different meanings for a single word when it is used in different contexts and occasions. But, since there is no unified form where the expressions of language can find these meanings, what did Wittgenstein mean by the inexpressible background and how can the meaning of our expressions be set against it? The best way to answer this question is to go through his ideas concerning bringing up a child in certain religious beliefs and show how this background, or world picture or system, can be formed. That will give an answer to the above question and it will be based upon the idea that understanding the meaning of one action requires understanding its relation to other actions which form this background. In other words, the expressible are the action forms of life, and their totality is the inexpressible background, according to which the meaning of a single action can be found.

Any religious belief is built upon a network of activities and relationships and when a child is brought up in a certain belief, he learns a host of activities, which correspond to that belief. The following remark in 'On Certainty' states that:

> The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or

convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it. (OC, 144)

When children start to learn how to behave, their behaviour is accompanied with a belief. This belief might be religious or based upon other grounds. For instance, atheist parents instruct their child to act in this or that way according to a belief that this action is right and to avoid other actions on a belief that they are bad or evil. In other words, an action is described as good or evil, based upon a belief. In this sense, when a child grows up performing certain activities according to a belief, these actions form a system. This system is a result of a totality of activities which present a definite religious belief and that forms the way of life, according to which a child's life can be shaped and a belief, for example, in God can be maintained. Wittgenstein said:

> When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)
>
> It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support. (OC, 141, 142)

The way in which religious actions are fulfilled through deeds will result in forming a system of conduct. Every action in this system connects with another in a definite way and according to the role it plays in that system. In addition, what makes this system of activities hold fast is what lies around it. In other words, when a believer became certain that this action is right and another is wrong, that is due to what is going on around him in his community, i.e. to what other people perform in their social life, to the agreement in forms

of life. The daily recurrence of an action, or activities, which is carried on by the majority of the people, makes the individual certain that this action is the right or suitable one in such and such circumstances. And since there are different rules governing social activities, these rules form the basis of the way of life of, for instance a tribe, where everybody carries on the same activities and that will result in a common belief in these activities, which form together a complete system. The individual's belief becomes certain when it is confirmed by what surrounds it in the social life, i.e. in people's customs, institutes and traditions and their culture as a whole.

Wittgenstein gave an example concerning this matter when he discussed, in 'On Certainty', the existence of the earth from a long time. He made a comparison between Moore and a king who had been brought up differently from us:

> However, we can ask: May someone have telling grounds for believing that the earth has only existed for a short time, say since his own birth? - Suppose he had always been told that, - would he have any good reason to doubt it? Men have believed that they could make rain; why should not a king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way. (OC, 92)

In this example we can see how a person can be instructed from childhood to believe in certain things and how that upbringing forms his view towards life. If the people around this king tell him that the earth existed with

his birth and they practice their life according to this belief, the king will be certain of this belief, because there is nothing in front of him or around him telling him that the earth had existed before his birth, for millions of years.

The overall world-picture, or background, or system, is a result then from the upbringing of a child, the environment in which he lives, the way of life of his community, with all its cultural features. This world-picture becomes a certain picture when there is nothing to question its foundations, or anything which says things are otherwise. When someone says that "there is no-one who has been on Mars", this statement fits our world-picture because scientifically, and according to our previous knowledge, no-one ever has been there. On the other hand, according to the belief of some tribes there are people who can fly in the sky and have been on some planets. Those people carry this conviction because there is nothing in their knowledge or way of life to contradict this picture. They do not have an advanced scientific knowledge which enables them to view things in a different way. Wittgenstein confirmed this claim:

> Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite. (OC, 93)

In this sense, we look at the belief of the tribe which claims that people can fly in the sky, as a false belief, because according to our world-picture this, up to now, is impossible. In contrast, they might take our belief as untrue,

because according to their picture of the world, it is possible and there are people who have done it. Wittgenstein said:

> But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (OC, 94)

What someone views as right or wrong, i.e. as a right action, immoral action, or false belief, can be judged according to the background or world-picture which he inherited from his environment, with all its social features. He added:

> The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.

First, we should be careful in dealing with this point because, as I mentioned earlier, the world-picture or system or background cannot be described. For Wittgenstein claimed that the background is inexpressible and reiterated this about the system (OC 102, pp. 15, 16).

What Wittgenstein meant here is that the formation of this world-picture depends upon practical activities which form a specific belief. In other words, a superstitious religion provides in its context instructions to its believers, as to what they ought to do in their life and it could contain some stories dealing with the creation of the world and human beings. All the instructions and the stories and miracles, etc., play a definite role in forming the

world-picture of, for instance, a tribe. In other words, the formation of the world-picture is based upon the religious activities, i.e. the religious forms of life, which can be described by language-games within the religious context. So, what religious propositions describe is the activities, the way of life which ought to be carried on, not the world-picture or the background.

In order to have a complete picture we need to go two further steps. The first deals with the interpretation of events and actions and the second, whether or not an action can be understood in isolation from its context. Since people who grow up in different environments and cultures carry different views towards life and the world, then the way they look at things will differ also. They understand and interpret things or events from different points of view. Moreover, they will value things differently also and that value will be part of that system. Wittgenstein expressed that "our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it" (OC, 410). The value which a person attached to something is based upon how a person views this thing, according to his system of knowledge.

Furthermore, in 'Lecture on Religious Belief' Wittgenstein discussed how two persons look at and interpret an action. The first believes that anything that happens to him is a part of retribution. The other does not believe in that:

> Take two people, one of whom talks of his behaviour and of what happens to him in terms of retribution, the other one does not. These people think entirely differently. Yet, so far, you can't say they believe different things. Suppose someone is ill

and he says: "This is a punishment," and I say: "If I'm ill, I don't think of punishment at all." If you say: "Do you believe the opposite?" - you can call it believing the opposite, but it is entirely different from what we would normally call believing the opposite. I think differently, in a different way. I say different things to myself. I have different pictures. (LRB, p. 55)

The one who views anything as a reward or punishment, understands and interprets things according to his world-picture while the other understands and interprets things in a totally different way. Both, as Wittgenstein put it, "would be on an entirely different plane" (LRB, p. 56).

There are many controversial issues which have different interpretations in our contemporary world. Take an example the term 'terrorism'. This term has different explanations. For instance, take the massacre which happened in Hebron, when an Israeli settler opened fire on Muslims praying and killed around forty people. This act will be viewed as an act of terror and criminal behaviour by Muslims. But for fundamentalist Jews this person is a hero and a martyr, because it is part of their religious belief that the 'West Bank' is the promised land and should be part of Israel; so, they view this act as part of their belief, i.e. according to their background, within which this act can be interpreted. And that brings us to the second point, which concerns the interpretation of an action.

Any action should not be interpreted in isolation from its context, i.e. from a context of a definite social phenomenon or a cultural and religious context.

In this sense we cannot judge one action of a person who belongs to another community in isolation from his culture or the way of life he or she lives in their community. In 'Zettel', Wittgenstein wrote the following remark about this matter:

> How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by sketching the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions, is not what one is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action. (Z, 567)

So, if we judge an action as immoral or a crime or inhuman without any consideration for the belief or their way of life or the total activities of, for example, the members of a tribe, our judgement will not be a complete one even when we do not agree completely about what they are doing. We might find not only this action is strange to us, but others also.

Wittgenstein maintained his dissatisfaction with the way in which the people in the modern world look at and judge the behaviour of primitive people. He insisted that any judgement should be formed, not according to the standard of advanced scientific knowledge, but according to the cultural background and the primitive knowledge and tools which exist in the savage

communities. One obvious example is Wittgenstein's opposition of James

Frazer's interpretation of the behaviour of the primitive tribes and the way that

these actions were judged which appeared in Frazer's book "The Golden

Bough". Wittgenstein's criticisms appeared in some of his notes published as

'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough'. The crux of his criticism is that it is

inappropriate to judge and interpret the activities and the way of life of

primitive people according to our standards. He denounced Frazer's

explanations as unsatisfactory and cited Frazer's account of the killing of the

priest-king. Wittgenstein wrote:

> Even the idea of trying to explain the practice - say the killing of the priest-king - seems to me wrong-headed. All that Frazer does is to make this practice plausible to people who think as he does. It is very queer that all these practices are finally presented, so to speak, as stupid actions.
>
> But it never does become plausible that people do all this out of sheer stupidity.
>
> When he explains to us, for example, that the king must be killed in his prime because, according to the notions of the savages, his soul would not be kept fresh otherwise, we can only say: where that practice and these views go together, the practice does not spring from the view, but both of them are there.
>
> It may happen, as it often does today, that someone will give up a practice when he has seen that something on which it depended is an error. But this happens only in cases where you can make a man change his way of doing things simply by calling his attention to his error. This is not how it is in connexion with the religious practices of a people; and what we have here is not an error. (RFGB, pp. 1, 2)

It is clear that Frazer has formed a judgement of one action, without

bearing in mind what this action meant in the whole way of life of this tribe, i.e.

he judged this action in isolation from other activities, i.e. judged it out of its social context. This explanation was erroneous, in Wittgenstein's opinion because it neglected the whole cultural background in which this action could be explained. He said once that "Culture is an observance. Or at least it presupposes an observance". (CV, 1944, p. 83). A culture is a group of observances, of forms of life, which connected with each other and every particular form of life or action has its place within the cultural framework which presents the common belief in any community. As an example which helps in clarifying this notion, I will pose how a moral value such as good can be interpreted and understood in different communities and how that depends upon learning this value from childhood.

In his later writings and lectures, Wittgenstein did not present anything written specifically about ethics. For in the 1930s, when he was a lecturer at Cambridge, he delivered some lectures about different issues such as aesthetics, religious belief and psychology. None of his students reported that he had given a lecture in ethics. Indeed, the 'Lecture on Ethics' which was delivered in 1929 was the last piece of organised writing about ethics. Nevertheless, moral values can be seen through a certain perspective. It is to show ethics within the religious way of life. In other words, Wittgenstein claimed that religion is a way of living. That means, in this way of life the believer is instructed to perform certain activities and services in which he engages in relationships with other people or contacts other people. This engagement and contact will lead him to behave according to certain moral values and these values can be

inculcated through religious teachings. From this argument I will talk about the meaning of good as a moral value and how it can be different from one community to another and what are the bases of these differences. That can be shown through Wittgenstein's claim that the meaning of a word can be seen through the stream of life, (Z, 173) i.e. through the total activities in any community. Later on, I will focus on the role which literary and religious language plays in conveying moral values. I.e. literary works can show people how to behave and this behaviour is connected to the way of life the believer should live.

Moral values can be fulfilled through actions and these actions take place between people. Moral values are determined by the way which people live and according to their customs and traditions. These traditions and customs are governed by rules which present in different language-games. Values, in this respect can be communicated, understood and interpreted through these language-games, which represent forms of life. In the 'Investigations', Wittgenstein said:

> In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ('good' for instance)? From what sorts of examples? In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings. (PI, 77)

Since the meaning of a word is related to the way in which it is used, which is, by itself, governed by rules related to social activities, then, the meaning of the word 'good', and any other moral value, is related to the social

practices of the people in any community. For "the use of the word in practice is its meaning" (BB, p. 69).

In this sense I will pose an example which will show the difference in the use of the term 'good' and how good actions can be understood. This example will concentrate upon the treatment of elderly people and what should be good behaviour towards them. I will make a comparison between two communities, the first is the Kuwaiti community and the other is a tribe in North America. I will compare the way of understanding 'good' in both communities.

In Kuwait, young people care about the elderly. They provide them with the best of care and treat them well. Kuwait is an Islamic community and the people adopt the Islamic way of life, following Islamic instructions. The concept of 'good' is connected to this way of life. One of the good actions is the treatment and help of old people. Young men and women must provide for their old parents, the care and help they need until their death. Young people are brought up with this concept and behaviour, according to the teachings of Islam. In the Qura'n, obeying and caring about parents is not a separate part God's worship:

> Thy lord hath decreed. That ye worship none but him, and that
> ye be kind to parents. Whether one or both of them attain old
> age in thy life, say not to them a word of contempt, nor repel
> them but address them in terms of honour. And out of
> kindness, lower to them the wing of humility and say: My lord

bestow on them Thy mercy even as they cherished me in childhood.[16]

As an Islamic moral duty, the youth must look after their old parents, to repay the care that the elderly formerly bestowed on them (the youth).

On the other hand, there is an ancient tribe in North America which treats elderly people in a totally different way. When a member of this tribe gets old and is not able to support himself and depends totally on other people, the good thing for him is that he should die, i.e. to be killed. The act of killing the elderly member of a tribe is describd as a good action, for according to that people's traditions and beliefs, it is to his advantage to be killed and rest in peace, rather than suffering. The action is carried out by the relatives of that person.[17] If a Kuwaiti read or was told about the way this tribe treats its old members, he would consider this act as a crime. In contrast, if a member of this tribe knew how Kuwaitis treat old people, he would consider this act as evil, because he would consider that the Kuwaitis let old people suffer for a long time.

The conclusion which can be reached here is that, people learn how to behave from their childhood and their behaviour is determined by the environment they live in. Children learn to act by the instructions of their parents or imitate their fellows. Their actions form a part of the total activities in their community which, for instance, may be based upon a religious belief, or

on some moral basics in a non-religious community. The fact that moral

judgements get their sense against such a comprehensive background shows

that we cannot abstract judgements from their background and compare them

in isolation. The different judgement of Kuwaitis and Indians thsu provide no

grounds for moral relativism, since their sense is not constant across different

forms of life.

In this section I have tried to show how the later concept of religion as

a way of life motivated some central philosophical idea of the later thought.

That has been shown in the acceptance of forms of life, the refusal to build

religious belief and philosophical ideas upon a doctrine or theory, the end of

explanation and finally the notion of a world-picture. These ideas are

analogous between the two, which reveals that there is a religious awareness

behind central philosophical notions in the later thought. But there is another

important factor which enhances this claim. It is the shift in Wittgenstein's

attitude and interpretation of the arts and the role they play in life. This will be

the subject of the next section.

* * * * * * * * *

This section concentrates upon the shift which occurred in the artistic

interest, especially the literary interest of the philosopher. It starts with some

personal remarks which point to the significance of literary works attached to

real life and people, then goes on to some remarks from his writings which

show the clear connection between the content of the work of art, such as

literary works and what goes on in life. At the end, a quick review will be

presented of some aspects of religious language such as figurative and expressive, which had been discussed in the earlier thought in the process of comparison between religious and scientific language, in the light of the later interpretation of the arts.

In the earlier thought, we saw how art was connected with mysticism according to the distinction between the sphere of fact and value. One way the mystical shows itself is art. The work of art provides an insight to view the world 'sub specie aeterni' and art is considered as a kind of expression. Its essence is to look at the world through a happy eye (NB, p. 86) and it can redeem the individual from the troubles of life. But this view changed with the development of Wittgenstein's thought.

From the nineteen thirties until the end of his life, Wittgenstein had a great interest in reading detective stories. His favourites were American stories. He became an addict of an American Magazine, "Street and Smith". When it was not available in the UK he asked his friend, Norman Malcolm, to send the magazine to him from the United States. Once, in a letter he wrote to Malcolm the following, which shows his interest in reading these stories:

> Your mags are wonderful. How people can read Mind
> if they could read Street and Smith beats me. If philosophy has
> anything to do with wisdom there's certainly not a grain of that
> in Mind, and quite often a grain in detective stories.[18]

These words show how much pleasure Wittgenstein felt when he read

these magazines. He found it far better to read a detective magazine than "a

mediocre philosophical reflection".[19] In addition, when he was teaching in

Cambridge, he sometimes gave examples from detective stories, although he

was discussing philosophical themes (especially when he taught "Sense Date

and Private Experience").[20]

The inclusion of detective stories in the later view of the arts may sound a bit

strange, since the argument in this chapter has focused upon the role of religion

in the development of the later philosophical ideas. But this interest can be

seen in line with the consideration of religion as a way of life and a departure

from the earlier concept of a mystical experience, where art was considered as

a form of expression. For since religion is part of social activities, i.e., to what,

as he put it, takes place in life (CV, p. 28), the interest in these magazines

springs from their depiction of actual events in life. For instance, a detective

story depicts an actual crime which took place in real life. So, without doubt,

Wittgenstein's understanding of religion as a set of activities which take place

in ordinary life and not based upon a theory or doctrine, influenced his interest

in and view of the arts, i.e. the works of art which correspond to what happen

in life. In a remark in 'Culture and Value' he said:

> Let us imagine a theatre; the curtain goes up and we see a man
> alone in a room, walking up and down, lighting a cigarette,
> sitting down, etc. so that suddenly we are observing a human
> being from outside in a way that ordinarily we can never
> observe ourselves; it would be like watching a chapter of
> biography with our own eyes, - surely this would be uncanny
> and wonderful at the same time. We should be observing
> something more wonderful than anything a playwright could

arrange to be acted or spoken on the stage: life itself. (p. 4, 1930)

Wittgenstein was attracted to literary works whose plots recreate real events in life and portray real people. That led to him reading the works of the novelists and writers who presented this characteristic. He read with enjoyment Agatha Christie's works and admired Charles Dickens' writings because he believed that English writers have the ability more than anyone else to portray real people an events.[21] F. Leavis reported that Wittgenstein knew by heart Dickens' story, 'A Christmas Carol'.[22] The 'Commercial Traveller', of Dickens, was another favourite novel. On the other hand, Wittgenstein expressed his dissatisfaction with literary works which did not convey real events or represent real characters. That appeared in a comment on Goethe's 'Faust':

> The characters in a drama excite our sympathy; they are like people we know, often like people we love or hate: the characters in the second part of 'Faust' don't arouse our sympathy at all! We never feel as thought we knew them. They file past us like ideas, not like human beings. (CV, p. 41)

It is obvious, then, that the works which attracted Wittgenstein's interest were those whose content corresponds to what takes place in life, whether they describe things which had happened or a creation of some themes attached to people's lives. Moreover, this view extended to the cinema also. His favourite movies were Westerns. He liked American films and showed his dissatisfaction with English films:

A typical American film, naive and silly, can, for all its silliness
and even by means of it, be instructive. A fatuous, self-
conscious English film can teach me nothing. I have often
learned a lesson from a silly American film. (CV, p. 57)

A film could be instructive; it could instruct people in different ways of

acting. That is when its content is attached to real life and events which

confront people daily. Since the arts are attached to real life, what is the role

they play in it? I will focus on the role of literature and how this role can be

accommodated with social context, i.e. in relation to our daily life's activities.

Let us start with the following remark, which appeared in 'Zettel':

A poet's word can pierce us. And that is of course causally
connected with the use that they have in our life. And it is also
connected with the way in which, conformably for this use, we
let our thoughts roam up and down in familiar surroundings of
the words. (Z. 155)

According to this remark we can get a clear meaning of, for instance, a

literary work by comparing the use of its words with the use of similar words,

in our daily life (roughly speaking). Daily activities can be represented in

literary works - to be precise, by realistic literary works which represent real

people and events. These works can be understood by people who are

acquainted with what they are talking about or represent. So, poems, novels,

plays and stories play an important role in describing events, activities and ways

of life. In 'Philosophical Investigations' Wittgenstein gave numerous examples

of language-games. Two examples were "making up a story and reading it,

play-acting" (PI. 23, p. 12). And as we found earlier, language-games can

correspond to forms of life, i.e. correspond to different activities of the people

in any community. For example, if a short story talks about certain aspects of good or evil behaviour, it presents a language-game of good and bad behaviour.

Let us take a further step and ask ourselves, how can a story help in communicating a certain action or idea? The answer can be found in Wittgenstein's conception of a picture in his later thought. In 'Zettel' he said the following:

> Certainly I read a story and don't give a hang about any system of language. I simply read, have impressions, see pictures in my mind's eye, etc. I make the story pass before me like pictures, like a cartoon story. (Zettel, 243)

> I read a story and have all sorts of images while I read, i.e. while I am looking attentively, and hence seeing clearly. (Zettel, 623)

Reading a story can provide us with images and pictures. These images and pictures, in the case of a realistic story, correspond to things we live or encounter in everyday life. If someone reads a story he will think and imagine its content. In this case if he wants to act or react according to the content of the story he will do that according to his understanding of it.

In 'Lecture on Aesthetics', the connection between works of art and actual life was apparent: "in order to get clear about aesthetics words you have to describe ways of living" (LA, p. 11). In addition, an insistence upon a perspicuous representation was clear. "The concept of perspicuous

representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things" (PI, 122). Here we recall the notion of a picture in his later thought again, for rules of life are dressed up in pictures (CV, p. 29), i.e. forms of life which are governed by rules can be represented by pictures. A literary work, for example, describes social activities in a series of pictures, i.e. a form of life can be told or communicated in a form of pictures in a story such as the magazines of detective stories or, in the case of children's stories, can be told or taught in a series of pictures. To enhance this claim and put it clearly here is a paragraph in 'The Brown Book' which shows clearly how a story represents daily activities:

> We have also some characteristic picture of the activities of the child, lying in bed, getting up, dressing, lunching, etc. This set I will call the life pictures. I imagine that the child can frequently see the position of the sun while about the day's activities. We draw the child's attention to the sun standing in a certain place while the child is occupied in a particular way. We then let it look both at a picture representing its occupation and at a picture showing the sun in its position at that time. We can thus roughly tell the story of the child's day by laying out a row of life pictures, and above it I called the sun series the two rows in the proper correlation. We shall proceed to let the child supplement such a picture story which we leave incomplete. And I wish to say at this point that this form of training is one of the big characteristic features in the use of language, or thinking. (BB, p. 105)

We can see clearly from this quotation, first, the role which a story can play in representing our daily activities and second, how, for instance, children can know how to behave or how they can be trained to behave according to a story, or in a wider sense through artistic representations. For we find that any religion contains plenty of narratives such as narrative of creation, of prophets,

miracles, etc. Some of these narratives talk about things which are supposed to have happened in the past. Others talk about ethical deeds which ought to be carried out irrespective of time, i.e. must be taught to every generation of believers.

These narratives can be taught and understood within their religious context, i.e. religious narratives in the Qura'n should be learned according to Islamic teachings, in other words, in the context of Islamic religion. Wittgenstein wrote concerning this matter the following:

> Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: believe, through thick and thin, which you can do only as the result of a life. Here you have a narrative, don't take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different place in your life for it. - There is nothing paradoxical about that! (CV, p. 32)

It is clear, then, that in order to understand a religious narrative, it must not be taken in isolation from its context, i.e. from its religious framework, because the intended meaning of religious narratives, whether by describing events in the past or ethical deeds, and their functions are employed in the whole religious belief. For instance, there is a narrative which shows that the prophet Mohammed was summoned to the sky by God and he went there passing seven skies in one night and met God, then he returned back, by the same route through Palestine, to Mecca. This narrative cannot be taken in isolation from the Islamic religious context, because it is one of the

fundamental basics of Islamic religion which construes with other narratives

and teachings the whole of Islamic belief. (Muslims celebrate this day as a

holiday throughout the Islamic world.)

We come now to the examination of some features of religious

language, such as its figurative and expressive qualities, in the light of

Wittgenstein's concept of religion as a way of life. Let us start with the

figurative features. In the distinction between the features of scientific and

religious language, in the last chapter, we saw the figurative versus the literal.

But this distinction disappeared in the later thought and the figurative uses of

language in any religion should be understood and interpreted through the

religious context. As an example, Wittgenstein in 'Lecture on Religious Belief'

showed the way in which children learn the word 'God'. Children learn the

word 'God' in a different way from the way they learn the names of material

objects. God represents to them a figure of a super man who is able to do what

we human beings are not able to do, and God is so powerful that no-one can

possess his power. In the lecture Wittgenstein mentioned that:

> The word 'God' is amongst the earliest learnt - pictures
> and catechisms, etc. But not the same consequences as with
> pictures of aunts. I wasn't shown [that which the picture
> pictured]. The word is used like a word representing a person.
> God sees, rewards, etc. ... If the question arises as to the
> existence of any person or object I ever heard of. (LRB, p. 59)

The language which talks about God is figurative because it portrays

God as a figure of a supernatural human being. This picture of God is not

separate from the whole religious belief. It is a part of a religious context which is determined by certain use of its words and that use is governed by definite rules. Then, the image of God should be understood within this context of language-games and it should not be taken as a concept separate from the whole context of a certain religion.

Furthermore, the uses of the expressions of emotions follow the same pattern, i.e. they should be understood within their context. For expressions of emotions differ from one occasion to another, and in a wider context from one culture to another. In other words, expressions of emotions can be shown within the language-games where they can be operated. In 'Lecture on Aesthetics', Wittgenstein described the way in which aesthetic expressions and words can be understood:

> When language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words. Language is a characteristic part of a large group of activities - talking, writing, travelling on a bus, meeting a man, etc. We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or 'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ('This is beautiful'), but on the occasions on which they are said - on the enormously complicated situation in which the aesthetic expression has a place in which the expression itself has almost a negligible place. (LA, p. 2)

For any expression, to be grasped, there should be a clear indication as to what it is used for and under which circumstances. For instance, expressions of fear such as "I'm afraid he might die" must be understood within their context, i.e. in the language-game in which they operate. If someone

pronounced the previous proposition as it is, it says something which is unclear. For example, the person who pronounced it might have expressed his fear because his friend is suffering from cancer or his friend is adventurous and wants to climb a rugged mountain in dreadful circumstances. To determine what that person is frightened of we must look at the circumstances or the context in which these expressions of fear have been used. In 'Zettel' we find that "among emotions the directed might be distinguished from the undirected. Fear at something, joy over something" (Z, 488). So, to have a clear knowledge of what an expression of emotion means, we must look at its function in the framework in which it appears. Hence, to understand an expression requires understanding of its framework, or its form of life or the circumstances which belong to it.

Moreover, expressions of emotion can be interpreted in a wider sense, instead of one event or some circumstances. They can be interpreted or understood against a whole way of life, i.e. against a whole culture. The way in which people express their emotions differs from one community to another. This difference depends upon the forms of life or activities which are presented in language games according to certain rules, i.e. according to the use of words in the whole life of a community. For understanding an expression or a word depends upon:

> ... the role this word plays in the whole life of the tribe; the occasions on which it is used, the expressions of emotion by which it is generally accompanied, the ideas which it generally awakens or which prompt its saying, etc. etc. As an exercise ask yourself: in which cases would you say that a certain word

uttered by the people of the tribe was a greeting? In which cases should we say it corresponded to our "Goodbye", in which to our "Hello"? In which cases would you say that a word of a foreign language corresponded to our "perhaps"? - to our expressions of doubt, trust, certainty. You will find that the justifications for calling something an expression of doubt, conviction, etc., largely, though of course not wholly, consist in descriptions of gestures, the play of facial expressions, and even the tone of voice. (BB, p. 103)

In this sense, expressions of emotions ought to be grasped according to the whole way of life of, for example, a tribe in Africa, an Islamic community or western society, and so forth. Because these expressions play a definite role in the way of life in any community, they form one aspect of a network of cultural of that community. Gestures, facial expressions and actions which represent some emotional states, must be taken against a whole way of life in order to know what they express. For example, a ceremonial dance of a tribe includes many expressions such as expressions of courage, horror, retreat, attack, etc., which cannot be understood out of the cultural context of this tribe, because if a certain expression was taken in isolation from its context, that might lead to misunderstanding or failure to understand its actual role in the life of this tribe completely. That applies to religious expressions, because in order to understand them, they should be taken within the religious way of life, otherwise they will lose their intended meaning, if they are taken out of their context.

In the beginning of this chapter I mentioned that Wittgenstein's understanding of religion played an important role in the development of his

philosophical ideas and attitude towards the arts. To view religion as a way of life meant to consider it as a large group of social activities dealing with what takes place in actual life. As a result, religion is not built upon a theory or a doctrine. This view exerted an essential influence in shaping Wittgenstein's later ideas and it asserts the seriousness of his religious conviction, for, in Paul Engelmann's words: "Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really matters in human life in precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about",[23] i.e., what cannot be said or the mystical. But this silence was broken with the dissatisfaction with the early ideas in the 'Tractatus'. In the previous chapter we saw how from his occupation as a teacher, he found that the meaning of a word differs according to its use and that use is connected with social life. All that paved the way to the systematic development of the later thought. The distinction disappeared in favour of language games, and what cannot be said was no longer considered as nonsense and the proposition was no longer a picture of fact.

Furthermore, the refusal to build religious belief upon a theory or dogma, instead of on a practical basis, had an impact on Wittgenstein's philosophical outlook. He described the philosopher as not a citizen of any community of thought, which implies his reluctance to give a theoretical explanation to philosophical problems and his view that the task of philosophy is to clarify the use of the words only. Since religion is not based upon a doctrine or a theory, it is then the process of shaping one's life from childhood.

This process begins with learning simple activities, simple forms of life, and bit by bit these activities form a system which holds fast because of what is going on around the individual, i.e. the continuous recurrence of the same activities within the whole community. The totality of activities form a background against which a single action, a form of life, has a meaning. If a single action is taken in isolation from its context, it will not be understood or interpreted fairly. It might be considered as a stupid action, as the criticism of Frazer showed. Moreover, the religious motivation extended to Wittgenstein's attitude towards the arts. His personal interest shifted to detective stories and works which depict real people and events in life. And the arts are accommodated within their cultural medium. Expressions of emotions, figurative uses of language and literature works which convey moral values are seen against a cultural background, i.e. they can be understood and interpreted within the cultural context of any community. In other words, the arts are linked to ways of living, to people's activities, to what takes place in actual life. This change in the role of the arts from the Schopenhauerian view as a redeemer from the troubles of life to portrayal of what goes on in social life was due to Wittgenstein's understanding of religion, which forced him to re-examine his earlier attitude towards the arts.

Notes

1. Tolstoy, Leo, *The Gospel in Brief*, p. 284.

2. Waisman, Fredrich, *Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle*, Edited by B. F. McGuinness, Translated by Jachim Schutz and B. McGuinness, Oxford, 1979, p. 117.

3. Tolstoy, Leo, *The Gospel in Brief*, p. 282.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

5. Drury, M., Conversation with Wittgenstein, *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections*, p. 94.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 181, 182.

9. Malcolm, N., *Wittgenstein, A Religious Point of View*, p. 18.

10. Quoted from Malcolm, N., *Wittgenstein, A Religious Point of View*, p. 18.

11. Von Wright, G. H., *The Origin and Composition of the Investigations with Wittgenstein*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, Britain, Ed 1982.

12. Drury, M., 'Conversations with Wittgenstein', *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections*, p. 117.

13. Bouwsma, O. K., *Wittgenstein, Conversations 1949-1951*, Edited by J. L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, U.S.A., 1986, p. 37.

14. Rhees, Rush, *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections*, p. 230.

15. Drury, M., 'Conversations with Wittgenstein', *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections*, p. 94.

16. The Holy Qura'n, Translated by A. Yusuf Ali, Amana Corp. U.S.A., Surat Bani Israil, p. 691.

17. This example was posed by Dr. M. Mitias when he was a lecturer in Kuwait University. I am greatly indebted to him for his help in sending me the source: "In a discussion of suicide ... First, there is the well-known ecological explanatory productive individuals cannot remain

with the roaming band. Killing of the aged by near relatives or their suicides are seen as accomplishing the same end." Balikci, Asen, *The Netsilik Eskimo*, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1989, p. 166.

18.   Malcolm, N., *Ludwig Wittgenstein A Memoir*, Oxford University Press, London, 1978, p. 36.

19.   Engelmann, P., *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with A Memoir*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, p. 91.

20.   Monk, R., *Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius*, p. 355.

21.   Drury, M., *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections*, pp. 147, 148.

22.   Leavis, F. R., *Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections*, p. 70.

23.   Engelmann, P., *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein and A Memoir*, p. 93.

CONCLUSION

Wittgenstein: The Religious Thinker

> "Wisdom is grey", life on the
> other hand and religion are full of
> colour. (CV, p. 62)

Since the first time I read 'Culture and Value' I was struck and puzzled

by the above remark. The cause of my puzzlement was the word 'colours', i.e.

what are the colours of life and religion? The study of religion and the arts

provided an answer to this puzzlement. This treatise started as an investigation

of religion and the arts in Wittgenstein's philosophy but, gradually, the

importance of religion emerged and made it necessary to include the

philosophical ideas. Apparently, religion was the most important theme in

Wittgenstein's thought and that can be seen in his biography, letters and

conversations with friends. It played a decisive role in shaping his personal life

and many of his essential philosophical ideas. Without the biographical and

intellectual material this role cannot be interpreted, because, as shown

throughout the thesis, from the philosophical writing alone, the religious

motivation behind these writings cannot be clearly seen. Against this

background Wittgenstein's attitude to the arts can be interpreted, also, in the

earlier and later thought. In order to establish a clear understanding of religion

and the arts in Wittgenstein's earlier thought, it is important to look for a

combination between his personal experience and the intellectual ideas with

regard to the distinction between science and religion, which were current in

the nineteenth century. Wittgenstein's personal experience is an essential

element in examining his earlier religious view and the role of the arts. It was

the condition of constant depression and torment, guilt, the fear of death and

suicidal tendencies, which led the young Austrian to seek a change and

volunteer for the Austrian army in World War I. The experience of war and

confrontation with death led to his conversion to the Christian faith, and the works of the Russian writers Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky exerted a decisive influence on his religious view and conversion. His service colleagues used to call Wittgenstein, "the man with the Gospel", (i.e. 'Tolstoy's The Gospel in Brief') and his deep interest in Dostoevsky's writings during the time of captivity was recorded by his friend, Franz Parak.

On the other hand, the radical distinction between the sphere of fact and value in the 'Tractatus' can be seen against the background of the distinction between science and religion in the nineteenth century. The separation between science and religion, which was one of the dominant themes of the intellectual argument, ended in showing that there are limits for each and they operate in different fields. Science deals with objective facts and natural phenomena, while religion deals with questions of the meaning of life and ethical deeds, which can be conveyed through artistic means, as understood from the ideas of Matthew Arnold and Soren Kierkegaard.

What Wittgenstein achieved is the rigorous separation between science on the one hand and religion, ethics and art on the other. He did this through linguistic analysis, by showing the limits of the expressions of thought. For the distinction between the two spheres was part of the discussions of the intellectual life of Vienna, the environment in which Wittgenstein had grown up. This and the argument of the importance of language attracted many thinkers who tackled these problems from different points of view. Wittgenstein was interested in the writings of Karl Kraus, who sustained the separation between fact and value, as Engelmann described Kraus as a creative separator, who insisted upon clarity and truth which can be achieved through language; Wittgenstein also admired Hertz's idea of a model as a representation

of things in the world, a process which can be carried out from within; these interests, together with Mauthner's claim that philosophical problems lie in language, which were the important themes in Vienna's cultural debate, helped in shaping the main ideas of the 'Tractatus'. In addition, the trip from Manchester to Cambridge and the meetings with Russell brought Wittgenstein to the intellectual atmosphere of philosophy. Without doubt the friendship with Russell and his supervision of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas, fitted the latter's roots in the philosophical world. In Russell's writings he found the analysis of the world and language into facts and atomic facts, and atomic propositions which developed consistency with logic. Finally, there was the apparent re-reading, during the war, of Schopenhauer, where there are clear similarities in the concept of the subject and its relation to the world, the will and the role of art as a redeemer from the troubles of life. All these served as a background to understand the essential themes in Wittgenstein's earlier thought.

In order to achieve the aim of the 'Tractatus' by setting the limits of the expressions of thought, Wittgenstein's main task, as he said in the 'Note Books', was the analysis of the proposition. This was the cornerstone of his analysis of language and the world. The division of the world into facts and atomic facts and language into complex and atomic propositions paved the way to examine the relation between language and the world. The analysis of a proposition into its components, i.e. objects or things, provided the opportunity to compare its constituents with what corresponds to them in the world. In other words, every name in an elementary proposition corresponds to a single object in the world and through the arrangement of names in a proposition, meaning can be achieved. The process of the analysis of the world and language produced an important consequence: the consideration of a

proposition as a picture of fact, by showing the role of logic and its relation to the world, through which the limits of the expressions of thought can be accomplished. The notion of the proposition as a picture, the picture theory of meaning, is the culmination of the process of analysis, where language serves as a representation of actual facts in the world. Language can only represent what is the case, i.e. objective facts, and what is outside this sphere cannot be represented. In addition, the limits of the expressions of thoughts were achieved by setting the limits of language from within; that is the role which logic plays in the process of representation. Setting the limits of representation is a clear Hertzian concept which Wittgenstein succeeded in applying to language. As a proposition is a picture of fact, i.e. represents objects in a certain order, what relates these objects together is the logical form. The logical form is the internal bond which connects objects in a proposition and it cannot be represented in language; rather, it shows itself in it. Since logic shows itself in a proposition and connects its components, then it sets the limits of representation from within and that sheds light on the relation between logic and the world. As logic pervades the world and the limits of the world are its limits, then these limits are the limits of representational language, i.e. the linguistic representation from within. This is the method of distinguishing between the spheres of fact and value, which was carried out in Wittgenstein's earlier thought through the analysis of language and the world and the role of logic in that relation. And the rigorous distinction between fact and value is, in fact, between what can be represented, such as the propositions of science and what cannot be represented, the propositions of ethics, aesthetics and religion. Moreover, the distinction between science and religion can be seen in the nature of the language which represents the content of each of them. Scientific language is descriptive, literal, determinate and non-expressive, showing that it deals with objective facts or natural phenomena in the world. It does not deal

with what lies outside this sphere. In contrast, the features of religious language show clearly how it deals with what lies outside the world, according to the picture theory of meaning. In other words, the figurative uses of literary examples, the use of metaphors to express feelings and emotions, point out action and convey moral teachings, all deal with what lies outside the sphere of fact, i.e. the sphere of scientific discourse.

The distinction between the spheres of fact and value led to a distinction between saying and showing. While representational language is all that can be said, on the other hand, what cannot be said shows itself in the mystical. Wittgenstein's mysticism is an essential consequence of the analysis of language and for that reason, my argument was that the 'Tractatus' is to be interpreted not only as a book dealing with language and logic, but as a whole, i.e. the final few pages are a result of all that went before. From this point of view I have presented the argument of the mystical, which shows itself in art and action. Part of that argument was based upon Wittgenstein's claim that the point of the 'Tractatus' is an ethical one and on the assessment of Paul Engelmann of the unutterable which shows itself in art and value.[1] These were the basis of the view of the mystical, which was interpreted through a combination of Russell's and Schopenhauer's ideas. From Russell came the emphasis upon the elements of mysticism while from Schopenhauer came the concept of the subject, values and the will.

The connection between ethics, the mystical and art can be seen in viewing the world *sub specie aeterni*, from the point of eternity. Works of art help us to view the world or an object from a certain perspective, equivalent to the experience of wondering at the existence of the world, where allegory is the essence of wonder. It is the experience of wondering at the existence of the world as a creation of God or attributing what goes on in the world to the will

of God. Moreover, Wittgenstein considered that the essence of the work of art is to see the world in a happy eye. In the view that happiness is an essential element of mysticism, the Schopenhauerian concept of art as a redeemer from the trouble of life can be seen clearly and as the work of art can help in viewing the world from the point of eternity then it can free the self from the captivity of time. On the other hand, it is the idea about how the mystical shows itself in action, which provide the interpretation of the ethical point of the 'Tractatus'. That interpretation is based upon the relation of the subject with the world and as a bearer of ethical value, where ethics and the subject, are respectively, a condition of the world, like logic, and a presupposition of its existence. The ethical relationship between the world and the subject can be seen in the exercise of the will; in specific, the religious exercise of the will. Through this exercise the world waxes and wanes, the world of the happy and the unhappy man. The happy world is the world of the believer who implements the will of God on the earth, i.e. who fulfils his religious duties and instructions, the man who feels absolutely safe in the hands of God. Once Wittgenstein told Schlick that "what God commands, that is good".[2] In contrast, the unhappy man is the man who feels guilty for not doing his religious duties, who experiences the feeling of guilt. In this respect, we see here the direct influence of the Russian writers who led Wittgenstein to the Christian faith. Their writings guided a man who was confronting death to Christianity, where he found a refuge from personal torment; for what a sharp contrast, between constant depression and fear of death, and the feeling of absolute safety. The important conclusion, with regard to the relation between the arts and religion, is that the arts, in the form of religious literary works, led Wittgenstein to consider religion as a mystical experience, i.e. the experience of wonder and the experience of safety. That explains the religious dimension of the earlier thought.

The end of the war marked a new era in Wittgenstein's life. It was, as the last paragraph of 'Crime and Punishment' puts it, an end to a story and a beginning of another one. It was a new story personally and intellectually. The change which took place in Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas was motivated by his religious awareness. The earlier religious view was a consequence of Wittgenstein's work on logic and proposition as a picture of fact which started before his conversion to Christianity during the war. That can be seen through the development of the writings in the 'Note Books'. In other words, the work on the analysis of language, as a means to achieve the limits of the expressions of thought, led Wittgenstein to consider religion as a mystical experience. But after the war, gradual dissatisfaction with the early philosophical ideas resulted from dissatisfaction with the early religious view and the later concept of religion as a way of life motivated that change, at the heart of which lies the notion of form of life. That change was a result of a personal experience and intellectual influence. Wittgenstein's decision after the war to abandon the glorious life of Vienna and to live and teach in rural Austria marked the seriousness of his commitment to his faith. This period shows the obvious influence of Leo Tolstoy on his personal life and on his understanding of religion. Several parallels can be found with what Tolstoy had done during his life; he taught the peasant children, lived with the peasants on his Estate, worked with them in the fields, even considered giving up his fortune, etc. These activities correspond to what Wittgenstein did, and show, without doubt, the deep influence which Tolstoy exerted upon Wittgenstein's view of life. The other personal factor which contributed to the change to the later thought was Wittgenstein's experience as a school teacher. The main idea which proved to be very decisive is that of how children learn language in connection with social activities, i.e. when a child learns language he learns a language game, a form of life. The way children are taught the meaning of a word in a social

environment led Wittgenstein to reconsider the early concept of meaning as an arrangement of elements in a proposition. A word does not carry one single meaning only, but it has different meanings when it is used in different circumstances. In other words, what determines the meaning of a word is the social context in which it operates. That led to the claim that Wittgenstein connects meaning with teaching (Z, 412). The impact of teaching upon the later thought is also shown in scattered remarks throughout the later writings concerning a child, a pupil, teacher, etc. These remarks contained the process of teaching a child a language game, form of life, the use of words and more importantly, how to bring up a child in a certain belief, shaping his life.

This paved the way to the gradual development of the later philosophical ideas, and the meaning of a word or a proposition lies in the heart of this change. Wittgenstein had recognised his failure to achieve a clear and sharp meaning when he did not provide an example of an elementary proposition or determine an exact meaning of a word. The exact and sharp meaning of a word depends upon its use and that use is part of social life, i.e. social activities. As he put it "the meaning of a word is its use in practice" (BB, p. 69). The consideration of religion as a way of life which is part of actual activities in daily life had an important impact upon his philosophical ideas and attitude towards the arts. In addition, the fundamental notion in Wittgenstein's later concept of religion is the refusal to build religious belief upon a doctrinal or theoretical basis. He stood against any sort of dogmatic interpretation or justification to religious themes and built his religious view upon a practical basis, i.e. upon social activities in daily life. What is important in religious belief is not attending a service, but how a believer behaves towards his fellow men.

Wittgenstein's later concept of religion played an important part in morivating essential philosophical ideas. The first is the acceptance of forms of life without any justification, because any religious belief demands that its followers perform their duties without justification or explanation. Forms of life are the 'given' (PI, p. 226) and they can be learned, like learning any game. The second is his refusal to build philosophical ideas upon a theory or a doctrine, when he declared that a philosopher does not belong to any community of thought. As social activities are at the centre of the later philosophical ideas, they are governed by rules and these rules are rooted in social life, which are learned through practice not theory. The later religious view ended in a world picture or a background against which meaning can be understood. It is a result of the process of bringing up a child in certain beliefs, by performing the activities or following the way of life of that belief. In this respect, any action should not be interpreted on its own, but as part of all activities or the whole way of life. Moreover, the impact of Wittgenstein's understanding of religion extended to his view of the arts. His personal interest shifted from the moral and religious literary works of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky to detective stories and literary works which represent real people and events in life; the arts as a whole were seen to play different roles. The Schopenhauerian concept of art as a redeemer from the troubles of life is not compatible with Wittgenstein's later ideas. His later concept and interpretation of the arts is connected to culture and ways of living. Expressions of emotions and values should be understood and interpreted against a cultural background, i.e., the whole way of life of a certain community. Wittgenstein said clearly that the arts describe a way of living and that is a result of attaching the arts to real events and portraying real people in life. This view of the arts is very important in terms of the relation between them and religion, for it is obvious that Wittgenstein's concept of religion as a way of life forced a change in his

concept of the arts, which is in marked contrast with the earlier thought, where the arts played the decisive role in Wittgenstein's view of religion as a mystical experience.

If there is a final point I want to emphasise, it is the importance of religion and the arts in Wittgenstein's life and their decisive role in the development of his philosophical ideas. Once he mentioned in 'Culture and Value' that:

> I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetic questions do that. At the bottom I am indifferent to the solution of scientific problems, but not the other sort. (p. 79)

What held the grip on his thinking is what he described as "what cannot be said", or what he preferred to be silent about. This silence is the religious awareness which dominated the rest of his life and many aspects of his writings. It is astonishing to find that the man who is considered to be a landmark in the history of philoscophy expressed so little interest in it. In contrast, he was deeply interested in reading novels, stories, poems, and attending the cinema and musical events. Finally, as religious language is considered as literary language, the content of religion is akin to art; religious techings can be conveyed by artistic means and religion can provide the meaning of life. And since, in the earlier thought, the meaning of life and the world lies outside the world and the experience of wonder can be described by allegory, and, in the later thought, a story or play-act can be presented in language games, religioin is a way of life and the arts describe ways of living, then, it may be said that *the arts are the colours of life and religion.*

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Notes

1.   Engelmann, P., *'Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein'*, p. 111.

2.   Waismann, F., *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, p. 115.

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