

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

Why does the OECD exist? A qualitative study into
the added value of the organisation

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
(PhD)

in the University of Hull

by

Stephanie MacLeod, BA (Hons), MA.

April 2016

Abstract

This thesis has two interrelated aims, both of which reflect my interest in the development of a variety of supra-national organisations since 1945 and the possibility that a new system of global *soft governance* may be emerging.

The first is to fill a gap in the literature created by scholarly neglect of one of the most important of these supra-national bodies, viz. the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The method adopted partly involves archival research and partly elite interviews with fifteen of the twenty original OECD member states.

The second aim is more theoretical. It consists of relating my research on the OECD to the development at global level of what some scholars have termed a novel system of *soft governance*. What characterizes soft governance is the gradual establishment by international organisations like the OECD of a relative degree of autonomy in their relations with the larger states with which they interact. My findings suggest that this autonomy has transformed the OECD from a purely economic tool of large states into an institution enjoying a degree of independence as an expert adviser on issues of technology and development; as a moral educator on issues of social reform; and as a locus for diplomatic activity.

Although soft governance is fragile, my research points to the emergence of a wholly unplanned normative framework for interaction which alleviates the uncertainties of a post-Westphalian international order.

Particular attention has been devoted to Turkey, one of the original OECD members, since the Turkish case illustrates the great change in the global role of the OECD from being merely an American creation for implementing the Marshall Plan to a relatively autonomous international institution possessing a moral authority capable of transcending in some degree national economic, political, and cultural diversity.

This thesis is dedicated to (retired) Ambassador Einar Benediktsson.

May I someday learn to be like you.

At age 84, Ambassador Benediktsson made the effort to speak with me across several time zones and in the midst of the holiday season despite a busy schedule. His experiences working for the OEEC Secretariat (1956-1960) and as Iceland's Permanent Representative to the OECD (1976-1982) have greatly informed my study. Just as importantly, Ambassador Benediktsson's ceaseless engagement in scholarly endeavours has fortified my penchant for lifelong learning.

Acknowledgements

Over the past three years, I have been confronted with several struggles – a bacterial infection in my brain, the scares of cervical cancer, and the passing of close family members – making it seem, at various times, almost impossible that I would be able to see this thesis through to completion. Nevertheless, thanks to the unwavering support of family and friends, I have been able to persevere.

Due to space constraints, I will limit my gratitude to a key few: Dr. **Elizabeth Monaghan**, my supervisor, for her strength; Dr. **Angela Specht**, for her faith; Dr. **Gloria Filax**, for her acumen; Dr. **Richard Woodward**, for his kindness; **Tomohiro Kondo-san**, for his humour, and Professor **James Connelly** and his wife **Rana**, for their patience (in teaching me Turkish).

This thesis has benefited enormously from comments by Professor **Esther De Bruijn**, Dr. **Sophia Dingli**, **Micheline Guertler**, Professor **Rana Izci**, Professor **Caroline Kennedy**, Dr. **Sameera Khalfey**, **Ian MacLeod**, and Professor **Noël O’Sullivan**.

Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to the archivists and technicians at the OECD Library & Archives in Paris (especially **Sylvia Lopez** and **Marie-Ange Sicaire**). Their hospitality and professionalism have been exemplary.

In like manner, I would like to convey my appreciation to all of my interviewees, who freely gave of their time and opinions. Various embassies and home offices went to great lengths to assist with my information requests, and it was quite heartening to see the tremendous efforts that some delegations made in order to provide me with pertinent details. Through these exchanges, I have gained a few friends and broadened my knowledge of the world. I hope that this thesis brings their voices to life, offering inside glimpses into the diplomatic realm of the OECD.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|------|
| Acknowledgements..... | iii |
| Abbreviations and Acronyms..... | viii |
| List of Acts and Conventions..... | x |
| Timeline..... | xi |
| Chapter 1: Introduction..... | 1 |
| 1.1-Impetus..... | 1 |
| 1.2-Subject: The OECD..... | 4 |
| 1.3-Environment..... | 5 |
| 1.4-Historical Framework..... | 6 |
| Truman Doctrine..... | 7 |
| Marshall Plan..... | 8 |
| OEEC..... | 10 |
| Reconstitution..... | 13 |
| 1.5-Exploratory Observations..... | 16 |
| 1.6-Research Question..... | 18 |
| 1.7-Justification..... | 18 |
| 1.8-Overview of the Chapters..... | 21 |
| Chapter 2: Methodology..... | 25 |
| 2.1-Causality..... | 26 |
| 2.2-Hypotheses of Primary Interest..... | 27 |
| 2.3-Testing of Hypotheses..... | 27 |
| 2.4-Theoretical Framework..... | 28 |
| Rationalism..... | 29 |
| Rational Choice Theory..... | 29 |
| Strategic Choice Theory..... | 33 |
| Game theory..... | 34 |
| Constructivism..... | 35 |
| 2.5-Terms and Scope..... | 37 |
| 2.6-The Logic of Qualitative Research..... | 40 |
| 2.7-Process-Tracing..... | 41 |
| 2.8-Case Study Approach..... | 43 |
| 2.9-Methods of Data Collection..... | 47 |
| Review of the Literature..... | 47 |
| Archival Study..... | 48 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Elite Interviews..... | 52 |
| 2.10-Method of Data Analysis | 59 |
| Discourse Analysis..... | 59 |
| 2.11-Conclusion..... | 61 |
| Chapter 3: What is known about the OECD?..... | 64 |
| 3.1-Is the OECD real? | 64 |
| 3.2-What is the OECD?..... | 69 |
| A Think Tank..... | 70 |
| A Club of Best Practices..... | 71 |
| A Rich Countries' Club | 72 |
| A Forum for Market Democracies..... | 74 |
| Observation - It is an International Organisation | 75 |
| 3.3-How Does the OECD Work? | 79 |
| Mission..... | 79 |
| Budget..... | 80 |
| Structure | 81 |
| Permanent Delegations..... | 83 |
| The Council | 85 |
| Committees | 86 |
| Secretary-General..... | 88 |
| Secretariat | 89 |
| Independent Bodies..... | 92 |
| Other Organisations..... | 93 |
| 3.4-How Does the OECD Take on New Members?..... | 96 |
| The OECD Acquis..... | 97 |
| The Process | 99 |
| 3.5-What is the OECD's Role in the World? | 100 |
| Cognitive Governance | 103 |
| Normative Governance..... | 105 |
| Legal Governance..... | 110 |
| Palliative Governance..... | 115 |
| Scientific Governance..... | 118 |
| 3.6-Conclusion..... | 122 |
| Chapter 4: The Case of Turkey | 125 |
| 4.1-The Question of Turkey | 126 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 4.2- Challenging Common Notions of the OECD | 128 |
| The Country's History with Democracy | 129 |
| The Country's Status as an Advanced Economy | 136 |
| Human Rights and Social Well-Being in Turkey | 147 |
| 4.3-Turkey's Relations with the OECD | 156 |
| 4.4-Why Turkey? | 161 |
| 4.5-Turkey's Views | 167 |
| How Turkey Perceives of Itself and the OECD | 167 |
| What Turkey Values in the OECD | 170 |
| 4.6-Conclusion | 173 |
| Chapter 5: The Views of the OECD Founder Countries..... | 176 |
| 5.1-The Attitudes and Impressions of Members..... | 177 |
| How Members Perceive of the OECD & its Role in the World | 178 |
| How Members Perceive of Themselves (as OECD members) | 182 |
| 5.2-What Members Value in the OECD | 189 |
| Identity Reinforcement..... | 190 |
| Educator Role | 192 |
| Scientific Innovation..... | 196 |
| Social Relations..... | 198 |
| 5.3-Qualifying the Responses | 205 |
| Response Rates and Times | 206 |
| Historical Valuations | 206 |
| Current-Day Valuations | 208 |
| Observation Based Upon Responses | 209 |
| 5.4-Conclusion..... | 211 |
| Chapter 6: Some Reflections..... | 215 |
| 6.1-Hypotheses of Primary Interest..... | 216 |
| Avant-garde Spirit..... | 218 |
| Mutual Trust | 222 |
| Education..... | 223 |
| 6.2-Hypotheses of Secondary Interest..... | 227 |
| 6.3-Conclusion: The OECD's Role in the World..... | 238 |
| Chapter 7: Conclusion | 241 |
| 7.1-Summary of Chapters | 241 |
| 7.2-Why does the OECD exist? | 243 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 7.3-Contribution of the Thesis | 247 |
| 7.4-Significance for International Politics | 248 |
| 7.5-Areas of Future Research | 249 |
| Concluding Hypothesis..... | 252 |
| 7.6-Closing Allegory..... | 252 |
| References Cited..... | 254 |
| Appendices..... | 304 |

Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| AKP | Justice & Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) |
| APEC | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| BIAC | Business and Industry Advisory Committee (to the OECD) |
| BIS | Bank for International Settlements |
| BRICS | Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa |
| CEEC | Committee of European Economic Co-operation |
| CoE | Council of Europe |
| CSCE | Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| DAC | (OECD) Development Assistance Committee |
| ECA | Economic Co-operation Administration |
| ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council (of the United Nations) |
| ECtHR | European Court of Human Rights |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EFTA | European Free Trade Association |
| EIB | European Investment Bank |
| EPU | European Payments Union |
| ERP | European Recovery Programme |
| EU | European Union |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| G7 | Group of Seven |
| G20 | Group of Twenty |
| GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GNI | Gross National Income |

| | |
|--------|--|
| IGO | Intergovernmental Organisation |
| IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| IEA | International Energy Agency |
| IEO | International Economic Organisations |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IO | International Organisations |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| INGO | International Non-Governmental Organisation |
| ISO | International Organisation for Standardization |
| MAI | Multilateral Agreement on Investment |
| MIKTA | Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, & Australia |
| MOFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of Japan) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NEA | Nuclear Energy Agency |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop |
| OEEC | Organisation for European Economic Co-operation |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PISA | Programme for International Student Assessment |
| PKK | Kurdistan Workers' Party |
| PSR | (OECD) <i>Pressure-State-Response</i> Model |
| TUAC | Trade Union Advisory Committee (to the OECD) |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization |
| UNRRA | United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration |

| | |
|------|-------------------------------------|
| USA | United States of America |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WWI | World War One |
| WWII | World War Two |
| WB | World Bank |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

List of Acts and Conventions

| | |
|-------------|--|
| 22 May 1947 | <i>An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey</i> [Public Law 75] |
| 3 Apr 1948 | <i>Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, embodying four parts, including: Title I – The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (European Recovery)</i> |
| 16 Apr 1948 | <i>Convention for European Economic Co-operation (establishing the OEEC)</i> |
| 10 Dec 1948 | <i>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</i> |
| 14 Dec 1960 | <i>Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</i> |
| 18 Apr 1961 | <i>Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations</i> |

Timeline

Turkey:

| | |
|-----------|---|
| Aug 1920 | <i>Treaty of Sèvres</i> is signed (between the Allied Powers and Turkey) ¹ |
| Nov 1922 | The Ottoman sultanate is abolished |
| July 1923 | A Treaty of Peace with Turkey is signed at Lausanne |
| Oct 1923 | The Republic of Turkey is proclaimed (with Atatürk as president) |
| Mar 1924 | The Caliphate is abolished |
| Apr 1928 | The Republic of Turkey declares itself secular |
| Aug 1932 | Turkey joins the League of Nations |

World War II:

| | |
|-----------|---|
| June 1940 | Germany and Turkey sign a non-aggression pact |
| Aug 1941 | Roosevelt and Churchill issue <i>The Atlantic Charter</i> |
| July 1944 | UN Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods between the 44 Allied Nations, leading to the establishment of the IBRD and the IMF (and later GATT) |
| Feb 1945 | Turkey declares war on Germany and Japan (to become a charter member of the United Nations) |
| May 1945 | Germany surrenders (on May 8 th) |
| June 1945 | The Allies assume government of Germany (on June 5 th) 51 countries proclaim the charter of the United Nations (on June 26 th), creating the UN Organization |
| Sept 1945 | After two atomic bombs, Japan surrenders (on Sept 2 nd) |

Post-war:

¹ This Treaty of Peace was never ratified.

| | |
|-----------|--|
| Nov 1945 | UNESCO is established in Paris, France |
| Jan 1946 | The United Nations Security Council meets for the first time |
| June 1946 | The World Bank formally begins operating |
| July 1946 | Turkey holds its first general elections |
| Mar 1947 | The IMF formally begins operating |
| May 1947 | <i>The Greek-Turkish Aid Act</i> (P.L.75) becomes law |
| June 1947 | Launch of the <i>Marshall Plan</i> with an address by US Secretary of State George C. Marshall at Harvard University |
| July 1947 | The OEEC is formed (in Paris, France) |
| Oct 1947 | The GATT is established by statute with 23 contracting parties |
| Jan 1948 | GATT provisionally enters into force on January 1 st |
| Apr 1948 | The OEEC is established by convention (on April 16 th) |
| | The USA creates the Economic Co-operation Agency to manage the European Recovery Programme (ERP), 1948-1951 |
| | The ILO Constitution enters into force on April 20 th |
| July 1948 | The OEEC Convention comes into force (July 1 st) |

OEEC Years:

| | |
|-----------|--|
| Dec 1948 | The UN General Assembly adopts and proclaims the Universal Declaration of Human Rights |
| Apr 1949 | NATO is established (in Paris, France) |
| May 1949 | The Council of Europe is created by statute |
| Aug 1949 | Turkey is admitted to the Council of Europe |
| Nov 1949 | Convention on Social Security Schemes in the Member States of Western Union |
| July 1950 | Turkey offers military troops to the UN (to assist in Korea) |
| Sept 1950 | The European Payments Union (EPU) is created (by OEEC members) |
| Apr 1951 | The European Coal and Steel Community is established by treaty |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| Feb 1952 | Turkey becomes a <i>full-fledged</i> member of NATO |
| Jan 1955 | Western Europe is experiencing an <i>economic miracle</i> |
| May 1955 | The USSR and 7 communist nations sign <i>the Warsaw Pact</i> (for economic, cultural, and military co-operation) |
| Mar 1957 | The European Economic Community (EEC) is formed by treaty (on March 25 th), with the signatures of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany |
| Feb 1958 | The European Nuclear Energy Agency is founded |
| Feb 1959 | Britain, Greece, and Turkey agree to establish an independent republic of Cyprus (as part of the London-Zurich Agreements) |
| Mar 1959 | Turkey and the USA sign a bilateral defence pact |
| July 1959 | Turkey applies to be an associate member of the EEC (on July 31 st), 16 days after Greece |
| Jan 1960 | The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is established between Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK |
| | The Development Assistance Group (DAG) is formed at the OEEC |
| Apr 1960 | A new Cypriot constitution is finalized (marking independence) |
| | Cyprus, Greece and Turkey sign a treaty of Alliance |
| May 1960 | A military group seizes power in Turkey (and Prime Minister Menderes is arrested) |
| Aug 1960 | Cyprus proclaims its independence |
| Sept 1960 | The Democratic Party (of Turkey) is abolished by court order |
| Dec 1960 | The OECD is established by convention (on December 14 th) |
| Apr 1961 | The UN adopts the <i>Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations</i> |
| July 1961 | Greece signs an association agreement with the EEC |
| Aug 1961 | The Berlin Wall is erected |
| Sept 1961 | Former Turkish Prime Minister Menderes is sentenced to death and hanged |

The OECD becomes operational (on September 30th)

OECD Years:

| | |
|-----------|---|
| Oct 1961 | Turkey holds national elections (leading to a coalition government) |
| Dec 1961 | OECD adopts two Codes: a <i>Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements</i> and a <i>Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations</i> |
| Jan 1963 | Turkey announces its Five-Year Development Plan |
| Sept 1963 | Turkey signs its association agreement with the EEC |
| Dec 1963 | There is conflict in Cyprus, with Greek Cypriots rejecting provisions of the 1960 London-Zurich Agreements |
| Apr 1964 | Japan joins the OECD (on 28 April) |
| Aug 1964 | Turkish Air Forces bomb regions of Cyprus inhabited by Greeks |
| Dec 1964 | <i>The Ankara Association Agreement</i> comes into force (between Turkey and the EEC) |
| Oct 1965 | The Justice Party comes to power in Turkey by national election |
| Apr 1972 | The European Nuclear Energy Agency becomes the Nuclear Energy Agency (to reflect its growing membership) |
| May 1972 | OECD adopts the Polluter Pays Principle |
| Nov 1974 | The International Energy Agency is formed in response to the oil crisis |
| Jun 1976 | First meeting of the G7 leaders (in Puerto Rico) |
| Nov 1989 | Berlin Wall comes down |

Post-Cold War:

| | |
|----------|---|
| Oct 1990 | Germany is re-unified |
| Apr 1993 | OECD Partners in Transition programme is established to assist former Eastern European countries in liberal reforms |
| May 1994 | Mexico joins the OECD |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| May 1996 | OECD proposes basis for Millennium Development Goals Hungary joins the OECD |
| May 1998 | G7 officially becomes the G8 (with the inclusion of Russia) |
| Jun 2000 | PISA surveys launched in 43 countries OECD sets up global forums |
| May 2004 | OECD strategy for enlargement and outreach |
| May 2007 | The Russian Federation begins discussions for OECD membership OECD institutes <i>enhanced engagement</i> with 5 Key Partners: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa |
| Sept 2009 | The Organisation starts working with the G20 |
| Sept 2010 | Israel joins the OECD |
| May 2011 | OECD commemorates its 50 th anniversary (25-26 May) |
| May 2013 | Colombia and Latvia begin discussions for OECD accession |
| Mar 2014 | The OECD Council postpones Russia's accession process (due to events in Crimea) |
| Apr 2014 | 50 th Anniversary of Japan's accession to the OECD |
| Apr 2015 | Costa Rica and Lithuania begin discussions for OECD membership |

Chapter 1: Introduction

Scientific *progress* is mainly achieved through solving puzzles -- gaining wisdom by engaging in theories and investigations to understand phenomena of interest (Ma, 2007: 59). The study of international politics (as a form of social science), quite understandably, seems to present an everlasting number of perplexities and paradoxes (Finnemore & Goldstein, 2010). This thesis is concerned with the puzzle that is the OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. What is the OECD? What does it do? Why does it exist?¹ By exploring these themes in depth, this thesis aims to understand the significance of a rather ambiguous international economic organisation.

This chapter serves, by way of introduction, to provide a foundation for these questions, laying the groundwork for the findings of this thesis. The chapter begins with a metaphor, identifying the catalyst for this study and ultimately what has led to the research question: *why does the OECD exist? What is its added value to the international economic architecture?* It sets the scene by presenting the background details needed to contextualise the study, historically and topically speaking. The chapter, then, presents key observations and assumptions before justifying the research question. Finally, it concludes with an overview of the chapters to come.

1.1-Impetus

First, it is important to acknowledge the catalyst that has inspired this study. Ironically and contrary to what one might assume, the research question -- *Why does the OECD exist? What is its added value?* -- does not stem from contemplating the affairs of the OECD directly. Instead, it originates in observations about

¹ This is the primary question of the thesis (as well as the title).

original acts of choice and selection (as explained herein with the allegoric example of an art exhibit) and how these seemingly random (yet much more purposeful) acts are reflected in the OECD's somewhat peculiar membership, speaking from the vantage of 2016.

International (economic) relations are complex, in part because they are not tangible. Participatory art is a commendable medium for bringing the meaning of such interactions to life. The experimental work of Martin Creed,² the famous British conceptual artist, suggests much about modern life and socio-economic groupings. His exhibition spaces, themselves, become part of the exhibition's message, demonstrating how value is in the eye of the beholder.

In 2014, the Hayward Gallery in London held a solo exhibition of Creed's work. Pieces seemed to be arranged rather chaotically, but a side room made clear his point. Everything in the room had been methodically placed but made to seem random or natural.³ Pieces were strategically arranged to produce desired outcomes, creating relations between the objects, as signified by their physical groupings. In this way, the relations were constructed, but the calculations behind the selections were not visible – only the results.

Selection, thus, can be seen as an act that often occurs behind the scenes in a given space and time. There is power⁴ at play in the selection, as it is singling some things out from among others and minimizing the choice in the decision (Secchi, 2011: 11). The onus is upon the viewer to ask questions: How has a selection been made? What is it based upon? Who has arranged things? After all, selection not only involves choosing certain people or things (thereby singling them out and making them important). It also involves *not* choosing

² A collection of Creed's work can be viewed at <http://www.hauserwirth.com/artists/5/martin-creed/images-clips>

³ See *Work No.916 (Boxes)* or *Work No.928 (Tables)* as examples: www.martincreed.com/site/works

⁴ This refers to the exercising of power, meaning an intervention that has an effect upon the result (Lukes, 2005: 43).

people or things (and making them unimportant). In so doing, selection naturally creates boundaries or limits (between those chosen to be in the group and those not), just as Creed demonstrated in his art.

Connecting this theme to the issue of organisational membership, it is evident that member selection is much more of a politically-motivated process (Hurd, 2008) than it appears. There is power at play in the action of selecting members (showing preference to some over others) and, thus, affording them special status or recognition. Consequently, such selections help to create the social world. Intergovernmental organisations⁵ are arrangements of nation states directed at particular aims in a distinct time and space. In the world, there are seemingly countless arrangements possible, and this is reflected in the fact that almost eight thousand intergovernmental organisations are currently listed with the Union of International Associations (in its *Yearbook of International Organizations 1909-2013*). Relations between states are, thus, dynamic, just like the universe.

The act of choosing other states to jointly found organisations appears to be quite random or natural when, in fact, there are considerations at play behind the scenes (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985), creating boundaries between those on the inside and those on the outside and placing limits upon membership, but at the same time, making membership possible. In accordance with the principle of sovereign equality⁶, when states opt to normalise their relations through membership in intergovernmental organisations they create the opportunity to relate to each other as equals (Kelsen, 1944). In choosing not to act accordingly with other states, they are effectively setting forth boundaries of political incorporation. This choice

⁵ IGOs here refer to entities that are formed by treaty by two or more nation states in order to work on issues of common interest.

⁶ The sovereign equality of states in international law is a recognition that states confer on each other in reciprocal terms. It is associated with Article 2(1) Chapter 1 of the *Charter of the United Nations* and is often traced back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.

consequently creates a group of exclusive members amongst all world states in a manner that is publicly presented as legitimate (Hollis & Smith, 1986: 284).

1.2-Subject: The OECD

This study has isolated one particular intergovernmental organisation –the OECD – based upon its somewhat peculiar membership. The OECD is one of the main international economic organisations in the world. It is based in Paris, France and has been in operation since 1961. The OECD has traditionally been regarded as a group of market democracies that have the objective of working together to realise sustainable economic growth and social prosperity. Accordingly, the OECD works to disseminate policy ideas and approaches based upon statistical analysis and reflective discussion.

Though it is not an ad hoc grouping, such as the G7, the OECD does not have universal membership or universal criteria for membership, as do the other main international economic organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). OECD membership is not, theoretically speaking, open to all nation states.⁷ The OECD is much more selective in its membership (as chapter three explains), counting only thirty-four member states.

Simultaneously, however, the OECD asserts global aims and is increasingly taking a global approach to its affairs (OECD, 2012: 10). Since the late 1990s, it has typically seen itself in the role of setting global economic standards and principles (Republic of Slovenia, 2012: para 1) despite its relatively small membership. Furthermore, the OECD's expanded co-operation

⁷ The *OECD Strategy for Enlargement and Outreach* lists four key criteria for membership: *like-mindedness*, being a *significant player*, having *global considerations* and offering *mutual benefits* (2004: 16).

with the G20, especially regarding multilateral tax avoidance (base erosion and profit shifting), has helped to extend the Organisation's⁸ international reach.

It is this discrepancy of having selective membership and yet aspiring to set global standards that makes the OECD puzzling and worthy of investigation. As will be seen in section 1.6, this discrepancy has led to the main research question: *Why does the OECD exist? What is its added value to the international economic architecture?*

1.3-Environment

Before proceeding with a discussion of the OECD and the study at hand, it is helpful to situate the subject within its greater context.⁹

The **international economic architecture** is a “cognitive entity” (Wendt, 1992: 399) – a concept that has been developed in order to make sense of the world. It refers to the set of international economic arrangements that have been established (by the United States and its allies) mainly in response to the Great Depression¹⁰ and World War II. In this sense, the international economic architecture is also known as the *post-war* economic architecture (Stiglitz, 1999). The OECD is one part of this superstructure, as are its counterpart institutions – the IMF, GATT/WTO, and the World Bank – which govern economic (and financial) actions and agreements between nation states. As new developments arise, new arrangements take form (Ruggie, 1991: 209), and these are reflected in the international architecture (Tentori & Zandonini, 2013).

⁸ The thesis alternates with references to the OECD as *the Organisation*.

⁹ The thesis adopts the view that knowledge is socially constructed and context specific, making context integral to meaning (Massingham, 2015: 197).

¹⁰ The *Great Depression* is associated with the US stock market crash of 1929 and an ensuing loss of economic confidence (and employment) that affected many countries during the 1930s.

Over the decades, high-income countries have notably dominated these arrangements, making it easier for them to advance their positions within economic institutions (VanGrasstek, 2013: 4). Nonetheless, at the core of these post-war settlements prevails the key belief that there is no excuse for war if countries have reliable access to (essential) resources (Post & O'Reilly, 2011: 4). The post-war economic institutions duly help to provide reliable access to resources so countries cannot use a lack thereof as an excuse to wage war.

Henceforth, the term *international economic architecture* is used to refer to the OECD and its counterpart institutions, as will be explained in discussion of the research question.

1.4-Historical Framework

Returning to the subject, a clarification is in order. The OECD, as a conceptualisation, encompasses much more than one organisation. It began as a plan (the Marshall Plan); emerged as a conference (the Conference for European Economic Co-operation); took shape as a committee (the Committee of European Economic Co-operation); then matured into another international organisation, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (the OEEC), before eventually being reconstituted into the OECD. With many similar names and acronyms, the history of the OECD is perplexing and requires some explanation. Rather than delving into the history of the OECD though, it is important to mention a related narrative, which has become known as the *Truman Doctrine*.¹¹

¹¹ A *doctrine* is considered to be the stated basis of a government's proposed course of action, mainly in foreign and military affairs (Oxford University Press, 2014)

Truman Doctrine

On 12 March 1947, United States President Harry S. Truman delivered a speech¹² to Congress, asking for public support for America to intervene in peripheral Europe (Halsey, 1998: 113) in the form of \$400¹³ million in direct assistance to Greece and Turkey in order to restore domestic order (Pelt, 2006: 38, 2014: 43).¹⁴ For many, the speech is considered to mark a turning point in American foreign policy (Satterthwaite, 1972). It promotes liberal democracy¹⁵ as the preferred regime type (Halliday & Rosenberg, 1998: 373; Spalding, 2012: 343) and implicitly refers to the Soviet Union as an aggressor in need of being *contained*.¹⁶ The doctrine also signifies the gradual consociation of the American sphere of influence with the European one, seeking to commit the USA to post-war domestic intervention in Europe. At the time, political intervention in Europe was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which pledged that the United States would abstain from interfering in European affairs (Borchard, 1947: 886; Kaplan, 1993). Nevertheless, it did not take long for political elites to begin calling for an aid programme to Western Europe (Halsey, 1998: 111),

¹² A copy of Truman's speech can be accessed on-line through the Truman Library at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf#zoom=100. (There is also an audio archive of the speech, but it is currently not available.)

¹³ \$300 million for Greece and \$100 million for Turkey (Spalding, 2012: 339)

¹⁴ Greece was under civil war, and its people were faced with obvious financial and social hardships (Hatzivassiliou, 2010: 1), so it was relatively easy for the Truman Administration to claim the need for humanitarian relief to Greece. The situation of Turkey did not seem as dire, which Truman, himself, admitted during his speech. American aid to Turkey was justified "somewhat vaguely" (Gaddis, 1974) as a counter to Russian imperialism, for Turkey had come under pressure to relinquish some control over the Dardanelles (Turkish Straits) to the Soviet Union (Shannon, 2012: 373). By administrative accounts, most of the aid to Turkey was directed at training and better equipping its 500,000-man army (Satterthwaite, 1972: 77). Then Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson theorized that if either Turkey or Greece fell to communism, there would be a *domino* effect throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and greater Middle East (Warner, 1974: 88).

¹⁵ a political system affording citizens various political liberties as well as the opportunity to govern, with the government being held accountable to the general population (Bollen, 1980, 1993: 1208)

¹⁶ This alludes to the notion of keeping Soviet Russia from any further extension of its influence, seeing that Russia was in the process of extending its control over Eastern Europe (Kennan, 1947: 572).

which precipitated the advent of the Marshall Plan.

Marshall Plan

The narrative of the Marshall Plan commences with a different speech,¹⁷ about two weeks after the *Greek-Turkish Aid Act* was passed into law, on 5 June 1947. Then Secretary of State George C. Marshall¹⁸ outlined a platform for European recovery, speaking at the annual meeting of the Harvard Alumni Association. The proposal has since become known as *the Marshall Plan*.

Admittedly, as some critics have noted, it was not really a *plan*, considering that Marshall provided few specifics and a policy for European recovery had not yet been devised (Gimbel, 1976: 274). It was more like “a plan to develop a plan” (ibid: 277), reflecting American diplomacy at the time. Nevertheless, Marshall’s proposal of foreign aid proved to be widely popular. The Marshall Plan is upheld to be one of the most successful foreign policy programs of the United States (Landrum, 2012: 347). Many claim that it has reached mythic proportions (Cowen, 1985: 61; Ellwood, 2006; Bossuat, 2008: 13; Ritschl, 2012). Overall, it aimed at curbing movements towards communism in Europe (Jackson, 1979: 1046; Hogan, 1987; Folly, 2013) by way of permanent (long-term) economic recovery (Cardozo, 1953: 165).

Marshall’s Plan treated European recovery as a joint (mutually beneficial) initiative between the United States and Europe by reason that Europe was considered to be an “essential part of [the] world trading network”

¹⁷ An audio recording of the speech can be accessed through the Marshall Foundation at <http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/>

¹⁸ General Marshall, who was considered to be the “architect of military victory” (Magid, 2012: 2) in World War II, was appointed US Secretary of State in February of 1947. In 1953 he became the first professional soldier awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace (Spahn, 1997: 7). For a complete biography see http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1953/marshall-bio.html

(Truman, Special Message, 1947: 2).¹⁹ Marshall put forward the idea of an integrated European economy with states working together to solve their common problems (backed by American aid and expertise) in an effort to overcome nationalistic tendencies (Sullivan, 1997: 6).²⁰

Marshall claimed to have wanted “the entire continent west of Asia” (United States of America, Department of State, 1947: 9) to join in the programme; therefore, a conference, the **Conference for European Economic Co-operation**, was held in Paris²¹ for all European states interested in participating in the post-war experiment (except for Spain, which was under General Franco’s regime). Most conspicuously, Soviet Russia and the states within its sphere of influence²² declined to participate (U.S. Congress, 1948: 13).²³ In total, sixteen countries chose to take part in Marshall’s plan²⁴ and formed a Paris-based **Committee of European Economic Co-operation** (CEEC), which was tasked with estimating their shared economic needs and identifying solutions for greater productivity (US Department of State, 1947: 1).

Through the formation of various technical groups, the Committee identified two main difficulties to overcome for recovery: inadequate supplies of key commodities (such as petrol and grains) and dollar shortages (lack of

¹⁹ The United States considered that it was the only country in a position to help. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was expiring at the end of June (as scheduled); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) did not have the resources to undertake a full-scale European Recovery Programme, and the private sector was hesitant to invest heavily in Europe due to unstable economic and political conditions (U.S. Congress, 1948:52; Strange, 2011: 5; Magid, 2012: 2).

²⁰ Some scholars note that the Marshall Plan also cemented the division of Europe -- between a USSR sphere of influence and a US sphere of influence (Parrish, 1994; Spalding, 2006; Landrum, 2012: 352).

²¹ 12 July - 16 July 1947

²² Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia did not attend.

²³ The Soviets countered with their own *Molotov Plan* for co-ordinating industrial development and furthering economic relations among eastern European countries (Diebold, 1948: 712).

²⁴ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom convened the conference in Paris. The Federal Republic of Germany was not yet founded.

sufficient means to pay for goods) (US Department of State, 1947: 12). US President Truman then went before Congress to request \$17 billion over a four-year period for the **European Recovery Programme** (U.S. Congress, 1948: 3) – notably about five per cent of what the United States spent on defending Europe during World War II (Truman, 1947: 11). The money was directed at improving the European standard of living through greater access to goods as well as increasing European productive capacity (ibid: 8).

Despite the impressive size and scale of the European Recovery Programme, there is difference of opinion about whether it was, in fact, necessary (Gimbel, 1976; Hogan, 1982, 1987; De Long & Eichengreen, 1991; Sørensen, 2001: 48). In any manner, continuity of assistance became conditional upon continuity of co-operation among participating states,²⁵ including the progressive elimination of intra-European trade barriers and the joint expansion of foreign trade (Surrey, 1948: 511). Eventually, the Truman Administration suggested that a more permanent European body be formed to co-ordinate the aid ²⁶(Griffiths, 1997: 3), and the OEEC was founded.

OEEC

All (sixteen) members of the CEEC²⁷ (together with the commanders-in-chief of the French and Anglo-American occupation zones in Germany) signed the *Convention for European Economic Co-operation*,²⁸ establishing the OEEC on 16

²⁵ The Marshall Plan also institutionalised post-war debt forgiveness in that it sought to have Europeans forgo reparation payments owed by Germany, which was in the process of realigning its economy (Ritschl, 2012).

²⁶ Marshall Aid was divided into loans (20-40%) and grants (60-80%) depending upon the recipient country's ability to re-pay (Gubin, 1948; Magid, 2012: 4).

²⁷ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom

²⁸ A copy of the *Convention for European Economic Co-operation* (1948) is available on-line: <http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/769de8b7-fe5a-452c-b418-09b068bd748d/>

April 1948.²⁹ The parties agreed to co-operate to execute a joint recovery programme [Article 1] in the spirit of mutual aid. They also accepted to work towards the free movement of goods, services and persons [Articles 4 & 8] as well as towards a multilateral system of payments [Article 4]. In the short term, the Organisation was tasked with ensuring the success of the European Recovery Programme [Article 11], but the overriding goal of the OEEC was unreservedly “the achievement of a sound European economy” [Article 11].

OEEC membership was a condition of *Marshall Aid*, but by no means was the OEEC’s work limited to the administration of *Marshall Aid*. In fact, the OEEC surprised many by outlasting the termination of *Marshall Aid* in 1951 (Benediktsson, 2003: 33). The OEEC was also mandated to increase European productivity (Asbeek Brusse & Griffiths, 1997: 27), which meant that much of its effort was directed at encouraging structural reforms (Magid, 2012: 4) by way of its technical committees³⁰ and reconstruction programs. The OEEC also proved itself to be adept at tackling politically sensitive issues and softening differences between parties (Gordon, 1956: 10).³¹ In this manner, the OEEC became known as a body for discussing issues and learning from others (Asbeek Brusse & Griffiths, 1997: 27). The OEEC established a consensus around the welfare state and market intervention (Kakridis, 2009: 251), legitimizing industrialisation and entrenching capitalism (ibid: 246) in the Cold War against Soviet Russia.

[publishable_en.pdf](#)

²⁹ The US Congress had three requirements for all European recipient countries: accepting the principles of the ERP, signing the OEEC Convention, and negotiating bilateral agreements with the USA for loans and grants (Sørensen, 2001: 64).

³⁰ The OEEC expanded upon the technical groups developed by the CEEC to further co-operation in important economic sectors, such as agriculture, energy, maritime transport, tourism and the like, thereby strengthening interdependence among members (Asbeek Brusse & Griffiths, 1997: 27). Such collaboration helped to overcome shortages of scientific and technical personnel in many of the member states (Hahn, 1962: 530).

³¹ By way of example, in the 1950s, the OEEC established a conciliation committee and resolved the first of the Cod Wars between Iceland and Britain. The four-year fishing dispute had also been brought forward in NATO and the UN, but to no avail (Benediktsson, 2003: 49). The *David and Goliath* story epitomises the leveling aspect of the Organisation, which will be explained in chapter five.

By many accounts, the OEEC was “the most successful of the many post-war experiments in international organization” (Gordon, 1956: 1). The Western European economy grew at a rate of more than ten per cent per year (Eichengreen, 1995: 3), attesting to the performance of the Marshall Plan (De Long & Eichengreen, 1991; Behrman, 2007; Bossuat, 2008). The OEEC was just as successful at facilitating the work of other multilateral institutions. European currencies became convertible in great part due to the work of the OEEC, enabling the IMF and the IBRD/World Bank to become operative in 1959. Likewise, after *Marshall Aid* had contributed to European recovery and the OEEC was turning its attention to developing other world regions, the GATT was deemed to be more suitable for trade negotiations and tariffs (Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, Numbered Letter 624, 1960). Moreover, the OEEC also played an important role in European integration and institution building (Haas, 1961: 369; Urwin, 1995: 19), but this role has been de-emphasized, partly because the narrative of the European Commission commences with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the creation of a common market (Geiger, 2000: 107).

Overall, the OEEC has been recognized for two main successes: the liberalisation of commodity trade through its binding *Code of Liberalization*³² and the creation of a European payments system (the European Payments Union),³³ which helped lead Western European currencies to full convertibility by 1958 (Kristensen, 1967: 100; Webb, 1995). Yet, the OEEC is also known for one significant failure: its inability to establish a European free trade area

³² In 1950 the OEEC adopted the *Code of Liberalisation of Trade*, committing members to the progressive elimination of quantitative restrictions on European imports and a policy of non-discrimination in trade with the other partners. The Code was considered to be one of the strongest instruments for promoting intra-European trade in the 1950s (Hieronymi, 1973: 95).

³³ The European Payments Union (EPU) was created by formal agreement in 1950 and operated through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland. Its currency convertibility allowed for multilateral payments and, therefore, the liberalisation of trade. When the IMF and the IBRD/World Bank became fully functional in 1959 (with European currency convertibility), the EPU was no longer necessary and was, therefore, abolished (Kristensen, 1967: 101).

(Kritsenen, 1967: 100).³⁴ Instead, the OEEC ultimately split into three trading groups, with division existing between those who wanted to pursue closer integration (the *Inner Six*),³⁵ those who favoured a looser form of co-operation (the *Outer Seven*)³⁶, and those who were left outside of both groups (the *Forgotten Five*)³⁷.

Reconstitution

Despite the divisions that existed between the members, it is to the OEEC's credit that it was able to maintain all the member states in the formation of a new organisation. With a trade impasse between the *Inner Six* and the *Outer Seven*, it became easier for the OEEC to focus on developing *external* (rather than *internal*) relations (Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, Numbered Letter 624, 1960: 2). The OEEC resolved to treat the needs of countries with less developed industrial economies as a "problem of first importance" (ibid, 2 July Memo, 1960) and to promote the flow of *development capital* to these less developed areas (ibid: 2 March Memo, 1960). Instead of concentrating upon *European* productivity and economic well-being, the OEEC was to be reconstituted³⁸ into an organisation striving for *international* development (Kristensen, 1967). The OEEC would become the OECD, taking on

³⁴ In 1957 the OEEC launched negotiations to form a European Free Trade Area to *loosely* join the fledgling customs union of *the Six* with the remaining eleven OEEC member states. Negotiations faltered for political reasons (Benediktsson, 2003: 57). The seven OEEC member states outside the Common Market then established their own trade group – the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – to operate in parallel with the EEC (ibid: 61).

³⁵ Belgium, France, (the Federal Republic of) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands formed the EEC in 1958.

³⁶ In 1959, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom began forming the EFTA (Sullivan, 2011: 26).

³⁷ Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and Turkey did not originally join either the EEC or the EFTA and were, thus, not covered by the trade agreements of either group.

³⁸ By definition, *reconstitution* means a fresh constitution (Hahn, 1962: 536).

a new convention and a new membership³⁹ while continuing the legal personality (functions and principles) of the original (European-focused) organisation.

From a legal perspective, it was not necessary to reconstitute the OEEC in order to extend full membership to the North Americans, as an amendment likely would have sufficed (Hahn, 1962: 535) and the OEEC was to remain “primarily European in complexion” (Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, Numbered Letter 323, 1960: 2). Members recognised the importance of preserving “the great value of the OEEC” (ibid, Numbered Letter 256, 1960), so they did not want any substantial changes to OEEC legal acts and economic activities (ibid, 2 July Memo, 1960).

Over the years, the OEEC had developed an impressive body of knowledge (administrative, legal, and statistical) as well as its own way of working (its own practices and techniques). Like other organisations, the OEEC had its own bureaucracy and its own organisational culture. There was debate about the reconstituted OEEC taking on new powers, especially financial powers. The Mediterranean member states wanted the new OEEC to have a financial mechanism for extending long-term credits, but Germany, in particular, was against the idea (ibid, 27 February Memo, 1960). Additionally, the United States was cognisant of the need for congressional ratification, so it was not interested in the reconstituted OEEC having any new powers (ibid, Transmission of Information from Washington DC, 1960: 4). The language of the OEEC Convention was considered to be broad enough to allow the OEEC to participate in almost any field of economic co-operation (ibid, Numbered Letter 324, 1960: 2), so it was decided that the best course of action was for the OEEC to keep its mandate broad (ibid, 22 June Memo, 1960: 2). In this way, the

³⁹ with Canada and the USA being full members rather than associate members

reconstituted OEEC (the OECD) would become an economic institution without any independent material powers.

On 14 December 1960, the eighteen OEEC members⁴⁰ and two associate members (Canada and the United States) signed the *Convention on the OECD*, as did the three European Communities (the Atomic Energy Community, the Coal and Steel Community, and the European Economic Community) by way of a separate protocol, thus enabling them to participate in the work of the OECD. This is the visible side to the narrative -- one that promotes a sense of inclusivity.

Behind the scenes, however, many other arrangements were possible. When the OEEC provided notice of its intended reconstitution, asking for feedback from national governments and other intergovernmental organisations, it received quite a few expressions of interest from countries wanting to participate in the new organisation (ibid, File 39-1, 1960). These requests were largely not heeded, most notably those from Latin and South American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, which wanted to join the OECD because their exports were to Europe (ibid, Numbered Letter 85, 1960). In addition, the requests of Israel and Yugoslavia (ibid, 28 April Letter, 1960: 2), Cuba and the USSR⁴¹ (ibid, 26 April Memo, 1960) were also denied. It is only recently that the OECD has expanded to include some of these interested parties (Chile, Israel, and Slovenia) as members – more than four decades after the OECD was first formed. Decisions regarding the OECD's original membership, thus, raise questions about selection and how this reflects the nature of the Organisation.

⁴⁰ The Federal Republic of Germany had joined the OEEC in 1949 and Spain, in 1958.

⁴¹ The USSR's request was not taken seriously (ibid, 26 April Memo, 1960).

1.5-Exploratory Observations

Liberal democracy⁴² and (free market) capitalism⁴³ are two key pillars of OECD membership, as will be established in chapter three. For this reason, one country, in particular, is a curious case among the OECD's founding membership⁴⁴: Turkey. It is the only founder country that raises questions in terms of both its democratic and market credentials (as will be explained in chapter four). Other OECD founder countries, such as Greece (the Hellenic Republic), may be questionable on one of these accounts (as an advanced economy, for instance) but not on both accounts.

Among the OECD's full membership,⁴⁵ Turkey is not such a curious case, considering that other OECD members, like Hungary and Israel, may also be questionable as both democracies and advanced economies. Nevertheless, the case of Turkey deserves special attention due to the status of its OECD membership: Turkey is an original (founding) member of the Organisation. The country is not typically associated among western economic alliances, and Turkey has a history of weak economic and political institutions, not to mention social conditions well below the European average (Esfahani, 1996; Özbudun, 2000; Öniş, 2010; Burak, 2012; Kuran, 2013, Meyersson, 2014). Turkey's (founding) membership, thus, indicates that the OECD is not based upon (*liberal*) *democracy* or upon *leading* economies. The question, there upon, arises: what is the basis of the OECD?

⁴² This concept is developed in chapter four. It refers to a political system that has a balance of liberty and equality (Fukuyama, 1992).

⁴³ Rather than the state, the private sector is upheld to be the main engine of strong economic development, primarily through market competition (Bremmer, 2010: 252).

⁴⁴ In 1961, the following twenty states founded the OECD: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, (the Federal Republic of) Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (USA).

⁴⁵ See Appendix 1 for a list of OECD member states.

A key assumption of the thesis is that the decision to include the Republic of Turkey among the original members of the OECD is connected to the decision to establish the Organisation.⁴⁶ Over the years, both the OECD and Turkey have identified themselves as Cold War bastions. Nevertheless, both have outlasted the east-west division of the world (as explained in chapters three and four), signifying that they have other purposes for being. What is more, Turkey geographically and symbolically bridges the East (Asia) and the West (Europe), making it a conspicuous point of departure for study into the OECD's unique makeup.

The case of Turkey's membership of the OECD is significant from another standpoint, that of revisionist history and theory which seeks to reconceive how the East and the West are interlinked. This is the domain of a relatively new wave of scholarship in International Studies that has gained significant ground in the academy and which reads the international order from the perspective of the East (Hobson, 2004). It also recognises new ways of conceptualising the post-Cold War order (Lawson, 2010). After World War I, Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) was regarded as the *Sick Man of Europe*, and, yet, the country became a founding member of the OECD, which was then a grouping of predominantly European countries. This was outside the norm of the time in that Turkey was not (fully) European. Starting from the selection of Turkey, therefore, affords a revisionist glimpse into the relations of East and West, in the specific context of the OECD.

⁴⁶ In putting forward a rationale for the study, the thesis does not wish to intimate that the research process is systematic and straight forward. Rather, it acknowledges that "research is often confusing, messy, intensely frustrating, and fundamentally nonlinear" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 21), with research questions often stimulated by direct experience and curiosity (ibid: 28).

1.6-Research Question

Thus, as a point of departure, this thesis is exploring the question of Turkey's OECD membership:

What accounts for the Republic of Turkey being included among the OECD's founding membership?

This initial question is primarily a conduit through which to understand the underlying and overriding question:

Why does the OECD exist? What is its added value⁴⁷ to the international economic architecture?

1.7-Justification

The research question is not intended as an existential question, motivated by philosophical inquiry. It is more substantive than hypothetical. The thesis is primarily directed at understanding the significance of the OECD, one of the world's main international economic institutions.

Until recently, the OECD has largely been neglected by the literature (Martens & Jakobi, 2010: 2; Kudrle, 2012: 696; Eccleston & Woodward, 2014: 1; Leimgruber & Schmelzer, 2015: 2), and the Organisation has maintained a relatively low profile (Major, 2014: 52).⁴⁸ In fact, it is one of "the least written about and least well understood" (Woodward, 2007b: 59) of the world's multilateral economic organisations. As well, the OECD has a rather

⁴⁷ This is an expression borrowed from the Austrian Deputy Permanent Representative to the OECD, Birgit Wilder, who referred to the *added value* of the OECD during her interview for this study. Here, the phrase is not being employed to refer to the hard value of the OECD in cost-benefit (material) terms. Rather, it alludes to what makes the OECD unique, distinguishing it from its counterpart institutions. In other words, what does the OECD contribute to the international economic architecture?

⁴⁸ Mahbubani (2012) claims that in contrast to the Marshall Plan, "the OECD has no success story" (para 2) to give it a higher profile.

ambiguous mission, making it all the more difficult to appraise (Marcussen, 2004a: 92) and, therefore, all the more convenient to overlook.

Yet, it is now timely to contemplate the fundamental nature of the Organisation. The OECD has been expanding the scope of its work, such that it is increasingly concerned with social policy and social investment (beyond its traditional interest in the economic environment).⁴⁹ The increasing span of the OECD's policy work has further confounded the Organisation's mission (Julin, 2003: 48); while at the same time, this wider purview has made it even more imperative to inquire into the Organisation's affairs.

In other respects, the OECD is recognised to be at a turning point (West, 2011: 67) in which several large, dynamic economies (most notably the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are not full members of the Organisation and, therefore, there is a common perception that further enlargement of the OECD (to include some of these dynamic economies) could serve to enhance the Organisation's relevance⁵⁰ in world affairs (Government Offices of Sweden, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 23; Patrick & Egel, 2015).

On the other hand, the OECD has been considering proposals for enlargement since 2001 (OECD, Resolutions of the Council, 2015: 2). Members do not want to have the Organisation become too large, detracting from the confidential nature of OECD co-operation and the real advantages to the OECD style of working⁵¹ (Government Offices of Sweden, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 24). The OECD would like to maintain its principle of consensus (mutual

⁴⁹ The OECD has always been concerned with public welfare; nonetheless, the title of this OECD publication is a prime example of the Organisation's far-reaching sphere of influence: 'What Can Parents do to help their Children Succeed in School?' (OECD, 2011). The OECD'S work in the domestic sphere (such as health policy) is attracting ever greater levels of international co-operation (Mahon, 2008).

⁵⁰ There is growing consensus that global economic power is progressively shifting away from OECD to non-OECD countries, especially to populous states with growing middle classes (Whalley, 2009: 2). The OECD currently represents only 17% of the world's population and less than 50% (47%) of global GDP (Patrick & Egel, 2015).

⁵¹ These will be addressed in chapter three.

agreement) for decision making (OECD, Resolution of the Council, 2015: 10); however, if it were enlarged, especially by admitting countries that have typically defined themselves counter to the values espoused by the Organisation (such as the People's Republic of China), then the OECD would lose legitimacy and, ultimately, this would further add to the Organisation's identity dilemma (Woodward, 2009: 106).

Since the end of the Cold War,⁵² the OECD has appeared to be suffering from an identity crisis (Marcussen, 2004a: 101; Woodward, 2008b; Knill & Balint, 2009: 60; Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 95).⁵³ It has been trying to carve out a niche in various sectors, but at the same time, it has faced increasing competition from other intergovernmental organisations and private institutions, like the World Economic Forum (Julin, 2003: 48; Woodward, 2007a: 237). At present, the OECD seems to have wisely aligned itself with the G20, helping to cultivate a more global image for itself. Nevertheless, the emphasis upon its relationship with the G20 concurrently underscores the fact that many of the G20's members (especially the BRICS) are not yet members of the OECD. Fundamentally, these seemingly contradictory elements point to a key objective of this thesis: the necessity to understand core reasons for the OECD's existence. This study aims to lay the groundwork for further reflection into the OECD's future role and organisational direction.

Moreover, Turkey has been selected as a case study to further investigate the primary research question. It is a pertinent country to examine because not only does its post-war history parallel that of the OECD, but also because Turkey's membership as a *founding* country in the OECD raises questions; for example, what accounts for the absence of Turkey's membership in a related,

⁵² In December of 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia's arms race with the USA ended.

⁵³ The identity crisis has stemmed, in part, from a struggle about whether to remain a predominantly European organisation or to enlarge to become a more global institution (Knill & Balint, 2009: 60).

European-based intergovernmental organisation, the European Union (EU).⁵⁴ Through its examination of Turkey's history of relations with the OECD, this thesis adds the Organisation to the trilogy of European-based intergovernmental organisations more readily associated with Turkey – the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In so doing, at a deeper level, the study aims to show that the OECD is an organisation in Europe that really matters. Nevertheless, the case of Turkey also demonstrates the limits to the OECD's ability to improve socio-economic conditions, as will be seen in chapter four.

1.8-Overview of the Chapters

By way of a brief overview, **chapter one** now turns to describing the body of work that makes up the thesis, outlining the remaining chapters, which are to follow. The chapters are arranged such that the thesis moves from the methodology (chapter 2), to the subject (chapter 3), to the case study (chapter 4), and the wider research sample (chapter 5), before moving to the discussion (chapter 6) and then drawing together concluding observations and statements (chapter 7).

Chapter Two sets out the methodology – the various techniques here employed to garner responses to the research question. It defines the hypotheses of primary interest as well as the terms and scope of the study. Chapter two, then, identifies the theoretical lens with which the thesis considers the research question, acknowledging the benefits and weaknesses of the (social) constructivist approach. After describing some of the more common

⁵⁴ The OECD and the EU share a common antecedent: the OEEC. They also have similar memberships, values, and policy approaches. Indeed, Turkey applied for associate membership of the EEC more than one year before it became a signatory to the Convention establishing the OECD.

rationalist techniques, the thesis defends the decision to consider the research question within a constructivist framework as opposed to viewing it within the parameters of the more traditional rationalist perspective. Overall, the chapter expounds the logic of qualitative research, pointing out the benefits of process tracing and the case study approach. Chapter two also specifies the methods of data collection (literature review, archival study, and elite interviews) and analysis (discourse analysis), laying the foundation for a detailed examination of the thesis topic (chapter 3).

Chapter Three enquires into the nature of the OECD: what it is; how it works, and what it does. Principally, the chapter explores the essence of the Organisation, seeking to understand what distinguishes it from other international economic organisations. In so doing, it discusses the non-material (soft) influence of the OECD, which is quite opposite to the hard influence associated with its counterpart institutions, such as the World Bank (loans/grants) and the WTO (sanctions), thereby underscoring the merit of adopting a constructivist approach to the study. Furthermore, by challenging attributes commonly assigned to the OECD – such as *rich countries' club* and *forum for market democracies* – the thesis argues that the Organisation is more than the sum of its parts. The chapter, thus, explains the *OECD way of working*, reviewing the various bodies and figure heads that make up the Organisation. Finally, the discussion turns to the OECD's role in the world (its cognitive, legal, normative, and palliative aspects). The thesis proposes an additional aspect to the paradigm: scientific. The OECD plays an important role in scientific governance, which is often overlooked.

Chapter Four examines the case of Turkey and why its (founding) membership of the OECD brings traditionally-held notions of the Organisation into question. Specifically, the chapter considers Turkey's controversial history with democracy, its dubious status as an *advanced* economy, and its problems with human rights and social well-being in order to demonstrate why the

country cannot easily be characterised as a *liberal democracy* or an *advanced economy* – two typical traits of OECD countries. Quite pointedly, the chapter asks, *Why Turkey?* Geo-strategic reasons are usually cited for Turkey's inclusion in the European –based club, except they do not give sufficient weight to the Organisation's greater social mandate. A review of the literature presents an image of Turkey as (economically and politically) weak and in need of assistance. Interviews with Turkish officials inform a different understanding of the country – one of Turkey as strong and becoming stronger and, thus, in a position to make a notable contribution to the Organisation. Overall, the case of Turkey suggests that the OECD is valuable as a social organisation as well as technical organisation.

Chapter five delves into the first-hand accounts of the wider research sample, the OECD's founding member countries. The thesis draws upon elite interviews with their national representatives in order to discern what it is that they value about the OECD today and, relatedly, why the Organisation continues to exist (having outlasted the end of the Cold War). The responses of the founder countries demonstrate that they value the OECD for its social aspects, not just for its more obvious economic and technical capabilities. A detectable number of the original members also view the OECD as an autonomous actor in its own right – one that has *the power* to request information (of member and non-member governments) and *the power* to issue recommendations (regarding best courses of action). Overall, the OECD has forged a shared heritage among member states. Building upon the success of the Marshall Plan and European reconstruction, the Organisation has demonstrated that social progress can be achieved through means other than war. In so doing, the OECD has shifted the European identity from one shaped by war to one based upon (economic and political) co-operation. Like an educator, the OECD has helped to change the mind-set of members and non-

members alike, instilling them with a new perception of themselves and a new identity for Europe.

Chapter six, the pre-conclusion and discussion of findings, draws together the results of the research, highlighting key themes and making inferences based upon the observations and reflections put forward in the preceding chapters. The chapter is primarily concerned with revisiting the hypotheses to determine if they have held true. First of all, it revisits the hypotheses of primary interest and discerns that the OECD's peer-to-peer way of working is at the heart of the Organisation's continued relevance. It gives rise to three inter-related themes, which associate the OECD with a moral sense: avant-garde spirit, mutual trust, and education. After examining these themes, the chapter, then, turns to the hypotheses of secondary interest, which are based upon the case study of Turkey. The hypotheses of secondary interest provide further insight into the avant-garde nature of the OECD, showing that the Organisation is not simply a venue (forum) or a handy tool of governments. Rather, at its basis, the OECD actively creates learning relationships and fosters partnerships that would have previously seemed unthinkable.

Chapter seven, the conclusion, summarises key points raised in chapters one to six in order to revisit the primary research question: *Why does the OECD exist? What is its added value to the international economic architecture?* After putting forward concluding observations about the OECD's continued relevance in the eyes of its members, the chapter suggests areas for future research, including study into the attitudes of prospective OECD member countries and large corporations (as per what they value about the OECD) as well as study to elicit views about the OECD having autonomous power. Based upon interviews with the founder countries, it seems that perceptions of the OECD's power are associated with the OECD's role in structural reform. The chapter culminates by proposing a new hypothesis: *the OECD has independent (hard and soft) power distinct from that conferred by its member states.*

Chapter 2: Methodology

Social science involves making order out of disorder (Law, 2004: 2) and, therefore, methodology -- what one actually does to test a thesis or to answer a research investigation (Cryer, 2011: 5) – is central to the study, itself, and merits considerable reflection. After all, the methodology is what *guides* (ibid: 5) the questioning of a thesis as well as the thinking of a discipline. Rather than commencing this study with analysis of the research subject, it is, therefore, first important to describe the investigation, itself, in order to establish the parameters of the research and to address any issues regarding validity¹ and reliability² (Morton & Williams, 2008: 344).

This chapter aims to more thoroughly detail the questioning that underpins the thesis and to explain the various methods that have been adopted in pursuit of responses. The chapter begins with a discussion of causality, leading to a statement of the primary hypotheses, followed by an explanation into the theoretical framework. Before recounting the methods of data collection and analysis, it expounds the logic of qualitative research and the case study approach, in particular.

In international politics, most phenomena are not quantifiable, which makes it necessary to qualify any inferences being made rather than rushing to present generalisations³ about phenomena that are difficult to measure (Jackman, 2008: 119). Acknowledging these limitations, the chapter now turns to the main research question at hand:

¹ *Validity* is defined by Hérítier (2008: 62) as measuring what one intended to measure (internal validity) and being able to generalise across other studies (external validity).

² If a study is replicated (the hypotheses are subjected to the same empirical assessment), it is considered to be *reliable* if it achieves the same outcomes or reaches the same conclusions (Hérítier, 2008: 62).

³ making general statements by drawing inferences from observing particular instances (Schwandt, 1997: 57; Tsang, 2014: 371)

Why does the OECD exist? What is its added value to the international economic architecture?

The Experiment:

In order to examine the nature of the OECD, the study has extracted the case of the Republic of Turkey⁴ as an outlier⁵ among the OECD's founding member countries and is posing the following sub questions to provide the foundation for the overarching research question:⁶

- What accounts for the phenomenon of Turkey's OECD original membership?
- What does the phenomenon inform about the OECD?
- What does the phenomenon convey about the OECD's greater environment -- the international economic architecture?

2.1-Causality

The first sub question is aimed at exploring a causal explanation to serve as an empirical investigation. To that end, the objective of the study is to learn the perspective of the actors involved in order to understand the factors that led to the outcome (Héritier, 2008: 64). *Causation* is conventionally referred to as the regular association between factors (X and Y, for instance, with Y being the outcome) and other possible relevant causes being controlled or factored into consideration (Marini & Singer, 1988; Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 24). Causal inference is considered to be "fundamental" (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady &

⁴ The study has singled out Turkey based upon its national identity rather than its OECD identity.

⁵ Scientifically speaking, an *outlier* is an observation in a sample that lies outside the *bulk* of the sample data (Lee, 2008). More generally speaking, *outliers* refer to "abnormalities, discordants, deviants, or anomalies" (Aggarwal, 2013: 1).

⁶ The anomaly is oftentimes more interesting than the norm, for the norm proves nothing, while the anomaly not only confirms the norm, but it also shows how the norm has led to the exception (Hagström, 2015: 125).

Collier, 2008: 4) in political science, and much political science research explores the causes of phenomena (ibid).

However, determining causality is difficult, as much research in international politics is theoretical by nature, making causal inference uncertain (Braumoeller, 2003). David Hume⁷ (1711-1776) has famously claimed that causal relations should better be regarded as **correlations** between factors, as one can never completely ascertain that a causal relationship exists (Shanks, 1985). Nonetheless, correlation does not prove causation.

This study takes these conditions into consideration, on the point of searching for a correlation between the factor, in this case the selection of Turkey, and the outcome, or Turkey's membership of the OECD, in an exploration of the overriding research question – the meaning of the OECD.

2.2-Hypotheses of Primary Interest

In response to the main research question – *why does the OECD exist? What is its added value?* – this study proposes two primary hypotheses:

1. The OECD exists for reasons other than economic factors.
2. The OECD has contemporary value beyond its Cold War identity.

2.3-Testing of Hypotheses

The primary hypotheses are based upon two correlating predictions (hypotheses of secondary importance) about the instance of the Republic of Turkey:

⁷ Hume discusses causality and induction in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40) and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748).

1. Turkey's membership in the OECD is the result of political reasons rather than purely economic factors.
2. Turkey's OECD membership is predicated upon more than its strategic geographical location.

The study tests all hypotheses by way of process-tracing, which encompasses archival research and elite interviews (see sections 2.7 and 2.9). It is important to note that as the hypotheses are tested to determine fallibility, they are re-evaluated in order to ensure the appropriateness of the research methods. In so doing, the study acknowledges that the "pursuit of scientific knowledge should be marked by hesitation and a preparedness to retreat, to concede ground to scepticism" (Basu, 2010: 49). Ultimately, by way of conclusion, the study may produce new hypotheses in order to produce generalisations about the research subject and the case at hand.

2.4-Theoretical Framework

Before launching into discussion of the various methods employed to investigate the research question, it is imperative to specify the particular approach of the inquiry, for to a great extent, the data gathered depends upon the manner in which the question is framed. In such a way, the theoretical paradigm not only structures the study, it also directs the selection of methods, thereby influencing the sample of data gathered in response to the research question. It is, therefore, important to acknowledge that the study has adopted a social constructivist perspective.

There are many different ways to theorize about decisions (in which acts of choice often play a part), so there are many different research traditions to draw upon for the study (Hansson, 2005: 5). The chapter details rationalism and constructivism, not for comparative purposes, but rather, to explain why

the study has elected to take a constructivist approach instead of the more traditional rationalist position. While rationalism and constructivism are not theories of international politics (Checkel, 1998), they offer “sets of assumptions about what social life is made of and what types of relationships exist” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002: 52) between elements under consideration. With this in mind, the chapter proceeds by examining the pertinent assumptions of both theoretical approaches in order to explain why constructivism is more relevant to the study and better able to provide insight into the research question.

Rationalism

Rationalist explanations “abound” (Fearon, 1995: 379) in the academic literature and have, in effect, been given “a certain pride of place” (ibid: 379) among scholars. Rationalism takes a positivist⁸ approach to questions of international politics through the application of rational choice theory (Fearon & Wendt, 2002: 54). It examines problems from the bottom-up⁹ (ibid: 53) and focuses on material (mainly military and economic¹⁰) interests and sources of power, considering them to be *natural* (expected) human drives (Diaye & Lapidus, 2005).

Rational Choice Theory

⁸ It takes the viewpoint that social phenomena exist concretely in the world (Della Porta & Keating, 2008b: 7)

⁹ Rationalism studies international politics in an individualistic fashion (bottom-up), from unit to system (Wendt, 1991: 384).

¹⁰ The main principle of economics is *rationality* (Davutoglu, 2015). Economic thinking has influenced the study of international politics (Moravcsik, 1997) in that states are often assumed to have logical reasons for their behaviour; namely, *rationality led* states are considered to have material incentives for their actions, which may be costly, such as warring (Fearon, 1995: 379).

Rational choice theory is “pervasive” (Amadae, 2003: 6) in many disciplines beyond economics (Sen, 1977: 321), including political science. With its modern origins stemming from the Age of the Enlightenment¹¹, it is one of the most influential paradigms (Levy, 1997; Snidal, 2002: 73) in the study of international politics. The influence of *rational* choice, in part, results from its appeal to *common sense* (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 21) as a *reasonable* model of human behaviour, founded in mathematical probabilities. As a deductive theory¹², it presupposes many things about the world and, instead, focuses on the choosing behaviour of actors, considering it to be *purposeful* (Oppenheimer, 2010) – oriented at achieving their goals and interests. The simplicity (Simon, 1978: 346; Snidal, 2002: 76) of the rational choice perspective is aimed at predicting (future) behaviour through the observance of patterns and regularities (Simon, 1959: 255, 1978: 347; Sugden, 1991: 751; Snidal, 2002: 86). It is this simplicity that makes the paradigm so flexible and, therefore, attractive (Snidal, 2002: 74).

Yet, at the same time, this simplicity is also what makes the approach a less appropriate model for this study. Rational choice theory makes several strong assumptions about human behaviour and thinking processes (including that preferences are *knowable*). Drawing upon classical economics¹³, it applies utilitarian calculations¹⁴, presuming that actors wish to maximise their interests

¹¹ The Enlightenment (sometimes known as the Age of Reason) refers to a shift in beliefs in Europe and America, which occurred primarily in the eighteenth century, with a move towards rationality and science as well as critical questioning of traditional institutions (namely the Church and the monarchy) and morals. The focus of scientific attention became the material world as perceived by the human senses (Ward, 2013: 171)

¹² It postulates an expected state of affairs with predictable outcomes (Héritier, 2008: 63).

¹³ *Classical* economics is a school of economic thought that peaked from the late eighteenth century to the late nineteenth century. It puts human relationships at the centre of the economic process, thereby promoting *rational* behaviour (the pursuit of individual goals) that, in turn, benefits free market efficiency. (Sowell, 1974).

¹⁴ Modern utilitarianism applies cost-benefit calculations and dictates the selection of options which maximise *net expected utility* for all concerned (Scarre, 2002).

(through efficient means)¹⁵ and minimize their losses, materially speaking (Sen, 1977: 317; Snidal, 2002: 86; Thurston, 2013: 22). In so doing, rational choice theory assumes that decision makers have a consistent set of clear preferences, ranked in a well-defined order for any situation (Shafir, 1993: 546; Riker, 1995: 24),¹⁶ with complete information regarding alternative courses of action. *Reasoning* is seen to precede response (Wildavsky, 1987: 8), guiding actors through a sequential process (Sugden, 1991: 751). Rather than providing insight into the interests and motivations of actors, rational choice theory takes them to be self-evident (Wildavsky, 1987: 4; Goldstein & Keohane, 1993: 4), with their desired courses of action deriving from their goals. Preferences are, thus, choice dependent (Sen, 1977: 323), as self-interest (e.g. *national interest*) defines motivation (and, therefore, behaviour).¹⁷ In other words, actors will always be viewed as selecting (opting for) their preferred courses of action (ibid: 322; Strange, 1998).

From a rationalist point of view, returning to the research question, one would assume that the other OECD founder countries deliberately *chose* Turkey as a partner because Turkey was one of their essential *preferences*. In other words, from a rationalist perspective, choosing Turkey was in their (material) interest. Rational choice theory does not extend analysis beyond these given positions, thereby discounting non-rational motivations that may have led to Turkey's OECD membership (Sugden, 1991: 753).

Furthermore, the rational choice approach does not reveal which OECD founder country or countries initially preferred to have Turkey as a co-founder. In group decisions, some options may have significant benefits for particular

¹⁵ Competition is believed to favor *rational* actors and organisations; therefore, choice is seen as a maximisation process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986: 251).

¹⁶ There is, however, considerable evidence that preferences change over time, particularly in response to shifts in the social environment (Basu, 2000, Basu, 2010: 47).

¹⁷ Influenced by the neoclassical assumptions of both law and economics, *preferences* are considered to be *amoral* with decisions based strictly upon cost-benefit analysis (Basu, 2010: 47).

members, while at the same time such choices may not be optimal for other participating countries (Simon, 1955: 109). Yet, the *group* ultimately decides upon a course of action.¹⁸ Rational choice theory informs little of such decision processes.

Moreover, when approaching questions in international politics, one must be careful, as actors may not be forthright about their goals or preferences. What countries *say* may be quite different from what they actually hold to be true (Riker, 1995: 25). In this respect, a rationalist approach does not seem appropriate to the research question at issue, considering that the perceptions of the OECD members are fundamental. Equally problematic, an actor's *choices* (as seen through his or her selections) cannot be equated with his or her *preferences* (individual interests and goals)¹⁹, especially in collective decision-making situations, where social dynamics²⁰ are involved (ibid: 26). These need to be revealed through other methods.

To briefly summarise, there would be some key problems in employing rational choice theory for the theoretical framework, including the following:

- Rational choice theory informs little about the actors (including their interests and beliefs).
- Rational choice theory is not very instrumental for group decisions (such as those by the OECD).

¹⁸ In the social world, incentives emerge through cooperation, thus guiding behaviour. *Preferences* can, therefore, be reshaped through human interaction, especially among groups (Schlee, 2013: 13).

¹⁹ There is indication that humans make trade-offs when they are forming decisions. Rather than being *rational* (maximizing utility), they exhibit *satisficing* (Simon 1947, 1957 and 1999) behaviour – settling for alternatives that satisfy their drives and aspirations, mainly as a coping mechanism for dealing with their complex environment and more short-term oriented cognitive abilities.

²⁰ In group situations, there are social expectations of behaviour which are context dependent (Brown, 1988)

- Rational choice theory does not take context into consideration as a variable.
- Choice acts take place under considerable future uncertainty.
- Rationality does not properly account for social norms and emotional motivators.

(Simon, 1955: 101, 1978: 352; Archer & Tritter, 2000)

Rational choice theory alone is not sufficient to understand the ways in which decisions are reached, especially in group settings (Sen, 1977; Thurston, 2013: 22). Self-interested behaviour is too narrow as an explanation, for goals may be ambiguous (Jones, 1999: 312). Humans are not simply *rational* beings;²¹ they are *social* beings (Sen, 1973: 252). Hence, choices are not strictly limited to individual preferences. An act of choice for a social being is always a *social* act (ibid: 253). Thus, one must consider social codes of behaviour which help to shape *social* choices.

Strategic Choice Theory

Strategic choice theory is another approach based upon *rational* explanations of human behaviour that has been considered for the methodology. The theory addresses some of the important weaknesses of rational choice theory; namely, it accommodates for group decision making; considers the presence of other actors;²² and doesn't ignore context²³ (Snidal, 2002: 86). The paradigm is similar

²¹ There are regularly too many deviations from the choice maximisation model for humans to be seen as making *optimal* decisions. Perception and judgment limit the *rationality* of choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).

²² It acknowledges the fact that people do not make decisions in isolation. They interact with others (who also have decisions to make) and, thus, modify their goals accordingly (Jones, 1999: 308).

²³ It recognises that decision-makers must modify their goals to suit their social environment (Jones, 1999: 308).

to rational choice theory in that it is a flexible, deductive approach that assumes self-interested, purposive behaviour in order to explain the choices of decision-makers (Stein, 1999: 198). Additionally, it considers that their strategies are also derived from interactions with other actors (who are equally busy strategising) (ibid: 197), acceding a certain amount of arbitrariness to the act of selection (March, 1994: 175).

Game theory

Game theory is the basis of the strategic choice approach. Modern game theory appropriates “metaphorical and analogical games”²⁴ (Snidal, 1985: 25) to model choice situations in international politics (Luce & Raiffa, 1989). It extends the concept of rational behaviour by allowing the chooser to contemplate the probable reactions of other actors to his or her decisions (Simon, 1959: 266, 1978: 360), emphasizing the role that expectations play in upholding norms and making decisions (Bicchieri and Muldoon, 2014). While game theory is a useful tool for improving decision-making (Stein, 1999: 212), it does not seem to be as useful for explaining choices made by actors in the past (ibid: 212). Owing to the fact that the case study and the secondary research question of this study refer to historical choices, game theory would not be an appropriate framework for the study.

Furthermore, humans have been found to “deviate from rationality” (ibid: 212) when making decisions, meaning that they also rely upon intuition.²⁵ Actually, when decisions become more complicated (and humans need to make numerous *mini choices*), they tend to be less consistent in their behaviour (Simon, 1959: 258), as they are relying more upon non-rational means to cope

²⁴ The games use relational matching (through metaphors and analogies) as an extension of *common sense* reasoning in order to make inferences about the world (Gentner & Jeziorski, 1993: 449).

²⁵ Intuition is the act of retrieving mental images from the subconscious to inform the conscious mind (Foote Rhyne, 2003: 79).

with the added complexity. Nevertheless, game theory assumes actors to have great reasoning capabilities (ibid: 266). Yet, unless the game is “unusually simple” (Sugden, 1991: 752), decision makers cannot fully predict the behaviour of their opponents (who are other *rational* actors). Hence, game theory does not appear conducive to addressing the research question.

Constructivism

Constructivism offers an alternative to rationalism, which has, otherwise, largely gone unchallenged over the decades (Foote Rhyne, 2003: 58).

Constructivism is a social theory of international politics that emphasizes the construction of world affairs rather than supposing them to be given entities (Adler, 1997: 328; Fearon & Wendt, 2002). In this way, constructivism is able to critique the *common sense* espoused by rational paradigms by showing that it is not so *rational* after all (Adler, 1997: 329; Fearon & Wendt, 2002: 52). Without forsaking rationalism, constructivism focuses on shared understandings²⁶ that actors have about the world, which channel behaviour and help to frame their expectations (Wendt, 1992: 397). While it acknowledges that material factors are important to decision-making, constructivism takes a subjectivist approach to the study of international politics (Houghton, 2007: 28), highlighting the role of ideas as “collective knowledge” (Wendt, 1992: 399) and, emphasizing how ideas create identities and interests apart from the *natural world* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001).

Rather than assuming that individual interests determine *preferences* (which then become *choices*), constructivism assumes that social relations create identities through social rules²⁷, which, in turn, shape interests (Wendt, 1992:

²⁶ Common knowledge “underwrites much of social life” (Vanderschraaf & Sillari, 2014) and is difficult to challenge because humans interact and communicate based upon shared understandings about the world.

²⁷ This is a broad concept, referring to stable patterns in relations, which include legal rules, social norms and such (Onuf, 1998: 62). Constructivists claim that social rules create choice, necessitating that actors

397; Katzenstein, 1996; Adler, 1997: 329; Onuf, 1998: 59; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 395) and present the actors with choices in behaviour²⁸ (Onuf, 1998: 60). *Preferences*, then, emerge from social interaction (Wildavsky, 1987: 4). They are socially *constructed*:²⁹

Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations.

(Wendt, 1992: 238)

Such an approach is well-suited to the research question posited here, for it emphasizes the roles of choice and interpretation in international politics (Adler, 1997: 329), while conceding elements of unpredictability and irrationality (March, 1994: 175). Not only do member states create institutions and international organisations, but also these entities, respectively, establish *membership* and *members*, thus helping to form their interests and identities, opening up analysis into a further level of meaning. Constructivism, thus, allows for broader explorations into causality (or more aptly, correlations) than rationalist paradigms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 395).

Constructivism's top-down approach³⁰ accommodates *explaining-outcome process-tracing* and the qualitative nature of this study (Fearon & Wendt, 2002: 53), as will be further explained in this chapter. It allows for a holistic approach³¹ to the research question, including identifying and analysing

consider between abiding by the rules (and likely obtaining their goals) or not (which may involve predictable consequences) (ibid: 61).

²⁸ Scientists believe that only human beings are capable of making choices, as they have the mental capacity to consider probable consequences resulting from their choice in behaviour (Onuf, 1998: 60). Choice is, thus, context dependent.

²⁹ Instead of viewing *preferences* as fixed objects of desire, constructivism holds them to be socially created and, thus, the concept of having material *preferences* is, itself, a construction.

³⁰ It studies the subject in a holistic manner, from the system to the unit (Wendt, 1991: 384).

³¹ It considers the entity in its entirety (as a *whole*) rather than just examining individual parts (ibid: 384).

context, actors, morals, and beliefs, so that the scenario can be analysed within all of its complexities, rather than presupposing key factors, such as interests and motivators (Fearon & Wendt, 2002: 52). When reflecting upon an event of an historical nature (as do the primary and secondary research questions), significant factors should not be assumed. It is beneficial to examine the context within which a choice is embedded, for it is within this setting that the choice has been articulated, even if it takes on a new meaning in future circumstances (Foote Rhyne, 2003: 58).

Perhaps most significantly, in terms of this study, constructivism offers an in-depth means through which to examine the intricacies of the OECD's selective membership, including its need for *like-mindedness*. The constructivist lens enables one to examine the processes by which social identities and interests are formulated, which make it well-suited for researching the attributes and compatibility of member states.

All things considered, when humans are asked to select among alternatives, they *choose* rather than *reject* options (Shafir, 1993: 555), largely based upon a cognitive matching technique that searches for compatibility between socialized images and a desired attribute, such as wealth. Hence, compatibility among actors may help to determine preferences for membership. As will be explained in chapter six, actors choose others who have social images similar (or similarly constructed, in any regard) to their own (ibid: 555). In this way, decision-makers do not select the most rational choice. They select a compatible option based upon context.

2.5-Terms and Scope

A few key terms, which are central to the methodology, need to be clarified before proceeding in order to avoid confusion.

Choosing:

Choosing is a natural mental activity based in intuition that occurs almost instantaneously (in a few tenths of a second). It is an action that sets in when humans are not able to use reasoning (a cognitive sequential process) to select among options (such as when future outcomes are uncertain). In a form of evaluation, humans *intuit* which option that is “open to selection” (Foote Rhyne, 2003: xxvii) fits best with their image of a given context (Secchi, 2011). Choosing is considered to be central to freedom. For the purposes of this study, a **choice act** is an act of choosing.

Selection:

Selection takes place through choosing (when an actor *chooses*, he or she makes a selection). Selection denotes a sense of responsibility, as there are risks associated with such behaviours when the future is not certain (Foote Rhyne, 2003: xxiii).

Preference:

Preferences are desires about end states or outcomes (Jones, 1999, 307).

Deciding:

Deciding is a process through which a prospective selection is made. It is not something that occurs at a single moment in time (Hollis & Smith, 1986: 284), though the literature often does not often distinguish between *choosing* and *deciding* (Foote Rhyne, 2003: xxiii).


Decision:

Decisions are reached through choosing, reasoning, and/or combinations of both. Decisions arise from two sources: the external environment (responding

to circumstances) and the internal environment (listening to internal demands) (Simon, 1996; Jones, 1999: 298).

In summary, a brief schema is helpful to visualise these terms:

Figure 1 - The Act of Selection



Scope of the Study:

An appreciation of the seemingly nuanced distinctions between the above-stated terms helps to better understand the scope of the inquiry. This study approaches the research question with a present-day mind set, while drawing upon historical information and theoretical insight to interpret responses.

In terms of the case study of the membership selection of Turkey, it regards the variable (the selection of Turkey) as a choice act – a decision reached by the actors involved, including, in this study, the OECD, itself (Hurd, 2011b: 21). Overall, the study thus examines the interaction between the intergovernmental organisation (the OECD) and the founding OECD member states in order to explore various reasons for establishing the OECD. With the OECD forming a part of the international economic architecture (as explained in chapter one), the study concludes in discussion about what the OECD adds to the international economic architecture.

Although the primary focus is to understand the necessity of the OECD, this study is not limited strictly to the OECD. In order to adequately address the research question, the study also includes analysis of the Organisation for

European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the organisation from which the OECD was reconstituted in 1961. A key assumption of the study is that the significance of the OECD relates to the significance of the OEEC – the rationalisation being that the Republic of Turkey was also a founding member of the OEEC. By this account, the study is, in effect, investigating the initial inclusion of Turkey in the OEEC’s founding membership. Accordingly, the archival study is framed temporally, between 1947, just before the OEEC was established³², and 1965, shortly after the OECD was instituted in 1961³³. Therefore, the phenomena are placed “in time” (Pierson, 2004: 2) – spread over an extended period yet observed within a particular dimension of social life.

2.6-The Logic of Qualitative Research

Due to the nature of the research question -- and its interest in the uniqueness of the OECD -- this study has opted to carry out qualitative research. Oftentimes, however, there is a notion that qualitative research “does not count as research” (Denzin, 2009: 140), for it lends itself to being impressionistic, and it does not usually employ random control trials (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538). This study acknowledges that all research, both quantitative and qualitative, “should conform to a set of shared criteria (e.g. validity, credibility, transferability, confirmability, transparency and warrantability)” (Teddlies & Tashakkori, 2003: 13; Dixon-Woods et al, 2004, 2006; Denzin, 2009: 141). However, in the social sciences it is not possible for researchers to directly observe many phenomena (Jackman, 2008: 119), which is especially true of international politics, with events often taking place at a distance.

³² The OEEC was established as a permanent organisation on 16 April 1948.

³³ The OECD was established on 30 September 1961. It continued the legal personality of the OEEC [Article 15, *Convention on the OECD*].

In this way, scholars need to employ methods that help them to *see* through others. Qualitative methods are good for this purpose. The discursive (rather than numerical) style of qualitative methods allows for phenomena to be accounted for comprehensively (King, Keohane & Verba, 1996: 4). By employing an inductive approach, qualitative methods also allow for an enormous amount of information to be uncovered, creating a narrative of *thick* description and depth, with direct quotations capturing the experiences and views of the actors involved (Marsh & Stoker, 2010: 257). The qualitative style, then, enables researchers to be both empathetic and neutral – a good vantage from which to judge the social world (ibid: 257). The data is useful for exploring the dynamics underlying relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989, 538). As researchers cannot physically *see* many phenomena in international politics, they cannot physically measure (quantify) them, making judgement (social or cognitive measurement) a valuable alternative. The claim that qualitative *evidence is soft* (not valid or not replicable), thus appears to miss the point of qualitative research (Denzin, 2009: 142).

This study employs two forms of qualitative research as key methods: the case study and the elite interview, which will be explained in sections 2.8 and 2.9. In an effort to build trust in qualitative research, this study strives for transparency, clearly explaining the processes of interpretation involved in the findings.

2.7-Process-Tracing

As its name implies, *process-tracing* is a process that seeks to trace causal mechanisms in a specific, theoretically informed manner (George & Bennett, 2005; Checkel, 2005, 2008). Many uphold process-tracing to be “an important, perhaps indispensable, element of case study research” (George & Smoke, 1974; George & McKeown, 1985; Vennesson, 2008: 224). In fact, the practise is now

“widespread” (Vennesson, 2008: 230) within qualitative political science research, and process-tracing is considered to be a “common way” (Ford et al, 1989: 75) to examine decision-making, such as that pertaining to the case study.³⁴ The researcher must examine a range of materials pertaining to his or her case, such as archival documents, interview transcripts and other sources, studying them in terms of a sequence (temporal ordering) of events in order to observe whether a proposed hypothesis is evident or if a factor is sufficient to produce the outcome (George & Bennett, 2005). In this way, process-tracing can be particularly helpful in small-n studies³⁵ (ibid) and often just focuses on single case studies, where strong inferences are possible.

This study employs *explaining-outcome process-tracing* (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 9) – a case-centric variant of process-tracing, which is the most common form applied by researchers (ibid: 11). *Explaining-outcome process-tracing*, as the name suggests, is geared towards a single-outcome study, where the researcher is trying to sufficiently explain a particular historical outcome by way of finding its specific causes (Gerring, 2006; Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This form of process-tracing differs from historical research in that it is theoretically guided and often seeks to make generalizations that have wider applicability beyond the single case study. As the outcome is known, the researcher takes an inductive approach, working backward from the outcome, searching through documentation, trying to uncover or construct a plausible yet “minimally sufficient explanation” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 20) of the causal mechanisms that produced the outcome. In so doing, the researcher is able to piece together the actors’ choices in an eclectic style of theorization (George & Bennett, 2005). It is also possible to examine actors’ motivations and to explore the relations between their ideas (beliefs) and their actions (behaviours) (Jervis,

³⁴ looking at decisions relating or referring to other decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)

³⁵ The letter *n* refers to the number of cases, distinguishing between *small-n* (single or comparative studies) and *large-N* (statistical research) studies (Franklin, 2008: 240).

2006; Vennesson, 2008: 233). While there can be coincidences of timing and the researcher can never completely confirm a theory³⁶, with the explaining outcome variant of process-tracing, the researcher can be satisfied upon reaching the *best possible explanation* after accounting for all pertinent aspects of the outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 21).

That being said, this study has been mindful of one of the biggest problems associated with process-tracing: confirmation bias – seeking information that supports one’s favoured theory and ignoring factors that negate it (Vennesson, 2008: 238). The study has, therefore, made an explicit effort to consider alternative hypotheses throughout the research rather than simply tracing *facts* that reinforce original beliefs.

2.8-Case Study Approach

While process-tracing, itself, is a *methodological safeguard* against case selection bias (George & Bennett, 2005: 22), it is the case study approach that allows one to process-trace.³⁷ This study has opted for the *explaining outcome* process-tracing method, as it best suits the type of study undertaken in response to the secondary research question. The case study is a fairly intuitive research strategy (ibid: 4), which does not require an extensive level of explanation. Nevertheless, some consideration is merited in order to appreciate what this case study approach brings to the research question.

Over the past few decades, scholars of international political economy have relied on case study methods more than other empirical approaches,

³⁶ As Piketty (2014) notes, inferences in the social sciences are always imperfect due to the nature of the study. One cannot run a controlled experiment across the twentieth century, for instance.

³⁷ Documenting almost any case study involves process tracing (Odell, 2002: 72).

primarily for their insightfulness (Odell, 2002: 65).³⁸ Yet, the term is so broad that it is easy to understand why so many studies are classified as such, for “[w]hat counts as a case can be as flexible as the researcher’s definition of the subject” (ibid: 66). More often than not, case selection is guided by the researcher’s interest rather than theory, wherein all case studies involve documenting a dynamic process³⁹ of some sort, whether it a conflict, decision, or policy change (ibid: 72-73). Methodologically, case studies are usually considered to be a form of qualitative research, in that they are an empirical form of inquiry that investigates phenomenon in depth and usually within their natural contexts as single (or a small number of) cases (Yin, 2009; Tsang, 2014: 371).

Typically, such studies combine data collection methods such as interviews, questionnaires, archival research and ethnographic observations (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534), drawing upon various sources. Nonetheless, case studies are frequently criticized for being a “weak” (Eckstein, 1997: 50) testing method (generating results that lend themselves to being only idiosyncratic rather than generalizable), causing concerns of validity and reliability (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). Ironically, the practise is derived from clinical studies in medicine and psychology (Eckstein, 2000: 120).

The concept is quite broadly defined in the literature (ibid: 130): a case study is a detailed analysis of a “spatially bounded phenomenon” (Gerring, 2004: 342), such as a nation state, carried out over a delimited period of time, for the purpose of understanding a wider group of similar phenomenon (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 76-77; Gerring, 2004: 342). The strategy is, thus, theoretically oriented, singling out one particular phenomenon for analysis in

³⁸ Case studies are known for making knowledge *concrete* through the practical study of particular events and issues (Dahl Rendtorff, 2015: 37).

³⁹ Aristotle, the classical Greek philosopher (300 B.C.), has emphasised the necessity of using case studies by reason of the ethical and practical knowledge that they afford from insight into a particular *arena of action* (Dahl Rendtorff, 2015: 38).

order to make generalizations about the social world (George & Bennett, 2005: 19). For this reason, case studies usually examine subjects that have previously been little researched (Gerring, 2004: 345).

The case study approach is particularly popular for analysing rare historical events (ibid: 35), in that it can generate theories to help frame historical explanations (which is especially helpful for the research question at hand). In like manner, case studies are good for testing theories in macro politics (Eckstein, 2000: 132), for both case studies and macro politics examine complexities of collective individuals. One of the notable advantages of case studies is, thus, their ability for addressing complex causation,⁴⁰ often drawing upon multiple sources of evidence (triangulating data⁴¹), helping to develop theoretical explanations of the phenomenon in question (Yin, 2009: 18).

Overall then, as a research method, case studies have several advantages. Foremost among these would be the ability to study a single phenomenon in great depth (Gerring, 2004: 345), using multiple levels of analysis. This affords the opportunity to investigate complex concepts, including beliefs and notions of identity (which are particularly beneficial for addressing the research question at hand). Actually, case studies are considered to be ideal for capturing “the private speech and writings of policy actors” (Eckstein, 1997: 54). Such details are generally lost in large-N-studies, where the sample size is often too large to accommodate such insights. This, then, is also why case studies are able to do more exploration into causation than large-N-studies. Furthermore, they are a good means for exploring the *fuller* context of hypotheses as well as analysing processes of decision-making and strategic interaction (George &

⁴⁰ *Complex causation* occurs when an outcome results from several factors or combinations of factors (Braumoeller, 2003).

⁴¹ Having multiple data collection methods allows for a greater substantiation of constructs as well as hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538).

Bennett, 2005: 19), providing useful information for assessing results and building theories.⁴²

Yet, these advantages are often upheld to be inherent disadvantages. Case studies are criticized for having too few data sets (especially when compared with large-N-studies) (Eckstein, 1997: 50), thus raising questions about their accuracy, in that their calculations are less precise (Odell, 2002: 78). They are also denounced for being indeterminate – not really able to *prove* between competing explanations based upon their *soft* approach to *evidence* (George & Bennett, 2005: 28). Their causal arguments are *probabilistic* (Gerring, 2004: 349) rather than deterministic, presenting only generalizations or “tentative conclusions” (George & Bennett, 2005: 25) from single-case studies, raising questions about their neutrality and rigour (Odell, 2002: 78).

Taking all of the aforementioned into consideration, this study has opted to employ a *hypothesis-generating case study* (Vennesson, 2008), which aims to produce new hypotheses inductively⁴³ (in addition to testing the original hypotheses). Aside from the reasons already given, one of the chief considerations has been the case study’s ability to identify and disconfirm instances, permitting falsification (of the hypotheses) and theoretical generalization (Tsang, 2014: 374).

Furthermore, looking to the scholarly works already conducted on the OECD, most have adopted the case study approach, so it is a legitimate and widely-used technique for analysing the intricacies of the Organisation. The case study is particularly relevant for contemplating abstract concepts, such as *value* and *like-mindedness*, operating within the greater social context of an institution; thereby allowing for generalisations to be drawn from *concrete*

⁴² This is why case study selection is important (Eisenhardt, 1989: 536).

⁴³ inferring “from observed matters of fact to unobserved matters of fact” (Tsang, 2014: 372), similar to making generalizations

reality (Gerring, 2007). Yet, it is important to stress that the hypothesis-generating case study approach does not presuppose a bounded phenomenon (ibid: 230). Rather, the study imposes boundaries upon the phenomenon of interest -- namely a time frame (as indicated at the beginning of the chapter) -- thereby creating a starting point and a framework for the research.

2.9-Methods of Data Collection

Herein the chapter progresses to a discussion of the methods employed for data collection. It should be stressed that the study is designed to be completed within a three-year time period. Primary data collection has, therefore, been limited to a one-and-a-half year time frame (June 2013 – January 2015) in order to accommodate the schedule. Secondary data collection has taken place concurrently over the full three years (September 2012 – September 2015) and continues on, surpassing the life span of the study.

Review of the Literature

In pursuit of a response to the research question, the study has first set about conducting a review of the related literature on the OECD (and concomitantly, the OEEC), paying particular attention to works examining the nature and history of the Organisation's membership. This seems an obvious starting point, considering that "knowledge is always mediated by pre-existing ideas and values" (Seale, 1999: 468), and intergovernmental organisations are a conceptually complex subject of study (Hurd, 2011a: 8). It appears prudent to first see what others have written on the topic in order to use the body of work as a foundation for grounding the study and then building upon, for the benefit of future researchers. A careful reading of the related literature on the OECD satisfies two main purposes: it establishes the significance of the study,

situating its contribution to an ongoing empirical discourse, and it identifies the intellectual traditions that surround the research question and guide the study (Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 23).

The findings of the literature review are divided between chapters three and four of the thesis. Until recently, there have been few critical studies of the OECD⁴⁴. Scholars have, instead, opted to examine particular policy areas of the Organisation or have drawn upon the OECD's authoritative reports and extensive data for their own studies. In this way, much of the material written about the OECD has been produced by the Organisation, itself.⁴⁵ While this first seemed to be a disadvantage, it has necessitated consulting with the OECD directly – a research experience that has proven to be rewarding in and of itself.

Archival Study

Second only to the literature review, archival research has seemingly formed a natural part of the thesis. Perhaps this stems from the innate human desire to return to the origin or to a place in search of a commencement in order to connect with the past (Derrida, 1995). Archives are central to scholarly endeavour, and they manifest social aspirations for truth and trust (Velody, 1998). Nevertheless, the word *archive* is ambiguous (Manoff, 2004: 10). It refers both to the place (repository) where a collection of materials is stored as well as to the collection of materials and artefacts, itself.

⁴⁴ The title of J. Verschaeve's (2013) book review is telling: 'The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Unimportant or Under-Researched?'

⁴⁵ Though arguably not as critical, OECD publications are also wonderful resources, in that they draw together a wealth of information and make it easily accessible. Sullivan (2011)'s 50th anniversary book is an example.

Archival sources are preserved⁴⁶ by organisations (both public and private) due to their perceived value (historically or intrinsically speaking). Typically, archives hold unpublished information, such as paper correspondence, manuscripts, and diaries, which provide insight into particular topics that might not be widely understood through analysis of published sources alone (Zickar, 2009: 57). Far from being limited to text-based records, however, archival materials commonly encompass a range of formats, such as photographs, digital and sound recordings as well as three-dimensional artefacts, allowing for varied forms of analysis. The sheer amount of information housed in an archive can make navigating the sources difficult (ibid: 57), especially with digitisation of paper and parchment-based documents often only partially complete (Cunningham, 2008: 2).

In the public realm, preserved records of government activity are almost at the point where paper-based files have ceased to be the main materials for accession and, instead, it is *born-digital* documents, such as web pages, as well as electronic files, like Excel spreadsheets, which are being preserved for posterity (ibid: 1). The transition towards electronic, web-based archival holdings raises questions about the accuracy⁴⁷ and comprehensiveness of some collections, a valid concern, considering that the repositories act as a form of public memory -- affirming the past, present, and future (Derrida, 1995; Velody, 1998).⁴⁸ Concomitantly, there has been a shift since 2003 in some countries, like Canada, towards the restriction of access to public documents held in government archives,⁴⁹ so complete access to information is not assured with

⁴⁶ Archival materials are not considered to be *in use* or *living*. Rather, they are considered to be *past* objects that have been kept for posterity (Craik, 2013)

⁴⁷ There is a concern that archives may only present the *official* culture of an organisation, with a tendency towards the *purposeful construction* of the past (Gillis, 1994).

⁴⁸ In this way, the archive is central not only to scholarly pursuits, but also to democratic society, in that it provides access to public information (Manoff, 2004: 9).

⁴⁹ As of November 2015, this shift should be reversing with the change in Canada's federal leadership.

physical archives either. In the end, both web-based and physical archives, by practise, store data that has been removed from its original context. Thus, the onus is upon the researcher to carefully interpret the content in order to piece together the context of the records and beware of any partial truth claims (Velody, 1998; Cunningham, 2008: 7).

While the study acknowledges that archives are not *neutral* places of information that can provide all of the answers (Foucault, 1972; Manoff, 2004: 14; Cox & Kennedy-Pipe, 2005: 99), they do contain a wealth of primary sources⁵⁰ and offer the chance to reflect upon the significance of a historical collection of information as a whole. They also afford the opportunity to observe changes in the types and amounts of material maintained over the years, thereupon providing insight into any shifts in public *knowledge-making* practices (Foucault, 1972).

Biases aside, the quantity of data gathered from various archival sources in response to the research question appears to be more than sufficient for testing and retesting the hypotheses at hand. As the OECD and its member states continue to declassify records,⁵¹ new data becomes available to help revise current views,⁵² situating the study within the ongoing unfolding of knowledge.

The OECD makes its recent official (unclassified) documents⁵³ electronically available to the public via its website; however, most of its older

⁵⁰ Primary sources are materials that contain first-hand (eyewitness) accounts of events, either created at the time of the event or later recounted by observers.

⁵¹ As of 1997, OECD official records are declassified after ten years rather than thirty, as they were previously (UNESCO, 2014)

⁵² In 2009, for instance, the US Administration created a prioritisation plan for the declassification of national records. As a result, many OECD documents have been made available to the public, including official documents relating to the reorganisation of the OECD (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2009: 37).

⁵³ There is a clear distinction that can be drawn between the *documents* and the *publications* of intergovernmental organisations: *documents* are official records of meetings as well as the materials generated for such meetings, while *publications* are materials intended for wider distribution, usually to

records (pre-dating 1990) are not electronically accessible. They are housed in the OECD Library & Archives⁵⁴, located on the OECD premises in Paris, France. To date, few scholars have visited the OECD to conduct archival research of the Organisation, itself (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 2).

In spite of such circumstances, it was necessary to inquire about viewing archived documents due to the historical time frame of the case study. When the OECD's Centre for External Researchers⁵⁵ was informed of the nature and time frame of this case study,⁵⁶ they kindly offered to make OEEC records held by the European University Institute in Florence, Italy available at their Centre as well.

An OECD information specialist provided an inventory of OEEC historical archives (1,174 pages) detailing the contents of one hundred and seventy microfilms and twenty-one linear metres of microfiche that comprise the OEEC 1948-1961 collection (of Council, Committee, Directorate, Executive, General Secretariat, and Steering Board records, including minutes of meetings, working papers, and some correspondence files).

A range of documents (encompassing the various types of records available) was selected from the OEEC inventory based upon references to <Turkey> and <membership>. The OECD staff, then, conducted an archival search of OECD records (from 1961 to 1965) using the same search terms and prepared all of the microfilm and microfiche for the research visit. At the OECD

inform the public about the organisation and its activities (Louis-Jacques and Korman, 1996: 1).

⁵⁴ An overview of the services and collections at the OECD Library and Archives can be viewed at <http://www.unesco.org/library/PDF/OECDLibrariesArchives.pdf>

⁵⁵ This is a wonderful resource, considering that many organisations now do not offer services for primary data collection due to financial constraints and public relations concerns (Manoff, 2004: 13; Shultz et al, 2005: 31).

⁵⁶ Since 1992, OECD official documents that are thirty years or older are classified as *historical* and are added to the historical archives. The collection can be consulted in Florence, Italy at the Historical Archives of the European Communities, in the European University Institute (UNESCO, 2014).

Centre for External Researchers, close analysis was conducted of the records, searching for information relating to the outcome, variable, and hypotheses. In total, 3,323 corresponding documents were converted into portable digital files (pdfs) for further consultation.

So as not to base the document analysis strictly upon one source of records, archival research was also conducted in person (though far less extensively) at the British Library in London⁵⁷ and Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa, as well as via the internet at the George C. Marshall Foundation, the Harry S. Truman Library, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and the United States Library of Congress. The same search terms were used, but for the American archives two additional criteria were added: <Marshall Plan and Turkey> and <Truman doctrine and Turkey>⁵⁸.

Elite Interviews

In addition to the aforementioned literature review and archival research, this study has also opted to use personal interviews to add depth to the research. Qualitative interviews offer a different data collection experience from the static, two-dimensional historical record. That being said, qualitative interviews are more than *inter-action* or *inter-views* between interviewers and interviewees (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 2). They are aimed at helping the researcher to access qualitative knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible, such as subjective values and experiences (Peräkylä, 2005: 869). In this regard, qualitative interviews help the researcher to *see* relations that he or she would not have been aware of previously (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 31), mainly by

⁵⁷ The British Library's collection includes copies of the OECD Convention and related documents – a real treasure

⁵⁸ Several relevant files (particularly through the Library of Congress) co-locate documents pertaining to Turkey together with those of Greece and, therefore, some records pertaining to Turkey's history are retrievable with search criteria using <Greece> rather than <Turkey>.

way of adopting the perspective of the interviewees. Qualitative interviews are, thus, an ideal method for learning about sensitive issues like personal motivations (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). Pertinent to the research question at hand, qualitative interviews are also a convenient method for studying past (historical) events and faraway experiences in which the researcher did not participate, as they can overcome distances in space and time (Peräkylä, 2005: 869), helping to bring a research topic “to life” (Stedward, 1997: 151).

Elite interviews are distinctive among qualitative research in that they are defined by both their target group and their research technique (Burnham et al., 2008: 231). Respondents are those regarded to be experts about the topic of study (Leech, 2002: 663) and are generally recognised to have influence over decision-making processes, such as political party leaders or government ministers (Burnham et al, 2008: 231). Consulting the literature on elite interviewing, there is “no standard set of techniques that can be applied” (ibid: 232). Nevertheless, elite interviews are an excellent method for informing research that uses other sources of data, by virtue that they are good at adding context and “colour” (Goldstein, 2002: 669). This is consistent with the principle of sociological triangulation – using multi-methodological research or multiple sources of data in order to deepen research findings – a principle that is generally applicable to political studies at large (Davies, 2001: 73).

Elite interviewing is especially relevant for process-tracing approaches to case study research, seeing that elite actors are significant sources of information, not only about decision-making processes, but also about political processes in general (Tansey, 2007: 4-5). Overall, there are several purposes for using elite interviews in the context of process-tracing, including:

- to corroborate earlier findings (from other sources)
- to help reconstruct events (to learn the decision-making behind them)
- to determine what a particular aggregate of people thinks

- to make inferences about the decisions of a wider group of people

(ibid: 5)

Data gathered from elite interviewing can indicate weakness in data sourced by other methods. In fact, elite interviews are “rarely considered in isolation” (Tansey, 2007: 6). Instead, the goal of collecting such data is often to confirm information that has already been collected from other sources. Perhaps more significantly for the case study and research question at hand, elite interviews can be used to fill in “historical blanks” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005: 3) when official documentation is lacking. Official records only present final versions of events (not *drafts*) and often lack supporting documentation of the political processes involved. In this way, they chiefly “conceal the informal processes and considerations that precede decision-making” (Tansey, 2007: 9), and they tend to present decisions in a manner that implies consensus, not making indication of any disagreement that may underlie the final decisions (ibid: 9). Elite interviews can, therefore, be used by the researcher to make sense of an abundance of documentation, indicating what is significant and what is accurate.

At the same time, the researcher cannot completely rely upon data from elite interviews to remedy omissions and to correct distortions, as this data has its own inherent flaws. If the event under question has occurred several years previously (like the establishment of the OECD) then errors in memory are likely. Interviewees may also be inclined to misrepresent their positions in order to portray themselves and their organisations favourably (Tansey, 2007: 10). Discourse analysis is a helpful strategy for overcoming some of these limitations by assisting the researcher to uncover representations and to determine what has not been said by the interviewees (Jacobs, 2006: 138). Discourse analysis will be addressed in greater detail in the next section of the methodology. First, the chapter will turn to describing the interview process carried out in response to the research question.

Given that the thesis has opted to use process-tracing in the context of the case study, qualitative research interviews seem to be a convenient means for filling in *gaps* in the archival research both historically and qualitatively – adding context and corroboration.

Interviewees:

Considering that the study has been set between 1947 and 1965 (between fifty-one to sixty-nine years ago), it did not seem feasible that first-hand participants or direct witnesses (those present when Turkey and others formed the OEEC and the OECD) could be obtained for interviews. It was, therefore, a positive surprise to locate and interview one retired ambassador (Einar Benediktsson) who worked for the OEEC Secretariat (1956-1960) when the OEEC became reconstituted as the OECD. Ambassador Benediktsson did not work for the OEEC when it was first formed; nevertheless, owing to the fact that two decades later he was Iceland's Permanent Representative to the OECD (1976-1982), Ambassador Benediktsson has been able to provide a unique and very insightful perspective into the workings and relations of both organisations. His input has given the study life, informing multiple aspects of the inquiry and providing renewed vigour to the research question.

To complement Ambassador Benediktsson's observations, interviews have been conducted with a senior official at the OECD (Jan Schuijjer, Global Relations Secretariat) as well as with diplomatic and national representatives of the other OECD founder countries. In total, 17 elite interviews have been conducted, including 16 interviews with representatives of the OECD founder countries.⁵⁹ (One delegate interviewed on two separate occasions.) Overall, the study gained access to the views of 15 of the 20 OECD founder countries.⁶⁰ It

⁵⁹ This is detailed in chapter five, and Appendix 9 provides a complete list of the interviewees.

⁶⁰ The study achieved a 75% response rate among the OECD founder countries.

also obtained the viewpoint of Japan through communications with one senior economic and trade official of the Japanese government.

Mode:

In order to establish rapport⁶¹ and be able to probe⁶² more deeply with questions, the study has opted to conduct in-person, semi-structured interviews⁶³ when possible. Where distance has posed a constraint,⁶⁴ the interviews have been conducted via telephone.

Face-to-face interviews are generally considered to be the most effective mode for collecting qualitative data (Holt, 2010: 113) and have long been regarded as the “dominant interview technique” (Opdenakker, 2006: 2) for social science research;⁶⁵ whereas, **telephone interviews** are often considered to be *suspect* (Block & Erskine, 2012: 429) by the academic community (Frey, 1989; Taylor, 2002).⁶⁶ Nevertheless, telephone interviews are a “good option” (Irvine, 2011: 202) in certain circumstances; most notably, to overcome constraints of time and distance, not to mention cost (Cannell, 1985; Sturges & Hanrahan,

⁶¹ Forming a relationship with the interviewee, such that he or she feels encouraged to participate in the interview, giving of his or her time (Bryman, 2001: 114).

⁶² When interviewing, the researcher uses his or her judgement to pursue responses by eliciting further details, being careful to exercise discretion and not to be too intimate (Bray, 2008: 314).

⁶³ The researcher has a set of focused but general questions to pose in a flexible sequence depending upon the responses elicited. The interviewer may also ask further questions if they seem significant (Bryman, 2001: 110).

⁶⁴ Chapter 5 explains the process in greater detail. For the scheduling of interviews with the various diplomatic representations of the OECD founder countries in Ottawa, logistics sometimes proved problematic. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg does not have full diplomatic representation in Canada, for instance. Its embassy in Washington, D.C. services North America, so the interview with the Deputy Chief of Mission, Olivier Baldauff, was conducted by telephone.

⁶⁵ Face-to-face interviews are classified as a *rich* channel of communication, meaning that they manage several cues at once and are often seen to be more personal (Block & Erskine, 2012: 435).

⁶⁶ Telephone interviews are classified as a *lean* channel of communication, in that they lack eye and face contact and must rely strictly upon verbal communication (Block & Erskine, 2012: 435). Moreover, data collection by telephone is associated with market research and polling (Cannell, 1985; Block & Erskine, 2012: 430).

2004; Block & Erskine, 2012: 429). Essentially, interviews by telephone are “the next best thing to being there” (Tausig & Freeman, 1988).

Overall, few differences have been found between data gathered by telephone interviews and data gathered by face-to-face interviews (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Block & Erskine, 2012). Still, the interviewer and the respondent may interrelate differently by telephone due to the asynchronous communication of place (Opdenakker, 2006). It is more difficult for the interviewer to establish trust due to the physical distance and there is, consequently, less opportunity to create a good ambience and have spontaneous conversation (ibid: 7). Communication can be less clear due to the reduced social cues, leading to generally shorter interviews by telephone, with the researcher often needing to speak for more time than he or she would if interviewing in person (Irvine, 2011). Not only do the typically shorter interviews mean that the respondent is speaking for less time, but there is also a tendency for him or her to elaborate less when speaking, mostly as a result of the reduced social cues (ibid: 203).

In terms of the interviews conducted for this study, there did not seem to be any significant difference between the responses provided by telephone and the responses provided face-to face, mostly because the interviewees are senior diplomats and, therefore, very accustomed to speaking and engaging socially. In other words, the mode of the interview did not seem to have a noticeable effect upon the data collected. It was, however, sometimes more difficult to establish initial rapport when engaging with the respondents by telephone and their gestures and work environment could not be observed.

Process.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ This details the logistics of how the interviews were conducted in general; whereas, chapter five offers a more introspective account of the experience of interviewing the OECD founder countries.

The offices of potential interviewees were contacted directly (by e-mail and by telephone) to request interviews. The respondents were relatively easy to identify and locate due to the public nature of their positions (Marsh & Stoker, 2010: 258). The interviews were arranged, accommodating for various schedules, and the interviewees were provided a copy of the interview questions⁶⁸ in advance so that they could prepare for the meetings and have confidence in the procedure. Generally, the sessions lasted approximately one hour, providing respondents with sufficient time to speak at length and in depth. They were conducted on-site at official premises, so the interviewees were in *work mode*, speaking in their official (diplomatic) capacities and within the context of their everyday work environments. All sessions were recorded upon permission of the interviewees (Burnham et al., 2008: 239). Perhaps as the interviewees are public figures, they appeared to be at ease with the recording of the meetings, which did not seem to detract from the interview process. Certain government representatives asked that their comments not be attributed directly to them or their governments⁶⁹, affording them more discretion to freely discuss matters (Goldstein, 2002: 671).

The interviews began with a few casual opening questions in order to build rapport with the respondents. They proceeded with the most important questions being asked first, conscious of the fact that the interviewees could be called away at any time to attend to other matters (Leech, 2002: 666; Burnham et al., 2008: 240), though this did not occur. The questioning was kept flexible, using an interview guide as a general reference, *subtly directing* (Burns, 2000: 425; Rubin & Rubin, 2005: 4) the exchange of ideas. Open-ended questions were used so that the interviewees would not be limited in their potential responses. Body language and subtle cues were studied in an attempt to read implicit meanings expressed behind the verbal opinions (Burnham et al., 2008: 241).

⁶⁸ A copy of the interview schedule is included in the appendices (Appendix 10)

⁶⁹ Accordingly, within the body of the thesis many comments are identified strictly by the dates of the interviews.

During the interviews, short-hand notes were taken about what the interviewees said and, then, following the meetings, by reading between the lines, notes were made about what the interviewees *did not* say (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 30). All in all, the interactions between the interviewer and the interviewees created new knowledge (ibid: 2), which could be analysed and examined at the level of production. To this end, the research interviews have been transcribed and discourse analysis has been applied to an in-depth study of the texts before reporting the findings (as will be discussed next).

2.10-Method of Data Analysis

It seems a natural tendency to employ content and document analysis when conducting archival research (Della Porta & Keating, 2008: 28); therefore, the means of analysing the data appears to be limited to the scientist's interpretative abilities and practices (for identifying key references, symbols and the like) (ibid: 28). However, much can also be gleaned through discursive and intertextual approaches to the data, such as by employing discourse analysis.

Discourse Analysis

There is no consensus in international politics about the best approaches for studying discourse (Milliken, 1999: 226), partly because there is no consensus about what constitutes a discourse (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 1). Actually, *discourse analysis* is not a single method. It is a series of approaches that are used across disciplines – analytical approaches to speech, texts and other symbols in order to examine the social constructions of reality put forward by different groups (Bryman, 2001: 360). Discourse analysis has largely been

inspired by the works of Michel Foucault (1973, 1977, 1978).⁷⁰ Though Foucault did not propose a definitive set of methods for analysing discursive patterns, his works demonstrate innovative ways that social life can be examined by way of language (Peräkylä, 2005: 871).

Discourse analysis involves more than its name implies, as it is aimed at “drawing out the efforts made to stabilize and fix dominant meanings and studying *subjugated knowledge*” (Milliken, 1999: 230). The researcher must work with what has been said or written, “exploring patterns in and across the statements” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 21). Ironically, it is particularly difficult to examine discourse that one is accustomed to reading or hearing, mostly because such expressions are taken for granted to be *common sense*. Yet, it is these common sense understandings that most need to be investigated (ibid: 21). The researcher must analyse how some statements are made to seem *natural* or *true*, while other statements are silenced (ibid: 21). Furthermore, he or she should reflect upon how particular groups (such as a membership) are constituted discursively. The strategy is consistent with a constructivist approach to international politics.

In terms of this study, discourse analysis has been applied to the interview transcripts of the sessions with the fifteen OECD founder countries. The transcripts have first been analysed to determine how the members perceive of the OECD and its role in the world. Accordingly, all references to the OECD (using language other than *the OECD*) have been extracted and divided into the categories of *adjectives*, *nouns*, and *verbs*. These have been analysed for any subjugated knowledge about the OECD. They have also been juxtaposed to examine any relationships between the expressions adopted by the members and what they inform about the OECD. The transcripts have been

⁷⁰ In the 1970s, several of Foucault’s works were translated from French into English, including: *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (1973), *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977) and *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction* (1978).

closely examined for recurring themes and perceptions. The same approach has been employed to discern what the members value about the OECD. In aggregate, the expressions have been analysed for what they indicate about the OECD and how the member states define and construct social reality (Milliken, 1999: 241).

2.11-Conclusion

By way of conclusion, it is helpful to synthesize the various terms, techniques and approaches that make up the methodology, as there are quite a few. Briefly, this study consists of a qualitative case study, which draws upon discourse analysis and process tracing to examine data collected through elite interviews and archival research. In this way, it makes an original contribution to the scholarly literature, for, to date, there are few studies of the OECD based upon either archival study or elite interviews, and this study draws upon both.

The subject is perceived through a constructivist lens, which emphasizes the social construction of world affairs (Adler, 1997: 328). As the concept of *choice* permeates the thesis, a great deal of attention has been paid to explaining the three theoretical approaches that have been considered for the study – rationalism, strategic choice theory, and constructivism. The choice of theoretical framework is particularly important, for it structures the questions posed of international politics, thereby determining the manner in which the questions are answered (Wendt, 1992: 422).

The conclusion will, thus, spend a few moments in summarising the steps undertaken to select a theoretical paradigm:

- The study has attempted to approach the decision in a *rational* manner and, therefore, consulted the literature.

- However, due to the range of ways to approach the research question, *choosing* was relied upon to produce decision alternatives.
- Rationalism, strategic choice theory, and constructivism were produced based upon their associations with *choice* and *preferences* as well as their predominance in the study of international politics.
- Careful examination of each paradigm alongside reflection into the research question has led to the following summary:

Figure 2 - How the Three View Choice Acts:

| Rationalism (Rational Choice Theory) | Strategic Choice Theory (Game Theory) | Constructivism |
|---|--|--|
| Actors' choices reflect their interests and goals | Actors' choices reflect their interests and goals + consideration of the choices of other actors | Actors' choices reflect their inter-relations (shaped socially) as well as their interests and goals |

Of the three approaches, the study has selected to employ constructivism, mainly because it offers the “most fruitful” set of questions (ibid: 422) for approaching the case study and the research question. Intuition informs that a non-rational approach to the study would be best. Utilitarian economics⁷¹ is at the foundation of the OECD, with its focus on the comparative gains and losses of different actors (Sen, 1998: 182); therefore, by employing a different

⁷¹ It is otherwise regarded as *welfare* economics – concerned with maximising the utility function for the social interest (Sen, 1979: 538).

paradigm, the study can better examine the *common sense* workings of the OECD, rather than supposing them to be *natural*.

Chapter 3: What is known about the OECD?

The OECD is an established international economic institution that has come to form part of the international economic architecture. As such, the OECD's existence is taken for granted rather than arousing profound questions into the nature of its being. More than sixty-five years after *Marshall Aid* has ended, the OECD still exists. The natural question is, therefore, *why?* Why does the OECD exist rather than not exist? This is not a rhetorical question. A valid response is being sought. While the question may appear self-evident, as will be seen, when it comes to the OECD, there is no decisive answer.

By way of extension, this chapter aims to analyse the core nature of the OECD. To this end, the chapter reflects upon the main research question (*Why does the OECD exist? What is its added value to the international economic architecture?*). After first contemplating whether the OECD is real, the chapter delves into what is generally known about the Organisation. In so doing, it poses a few important questions about the OECD: what is the OECD? How does it work? What purpose does it serve? In other words, what is the OECD's current role in the world? After exploring these questions into the essence of the OECD, the chapter concludes with some initial suggestions about the *added value* of the Organisation (as part of the international economic architecture).

3.1-Is the OECD real?

This study has adopted a constructivist approach, so a question such as this may seem redundant; however, before inquiring as to the nature of the OECD's existence, it is necessary to question whether the OECD exists at all.

Physically speaking, the OECD exists as one of the world's largest international bureaucracies (Porter & Webb, 2008: 45). It is headquartered in

Paris, France,¹ where it brings together official representatives from thirty-four nation states² under a mandate “to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world” (OECD, *Our mission*, 2013: para 1). The OECD is active in all public policy areas of interest to high-income countries, except for those in the salient areas of defence, culture, and sport (Henderson, 1996: 13; Marcussen, 2004c: 107; Woodward, 2009: 4; Kudrle, 2012: 696). As twenty-five of the OECD’s thirty-four member states are European – and the remainder (with the exception of South Korea) have strong historic ties to Europe³ -- the OECD is often regarded as a *European* organisation (Sands & Klein, 2009: 186; Clifton & Díaz Fuentes, 2014; Davies, 2014).⁴ Nonetheless, the OECD has global aims (Sands & Klein, 2009: 186), with regional centres in Berlin, Mexico City, Tokyo, and Washington D.C. (OECD, *OECD Centres*, 2013: para 2), meaning that the OECD’s existence is not, in fact, limited to Europe. The OECD has a presence in some of the main decision-making centres of the world (O’Brien et al, 2000: 1).

More abstractly speaking, the OECD exists as a name – *the OECD* – an acronym that carries connotations of wealth when it acts as a label for countries, as will be explained in a portrayal of the OECD as a *rich countries’ club*. Similarly, the OECD exists as a brand -- one denoting value and prestige, as will be evidenced in a portrayal of the OECD as a *club of best practices*. In like manner, the OECD exists as a group – a group of market democracies, as will be explained in future paragraphs. From the perspective of the general public, the OECD exists by way of its numerous publications (OECD reports and policy papers) and its online presence (at <http://www.oecd.org/>). The OECD also exists by way of national media and parliaments, which reference OECD statistics and

¹ UNESCO is also based in Paris (see Appendix 5).

² See Appendix 1 for a list of the OECD member states.

³ For instance, many have membership in the Council of Europe (CoE).

⁴ Twenty OECD member states are also full members of the European Union.

findings, all the while disseminating OECD ideas. In this way, the OECD has various representations depending upon one's frame of reference.

The nature of the OECD's existence is quite abstruse. The OECD does not seem to have one specific, functional purpose, unlike its counterpart institutions (Porter & Webb, 2008), the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, among others. Rather, the OECD carries out a range of activities that combine its diplomatic and economic features. Rationalist approaches tend to emphasise single aspects of the OECD and to depict it according to one of these functions, thereby classifying the OECD as an international forum, a statistical centre, and/or a publishing house (Van Meerhaeghe, 1980: 401), to name a few. Internal and external observers who are cognisant of the OECD's diplomatic aspect, on the other hand, describe the OECD with various social descriptors, including *the world's largest think tank* (Pal, 2012: xiii); *a club of best practices* (Bonucci, 2011: 252); *the rich countries' club* (Arnold, 2003: para 14), and *a unique forum for market democracies* (OECD, 2008: 7), as will be discussed in section 3.2.

The OECD gives the feeling of being secretive (Hadzhieva, 2015: 12), which makes questions into its existence quite challenging. Perhaps this sentiment stems from the OECD's location. After all, the OECD is housed in *Château de la Muette* and one meaning of *la Muette*, of course, is *secretive* or *hidden from sight* (Osborne, 1999: 21). Quite reasonably, this secrecy may be part of the OECD's Cold War legacy. In any regard, undertaking a study of the OECD is a complex and challenging process due to the multifaceted nature of the Organisation. There are surprisingly few independent accounts of the OECD (Martens & Jakobi, 2010: 2; Bonucci, 2011: 241; Kudrle, 2012: 696; Eccleston & Woodward, 2014: 1).⁵ The OECD does, however, publish to a large extent (as will be seen) and has commissioned some public studies of its own operations (Griffiths, 1997; Sullivan, 1997; Pagani, 2002; Sorel & Padoan, 2008).

⁵ Most of the scholarship has, instead, focused on "established" (Jakobi, 2012: 4) policy areas of the OECD, such as economics (Pitlik, 2007), health (Colombo et al, 2011), and labour (Grinvalds, 2008).

While this has reduced some of the secrecy, it also has led to often skeletal or biased portrayals of the OECD in that the public is privy only to a select image of the Organisation (that which the OECD has chosen to reveal).

The OECD has maintained a relatively low profile in terms of public attention (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 2; Major, 2014: 52; Leimgruber & Schmelzer, 2015: 3). One exception to this has been the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)⁶ affair in 1995, in which more than six hundred non-governmental organisations from seventy countries (Kobrin, 1998: 97-98; Kurtz, 2002) petitioned against the agreement, inciting two days of campaigning at the OECD's headquarters in Paris. In fact, the OEEC/OECD has been privileged over other international economic institutions for being able to conduct negotiations in secret (Major, 2014: 52). According to a former ambassador to the OECD, the Organisation "is not in the public awareness, and it will not be possible for it to be in the public awareness" (interview, 6 January 2015). The nature of the OECD's activities is such that "it is not for the general public to be interested in. Its work impacts their daily lives but not often directly or immediately" (ibid). The OECD works in specialised fields, meaning that it is not well known⁷ "beyond the people whose work it is to know about the Organisation" (ibid).

Moreover, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the OECD maintained a culture of *confidentiality* and *closed door* meetings. Much of its work was considered to be *classified* (Camps, 1975: 47).⁸ Therefore, scholars who attempted to research the OECD were usually confronted with difficulties in accessing information and complained about the OECD's overly rigorous classification of

⁶ For a good explanation of the MAI, see Juillard (1998)

⁷ To be fair, the OECD has recently rebranded itself to promoting *better policies for better lives*, taking on a softer, less technical tone and appealing to a wider audience.

⁸ The OECD's technical nature added to this secrecy, leading to the perception that the Organisation plays only a marginal role in international affairs (Peña, 2015: 55).

records (Aubrey, 1967: 130; Camps, 1975: 47; Blair, 1993: xii). It has only been since 1996 that the OECD's papers have become declassified and its working records have been made accessible to external researchers, offering greater insight into the workings of the Organisation (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 2). Yet, this accessibility has enlivened only scant academic investigation (Mahon & McBride, 2008; Woodward, 2009; Martens & Jakobi, 2010; Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Pal, 2012). A fundamental issue in trying to investigate the OECD, which dates back to its origins, is that considerable aspects of its work "must be on a confidential basis for it to be useful" (Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, Numbered Letter 324, 1960: 2). Indeed, public relations officials at the OECD have been known to comment that the Organisation does not have much "sex appeal compared with other international organizations" (ibid: 2) because the truly intriguing matters must be kept inconspicuous (ibid), thus furthering the point that numerous unknowns surround the OECD.

During the *Cold War*, when capitalism and communism were upheld to be competing forms of public organisation, there was a tendency to typecast the OECD as "the economic branch of NATO" (Asbeek Brusse & Griffiths, 1997: 175),⁹ and, in fact, the OECD regarded itself as such (ibid).¹⁰ At that time, the world was black and white¹¹ and easy to qualify (Trout, 1975; Gould-Davies, 1999). The OECD was upheld to be an elite group of nation states devoted to market capitalism and liberal democracy (Camps, 1975; Davies, 2014). Its membership was, thus, characterised by its co-operative character – its

⁹ NATO and the OECD were both headquartered in Paris until 1966, when the French government requested the removal of NATO headquarters from French territory (Le Blévenec, 2007). There was some overlap in the work of the two organisations and, more importantly, the OECD was able to bring together European countries that were not members of NATO -- including Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland -- to solidify support for Atlantic co-operation (Harned, 1964: 184). Accordingly, the OECD was considered to be "another step in Atlantic cooperation on an institutional basis" (McGhee, 1962: 134). It was tasked with boosting growth and employment in member states in order to keep ahead of the fast-growing Soviet Union (Martens & Jakobi, 2010: 3).

¹⁰ Woodward (2009) claims that this depiction has been "overblown" (63) in that the OECD would have dissolved following the Cold War if this depiction was accurate.

¹¹ according to the *blind logic* of the Cold War and its forced alignments (Hecht, 2011: 6)

absoluteness – rather than by its individual parts. The OECD came to promote this coalition-centric stance, claiming by mission to bring together countries committed to promoting market liberalism and democratic institutions (OECD, *Our mission*, 2013: para 4; Davies, 2014: 1), thereby blanketing all members with this sameness -- with this devotion to the *free* world. Scholarly analysis never probed beyond this image of unity, for it was part of the cloak of the Cold War and seemingly accepted as one wholly unified entity.

Subsequently, now that there is no longer this marked international competition between capitalism and communism, the ways of viewing the world have changed as has knowledge about the world (Ratner, 1998: 66; Kwiek, 2000: 79).¹² Subsequently, the identity of the OECD has begun to be challenged, being that it is no longer a *bulwark* of the Cold War (Ostry, 2008; West, 2011). Resultantly, the OECD is more difficult to characterise and, therefore, to understand.

Given that the OECD has continued to operate (and, indeed, has continued to enlarge its membership) beyond the requisites of the Cold War, surpassing more than fifty years in operation, it is time to consider the contemporary nature of the OECD (Carroll & Kellow, 2011). Namely, researchers want to seek out various answers to questions such as: what does the OECD stand for? ; or what is its post-Cold War purpose?. In contemplating these questions, this chapter will first pursue some of the better known adages for the OECD, precipitating ideas about what the OECD is not.

3.2-What is the OECD?

The OECD is referred to in various ways, which is interesting, considering that it is an economic institution. However, these characterisations should not be

¹² The Cold War reinforced a realist perspective of international politics. Now, however, there is growing consensus that, ultimately, the Cold War was about ideas and beliefs (Westad, 2000: 1).

seen as truisms. They are, in effect, constructions that depict the OECD in different ways and help to make sense of the OECD's existence. Some of the more common characterisations will here be explored in turn.

A Think Tank

This depiction typecasts the OECD as a *thinking organisation*. The OECD is regularly referred to as a *think tank* (Stone, 2007: 262), a term which, itself, has become overused and often misapplied over the years (ibid: 259). In essence, a think tank is an institution carrying out research and analysis in the aim of influencing (political) decision makers (Sánchez & Pizarro Miranda, 2015: 22). To be sure, in the manner of a think tank, the OECD collects data and statistics, publishes its ideas and findings, and makes its recommendations known to governments and the wider public.¹³ In this way, the OECD connects its specialists (policy and technical experts) with decision-makers (Stone, 2005: 40) and influences not only policy transfer¹⁴ but also agenda-setting and political decision-making (Stone, 2001: 338). These formidable analytical and advisory capacities are what increasingly predispose the OECD to being readily labelled as a *think tank* (Stone, 2005: 41). Indeed, since its inception, the OECD has forged a niche for itself in innovative research under the guidance of its first Secretary General, Thorkil Kristensen, an *academic* economist (Schmelzer, 2013).

While, admittedly, the OECD is an “ivory tower,” (interview with former ambassador to the OECD, 6 January 2015) it cannot be equated with the average policy research institute. First of all “very few think tanks are membership organizations” (Stone, 2007: 268-69). The OECD is defined by its members (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 11). Secondly, and more importantly, its members are

¹³ The OECD is a source of long-term quality data on its member (and several non-members') economies, providing credible indicators as to their ongoing policy making and future capabilities (Toniolo, 2005: 34).

¹⁴ the process of one jurisdiction adopting the ideas and arrangements of another jurisdiction (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000: 5; Eccleston & Woodward, 2014: 4)

nation states. Typically, think tanks don't have countries as members. The OECD is an arrangement quite different from most policy institutes in that it has permanent representations (Grinvalds, 2011: 83) – the national delegations of its thirty-four member states plus the European Commission (EC), which afford it a direct line of communication to these governments.

Characteristically, think tanks exert influence “through mediation” (Sánchez & Pizarro Miranda, 2015: 4), meaning that they do not directly voice their opinions to decision makers; rather, their ideas are filtered through other entities like the press. Furthermore, the OECD's involvement in “the policy innovation process” (Gass, 2013: para 1) goes well beyond purely advocating policy positions. Unlike think tanks, which select topics and frame issues, the OECD formulates the very models upon which government policies (and procedures) become based.¹⁵ Lastly, the OECD plays too significant a role in legal governance for it to be likened to a think tank. The OECD's standards and benchmarks have a direct impact upon the national laws of its member states (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014), as will be explained in discussion of the OECD's role in legal governance. Though the OECD provides a credible, neutral opinion, its member states look to it “for more than that” (ibid). Ultimately, therefore, the OECD shares many of the qualities of a think tank, but the *think tank* label does not fully justify the OECD's role and influence as an intergovernmental organisation (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 5).

A Club of Best Practices

The promotion of best practices shows the OECD to be a *doing organisation* rather than simply a thinking organisation. Though initially the OECD

¹⁵ An example is the OECD's *Pressure-State-Response* (PSR) model, which structures how environmental policies are reported, developed, and inspected (Woodward, 2009: 66). PSR is designed to encourage policymakers to consider environmental issues in relation to policy fields by having them measure human environmental *pressure*, the *state* of the natural environment, and social *response* to environmental degradation.

concentrated on coordinating the policies of its member states (Wolfe, 2008: 34), it now focuses on establishing *best practices*¹⁶ among them. This characterisation will be developed in future discussion of the OECD's role in normative governance (in section 3.5). At present, it suffices to say that what the OECD identifies – and upholds – as *best practice* becomes the standard for the *modern* and *leading* nation state (Porter & Webb, 2008: 47).¹⁷ The OECD attempts to measure, benchmark, and promote *best practices* in democratic governance by identifying *leaders* and *laggards* through its committee work and peer review process (Pal, 2012: xvi). As one national delegate acknowledges, the OECD fully embodies this *club of best practices* tag name (interview, 14 October 2014). The OECD provides its members with “the best kind of government and administration” (ibid) through its extensive capacities, thereby setting a high standard for others to follow. While the *club of best practices* moniker does describe a key competence of the OECD, it, nevertheless, conveys only one aspect of the OECD's work.

A Rich Countries' Club

This depiction of a conglomeration of wealthy nations gives prominence to the OECD as a social organisation. Over the years, the phrase has almost become synonymous with the OECD¹⁸ – a trademark that is now proving difficult to desist despite the OECD trying to be more inclusive and give voice to less fully developed countries (Slaughter, 2004: 144). The OECD is an “exclusive club” (ibid: para 4), counting only thirty-four of the United Nations' one hundred and

¹⁶ helping member states to meet the expectations of their citizens in democratic, capitalist societies

¹⁷ From the 1980s onward, OECD countries have reached consensus on a set of four economic policies to provide for sound economic growth: monetary policy (fighting inflation), fiscal policy (lowering public debt), trade liberalisation (allowing greater competition to enhance productivity) and structural reform (accepting painful adjustments). *Good governments* are expected to promote all four (Dodge, 2003).

¹⁸ Over the decades, the term *OECD countries* has become an identifying label to refer to a group of wealthy, industrialised countries (Porter & Webb, 2008). In fact, it has almost become a synonym for *industrialised countries* (Martens & Jakobi, 2010: 5).

ninety-three member states (United Nations, 2013) as full members -- roughly 18 per cent of world states. It is true that some OECD members, such as Japan, Norway, and the United States, rank among the world's highest-income countries and that the OECD has come to be recognised as an important player in international development aid (Leimgruber & Schmelzer, 2015: 15).¹⁹ However, the OECD's membership does not incorporate all high-income countries in the world. There are several nations ranking among the World Bank's list of *high-income economies*, such as Brunei Darussalam, Greenland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (World Bank, 2013), which are outside of the OECD. Therefore, OECD membership is based upon more than economic wealth, though the metric for OECD membership has typically been considered gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and this still appears to be the case (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014).

Moreover, not all OECD member states are high-income countries. Chile, Mexico, and Turkey, for instance, are classified as *middle-income countries* (World Bank, 2013),²⁰ meaning that there is an observable distinction between OECD member states. By way of illustration, the World Bank has a separate category for *high-income OECD members* in its country classification by gross national income (GNI) (ibid). This distinction intimates that there is a clear divide that can be drawn between high-income OECD countries and less-affluent OECD countries, so the OECD is not necessarily a homogenous group of countries in terms of wealth. There is speculation that the OECD's inclusion of these particular lower-income countries has more to do with politics and projected income levels than with their current national revenues (Kudrle, 2012: 696). In any regard, the OECD's depiction as a rich countries' club appears to be more of a stereotype than a standard.

¹⁹ Instead of having its own bank, the OECD encourages development aid by making such assistance a *normal function* of the modern state (Leimgruber & Schmelzer, 2015: 15).

²⁰ with average incomes ranging from \$4,036 to \$12,475 per year

A Forum for Market Democracies

The forum connotation accentuates the OECD's reputation as a *talking organisation*. Accurately, the OECD does emphasise continual forms of dialogue. The OECD annually brings together more than fifty thousand officials from around the world to attend two thousand meetings in Paris (in addition to its meetings held overseas) (Rodrigues & Black, 2013: para 8). In fact, according to one diplomat, networking is a large part of what the OECD does (interview, 14 October 2014).²¹ It encourages contact and, therefore, dialogue between a number of countries that might not otherwise have regular contact or communication (ibid).²² The OECD is regularly referred to as a *talking shop*, underscoring the belief that it has no hard power and is, therefore, limited to organising dialogue (Prost & Kingsley Clark, 2006: 353).

The depiction of the OECD as an organisation for market democracies is, however, inconclusive. The case of Turkey, an OECD founder country, is examined in chapter four, in part because when Turkey helped to establish the OECD, it was under military rule, thereby bringing the authenticity of its democratic roots into question. Albeit, the Republic of Turkey is not the only such questionable inclusion. Portugal and Spain, respectively speaking, were also under military direction and the command of a dictator when they helped to establish the OECD.²³ Similarly, Greece came under military rule not long after joining the OECD (1967-1974). More recently, in 1994, when Mexico formally joined the OECD, it was considered to be a "one party democracy" (Rhoda & Burton, 2013). Likewise, Hungary, an OECD member since 1996, is

²¹ Hall and Soskice (2001) have labelled bodies like the OECD *deliberative institutions*, by reason that they provide national officials (who are potentially able to co-operate) with a means for deliberation, encouraging them to share information for cross-national comparison and to reach agreement based upon greater common knowledge (11-12).

²² and in a much more intimate environment than the United Nations

²³ Portugal was under the *Estado Novo* (1933-1974), and Spain, under General Francisco Franco (1939-1975).

said to be transforming into a “distorted democracy” (Dezso Czigler & Takacs, 2012).²⁴ To such a degree, the delineation of the OECD as a forum for market democracies is a dubious designation.

Observation - It is an International Organisation

While each of the aforementioned attributes colourfully defines one specific aspect of the OECD, “none of these descriptions captures the essence of the OECD” (Comenetz, 2011: para 6) in and of itself. The OECD is, in the words of its Secretary General, Angel Gurría, “much more than that” (Marcussen & Trondal, 2011: 1). The question thus persists as to what exactly the OECD is and how can a clear definition of it be established.

The fact that the OECD – an international economic institution – has attracted so many catchphrases only reinforces the complexity of its peculiar makeup and purpose. This further demonstrates that the OECD is viewed differently than its peers, which are not referred to with similar truisms. Actually, it is regularly noted that the OECD is unlike its counterpart institutions in that the OECD does not have coercive means for pursuing its mandate; expressly, the OECD is not a fund and does not have sanctioning powers (Slaughter, 2004: 145; Pal, 2012: 214; Major, 2014: 52).

Nonetheless, what most of the aforementioned characterisations of the OECD contain is an element of reservedness or impressiveness. Despite the OECD’s work with the G20 and its recent shift to include some Latin American countries (Chile and Mexico) as members, the OECD is still notoriously selective. This elite quality is one of the elements that truly characterises the

²⁴ Hungary has brought in constitutional amendments that critics say put the country on path to becoming a dictatorship by removing the checks and balances on government. On March 11, 2013, the two-thirds parliamentary majority of Prime Minister Orbán passed amendments that remove the constitutional court’s power of review on grounds of substance and render pre-2012 legal rulings null and void, among other changes, such as tighter control of the media (Gardner, 2013; MacDowall, 2014).

Organisation.²⁵ When queried about the nature of the OECD, for instance, one senior government official of an OECD founder country quickly opined that the OECD is “a prestigious institution that is impossible to join” (interview, 5 November 2015). The OECD’s prestige, then, especially the prestige linked to its membership, is what gives the OECD influence.

Yet, before becoming distracted by the elitism that distinguishes the OECD, one obvious factor needs to be expressed, and that is that the OECD is an **international organisation**, broadly speaking.²⁶ Its members are nation states, with the European Commission participating in the initiatives of the Organisation (OECD, Members and partners, 2013: para 2); it has been established by a convention, the *Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (1960);²⁷ and it is vested with legal personality²⁸ as well as with its own aims, through which it reinforces accepted norms, such as *co-operation and development* (Sands & Klein, 2009: 15).²⁹

As an international organisation, the OECD performs functions similar to other international organisations by gathering information and monitoring

²⁵ The OECD’s highly technical work, lofty location, generous budget, and expert staff all help to define it in this way.

²⁶ While the OECD is an inter-governmental organisation, more generally speaking, it is an international organisation. The definition of an *international organisation* is primarily legal (and normative) (Brölmann, 2007: 23). The mainstream literature refers to international organisations as entities set up between nation states and based upon treaties, giving them (at least some) independent powers in order to carry out given functions (Prost & Kingsley Clark, 2006: 348; Klabbers, 2013: 4). Case law specifying the concept is rare, being that it is more common for the courts to specify what international organisations are not (Klabbers, 2013: 15). Nevertheless, there is a general presumption that international organisations are “innately good” (ibid: 5) and socially beneficial, performing tasks that are somehow in the public interest (ibid: 4). However, there is no reason to believe that international organisations do less harm than states acting individually (Sarooshi, 2005).

²⁷ An international organisation’s power is legally said to be based in its founding documents (Guzman, 2012: 10).

²⁸ Since 1949, international organisations are considered to be *international legal persons*, separate from the nation states that form them (Sarooshi, 2005; Alvarez, 2008).

²⁹ Conventionally, scholars have assumed that the most important functions of international organisations are facilitating cooperation and resolving problems (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005: 161) though their role in building national capacity should not be under estimated, particularly in the case of the OECD (Haas, Keohane and Levy, 1993).

trends; delivering services (timely reports, comparative statistics, special studies); providing a forum for intergovernmental negotiation and idea generation; setting international (and, therefore, national) agendas; regularising diplomacy through frequent meetings; and institutionalising state co-operation in various fields, allowing for policy co-ordination and joint operational activities (Karns & Mingst, 2004: 7).

International organisations “come in all forms and shapes” (Klabbers, 2013: 3). Strangely, “few seem to be alike” (ibid: 1) though they are numerous.³⁰ Under international institutional law, organisations are generally either classified by their function (purpose) or by their membership (universal or closed) (Sands & Klein, 2009: 17).³¹ Historically speaking, international organisations have been perceived as extensions of nation states, created to perform functions that the states themselves are unable to (easily) perform (Klabbers, 2005: 278). This perspective has typically favoured rationalist approaches to international politics, emphasising the assigned tasks of international organisations, all the while presupposing national interests and material benefits to be at the core of their existence (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005: 161; Klabbers, 2005: 279). Yet, such an approach de-emphasises the social and political nature of international organisations,³² and the OECD is no exception.

The OECD has a broad mandate (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 4) and its functions, accordingly, are flexible, making it more prudent to classify the OECD by its membership (which is *select*)³³ and, hence, to adopt a social constructivist approach to its analysis. Select membership is not particular to the OECD (Karns & Mingst, 2004: 7), but among the main, formal international

³⁰ As an indication of the wide variety that exist, *The Yearbook of International Organizations* lists the profiles of more than 67,000 international organisations (Union of International Associations, 2015).

³¹ These categories are purely analytical. They do not carry legal consequences (Brölmann, 2007: 22).

³² Barnett & Finnemore (2005) contend that statist and functionalist views of international organisations obscure important features of their power, downplaying their political nature (161).

³³ Klabbers (2013) evinces that the OECD has “select membership along ideological lines” (3).

economic institutions, the OECD shares the characteristics of an elite few organisations by having its membership not be, theoretically, open to all (see Appendix 2). This selection of relations is, thus, what defines the OECD, giving it purpose and qualifying its members (Davis, 2013).

Territorially speaking, the OECD member states are heterogeneous, spanning several continents. Economically, legally, and politically speaking, however, they are upheld to be homogeneous -- sharing common governance practices, including open markets, democratic elections, and respect for human rights (Czarney et al, 2010:82). As the analysis in this chapter has evidenced thus far, such a broad sweeping characterisation (of homogeneity) does not always prove true though in the case of the OECD (and this will be examined further in chapter four).

There is a great deal of (political) discrepancy in OECD member selection (Davis, 2013). Technically speaking, under the parameters of the OECD Convention, it is possible for any country to join the OECD, providing that said country is willing to promote the OECD's *common values*.³⁴ Article 16 of the Convention establishes that membership of the OECD is open to "any Government prepared to assume the obligations" (OECD, 1960). However, the caveat is that such selection must be "upon the unanimous decision of the Council" (ibid). In practise, therefore, membership choices are quite constrained in that all member states must agree with a selection. A constructivist lens will be employed herein to help determine if the OECD alliance is disingenuous (hollow) or if there is some more profound context beneath the OECD's homogenous façade.

³⁴ These will be described in the next section.

3.3-How Does the OECD Work?

In order to understand why the OECD exists, it is imperative to understand the details of what it does and how it is structured.

Mission

In essence, the OECD is guided by a mission to increase economic development both domestically and abroad:

The aims of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development shall be to promote policies designed:

- (a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;*
- (b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and*
- (c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.*

[Article 1, Convention on the OECD, 1960]

In many regards, the OECD is not given sufficient recognition for the significance of this mandate. While it is extremely broad, the OECD's mission is, nonetheless, important to capitalist states by sustaining economic development (GDP) and, concomitantly, increasing international trade (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014).³⁵ This is why the OECD's policy approaches seem to change dramatically over time. As the means for

³⁵ There is a need for more research into the OECD's role in trade promotion. Rose (2005) has found that membership of the OECD has a consistently strong (positive) effect on trade (693), much more so than membership of the other prominent international economic institutions (690).

sustaining economic development change, so, too, do the OECD's policy prescriptions for achieving economic development (ibid).³⁶ This is suggested in the OECD's mission statement -- *Better Policies for Better Lives* – the notion being that the OECD promotes policies that improve peoples' lives by generating more wealth in the world, thereby improving social welfare overall (as seen in chapter four).

Budget

Behind this ambitious mission, there is a sizable budget (see Appendix 3). The OECD is member-funded and, in keeping with its prestigious image, is equipped with substantial resources, denoting the value that member states place upon the OECD (Grinvalds, 2011: 51).³⁷ Similar to the member funding of the United Nations' regular budget, member-funding of the OECD is based upon a formula, which calculates member contributions relative to the size of their economies (OECD, Budget, 2013). The United States has continuously been the largest contributor, and the United States currently funds over one-fifth (21.07% or EUR 76.48 million) of the OECD's general budget (of EUR 363 million). The other thirty-three OECD members collectively contribute EUR 286.52 million annually (OECD, Member Countries Budget Contributions, 2015).³⁸ The funding is directed at the OECD's research and programs, with the Organisation's budget and work plans decided on a two-year basis (OECD,

³⁶ Presently, for instance, the OECD places much emphasis upon working with new economies, such as Africa, China, and Brazil, to sustain economic development (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014).

³⁷ Member contributions to the OECD's (regular) operating budget are in addition to other national expenses associated with OECD membership, such as permanent missions in Paris, annual travel expenses of national officials to and from meetings in Paris, and the like. All said, participation in the OECD entails significant costs to governments.

³⁸ The EU is not a full member of the OECD and, therefore, does not make obligatory contributions towards the regular budget; rather, it makes contributions on a voluntary basis (Davies, 2014: 8).

Budget, 2013). The flexible nature of the contributions³⁹ enables big and small countries alike the opportunity to participate in the OECD's work and to learn from other member states. When a member country increases its GDP, thereby fulfilling the mission of the OECD, it is expected to finance a greater proportion of the OECD's operations, assisting its peers in kind. Furthermore, if a member state wishes to fund a special study or research program, it may do so, granted it has the means and the OECD has the capacity to carry it out (OECD, Member Countries' Budget Contributions, 2015).

Nonetheless, OECD members also recognise that the funding arrangement works in favour of the United States (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014). The United States makes a relatively small investment in the OECD compared to what it spends on other international initiatives; nevertheless, America can be "very influential within the Organisation" (ibid) by exerting its influence⁴⁰ on the rules and procedures adopted, for example (ibid). Considering that the OECD has many small countries as members, powerful members, particularly the United States, can have a tremendous influence over the affairs of the Organisation.

Structure

Notwithstanding, there is said to be an *OECD way of working*,⁴¹ based upon the Organisation's homogenous membership and resulting high degree of trust. The OECD is structured in a manner that allows for open dialogue and mutual accountability between officials at all levels of the Organisation, enabling

³⁹ There are only three constraints upon national contributions to the general budget: they should not exceed 25%; they should not be less than 0.1% of the OECD's budget, and they should not increase more than 10% per budgetary allocation (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 15).

⁴⁰ Unlike *coercion*, *influence* does not involve an element of threat, meaning that compliance is achieved through the recognition of one's capabilities and legitimate command (Lukes, 1974: 18).

⁴¹ This is nicely graphed on the OECD's website: <http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/>

member states to work together to solve common problems (Guzman, 2012: 23). What is striking about the OECD's way of working is its versatility. Member states seem relatively free to participate as they wish in the work of the OECD.⁴² Beyond needing to have a permanent representative (ambassador) as well as representation at the annual Ministerial Council Meeting, member governments appear to have few requirements dictating their level of participation in the OECD. They can take part in the committees of their choosing, have a self-designated delegation size, and promote the work of the OECD in a way they deem appropriate.⁴³ The high level of flexibility encourages the voluntary exchange of ideas and practices.

The basic structure and way of working of the OECD has continued since the time of the OEEC, emphasising international co-operation in the committees and the Council. In effect, the OECD is a complex web of inter-networking groups, including approximately two hundred and fifty committees and working parties (OECD, *Who does what*, 2013: para 4) in addition to a sizable Secretariat of two thousand and five hundred staff. To simplify matters, the OECD can be regarded as a composite of two types of people: international civil servants (who are engaged directly by the OECD and work in the Secretariat) and international diplomats, visiting experts, and other visiting representatives (who work for their respective governments and other institutions and participate in the OECD's committees and delegations). These two groups help to make up the various entities of the OECD (see Appendix 4), which can be divided into six parts: the permanent delegations, the OECD Council, the committees, the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, and the

⁴² This tendency will be examined further with the case of Turkey's membership.

⁴³ There are great discrepancies between how OECD member states participate in the Organisation despite the small size of the OECD. Some national delegations do not have their own websites; some consist of only a few staff members; others are quite large, and, finally, some delegations are eager to lead committee work, while others do not seem to be as interested.

independent bodies, as detailed henceforth.

Permanent Delegations

Paris is a symbolic choice of location for the OECD's headquarters and permanent delegations to the OECD in that it embodies the post-war spirit of the Organisation. The city was liberated from the Nazis through Allied co-operation and continued to serve as a site for international co-operation following World War II ⁴⁴ (in dichotomy with the city of Berlin, which became divided following World War II, with the Berlin Wall being erected just one month before the OECD became operational).

Generally speaking, as a city, Paris is better known for its tourist appeal than as a financial centre; however, the choice of location for the OECD's headquarters and permanent delegations is emblematic of the greater duality among the diplomatic missions of the world: they are located in some of the top tourist destinations, highlighting their social nature, while at the same time being highly technical in their subjects of focus, such as atomic energy and intellectual property, to cite but two examples.

Carroll and Kellow (2011) have observed a tendency for OECD member states located at a greater distance from Paris to have larger delegations to the OECD (16). Basically, each member state maintains a permanent delegation to the Organisation in Paris,⁴⁵ headed by an ambassador. Principally, the delegations act as conduits for their home offices and facilitate the continuous stream of visiting officials to the OECD (as will be explained in discussion of the

⁴⁴ While the Château de la Muette embodies the prestige of the OECD, with the property being associated with the likes of Marie-Antoinette, Louis XV, and the Rothschild family, it also epitomises the *post-war* character of the OECD. During World War II, the Château became the military headquarters of the German Naval Command until Paris was liberated and, then, the Château became the site of the US Naval Command (Osborne, 1999).

⁴⁵ as does the EU (which has quasi-membership status through representation by the European Commission)

OECD committees). Overall, the delegations strive to ensure that the OECD's work reflects their governments' views and priorities, and, accordingly, each ambassador sits on the OECD Council, its governing body (to be explained later in this chapter), while national representatives supervise and participate in the work of the OECD's various committees and working parties.

The OECD is not unique in having permanent delegations (see Appendix 5), which represent the interests of their respective national governments and participate in the work of the OECD. However, the OECD is rather unique in being an international economic institution *and* having permanent delegations (ibid). Most of the world's permanent missions are to the United Nations – to its various offices and agencies around the world – which are primarily located in the United States and Europe. Other missions are to regional institutions, including the African Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the European Union (EU), and the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as to security organisations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Security Organization (NATO). Aside from the UN system organisations (and UN-associated bodies, such as the WTO), the OECD is the only non-regional international economic institution to which there are permanent delegations.

The OECD's diplomatic element colours its activities and frames its approach to working. Quite significantly, the OECD began operating just months after the United Nations adopted *the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* in 1961⁴⁶, and this helps to explain the OECD having a diplomatic aspect to support its economic mandate. Thereabouts, the OECD's diplomatic

⁴⁶ The *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* was adopted on 18 April 1961, while the OECD became operational on 30 September 1961. The Convention endorses a body of rules regulating diplomatic relations, including the establishment and functions of permanent missions, specifying the immunities and privileges of diplomatic officials. A copy of the text can be accessed on-line at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1964/06/19640624%2002-10%20AM/Ch_III_3p.pdf.

aspect should not be discounted and needs to be seen as a key part of the OECD's overall way of working.

The Council

The ambassadors (permanent representatives) of each member state as well as the European Commission comprise the Council of Permanent Representatives -- the "central body" (OECD, 1982: 7) of the OECD. As its name implies, the Council presides over the Organisation. Yet, it should be stressed that the Council maintains relatively loose oversight, considering that there are approximately two hundred and fifty committees and working parties at the OECD at the time of writing (OECD, *Who Does What*, 2013: para 4). Working with the Secretary General (to be explained later in this chapter), the Council oversees the administration of the OECD by delineating organisational rules and regulations, managing problems, and approving the budget (Woodward, 2009: 48). As a hallmark of the *OECD way of working*, the Council makes decisions by consensus⁴⁷ (OECD, *Who does what*, 2013: para 2), which is a significant feat, given that thirty-five diplomatic heads need to reach agreement. The group meets monthly (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 11), with the meetings chaired by the Secretary-General.

Once a year the Council meets at the ministerial level⁴⁸ to give "political impetus to the coming year's work" (OECD, 1982: 9) by setting the overall strategic direction for the OECD. Member states take turns chairing the annual

⁴⁷ Like NATO, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and many of the specialised agencies of the UN, the OECD's decision-making and procedural rules are by consensus. Steinberg (2002) qualifies this style of decision-making as *sovereign equality* decision-making, to the extent that the Organisation grants equal representation and voting power to all member states (339). On a smaller scale, some administrative decisions of the OECD can be taken by qualified majority vote.

⁴⁸ The name is now a bit misleading. Traditionally, it has been the ministers of trade, finance, and foreign affairs who have attended the MCM (Ministerial Council Meeting). Over the past decade this has changed, and less senior officials are representing their governments at the MCM (Woodward, 2009: 46).

meeting and, thus, guiding the event. In this way, the diplomatic representatives are directly responsible for the administration and oversight of the OECD separate from the international civil servants (the Secretariat).

Committees

For many, the OECD's committee system is "its key distinguishing feature as an international organization" (Pal, 2012: 85). It is the "beating heart" (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 18) of the OECD. In essence, the committees are the group of bodies to which the Council delegates powers and the locus of much OECD dialogue. Just as John F. Kennedy (who ratified the convention establishing the OECD) was known to profess, "You cannot have serious government without collective discussion" (Schlesinger Jr, 1965: 211). Unlike meetings at the intra-state level, the OECD's committee and working group meetings are formed almost exclusively of government officials, not politicians (Pal, 2012: 85), which has a tremendous impact upon the nature of the committees' work. Rather than being concerned about projecting politically popular views, bureaucrats (especially technocrats) are more in a position to freely listen and to learn from each other (Şhafak, 2011). This is what some countries, such as Denmark, feel makes the OECD practical and effective. The Organisation "offers the possibility of dialogue" (interview with national delegate, 23 October 2014), unlike many other international economic institutions.

Committee discussions generate a sense of sharing amongst peers, creating opportunities to bond with others facing similar issues in their home countries (Pal, 2012: 85). Committees must reach decisions by mutual agreement, thereby strengthening their sense of camaraderie⁴⁹ and trust through the necessity of reaching compromises (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 24).

⁴⁹ The committees have several working methods that enhance *like-mindedness* among the members, including peer review, best practices, and principles of *soft law*. These will be reviewed in section 3.4.

Perhaps even more importantly, when members have problems (experiences to share from their home countries), they voice them rather than keeping them hidden. It is this aspect that truly characterises the OECD's form of open dialogue, as will be discussed further in chapter five.

Overall, committee membership varies depending upon the topic (issue) in question. Representatives typically have expertise in the committee's subject matter and are from relevant government ministries (Pal, 2012: 84). It is possible for non-members to participate in most OECD technical groups as well.⁵⁰ Those participating in one or more of the OECD's committees are referred to as *partners* (OECD, Legal Affairs, 2013).⁵¹ Participation is at the invitation or pending the approval of the Council (and possibly the relevant committee). Generally, the committees meet only once or twice annually, for two or three days at a time (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 20). Though they do not occur frequently, the meetings are a central means through which public servants can build networks (Pal, 2012: 85) with international colleagues.⁵² The working groups, in particular, afford representatives from smaller countries (economically speaking) the opportunity to interact at a close level with policymakers from larger economies, to whom they might not otherwise have access (West, 2011: 77).

The most important OECD committee within the area of economic policy matters is the Economic Policy Committee (interview with diplomatic representative, 1 October 2014) – a long-standing OECD group, which is as old as the OECD itself. The Committee presents a country economic outlook twice a year and gives recommendations as per key structural reforms (ibid). Owing to

⁵⁰ In addition to non-member governments, representatives of non-governmental organisations also participate (as observers) in a limited number of committees (Davies, 2014: 4).

⁵¹ Brazil, for instance, presently participates in 18 OECD committees, but it is not a full member of the OECD (OECD, Active with Brazil, 2015).

⁵² They form *occupational communities* that bypass their national borders, helping to establish a similarity in their worldviews (Schein, 1996: 12).

the innumerable number of economic committees within the Organisation, the OECD has an on-line database of its committees and working groups⁵³, which further highlights its wide-ranging expertise and subject knowledge on international economic conditions, trends, issues, and solutions.

Whereas the OECD's committees only convene a few times a year, their work is supported on an ongoing basis by the Organisation's civil servants (in the corresponding directorates of the Secretariat). This has created a two-way relationship. The directorates (civil servants) maintain on-going analytical work for the committees, and the committees, in turn, provide feedback to the directorates. Such material comes to shape the substantive basis of the OECD's outputs (Grinvalds, 2011: 57). To this degree, the OECD's committee system and the Secretariat profit from a two-way relationship (United States Mission to the OECD, 2013: para 3) and keep the OECD and its member governments dependent upon each other for valuable information. One can understand that OECD policy work is not created in vertical silos. The committee system is a way of working that distinguishes the OECD in that government officials, themselves, are involved in producing the data and policy outputs, so they have a stake in the work (Pal & Clark, 2014: 32).

Secretary-General

The Secretary-General is the figurehead that links the Council (executive oversight) with the Secretariat (the bureaucracy). In addition to managing the Secretariat, the Secretary-General reports to the Council and chairs their monthly meetings (at the level of the permanent representatives.) The Secretary-General also has a public role. He or she is the *face* of the OECD, making official visits to member and partner countries and representing the

⁵³ The database can be accessed at the following web address: <http://webnet.oecd.org/OECDGROUPS/Bodies/ListByIndexView.aspx?book=true>

OECD at bilateral meetings and other high-level affairs. The Secretary-General is appointed for a five-year renewable term by decision of the Council [Article 10, Convention on the OECD, 1960].

The current Secretary-General, Angel Gurría (2006 -), has served as Mexico's Minister of Foreign Affairs (1994-1998) and Minister of Finance (1998-2000). His background exemplifies the role of the Secretary-General in that he has an impressive history serving his own national government, but his position at the OECD is impartial (independent of his national background). Secretary-General Gurría is known for his dynamism and desire to achieve a higher profile for the OECD (interview with a former ambassador to the OECD, 6 January 2015). This indicates that the OECD Secretaries-General have some latitude in the direction that they steer the OECD, much like a chief executive officer.

Secretariat

The OECD Secretariat is a body of international civil servants, meaning workers from the various OECD countries who are engaged by the OECD directly and who, therefore, do not act in a national capacity. They are expected to be impartial, acting on behalf of all OECD member countries.⁵⁴ In total, the Secretariat is comprised of two thousand, five hundred staff members,⁵⁵ who are based in Paris. Owing to the fact that the OECD's diplomatic base⁵⁶ changes frequently, the Secretariat is the mainstay of the Organisation (the body comprised of its own staff), which helps to ensure the long-term success of the OECD.

⁵⁴International bureaucracies are seen to depoliticise decision making (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005: 164).

⁵⁵ As a point of reference, the UN Secretariat has a general staff of about 8,900 persons, meaning that the OECD Secretariat is a little less than one-third the size of the UN Secretariat (UN, 2004).

⁵⁶ the permanent delegations, the Council, and some of the committee members

The Secretariat is structured much like a government, with its functions clearly divisible into three parts: operational matters (such as human resources, legal affairs, and global relations), public affairs (media relations and publishing), and departments, which parallel the work of the OECD committees (see Appendix 4). For the most part, the work of the Secretariat is divided into *directorates*, wherein groups are organised by related responsibilities (OECD, 1985: 7). There are twelve departments, which correlate with the topics of OECD committees: development co-operation; economics; education and skills; employment, labour and social affairs; entrepreneurship, SMEs and local development; environment; financial and enterprise affairs; public governance and territorial development; science, technology and innovation; statistics; tax policy and administration, as well as trade and agriculture. As the mainstay of the OECD, the Secretariat also houses the day-to-day operations of the Organisation, including OECD Publishing and Media Relations. In this way, the Secretariat is what keeps the OECD functioning, encompassing the Economics Department and the Statistics Directorate, to name but two of the Secretariat's key entities.

Yet, the most striking feature of the OECD Secretariat is its expertise.⁵⁷ The Secretariat is recognised to have established “a quasi monopoly on comparable statistical data for developed countries in almost any conceivable policy area” (Busch, 2009: 90). The Secretariat is made up of “numerous world class experts” (Rhoda & Burton, 2013) to assist member states with specific policies and issues, enabling greater flexibility overall in the OECD's work. About one-third (seven hundred and fifty staff) of the Secretariat are economists, lawyers, policy

⁵⁷ The Secretariat encompasses an extraordinary body of knowledge. It maintains statistics on four hundred and seventy-five public policy topics, covering everything from household broadband access to prison population rates (OECD, Data, 2015). This has helped to make the OECD into a tremendous publisher. In addition to its monthly magazine, the *OECD Observer*, the OECD (Secretariat) annually publishes about two hundred and fifty books and papers a year – more than eight thousand to date (OECD, iLibrary, 2013). Its research topics cover everything from astronomy and health to e-government, making the OECD (Secretariat) one of the largest publishers in the world in the fields of economics and public policy (Delegation of Sweden to the OECD, 2013: para 3).

analysts, and scientists (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 26). The remaining staff members are primarily administrative professionals, information technologists, translators, and interpreters (ibid: 26). Conjointly, policy experts are increasingly being seconded from member governments to work on special OECD initiatives (ibid: 26), further augmenting the Secretariat's "highly skilled research cadre" (Pal, 2012: xix). This breadth in capabilities means that "the OECD is capable of gathering data and undertaking analysis on a scale that few countries can achieve alone" (Grinvalds, 2011: 56).

Officially, the OECD Secretariat is not an academic body (OECD, 1985: 3), though its work forms the basis of committee and working group discussions as well as OECD reports and publications (Wolfe, 2001). Some departments within the Secretariat have more academic suasion than others. Over a ten-year period (1995-2005), for instance, the Environment Directorate contributed to fifty-five articles in academic journals and over about the same period of time (1998-2005), the Environment Directorate hosted 140 academic conferences, workshops, and meetings to facilitate Council decisions and recommendations (Busch, 2009: 76-77).

It is generally claimed that Secretariat staff work under the initiative of the OECD member states. Most Secretariat documents, for example, pass through at least one committee before publication (Grinvalds, 2011: 57). Secretariat staff are not believed to have the authority⁵⁸ to impose their own ideas as a group (OECD, 1985: 3). Instead, their influence lies in their "capacity for intellectual persuasion" (ibid: 3).⁵⁹What makes their expertise so valuable is that they have

⁵⁸ *Authority* is a social construction that confers a *right* upon the holder to issue declarations that are morally binding based upon his or her special status. Whereas *power* coerces, *authority* obligates. Since the publication of *Leviathan* in 1651, there has been a distinction between *being an* authority (an expert) and *being in* authority (an office holder), though the two do not preclude each other, meaning that an expert (an authority) can also *be in* authority (O'Sullivan, 2003: 44-45; Barnett & Finnemore, 2005: 169-170).

⁵⁹ It is commonly claimed that the OECD (through the Secretariat) has the ability to change peoples' perceptions. Building upon Weber's concept of the rational-legal authority of bureaucracy, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) suggest that international organisations, such as the OECD, have four types of

regular access to the inside knowledge of governments through conferences, OECD networks, and internal interactions (Busch, 2009: 90).

Over the years, there has been some concern regarding the objectivity of OECD Secretariat staff (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 26) despite the generally high reputation of the Secretariat (ibid: 29). Staff members are selected based upon merit, namely their qualifications and experience (Grinvalds, 2011: 70). They must be citizens of an OECD member country, but there is no proportional system for hiring based upon nationality, such as population, or the budgetary contributions of the respective member countries. As the OECD is based in Europe, the majority of staff members are European, most notably from France and the United Kingdom, in addition to the United States, respectively (Clifton & Días-Fuentes, 2011: 560).

Furthermore, there has been notable critique that the majority of Secretariat staff have professional qualifications from Anglo-Saxon countries or have been trained in neoclassical economics (Dostal, 2004: 446; Mahon & McBride, 2008: 14; Grinvalds, 2011: 72), thereby maintaining a dominant discourse at the OECD (Mahon, 2015: 6) by way of the similarity of views (values and beliefs) and approaches across the Secretariat. Nevertheless, many departments within the Secretariat have always invited external experts to participate in the work of the Organisation and by that welcomed the exchange of new ideas and practices (Busch, 2009: 90). At any rate, the Secretariat is what gives the OECD a reputation for technical expertise (Eccleston & Woodward, 2014: 2), maintaining its credibility, as discussed in section 3.5.

Independent Bodies

authority: delegated (from member states), expert (due to their specializations), moral (embodying certain principles and practices), and rational-legal (technocratic) (23). Secretariat staff strongly display expert and technocratic authority.

There are seven semi-autonomous bodies that operate within the framework of the OECD (see Appendix 4). Some of these have become famous research institutions in their own right, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). One could argue that these bodies give the OECD *added value*, qualifying its continued existence among international organisations. In fact, the Nuclear Energy Agency predates the OECD, itself. The NEA⁶⁰ was formed in 1958 (shortly after the creation of Euratom, the European Atomic Energy Community)⁶¹ in order to further the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (OECD, 1982: 10). Under the auspices of the OECD, then, countries that were former enemies are able to come together to share the most sensitive of information and technologies. Like the OECD, its special bodies have restricted membership, and they often focus on specially-financed projects (ibid: 9). The special bodies contribute to the OECD's overall impressive scope of work.

Other Organisations

Separate from the aforementioned independent bodies, there are two main special interest groups with which the OECD regularly co-operates: the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC). Each has its own small, permanent secretariat in Paris at a distance from the OECD's headquarters. BIAC has been active since 1962 and seeks to ensure that the OECD's economic policies do not negatively affect its members (BIAC, 2013). TUAC dates back to 1948, when it was established as a trade union advisory committee for the European Recovery Programme under the *Marshall Plan* (TUAC, 2013). TUAC works with the OECD and member governments to ensure that union views are

⁶⁰ NEA, which allows for co-operation in the field of nucleonics, is said to have "brought about one of the most important achievements in the law of international public services" (Hahn, 1962: 528). It has institutionalised the first collaborative policy work in the field of nuclear energy.

⁶¹ The European Atomic Energy Community was created in 1957 under the Treaties of Rome.

considered before OECD policies are formalised. It is common for BIAC and TUAC to have *pre-meetings* with OECD committee members in order to present their positions prior to formal meetings (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 21). Both interest groups are funded through their affiliates in OECD countries (Woodward, 2008a: 81).

Mention should also be made of the OECD's extensive collaboration with other international organisations, as the OECD is not an entity onto itself. It operates in conjunction with others and is, accordingly, social by nature.⁶² The OECD has partnership and information-sharing agreements with several international development banks and multilateral organisations (see Appendix 6.). The OECD has conspicuous ties with prominent European-based international organisations, namely the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union (EU), and NATO. The OECD has continued the OEEC's relationship with the Council of Europe, and each year the OECD Secretary-General presents an organisational update to the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (OECD, Relations with the Council of Europe, 2013). The Secretary-General is also required to present an annual economic update to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (OECD, Relations with Parliamentarians, 2013). The EU visibly participates in the work of the OECD (as noted in previous sections of this chapter), and the two organisations share several common initiatives, including Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA).⁶³ The OECD's partnerships do not end with these few examples, however. As will be explained in section 3.5, the OECD operates within "an increasingly dense web of transnational networks" (Mahon & McBride, 2008: 3). These networks spread the OECD's data and opinions far beyond its member states (Martens & Jakobi, 2010: 270).

⁶² Alvarez (2008) bluntly professes, "IOs breed. They proliferate, interact and reproduce themselves through multiple subsidiary organs" (596).

⁶³ SIGMA is a joint (OECD-EU) initiative, principally funded by the EU. It helps EU candidate countries and potential candidate countries to meet European regulatory and administrative standards for stable democracies and free market economies. See www.sigmaweb.org for more details.

Through these relations, the OECD's "unparalleled access to networks of experts in all policy domains" (Wolfe, 2008: 40) affords it the ability to constantly bring new ideas to the foreground. Its policy approaches are often aimed at changing its members' manner of thinking, exposing them to new ways of looking at issues, and directing them to novel ways of considering solutions (ibid: 38). Because the OECD is well linked into the wider processes and institutions of international governance, it is able to share its ideas with other political and research institutions – including international executive institutions, such as the G8 and the G20 – and influence policy approaches in turn (Mahon & McBride, 2008: 6). Yet, perhaps more importantly, as a body with ambassadorial overlay, the OECD not only institutionalises with whom its members relate but also the manner in which they interrelate (Wolfe, 2008: 41). Article 3 of the *Convention on the OECD* encourages members to voluntarily co-operate and openly exchange information regarding their experiences in economic fields, as is evident from the following:

Article 3

With a view to achieving the aims set out in Article 1 and to fulfilling the undertakings contained in Article 2, the Members agree that they will:

- (a) keep each other informed and furnish the Organisation with the information necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks;
- (b) consult together on a continuing basis, carry out studies and participate in agreed projects; and
- (c) co-operate closely and where appropriate take co-ordinated action.

(OECD, 1960)

Members learn that they come together to reach agreement, respecting each other's positions under the expectation that they must reach a consensus (Wolfe, 2011: 281).

International co-operation is often taken for granted, but it is not arbitrary (Pease, 2010: 125). It must be encouraged (including through joint commitments and collective goals) for it to rise above national interests. Once interdependence increases, so, too, does the importance of the international organisation, in this case, the OECD (Hurd, 2011b: 1). It is this “appearance of consensus” (Porter & Webb, 2008: 57) that empowers the OECD to define its values – liberal idealist values – as *universal* values, giving its concepts clout among people of influence, through shaping their attitudes and common perceptions (Woodward, 2008a: 84).

All in all, the OECD way of working is rather complex, but it is effective, to the degree that it maintains both an international bureaucracy (Secretariat) and diplomatic representations (the Council) all the while hosting thousands of meetings and forums and publishing hundreds of titles a year.

3.4-How Does the OECD Take on New Members?

Thus far, the chapter has contemplated what the OECD is (section 2) and how the OECD works (section 3). This section now examines the OECD’s member selection process. Though Turkey was a founding member of the OECD and, consequently, did not need to join the Organisation, it is purposeful to consider the basis upon which the OECD selects its members, for as seen in section 3.2, the OECD is classified by its membership, which is select. This selectness is what defines the OECD.

By and large, every international organisation has its own way of selecting members and introducing new participants to its group (Magliveras, 2011). Selection, in fact, is an activity that can identify a particular social group, being that each group has its own selection methods and patterns of behaviour (Sirianni et al., 2015). Ironically, though the OECD is defined by its select

membership, much of how the OECD goes about selecting candidate countries to join its Organisation is unknown.

The OECD's membership policies are outlined in its enlargement webpage (*OECD and enlargement*),⁶⁴ which contains information about accession⁶⁵ to the Organisation, current candidate countries, and the OECD's accession roadmap.⁶⁶ While various documents refer to general criteria for OECD membership, such as *like-mindedness* and a commitment to the fundamental values of the Organisation, there are no specific details about *how* the OECD selects its members. There is no indication of the basis upon which the OECD determines which nation state is a *good* candidate for selection. The Organisation's accession process, itself, has been standardised (made into an exercise of legal compliance), and, thus, the steps for joining the OECD are procedurally similar for each candidate country; however, the steps preceding the accession process are primarily unidentified.

The OECD Acquis

In the early decades of the OECD, there was no *acquis*⁶⁷ for countries to formally

⁶⁴ The page can be accessed on-line at <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/enlargement.htm>

⁶⁵ *Accession* is a technical term referring to the process of compliance involved with a country adopting an organisation's rules, norms, standards, and the like (Lendvai, 2004: 320). Here in this context, accession is so that the country can become member to an organisation. The *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (1969) defines *accession* as "the international act so named whereby a state establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty" [Article 2(1)(b)]. In the case of the OECD, accession countries consent to be bound by the OECD Convention and as a corollary, to the OECD *acquis* (the OECD's body of laws and obligations).

⁶⁶ The OECD roadmap details the reviews that a candidate country will have to undertake with the respective OECD committees in order to establish its preparedness for membership as well as the terms, conditions, and steps needed to be taken in order to adopt the OECD Convention.

⁶⁷ The OECD's accumulated body of laws and obligations is known as the *OECD acquis* (OECD, OECD Enlargement, 2013). The terminology has been assumed from the EU (interview with senior OECD official, 6 June 2013) and refers to the legal acts that have already been acquired and the decisions that have already been achieved (Miller, 2011). Before candidate countries can join the OECD they must accept not only all of the Organisation's internal rules but also all of the legal acts previously forged by the members (OECD, OECD and Enlargement, 2015).

adopt in order to become members. Membership was a political agreement (interview with senior OECD official, 6 June 2013). The OECD upheld commitment to the principles of market capitalism and pluralistic democracy as the requirements for joining, and this was a means to exclude communist countries from membership (Woodward, 2007a: 232). Observers perceived the posturing through the lens of the Cold War. Domestically speaking, in order to join the OECD, countries were not required to change a significant number of their policies and practices (interview with senior OECD official, 6 June 2013), nor did they have to adopt all of the OECD's legal codes (Carroll & Kellow, 2011), so a country's size and administrative practices were not significant factors in candidate selection.

Since 2004, having an *acquis* to adopt as part of the OECD accession process means that only those countries that are serious about membership enter into accession talks, as the demands for taking on the *acquis* are quite onerous (interview with senior OECD official, 6 June 2013). Connectedly, however, the *acquis* precludes many countries from putting themselves forward for candidacy. On one hand, the *acquis* inhibits big countries from joining,⁶⁸ owing to the fact that it would entail changing a majority of their policies and practices (ibid).⁶⁹ OECD officials, therefore, believe that it is more feasible for smaller countries to adopt the OECD's myriad of standards and agreements (ibid). On the other hand, self-proclaimed small countries believe that it would be difficult to put themselves forward and try to join the OECD given that there are too many hurdles to jump for a small country (interview with diplomatic representative, 28 November 2014). The conundrum leads to an

⁶⁸ Russia is a good example. It has been in the process of acceding to the OECD since May 2007. The other nation states that entered into discussions for OECD membership at the same time – Chile, Estonia, Israel, and Slovenia – have all since joined the Organisation. By the OECD's account, there are "big gaps" (OECD, Economic Surveys, 2011: 83) separating the governance environment in Russia from that in the OECD economies. At any rate, Russia's accession activities have been postponed as of 12 March 2014.

⁶⁹ The OECD accession process also involves trade liberalisation, so big countries would have to be willing to do this (Rose, 2005: 684).

obvious question: just how does the OECD select appropriate countries for membership?

The Process

According to a national official to the OECD, there are always countries interested in joining the Organisation:

There are countries that write to the OECD Secretary-General all the time saying ‘we’re interested in membership,’ but that’s not enough to become an OECD member.

(interview, 1 April 2014)

The decision rests with the OECD Council. The Council has to agree unanimously to enter into accession talks with a particular country. There are a number of factors – many of them geopolitical – that determine which countries the Council, ultimately, begins accession talks with (ibid). Dispelling with complexities, oftentimes it comes down to “looking at the geopolitical landscape and seeing who’s interested” (ibid).

The terms defined in chapter two (section 5) provide more insight into the selection of candidate countries. First, choosers (Council members) have to *feel* (survey) which countries *are*, in fact, open to selection. Then, from these options, they select those that best fit with an *image* of a given context (in this case, their image of OECD members or their image of the OECD in the world).⁷⁰ It is through the process of interacting with the parties interested in joining the OECD (and arguably through the interactions of OECD Council as well) that certain countries emerge as *preferences* – potential candidate countries. Once said countries achieve certain OECD-requested feats (domestically speaking) and are deemed ready to commence the accession process, these countries are

⁷⁰ An identity of the OECD and its member states has become socially established over time through the day-to-day operations of the Organisation (its creation of rules, norms, standards, and the like) as well as through the inter-relations of its members.

publicly declared to be *candidate countries* – socially constructed as entities of this *preferred* category. There upon, the essential factor seems to be congruency. There must be a desired level of congruency between the image that the Council has of OECD members and the identity of the country wishing to join the OECD.

This is evidenced by the OECD's literature regarding the need for membership hopefuls to demonstrate *like-mindedness* or a commitment to the shared values of the OECD. One clear example of the OECD upholding its perspective on membership is the postponement of Russia's accession activities. In 2014, Russia deviated from upholding the OECD's standards with its military actions in Ukraine and, subsequently, its accession activities were put on hold. The OECD Council determined that Russia's actions "were not demonstrating shared values with OECD members" (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014). In this way, it can be said that OECD membership is not only about co-operating; it is also about conforming -- acting in a manner that is *appropriate* to the group (Martens & Jakobi, 2010: 16), as will be further detailed in the following section on the OECD's role in the world.

What is important to stress is that by upholding high standards for OECD membership (requiring that countries exhibit like-mindedness and carry out requisite economic, legal, and administrative changes for policy congruence), the OECD is, in effect, re-confirming its identity, thereby maintaining its value.

3.5-What is the OECD's Role in the World?

In contemplating why the OECD exists, it is necessary to consider the OECD's role in the world as an international organisation and why the world still needs the OECD. Early analysis of the Organisation (Aubrey, 1967; Camps, 1975)

adopted a rationalist approach to understanding the OECD's role in international politics, appraising the OECD to be little more than an arena (forum) and a tool with which member states – especially the most powerful members – could more efficiently realise their goals (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). The OECD was not considered to have any independent (autonomous) power.

At the end of the Cold War, with greater recognition of the *changing face* of power (Nye, 1990: 166), there was increasing critical awareness of the OECD's abilities for exercising *soft* power, meaning more intangible facets of power through which the OECD could shape the preferences (and, therefore, the behaviours) of others (Nye, 1990: 165, 2004). Nevertheless, compared with its counterpart institutions, the OECD was not upheld to be very significant, for it was not regarded to have any direct means for commanding or coercing (no bank or sanctions). The OECD was judged to be *soft* (Woodward, 2008a: 84, 2009: 126), and this emphasis was not very appreciable for an economic organisation.

Since the turn of the century, with enhanced globalisation transforming governance⁷¹ (Wolfe, 2008: 25) and international organisations taking on a greater role than in the past (Bayne & Woolcock, 2007: 25), the OECD's position in the world has understandably been changing. Most notably, the OECD has aligned itself with the G20 (in addition to the G7), offering its Secretariat services (Hadzhieva, 2015: 14) and taking on the increasing role of *World Tax Organisation* (Cockfield, 2006; Hadzhieva, 2015: 12). In so doing, the OECD's "subtle ways" (Blair, 1993: 6) have begun to attract more critical attention (as mentioned in section 3.2).

⁷¹ *Governance* is here considered to be a continuous process rather than a series of acts (Von Bogdandy, Dann and Goldmann, 2007). The concept was borrowed from economics, and, more and more, it is regarded to be a technocratic process (ibid: 1378-79).

Commencing with Theodore Cohn (2002), Jörg Michael Dostal (2004), Martin Marcussen (2004b), Morten Ougaard (2004), and Richard Woodward (2008b), scholars have begun to piece together a more nuanced understanding of the OECD's influence in world affairs. Concurrently, the social turn in international political theory has aided in highlighting the *soft mechanisms*⁷² at play in the OECD's way of working, making the OECD an overall more compelling subject of study, as will be seen.

More specifically speaking, it is the recent publication of two texts that has really established a springboard⁷³ from which analysis of the OECD's role in the world can now take place: *The OECD and Transnational Governance* (2008), an edited text by Mahon and McBride, and *The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)* (2009), an introductory study by Richard Woodward. The title of the Mahon and McBride text speaks for itself. The volume encompasses a variety of policy perspectives that present a composite view of the OECD's emerging role as a key "node" (Mahon & McBride, 2008: 3) within an ever more complex and interconnected *patchwork* of knowledge networks that support international governance⁷⁴ (ibid: 5). The monograph by Woodward, for its part, offers a four-dimensional framework for understanding the OECD's place and influence in world affairs (Woodward, 2009: 62),⁷⁵ which will be expanded upon here forth. The framework examines the cognitive, normative, legal, and palliative aspects of the OECD's role in the world. This chapter extends the analysis of the OECD by adding a fifth dimension –

⁷² The OECD's *soft power* considerations include persuasion, reputation, and intellect (Whalley, 2009: 6), as will be discussed.

⁷³ These two works have already succeeded in enlivening critical interest in the OECD and its evolving role in world affairs (Martens & Jakobi, 2010; Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Pal, 2012).

⁷⁴ *Governance*, itself, can be seen as "the sum of the many ways that individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs" (Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 2). More succinctly, it is "how society, or groups within in, organise to make decisions" (Institute on Governance, 2014: 0:27).

⁷⁵ The framework builds upon a three-dimensional model developed by Marcussen (2004c) by adding a fourth element (*palliative governance*) to the paradigm (Woodward, 2007a: 232, 2007b:59).

scientific governance – to the framework.

Cognitive Governance

Cognitive governance refers to the OECD maintaining order by upholding particular values (economic and political liberalism) and ideals (Woodward, 2009: 6-7). At the heart of its way of working, the OECD changes peoples' ways of seeing⁷⁶ and understanding their place in the world. Cognitively speaking, the OECD brings people together under the framework of a common ideology. In so doing, it creates a similarity in their aspirations (Nye, 1990: 156). The OECD, effectively, acts as a symbol for overarching community values.⁷⁷ Behind its technocratic appearance, the OECD has liberal values and a strong social purpose (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005: 163), which help to distinguish it from its counterpart institutions.

Throughout the Cold War and still today, above all else, the OECD embodies “a consensus about the superiority of capitalism and democracy as the organizing principles” (Woodward, 2009: 63) for governance in the world. The alliance is understood. By manifesting co-operation, the OECD simultaneously provides young nation states with a political identity and more established nation states with a sense of unity (Kennedy, 1957).

The OECD Convention and *acquis* do not explicitly require that members be market democracies (Woodward, 2009: 64), but member states have developed an understood agreement that “capitalism and democracy are the optimum modes of governance for managing [their] collective affairs” (ibid:

⁷⁶ Through the OECD's day-to-day activities, it changes peoples' ways of thinking. The Organisation presents ideas, defines concepts, and frames discourses in a manner that identifies common problems and shared solutions (Busch, 2009: 77-78).

⁷⁷ The constructivist literature argues that cognitive structures create international *reality* by conferring social meaning to the material world (Adler, 1997: 319).

62). They share in the OECD's aspirations for a better future by way of stronger economies and higher standards of living and employment. Countries do not join the OECD for material reasons alone. They join the OECD to share in its aspirations and to be identified with the OECD's common goals (Geiger, 2000: 110; Porter & Webb, 2008: 43). This, in turn, shapes their interests and notions of self-interested behaviour (Porter & Webb, 2008).

The existence of the OECD, itself, upholds capitalism and democracy as ideals, equating the two in people's minds⁷⁸ and endorsing them as determinants of *progress* and *economic growth*. Among the main international organisations, the OECD is unique in this regard. The ability of the OECD to exercise moral influence should not be overlooked, especially as per its promotion of ethical behaviour, such as the *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*.

In supporting the OECD ideals of liberal democracy and market capitalism, member states believe that they are helping to foster international security, for "stable democracies do not tend to war against each other" (Wolfe, 1993: 5). The OECD group identity helps member states to rise above their individual, national interests, generating mutual interests and shared values (Wendt, 1994: 386). OECD members have, thus, developed a common perception that war between them is not possible (Nester, 1995: 192). Through economic and social interdependence, they have developed an expectation of peaceful change based upon the belief that common problems can be resolved non-violently (ibid: 199), and, indeed, since 1945 no war has occurred between OECD member states (ibid: 192).

Basically, the OECD's like-minded approach to policy work helps to develop a *logic of appropriateness* among member states (Porter & Webb, 2008:

⁷⁸ Adam Smith (1790) has prudently observed that when two objects are frequently seen together, "the imagination acquires a habit of passing easily from the one to the other" (v.l.2) such that they become connected together by custom and habitually arranged in one's ideas as such.

43). The OECD way of working teaches member states to act, to interact, and to make policies according to the appropriateness of their behaviour as “liberal-democratic countries that see themselves as world leaders” (ibid: 43). Members are expected to lead by force of example rather than by brute force (Kennedy, 1960). In effect, the OECD badge identifies members with a set of values and expectations (that define their aspirations) to which they must conform their behaviour in order to be seen as *modern* and *progressive* and *on par* with their OECD peers (ibid: 43). This notion will be addressed further in discussion of the OECD’s role in normative governance.⁷⁹ It must first be stressed, however, that *like-mindedness* is a key element that many feel makes the OECD unique among international organisations (Council of Europe, 2004: 1105).

Normative Governance

In terms of the OECD, normative governance⁸⁰ is a form of economic governance. It refers to the ways in which the OECD brings countries together and encourages them to co-operate in order to foster economic development. In so doing, the OECD upholds particular standards of behaviour, largely by imparting its knowledge about the world (Woodward, 2009: 7). From its inception, the OECD had a programme of technical assistance through which it sought to transfer practices (knowledge and experience) from its more industrially developed member states to its member states in the process of development.⁸¹ Shortly thereafter, in 1963, the OECD, then, turned to imparting its practices to non-member states through its Development Centre (Kristensen, 1967: 104). This spirit of peer development has endured with the Organisation.

⁷⁹ *Normative*, in this case, refers not to what is *normal* but to what is expected, as in failure to behave accordingly would elicit possible criticism, censure, or penalty (Hollis & Smith, 1986: 275). It exemplifies the liberal ideal of leading by force of example rather than by brute force (Kennedy, 1960).

⁸⁰ Here, *norms* are taken to be (social) standards of behaviour.

⁸¹ namely Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey

Effectively speaking, the OECD *teaches* countries to understand that progress can be learned and advanced through co-operation (Asbeek Brusse & Griffiths, 1997: 28). It socialises them, teaching them the value of new policy approaches. This is why the OECD's committee work is so important. National representatives are embedded in the OECD's committees and committee work, being exposed to new ideas and practices over time (Busch, 2009: 84). To be fair, just like many teaching and learning situations, there are frequent examples of OECD member states not complying with OECD advice or only half-heartedly adhering to OECD advice (ibid: 83), usually due to domestic (political) concerns.

For the most part, however, the OECD is a great facilitator of (social) emulation, commonly directed at having members share in the policy successes (and positive images) of their peers (Porter & Webb, 2008: 43). Member states learn to adopt appropriate behaviours in order to be regarded as modern, liberal, and efficient (March & Olsen, 1998: 961; Porter & Webb, 2008: 44). An obvious example is the OECD's *best practices* model (OECD, Best practices, 2013). Officials come together in committees, working groups, and OECD forums to discuss their experiences and to learn from each other, informing *best practices* in governance. The OECD Secretariat, then, uses the information to draw up reports and publications, recommending governance practices by way of indicating what *country experience* shows. Over the years, the OECD has published a wide range of best practice guides, covering everything from *OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency and User Charging for Government Services Best Practice Guidelines* and *Case Studies to Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations*.

While OECD best practices are guidelines and, therefore, not usually formal (legal) standards, they are recommendations based upon technical opinion, meant to serve as reference tools for the benefit of governments. In other words, they lead to "expert-based standardisation" (Peña, 2015: 53). The

seemingly neutral policy advice allows for a great deal of emulation (Pal, 2012: 16; Kudrle, 2012: 697) -- imitation of OECD best practices and ways of working.⁸² *Laggards* learn to keep up with *leaders* or risk social criticism (Sands & Klein, 2009: 197).

The OECD is not designed to enforce compliance with its recommendations (Edwards, 2012: para 4). The OECD does not have explicit power of coercion.⁸³ Rather, one of its main purposes is to foster co-operation and mutual trust (Aubrey, 1967). Countries participate in the OECD because they wish to (ibid: 5). In contrast to the IMF, which can deny countries access to loans if preconditions are not met, the OECD must rely upon informal (social) mechanisms to achieve conformity with its policies. To be fair, international organisations are generally viewed to operate more by persuasion than by coercion (Prost & Kingsley Clark, 2006: 358; Sands & Klein, 2009); nevertheless, for an economic organisation, the OECD is deemed to be *soft*, being that it works within the framework of *soft* law, as discussed in the next section on legal governance. The OECD has limited legal and financial means to enforce its decisions or punish for non-compliance, so it must rely upon persuasion (Checkel, 2007: 231) to encourage members to adopt its recommendations.

Persuasion is a social mechanism where the interactions between individuals may potentially lead to changes in their core preferences or interests (Checkel, 2007: 231). Persuasion is found to be commonly used in clubs (or social groups), such as the OECD, where organisational membership rules stress exclusivity (ibid: 234). The OECD's form of group dynamics lends itself to various forms of persuasion, including peer review and peer pressure (Sands & Klein, 2009: 187), which will be discussed in turn.

⁸² *Convergence* does not require the establishment of identical policies and enforcement mechanisms, as complete uniformity is probably not attainable. Rather, it necessitates the broad acceptance of substantive standards and their administration (Kovacic & Hollman, 2011: 278).

⁸³ By definition, *coercion* involves an element of threat. It achieves compliance through the threat of sanctions (Lukes, 1974: 17).

One of the more prevalent methods that the OECD uses to persuasively present its solutions is country surveys,⁸⁴ which the OECD produces for all members (Armingeon & Beyeler, 2004: 1). This process is designed to allow members to evaluate the policies and practices of the government under review, applying group pressure where conformity is desired (Schäfer, 2004: 6), yet “discreetly” (Bayne, 1987: 28), away from public scrutiny in informal debate. Ironically, this *soft* approach gives the OECD’s ideas greater potential for acceptance among its members, as it does not encroach too significantly upon national sovereignty.⁸⁵

The OECD’s peer-to-peer (horizontal) style of working enables two key mechanisms to achieve its organisational goals of co-operation and development: social learning (through peer review) and soft coercion (through peer pressure) (Grinvalds, 2011: 52). Firstly, *social learning* is another term for policy learning, seeing that ideas provide the basis for new beliefs (ibid: 18). The OECD brings together government officials from all policy backgrounds (Kudrle, 2012: 696), providing the impetus for members to meet regularly and to exchange knowledge. This feat should not be underestimated. Each year through OECD meetings thousands of officials are *inducted into* (Marcussen, 2001: 21) the group and its preferred beliefs and approaches. In other words, government officials are taught to accept new norms, priorities, and principles through a process of socialisation at the international level (Finnemore, 1996). Peer-to-peer learning (by horizontal information sharing) is often considered to

⁸⁴ According to Armingeon and Beyeler (2004), one of the most prevalent methods that the OECD uses to persuasively present its solutions is country surveys, which it produces for all members (1). Every eighteen to twenty-four months the OECD publishes a detailed economic survey of each member state. Not only do Secretariat staff work with members to complete questionnaires, but OECD officials visit the national capitals to report on the operations of key ministries and public institutes, including central banks and scientific bodies (Schäfer, 2004: 6). After discussing findings with the member state at issue, a report on the country’s economic position is distributed to all members about four weeks in advance of discussion in the OECD’s Economic Development and Review Committee (EDRC).

⁸⁵ This refers to the Westphalian or Vattelian meaning of sovereignty, whereby the state has a monopoly over authoritative decision-making within its own borders both *de jure* and *de facto* to the exclusion of external sources of authority (Krasner, 2001: 232).

be more effective than vertical teaching (Schein, 1996; Boud & Lee, 2005; Topping, 2005). When government officials are socialised to be more receptive of new policy ideas, they are more likely to bring about policy changes (Hall, 1989: 370; Grinvalds, 2011: 26).

Most commonly, the OECD uses peer review as a process “for co-operation and change” (OECD, Peer review at a glance, 2013). As the name implies, *peer review* is a systematic review of a country’s performance in a particular area, which is carried out by the country’s OECD peers with the intended goal of being able to help the country under review “improve its policymaking, adopt best practices and comply with established standards and principles” (ibid: para 1).

Secondly, peer pressure or indirect coercion functions well in the OECD, and it has a strong impact upon the OECD way of working (Aubrey, 1967; Sullivan, 1997), mostly because members being coerced “are already amenable to this pressure” (Grinvalds, 2011: 22). Peer pressure seeks compliance with certain standards of behaviour through social pressure. It facilitates the peer review process, as members, themselves, participate in developing and agreeing to the evaluation criteria (Marcussen, 2004b: 18). Shaming (moral pressure) is one form of peer pressure that is commonly used by members during the peer review process (Sands & Klein, 2009: 187; Marcussen, 2004b: 14), especially when one member has not lived up to expected standards of economic behaviour.

Finally, the OECD also uses international economic surveillance, a non-coercive form of group pressure, to encourage adherence to economic norms (Qureshi, 1991: 20). Rather than using sanctions, the OECD encourages compliance through the recognition of violations, thereby influencing long-term behaviour. Economic surveillance is “very effective” (ibid: 19), for it does not only correct deviant conduct after the fact, but it is also applied to pre-

emptively correct state behaviour. In this way, international organisations like the OECD do more than monitor particular economic behaviours. They, in effect, guide compliance with particular economic behaviours (ibid: 21). Member states observe the rules in order to maintain and solidify their reputations for good behaviour (Eccleston & Woodward, 2014: 2).

To this extent, the OECD *adds value* by creating and upholding standards of behaviour for international economic relations. It does so by promoting socially effective techniques, such as peer review, peer pressure, and best practices. Member states must comply with these standards in order to meet the expectations of the group and avoid social friction.

Legal Governance

Legal governance refers to the OECD's production of international law, particularly with respect to international regulatory co-operation. The OECD is "hardly a riotous legislator" (Woodward, 2009: 73).⁸⁶ In 2011, by way of example, the OECD Council endorsed only three recommendations (OECD, Decisions, Recommendations and other instruments, 2013). Nevertheless, the OECD is able to directly influence and change international legal norms (Guzman, 2012: 17). In total, the OECD has developed more than two hundred and sixty legal instruments over the years,⁸⁷ including conventions, declarations, recommendations, and guidelines, to name the most prevalent (OECD, Decisions, Recommendations and other instruments, 2015). Many of these are far from inconsequential.⁸⁸ In various areas involving public safety, for instance, the OECD has been able to enact decisions that can be upheld as

⁸⁶ Compared with highly legalised international organisations, such as the WTO and the EU, the OECD has a low degree of legalisation (Abbott et al., 2000).

⁸⁷ It has published more than 100 such instruments since 2,000.

⁸⁸ Over the years, for instance, about half of the OECD legal acts have been adopted within the area of environmental and nuclear safety (Long, 2000).

binding upon its members and other addressees (Sands & Klein, 2009: 268). Furthermore, some of the OECD's legal instruments have proven themselves over time. A foremost example is the *OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements* (1961) – a set of legally-binding principles for *freeing* capital, which are also binding upon all members of the IMF (OECD, *OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements*, 2013: Foreword).

The OECD has adopted certain multilateral conventions that testify to the breadth of its influence.⁸⁹ One diplomatic official, who is also a lawyer, points to the *OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions* (1999) as proof of the OECD's incursion into criminal law. All OECD member states (plus seven non-member states) are signatories to the Convention and have, therefore, been obligated to implement legislation at the national level, modifying their domestic laws dealing with white collar crime. Basically, the said convention “obliges all signatories to make bribery of foreign public officials a crime under their laws” (interview with national representative, 1 October 2014). To this extent, the OECD fosters norms of conduct that are now also criminally enforceable by domestic law.

After all, the OECD's agreements carry significant “moral force” (Woodward, 2009: 70). As seen, the OECD is able to cognitively (ideationally) and normatively (socially) shape members' behaviour and it sometimes channels their actions through formal legal agreements (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), which require domestic administration and oversight. It is also argued that the OECD exercises international public authority through disseminating information, particularly rankings (Von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, 2007: 1382). Determinations do not have to be legally binding in order to be observed. When the OECD's non-binding standards, such as those for avoiding double taxation, are adopted, they are rendered effective, giving credence to the

⁸⁹ Such as the *Convention on the Establishment of a Security Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy* (1959) and the *Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property* (1967)

OECD's public authority (ibid: 1382). Actually, most international law is *soft*⁹⁰ or non-binding (Abbott & Snidal, 2000: 421). It is an exception rather than the norm for an international organisation to issue binding decisions (Prost & Kingsley Clark, 2006: 358; Guzman, 2012: 47).

Soft law principles⁹¹ reflect the OECD's approach to inter-state relations, as members are able to treat co-operation as a learning process and, thereby, learn through their mistakes and solve their problems over time (Abbott & Snidal, 2000: 435). Soft law also facilitates compromise between large and small OECD member states (ibid: 447). Rather than judging the OECD simply according to the number of agreements that it forges, it is more instructive to value the OECD for initiating co-operation in particular fields and, thereby, encouraging ratification by member states in the future (Alvarez, 2008: 600).

The majority of the OECD's legal instruments are recommendations and, therefore, are not legally binding upon members;⁹² nonetheless, they constitute an extensive body of *soft law* – legally-relevant norms (Alvarez, 2008).⁹³ They demonstrate the substantive work that is carried out in the OECD's committees and the OECD's overall aim to foster co-operation. It takes a notable amount of

⁹⁰ Rather than administering *hard law*, which is mandatory, the OECD deals in *soft law*, which is hortatory. Public international lawyers often consider *soft law* to be inconsequential (Steinberg, 2002: 340), and it has been widely criticized in international politics (Abbott & Snidal, 2000: 422). Nevertheless, *soft law* is preferable in certain regards. It is well-suited to international organisations that reach decisions by consensus, as it is often easier to achieve (Steinberg, 2002: 340). *Soft law* is also better suited for dealing with uncertainty and for facilitating compromises (Abbott & Snidal, 2000: 423). Perhaps most importantly, *soft law* is deemed to be more suitable as a tool of persuasion and works well when noncompliance can be easily monitored (D'Aspremont, 2008: 1076).

⁹¹ Since the 1970s, the theory of *softness* of international law has slowly gained ground in international legal scholarship (D'Aspremont, 2008: 1075) in recognition of the growing importance of normative (regulatory) instruments (ibid: 1076). These liberal regulations reflect members' sense of identity and reinforce their view of the world (Porter & Webb, 2008). *Soft law* principles are also said to be a starting point for *hard law* (Ratner, 1998: 68).

⁹² Though *hard law* is seen to be more credible (because it can be enforced and carries compliance costs), *hard* and *soft law* are not binary distinctions; rather, they should be considered as part of a continuum (Abbott & Snidal, 2000: 421).

⁹³ These *soft law* principles serve as "focal points" (Guzman, 2012: 40), nudging member states towards greater co-operation in particular areas.

time for customary law to evolve, so it is more expedient if normative expectations can be established by soft law principles in areas where compliance is desirable (Ratner, 1998: 68). In this way, the OECD is able to act as a “catalyst” (Guzman, 2012: 23) for the creation of international law, bringing countries together to exchange concerns and initiate shared understandings. In like manner, the OECD is able to establish legal definitions -- another form of soft law – inspiring co-operation in key areas; for instance, the OECD has put forward the first legal definition of *pollution*, attesting to the OECD’s contribution towards the development of international laws as well (Kiss & Shelton, 2007: 57).

Furthermore, OECD committee work predisposes member states to being more receptive to reforming their national laws. This owes to the fact that for several OECD member countries before a proposal can reach parliament, it must first go through various working committees for comment and approval. Members of these working committees have most likely already been exposed to the issue under review through work with the OECD.⁹⁴ Consequently, they have been socialised to understand the importance of the reform and, accordingly, for the need to have it successfully passed by parliament (interviews with national representatives, 1 October 2014; 1 April 2014). As a case in point, in Canada, new consumer protection legislation (the *Canada Consumer Product Safety Act*) was adopted in 2011, relatively quickly after consumer protection mechanisms became a renewed subject of study by the OECD Working Party on Consumer Product Safety.

Having a relatively small membership that is accustomed to working by consensus, the OECD is able to use its mainly soft legal instruments to pre-empt

⁹⁴ By way of another example of the Organisation’s sway over domestic laws, the OECD, in its second restructuring *toolkit* for the Greek economy, recommended that the country prohibit the sale of homemade *tsipouro* (a traditional Greek alcohol that has predominantly been homemade throughout Greek history) in order to tax its production (Adamopoulos, 2015). To such a degree, it can be seen that the OECD’s economic advice sometimes directly affects national laws and can even impinge upon national customs and traditions.

the formation of binding commitments by other organisations at the international level. In 1976, for example, the *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises* (voluntary standards) pre-empted binding conditions being imposed on foreign-investing companies by the United Nations (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The OECD's non-binding commitments have, thus, become the global standards, necessitating surveillance rather than sanction (Woodward, 2009: 72). Overall, it is important to realise that OECD legal agreements can deal with issues "disproportionately affecting OECD countries" (ibid: 72) that would likely meet an impasse in other international fora (ibid: 73).

Moreover, OECD legal principles are also regularly taken up by other international organisations and private organisations, extending the influence of the OECD's norms and values far beyond OECD member states. The *OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Data* (1980), for instance, form the basis of ISO/IEC 27002 – an information security standard published by the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Considering that the subjects of OECD legal instruments tend to be very specialized, they are not generally addressed by other international organisations (Mahon & McBride, 2008: 10) and, so, the OECD is able to have a greater influence within the wider policy community. By way of recent examples, the OECD has developed recommendations on assessing the sustainability of bio-based products, on fighting bid rigging in public procurement, and on the governance of clinical trials (OECD, Decisions, Recommendations and other instruments, 2015) – "cutting-edge problems" (Woodward, 2008b: 263) that are not addressed by many other organisations.

Above all, OECD members wish to be seen as law-abiding and well-intended, so they are willing to forego some national sovereignty in order to establish agreements. Secretary-General Gurría suggests that one of the OECD's greatest strengths is its ability to spot areas of emerging policy and address

them in order to further economic growth (OECD, 2011: 27). The OECD's role in initiating international legal agreements can be seen as an extension of this capability. Likewise, it is the OECD's expertise that ties into the fourth dimension to the OECD's role in the world: palliative governance.

Palliative Governance

Palliative governance refers to the many ways by which the OECD facilitates the wider processes of governance in the world, thereby maintaining order (Woodward, 2009: 8). Most overtly, the OECD offers a host of "supportive services" (Woodward, 2004: 115), thereby enabling the work of others, particularly executive groupings, such as the G7 and the G20 (Cohn, 2002; Woodward, 2007). Ironically, while the OECD is one of the strongest advocates of liberalised markets on the world stage (Sands & Klein, 2009: 186), much of its policy work is focused on helping member states to manage the consequences of increasing interdependence, most notably environmental concerns, but also issues involving fiscal co-ordination, intellectual property, and consumer policy, to name a few.

The OECD is well positioned to deal with issues arising from increased economic globalisation, as its expertise, networks, and tremendous range of policy competence provide the Organisation with the ability to work across disciplines and help to solve problems in other groupings (Woodward, 2009: 63). The OECD's broad mandate enables it to address issues that cannot easily be taken care of by other international organisations with more rigid mandates,⁹⁵ such as the governance of non-commercial clinical trials, illegal employment of foreign workers, and trans-frontier movements of hazardous wastes. Given that the OECD is involved in a wide range of policy areas, it is able to ensure (through committee dialogue and economic surveillance) that its

⁹⁵ To this extent, the OECD is also able to fill in the gaps of international law through establishing soft law principles in newly expanding areas (Guzman, 2012: 40).

members are not creating regulations in other international organisations that would adversely affect their respective initiatives. In this way, the OECD plays a significant harmonisation role in the world, both directly, by way of its own day-to-day affairs, as well as by assisting other international organisations.

Owing to the volume of the OECD's comparative data and its direct access to government information, the OECD has a special capacity to examine the interplay among diverse public policies (Woodward, 2009: 79), thus helping to inspire new ways of thinking,⁹⁶ which are then taken up by other organisations. In 2008, for instance, the OECD looked at the inter-relationship of climate change, space tools, and natural resources in order to provide a rationale for further development of satellite systems: to measure and monitor climate change and help to mitigate its consequences.⁹⁷ In so doing, the OECD has offered a new way of thinking about satellites and the economics of space (OECD, 2008: 3). To this extent, the OECD "plugs gaps" (Woodward, 2009: 8) in governance with its state-of-the-art ideas.

Not only does the OECD inspire innovations, but it also has an ability for "spotting new problems and stimulating work on them to keep the broader system going" (Camps, 1975: 39). The OECD, for instance, initiated the assessment of migratory flows within Europe (OECD, 1982: 12). Currently, this research is carried out by the European Union and the United Nations Refugee Agency. By thinking with long-term projections, the OECD is able to *nudge* its members to proactively take action before issues become unmanageable (Woodward, 2009: 79). The OECD's versatility and breadth also enable it to take on new technical subjects where joint action is needed, such as international energy co-ordination. In 1974, the OECD became the umbrella organisation for the International Energy Agency (IEA) in response to the

⁹⁶ This gives the OECD the ability to guide future practices that shape international governance (Porter & Webb, 2008).

⁹⁷ See OECD (2008) *Space Technologies and Climate Change: Implications for Water Management, Marine Resources and Marine Transport* (Paris, France: OECD Publishing)

international oil crisis and the need to achieve long-term stability. As energy is a complex subject matter, and energy policy impacts several other policy areas, the OECD was an ideal choice (Keohane, 1978: 932) to oversee the crisis and maintain international energy co-operation.

The OECD also performs various types of *behind -the-scenes* supportive work that are not as visible but are, nonetheless, important for the wider processes of governance in the world. Wolfe (2008) has noted that the OECD is often able to help members solve problems in other multilateral contexts. Rather than simply providing the background information necessary to negotiations, OECD officials have, in some cases, attempted to intervene at a deeper level; for example, the OECD has been known to advance WTO negotiations owing to its close association with the WTO Secretariat (39). The OECD often brings its members together to *pre-negotiate* (Woodward, 2009: 76) before WTO and other multilateral meetings, so that they have a common position from which to negotiate terms. Furthermore, the OECD provides research and statistical services to international organisations lacking in resources or expertise, such as the G7 and the G20, which have no permanent Secretariats, and the WTO, which has limited personnel (ibid: 75). In this manner, the OECD is able to influence the international agenda by way of its assistance to other groupings in addition to advancing its own mandate (ibid: 75). While such support often goes unnoticed, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes (2011) believe that it is vital:

In the context of the ongoing financial and economic crisis, the OECD could make key contributions towards their solution, such as producing new policies to redesign an efficient, reliable, sustainable and fairer regulatory financial framework, as well as proposing socio-economic policies to ease the effects of the crisis. At the highest level, the OECD could serve the global webs of governance well, by offering critical support in terms of the delivery of data, analysis and policy on a wide range of issues, particularly to the informal international organizations which lack secretariats, most importantly, the G20.

Essentially, the OECD (Secretariat)'s reliable statistics and strong research capabilities predispose the Organisation to supportive work, but the OECD is much more than that. It inherently works across policy fields and is able to re-position economic concepts, thereby developing new ways of looking at the world, bringing about new forms of economic co-operation in turn.

Scientific Governance

For its part, this chapter proposes another dimension to Woodward's analytical framework by way of suggesting that the OECD also plays a significant role in scientific governance – an aspect that has largely been undervalued by scholars, perhaps due to the OECD's more respected role in economic governance. The chapter does not infer that the OECD is strictly a technical organisation. Rather, the scientific dimension draws attention to the *engineering* aspect of the OECD's culture, emphasising its multi-faceted capabilities and the OECD's role as a knowledge intermediary in the post-war (modern) world.

The scientific dimension is closely related to the OECD's palliative role in that the OECD is known for trouble-shooting and identifying policy problems that can later be taken up by other international organisations that have more universal membership (Long, 2000; Woodward, 2009). On one level, therefore, the OECD is appreciated as being a *laboratory* for new ideas (Sullivan, 1997; Dostal, 2004) – a *trail-blazing* international organisation known for its avant-garde research (Marcussen, 2004a; Woodward, 2006; Schmelzer, 2013) and technical expertise in international affairs. Nevertheless, the scientific dimension manifests more than the highly technocratic⁹⁸ (Schein, 1996; Murphy,

⁹⁸ With its impressive research capabilities, the OECD derives much of its authority from being what Haas (1992) describes as an "epistemic community" (Armingeon & Beyeler, 2004: 4) – "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain" (Haas, 1992: 3; Armingeon & Beyeler, 2004: 4). Being an *epistemic community*, the OECD influences policy in two ways: through the diffusion of its ideas and claims as well as by the presentation of more scientifically rigorous models of policy design

2000: 799) nature of the OECD's Secretariat and working committees (the *OECD way of working*).⁹⁹ It also reflects the new *science norm* (Finnemore, 1996) of governance since the 1950s and 1960s, which establishes technical innovation as a benchmark (Adas, 1989).

In 1960, when the OEEC ceased operating and was reconstituted into the OECD, its bureaucracy¹⁰⁰ served as a continuum, defining areas of shared interest upon which its members could base their relations.¹⁰¹ Key among these areas has been science policy and innovation. Following World War II, science was re-organised to meet peacetime needs (Finnemore, 1994: 570), and the OECD (alongside UNESCO) was one of the first international organisations to actively promote the governance of science in the world (ibid: 576). The OECD taught its members the value of science policy, persuading them to restructure their administrations to be better equipped to take on the tasks of the *modern* state (ibid: 566), such as economic development. In such a way, the OECD promoted a new norm among *advanced* nation states: that of controlling science activity (ibid: 567). This, in turn, created the view of scientific knowledge as an immaterial resource, which could be *developed* (by governments), shared, and even rivalled (ibid: 576).

The Cold War was not simply concerned with geopolitics and military posturing. It was also a confrontation between two different ways of organising science (Pollock, 2006). While both the Soviets and the Americans placed high value upon scientific *progress* (Kojevnikov, 2008: 115; Hardesty and Eisman,

(Armingeon & Beyeler, 2004: 4).

⁹⁹ The OECD's *scientific* approach to policy analysis and development presents quantifiable benefits to support its rationales, giving it the appearance of scientific impartiality (Woodward, 2009: 68).

¹⁰⁰ Its bureaucracy has helped to establish the Organisation as an autonomous (and influential) actor in its own right (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999: 699, 2004: viii).

¹⁰¹ While other entities within the OECD are continually changing, the bureaucracy has remained relatively constant. According to research by Leimgruber and Schmelzer (2015), it was the OECD's Secretariat that "consciously constructed" (4) the OECD's expert outlook and think tank role.

2007), Marxism-Leninism provided a *science of society* (Pollock, 2006); whereas, America and its allies promoted capitalist modernity.¹⁰² The OECD, correspondingly, favoured (and continues to do so today) the superiority of western science, upholding democracy and (free-market) capitalism as the preferred organising principles for scientific development, “grounded in [the] freedom of critical discourse” (Kojevnikov, 2008: 128). In other words, during the Cold War, the co-operating mission of the OECD – the bringing together of America and Western Europe (two relatively wealthy regions of the world) for the purpose of *development* -- reinforced the technical superiority and innovation of OECD member states (Adas, 1989; Hecht, 2011), all the while furthering their identity as *leading* world nations.

Just a few years prior to the founding of the OECD, in 1957, the Soviets sprang “the shock of the century” (Dickson, 2001) by launching Sputnik,¹⁰³ the first satellite into outer space. The event was a “catalyst” (Finnemore, 1994: 569) for the promotion of national science programs in both Europe and the USA. The direct influence of this event can be seen in the early years of the OECD. The Organisation’s first Secretary General, Thorkil Kristensen (1961-1969),¹⁰⁴ was determined to have science included among the OECD’s expanded activities, and he won consensus of the member states to undertake scientific initiatives. Given that science was a less politically sensitive topic than trade or agriculture – areas where it was generally difficult for the OECD to achieve agreement (Carroll & Kellow, 2011: 52; Carroll, 2015: 14) – Kristensen’s vision enabled the OECD to promote scientific governance in the world.

¹⁰² The Soviet model of scientific progress was very similar to the American one, except it rejected the *free market* (Hecht, 2011: 5). To that end, both the Soviets and the Americans had a claim to *rationality*, but the American model of scientific progress reinforced the rationality of (free market) capitalism (ibid: 5).

¹⁰³ The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has 3-dimensional models and a full history of the event on its website: <http://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/SpaceAge/>

¹⁰⁴ Driven by his own passion for research, Kristensen wanted the OECD to be an “avant-garde think tank” (Leimgruber & Schmelzer, 2015: 15) with a “catalytic role” (ibid: 15). He strongly influenced the future outlook of the OECD.

During interviews with the OECD founder countries, one impression that freely came to the forefront among the smaller member states was the value that they hold for the OECD's work in the field of science and technology (interviews with national representatives, 28 November 2014; 6 January 2015). While it is true that the OECD's initiatives in this area supplement their own often meagre domestic scientific policies and capacities,¹⁰⁵ the OECD offers more than that. The OECD teaches member states a mind-set about science and technology – a new way of *rationaly* thinking about the world, by helping them to see how it can contribute to their economic development and ultimate prosperity. In so doing, the OECD also imparts values upon its members, advising them to restructure their economies in a manner that gives purpose to being *progressive* and *modern* by measuring their achievements in industrial technologies and scientific practices (Hecht, 2011: 5).

Due to the relationship between economic growth and technical progress (Dosi, 1982: 147), the OECD produces a notable body of *soft law* in the scientific realm. While the OECD has produced only twelve legal instruments under the category of *science and technology* (OECD, Legal Instruments, 2015), such as a *Recommendation of Council on Quality Assurance on Molecular Genetic Testing* (2007), many of the OECD's legal instruments are at least partially scientific (technical) in their approaches, if not in their subject matter.¹⁰⁶ Much of the OECD's scientific research and body of laws pertain to the environment, for the OECD has always been focussed on the science of environmental threats (Long, 2000). Nevertheless, the OECD's work in science and technology encompasses a wide gamut of topics, ranging from the bio-economy to green growth (sustainable development) to medical science (such as dementia) research. The

¹⁰⁵ The OECD's information and technological systems also augment domestic capacities, especially in the area of statistical modeling and analysis (Hecht, 2011: 1).

¹⁰⁶ To cite a few examples, the OECD has enacted a *Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation* (2006), a *Recommendation of the Council on Electronic Authentication* (2007), and a *Recommendation of the Council on the Safety Testing and Assessment of Manufactured Nanomaterials* (2013).

OECD also brings together *like-minded* policy officials and other stakeholders to exchange best practices under the auspices of its Global Science Forum and its Space Forum. Such initiatives contribute to the OECD's image as a pioneering institution, affirming the *advanced* identities of its member states (Hargittai, 1999).

Generally speaking, these five dimensions – cognitive, normative, legal, palliative, and scientific – offer diverse (and yet overlapping) ways of analysing the OECD's role in the world. In so doing, they suggest that the OECD exists for a variety of reasons rather than for one overriding purpose. It can clearly be seen that the OECD plays an important role in inspiring, socialising, regulating, helping, and teaching states.

3.6-Conclusion

Based upon the research undertaken in chapter three, the hypotheses of primary interest hold true:

1. The OECD exists for reasons other than economic factors.
2. The OECD has contemporary value beyond its Cold War identity.

The OECD exists for social and political reasons as well as economic. This is manifest in the OECD's selective character and in one of its main founding norms, which has been carried forward from its predecessor institution, the OEEC: co-operation. Co-operation is, by nature, a social activity that brings about political relations. In this way, the OECD is an economic organisation, but it is an economic organisation based upon social and political goals.

The chapter examines the OECD's role in cognitive, normative, legal, palliative, and scientific governance, reflecting upon the OECD's post-Cold War

value. The OECD's "hybrid" (Salzman, 2005: 189) construct¹⁰⁷ exteriorises its multi-dimensional character, demonstrating that the OECD is more than a think tank; more than a club of best practices; more than a rich countries' club, and more than a forum for market democracies. The OECD is an international organisation that has value in evidencing the shared ideas, actions, rules, and laws of its member states to be *leading* (in other words, *superior*). This role transcends the OECD's Cold War days.

Since 1961, when the OECD was established, the basic premise of the Organisation has been the belief that "a high degree of international economic interdependence is beneficial for economic growth and social progress" (OECD, 1982: 5). Over the years, the OECD's basic means of achieving results has not changed. The Organisation draws upon "the best available technical expertise and inter-governmental consultation to look at the international dimension of policy issues" (ibid: 7).

At the most basic level, the OECD *adds value* (Porter & Webb, 2008: 80) by helping to manage international economic affairs, establishing and upholding *acceptable* forms of behaviour in its field of competence (Sands & Klein, 2009: 268). At a higher level, the OECD fosters regional integration by encouraging member states and their officials to think similarly, act harmoniously, and converge policies along unified technical lines.

All factors researched in the chapter considered, the OECD institutionalises a collective identity or "collective wisdom" (Woodward, 2009: 66), and collective rules to lead international economic affairs, setting standards for other countries to follow. The Organisation's values, ideas, and principles, thus, underpin the globalising economy, upholding the shared normative understandings of its members. These understandings permeate many areas of

¹⁰⁷ The OECD brings together international diplomats and technical experts, buttressing the Organisation with networks of world authorities and leaders in addition to ideas and information.

society in kind, creating notions about desirable forms of economic (and, therefore, social) behaviour (Porter & Webb, 2008). To this end, the chapter concludes that the world still needs the OECD.

Chapter 4: The Case of Turkey

The Republic of Turkey is a curious case, and its diverse makeup has inspired this study to single out the country from among the OECD's founding membership in order to examine it in closer detail. Yet, inquiry into Turkey's various complexities is not simple. Much like the OECD, itself, the Republic of Turkey is a hybrid of identities (Bilgic, 2015: 206), making it difficult to describe. Part of the problem is that Turkey does not easily fit into typical categories, such as geographical or linguistic classifications¹ (Robins, 1991: 1; Laçiner, 2001: 17; Heper, 2004). Being unique in many ways, Turkey is often in a category all its own (Pope & Pope, 1997: 2; Şafak, 2011). This is exemplified by the literature in that, as a rule, Turkey is not included in the analyses of comparative Middle Eastern or comparative southern European studies (Özbudun, 2000: 1) due to its particular circumstances. The country will assumedly not be pigeonholed. How, then, to fit it into the puzzle that is the OECD?

The principal purpose of this chapter is answering two seemingly straightforward questions: Firstly, why Turkey? In other words, how is it that the Republic of Turkey has been selected to help found the OECD?² Secondly, what does this inform about the Organisation, itself? Namely, what does the case of Turkey suggest about the importance of the OECD? The chapter begins by explaining the enigma that is Turkey and how its place of belonging has often been a point of debate. After considering what the literature says about the country's problems with democracy, capitalism, and greater social welfare, the chapter, then, applies this insight to examine Turkey's history of relations with the OECD and notions conveyed in the literature for the decision to

¹ For instance, when mentioned alongside Greece, Turkey is said to be part of the *Near East*; however, when Greece is not included, Turkey is said to be part of the *Middle East* (Robellet Kuniholm, 1980: xv).

² The chapter builds upon a key assumption of the thesis that the decision to include the Republic of Turkey in forming the OECD pertains to the decision to found the Organisation. It, therefore, primarily contemplates Turkey's membership from an institutional (group) perspective rather than the national perspective of Turkey.

include the Republic of Turkey in founding the OECD. The chapter concludes with a look at the Turkish government's perspective on the issue and what it deems to be significant about the OECD and OECD membership.

4.1-The Question of Turkey

Turkey's OECD membership has not attracted critical attention. Compared with the country's membership of other European-based IOs – such as the Council of Europe, NATO, and the European Union – its OECD membership has not gained much notice over the years (see Appendix 8). Perhaps this is owing to the country being one of the original OECD members and not, under the circumstances, in need of meeting social and economic requirements for admission. At any rate, Turkey's OECD membership does not arouse the same impassioned views as does its membership of the other aforementioned international organisations.³ Of course, the OECD is, first and foremost, an economic organisation. Despite its important social mandate, the OECD is perceived to be a technical body (as discussed in chapter 3) more so than a political organisation, meaning that the OECD is associated with reason (economic science) and rationality (rational behaviour) rather than emotions. Nevertheless, it seems odd that a primarily Muslim country has not generated debate for its membership of a European-based international organisation, especially an international organisation that promotes strong values (as discussed in chapters six and seven).

Turkey's place of belonging⁴ has often been a point of contention (Kushner, 1997; Neumann, 1999: 39; Dixon, 2006). The question of the country's

³ One hypothesis of the thesis is that there is an affinity in the identities of the OECD and the Republic of Turkey.

⁴ Ignatieff (1994) famously characterises *belonging* as being recognized *and* being understood, such that it imparts a sense of one's place in the world.

place in Europe has been a common debate inside Turkey just as it has been within Europe (Taciser, 1993; Timmerman, Rohtus & Mels, 2008; Manisali, 2011). The Turkish government applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, and from the 1960s onward, observers note that there has been a “constant political debate” (Döşemeci, 2013: 85) in Turkey about the country’s role and position in Europe and the world at large (Bürgin, 2010: 417). The *question of Turkey*⁵ is so compelling because it raises issues of “cultural logic” (Neumann & Welsh, 1991: 328) based upon group identity and recognition.

Reflecting historically, the Turkish Empire⁶ (the Ottoman Empire) was the first non-European (*Mohammedan*) polity officially permitted entry to the Concert of Europe⁷ in recognition of its importance to the European balance of power, dating back to the sixteenth century (Neumann, 1999: 40). Nonetheless, the Turks’ admission evoked concern, for the Ottoman Empire (1300 – 1922)⁸ was presumed to be unsuited to the Westphalian system, which defines states by territory rather than by spiritual authority (ibid: 51). Even though a significant portion of the Ottoman Empire was geographically situated in Europe, it was not considered to be *of* Europe but, rather, something from *outside* (Becker Lorca, 2010). As a semi-peripheral polity (ibid: 475), the Ottoman Empire was defined by its adjacency to Europe (Wolff, 1994: 4): the *Near East* – a perceived threat (McNeill, 2004: 37).⁹ Islam was regarded as the rival (Lewis,

⁵ The concept of *Turkey* is ontologically unstable.

⁶ *Turkey* or the *Turkish Empire* was the English-language synonym for the Ottoman Empire. Europeans considered *Turks* and *Muslims* to be one and the same and, thus, referred to the Empire as *Turkey-in-Asia* (Asia Minor and the Arab provinces) and *Turkey-in-Europe* (the Balkan provinces) (Ahmad, 2014).

⁷ The Ottoman Empire joined the Concert of Europe by way of the *Treaty of Paris* in 1856, which made it a legal person and, therefore, subject to public international law (McKinnon Wood, 1943: 262), evincing that international law was no longer just between Christian countries (ibid: 271).

⁸ Turkey became the legal successor of the Ottoman Empire

⁹ The Ottomans’ physical proximity, military might, and strong religious tradition made them seem threatening. By the twentieth century, however, they no longer posed much of a military threat but

2003: 5) and target of Christian hostility, despite Muslims' long history within Europe (McNeill, 2004: 29). In this way, the Ottoman Empire came to be defined both by its inclusion (alongside Europe) in the *Family* of Europe and by its exclusion (as an adversary of Europe) (Wolff, 1994: 7).

Dating from the age of Enlightenment (in the eighteenth century), the Ottoman Empire was recognized for its orientalism as *l'Europe orientale* (oriental Europe) or *l'Orient Européen* (the European Orient), that is, as *the other* (Said, 1977; Wolff, 1994: 190). This enabled Western Europe to uphold and express its sense of being a "superior civilization" (Wolff, 1994: 165),¹⁰ thereby reinforcing its own self-understanding at a time when European identity was being brought into question through greater inquiry into the world at large. To this extent, then, *the Turk* has been "the dominant other in the history of the European state system" (Neumann, 1999: 39). Over centuries the Turkish identity has been cast in binary opposition to that of the European (Müftüler-Bac, 1998: 242). This impression of the Turks has, therefore, become ingrained over the years and is far from being a recent phenomenon (ibid: 243).¹¹

4.2- Challenging Common Notions of the OECD

The OECD represents eliteness. It is a prestigious international organisation that brings together the world's most *developed* countries in the aim of fostering sustainable economic growth. OECD membership is qualified by national commitment to being a liberal democracy and a market economy. As will be seen, the Republic of Turkey has authoritarian tendencies; over the decades, it

remained a cultural threat to Europe (Neumann, 1999: 52).

¹⁰ *civilized* as per its humanity, law, and social mores (Neumann, 1999: 52)

¹¹ As Graham Fuller (2011) evinces, the division between *the east* and *the west* predates Islam and has led to deep-seated conflicts over the years in Eurasia and the Middle East.

has not been a steadfast democracy, nor has it been a strong welfare state.¹² Upon cursory analysis, therefore, Turkey has not demonstrated commitment to the fundamental values of the OECD (a requirement for membership)¹³ or, more aptly speaking, since helping to found the OECD, Turkey has demonstrated only superficial commitment to the fundamental values of the Organisation.

With this in mind, the chapter now shifts to discussing Turkey's history of democracy and capitalism as part of the case study into understanding Turkey's position within the OECD as well as a means to exploring the wide degree of subjectivity involved in qualifying a state as a *liberal democracy* and a *market economy* – two fundamental pillars of OECD membership.

The Country's History with Democracy

The chapter wishes to stress the fact that there is no simple, agreed upon concept of democracy (Said, 1977: xiv).¹⁴ This complicates analysis, obliging in-depth study into the particulars of Turkey. The country is recognized and referred to as a *republic*, a term which carries connotations of freedom and equality (Michelman, 1988: 1495), yet being a *republic* does not necessarily mean being a *democracy* (Madison, 1787: para 9; Shoemaker, 1966; Banning, 1995).¹⁵ Traditionally, they are dissimilar forms of government (Long, 1976). A republic

¹² Likewise, Turkey's economic policies have a history of promoting economic roller coasters, as will be seen in section 4.2.

¹³ For instance, Turkey experienced its first modern day military coup on 27 May 1960, just months before signing the Convention on the OECD, on 14 December 1960, and the military was in control of the country when Turkey officially became a member of the Organisation (and the OECD began operating) on 30 September 1961.

¹⁴ The term *democracy* combines in itself several meanings and is variously seen as a value, a requirement, and an ideal (Gecer, 2014: 18; Wigen, 2015: 434).

¹⁵ The dictionary meaning of a *democracy* considers that the general public has the possibility of meaningful participation in the management of public affairs (Chomsky, 1992). The definition, thus, partly explains why a democracy is the system of government that has the strongest claim to legitimacy as well as the most enduring moral and persuasive power (El-Fadl, 2003: 7).

is a state with a constitutionally limited government, meaning that government is by law and the rights of the majority are limited by way of a written constitution; whereas, a democracy is a state with *rule by omnipotent majority*, meaning that government is by the people (they are the source of the law, which is established to protect their interests and basic well-being, even more so in the case of a *liberal democracy*,¹⁶ which seeks to maintain unrestricted equality) (Long, 1976; El-Fadl, 2003: 7). Over time, the concept of *democracy* has popularly come to be associated with *electoral* democracy¹⁷ and representative government, but these do not necessarily refer to a republic. A republic can be democratic or non-democratic (Akyol, 2011).

In the case of Turkey, it was founded as a republic in 1923¹⁸ by the People's Party (later named the *Republican People's Party*) based upon the liberal beliefs of its leading intellectuals (including Ahmet Ağaoğlu) for establishing national sovereignty to further *development* and *progress* by way of citizenship (Shissler, 2003; Rodríguez et al., 2014). These nationalist intellectuals (*reformists*) believed that they needed to bring about a *revolution of the mind* (create a national conscience) in order to achieve their modernisation project (Kadioğlu, 2007). They professed a renunciation of Eastern culture (especially Persian) and turned to French democratic thought for inspiration, taking the ideals of the Second French Revolution as their model (Rodríguez et al., 2014).¹⁹ Influenced by Rousseau's impressions of civil religion, the reformists sought to create a

¹⁶ As discussed in section 1.4, in a liberal democracy the rights of all are respected and only limited by the degree to which they impinge upon the rights of others, such as the freedom of expression.

¹⁷ Electoral democracies are the most common type of democracies (Schedler, 1998).

¹⁸ Following World War I (1914-1918), there was no regime change in Ottoman Anatolia (where the Republic of Turkey was later established), and the sultan (sovereign) remained in power until 1922. The caliphate (religious leadership of all Moslems) wasn't abolished until 1924.

¹⁹ The French Revolution has commonly served as the model for democratisation in non-English speaking societies (Lewis, 1994). Scholars widely recognize there to be a French element in *Kemalism*, the official ideology of the Turkish Republic, which was put forward by Turkey's first president, Mustafa Kemal (Lombardi, 1997; Özgüç, 2013).

Turkish style of secularism²⁰ by imposing state domination over religion and *Turkifying* (nationalising) Islam (Kadioğlu, 2007; Beiner, 2011; Akil, 2015).²¹ In this way, rather than social change being *won* by revolution (spontaneously occurring from the bottom-up), it was *imposed* by revolution (in a top-down manner) upon the people (Danforth, 2015: 105).²² In many ways, secularisation and modernisation were intended to develop a society that would be the “antithesis of the Ottoman empire” (Landau, 1993: 271). Nevertheless, it can be said that at the time it was founded, the Republic of Turkey was a *democracy* (Dahl, 1998; Akyol, 2011).²³ There was a national parliament (Great National Assembly) composed of elected representatives from many parts of the country, and within six months (from 1924-1925) two political parties had emerged (the Republican People’s Party and the Progressive Republican Party),²⁴ so there was some degree of political competition (Schumpeter, 1947; Zürcher, 1991).

Be that as it may, modernisation is a painful process (Akyol, 2011). The reformists soon turned to authoritarian measures²⁵ in order to bring about swift

²⁰ The Turkish form of secularism draws upon the French understanding of secularism (*laïcité*) (Akil, 2015), but rather than having a separation of church and state, the state seeks to dominate over religion (Beiner, 2011).

²¹ Religious courts were abolished and Muslim law (*shari’ah*) was repealed so that western legislation could be introduced in all fields (Bal, 1998:2). Furthermore, religious schools were closed, and education came under the direct supervision of the government (Ministry of Education).

²² The military and the bureaucracy became the central pillars of the new republic (Akkoyunlu, 2014: 54). The weekday holiday was changed from Friday (the Islamic holy day) to Sunday; polygamy was abolished, and perhaps most significantly, the alphabet was changed from Arabic script to Latin, symbolically disassociating Turks with Islam and the Middle East (Mandel, 1989: 30).

²³ Situating Turkey within a greater socio-historical context, it falls within Huntington (1993)’s first wave of democratisation (1828-1926), which is characterised by *minimal democracy*, but soon thereafter (1922-1942), there was a reverse wave of democratisation and most of the newly formed countries after World War I quickly shifted away from democracy (17).

²⁴ By 1925, the Progressive Republican Party was excluded from politics by the Kemalist regime (Zürcher, 1991).

²⁵ Linz (1964, 2000) has eminently distinguished authoritarian behaviours from democratic and totalitarian practices, noting that authoritarian regimes encourage political apathy and cooption with the basic values and attitudes of the elite coalition.

social changes,²⁶ and the Republic of Turkey entered a single (parliamentary) party period (Landau, 1993: 271) from 1925 until 1946, with the Republican People's Party as *the* governing regime and Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, the triumphant military commander, as *Atatürk*-- the father (president and founder) of the nation (Lerner & Robinson, 1960: 19). Overall, the tension between secularism (politics) and Sunni Islam (religion) was controlled by authoritarian means while the new republic established itself (Webb, 2007; Beiner, 2011: 11).

Following World War II, nonetheless, Turkey's one-party system gave rise to a multi-party regime after European writers criticized the country for being *western* (liberal and civilised) in form but *eastern* (illiberal and uncivilised) in practice (Bal, 1998:3).²⁷ Eager not to be considered inferior to the West,²⁸ Turkey instituted a multi-party system in 1946 in an effort to appear more democratic (ibid: 3). The transition to multi-party politics was linked with a growing role for Islam in the public sphere, which over time came to challenge the supremacy of the (secularist) Kemalist bureaucratic elite (Grigoriadis, 2009). Since 1946, then, Turkey has been seized with democratic upturns and downturns as a result of military interventions (in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997),²⁹ incited, in part, to quash these opposing demands of politics and religion and, thereby, maintain the status quo (the stronghold of the state).³⁰ At several points

²⁶ Democratic governance usually necessitates a much slower pace for industrialisation and secularisation. States often resort to authoritarian measures in order to bring about rapid changes, justifying them in the need of the people (Kinzer, 2001: 69).

²⁷ Upon accepting the *Charter of the United Nations*, Turkey committed itself to liberalising its political regime and "setting the stage for opposition political parties to arise" (Özkan, 2012: 178).

²⁸ American military and economic success during the Second World War attested to the beneficial effects of democratic institutions (Lewis, 1994: 42).

²⁹ Until the twenty-first century, Turkey experienced one military coup each decade since joining the OECD in 1961.

³⁰ Jenny White (2014) characterises such behaviour as *aggressive defensiveness*, explaining that, "Although the Kemalist state oversaw free and fair elections that became the expected standard, the country was micromanaged socially and politically by elites positioned in state institutions and by the military, which carried out several coups when it felt that national unity was threatened by nonconforming identities and ideologies" (358).

over the last half of the twentieth century, therefore, Turkey has vacillated *between democracy and secularism* (Cevik & Tas, 2013).³¹ For more than fifteen years now, Turkey has not experienced another military coup and, for the most part, the literature now refers to the country as an *electoral democracy* or a *Muslim democracy* (Tepe, 2005: 69). In such a way, while Turkey has remained a constitutional republic for almost one hundred years, it has not always been a democracy and has fluctuated regularly between military and civilian rule.

In essence, when it comes to democracy, Turkey has its own ebbs and flows, accentuated by the fact that moods change quickly in the country (Şhafak, 2011). Turkey does not consistently fit into the empirical categorisations of democratisation, nor is it typically included in the grand narratives of democratic history (Akkoyunlu, 2014: 31). Alternately, scholars have tended to label Turkey as an *outlier country* and have regarded it as a “consistently ambiguous” (Diamond, 2002: 30-31; Akkoyunlu, 2014: 32) case within the democratisation literature. When required to empirically situate Turkey’s political system, observers say it lies between competitive authoritarianism³² and electoral democracy (ibid: 32). In this way, Turkey can be viewed as a *hybrid regime*,³³ combining elements of authoritarianism and electoral democracy (Kinzer, 2001: 70; Akkoyunlu, 2014: 11).³⁴ Until recently, the

³¹ While the democratisation literature quite often shies away from emphatic categorisations, it is definitive in its qualification that Turkey was not a *democracy* while under its various periods of military intervention (Erdem, 2011; Sütçü, 2011). Instead, during such periods of direct military rule, Turkey has been classified as an *authoritarian regime* (Akkoyunlu, 2014: 46).

³² Political authority is largely seen to be exercised through formal, democratic institutions, but there are frequent violations of civil liberties and those in office routinely manipulate the rules, though they do so subtly, rather than openly, as in authoritarian regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2002; 2010).

³³ a mixed regime (in this case, Turkey cannot be labelled as either democratic or authoritarian, but it has elements of both)

³⁴ Fareed Zakaria has coined the term *illiberal democracy* for such political regimes that hold regular elections but infringe upon human rights (Zakaria, 1997).

military has had too much oversight of the government for it to be seen as truly democratic (Rouleau, 2000: 102; Cizre, 2004).³⁵

In Turkey, the military³⁶ has been a “guardianship institution” (Akkoyunlu, 2014: 40) -- a powerful, unelected tutelary body that applies pressure on elected offices when it feels that the ideals and institutions of the Republic are at risk (Lombardi, 1997: 209). Since Atatürk’s death in 1938, the military has acted as the *guardian* for Kemalism (his legacy) and intervened in state affairs when it has deemed this ideology to be at risk (Kili, 1980; Lombardi, 1997: 209).³⁷ The hybrid regime in Turkey has, thus, been a compromise between guardianship and democracy. Considering that political sovereignty is shared in this manner, the guardians (military officials) have to be more restrained than they would under plain dictatorships (Akkoyunlu, 2014: 44); nevertheless, their authority is still real. Overall, this has led to a rigid political system (White, 2014: 360).

To foster a true culture of democracy³⁸ and, thereby, embody the founding values of the OECD, Turkey would need to change its patrimonial structure,³⁹ which encourages “heavy-handed paternalistic governance” (White,

³⁵ Since the Justice & Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, there has not been a military intervention in Turkey despite there being a turn away from the Kemalist system; nevertheless, the military is still very much present in the background (White, 2014).

³⁶ In Turkey, the military is older than the nation (Weber, 1927) and is a “core constituent of society” (Cooper, 2002: 119) with an overall good image. In fact, it is the oldest (social) institution in the country and the only one remaining from the Ottoman era (Karpas, 1970: 1656). Young Turkish males are indoctrinated into the established views of the Republic (Kemalism) through their military service and learn to protect the state in its traditional form (ibid: 121).

³⁷ Over the past decade, the government has been able to subjugate the military under greater civilian control and thwart such interventions before they could be enacted, however. The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations are two notable examples, demonstrating that the secularist ‘Old Guard’ (Rodrik, 2013: 129) is being dislodged from power in Turkey.

³⁸ a “democratic mentality” (Sütçü, 2011: 59), whereby citizens feel at liberty to express themselves and contribute to public governance

³⁹ Patriarchy, and, therefore by extension, patriarchal domination, is upheld to be at the heart of patrimonialism, whereby rulers justify their political authority by citing tradition and age-old conventions (Weber, 1968, 1978; Adams, 2005). Similar to seigniorial monarchies, there is only one master, who by natural right has the power of life or death over his family members and by custom is

2014: 361) and social manipulation (ibid: 356). While, generally speaking, authoritarian acts are more easily perceptible, it is, in actuality, the patrimonial tendency in military rule that has the greatest ramification for democracy (Ikpe, 2000: 146; Seeberg, 2013). During the twentieth century, the military has, in effect, been considered to be above the law in Turkey (Budd, 2004: 5).⁴⁰

Military governance, itself, is not consistent with democratic norms and practices; what is more, military intervention in civilian affairs disrupts public credence in democratic processes, preventing the stabilisation of democracy (Heper, 1992; Budd, 2004: 79). Instead, emphasis is placed on loyalty to the state (Heper & Selçuk Sancar, 1998: 147).⁴¹ In Turkey's case, this loyalty has been directed at "the self-designated mission of the bureaucracy" (ibid: 148), which traditionally has been to uphold the guardianship of Atatürkian (modernisation) principles. The military elite have typically regarded Turkish politicians as *hindering* national development rather than encouraging it (Cooper, 2002: 118). Over the years, the military has been particularly sensitive to threats directed at Kemalism, for its values are understood to be the same as Atatürk's conception of the secular state, and Kemalism (Atatürk's legacy) has been the source of the military's legitimacy (Lombardi, 1997: 209). On this account, although Kemalism has lost its stronghold over the past decade, it is

owed reverence (Bodin, 1955). In this manner, patrimonialism refers to a regime where the leader exercises absolute personal power through a small, central bureaucracy, with a lack of separation between the public and private sectors, keeping state administration all the more personal (Weber, 1968, 1978; Skocpol, 1979) but, therein, enabling massive corruption (personal abuses of power) and nepotism (Ikpe, 2000: 146).

⁴⁰ The founders of the Republic of Turkey kept the traditional state-society (patrimonial) structure of the late Ottomans, which was elitist in its top-down approach and centered on the sultanate (M. L. Karaman & B Aras, 2000: 48). Since 2002 there has been a shift in power away from the military (Rodrik, 2013). In particular, the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) trials in 2012 have greatly tarnished the military's public image, not to mention, its administrative structure (Esayan, 2013), revealing evidence of corruption, while at the same time, making a mockery of the rule of law (Rodrik, 2011).

⁴¹ Recently, this loyalty has become more fragmented in Turkey (Esayan, 2013).

still the substructure of society (White, 2014), meaning that guardianship is ever present in Turkey.⁴²

The military has recently ceded its position in order that Turkey can meet the EU's criteria for membership, so the country has diverged from its pattern of military interpositions (Cook, 2007: x), but the military has not completely relinquished its authority over society as a whole.⁴³ Such reform would entail more than bureaucratic changes (Rouleau, 2000: 102); it would necessitate significant socio-cultural transformation, which could not be brought about by a coup.

Hence, while Turkey has made clear its goal to "show the world that a country, which has a Muslim population, can also be democratic" (Haass, 2003: 144), liberal democracy is not something that can simply be instituted or commanded. It must be practiced. As a conceptual framework supported by commitment and belief, *democracy* requires dedication or it cannot really exist (El Fadl, 2003: 8). It is possible for a country, such as Turkey, to have the formal appearance of being a democracy (boasting a constitution, a representative parliament, regular elections, and other essential elements) without having the mindset (sharing in the moral values and attitudinal commitments) of a democracy (McGhee, 1954; El-Fadl, 2003: 8; Rodrik, 2014) as espoused by OECD membership.

The Country's Status as an Advanced Economy

⁴² If the country replaces its 1982 constitution with a *civilian* constitution as planned, this will no longer be the case.

⁴³ As patrimonialism is a personalistic regime, it is very difficult to imagine – let alone bring about – a separation from the state (Bellin, 2004: 144). Atatürk is part of Turkey's national identity, and he is a revered military hero, so in this way, the military is also part of Turkey's national image and there is an unbroken line of authority.

In many regards, Turkey's approach to economic affairs parallels its attitude towards democracy in that the national economy has been on a "roller-coaster ride" (Acemoglu & Üçer, 2015: para 1) for the past several decades. During much of its history, Turkey has superficially been a market economy (Ahmad, 1993; Morady & Şiriner, 2011). It is only with the recent development of a middle class (progenerated through employment in Germany and beyond with resulting return migration) that the country has transformed into a full-fledged market economy (Papademetriou & Martin, 1991; Erdemir, 2006; Heinemann, 2011: 134). That being said, scholars are hesitant to qualify Turkey as a *liberal* market economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Gwartney & Lawson, 2008: 8)⁴⁴ or an *advanced industrialised country* (Bölükbaşı, 2012: 342).⁴⁵ As will be discussed, this quandary partly stems from Turkey's patrimonial legacy, but it also reflects more far-ranging cultural differences regarding economic *modernisation* (Granato et al., 1996: 608).⁴⁶

Turkey's Ottoman-based culture is not perceived to be in complete conformity with the Protestant ethos of modern Western capitalism, with its emphasis upon individualism, rational organisation of labour, and regularised investment of capital (Weber, 1930; Glyptis, 2005). From this standpoint, Turkey is judged to be lacking – in a state of incomplete development and otherwise dependency (Hershlag, 1958; Bhagwati, 1966; Nas, 2008). Turkey is, therefore, almost exclusively featured in the comparative political economy literature of

⁴⁴ a country that reflects the ideals associated with perfect market competition, whereby the state plays an arm's length role in the economy and formal contractual relations prevail over long-term social obligations (Soskice, 1999: 103; Hall, 2001: 53)

⁴⁵ a country that has privatised state enterprises and is recognised for efficiencies and flexibilities of labour and technology, which are based upon considerable human and financial capital and development (Vogel, 1996: 2)

⁴⁶ Turkey does not feature in the literature on the political economy of advanced industrialised countries (Bölükbaşı, 2012: 342). Hall and Soskice (2001) have classified it as such, but for the most part, observers claim that Turkey is *not quite* an industrialised country (Gürsel, 2013: 202), though it has changed considerably from its agrarian stature of the 1920s. Generally, it is felt that Turkey lacks highly-skilled workers and domestic savings, and the country does not invest sufficiently in research and development or allow for a flexible labour force (ibid: 201).

developing countries (Dick, 1974: 825-826; Bölükbaşı, 2012: 341), namely that relating to the Middle East region, which is frequently characterised by political instability⁴⁷ (Alesina & Perotti, 1994; Henry & Springborg, 2010), thereby legitimating its underdevelopment.

Yet, Turkey ranks among the twenty largest economies of the world (World Bank Group, Turkey Overview, 2015), and it is classified as an (upper) middle income country (ibid, Country and Lending Groups, 2015), with a per capita income exceeding USD \$10,000 per annum. Turkey is also a member of the Group of 20 (G20) and MIKTA⁴⁸, and principally due to its size (both demographic and territorial), it is one of only four OECD countries⁴⁹ that is not a member of the G7 but that ranks among the G20 major economies (G20 Research Group, University of Toronto, 2010).⁵⁰ In this way, Turkey outranks more than half of the other OECD countries by the sheer scale of its economy, though it does not yet seem to meet other standards of economic modernity, namely those surrounding socio-economic investment and technological development.⁵¹

Much of the history of the Republic can be characterised by a precarious economic position and behaviour that is questionable for a *leading* world economy (Önis & Rubin, 2003). Perhaps most astoundingly, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took office in 2002, Turkey “had the dubious distinction of being the all-time greatest recipient of IMF loans” (Patton, 2006:

⁴⁷ Turkey is said to be *dead centre* in an “arc of instability” (Lombardi, 2006: 6).

⁴⁸ MIKTA is a relatively new forum that brings together the foreign ministers of Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Australia (Cooper, 2015).

⁴⁹ Australia, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea being the other three

⁵⁰ Moreover, Turkey is the only OECD founder country that is not a G7 member but is a member of the G20.

⁵¹ Nevertheless, some scholars, including Jeffrey Sachs, are quick to note that Turkey is improving in this regard (Sachs, 2013: 2)

516).⁵²It had borrowed USD \$31billion, and by 2005 it was still classed as the IMF's leading debtor (ibid: 516).⁵³What's more, by 2011, Turkey had *run up* eighteen IMF programmes, reinforcing its image as an *emerging market* economy, while reversing its claims to being an advanced industrial country (Heinemann, 2011: 13). When Turkey helped to found the OECD in the early 1960s, it ranked sixth among the world's major recipients of economic assistance (Tuncer, 1975: 209),⁵⁴ so considering the late Ottomans' ill-famed reputation as the *Sick Man of Europe* (Smith Anderson & Smith Anderson, 1966; Cunningham, 1981), Turkey was known not to have the best credentials for managing its economy. "Wildly ambitious investment schemes" (Simpson, 1965: 145) and past policies of *expansion at all costs* (OECD, 1963: 11) had left the Republic with a formidable debt.⁵⁵ Consequently, at the time of joining the OECD, Turkey was seen to be both an *underdeveloped* country and a *highly indebted* nation (Simpson, 1965: 142; Wood, 1986: 191).⁵⁶ The country was deemed to be caught in a perverse cycle of economic problems:

[Turkey was in] a treacherous process of high and volatile inflation, unsustainable public debt accumulation, and increasing financial fragility, resulting from irresponsible policies and lack of fiscal discipline that had been endemic under various governments.

(Akyüz & Boratav, 2002: 1)

⁵² By 2002 year-end, Turkey had domestic and foreign debt totally USD \$206 billion, with more than half (\$131.6 billion) being external debt (Patton, 2006: 516). The 2001 financial crisis had prompted the worst economic downturn in Turkey since 1945 (IMF, 2002: 392)

⁵³ This means that over the years, Turkey has been deemed more in need of financial support than the IMF's other 187 member states (IMF, 2015).

⁵⁴ after India, Pakistan, South Vietnam, Brazil, and South Korea

⁵⁵ In considering the wealth of nations, Adam Smith (1776) deduces that "[v]anity almost always leads to extravagance" (Book V, Chapter III, v.3.2), which is at the root of public debts. Despite the Ottoman Empire ceasing, in part, due to the lavishness of its monarchical governments, the Republic of Turkey has not been very frugal either (ibid: v.3.3; Waugh, 1933).

⁵⁶ When the OECD began operations in 1961, Turkey had an outstanding debt (payable in foreign currencies) of \$950 million (OECD, 1963: 11).

One of the biggest obstacles facing the country was, and continues to be, the servicing of its public debt⁵⁷— a burden that was transferred from the Ottoman Empire and has been a constant affliction for the Republic.⁵⁸ Under Atatürk’s leadership in the 1920s and 30s, Turkey struggled with its desire to be self-sufficient (remain independent of foreign domination) and to carry out its plans for rapid modernisation and economic development, which necessitated substantial resources and expertise (Tuncer, 1975: 210). Atatürk’s reforms came at considerable cost: the fiscal system was changed, industries (like textiles) were subsidised, and even small businesses (such as turban manufacturers) were compensated when a new hat law was introduced (Toynbee & Kirkwood, 1927: 228). From the beginning, therefore, the government was strained to both repay its Ottoman-inherited debts⁵⁹ and to buy foreign goods and services to develop a national economy (ibid: 210). Rather than relinquishing further sovereignty, it “preferred national impoverishment to the sacrifice of [its] newly-won economic and fiscal independence” (Toynbee & Kirkwood, 1927: 226).

In order to foster a sense of national pride following the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish government nationalised several industries (including the tobacco, sugar, match, and cigarette-paper industries), making them monopolies. While such state actions were well intended, they were not enough to remedy the disproportions in Turkey’s public debt: over half of the state revenue was exhausted by the interest and amortisation of the

⁵⁷ *Public debt* is here considered broadly to mean the gross debt of general government (Chouraqui et al., 1986: 105-106). Turkey has typically been required to borrow extensively in order to pay off domestic debt, thereby incurring more (Patton, 2006: 516-517).

⁵⁸ Several times over the course of its history, Turkey has been unable to service its debt and has, therefore, needed to turn to foreign sources of assistance. Beginning in 1958, only a couple of years before helping to found the OECD, Turkey was in economic crisis and had to accept a stabilisation program. As a result, the Republic quickly became dependent upon western resources, adopting a policy of borrowing as much as possible in order to finance further *development* (Tuncer, 1975: 213).

⁵⁹ The Republic was held responsible for about 40% of the Ottoman’s pre-World War One debt (Toynbee & Kirkwood, 1927: 236). As a result, the Turkish state has been typecast as “always seeming to exist on a deficit” (ibid: 240).

debt as well as by the Ministry of War, meaning that there was little being invested in constructive and productive industries in Turkey (Toynbee & Kirkwood, 1927: 228; OECD, *Economic Surveys*, 2004: 40). This disequilibrium still underpins Turkey's vulnerability, especially when factoring in chronic high inflation and the volatility of the Turkish lira (IMF, 2002: 392; Gürbüz, Jobert & Tuncer, 2007).⁶⁰

In addition to oppressive loads of debt and oftentimes irresponsible economic governance, the perennial crisis in the Turkish economy stems from an enormous expenditure on defence (Lewis, 1974: 226; Brzoska, 1995; Karagol, 2006).⁶¹ Turkey consistently spends more than the NATO European average on defence (as a percentage of GDP) (NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, 2014: 6). For the Turks, the art of war is "certainly the noblest of all arts" (Smith, 1776: Book V, Chapter I, v.1.13).⁶² Among government programs, defence spending has historically commanded the highest financial priority in the country,⁶³ even above education and social security (Lewis, 1974: 226).⁶⁴ Under Kemalism, the

⁶⁰ Since 2008, Turkey has accumulated over USD \$320 billion in hard-currency debt, and its currency has lost more than 30% of its value against the US dollar since mid-2014, leaving Turkish debtors with higher debt servicing costs (Government of Turkey, General Directorate of Public Finance, 2015).

⁶¹ As Adam Smith (1776) makes well aware, "The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force" (Book V, Chapter I, v.1.0). Expenses must be incurred both in preparing the military during times of peace and in employing it during times of war. Nevertheless, "it becomes universally necessary that the public should maintain those who serve the public in war, at least while they are employed in that service" (ibid: v.1.9).

⁶² Under the constitution, military service is compulsory in Turkey (Yentürk, 2014: 15). The country has the 11th largest army in the world, with 600, 000 personnel (ibid: 14).

⁶³ This being said, it is not easy to calculate exactly how much Turkey spends on its military, as the costs are distributed among several budget areas and now encompass services performed by private companies as well as aid being transferred to Northern Cyprus for military purposes (Günlük-Senesen, 2004: 145; Yentürk, 2014: 14). Furthermore, there is very little information available about the pension costs of retired military personnel, despite the fact that three quarters of Turkey's military expenses are personnel-related (Yentürk, 2014: 14). Nevertheless, Turkey's *military burden* (military spending as a share of GDP) is about 2.36% --the same as that of France (ibid: 13).

⁶⁴ For instance, Turkey's 1973 budget allocated nearly six times as much towards defence (61,967 million TL) as towards education (11,100 million TL), the government's second-highest priority (Lewis, 1974: 226).

Turks have constantly been in a state of war,⁶⁵ on the alert against *inside and outside enemies* (White, 2014), creating a justification for the colossal expenditure on the military.⁶⁶

Yet, in Turkey, due to its patrimonial form of government, the military has also traditionally taken on the role of overseeing the economy,⁶⁷ such that it has stepped in and taken command when it has felt that the government has not properly been steering the country (Türkiye İş Bankası, 1981: 191). Essentially, the 1960 coup, which took place just months before Turkey signed the *Convention on the OECD*, was in part a reaction to the Democratic Party's mismanagement of the economy (Tuncer, 1975: 213).⁶⁸ The military took control and established a state planning organisation to initiate long term economic goals and assure a steady flow of external financing for development (ibid: 214). Moreover, in the early 1980s, following another coup, the military so much as re-wrote the constitution to allow for trade liberalisation after the government's various economic stabilisation measures had failed (Heinemann, 2011: 137). It banned all trade unions and eliminated internal opposition to neoliberal reforms (ibid: 138), thereby demonstrating who had real authority over Turkey's economic trajectory.

⁶⁵ In this way, the army must be augmented. During times of immediate danger, there is no time for the government to gradually raise taxes, so it must resort to borrowing (Smith, 1776: Book V, Chapter III, 3.4).

⁶⁶ Even though Turkey is normally in a state of military preparedness, Smith (1776) explains why its defence expenditure is so great: "The want of parsimony in time of peace imposes the necessity of contracting debt in time of war. When war comes, there is no money in the treasury but what is necessary for carrying on the ordinary expense of the peace established. In war an establishment of three or four times that expense becomes necessary for the defence of the state, and consequently a revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue" (Book V, Chapter III, v.3.4).

⁶⁸ The government had failed to deliver the material wealth promised by way of modernisation and economic development, so the benefits of democracy and secularism (as organising principles) became dubious (Berkes, 1964; Ergil, 2000: 43).

Turkey is not a socialist republic,⁶⁹ though its founders, in seeking to create a *people's state*, abstained from adopting most western practices for economic development in an attempt to de-emphasise class differences and, thus, avoid class warfare (Türkiye İş Bankası, 1981: 104).⁷⁰ They endorsed private capitalist entrepreneurship and western rights of property ownership, but they opted to follow the socialist model to manage industrial production and distribution (ibid: 98).⁷¹ To this extent, the Republic established its own economic configuration, more similar to the capitalist philosophy of Northern Europe in the nineteenth century than to the laissez-faire philosophy of Western Europe (ibid: 129); yet, first and foremost, it was a model for a *state-controlled* economy (Hale, 1981).⁷²

Since the Republic was founded, many orthodox in Turkey have been opposed to much economic freedom and development for fear that growing wealth could lead to a decline in spirituality (Kadioğlu, 2007).⁷³ They have been contented with adopting western material culture (in the form of goods and services), but they do not endorse western civilizational culture (including its values and beliefs)⁷⁴ and, hence, have encouraged a strong (nationalising) role for the state in the economy as a form of defensive modernisation (Ayres, 1981: 111; Curtin, 2000: 128). In this manner, until 1995, Turkey was described as having an inward-looking, shielded economy (Hershlag, 1968; Heinemann,

⁶⁹ In fact, the military outlawed communist parties in 1980 (Pamuk, 1981: 27).

⁷⁰ The Kemalist reforms were aimed at alleviating the steep social distinctions from the Ottoman era.

⁷¹ By not fully adopting capitalism, the Turks were also signalling their resistance to Western domination (Türkiye İş Bankası, 1981: 161).

⁷² Turkey implemented *planned economic development* long before it became popular as a development strategy (Hale, 1981).

⁷³ In the early 1960s, when Turkey helped to establish the OECD, about 70% of its population was made up of peasants working in agriculture (Samli, 1964: 55).

⁷⁴ Many feel that the introduction of European values (namely rights to equality) in 1839 and 1856 led to the slow disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (Acer, 2009; Straw, 2010: 121), so traditionalists are hesitant about Turkey fully adopting western values today (Dismorr, 2008: 111).

2011: 161). In order to promote industrialisation, the Republican People's Party opted for a strategy of *étatisme* (economic statism),⁷⁵ which allowed the state to be the driving force behind the economy for more than four decades (Aktan, 1997; Waterbury, 1993; Nas, 2008: 132). *Étatisme* did not focus on economic stabilisation, but rather, it acted as a non-capitalist means to economic development, which has led to the perception in Turkey that responsibility for investment and development lies with government (ibid: 13).

While *étatisme* is often blamed for Turkey's underdevelopment (Türkiye İş Bankası, 1981), it is effectively the overriding system of patrimonialism that is culpable (Budd, 2004: 17; Seeberg, 2013). Citizens are socialised to trust and remain loyal to the patriarch, who has their best interests at heart, rather than placing their trust in the impersonal (rational) workings of the free market (Patton, 2006: 534).⁷⁶ This poses a barrier to capitalist development, and the economy remains governed by powerful, vested interests, thereby institutionalising economic uncertainty⁷⁷ and perverting economic decision-making (Budd, 2004: 24). Public resources are not allocated rationally. They are used discretionally, which often undermines the confidence of business leaders, resulting in higher unemployment and inflation (Waterbury, 1992: 141). Overall, patrimonial interference discourages investments in trade and industry, as the economic environment is too uncertain (Turner, 1974: 237). Leaders are faced with the ongoing problem of financing patrimonial troops, hence investors are apprehensive that their assets could, ultimately, be seized in order to furnish the military (ibid: 238).

⁷⁵ Under *étatisme*, private enterprise is *free* (the government does not nationalise existing businesses), but the state has a strong presence in the economy through establishing and managing basic industries (state economic enterprises) in order to develop the country in the shortest time possible (Pamuk, 1981: 26; Nas, 2008: 132).

⁷⁶ thus detracting from the spirit of capitalism (Turner, 1974: 237)

⁷⁷ Under the patrimonial state, most decisions depend upon personal considerations, such as privileges, favors, and personal connections. There is little procedural predictability, which is necessary for capitalist development (Weber, 1978).

In the case of Turkey, until the 1980s and 90s,⁷⁸ many underperforming businesses were kept, considering that competition was not an issue. Likewise, rationalisation and privatisation were not encouraged because it was more important for the government to maintain industries and by that, maintain jobs (Cooper, 2002). In the 1950s, in particular, the government built many state economic enterprises without consideration of their effects (Hale, 1981). Generally, due to political considerations, the state enterprises fixed prices and paid higher wages (20-30% higher) than the private sector, contributing to even greater government deficits and inefficient industries (Simpson, 1965: 149). By the end of the decade, the cost of living had increased by more than one hundred and fifty per cent (ibid: 150). On the whole, conditions were too unstable to attract foreign private capital, insomuch as the investment risks were too great (ibid: 145). Though by 1989 the Republic had lifted all restrictions on its capital account and had a vibrant stock exchange (the Istanbul Stock Exchange) in place (Heinemann, 2011: 144), by 2015 the country's market reality has still not changed: when the political leaders resort to authoritarian measures and irrational policy decisions in order to preserve their power, foreign investors become uneasy with the unpredictable economic conditions and *progress*⁷⁹ appears but a false impression (White, 2014).

This being said, Turkey has made great economic strides since 2002 under the AKP, mostly in an attempt to meet the EU's membership criteria. By the end of 2004, seventy per cent of Turkey's 241 state economic enterprises were privatized, for instance (Nas, 2008: 133). Even though economic criteria⁸⁰ are not considered to pose a barrier to Turkey's EU accession, the government

⁷⁸ In the 1980s, following constitutional changes implemented by the military, the Özal government introduced neoliberal reforms, allowing for the privatisation of several industries (Bal, 1998: 8).

⁷⁹ one of the most basic notions of the Age of Enlightenment (Kant, 1784, n.a 1954)

⁸⁰ The *Copenhagen criteria* (1993) require that countries wishing to join the EU have a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with (competitive) market pressures resulting from union (European Commission, Conditions for Membership, 2014)

has deferred to the obligation of maintaining neoliberal reforms (Patton, 2006: 527-528; Erdem, 2011: 169). Turkey claims that its “most ambitious challenge” (IMF, Letter of Intent, 2005: 1.2) is “securing convergence with the economies of the European Union” (ibid: 1.2). Yet, aside from checking inflation and reducing public debt, Turkey’s main problem seems to be corruption stemming from its patrimonial system, which impedes the country’s economic advancement and particularly affects small and medium-sized enterprises operating in Turkey (interview, international businessperson, 12 March 2014).

Reflecting upon the economic situation of the country, it becomes obvious that much has changed over the years;⁸¹ nevertheless, if Turkey is to be considered as a *liberal market economy*, then it is clear that much still needs to be done.⁸² Turkey is now quite open to international trade and investment and has the potential for sustained economic growth, but it also has sizable foreign debt that makes it necessary to attract and maintain greater foreign direct investment, keeping the economy in a state of vulnerability (Perchoc, 2015: 2). To that end, Turkey is not the typical model of a *leading* world economy. More than fifty years after joining the OECD, Turkey is still far from economically stable, though it has become one of the twenty biggest economies in the world. The country, thus, evokes an important question about OECD membership: how to measure⁸³ success (?)

⁸¹ During the Cold War, Turkey appropriated the image of an *underdeveloped* country that was in need of American financial and technical assistance (Simpson, 1965: 143). Post-Cold War, Turkey now portrays itself as an *emerging market* economy, worthy of foreign direct investment. Neither of these images matches the typical OECD member identity of being an *advanced* economy or overall rich country, however.

⁸² As Turkey has readily admitted, for instance, it greatly needs to improve the quality of its government spending (IMF, Letter of Intent, 2005: 1).

⁸³ Indicators such as income equality, level and quality of education, energy, environment, health, and technology signal whether a country has a healthy, functioning economy as well as a healthy, socially-cohesive environment and a good system of governance. As will be seen, Turkey has some achievements in certain of these areas but not in others, especially with respect to rights and freedoms.

Human Rights and Social Well-Being in Turkey

Turkey's attitude towards human rights and social well-being is just as important, for the promotion of civil rights and freedoms is, arguably, what makes a nation state *liberal*, and the OECD's mission is directed at improving the well-being of citizens (OECD, Our mission, 2013). While, traditionally speaking, as an OECD member country, Turkey's commitments to democracy and the market economy have been questionable, its intentions with respect to social well-being (ibid) are even more debatable.⁸⁴ Turkey is said to have "various shortcomings" (Akkoyunlu, 2014: 16) in fostering liberal-democratic features,⁸⁵ such as civil liberties,⁸⁶ human rights,⁸⁷ protection of minorities, and a (relatively) high standard of living (Özkurt, 2013: 124; Plattner, 2015).

By the same token, in the past few years, the country is known to have set more than its share of negative records, including having the largest number of journalists in prison,⁸⁸ victimising women in the utmost grisly of manners, and sending the most requests to Twitter and Facebook for content removal⁸⁹ (Gözaydın, 2006: 69; Beiser, 2013; Paul & Seyrek, 2015: 2). In 2014, Turkey was

⁸⁴ Turkey has the lowest labour force participation rate (50.4%) of fifty countries analysed by the OECD, with a 21.2% long-term unemployment rate. Social spending is only 13.5% of GDP (OECD, Data on Turkey, 2016).

⁸⁵ More so than competitive elections, it is these features, such as speech and media freedoms, that make a country fully democratic by allowing for the accountability of government (Özbudun, 2000: 3; Sütçü, 2011: 27).

⁸⁶ *Civil liberties*, variously, encompass the personal freedoms granted by way of statute and common law in order to allow for autonomy of the individual. Civil liberties can be either negative freedoms (freedom *from* torture and warrantless search and seizure, for instance) or positive freedoms (freedom *of* assembly and freedom *of* movement, for example) (Feldman, 2002).

⁸⁷ These are universal and inherent to all human beings, such as the right to life.

⁸⁸ The OSCE (Representative on Freedom of the Media) monitors the situation and maintains a list of the journalists imprisoned in Turkey, which can be accessed at <http://www.osce.org/fom/119921?download=true>

⁸⁹ In September of 2014, Turkey passed an amendment (to law 5651) allowing its regulator (the Telecommunications Directorate) to shut down access to any web site within four hours if the content is deemed to pose a threat to public order, national security, or general health.

also *the most complained about* country for free speech issues at the European Court of Human Rights⁹⁰, as it was in 2013 (Ó Fathaigh & Voorhoof, 2014; ECtHR, 2015: 175). Freedom House⁹¹ characterises the country as *partly free* for respecting civil liberties and political rights (2015: 3).⁹² Other international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) are quick to point out Turkey's front rank on their respective radars: Turkey has one of the highest numbers of work-related deaths in the world (due to hazardous working conditions) (Amnesty International, 2015: 374);⁹³ at present, Turkey also has more refugees than any other country, and most of them are destitute, living outside camps and not receiving any state assistance⁹⁴ (Refugees International, 2015); furthermore, except for Greece, Turkey is the only country relying upon a World War I treaty (the *Treaty of Lausanne*)⁹⁵ as the basis for not recognising (or accommodating) minority populations within its territory (Minority Rights Group International, 2011). So, all in all, one can see why it is often said that Turkey pays *lip service* to human rights and democratic principles (Özel & Özcan, 2011).⁹⁶

⁹⁰ 24 of the 47 complaints were against Ankara in 2014.

⁹¹ *Freedom House* is a Washington, D.C.-based non-governmental organisation dedicated to advancing political freedoms globally.

⁹² Turkey needs to do much more to uphold fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association.

⁹³ Turkey has the highest number of work-related fatalities among OECD countries and the second-highest number of workplace accidents in the world, after China (Müller, 2014).

⁹⁴ Due to upheaval in its surrounding region, Turkey has more than 1.7 million Syrian refugees, with over 1.3 million of them living outside camps (Refugees International, 2015).

⁹⁵ Turkey signed the peace treaty at Lausanne on 24 July 1923 following military victory by the Turkish nationalists, who later formed the Republic. It replaced the *Treaty of Sèvres* (10 August 1920) that had been imposed upon the Ottoman Empire after defeat in World War I. Under the Treaty of Lausanne the Turkish government rejected recognition of language, race, and ethnicity in defining *minorities* and agreed only to recognising *non-Muslims* as minorities in accordance with the administrative system used by the Ottomans (Shankland, 1993: 5).

⁹⁶ Turkey has officially declared its commitment to human rights: it was one of the first countries to sign the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948; it became a party (though reluctantly) to the *European Convention on Human Rights* in 1954, and it signed the *European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* in 1988; nevertheless, it has a poor reputation for following through with these pledges (Straw, 2010: 25, 2013: 15).

Much of the problem stems from Turkey's constitution, which was written in 1982 under military oversight⁹⁷ and is designed to protect the rights of the state rather than the citizen (Insel, 2003; Arslan, 2007: 8; White, 2014: 359).⁹⁸ It reinforces the identity of the *Father State* as the provider and protector of the national family by way of a *heavy hand* (ibid: 361). The text seeks to affirm "the indivisible unity of the Sublime Turkish State" [Preamble, para 1], which was brought into being through the concept of nationalism introduced by Atatürk, "the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, and his reforms and principles" [ibid]. As amended in 2001 (*Act 4709*), the Constitution endorses the family as "the foundation of the Turkish society" [Chapter 3, Article 41], thereby granting authority to the household over the rights and freedoms of individual members (Arat, 2000: 281). This has created the situation whereby crimes against women (murder, rape, and the like) are treated as indignities against their relatives rather than assaults against the females, themselves (Arat, 2000: 281; Straw, 2010: 38). As most violence against women in Turkey is of a domestic nature (occurring in the home), such assaults are not even legally addressed, in order to uphold the autonomy of the family (Liljeström & Özdalga, 2002), thereby further perpetuating the unequal situation of females within the patriarchal unit (Engels, 1884, 1962; Denzin, 1984: 486; Arat, 2009: 3). Reciprocally, the officially-sanctioned patriarchal command buttresses the authority and strength of the patrimonial state (MacKinnon, 1982, 1983).

Under the constitution (and in Turkish society), the group often overrides the individual, putting the interests of the nation before the individual rights of citizens (Glyptis, 2007: 130). Consequently, universal

⁹⁷ The military sought to overturn liberal concessions granted by way of the 1961 constitution and to re-establish state authority (Arslan, 2007: 8).

⁹⁸ For instance, as Article 5 of the Constitution stipulates, "The fundamental aims and duties of the State are to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy" (Part 1, 1982). Moreover, Article 4 establishes that the basis of the nation shall not be modified.

freedoms⁹⁹ have limitations different from those commonly accepted in Western European liberal democracies (ibid: 130),¹⁰⁰ since it is every Turkish citizen's duty to protect the nation and its territory from divisibility [Articles 1-3]. Under Article 42 of the constitution, for instance, the individual right to education also carries a duty: "loyalty to the constitution" [para 4]. Everyone is responsible for protecting the Republic, which is secular in nature, and education must be conducted according to "the principles and reforms of Atatürk, based on contemporary scientific and educational principles, under the supervision and control of the State" [para 3]. In this way, academic freedoms (including those of free speech and thought) are undermined by the duty to protect (Kemalist) orthodox views, and the university is not the place to question official dogma (Yavuz, 2003: viii).

Similarly, under Article 28 of the constitution, freedom of the press is restricted by several considerations, including public order, the integrity of the state, and the reputation and "family life of others" [Article 26, para 2]. These legal provisions enable the state to greatly limit the individual right to freedom of expression (Kemal, 2007). They also provide justification for *thought crime* under Turkish law (namely in the Penal Code and in the 1991 Anti-Terror Law), prohibiting the expression and dissemination of any comments that might promote separatism¹⁰¹ or threaten the unity of the Republic (Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, 2008: 336; White, 2014).¹⁰² Over the years, this crime has served as a "strong weapon" (Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, 2008: 336) for the military¹⁰³ in

⁹⁹ Under international law these are aspirational in nature, forming a principled, normative framework; implementation is at the discretion of the nation state (Rehman, 1995: 15; Ignatieff, 2001).

¹⁰⁰ There is no public interest clause, for instance.

¹⁰¹ Citizens are penalised (and often killed) for promoting their ethnic heritage (Cooper, 2002: 127).

¹⁰² This includes the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, under which it is still a punishable offence for a Turkish citizen to publicly denigrate the Turkish nation (or entities thereof), as well as the military (Algan, 2008: 2239; Straw, 2010: 68, 2013).

¹⁰³ Ironically, now that the military has a decreasing role in the political system, freedom of speech and expression is under greater threat in Turkey. The timing coincides with a societal shift across Turkey and

its battle against pro-Kurdish groups¹⁰⁴ as well as against social and political activists, in general (Gunter, 2000).

That said, Turkey's ambitions for EU accession have influenced major amendments to the constitution¹⁰⁵ since it was created in 1982 (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 5). In order to meet the EU's requirements for democratic conditionality, Turkey has been obligated to foster protection of basic freedoms, including human rights and the protection of minorities (Erdem, 2011: 154). Between 2001 and 2004, the country undertook a *silent revolution* with "an unprecedented level of political reforms" (ibid: 155) in its outlook towards EU accession. One of the greatest developments was the abolishment of the death penalty, although there were several notable reforms, including the elimination of state security courts, the implementation of *zero tolerance* for torture, and advances in human rights (permitting broadcasting in non-Turkish languages and extending property rights for non-Muslims) (ibid: 174).

Turkey is considering modernising its 1982 constitution (Gecer, 2014: 41).¹⁰⁶ During the 2007 election campaign, the AKP pledged to draw up "a new, civilian, and democratic constitution"¹⁰⁷(Arslan, 2007: 7) to foster participatory democracy and give priority to individual rights vis-à-vis the state (ibid: 9). In 2011, a Constitutional Reconciliation Commission was formed to reconceive the

the world toward inter-connectivity, information sharing, and globalisation. The restrictions upon such freedoms are one means by which the government can seek to maintain control (especially during times of significant socio-political change).

¹⁰⁴ The Kurds are Turkey's largest non-Turkish speaking community, who over the decades have been demanding greater cultural recognition and political independence.

¹⁰⁵ The 1982 constitution has been extensively revised in 1995, 2001, 2004, and 2010 (Örücü, 2011; Gunter, 2012).

¹⁰⁶ Turkey has amended its constitution seventeen times since ratification in 1982. This time, however, the country would be replacing its constitution, changing its parliamentary government to a presidential system. Rather than enhancing democracy, the move would abolish the office of the prime minister, consolidating the president's power over parliament and its agenda (as well as over the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors).

¹⁰⁷ distilling the notion that constitutions can only be created after military coups in Turkey (Arslan, 2007: 16)

relationship between the state and citizens (Turkey Constitution Watch, 2013), but the constitutional process was halted in 2013, when political parties were unable to reach agreement and the AKP withdrew from the process (ibid). Now that the AKP has won a majority in the 1 November 2015 general election, Prime Minister Davutoğlu has announced plans for the creation of a new constitution as part of a transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential system (Serbest, 2015; Kaya, 2014). Nonetheless, scholars affirm that real social change necessitates more than written enactments (Falk Moore, 1973: 719; Rosenberg, 2008: 107). It requires a change in social thinking and, thus, in acting.

In Turkey, for instance, some high-ranking members of society (military officers and their civilian alliances) have the notion that they should step in to protect the constitution (through secret, extra-judicial means) when it appears that the government is not able to defend the state through legal means (Straw, 2010: 162, 2013: 16). This *deep state* activity has served to crush domestic opposition (Filkins, 2012) rather than allowing bona fide public debate (Özel, 2003: 80). Quite alarmingly, it has led to extra-judicial executions and the disappearances of people while under police custody (Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, 2008: 337). As a case in point, in 1999, shortly after the government announced that it had a list of businesspeople identified as funding the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), many on the list died, more than coincidentally (Straw, 2010: 163, 2013: 16). Such behaviour cannot be remedied by legislative amendments alone.

As demonstrated, Turkey does not have (strong) human rights norms that help to define it as a *liberal democratic state*, so it is not readily identified as being a member of the *community of liberal states* (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 9). In addition to its historically tenuous links with democracy and free market capitalism, this is what creates such a dissonance with its (founding) OECD membership. There is an incongruity between Turkey's praiseworthy image as

an OECD member and its deviating figure within the global human rights community (Hoover, 2011: 9). Human rights norms are particular in that they both prescribe rules for appropriate behaviour and help to constitute the identity of liberal states (Checkel, 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 8).¹⁰⁸ Though Turkey may be concerned about how it is perceived by other countries, overtly, it has not sought to establish itself among the *community of human rights abiding states* (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 9). It has signed up to several expressive instruments, favourably declaring its human rights position,¹⁰⁹ but it has often not complied with its treaty obligations (Hathaway, 2002: 1941),¹¹⁰ defending national sovereignty over international human rights norms (Reisman, 1990; Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 4).

In this way, human rights have been treated as secondary (if not tertiary) to other values and goals in Turkey (Forsythe, 2012), including maintaining the integrity of the national identity (in not recognising minority claims to ethnicity and language, for instance). Generally, human rights treaties are only minimally monitored and enforced (Hathaway, 2002: 1941), but considering Turkey's candidacy for EU accession, its political activities are regularly monitored by the EU (European Commission),¹¹¹ so its overall compliance with international norms is an issue of contention. The dissonance between the EU's criticisms of Turkey and the OECD's stated mandate in the world brings Turkey's OECD membership even further into question.

¹⁰⁸ though this identity, itself, has been brought into question with the military behaviours of the United States and its allies following 2001 (September 11th)

¹⁰⁹ Under international law, such declarations do not necessarily have to be sincere (Hathaway, 2002: 1941).

¹¹⁰ To be fair, non-compliance with human rights treaty obligations is common (Hathaway, 2002: 1938; Forsythe, 2012).

¹¹¹ by way of an annual progress report

Hence, before turning to analysis of Turkey's relations with the OECD, it is meaningful to consider Turkey's overall standard of living,¹¹² which lags far behind that of most of its OECD counterparts.¹¹³ Under Article 25(1) of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), *freedom from want* is recognised as a human right – the right to an adequate standard of living (to ensure personal health, security, and general well-being). This is often interpreted economically, but non-economic factors are also telling (Osberg & Sharpe, 2002: 292). Looking to the OECD's comparative data on social and welfare issues, citizens of Turkey have the second shortest life expectancy in the OECD region (at 74.6 years), and the infant mortality rate for the country (17.0 per 100 births) is by far the highest in the OECD (averaging 4.7 per 100 births)¹¹⁴ (OECD, Family Database, 2011). Relatedly, the quality of life¹¹⁵ in Turkey ranks below the OECD average in important dimensions, such as education, health services, quality of the environment, and work-life balance (OECD, Better Life Index-Turkey, 2014).¹¹⁶ While the quality of life in Turkey is found to have improved considerably over the past two decades, in general, Turks indicate that they are less satisfied with their lives compared to their OECD counterparts (ibid).¹¹⁷ In particular, they

¹¹² The *standard of living* is an economic concept that subjectively measures the quality of life one leads by way of the desire for and satisfaction of vital commodities. The concept is associated with elements of happiness and is often used cross-comparatively (Sen, 1987: 15).

¹¹³ Turkey has the second lowest employment rate in the OECD, at just less than 50% (49.7%). Disposable household income is about 45% of the OECD average; one in three Turks reports not being able to afford to buy sufficient food, and almost one in two (46%) reports not being able to afford sufficient home heating.

¹¹⁴ Somewhat offsetting this tendency, Turkey has one of the highest birthrates among OECD members.

¹¹⁵ *Quality of life* differs from *standard of living* in that it is a social judgement assessing the wellness of a person's state of life (in a particular environment), especially the freedoms that he or she has to achieve desired states of being and doing (Sen, 1993:24).

¹¹⁶ The OECD has created a *Better Life Index* to measure (and compare) the quality of life in member countries (plus Brazil and the Russian Federation) using 11 dimensions that the OECD deems to be essential to citizens' well-being. It is an interactive tool that gives users the option of sharing their views. The survey can be accessed via the OECD's website at <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/>. The findings for Turkey are available at <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/turkey/>.

¹¹⁷ averaging 5.6 on a satisfaction scale of 0 to 10

report problems with air pollution and water quality. Only twenty-four per cent of respondents in Turkey claim to be *very satisfied* with the quality of their lives – one of the lowest ratings in the OECD region (OECD, How's Life in Turkey, 2014: 2).¹¹⁸

Generally speaking, the OECD is perceived to be made up of welfare states¹¹⁹ (Gal, 2010: 285), but Turkey does not have a comprehensive social security net infrastructure (Durdag, 1973: 6; Buğra & Adar, 2008; Gal, 2010: 295),¹²⁰ and its citizens are not considered to have a *right* to social assistance (Weber, 1927: 316; Arts & Gelissen, 2002: 145), for poverty has not traditionally been defined as a social problem in Turkey (Bugra, 2007: 35). Though the state now assumes some financial responsibility for social security and has introduced a system of universal healthcare (Adar, 2007: 167),¹²¹ Turkey still has a very weak welfare system (communication with former academic in Turkey, 4 December 2015).

Traditionally speaking, it is the family that acts as the nucleus of support in Turkey, protecting its members and helping to offset deficiencies in formal social networks¹²² (Durdag, 1973: 7; Buğra & Keyder, 2006: 212; *ibid*). This is what has led some scholars to include Turkey among an *extended family* of

¹¹⁸ In general, Turks rank health, education, and life satisfaction as top considerations influencing well-being (OECD, How's Life in Turkey, 2014: 7).

¹¹⁹ Countries adhering to social values and ideologies that allow for the allocation of public goods in such a way as to encourage the well-being of all its citizens (Armingeon & Beyeler, 2004).

¹²⁰ In sharp contrast with their role in economic and social étatism, Turkish political authorities have assumed only limited responsibility for social assistance (and dealing with poverty, in general) (Bugra, 2007: 35). Poverty has been regarded as the realm of voluntary initiatives and private benevolence rather than the responsibility of the state (*ibid*: 47).

¹²¹ Under changes to the Social Security and General Health Insurance Law (2006), national health insurance is now available to about 95% of the population (Üçkardeşler, 2015: 159), and the state contributes 5% towards social security schemes (Adar, 2007).

¹²² According to one interviewee, when people have problems in Turkey, their relatives help them, and this is what makes "the whole country much more resilient when it comes to economic shocks" (interview, 4 December 2015).

Mediterranean welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gal, 2010)¹²³ which can generally be characterised by having low levels of social expenditure, high levels of the population at risk of poverty, recent histories of authoritarian rule (or colonial domination), relatively delayed processes of industrialisation, and strong religious values (Gal, 2010: 288). In this way, Turkey and the other Mediterranean welfare states are treated as *underdeveloped* versions of the European continental model (Arts & Gelissen, 2002: 145), with seemingly ineffective social protections and rudimentary welfare conditions (Castles, 1995) and, thus, in need of *catching up*, socially speaking, with their *northern* OECD counterparts (Gal, 2010: 285). This notion has helped to create a distinction among OECD member countries, qualifying those considered to be *developed* or *underdeveloped*, based upon the degree to which social needs are met by the private market or the (extended) family (Titmuss, 1958, 1974: 145). This distinction challenges the stereotype of OECD countries as being *rich, welfare states*.

4.3-Turkey's Relations with the OECD

Turkey often complains that it has no friends in the international community and identifies itself as being on the outside, left out of major groupings (Keyder, 2006; Heraclides, 2011: 22). However, as an original member of the OECD – a highly selective organisation – Turkey clearly does have friends. In fact, soon after the OECD began operating, in July of 1962, one of the Organisation's first multilateral initiatives was the establishment of an **OECD Consortium for**

¹²³ Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey are generally considered to be the 8 Mediterranean welfare states.

Turkey¹²⁴ -- a group to aid the Republic -- instituted under the guidance of Professor Jan Tinbergen, the famous Dutch economist.

Critics claim that the Consortium¹²⁵ was a step backward for Turkey's foreign policy in that it prevented independent solutions and instead invited "collective control over Turkey's economic policies reminiscent of the Ottoman Debt Administration of the past" (ibid: 214). Turkey was seen to be lacking in the experience and the economic knowledge needed to control its own economy (Üstün, 1997: 48), and the country was depicted as not taking responsibility for helping itself and solving its own problems (Government of Canada, Department of Finance, 1964).

The Consortium simulated a tutelary body (Tuncer, 1967: 11), putting pressure on the Turks to undertake "certain necessary domestic economic reforms" (Government of Canada, Department of Finance, 1962). Even the Chairman of the Consortium, Mr. von Mangoldt, referred to Turkey as "one of the lesser-developed Members of the OECD" (Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, 1964), for the country was judged to be "in such an entirely different state of development" (ibid, Background Briefing, 1964: 3) that it merited concerted attention. In this way, the Consortium was one of the OECD's first opportunities to advance its new role in *development* (Tuncer, 1975: 215) and provide its member states with the opportunity to adopt and expand

¹²⁴ OECD Consortiums were created (by resolution of the OECD Council) for both Greece and Turkey. Participation was voluntary and originally included only 9 member states: the North Americans (Canada and the USA), the European Community (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany) and Turkey, as well as the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The Consortium for Turkey met three times a year at the OECD headquarters in Paris in order to establish Turkey's long-term needs for development assistance. Pledges were in the form of 80% project and program assistance and 20% debt relief (Tuncer, 1967: 4; Lewis, 1974: 226).

¹²⁵ An aid consortium consists of a group of donors that meet and formally pledge assistance for a particular country, in this case Turkey (Frank Jr & Baird, 1975: 143).

their new identities as *leading* and *advanced* world states vis-à-vis *lesser developed* nations.¹²⁶

The undertaking affirms the image of Turkey as *ailing* (Toynbee & Kirkwood, 1927: 10; interview with academic, 5 May 2015).¹²⁷ It depicts the country as *lesser*, not only for its on-again-off-again democracy, its relatively *underdeveloped* economy, and its lower standard of living (as discussed in section 4.2), but rather, the OECD aid Consortium (cognitively and socially) helps to substantiate Turkey as being weak --in need of external advice and assistance in order to maintain control – and as being afraid – fearful of being further divided up by external powers, in like manner to the *Treaty of Sèvres*¹²⁸ (Pope & Pope, 1997: 44; Karaman & Aras, 2000: 39). In the context of the Consortium, Turkey's image is one of dependency – dependency upon foreign donors for economic advice and heavy borrowing in order to reach the normative development targets established by the OECD (Tuncer, 1975: 223).¹²⁹

Delving through the OECD's archival records it is difficult to probe beyond this one-dimensional semblance of Turkey as being weak and in need of assistance, for apart from the Consortium, the country was not an active participant in the OECD until the turn of the century, when Turkey assumed a much more active role on the international stage, in general.¹³⁰ The timing is significant, in consideration of the fact that it was in 1999 that Turkey officially

¹²⁶ The *donor country* image enjoyed popular support among the OECD public (Tuncer, 1975: 214), so member states were keen to see themselves as *benevolent*, especially to fellow Europeans. It is fitting, then, that Greece and Turkey (Near Eastern countries) were two of the OECD's first *beneficiaries* before the Organisation focused on international aid to other continents.

¹²⁷ The *Sick Man* theory has persisted in western European attitudes towards Turkey (Toynbee & Kirkwood, 1927: 10).

¹²⁸ Following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I, the Allied Powers divided up its territories amongst Britain, France, Greece, and Italy.

¹²⁹ The OECD, effectively, helped to put Turkey on a *path* towards development.

¹³⁰ The country seldom features in the archival records unless in the context of all OECD members or all OECD Mediterranean members.

became a candidate for EU accession (European Parliament, 1999) and also when it became a founding member of the G20. The country's growing engagement in international economic and political affairs can, thus, be seen as a result of its EU candidacy, G20 leadership, and overall vision of itself as a more active member of the international community.¹³¹

At any rate, before the 1990s (during the Cold War), the duality of Turkey's OECD status, as both an original member, but a disengaged and passive member, of this privileged economic group strengthens the perception of the country being protected – watched over (by the other members) but sheltered at the same time (Larrabee, 2010). In Turkey's defence, until recently, it didn't have a strong diplomatic core (Kinzer, 2010), so to a certain degree this also accounts for Turkey's historically low-profile role in the OECD.¹³²

On its Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the Republic of Turkey describes its history of relations with the OECD, explaining that for the first couple of decades, from the 1960s to the 1980s, Turkey's interest in the OECD was "focused on" (Republic of Turkey, 2011: para 2) the work of the OECD Consortium and the *Working Group on Turkey's External Debt*, which was established in May of 1978, and it was not until the 2000s that Turkey's relations with the OECD "reached new heights parallel to the EU accession and national reform processes" (ibid: para 3). The government seemingly acknowledges its former lack of interest in the OECD,¹³³ conceding that now "relevant Turkish authorities and bodies are following the OECD work more closely" (ibid: para 4), but also affirming that they are not just passively *taking*

¹³¹ With foreign affairs under the stewardship of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current prime minister, Turkey has begun to see itself as a much more engaged player both regionally and internationally (Davutoğlu, 2001).

¹³² The OECD is a good *training ground* for diplomatic personnel, owing to the relatively low profile of the Organisation, but Turkey did not have many sufficiently qualified envoys (Kinzer, 2010).

¹³³ Or perhaps, Turkish officials perceived it to be more a lack of relevance (to their approach to governance), as will be addressed.

policy prescriptions from others, but are, in fact, actively “making their contributions and benefitting from the organization” (ibid:para 4).

This notion of Turkey taking on a more vigorous role in world affairs is part of the government’s foreign public relations. Examining Turkey’s *Foreign Policy Synopsis*, which is published on the various websites of the Republic’s diplomatic missions around the world, one is struck by the spirit of the communiqué, for it accentuates Turkey’s new “active diplomacy” (Republic of Turkey, 2015: para 12) in multilateral fora, correlating with the “[r]ise of Turkey” (ibid: para 5) and the growing complexity of foreign policy issues in general (ibid: para: 1). The Republic of Turkey claims to presently be more active in mediation and the resolution of conflicts than previously (ibid: para 14). If this is the case, then it also reflects a change in attitudes in Turkey, with the Republic now believing itself to be in a better position to engage in peer forums, such as the OECD (than in the past).

To quantitatively test the validity of this notion of greater engagement, this study randomly selected two years (1994 and 1995) of OECD Working Papers for content analysis of Turkey’s participation in the Organisation. The findings are revealing in and of themselves (see Appendix 7). On average, Turkey features in just ten per cent of the publications. To be fair, the 1990s is regarded to be Turkey’s *lost decade* (Arvanitopoulos, 2009: 32), both economically and politically speaking;¹³⁴ nevertheless, one would expect this to be added incentive for more conspicuous analysis of Turkey’s policies and practises by the OECD. This suggests that the random sample (from 1994 and 1995) could actually have a higher than average representation of Turkey. Regardless, the publications in which Turkey is featured are equally telling, as, generally speaking, they are market sectors and policy practises for which

¹³⁴ therefore accounting for Turkey’s poor showing in the OECD publications

Turkey is known (the clothing industry, steel production, volatility of effective exchange rates, and such).

From an intergovernmental perspective, one could say that Turkey is simply choosing to participate in policy areas in which it has an interest (or in which it feels that it can make a substantial contribution). More subjectively speaking, one will note that Turkey is participating in those policy areas with which it identifies¹³⁵ (that form part of its national identity) and, therefore, by engaging with others in these areas, it is inter-subjectively reinforcing (and to a certain degree recreating) its national identity (Wendt, 1999).¹³⁶ In other words, the Republic is protecting the policy areas that it feels to be integral to its national identity and in this regard, it is defending its (national) interest. Overall, then, Turkey's former disengagement helps to constitute its present day (national) identity, being that the country now defines itself oppositely to such indifferent behaviour (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, 2015).

4.4-Why Turkey?

The very fact that Turkey was able to secure a consortium reveals something about the significance of the country to the OECD and its peers.¹³⁷ While it is true that Turkey had to relinquish a certain amount of control over its economic

¹³⁵ James D. Fearon (1999) has distinguished two aspects of *identity*: identity as social categories (with membership rules, attributes, and expected behaviours) and identity as (socially) distinguishing features (that one takes pride in). In this case, the latter aspect applies. Turkey participates in policy areas that form the basis of its (national) pride and self-respect (33-34).

¹³⁶ This is true of OECD publications, considering that they are distributed to domestic and international audiences (where they can be discussed and further reflected upon), thereby affording even greater opportunities for identification (Wendt, 1994: 387).

¹³⁷ Within less than a year of the OECD being founded, Turkey's peers were willing to give it (and Greece) the opportunity for development.

policies,¹³⁸ at the same time, the country was successful in receiving relatively large amounts of capital and other concessions from its counterparts, some of whom, like Canada, had very few former ties with the Near Eastern state (Tuncer, 1967: 10).¹³⁹ In fact, between 1963 and 1970, Turkey received almost as much assistance as it requested from the Consortium: USD \$ 2,076 million in pledges (having requested \$2,114 million) – an average of USD \$296 million annually (Tuncer, 1975: 215).¹⁴⁰ Typically speaking, this helped to project an image of Turkey as being vulnerable and in need of assistance (Durdag, 1973), which is very much in contrast with the traditional European image of the *terrifying Turk* (Kinzer, 2001: 69; Çırakman, 2002).¹⁴¹

A militant impression of Turkey does not seem to manifest itself from within the OECD. Quite to the contrary, by including Turkey in the Organisation, the OECD proactively helped to overcome long-held stereotypes of the predominantly Muslim country and concomitantly assuaged some of Turkey's fears of its neighbours, including the fear of being left outside at the periphery.¹⁴² One can only marvel at this influence of the OECD. In validating Turkey's economic and political systems to be *weak*, the OECD was able to help neutralise anxieties about the *terrifying Turks* so as to incur support for the

¹³⁸ OECD members wanted to encourage Turkey to further develop its private sector (OECD, 1963: 21).

¹³⁹ Just as an early 1960s Department of Finance Canada memorandum underscores: "Turkey is not and never will be in Canada's orbit or *sphere of influence*" (1964: 1).

¹⁴⁰ with the United States being the main supplier of aid (Tuncer, 1975: 219)

¹⁴¹ Ottoman military power had intimidated the armies of Europe (as well as Iran and the other Muslim states) for centuries (Finkel, 2005).

¹⁴² Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk often speaks of this basic human fear – the fear of being left outside, at the margins and counting for nothing (see his 2006 Nobel address, *My Father's Suitcase*: para 14). Being a country on the periphery of Europe, Turkey is particularly vulnerable to the concern of not being included. (Dismorr, 2008: 110).

country economically in a manner that literally enabled Turkey to maintain and fortify its military.¹⁴³

Indeed, Turkey is actually a very successful nation state (Hale, 1999: viii)¹⁴⁴: it has remained a sovereign territory since it was founded as a republic in 1923, despite being located in a politically turbulent region of the world (Lombardi, 2006: 6),¹⁴⁵ meaning that Turkey has never been colonised or subjected to imperial domination (unlike most Islamic nations of Africa and Asia) (Lewis, 1994). Moreover, stretching further back in time, the Ottoman Empire lasted for more than six centuries, dating from 1300 to 1922 (Witteck, 1938), making it one of the longest-lasting (and extensive) empires in history (Quataert, 2005: 3; Barkey, 2008), imparting it with soft power influence in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Turkey has a history of being at the centre of the world (Akkoyunlu, 2014: 70). In fact, the region of Istanbul has been at the centre of various empires for more than sixteen centuries (Pope & Pope, 1997: 4). Accordingly, the United States and its allies would have good reasons for wanting to include the Republic of Turkey¹⁴⁶ in forming an international organisation like the OECD.

Academics have, thus far, mainly put forward geo-strategic reasons for Turkey being included in international organisations such as the OECD – most commonly reasons to do with Turkey’s geographic position. Indeed, Turkey is

¹⁴³ This practice was initiated with the Truman Doctrine. It has helped to keep Turkey’s currency weak.

¹⁴⁴ As Toynbee and Kirkwood (1927) colourfully illustrate, Turkey is much more competent than it is usually credited to be. They explain that it was Czar Nicholas I of Russia who, in the mid-19th century, labelled Turkey the *Sick Man of Europe*, yet his Czarism has vanished from Russia, while the Turkish *Sick Man* has survived, establishing that “the Turk perpetually astonishes the Westerner by failing to correspond to his ready-made picture of what the Turk must be” (10).

¹⁴⁵ Turkey’s immediate neighbours include Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, among others.

¹⁴⁶ For instance, Turkey has been part of every American strategic doctrine from the Truman Doctrine of the 1940s to the Carter and Reagan Doctrines of the 1980s (Karasapan, 1989) and beyond.

usually defined by its cardinal location¹⁴⁷ and, in consequence, this predominates over the literature, bringing realist perspectives to the fore.¹⁴⁸ During the Cold War, including when the OECD was established in 1960, Turkey was considered to be a *cold war warrior*, acting as a *southern shield* or buffer between Soviet Russia and the (Eastern) Mediterranean Sea together with Greece (Lawton Collins, 1956: 371).¹⁴⁹ Turkey's membership in European-based liberal international organisations was, therefrom, sought as part of an overall effort to augment cohesion (including economic co-operation) among NATO member states (Davis, 2013: 17), offsetting trade with Soviet Russia and its satellite states (Harriman, 1952: 5). From this perspective, geopolitical alignment is seen to have been the main force behind Turkey's OECD membership,¹⁵⁰ explaining how a relatively poor and non-democratic country could *join the ranks* of the OECD (ibid: 16-17).

The literature alludes to a couple of other compelling material reasons that could have incited the inclusion of Turkey in an organisation mandated to build upon European economic co-operation, namely incorporating the country into a Eurasian transportation hub and drawing upon Turkey as a source of labour to support post-war European economic expansion. In the first regard, Turkey was critical in helping to overcome transportation problems

¹⁴⁷ Turkey is located in south-eastern Europe and south-western Asia, bordering the Aegean, Black, and Mediterranean Seas. It controls the Turkish Straits (the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmara) that link the Aegean and Black Seas, opening onto the Mediterranean (Seddon, 2004: 525). A good visual is available online at http://www.eoearth.org/files/229601_229700/229676/black-sea-map-of.png

¹⁴⁸ Turkey is located at the *underbelly* of the Soviet Union (Skordeli, 2012) and, therefore, has been a prime region for airfields and air force bases as well as (nuclear) missiles for the defense of Europe and the Middle East (Duke, 1989: 273).

¹⁴⁹ Actually, from a security standpoint, Washington treated Turkey and Greece like "Siamese twins" (Athanasopoulou, 1999: x) following the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Greece's membership in the OECD can, therefore, be considered as an important factor prompting the inclusion of Turkey in the OECD.

¹⁵⁰ For instance, the Jupiter missile agreement between the USA and Turkey was completed in October of 1959, and the weapons were installed in late 1961, around the same time that the Berlin Wall was erected and the OECD began operating (Bernstein, 1980: 99-100; Criss, 1997).

during the post-war reconstruction of Europe. Bottlenecks were an issue requiring international co-operation across greater Europe in order to ensure the deliveries of scarce resources (Emmerij, 2009: 2). Turkey came to form part of an Eurasian transportation hub, much the same as it is does today with the development of a *New Silk Road* (Iron Silk Road) (Simpfendorfer, 2011: 14), linking together Asia (from Eastern China) with Europe (to Rotterdam) to facilitate distribution to Africa,¹⁵¹ the Middle East, and North America (Lin, 2011).¹⁵²

In the second regard, during the post-war economic boom, Turkey served as a main source of cheap and expendable labour for Western Europe,¹⁵³ most notably Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands (Akçomak & Parto, 2006: 6).¹⁵⁴ In particular, after the Berlin Wall was constructed in 1961, thereby preventing the flow of Eastern European refugees to the West, the Federal Republic of Germany established a recruitment agreement with Turkey and invited *guest workers* to fill its labour shortages (Triadafilopoulos & Schönwälder, 2006: 4; Oğuz, 2012: 2).

While these scenarios provide materialist explanations for Turkey's OECD membership, they also manifest a social level of compatibility that exists between Turkey and many of its OECD peers, including Germany. Upon further reflection, one begins to understand that the selection of Turkey was not

¹⁵¹ China would like the network to have a rail link joining Turkey to Egypt (Lin, 2011).

¹⁵² The recently completed Marmaray Tunnel project (linking across the Bosphorus from Istanbul) was one of the few remaining gaps in the new Eurasian Land Bridge (Otsuka, 2001).

¹⁵³ From 1945 to 1973 there was strong demand for foreign labour, especially to fill lower-skilled jobs, so all of the Western European countries turned to migrant recruitment for temporary workers at some point during their economic expansion (Castles, 2006: 742). Kindleberger (1967) and other economists have since claimed that this foreign labour was a key factor in Western Europe's long economic boom, from 1945 to 1975 (ibid: 743). It provided these capitalist countries with a means of competing (economically speaking) with the socialist states of the Soviet Union. In this way, Turkey is associated with Western Europe's post-war economic miracle more than symbolically as an OEEC member and Marshall Plan participant.

¹⁵⁴ They first recruited Italians as foreign workers and then turned to the other Mediterranean countries – Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey – to fill labour shortages (Triadafilopoulos & Schönwälder, 2006).

simply *rational*. It emerged by way of specific social circumstances and as a result of key beliefs. More expressly, aside from Greece and Turkey, in 1959, the only other possible applicants for association with the European Economic Community (EEC) were Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia (Lambert, 1961: 148). Citizens of these countries could have, quite viably, served as a source of migrant labour to the EEC.¹⁵⁵ However, the Federal Republic of Germany did not want to become a country of immigration and, therefore, pursued a *no non-Europeans* policy for unskilled workers (Triadafilopoulos & Schönwälder, 2006: 9), fearing that non-Europeans were more apt to become permanent immigrants (Schönwälder, 2004: 250). In 1961, when the German-Turkish Agreement on Labour Recruitment was negotiated (and when the OECD began operating), Turkey was essentially regarded as part of Europe (ibid: 251), so Turkish labourers were recruited as a means to systematically exclude potential migrants from Africa and Asia (ibid: 249).¹⁵⁶ The preference for Turkey was, therefrom, socially constructed, and it helped to further the identity of the country as *underdeveloped* and *weak*, in that it was a prime source of cheap, expendable labour.¹⁵⁷

A belief in the superiority of certain nations (and races), correspondingly, can be seen as a key notion motivating the selection of Turkey as an OECD peer. Turks were perceived to be more compatible with the desired (socialised) image and attributes of *Europeans* (and, relatedly, OECD members) than Moroccans and Tunisians, for instance. The notion of compatibility, hereinafter, helped to establish the preference of Germany and others for Turkey (Shafir, 1993: 555) – a long-time affiliate in international affairs. In other words, the selection emerged through a feeling that the Turks were culturally *more like*

¹⁵⁵ Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and (West) Germany

¹⁵⁶ By the turn of the century, there were 7.3 million foreign nationals in Germany: 5.8 million Europeans (including Turks), 300,000 Africans, and 842,000 Asians (Schönwälder, 2004: 248).

¹⁵⁷ Connectedly, this relationship between Turkey and (West) Germany helped to fulfill the OECD's mandate as well, in that it provided for sustained economic development in Europe.

Europeans than other potential candidates in Northern Africa and Asia (who could also provide cheap labour).¹⁵⁸ In this way, while the selection of Turkey as an OECD partner had obvious material considerations, these, in effect, were not guiding goals in and of themselves. Rather, the preference for Turkey was embedded in a particular moral context and emerged as a result of social feelings about national identity and suitability.

4.5-Turkey's Views

When interviewed, Turkish officials conveyed a substantially different perspective of their country than that projected in the literature. For the most part, their views substantiated the webpage narrative put forward by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Turkey's relations with the OECD.

Overall, the attitude of the interviewees, especially that of the economic attaché, the principal interviewee, communicated a great deal in and of itself. It denoted a sense of pride, a sense of strength, and a genuine appreciation for the OECD as an important organisation. These notions are, here forward, examined in turn.

How Turkey Perceives of Itself and the OECD

Firstly, Turkey is proud of its economic achievements and its (founding) OECD membership. The OECD has helped to foster Turkey's sense of national identity and its sense of pride. While Turkey is defined, in part, by the size of its economy, its economic growth also forms the basis for the country's self-respect (Fearon, 1999: 34).¹⁵⁹ The same thing can be said of OECD membership: it is an

¹⁵⁸ In 2016, this has relevance for the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe and informs a great deal about the historic depth of the problem.

¹⁵⁹ Since November 2015 this has begun to change with Turkey's declining revenues and increasing security concerns.

aspect of Turkey's identity, and it is something that Turkey takes special pride in (ibid: 34). To this extent, Turkey's economic development over the years has helped to foster national pride in OECD membership as well as enhancing Turkey's sense of national identity. Thus, Turkey's economic development is tied (ideationally) to the country's OECD membership, creating a correlation between its economic growth and its pride in OECD work.

Secondly, Turkey does not see itself as being *weak* or *ailing*. Quite to the contrary, *strong* and *strongest* were adjectives that repeatedly came up during the interview. The Turkish officials did not refer to their country as being a big or middle power (see 5.2), but they did characterise Turkey as being *strong* and having *strong* economic growth. In fact, the economic attaché asserted that Turkey has been "the sixteenth strongest economy in the world for the past forty years" (interview, 24 September 2014), and "the country is projected to have the highest growth rate among the OECD countries for many years to come" (ibid).

Thirdly, Turkey considers the OECD to be much more than a passive tool of its member states. While the Turkish official did refer to the Organisation as *a tool*¹⁶⁰ that "helped it [Turkey] to open itself up" (ibid), he also spoke of a much more engaged and directing (educational) role for the OECD in being the one that "draws out the potential" (ibid) that exists in countries. The Organisation is the one that has the special capabilities and long-term vision to guide member states. It is not simply an entity that is acted upon and accessed at will. The OECD, in effect, is a visionary that helps to make *development* possible, as will be discussed.

Without being prodded, the Turkish officials placed a great deal of emphasis upon qualifying Turkey's identity and its place in the world. The

¹⁶⁰ Since the era of the League of Nations, Turkey has tended to perceive of international organisations as tools of the great powers, and it has expressed great skepticism about their impartiality (Güçlü, 2003: 189-193).

economic attaché referred to Turkey a couple of times as being *European*, and “part of the western world after Atatürk’s reforms” (interview, 24 September 2014). According to the attaché, it was “natural” (ibid) for Turkey to join the OECD “after twelve years of OEEC membership alongside other European countries” (ibid). They were able to establish a pattern of good relations; hence, compared with countries such as Japan, which was socially and geographically outside of Europe – but wanting to establish more regularised relations with the continent – Turkey did not see itself as being located outside Europe (ibid). Helping to found the OECD “seemed obvious” (ibid) because Turkey “wanted to become a western country” (ibid). Joining the OECD was “a way to enhance this” (ibid).

The economic attaché also alluded to *a transatlantic identity*¹⁶¹ and Turkey seeing itself “as part of the Transatlantic” (ibid). In this way, OECD membership has helped Turkey in “solidifying its position within the North Atlantic” (ibid)¹⁶² and in distinguishing itself from its neighbours,¹⁶³ including by way of its high growth rate. The Turkish official singularised his country’s OECD membership (and partly defined Turkey’s identity) by underscoring Turkey’s economic growth since 2002 (rather than mentioning the Republic’s low per capita income, for instance).

To this extent, it seems that Turkey’s self-perceptions are coupled with its perceptions of the OECD and directly influence its views of the Organisation. Turkey’s self-perceptions are also directly linked with what it values about the OECD.

¹⁶¹ He did not specifically mention NATO or the OECD advancing Turkey’s security interests in any way.

¹⁶² having OECD membership as well as NATO membership

¹⁶³ With Soviet Russia considered to be *the East*, Turkey could relationally define itself as *western* (Wendt, 1994: 385).

What Turkey Values in the OECD

Based upon the founding narrative of the Republic,¹⁶⁴ it can be seen that OECD membership reinforces Atatürk's ambition for Turkey: becoming a *modern* state – *part of the outside civilised world* (meaning Europe and the west),¹⁶⁵ rather than remaining at its periphery. Indeed, during the interview, the economic attaché specifically made historical references to Atatürk and his reforms,¹⁶⁶ alluding to the dramatic change in Turkey's position (in wanting to become *part of the western world*, for instance).¹⁶⁷ It is important to note that while the OECD's liberal notion of *modernity* identifies member states as being *democratic* and *economically advanced*, it also conveys a sense of their being scientifically progressive. After Turkey was forced into becoming a territorially-based nation state in the early twentieth century, Atatürk recognised that scientific knowledge would be necessary to encourage Turks to adopt a new mind-set and overcome their ignorance. They would have to become more scientifically oriented. Quite interestingly, the Turkish diplomats did not mention *democracy* or *market capitalism* – cornerstones of the OECD -- during the interview; however, they did express their appreciation for the Organisation's technical aspect.

More often than not, the OECD is devalued as being a technical body, but less fully developed member states, such as Turkey, *value* being affiliated

¹⁶⁴ The Republic was established with a “pledge to follow a path of modernisation to accede to a level of contemporaneity” (Aybet, 1999: 103).

¹⁶⁵ In this way, when Turkey helped to found the OEEC, it defined modernisation according to the standards already set by its fellow (European) member states – standards that became the basis of OECD principles. Ironically, since then Turkey has been evaluated according to these standards, which it did not initially meet and which maintain it in a comparative position.

¹⁶⁶ This study acknowledges that the figure of Atatürk is omnipresent for Turks, and this is taken into consideration.

¹⁶⁷ Atatürk's original policy was to “adopt the social and mental apparatus of the western world wholesale” (Güçlü, 2003: 203) so that Turks could “hold their own against western imperialism” (ibid: 204).

with a scientific organisation, especially one that cognitively and socially puts them on a path to *technological advancement* by using knowledge of best practices and approaches. Less fully developed OECD member states are able to share in the identity of being *leading* world countries without necessarily exhibiting the typical features of *modern* states (such as having strong public and individual freedoms), for their OECD badge implies that they are in a state of advancement towards ever greater modernity.¹⁶⁸ Their interests, thus, become synonymous with their means of maintaining this identity.¹⁶⁹ What is striking in the case of Turkey is that OECD membership is valuable for helping to keep the Republic associated with the vision and values of Atatürk (of a *modern* republic), and his legacy is overseen by Turkey's military elite; therefore, membership of the OECD, de facto, has served to further legitimise the role of the military in Turkey, solidifying its position.

Correspondingly, as briefly mentioned the Turks also exhibited a strong appreciation for the OECD's (autonomous) capacity as an educator. To this extent, they praised that the OECD "draws out the potential that exists in countries" (interview, 24 September 2014). Their attitude indicates that the OECD is able to see the yet undeveloped talent that exists in a country, and by thinking long term, it works with that country to *develop* better governance practices and a stronger economy overall. The economic attaché referred to the example of his country, in particular. With great dignity of manner, he explained that Turkey is one of the strongest economies in the world, and "regardless of its economic situation when it joined the OECD, Turkey quickly became a strong economy by 1978 – one of the strongest in the world" (ibid). He did not directly credit the OECD with making Turkey's economy stronger, but he did allude to the fact that the country wasn't a strong economy before 1978,

¹⁶⁸ The Turkish officials, in fact, stressed their country's ever greater future (economic) projections.

¹⁶⁹ For Turkey, some examples would be maintaining a high population (to augment GDP), promoting Turkish values (such as the family, to increase the birth rate), and working towards EU membership (to fully join the *civilised* world).

and now that the OECD has *drawn out its potential*, Turkey is among the “strongest economies in the world” (ibid).¹⁷⁰ The self-glorification was evident in his words.¹⁷¹

Lastly, the Turkish officials suggested that “one of the benefits of OECD membership is that it offers the opportunity to associate with many countries” (interview, 24 September 2014). They didn’t allude to trade or developing trade relations. Rather, they specifically mentioned that the OECD “offers the opportunity to work together” (ibid) with many countries. More particularly, the Turks recounted that “the OECD now brings on board many of the developing countries” (ibid), offering the opportunity to associate with them. So, while a common criticism of the OECD is that the BRICS are not full members, from the perspective of at least one founder country (Turkey), this is not necessarily a drawback, considering that the OECD enables its members to “work together with” (ibid) *Key Partners* (who comprise the most populous G20 countries). In this manner, while the Turks did not mention the OECD’s work in social policy or social development (public welfare), they did acknowledge the Organisation’s role in fostering social relations.

This raises an interesting point: while it is important to consider what the Turkish officials explicitly said, it is just as important to reflect upon what they *didn’t say*. Most significantly, the Turkish officials did not mention (liberal) democracy, (free market) capitalism, or (social) welfare – pedestals of the OECD. Furthermore, they did not make reference to trade, foreign direct investment, or to peace and security in any way – only to science and technology. In general, the Turkish officials emphasised the OECD’s work in

¹⁷⁰ It should be stressed that no connection was made between joining the OECD and decades later becoming a strong economy. According to the interviewee, the OECD helped Turkey to *open itself up*, economically speaking, to the world. In such a way, it *taught* Turkey how to liberalise its economy and open itself up to others. In so doing, it *encouraged* Turkey to observe expected economic practices (Fearon, 1999: 2).

¹⁷¹ Based upon the situation described in section 4.2, however, it seems that (social) well-being has failed to improve in tandem with economic growth in Turkey.

economic policy, noting that the OECD concentrates on “improving economic positions” (interview, 24 September 2014). Quite unexpectedly, the Turkish officials also pointed out that “the OECD is not just an economic organisation” (ibid). They spoke of the OECD as being “political as well” (ibid) and claimed that “this is reflected in its membership and membership considerations” (ibid). They did not wish to go into further detail. Essentially, for the Turks, the OECD is largely about economics, politics, science, and social relations.

4.6-Conclusion

This chapter has enquired into the nature of Turkey’s OECD membership as a means to understand, not only what accounts for Turkey’s founding status, but also what it informs about the significance of the OECD. The case of Turkey demonstrates that OECD member states are not consistently *likeminded* as portrayed. Over the years, Turkey has not been a firm proponent of liberal democracy, free market capitalism, or social welfare, and the Republic has a notorious history of dramatic upturns and downturns as per its economy.

The instance of Turkey is difficult to assess, considering that the country did not actively participate in the OECD during its first few decades, and scholars are still making sense of the processes described herein, on the point of the political climate both inside and outside Turkey being particularly turbulent over recent years. Nevertheless, this is what makes Turkey’s membership of the OECD even more intriguing.

Turkey has traditionally been depicted in the literature as *weak* and *underdeveloped* and, therefore, in need of (expert) assistance – a demeanour that has helped to offset fears of *the terrible Turk* and, thereby, incur the financial support (of its OECD peers) to maintain its military. The impetus for the OECD Consortium for Turkey dates back to the Marshall Plan and the OEEC years, illustrating that the OECD has always had an important role to play in

structural policy and helping to restructure (national) economies, such as that of Turkey. In this way, the OECD has encouraged structural adjustment as a chief means for sustaining economic development.

At any rate, this *lesser* (less than equal) image of Turkey in the literature is at odds with the perspective directly presented by Turkish officials. From their viewpoint, Turkey is *strong* – one of the strongest economies in the world. They are proud of their country's (founding) OECD membership and its rate of economic growth. They view the act of helping to found the OECD as something that “seemed obvious” (interview, 24 September 2014) after the country undertook modernisation reforms, seeking to join the western world. OECD membership was, thus, “a way to enhance this” (ibid) aspiration. Turks perceive of themselves as *European* and part of the Transatlantic. To this extent, they believe that it was *natural* for Turkey to join the OECD after twelve years of co-operating with the other European powers under the mandate of the OEEC.

Contrasting this attitude with the literature, one sees that the decision to include the Republic of Turkey in forming the OECD was not simply instinctive or logical but, rather, diplomatic. As a former world empire, Turkey has enjoyed considerable soft power influence in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Turkey was, thus, (socially) constructed as a preference based upon social beliefs and notions of compatibility. Turks were considered to be *more like* Europeans than other potential affiliates, like Moroccans and Tunisians. To be sure, OECD membership reflects the founding narrative of the Republic and Atatürk's vision of scientific and technological progress, so there is congruity between the OECD's mission and Turkey's (long-term) goals.¹⁷² While Turkey may not be a stellar democracy or a stable economy, the country

¹⁷² Through OECD membership Turkey has learned to define 'progress' according to the values of its fellow members and, thus, consonant with OECD principles. Correspondingly, the country's level of success is measured relative to that of the other OECD founder countries.

has been able to share in the OECD image of development,¹⁷³ enough to indicate that it is in a state of *advancement* – becoming a “significant global player” (Aksu, 2013: 3), as evidenced by its G20 membership. In this way, the hypothesis regarding Turkey’s OECD membership holds true: it does appear that there is an affinity in the identities of the Republic of Turkey and the OECD.

According to Turkish officials, the OECD is valuable on different levels: as a social body that creates opportunities to work with others; as an educator that helps countries to develop to their potential, and as a technical organisation that enhances scientific knowledge and capabilities, branding its member states with a *modern* image. These responses will be further contemplated in chapter five, alongside the responses of the other founder countries in order to gain a complete perspective of what the original members value about the OECD.

All in all, while the case of Turkey is thought-provoking, it should not be considered in isolation. If one accepts that organisational decisions are a form of communication (Goldhaber, 1990), then the group decision to form the OECD conveys a particular message about the significance of the Organisation. The views of the other OECD founding members can, thus, provide further insight and will be examined next, in chapter five.

¹⁷³ though many would criticise that there are still huge economic inequalities in Turkey

Chapter 5: The Views of the OECD Founder Countries

Reflecting upon the primary research question – *Why does the OECD exist? What is its added value to the international economic architecture?* – this chapter weighs the opinions of the various OECD founder countries.¹ While the case of Turkey is considerable in and of itself, it is best not solely examined as an isolated instance. This chapter posits that the OECD membership of Turkey can better be judged as part of a greater whole. In this way, the attitudes and beliefs of the other founder countries are essential for a wider appreciation of the OECD and an understanding of why the Organisation continues to exist in the post-Cold War era. What is it that makes the OECD unique, distinguishing it from its counterpart institutions? In other words, what does the OECD add to the international economic architecture?

The chapter explores these questions from the perspective of the Organisation's greater founding membership. Drawing upon elite interviews with diplomatic officials, it discursively examines the perceptions of the OECD founder countries in order to discern their reasons for establishing and continuing to support the Organisation. Noting the diversity that exists among the OECD's original members, the chapter begins by examining how they perceive of the OECD and its role in the world as well as how members perceive of themselves as OECD members. The chapter, then, delves into what the founder countries value in the OECD, finding a greater affinity of views as per their respect for the Organisation. The chapter concludes by qualifying the time dimension to the study and how it has provided insight into the research question as per OECD membership being a social relationship that reinforces post-war identities.

¹ To reiterate, the 20 founder countries are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany (the Federal Republic of), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (USA).

5.1-The Attitudes and Impressions of Members

Forasmuch as the OECD is a self-described *like-minded* group, it was anticipated that the research would find a high correlation of similarity among the interview responses in terms of input and perspective. However, given the wide range of cultures, languages, and geographical sizes of the founder countries, this study found a diverse breadth of interpretations from the founder members² in terms of how they perceive of and relate to the OECD. This is important when one considers that the OECD is built upon dialogue (the sharing of experiences and ideas, including problems and best practices), and the Organisation uses dialogue to achieve one of its founding aims: co-operation.

The research concluded that certain OECD countries are notably more proud of their national accomplishments³ and more willing to openly share their experiences through dialogue, discussion and/or the online open publication of information. Notwithstanding, the research also detected some reticence among certain member states to openly discuss or publish information about national initiatives and past histories. Furthermore, there was considerable difference found in the attitudes toward the interviews, themselves (general willingness versus hesitancy) and the style in which interviews were conducted (individual versus group interviews). Thus from the onset, this study discovered that such variance to open information shaped the amount and type of data collected.

² The interviewees, as primarily diplomats, are taken to be official representatives of their national governments, especially given the fact that quite a few interviewees received replies to the interview questions from their home offices before granting interviews. Nevertheless, the study acknowledges that diplomats can also draw upon words of their choice when expressing their governments' perspectives.

³ This corresponds with the literature, in that cultures that emphasise traditional family values and deference to authority are found to have higher levels of national pride (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Inglehart, 2007).

Hence, it is not simply the case that the OECD member governments are structured differently and have allocated varying amounts of resources to the Organisation and to their OECD diplomatic missions. Rather, the member states plainly vary in the manner by which they approach informational exchanges and value social dialogue, thereby indicating that member states relate to the OECD in perceptibly different ways. By collating their inside views, this chapter seeks to understand the range of motivations at play in forming and supporting the OECD.

How Members Perceive of the OECD & its Role in the World

A particular interest of this study is how member states perceive of the OECD and its role in the world.⁴ During the interview process, the interviewees freely provided various descriptors to refer to the OECD and its work when addressing questions related to their country's specific role within the Organisation. Not surprisingly, given the multiple aspects to the OECD, the interviewees all made mention of the Organisation in different ways. There was only one expression that two interviewees separately used to refer to the OECD: *an ongoing process*.⁵ Otherwise, the founder countries spoke of the Organisation in varied ways, demonstrating the diverse ways that they relate to the OECD and the many different roles of the OECD in the world. This is particularly interesting considering that the interviewees represent the *founding* member countries of the OECD. One would presume them to have a homogenous outlook toward the Organisation and to perceive of it in a relatively singular manner. Referring back to a main point of chapter three, this variety of

⁴ The interviewees are referred to as *national delegates* (diplomatic officials), *national officials* (home office-based officials), and *national representatives* (non-diplomatic, foreign-based officials).

⁵ The Austrian delegate accredited the OECD with being "an ongoing process of consent," and the Icelandic representative referred to the OECD as "an ongoing process."

descriptors reinforces the notion that the OECD has no overarching character and regularly changes its identity to suit the macro-economic environment.

Nevertheless, all of the founder countries spoke highly of the OECD, alluding to it as an important organisation. This can be seen in the selection of words that they used when speaking about the OECD. When isolated from the larger dialogue, these units of language reveal patterns about how the founder countries perceive of the Organisation:

Figure 5.1-Adjectives used by delegates to describe the OECD

| <u>Adjectives describing the OECD:</u> | | | |
|--|----------------|---------|-------------|
| best | evidence-based | first | important |
| independent | irreplaceable | leading | neutral |
| non-politicised | scoping | sound | world-class |

Figure 5.2-Nouns used by the delegates to describe the OECD

| <u>Nouns describing the OECD:</u> | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------|----------|------------|
| advice | body | club | consultant |
| forum | house | platform | player |
| priority | process | source | structure |
| support | | | |

Figure 5.3-Verbs used by delegates to describe the OECD

| <u>Verbs describing the OECD:</u> | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-------|---------|
| allow | benchmark | come | compare |
| open | provide | start | talk |

The adjectives (Figure 5.1) employed by the members to describe the OECD testify to their regard for it as a preeminent organisation. They employed words such as *best*, *irreplaceable*, *first*, *leading*, and *world-class* when referring to the OECD. Most of these words are superlatives, denoting the sense of superiority that the members attribute to the Organisation. They did not use any less-than-complimentary words when qualifying the OECD and its role in the world. Admittedly, in and of themselves, the adjectives exhibited in Figure 5.1 do not present a concrete picture of the OECD; however, when considered alongside the nouns exhibited in Figure 5.2, such as *support*, *house*, *platform*, and *structure*, there is a general characterisation of the OECD as a steadfast organisation. To this extent, the OECD is both a leading and steadfast body.

There is also a recurring notion among the member states that the OECD is an a-political organisation. Despite one delegate being quick to claim that the OECD is a political organisation as well as an economic organisation (interview, 24 September 2014), the adjectives (Figure 5.1) and nouns (Figure 5.2) employed by the members reinforce this impression of the OECD as being a-political. The OECD is spoken of as being *independent*, *non-politicised*, *evidence-based*, *sound*, and *neutral* (see Figure 5.1). It is also described as being a *consultant* and a *source of advice* (see Figure 5.2). Again, the relatively neutral and a-political role ascribed to the OECD accords well with the steadfast portrayal of the Organisation in that members are quite cognisant of the OECD's role in guidance, using such nouns as *consultant*, *support*, and *advice* (Figure 5.2) when referring to the OECD. This notion will be developed further in section 5.2, with analysis of the OECD's role as an educator.

The verbs (Figure 5.3) used to describe the OECD and its role in the world are not as emphatic; nevertheless, they sketch a role for the OECD in assessing and initiating, including words such as *benchmark*, *open*, *start*, and *compare*. These notions are also manifest in the adjectives (Figure 5.1) used by the member states to describe the OECD: *scoping*, *first*, and *leading*. To this

degree, the members are cognisant of the OECD's role in assessing performance as an *independent, leading, and neutral* organisation (Figure 5.1) in addition to the OECD's role in initiating things, such as dialogue and policy research. The emphasis upon the OECD assessing and initiating alludes to a perception of the Organisation as being relatively autonomous and self-reliant – certainly more than a tool.

Considered together, these adjectives (Figure 5.1), nouns (Figure 5.2), and verbs (Figure 5.3) illustrate the layered perceptions that the members have of the OECD. As an aggregate they create an image of the OECD being an a-political, leading organisation based upon sound practices that allow for comparisons between peers. While, as indicated in chapter three, the OECD is a complex organisation to describe, the compilation of these terms provides interesting insight into the OECD's overall aspect and role in the world.

What is most incredible about the array of language is that one organisation can attract so many different descriptors and be regarded in such a range of ways by its members, especially its *founding* members. Quite surprisingly, none of the interviewees cited any of the common adages, such as *talking shop*, when speaking of the OECD, except for the Ambassador of the Netherlands, who emphasised that the OECD is “definitely not a talking shop” in the eyes of his government.

Instead, the interviewees drew upon an assortment of expressions to depict their impressions of the OECD and its role among international organisations. They used phrases such as *a body to start dialogue, a platform for benchmarking (structural policies), a house of rules for developed economies, and an irreplaceable support for the G20 process*. These expressions will be fully elaborated in chapter six. They make known aspects of the OECD that member states feel distinguish it from its counterpart institutions. More symbolically what the phrases manifest is that the OECD means different things to different people,

and member states convey their impressions of the Organisation according to their respective worldviews. Still, the fact that the *founder* countries refer to the OECD using so many different phrases attests to the unique character of the Organisation. In part, this multitude of views reflects the diversity of members' ideas about the nature of the OECD.

Most of the expressions put forth by the interviewees to refer to the OECD are listed in section two of this chapter. There is variance in the phrases depending upon whether a given interviewee perceives of the OECD as an autonomous actor in its own right or whether it supposes the OECD to be a tool of governments. Typically, it is the small countries as well as those countries that have undertaken structural reforms that treat the OECD as an autonomous actor in its own right,⁶ demonstrating a regard for the expertise of the OECD Secretariat (as discussed in 5.2). This study assumes these countries to be more expressive in their valuation of the OECD's knowledge and opinion because they are more cognisant (and conceding) of the OECD's influence. These viewpoints are further explored in the next section of analysis, which inquires into how the members self-identify.

Taken as a whole, the wide variety of expressions used by the founder countries to speak of the OECD reflects the observation that member states try to make sense of the Organisation in their own, distinct ways based upon their individual histories and cultural perspectives.

How Members Perceive of Themselves (as OECD members)

Though OECD (founding) members consider themselves to be a *leading* group within the international community, they do not all see themselves in the same way by virtue of membership, and this influences the degree of importance that

⁶ This approach to 'actorness' draws upon a model developed by Bretherton and Vogler (2006), whereby 'actorness' encompasses more than capability. It refers to having a presence (by way of existence) and an ability to exert influence (2).

they attribute to the Organisation. The interviews with the founding members produced significant data in which variance between the viewpoints of the small, middle, and big powers⁷ was evident.

Small Powers

Small states⁸ are, geographically speaking, usually small in size (land area) and have limited populations, such as Iceland and Luxembourg. When interviewed, these OECD countries were quick to describe themselves as being *small countries*⁹ and to define their place in the world according to this reality. Nevertheless, by joining the OECD, and becoming part of a greater whole (of *like-minded* countries), they have come to see themselves as part of a preeminent world group and, for the most part, lucky to be such. One phrase that the representatives of the smaller member states commonly cited was *having a voice at the table*.¹⁰ Typically, the small states were very cognisant of the fact that OECD membership gives them “a voice at the discussion table”¹¹ (interview with national delegate, 6 October 2014), affording them the opportunity to impart their views into the development of new rules and policies, and by that,

⁷ Power is relational, meaning that the power of states varies (Nye, 1990: 159-160), allowing for distinctions to be drawn between members.

⁸ The literature most commonly attributes *smallness* to a country's geographical size, population base, and level of influence in international affairs (Hey, 2003:2). Yet, the concept of *smallness* is a subjective notion based upon the perceived ranking of a state in the international hierarchy (ibid: 3). There is no objective demarcation that distinguishes *small states* from *non-small states* (Sutton, 2011: 142). Instead, a state is considered to be *small* if its citizens generally perceive it to be small or if the citizens of other states perceive of it as such (ibid: 3). Overall, being a small state does not mean being a weak state or having a small-scale political system (Sutton, 2011: 144).

⁹ Interestingly, even countries that have recent histories of being large empires, like Austria, described themselves as being *small* countries.

¹⁰ which, in turn, gives them a voice in policy development

¹¹ One delegate of a very small OECD member state claims that in the Organisation “one's voice can still be heard even if one is small” (interview with national delegate, 6 October 2014).

the ability to reflect their national beliefs at the international level (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014).

In such a way, OECD membership gives countries, including small states, the opportunity to see themselves (their values and principles) embodied in the international rules and standards that govern international trade and investment, making it easier for their national industries and corporations to uphold such regulations, further entrenching their *leading* position in the international community. By being included “at the negotiation table” (interview with national delegate, 6 October 2014), the small states do not feel isolated from mainstream international economic affairs. They can learn in advance about decisions being taken in other international fora (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014) and by that sustain their sense of being precedent-setting countries.¹²

In a similar vein, membership in multilateral organisations, such as the OECD, reinforces the national independence of small states so that their identities are not erased from the map (interview with national delegate, 6 October 2014). Luxembourg, as a case in point, is one of the smallest nations in the world. Being squeezed between France and Germany, it has proactively sought membership in multilateral organisations, such as the OECD, where it can collaborate with others as an independent nation rather than losing its own identity (ibid). Membership in international organisations like the OECD, therefore, offers small states the best of both worlds: the ability to maintain their national identities as well as the opportunity to take on a new (and stronger) identity – that of the larger group (interview with national delegate, 6 October 2014). Having a voice *at the table* also gives small states the means to protect their national image. Again referring to the case of Luxembourg, the country

¹² Generally speaking, small states have good capacity for learning and are able to quickly adapt to changes in the external environment, considering that they are small and have relatively open economies (Katzenstein, 2013: 17). In this way, small states are more readily able to undertake policy changes and to shift their policy practices (ibid: 18), making them particularly well suited to OECD-style collaboration.

was placed on a grey list for tax havens by the OECD in 2009. Yet, as it was a member of the Organisation (and a founding member at that), Luxembourg was able to voice its position so as to prevent its overall image from being severely tarnished. Other tax haven nations, such as the Cayman Islands, have not been as lucky and do not have a *place at the table* to bring forward their positions, meaning that their national images have notably suffered (interview with national delegate, 6 October 2014).

Middle Powers

Middle powers,¹³ on the other hand, view OECD membership somewhat differently. They see it as an opportunity to compare (*benchmark*) themselves against the other members of the group, so as to reflect their national strengths and weaknesses, especially in relation to the big powers of the Organisation (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014). This, in turn, reinforces their medium-power status (between the small states and the dominant players of the Organisation), helping them to understand “where [they] stand in the world” (interview with national delegate, 18 November 2014). In this regard, middle powers are forced to acknowledge their positions as less powerful yet still advanced world states, realising through regular contact with the big powers in the OECD that they have economic behaviours and practices at the helm of their less powerful status.

Nonetheless, within a small grouping like the OECD (which is valued for creating a *level playing field* among members), middle powers have plenty of

¹³ *Middle power* is a relative term connoting a *mid-point* position within the international hierarchy (Cooper et al., 1993:17; Chapnick, 1999: 73), in between the powerful and the small states in a given region of the world (Jordaan, 2003). The concept of *middle power* as a distinct category of states is based upon the notion of their ability to provide alternative sources of leadership, usually through multilateralism and in non-political (technical) fields (Glazebrook, 1947: 313; Cooper et al., 1993: 19), though geographic proximity to powerful states is also a significant consideration (Cooper et al., 1993: 17). In this way, middle powers are both leaders and followers, but they do not have any claim to becoming powerful states (Glazebrook, 1947: 307). For this reason, some scholars uphold that they are only (strong) small states (Mitrany, 1933: 107; Chapnick, 1999: 77).

opportunity to demonstrate leadership, more so than in many other international organisations (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014). As a neighbour to the United States, Canada, for instance, is well aware of its middle power status (Pal & Clark, 2014: 2); nevertheless, in a multilateral context like the OECD, it is able to promote its best practices and proven policy approaches, thereby demonstrating its big power potential, gaining confidence in its capabilities and experience leading at the international level. OECD membership is, hence, particularly well-suited to middle powers like Canada, since these countries embody the principal norms and constitutive rules of the Organisation – namely sharing (co-operation) and learning (developing).¹⁴

Yet, more importantly, throughout the interviews there is an undercurrent of comments – mostly by the middle powers – that inform a great deal about their desire to see (part of) themselves reflected at the international level. These countries are motivated to watch their values and principles playing out at the global level through co-operation (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014). They behold the OECD as an “opportunity to see themselves reflected at the international level” (interview with national official, 5 November 2015), thereby having international policies reinforce their identity. On the one hand, the founder countries are motivated to help “mould international policy” (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014). From another perspective, the founder countries want to ensure that their “rules and principles will also govern things going on with global interactions of the emerging economies” (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014). So, in effect, they want the social recognition of having their values and standards reflected in the economic interactions of others.

¹⁴ Typically, middle powers engage in multilateral and co-operative initiatives that serve to stabilise and legitimise the global (economic) order (Jordaan, 2003: 165), for they define themselves by their efforts at helping to maintain international peace and order (Glazebrook, 1947: 307).

Big Powers

In contrast, big powers¹⁵ view OECD membership as a means to reflect their superior status as “prime actors” (interview with national representative, 25 September 2014) in world affairs. Through OECD activities that benchmark national capabilities, they are able to demonstrate their leadership among *advanced* countries, thusly showing themselves to be the best in the world. This form of recognition is reflected not only within the Organisation (which reinforces American leadership) but also back to the individual big member states, adding to their sense of self and justifying their dominant positions in world affairs (Kratochwil, 1996: 188; interviews with national representatives, 25 September and 28 November 2014). In particular, the big powers are able to influence the kinds of policies that the OECD takes on (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014), which, then, shapes the policies that their peers develop at the national level.

According to one national official, given the historical circumstances of World War II, the OECD is remarkable for granting the defeated Axis Powers the opportunity to be leaders again in the post-war world (interview, 18 November 2014). This feat, alone, has given these governments tremendous respect for the OECD’s mandate and mission in the world (*ibid*). It has also helped to re-establish Germany, Italy, and Japan in the world (economic) order, reinforcing group expectations as per their behaviour, all the while upholding the significance of OECD values and norms. When interviewed, the German representative, in particular, expressed her country’s gratitude at being

¹⁵ The notion of *big* or *great* powers stems from a belief in the inequality of nations and the idea of some states having more capabilities and greater levels of influence than others (Klieman, 2015: 2). Though the distinction between small, middle, and big powers is arbitrary (Glazebrook, 1947: 315) and subject to change, some states regard themselves as being great powers due to economic and political factors (Klieman, 2015:3), such as market size (Dreszner, 2007), and they exert authority in international affairs accordingly (Glazebrook, 1947: 313). Traditionally, the members of the United Nations Security Council holding permanent seats have considered themselves to be great powers (Glazebrook, 1947: 307; Layne, 1993: 8; Chapnick, 1999: 77). Over time, this has been changing, with the number of regional actors increasing and, resultantly, a greater number of states having economic and political clout (Klieman, 2015: 1).

integrated from the beginning (alongside the other world leaders) and “allowed back at the table” with everyone. In this way, Germany’s identity and interests (as well as those of the other big OECD European powers) have reinforced the founding aspirations of the Organisation (international co-operation and development), by that emphasising its moral aspect.

Ironically, there is also much discrepancy in the way that members perceive of other members. When interviewed, the small states expressed the belief that the big powers (especially the United States) benefit the most from OECD membership and “for a relatively small investment” (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014). Contrarily, the middle and big powers attested that “it is the smaller countries that get the most out of the OECD” (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014), especially in terms of policy development, being that the smaller countries often do not have national policy development functions or strong think tank cultures (ibid).

The discrepancy in members’ views (about who is benefitting the most from membership) brings the OECD image of unanimity into question, mimicking members’ inability to describe the OECD by a single, identifying characteristic. All are benefitting from the sharing of ideas and the exchanging of practices; nevertheless, all do not believe that they are benefitting equally and perceive there to be some “far-apart realities” (interview with national delegation, 1 October 2014) between OECD member states, which now include former Soviet bloc countries, South American states, and Middle Eastern countries. Post-2008 there is an even stronger division that exists between OECD member states: that distinguishing G20 countries from non-G20 countries (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014), and the smaller states particularly feel this divide.

From a diplomatic perspective, all of the founder countries are equal as OECD members. However, from the subjective perspective of the member

states, themselves, OECD membership affects them differently, primarily due to their different positions as small, middle, and big powers. Generally speaking, the small powers value inclusion; the middle powers value demonstrating their potential, and the big powers value recognition of their superiority.

Nevertheless, what all the founder countries appreciate is the opportunity to see a part of themselves (such as their national beliefs or practices) reflected at the international level – something that is realised through the OECD way of working.

5.2-What Members Value in the OECD

Though the members often characterised themselves and their positions in relation to the OECD differently, for the most part, they expressed value for the OECD in similar ways. It was expected that members would draw upon common organisational slogans of the OECD when commending aspects of the Organisation. Intriguingly, however, only one interviewee mentioned the importance of the OECD's mission for sustaining economic development and, thereby, increasing international trade (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014). What is more, only one interviewee alluded to the OECD's values and, in fact, suggested that values are "what makes the OECD quite different from other international economic organisations" (interview with national delegate, 20 October 2014). A few of the founder countries also specified an appreciation for the OECD's social policy work, acknowledging the importance of the OECD's focus on social welfare (well-being). Otherwise, the members expressed value for the OECD using four themes: identity reinforcement, education (learning and teaching), scientific innovation, and social relations.

Identity Reinforcement

Identity was an important theme to the interviews; however, in most cases, it was a topic that did not expressly come to the foreground and become a subject of discussion. Instead, it informed members' views and their opinions regarding the value of OECD membership. A more noticeable tendency was for members to allude to the enhancement of their identities through OECD membership.

Reflecting upon the interview with Turkey, it is evident that the Turkish officials spent a significant amount of time in qualifying Turkey's identity (as *European* and *part of the civilised world*, for instance) and its place in the world vis-à-vis the OECD (namely as part of the trans-Atlantic). By contrast, other founder countries did not explain to any extent their identities or attempt to characterise their countries; perhaps because they perceive themselves to be clearly European and/or North American.

However, to be fair, more peripheral member states did have an observable tendency in which they each indirectly attributed their membership of the OECD to being part of a particular community. Such countries did not seek to defend their national identities or to elaborate upon them to the extent that Turkey did; however, to a certain degree, they found it important to re-nationalise their OECD membership. Ireland, by way of example, credited being part of Europe and following European standards as a basis for OECD membership. Similarly, Norway acknowledged its NATO membership, whereas Iceland associated itself with being part of the West. Some may criticise that these four countries are less obvious candidates for OECD membership, geographically or economically speaking; however, in their own way, Turkey, Ireland, Norway, and Iceland each portrayed their membership of

the OECD as a *natural* result of participation in related communities.¹⁶ In this way, it can be seen that, for them, OECD membership reinforces their national identities developed in other regional groupings.

Yet, few of the interviewees implied that their (national) sense of identity played a factor in helping to found the OECD. Turkey, which attributed its OECD membership to coinciding with its undertaking of certain reforms aimed at modernisation – along with Spain and Belgium expressed motivations related to nationalistic image – in joining the OECD. Spain commented upon its *political isolation* at the time the OEEC was established and its subsequent determination in the 1950s to see itself as an active participant in “the world economic scene” (interview with national delegate) and as a progressively open economy (rather than a “closed political regime”).¹⁷ Similarly, Belgium cited its former designation as *the Belgian miracle* – as the Benelux member country that recovered and developed its economy the quickest following the war (interview with national official), thus making the country an archetype for the OECD’s mission in the world, with its focus upon economic co-operation and development.

Nevertheless, the ideas and opinions expressed by the founder countries indicate that the OECD, in being a selective organisation, also helps to solidify their identities and positions within the international community. Ireland, which characterises itself as a “small country on the periphery of Europe” (interview with national delegate), recognises that multilateral membership, such as that of the OECD, is one way for it to maintain its national identity and “to stay independent of the UK” (ibid). The particular case of Luxembourg – as “one of the smallest nations in the world” (interview with national delegate)

¹⁶ Turkey claimed that it was *natural* to join the OECD after twelve years co-operating with its OEEC peers.

¹⁷ The Netherlands and the Republic of Ireland, likewise, both made reference to themselves as being small countries but “very open economies” (with this helping to explain their participation in the OECD and international economic affairs, in general).

that is “squeezed between two big nations” (ibid) – has already been mentioned. Luxembourg is very conscious of the fact that OECD membership is one means to protect it against being erased from the map like during World War II.¹⁸ The OECD reinforces its national identity as a co-existing peer to some of the world’s biggest powers (such as the USA and Japan), thereby maintaining its position within the international community. What is more, even big European powers like Germany are mindful of (and thankful for) how OEEC/OECD membership has enabled them to promote a new post-war sense of being as *leading* nation states (interview with national official). In bestowing it with a trusted position, the OECD has enabled Germany to re-develop its sense of self among its (European) peers. Hence, it is not only middle powers, such as Belgium, that are conscious of how OECD membership has augmented their sense of identity. Big economic powers like Germany are just as aware.

Altogether, the theme of identity builds upon discussion commenced in section 5.2 regarding how the founder countries perceive of themselves as OECD members. This study finds that members appreciate more than the opportunity to see (part of) themselves reflected at the international level. They also value this self-reflection being associated with a preeminent (selective) grouping like the OECD, as it reinforces their own sense of self. The theme of identity is further developed in chapter six, together with more comparative analysis of members’ opinions.

Educator Role

As indicated in chapter three, the OECD is an organisation known for enabling peer-to-peer learning; however, the OECD is not typically portrayed as a teacher. Analysis of the founder countries’ responses to the interview questions,

¹⁸ From 1940 to 1945 Luxembourg was attached to Germany and “no longer existed” (interview with national delegate). People with Francophone family names had to adopt German family names, and the younger generation had to fight in Russia for Germany, wearing the German uniform.

nevertheless, imparts a strong appreciation for the OECD as an educator. For explanatory purposes, this characterisation can be distinguished in two ways: value for the OECD's role in (directly) teaching and value for the OECD's role in facilitating learning.

Teaching

In articulating the value of the OECD, Turkey conveyed some of its highest regard for the Organisation's ability to *draw out the potential* that exists within countries (interview, 24 September 2014). Curiously, however, during the interview, the Turkish delegate never mentioned words like *recommendation*, *reform*, or *advice* when speaking about the importance of the OECD. Rather, he simply acknowledged the special ability of the Organisation for seeing and encouraging potential while claiming that by 1978 Turkey quickly became a strong economy (ibid). The suggestion being that the OECD helped Turkey to realise its true potential. When comparing Turkey's views with those of the other founder countries, there is a clear distinction between countries that mentioned structural reforms and countries that did not.

Turkey is unique in alluding to the educator role of the OECD without also directly expressing appreciation for the OECD's recommendations and role in teaching. Generally, the countries that mentioned structural reforms were quite direct in praising the OECD for sharing its knowledge and giving *sound* recommendations. They referred to the OECD as an *advisor* to governments that has the special ability of being able to work "within the administration of the different countries" (interview with national official, 6 January 2015) and in various fields. At least three founder countries explicitly stated that many of their ministries are involved in the work of the OECD, and the Organisation is important in each ministry – this being something that distinguishes the OECD

from other international economic organisations (interviews with national delegates, 14 October 2014, 17 October 2014 and 6 January 2015).

From this perspective, such support is what helps to make the OECD an “important source” of “world-class advice” (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014) because the Organisation is “already familiar with [their] practices and has information from around the world on the issues” (ibid). One member state even alluded to a *moral* aspect associated with the OECD’s “independent advice” (ibid) in that it can help countries to decide “what is right and wrong” (ibid). In this way, the OECD not only offers a form of critique, but it “will talk back” (ibid) to the member states about what it thinks they are doing wrong based upon its insider perspective.

The OECD, thus, has “moral suasion”¹⁹ (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014). It has “the power” (ibid) to²⁰ give economic recommendations because it has “the power” (ibid) to request and to obtain data from member states. Its recommendations are, hence, best seen as guidelines for national governments and national parliaments because though they are not binding, they, nevertheless, represent “a valuable point of reference for national reforms” (ibid).

Italy, for example, readily acknowledges the importance of the OECD’s economic recommendations. It professes that during the crisis of the Eurozone area, due to the economic situation in Italy, it was “very important to follow the recommendations of the OECD from the outset, particularly in the area of

¹⁹ This implies that the OECD has an agenda or at least the ability to persuade countries to adopt a particular course of action.

²⁰ The interviewees used the expression *power to*, denoting a capacity or ability of the OECD (Lukes, 2005: 34). They did not use the expression *power over*, suggesting an asymmetrical relationship whereby the OECD is in a position of domination over member states (ibid: 109). The diplomats most often presented their national perspectives, speaking from a statist point of view, so it would not be expected that they would speak of the OECD having *power over* member states. The key point is that it was the founder countries that mentioned structural reforms that spoke of the OECD using expressions of power, including the OECD’s *power to* make recommendations. The intonation was that the OECD is able to use its power to constrain their choices and secure compliance (ibid: 74).

growth – economic growth” (interview with national delegate). Italy can get financial and monetary recommendations from the IMF, but it is the OECD that provides it with economic recommendations, and it “especially valued this after the Italian state went bankrupt in the summer of 2011” (ibid).

Furthermore, for member states expressly aware of the OECD’s role in structural reform,²¹ the Organisation “teaches” them “how [they] can do better” (interview with national official, 18 November 2014). Rather than simply presenting them with data and recommending particular courses of action, it helps them “to understand what’s *behind* the statistics. No other organisation does this” (ibid). In other words, the OECD makes its various statistics and findings “understandable” (ibid) so member states can benchmark their economic behaviour and structural policies rather than simply following directives.

Learning

On the other hand, for the founder countries that didn’t mention structural reforms, they portrayed the OECD as a body that enables learning (rather than directly teaching), though a couple of the interviewees did also acknowledge the OECD’s role in providing “sound, evidence-based policy recommendations” (interview with national delegate, 17 October 2014) and “very good advice into policy making” (interview with national delegate, 14 October 2014). On the whole, the member states that didn’t mention structural reforms emphasised the OECD’s role in fostering peer learning, thereby enabling members to benchmark their progress and “set standards against others” (interview with national delegate, 20 October 2014). For them, the OECD’s value lies in its ability to create a “platform for learning” (interview with national delegate, 17 October 2014), where members can improve their

²¹ These are also the founder countries that treat the OECD as an autonomous actor.

policies and learn from the best practices of others (interviews with national delegates, 17 October 2014 and 23 October 2014). This is especially true for the small countries among them, as it is “a helpful way for them to get policy ideas concerning many areas” (interview with national delegate, 17 October 2014) that they would not have access to otherwise (due to the expense and lack of administrative capacity).

For the most part,²² the founder countries that expressed appreciation for the OECD’s ability to foster learning also spoke highly of the OECD’s work in furthering *best approaches* and in encouraging benchmarking. On average, these countries conveyed greater concern with comparing themselves to their counterparts and improving their public policies by means of *keeping up with* their peers.

Over all, the OECD plays a dual role in learning and teaching by facilitating the development of members. It *teaches* members by offering them the opportunity “to learn from the advice of the Secretariat (its analysis)” (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014) and it facilitates the learning of members through promoting “the best practices of the other OECD members” (ibid) about how to improve public policies. To such a degree, the OECD plays a complete role in the development process of member states.

Scientific Innovation

As suggested in chapter three, science is not a field readily associated with the OECD, though the Organisation does play a significant role in scientific governance and technological innovation. It is at the core of the OECD’s mandate for increasing economic development. Accordingly, members articulated value for the OECD’s scientific aspect and approach to innovation.

²² One country that mentioned learning did not specifically mention *best practices* but, instead, spoke of the OECD as a *standard-setter* (interview with national delegate, 23 October 2014).

Typically, it was the smaller powers (small-sized countries) and the countries with less fully developed economies that expressed appreciation for the OECD's scientific aspect.

Essentially, the founder countries that mentioned structural reform and valuing the OECD's advisory capacity also remarked upon the OECD's role in scientific and technological innovation.²³ These countries have histories of being less fully developed economies and undertaking structural reforms; therefore, they are more forthright about the capabilities of the OECD (including its technological abilities) and value its recommendations.

Turkey, as discussed in chapter four, claimed to have a strong desire to modernise in continuing with Atatürk's reforms. When interviewed, the Turkish officials expressed value for the OECD's technical (scientific) aspect – a quality that is often used to discount the (significance of) the Organisation. This view was shared by the other countries that were characterised as being *less developed* economies when they helped to found the OECD.

Indeed, one small country was unequivocal about the OECD's work in the field of science and technology being “very valuable” (interview with national official, 6 January 2015), especially to the small countries that would not have access to such expertise otherwise (ibid). It is the view of the small member states that the OECD's “novel technological approaches” (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014) give them a “competitive edge over other countries” (ibid), meaning countries outside the OECD. In this way, it is not simply the access to world class data and technologies that the small and less developed OECD member states value. Rather, they appreciate being able to share in the OECD's way of thinking.

As a point of fact, one founder country that has recently undertaken significant structural reforms credits the OECD with endeavouring to bring

²³ all except for one country

about scientific innovation and competition in the country by introducing “the *idea* of structural reforms” (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014). In lieu of simply trying to help the country to reduce its debt, the OECD encouraged innovation by advancing the *notion* of structural change (ibid) to reform peoples’ way of thinking.

Hence, the OECD’s role in scientific development is just as much about changing people’s ways of thinking as it is about advancing their knowledge of scientific pursuits, themselves.

Social Relations

While the OECD is regarded as a technical organisation and is valued for its technical approaches, the OECD is also very much a social organisation, given its prominent diplomatic aspect. As such, all members interviewed remarked upon social features of the OECD, which enhance the group’s solidarity, particularly when relating with non-members. For an economic organisation like the OECD, one would expect the founder countries to most often extol the benefits of the OECD’s technical work, such as its comparative statistics and high-quality studies. Though many of the founder countries did mention these features of the OECD, not all of them commented upon technical aspects of the Organisation; whereas, all members commented upon social aspects of the OECD, most notably in relation to networking, sharing and co-operation.

Networking

Three interviewees spoke of the OECD’s increased collaboration with the *Key Partners* (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa) and how the OECD has been “cultivating relations with growing powers” (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014). These interviewees expressed appreciation for the

opportunity to associate with the *Key Partners*. Generally speaking, small countries and peripheral European countries tended to remark upon the OECD's ability to create networking opportunities. One small country so much as pointed out the ability for some groups and affiliations, such as APEC member countries, to informally get together at the OECD to exchange views (interview with national delegate, 17 October 2014).

Yet, a clear distinction can be drawn between the responses of EU member states and non-EU member states in terms of their valuation of the OECD's capacity for networking. Non-EU member states expressed more sharply their appreciation for the opportunity to network and to work with others.

As a case in point, Norway acknowledged that the OECD offers it the means to "have contact with a number of countries that [it] might not otherwise have regular contact with" (interview with national delegate). The Norwegian delegate emphasised a few times that this is "important" (ibid) because Norway is *not* a member of the EU, so for Norway "the networking part is what makes the OECD valuable" (ibid). Norway sees the Organisation "as an exchange of people and administrations in addition to techniques and capacities" (ibid). In fact, for the Norwegians, "there is no other multilateral organisation where government representatives working on these specialised topics (and at this level) would have the possibility to meet and to discuss their issues" (ibid). Norway's perspective makes evident the value that non-EU member states place upon networking as OECD members.

For the EU member states, especially the big powers, the OECD is also best understood as "an exchange – an exchange between embassies and member states and committee members" (interview with national official, 18 November 2014). However, from their perspective, "there are many international organisations where government officials can network and discuss

issues in their area of expertise” (interview with national official, 14 October 2014). In the area of trade, for example, there are regular meetings and workshops at the European Commission, the IMF, the OECD, the UN, the WTO, and the like (ibid). For the EU member states, the OECD is looked upon not so much as a means by which to come into contact with others, but rather, as a means to *share* with others. *Sharing* was the expression used by all EU member states interviewed. Extrapolating from this finding, it becomes evident that EU member states have various opportunities for regularised policy exchanges, and that these countries place greater value upon the opportunity to *share* their knowledge and best practices with others.

Sharing and Co-operation

While materialist interpretations of international politics assume that countries are mostly concerned with what they can *gain* from international exchanges, constructivist accounts allow for a more social interpretation. Based upon the interviews conducted with the various founder countries, it appears that the member states are not primarily interested in what they, themselves, can *get* from the OECD and OECD relations. Rather, what came to the fore during the interviews was, instead, their interest in what they can *give* and what they can *bring* to the OECD and to OECD relations.

To be certain, many founder countries used strong neoliberal language to express their *interests* in the OECD, claiming to want the Organisation to reflect their national priorities as well as their desire to have their country *benefit* from OECD participation. Nevertheless, by examining beyond the rhetoric, one can clearly see a different perspective. Many of the founder countries remarked that the OECD is commendable for bringing together small countries and big

powers to share ideas and to achieve common goals.²⁴ This is a quality that distinguishes the OECD from its counterpart institutions, as mentioned in chapter three.

Moreover, all founder countries – big, middle, and small powers alike – expressed their contentment at having the opportunity to contribute, in one form or another. What was very telling was the number of ways in which the member states articulated this notion. For the purpose of analysis, these have been divided into three categories: ideational, physical, and verbal.

Ideational:

sharing the values of the OECD

finding common ground

sharing common problems and best practices

contributing to common solutions to these problems

sharing best practices to achieve a common welfare goal

sharing policy ideas

contributing analysis for international negotiations

sharing experiences – the OECD is quite important in this regard

solving problems together

sharing areas where you're good at something and others are not so good

Physical:

participating in the OECD's economic reviews

contributing, not just receiving

giving input

joint co-operation together

helping to get others around the table again talking

²⁴ The OECD's counterpart organisations have universal membership, so the situation is quite different, and the G7 and G20 only encompass big and middle powers.

collaboration – we have to push hard to have collaboration

building something together

helping to make things move forward

peer work and peer reviews

engagement with others (on economic policy)

showing leadership

Verbal:

having a voice in matters

having a voice together (in policy development)

even small countries have something to say and suggest

all having a say

possibility of dialogue with other members

The comments speak to one of the most valued aspects of the OECD: its ability to create *a common ground*,²⁵ where big and small countries alike can collaborate and reach common solutions to problems, giving them “a voice together – a collective voice” (interview with national official, 18 November 2014). In fact, one big European power commented that the OECD is valuable for small countries *having a voice*, meaning that “they are also being heard” (ibid). This notion is supported by the language used by other founder countries to denote their fondness for the horizontal relations fostered by the OECD. Curiously, the middle powers did not tend to use such wording. Typically, it was the small countries and the big powers that used expressions emphasising the horizontalness of OECD relations.

Small countries:

²⁵ A *common ground* forms the starting point for dialogue between diplomats (Watson, 1982; Berridge, 2010).

a platform for learning and improving your policies
all on equal terms at the table
at the table, where policies are being designed
the OECD creates a common ground from which you can compare your experiences
at the OECD table
at the negotiating table
at the discussion table

Big powers:

finding common ground (among members)
a level playing field
the OECD creates a peer-to-peer learning environment
a platform for benchmarking macro-economic policies

Typically, the small countries were much more conscious of the existence of an *OECD table*, where policies are created and discussions occur, and they tended to value having a place at this *table* alongside their peers and on equal terms. Quite strikingly, the big powers never made allusion to a *table*. Instead, they figuratively spoke of a level ground (a *common ground*, a *level playing field*, a *peer-to-peer environment*, and a *platform*) and conveyed value for working with others on equal terms.

Overall, this emphasis upon horizontalness reinforces the peer-to-peer style of OECD work, which promotes an atmosphere of respect and openness conducive to learning and sharing. In this way, OECD relations also foster mutual trust (through co-operation). Analogously, many interviewees specified the OECD's peer reviews as being very important, not only for the sake of having country economic reviews, but also for participating in them – learning

the process and techniques, as well as giving input into the macro-economic approaches of fellow countries.

The same interviewees who made reference to peer reviews also spoke of peer pressure,²⁶ which encourages countries to conform to the practices of the group and to meet with shared standards and expectations. Peer review, as a collaborative, horizontal process is enhanced by the practise of peer pressure, and the countries in question expressed a great deal of respect for the practice of peer pressure, itself, as it reinforces the horizontal nature of the OECD's way of working.

Moreover, some of the countries that mentioned undertaking structural reforms spoke of the OECD's talent for identifying and solving problems as a group. They noted that when countries have economic problems, "OECD membership becomes even more important" (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014). Member states can work together to solve the problems and, in the end, become stronger (interview with national delegate, 22 September 2014). In this way, the OECD is even more important "post-Lehman Brothers' collapse" (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014), when member states are in need of solutions to their economic problems (ibid). The OECD's horizontal way of working provides members with a platform for support from which they can co-operate and broach their problems together.

Thus, while all members are quick to praise social aspects of the OECD – especially as per engaging in the exchange of ideas and practices with others – they perceive of the benefits of OECD social relations differently due to their varied social circumstances (namely memberships in other international

²⁶ This study is able to directly affirm the effectiveness of peer pressure as a practice for achieving conformity with group expectations. Given that the OECD has a relatively small membership and the founder countries form an even smaller grouping, when two founder-country embassies had not responded to the requests for interviews, they were informed that most of the other founding members had provided their views. This put social pressure on the outstanding countries to conform to the group's behaviour so that they wouldn't attract attention (by not providing their opinions), thereby looking awkwardly. The two countries in question promptly offered interviews, demonstrating the persuasive force of peer pressure as a group mechanism.

organisations). Most notably, there is a clear distinction between the valuations of EU and non-EU member states. Non-EU member states place importance upon the OECD's networking opportunities and feel that they make the Organisation unique, being that policy experts in a variety of specialised fields are able to meet and share their ideas and experiences. In contrast, the EU member states do not perceive that this is what makes the OECD unique, as they have several other opportunities for similar exchanges at the European Commission and related bodies. What the EU member states value most about the OECD is having the opportunity to contribute (values, ideas, and experiences) in a peer-to-peer, horizontal manner, where they can be respected on equal terms.

5.3-Qualifying the Responses

The interviewees were posed six main questions (see Appendix 10). The first two questions involved historical valuations, namely reasons for their governments helping to form the OECD and details regarding their governments' roles in establishing the OECD. The remaining four questions were designed to obtain their governments' impressions about the OECD and OECD membership, particularly what they value about OECD membership.

It should be stressed that the questions were prepared in the assumption that the OECD founder countries are most knowledgeable about the OECD and, therefore, would be well-versed in their OECD history. This was especially expected of the four founder countries that have had national representatives serve as OECD Secretaries-General: Denmark (1961-1969), the Netherlands (1969-1984), France (1984-1996), and Canada (1996-2006). The interview requests, however, were met with varied responses.

Response Rates and Times

A clear distinction was visible among the members' responses to the interview requests. The founder countries that provided information in answer to the questions involving historical valuations (questions 1 and 2) responded to the interview requests very promptly (within one to four days); whereas, the founder countries that didn't provide information in answer to the questions involving historical valuations (questions 1 and 2) instead provided information pertaining to current-day valuations (questions 3 to 6), and they did not answer as promptly (at earliest three to four weeks later). A correlation was thus visible between governments providing historical information in relation to the OECD and responding to the interview requests promptly. Analysis of the interview transcripts later led to another observation: founder countries for which OECD membership marked a *national turning point* provided information in response to the interview requests about one month quicker than the other founder countries, as will be discussed.

Historical Valuations

One inference from the interview process is that accession to the OEEC/OECD forms a more notable part of certain national histories than others. A brief internet search, for instance, quickly locates government records pertaining to the *accession of Franco's Spain to the OEEC*; whereas, it is much more difficult to locate similar information pertaining to the Scandinavian OECD countries, by way of example. Indeed, when the founder-member embassies were contacted for interviews, certain delegations, including Denmark and Sweden, suggested that the interview questions merited deep, historical analysis, including archival study to do them justice. Some delegations were, therefore, hesitant to speak to the questions, partially because they felt that the questions necessitated research and background information to be wholly answered (communication

with national delegate, 23 October 2014). These delegations commented that “the average citizen would know the OECD by name but would not know what it does” (interview with national delegate, 23 October 2014; interview with national official, 18 November 2014).

Overall, the response time of member states that had a higher awareness of their country’s historical decision to help establish the OECD was faster than countries where a lower level of awareness was perceived.²⁷ This was particularly true for Canada, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. All five member states responded promptly to the interview request²⁸ and provided answers to questions one and two involving historical accounts.

For four of these members – Canada, Spain, Turkey, and the United States – OECD membership marked a turning point – joining the established European powers as equal partners. Spain had very belatedly been admitted to the OEEC; Canada and the United States had only participated in the work of the OEEC and were not full members; Turkey, as described in chapter four, “wanted to become a western country” (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014) and saw OECD membership as “a way to enhance this” (ibid). The interview responses of all four countries, thus, clearly exhibit a level of consciousness regarding this turning point in their national histories. For them, OECD membership is a social relationship that reinforces their post-war identities (as will be discussed).

The case of Luxembourg is slightly different, as there was no national turning point per se, but there was concerted awareness of OECD membership helping to protect Luxembourg’s national identity and its very existence as an

²⁷ The study acknowledges that historical awareness is but one factor that influenced response times, given that the diplomats and embassies in question could have been otherwise occupied; nevertheless, certain delegations, such as Luxembourg, had ministers visiting but still promptly provided their government’s position, indicating that certain members were more interested in speaking to the interview questions and were able to answer the questions from an historical perspective as well.

²⁸ Belgium also provided its historical impressions regarding OECD membership, but it responded to the interview request quite belatedly.

independent country. Luxembourg historically associates OECD membership with its *fight for survival* following World War II, when Luxembourg had only about 300,000 citizens and felt “squeezed” (interview with national delegate) between France and Germany. Luxembourg was conscious that it needed to *fight to survive* or it would “vanish from the map” (ibid) like it did during World War II, when it was overwhelmed by and attached to Germany. Luxembourg saw OECD membership as a means to cope with the “trauma” (ibid) of having its identity erased during the war. So, for Luxembourg, OECD membership is a relationship that strengthens and protects its national identity.

Hence, for these five members (Canada, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, and the United States) joining the OECD was a politically significant event – one associated with their post-war identity in the world.

Current-Day Valuations

The remaining respondents focused on providing answers to questions three to six, preferring to speak to the OECD’s present-day value rather than its historical value. They did not explicitly attach import (political significance) to the historical act of joining the OECD, but most did allude in conversation to the Marshall Plan.²⁹ This leads to the inference that these members identify with or attach value to the OECD’s contemporary role in the world (rather than seeing OECD membership as a national turning point, historically speaking). To be sure, these founder countries were quite interested in speaking to the various ways in which they directly contribute to the work of the OECD, doing their part to support the Organisation.

²⁹ Except for Denmark and Turkey, all Marshall Plan recipients made mention of the initiative.

Observation Based Upon Responses

The interview process has, thus, established a link between a country's political identity and its response time. As suggested in chapter three, joining the OECD has, in effect, been equated with becoming *a member of the civilised community* (interview with national official, 6 January 2015). The occasion is a significant moment, especially for certain states that previously felt excluded from or not recognised by "the countries with important weight in the international community" (ibid).

Spain was the first founder country to respond to the interview request and to provide its viewpoints on OECD membership (within a day of being asked). In this way, Spain exhibited an interest in being associated among the OECD founder countries.³⁰ In 1948, Spain was under General Franco's direction and so was "politically isolated" (interview with national delegate, 22 September 2014) and was not invited to the Paris Conference or asked to join the OEEC (Wolfe, 2008: 26). As a result, the Spanish economy was "isolated" (interview with national delegate, 22 September 2014) until the mid-1950s, when Spain joined the United Nations. Spain was not admitted to the OEEC until 1959, after it approved a stabilisation plan under the recommendations and technical assistance of the OEEC and the IMF (ibid). In this way, OECD membership in 1961 symbolised Spain's progressive insertion "in the world economic scene" (ibid) and the country's economic and political inclusion by the OECD community.

Spain was very prompt in providing its historical account of joining the OECD, as the event forms a part of the country's national narrative (Liu & Hilton, 2005: 539). It is one means by which Spain has been able to construct its political identity, clearly establishing a break with its past (its Franco days when the country was politically and economically isolated). Hence, OECD

³⁰ and has, in fact, followed up to inquire about the status of the study

membership is a medium through which Spain has constructed itself as an economically and politically engaged participant in world affairs during the post-war era. The event of joining the OECD, thus, forms a part of Spain's political identity, so the country has an interest in maintaining and reinforcing this identity, including through speaking about it.

National identity is based upon an awareness of national history (Ashworth & Larkham, 1994: 1). It can be politically interpreted to shape ideas about the nation state, thereby reinforcing a national consciousness and projecting an official discourse or national narrative (Berger, 2004). Such narratives are constructed to reflect prevailing social and political ideas, becoming a main frame of reference for national memories (Lebow, 2006: 11). Over time, these narratives influence external perceptions of the nation state (ibid: 21).

In this manner, nation states use *heritage*³¹ – selected parts of the past (real or imagined) – to define themselves in particular ways in the present (Van Gorp & Renes, 2007: 407). They officially sanction certain events in the past to construct their national identities, situating themselves with respect to the present as well as the future (Harvey, 2008: 21). To this extent, heritage is used to affirm a nation's worth, endowing it with prestige and purpose (Lowenthal, 1998: 8).

This study cannot ascertain that OECD membership forms a more recognisable part of certain national histories more so than others. Nonetheless, it can note a strong correlation between certain countries responding very promptly to the interview requests and providing historical information in relation to joining the OECD as well as indicating interest in being associated among the OECD founder countries.

³¹ *Heritage* differs from *history* in that heritage is idealised history. It serves to invent myths to inspire pride in the past. For this reason, heritage is immune to critical scrutiny and, instead, demands public loyalty, all the while sanctioning its bias. History, on the other hand, claims to be true and seeks to reduce bias. It is not free from criticism and cannot easily be amended (Lowenthal, 1998: 7-8).

Ultimately, the interview response rates and times testify to a variation among the OECD founder countries, between members that associate joining the OECD with an identity-defining national turning point (or some similar historical construction) and members that attach more political significance to identifying with the OECD's contemporary role in the world. These associations relate to elements of national heritage and officially-sanctioned public memory. *Shared* heritage – past events that a group selectively defines itself with – is similarly constructed. The concept of *shared heritage* and the OECD's post-war narrative of economic co-operation are explained further in chapter six, together with broader discussion of the OECD's role in identity formation.

5.4-Conclusion

The interviews have been an opportunity to probe beyond the common refrains for the OECD, which typecast the Organisation as a global think tank and a *talking shop*. Surprisingly, all of the interviewees refrained from using such expressions when referring to the OECD. They each tried to make sense of the OECD in their own, distinct ways based upon their various national histories and experiences. Hence, the interviewees alluded to the Organisation using a variety of expressions, reflecting the plurality of their views about what the OECD is. Notwithstanding, as a common denominator, all spoke of the OECD as a prominent organisation.

Quite optimistically, all founder countries expressed contentment for having the opportunity to contribute in one form or another to the work of the Organisation. They praised the ability to share and to collaborate with their peers, expressing some of the highest regard for the OECD's ability to form a *common ground* – a peer-to-peer atmosphere of respect and openness, which is a point of departure for dialogue between diplomats. In this way, what came across in the interviews was more of a concern shared among the founder

countries about what they can *bring* to the organisation, rather than what they can get from it.³²

While many of the interviewees remarked upon the technical aspect of the OECD (its technical work), *all* of the member states expressed regard for social aspects of the OECD. They praised the OECD for bringing them into contact with other countries, regions, and/or peoples with whom they might not otherwise come into contact. This is especially true of the non-EU member states (such as Norway), that strongly value the networking part of the OECD.

Before making the claim that an economic organisation like the OECD is more valued for its social aspects than its technical aspects, however, it is important to make clear that the data was collected primarily from diplomats,³³ so it is understandable that they would express great value for the more collegial aspects of the Organisation.³⁴ In any case, the interviewees overwhelmingly expressed a preference for the social elements of the OECD (as section two attests).

In a related note, the interviewees raised the issue of social recognition. Some of the founder countries, especially the middle powers, expressed the satisfaction of seeing a part of themselves reflected at the international level. In particular, they spoke of the desire to have their values and standards followed by others, especially the emerging economies in their interactions with each other. Nevertheless, the OECD offers all member states the opportunity to see themselves as *leading* world countries: the small states through association with the big powers; the middle powers through practise on the international stage, and the big powers through reinforcement of their existing status. The OECD

³² which is ironic considering that the majority of the interviewees adopted a utilitarian approach in describing their countries' relationships with the OECD

³³ as well as a few national officials based in their home countries

³⁴ Nevertheless, many of the interviewees were economic and trade officials, and all the interviewees had ample opportunity to speak about any aspect of the Organisation that they wished.

provides them with the opportunity to teach and learn from each other, and this form of sharing bestows them with social recognition as well.

Owing to the fact that the interviewees varied in the way that they regard the OECD (as a *tool* of governments or as an autonomous actor), they also differed in the way that they view the OECD's role in learning. The countries that mentioned undertaking structural reforms spoke of the OECD as an *advisor* and alluded to it *directly* "teaching" them how to do better, such as by helping them to understand the logic behind their statistics. These countries claimed that the OECD has "power" because it is able to request and to obtain data from member states and, in fact, from all areas of government. Correspondingly, they claimed that the OECD has "the power" to make recommendations based upon this knowledge and its work *within* the administrations of their countries. They did not explicitly say that the OECD has power *over* member states, but there is a strong correlation between member states mentioning structural reforms and referring to the OECD using language of power.

From a different perspective, the countries that did not mention undertaking structural reforms portrayed the OECD as an organisation that enables *learning* – peer-to-peer learning. Generally, these countries consider the OECD to be a tool and, therefore, refer to it having an *indirect* role in members' learning, mostly through enabling the work of others and by creating the opportunity for governments to learn from each other.

Finally, those countries that mentioned undertaking structural reforms also expressed value for the OECD's role in scientific and technological innovation, especially by introducing the concept of structural reform. For the most part, these countries had *less developed* economies when they helped to found the OECD. For them, the OECD is valuable for letting them share in the OECD way of thinking.

Thus, reflecting upon the interviews as a whole, it becomes evident that, for the most part, the members expressed value for the same things: learning and sharing, collaborating as a group, participating in peer reviews, and having their identities reinforced at the international level. This suggests a relative affinity of views as per their valuation of the OECD. How the founder countries differ is more in terms of how they approach their relationship as OECD members, which, in turn, has much to do with how they see themselves and characterise themselves as OECD members.

Chapter 6: Some Reflections

At this juncture in the thesis, it is helpful to bring together aforementioned observations and impressions in order to reflect upon the research as a whole. Rather than rushing to draw conclusions, this study considers it best to first synthesise key ideas and viewpoints put forward in the preceding chapters. Basically, it is an attempt to fully discuss the research question¹ before making any final judgements. In so doing, the study makes no pretention about *solving* the puzzle that is the OECD or identifying its *true* reason for existence. Instead, the study wishes to highlight key themes that make previously-stated observations meaningful. Upon this basis, it explores several reasons for the OECD's (continued) existence as well as Turkey's membership of the Organisation.

The chapter is largely concerned with determining if the hypotheses have held true. The chapter, thus, begins by revisiting the hypotheses of primary interest. In so doing, it explores three main, inter-related themes pertaining to the continued value of the OECD's peer-to-peer way of working: avant-garde spirit, mutual trust, and education. The chapter, then, focuses upon the hypotheses of secondary interest in order to make inferences about the OECD's continued existence based upon the case of Turkey. The country's active OECD participation in the *post*-Cold War period demonstrates that the Organisation is more than an economic counterpart to NATO. By way of conclusion, the chapter, thereupon, revisits notions about the OECD's role in the world.

¹ The main research question is quite straight-forward: Why does the OECD exist? What is its *added value to the international economic architecture*?

6.1-Hypotheses of Primary Interest

The chapter considers it most important to reflect upon how the case of Turkey and the OECD's wider founding membership afford greater understanding into the nature of the OECD. As mentioned in chapters two and four, the Republic of Turkey initially presented as an anomaly among the OECD's original membership given that its status as both an advanced economy and a liberal democracy are questionable (as is its support for social welfare). Turkey has proven to be a particularly helpful case for analysis. Not only does Turkey's history of relations with the OECD inform a great deal about the Organisation, but just as importantly, Turkey's contemporary valuations of the OECD provide insight into the OECD's post-Cold War identity.

Both the OECD and Turkey had their identities solidified by Cold War politics (the OECD self-identifying as the *economic counterpart to NATO* and Turkey distinguishing itself as a *Cold War Warrior*). Both have, nevertheless, outlasted the east-west division of the world. Subsequently, since the 1990s, both appear to be struggling to come to terms with their greater roles in the post-Cold War world (as explained in chapters three and four). From this vantage, the case of Turkey communicates a great deal about the quintessential character and continued relevance of the OECD. Likewise, the views of the other founding members serve to provide wider appreciation for the distinct qualities of the OECD in order to understand what the OECD adds to the international economic architecture.

Taking the aforesaid into consideration, the chapter revisits the main question of inquiry:

Why does the OECD exist? What is its added value?

The thesis has put forward two hypotheses in this regard:

1. The OECD exists for reasons other than economic factors.

2. The OECD has contemporary value beyond its Cold War identity.

Based upon the research conducted for this study, these hypotheses have held true. Regarding the first hypothesis, one of the elite interviewees pointed out that the OECD is also a political organisation, meaning that the OECD serves political purposes in addition to its economic mandate (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014). The opinion voiced was that the OECD's political character is reflected in the Organisation's membership and membership considerations (ibid). Indeed, the archival records and greater literature support this notion as per the case of Turkey, in that both Turkey and Greece were given equal consideration for OECD membership, for instance (as explained in chapter four).

Furthermore, the interviews with the founder countries also amply demonstrated members' perceptions of the OECD being a social organisation as well as a scientific body. In fact, all of the founder countries interviewed expressed value for social aspects of the OECD, including networking and association opportunities. Notably, a few of the interviewees commented favourably upon the OECD's increased collaboration with *Key Partners* (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa), and non-EU members expressed appreciation for having regular contact with several countries that they might not otherwise discuss specialised issues with (interviews with national delegates, 24 September 2014; 14 October 2014; 20 October 2014).

Whereas, the OECD is typically upheld to be a technical organisation, the interviews with the founder countries suggest that the OECD is more than this. They indicate a strong regard for the OECD's role in scientific governance. In particular, the founder countries that mentioned structural reform remarked upon the OECD's role in scientific and technological innovation. They articulated appreciation for the OECD's role in encouraging innovation and for being able to share in the OECD's innovative way of thinking (interviews with

national delegates, 24 September 2014; 1 October 2014; interview with national official, 6 January 2015), something that gives them competitive advantage over non-OECD countries (interview with national delegate, 28 November 2014) and influences the way they view the world. Hence, in the eyes of the members, the OECD exists for political, social, and scientific (technological) reasons, in addition to economic factors.

In terms of the second hypothesis, the contemporary value (or continued *added value*) of the OECD generally showed itself to be the Organisation's peer-to-peer way of working, as amply illustrated in section 5.2, with verbal imagery of a *common ground*, an *OECD table*, and a *platform for benchmarking*, as well as significant discussion about sharing and contributing. By and large, the interviewees devoted a great deal of time to speaking about the OECD's horizontal approach to policy work, including learning from and exchanging practices with peers. Overall, the continued value of the OECD's peer-to-peer way of working has manifested itself through three main (inter-related) themes: avant-garde spirit, mutual trust, and education, which are singled out for discussion.

Avant-garde Spirit

As explained in chapter three, the OECD has a history of portraying itself as an avant-garde organisation; however, this is usually in terms of its approach to policy work and pursuing new policy issues in advance of other international organisations. What the case of Turkey testifies to in and of itself is that the OECD is also a very progressive organisation for the way in which it brings together countries to collaborate.² Essentially, the inclusion of Turkey in the OECD is a testament to the avant-garde nature of the Organisation, for, as

² There is a general tendency in international politics to focus on (national) interests and to downplay values and "pervasive human diversity" (Sen, 1992: xi) – fundamental differences of culture, religion, moral outlook and social organisation (Hurrell, 2005: 36). Such variations are not irrational, but they necessitate non-rational (social) consideration.

acknowledged in chapter four, Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) has traditionally been recognised as *the other* in Europe.

Mindful of orientalism³ and the western tendency to ascribe itself “positional authority” (Said, 1977: 7), it needs to be said that the act of selecting a (largely) Middle Eastern (and majority Muslim) country to help form the OECD attests to the progressive post-war spirit of the Organisation. Countries with majority Muslim populations represent about one fifth of the world population, but they have few decision-making prerogatives in the main international organisations (Dal & Gök, 2014: 5). To a large extent, these countries have been marginalised both geopolitically and geo-economically (ibid: 9; Kösebalaban, 2014: 19). Their exclusion is partly said to stem from a lack of democracy in Muslim countries (Kösebalaban, 2014: 20). Yet, rather than excluding Turkey from co-operative, European-based arrangements,⁴ the OECD sought to include Turkey from the beginning as a secular republic that sees itself as “part of the western world” (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014).

Actually, the notion of *inclusion* was a frequent theme that spontaneously emerged during the interviews with the founder countries. Their expressions conveyed value for the OECD being forward-looking and inclusive. In particular, they praised the OECD for bringing together former Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) with the Allied Powers, giving all a place and a voice together, allowing for post-war integration and co-operation (interview with national delegate, 6 October 2014; interview with national official, 18 November 2014). Notably, the Scandinavian countries also remarked upon the OECD being unique among international economic organisations for bringing together small countries, like Luxembourg, to participate on equal terms with

³ a western discourse that makes generalisations about *the east*, portraying it as strange and different

⁴ especially following Turkey’s predominantly neutral position during World War II

big powers, such as the United States and Japan (interviews with national delegates, 20 October 2014; 23 October 2014; interview with national official, 6 January 2015). They find it quite forward thinking for the OECD to recognise that *all* members – regardless of size – have something to share, meaning that all members can learn from each other (interview with national delegate, 20 October 2014).

This sense of inclusion was not just the viewpoint of the Scandinavian countries, however. The small countries especially lauded the OECD for giving them *a voice in matters*, with all members *having a voice together* (interviews with national delegates, 6 October 2014; 28 November 2014). Furthermore, the small countries and the intercontinental states commended the OECD for giving them *a place at the table, where policies are being designed* and for ensuring that member countries are *all on equal terms* (interviews with national delegates, 23 October 2014; 28 November 2014). Such attitudes allude to the OECD being inclusive and egalitarian,⁵ which is ironic, considering that the Organisation is characterised by its selective nature, most notably its selective membership (as noted in chapters two and three). Perhaps, therefore, it is more precise to say that for those countries in the OECD grouping, the Organisation is credited for being inclusive and forward-thinking.

Nonetheless, the OECD has been pioneering in its approach to organising relations between nation states,⁶ such that it has been able to advance exchanges conducive to learning (as will be elaborated in future discussion). Howbeit, the OECD is not simply a convenient venue that member states can draw upon at will to enhance communication and to strengthen their diplomatic and trade relations. At its basis, the OECD actively creates learning

⁵ The OECD's *level playing field* is in sharp contrast to earlier failed attempts at international co-operation, most notably the League of Nations, which has been criticised for not creating an equal plane for its members (Güçlü, 2013: 190).

⁶ A good example is the establishment of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa as *Key Partners*.

relationships, and it fosters partnerships that would have previously seemed unthinkable.⁷ The celebrated author Elif Şafak candidly speaks to the usefulness of being encouraged to engage with diverse parties:

[W]e learn from people who are different from ourselves. If we are only surrounded by people who think like us, dress like us, and come from similar backgrounds that would be a narcissistic existence because it means that we are only looking at our own mirror image.

(2011: 16:53)

A lot of potential comes from having the opportunity to exchange experiences with others who are distinct and yet struggling with similar (policy) problems. Based upon the interviews with the founder countries, it is evident that the OECD is valued for its special ability in creating social networks and mentoring relations (see 5.2), which encourage the exchange of *best practices*. This is the forward-looking aspect of the Organisation and part of the uniqueness that is the OECD – encouraging countries to come together to teach each other about their policy practices that have functioned particularly well in order to foster good governance and economic growth across member states (as explained in chapter three).

Thusly, the case of Turkey testifies to the peculiar membership of the OECD.⁸ Simultaneously the OECD's unique membership both defines the Organisation and makes it quite a complex organisation to comprehend. While the OECD is known to take a cutting-edge approach to policy work, its role in fostering progressive partnerships is not as well recognised. In a convoluted manner, it is the OECD's selective membership that enables its avant-garde approach to social relations, being that members' relations are close-held and focused on exchanging first-hand experiences. At a time when the OECD is

⁷ such as Greece and Turkey exchanging practices to advance each other's economies

⁸ for instance, having Austria, Greece, and Turkey as founding members within the select grouping

seeking to redefine its place in the world among an ever-growing number of international organisations, the Organisation would do well to emphasise its avant-gardeness, especially among international economic organisations.

Mutual Trust

Rather than directing attention at differences – issues that keep countries apart – the OECD has principally focused on commonalities or matters that bring countries together, such as mutual goals. From the beginning, the Marshall Plan and the OEEC were initiated to foster pan-European co-operation based upon mutual trust (as well as democracy and economic liberalisation). Religion, national identity, and the quality of a member country's democracy were not significant issues (communication with unnamed Turkish academic, 6 January 2016). This is a main reason why Turkey's place among the founder countries was not questioned (ibid), though Turkey's place of belonging has been a matter of concern throughout the centuries (as described in chapter four). For international organisations that are more politically focused, such as the Council of Europe, Turkey's level of democracy and its political rights have been points of greater debate.

OECD member states support each other because they believe that they form a group based upon mutual trust (Fukuyama, 1995: 8). The Organisation's peer-to-peer way of working fosters this. While trust is not necessary for co-operation, it enables member states to work together to achieve common aims (ibid: 36). Trust involves an exchange of information, but it is not reducible to this (ibid: 25). Based upon the interviews with the founder countries, it is evident that their peer-to-peer form of *sharing* is a significant manifestation and outcome of trust.

When speaking about the value of the OECD, members often alluded to facets of peer-to-peer sharing (as recounted in section 5.2):

sharing the values of the OECD

sharing policy ideas

sharing experiences

sharing common problems and best practices

It is the OECD's *level playing field* that provides the means for such openness. It fosters a sense of cohesiveness from which trust can be built. In like manner, the interviewees, when voicing their perspectives regarding the value of the OECD, used several expressions commending the benefits of sharing, including the following:

achieving a common welfare goal

solving problems together

finding common ground

contributing to common solutions

Overall, these phrases extol the benefits of the OECD's horizontal relations (peer-to-peer style of working), which help to build the trust⁹ and confidence needed for members to engage in economic co-operation and development. In this way, it is the OECD's ability to create a level *platform for learning* that gives the Organisation *added value* as a neutral and independent adviser, as will next be explained.

Education

The third theme that emerged during the interviews was education. Primarily, the interviews with the founder countries confirmed several values that are associated with the OECD's work in the post-Cold War period, including three values pertaining to education: learning, sharing, and teaching. In general, the elite interviews conveyed a strong role for the OECD as an educator – an

⁹ As explained in chapter three, the peer review process, for instance, is dependent upon mutual trust for it to be a constructive exercise.

advisor, mentor, and facilitator for economic policies, most notably structural reforms. In many regards, the OECD is portrayed as a change agent. Its role as an educator can, thereby, be seen as a prime justification for its existence.

The image of the OECD as an educator first came to the fore when speaking with the Turkish officials. The Turkish economic attaché, certainly not one to be casual with compliments, acclaimed that the OECD “draws out the potential” (interview, 24 September 2014) that exists in countries. By way of reference, he implied that the OECD has a special talent for judging ability and encouraging a country to develop to its full potential. His words suggested that the OECD plays a part in supporting and inspiring member states to become the best that they can be. Such a notion is backed by the Organisation’s promotion of *best practices*, in that member states are encouraged to emulate the best practices of their peers in the strive towards better policies and ever greater levels of economic development. The Turkish attaché’s comment also intimated that the OECD has special techniques and skills for assessing countries and guiding them to develop their capabilities.

Like an educator, the OECD shares its knowledge. With its tremendous data and access to insider perspectives, the Secretariat is endowed with long-term (economic) vision. It is able to use its scientific models and advanced technologies to give advice to member states. Furthermore, the OECD has access to the first-hand experiences of member governments, so it is able to encourage peer-to-peer learning in order to foster best practices among the group. In this way, the Organisation is at a good vantage to share its knowledge and skills. It should be stressed, however, that the Turkish officials did not expressly refer to the OECD as an *educator* or a *teacher*, though this was the impression that they conveyed.

Actually, none of the other founder countries named the OECD as an *educator* or a *teacher* either. Instead, they spoke of the OECD as a *consultant* – a

world-class consultant and as an *advisor to governments*. To a degree, this terminology reflects the neoliberal language adopted by many of the interviewees. They attributed the OECD with being an external party and referred to the Organisation in utilitarian terms. Of perhaps greater note, the self-described small countries were the ones more apt to speak of the OECD as an *advisor* and/or a *consultant*. Quite often for these small countries, given their more limited government resources (as explained in section 5.1), the OECD supplements their policy capacities, indeed acting as an advisor of sorts. To be certain, these small countries also described the OECD as providing *sound* economic policies (interviews with national delegates, 17 October 2014; 28 November 2014; 6 January 2015), reinforcing their notion of the OECD acting in the capacity of a neutral, third party. For the most part,¹⁰ these self-described small countries characterise themselves as having very open economies, meaning that for them, international trade and investment is very important (*ibid*). This helps to explain their usage of neoliberal language as well as the importance that they confer upon the OECD's recommendations. Among the founder countries, in general, there is a feeling that the OECD acts as an independent third-party, providing advice and recommendations to its members. The Organisation is able to draw upon its extensive social networks to provide guidance based upon first-hand experiences from around the world.

Yet, at the same time, the member states also implied that the OECD is more than a consultant, as it has *power* – the *power* to give (economic) recommendations as well as the ability to *talk back* to member states (interviews with national delegates, 1 October 2014; 28 November 2014). The exercise of power is usually assumed to involve conflict and opposing interests, but this need not be the case (Lukes, 2005: 84). Power can also be authoritative and transformative, in other words, beneficent (Wartenberg, 1990). A teacher, for instance, uses his or her power to *empower* a learner with increased capabilities

¹⁰ Luxembourg is an exception. It is a self-described small country, but it did not characterise itself or the OECD in this manner.

and resources (Wartenberg, 1990; Lukes, 2005: 84). The teacher claims to be in a position to better understand the interests of the learner and, thus, expects to be obeyed (Lukes, 2005: 86). A direct analogy can, thus, be drawn with the OECD.

The OECD does not simply present facts and findings. It makes its research “understandable” (interview with national official, 18 November 2014), helping members to *understand* the (economic and social) logic behind its data (ibid). In this way, the Organisation *teaches* countries new ways of thinking economically and socially about the world (interview with national delegate, 20 October 2014). In so doing, ultimately, it changes their behaviour. The OECD has considerable resources at its disposal, which it uses to foster *best practices* among member states. With its vast social network of contacts and insider knowledge of government policies and practices around the world, the OECD can claim to be in a better position to understand the interests of its members. The Organisation, ultimately, operates to empower them as learners. Hence, without being explicitly recognised by the founder countries, the OECD acts as an educator, sharing its knowledge and skills with member states in order to further economic co-operation and development in the world.

Thereupon, returning to the main research question – *why does the OECD exist? What is its added value?* – the chapter deduces that the OECD exists for a variety of economic, political, technological, and social purposes. The member states articulated appreciation for these diverse roles of the OECD. The Organisation has continued value particularly as a social organisation, with emphasis upon its peer-to-peer way of working. In like manner, the OECD distinguishes itself with its role in teaching and learning, as well as by building mutual trust, and fostering progressive partnerships. In fact, it is its social aspect that makes the OECD unique among its counterpart institutions.

6.2-Hypotheses of Secondary Interest

Considering the aforesaid, it is beneficial to return to the initial research question to reflect further into the nature of the OECD, inasmuch as it is the case studies that have provided insider perspectives into the significance of the Organisation. The chapter, thus, reverts to the research question that was the point of departure for the study in order to make inferences about the OECD's continued existence.

*What accounts for the Republic of Turkey being included among the OECD's founding membership?*¹¹

The thesis has put forward two hypotheses in this regard:

1. Turkey's membership in the OECD is the result of political reasons rather than purely economic factors.
2. Turkey's OECD membership is predicated upon more than its strategic geographical location.

Based upon the data collected from archival research and elite interviews with national representatives and OECD officials, the two hypotheses have held true. With regards to the first hypothesis, Turkish officials were fairly quick to indicate that the OECD is a *political* organisation as well as an economic organisation, with this reality "reflected in its membership and membership considerations" (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014). In fact, Turkey was the only founder country to express such a view. None of the other members interviewed referred to the OECD's political dimension. This indicates that the Turkish officials perceive of the OECD as a political

¹¹ To be clear, the study has approached the secondary research question from an organisational (group) perspective in the assumption that the decision to include Turkey in the (American-led) organisation was related to the decision to found the OECD, as detailed in chapter one.

organisation as well as an economic organisation. Moreover, this implies that the Turkish officials are cognisant of the OECD's political dimension, including political considerations pertaining to its membership; whereas, other members are not as attentive to (or expressive of) these political factors.

Turkish officials were also quick to advise that their country had co-operated with the other OECD founding members for twelve years as OEEC partners and, thus, OECD membership was "natural" (interview, 24 September 2014) for Turkey, as it had learnt how to collaborate economically under the mandate of the OEEC. Politically speaking, there was no question about Turkey's membership (*ibid*), nor the membership of any of the other OEEC members (interview with national official, 6 January 2015). This is quite common for groups in that they often follow their initial decisions and conditions (including formations) rather than changing (Wright & Ayton, 1987; Castellan, 1993).

Nevertheless, if this study quickly accredited Turkey's OECD founding membership to its political ties with the other OEEC members, it would be carelessly overlooking an important fact: Turkey had co-operated with the other OEEC members for twelve years to bring about European recovery (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014). In other words, Turkey had contributed to European recovery and, in so doing, it had helped to create Europe's long, post-war economic boom. As discussed in chapter four, Turkey was invaluable in supplying much-needed labour to West Germany and its neighbouring countries in order to fuel post-war economic expansion. While this is an economic reason for Turkey's OECD membership, it is also very much a political and social reason. Turkey formed part of a *group* that achieved post-war economic and social prosperity together. In being associated with the Marshall Plan and the OEEC, Turkey ideationally shares in this political identity and is, thereby, related socially and politically with European recovery.

The Marshall Plan and economic development form part of Turkey's shared heritage, as will be elaborated in future paragraphs.

Returning to the second hypothesis, it is true that Turkey is commonly qualified by its strategic location. To a large degree, the country defines itself by its unique place in the world, which encompasses several geopolitical areas of influence, making it an international player (Grigoriadis, 2010: 4; Walker, 2007). Turkey is at the nexus of Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Simultaneously, it is a Balkan, Caspian, Caucasian, Central Asian, Black Sea, Gulf, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern country (Davutolğlu, 2001), giving it influence in all of these regions. From a utilitarian perspective, Turkey would, thus, be very beneficial as a partner to the big OECD powers, especially the United States, for its vantageous location at the centre of the world. In kind, Turkey has been portrayed as a *bridge* (between the East and the West) and a *flank* (blocking Soviet expansion), particularly during the Cold War and now, since 2003, following the affairs of September 11th. Undoubtedly, Turkey's geographic location can be seen as strategic – valuable to foreign powers for air and military bases, transit ways¹², and defence systems of the eastern Mediterranean. To this extent, the country can be characterised as a *convenient ally*, with its OECD membership (economic co-operation) complementing its NATO membership (military co-operation).

Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War era, if the OECD can no longer be considered *the economic counterpart to NATO*, then Turkey's membership of the OECD must be predicated upon more than its strategic, geographical location. This is especially true in acknowledgement of the fact that Turkey was an inactive member of the OECD during the Cold War period (as evidenced in chapter four), and the country has become an active member of the OECD during the *post-Cold War* era. As one national representative noted,

¹² especially considering Turkey's control of the Bosphorus

“geopolitical factors are always a consideration” (interview, 1 April 2014) in international affairs. In consequence, they can invariably be seen as rationales for most international behaviours and do not offer much insight in and of themselves. In such manner, Turkey’s OECD membership – and the continued existence of the OECD – should be considered in terms other than geo-strategic factors.

Indeed, most of the founder countries conveyed some form of respect for the OECD’s soft power influence. For example, they commented that the OECD has “global relevance and impact” (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014) and that “authorities take good notice of OECD studies” (interview with national delegate, 1 October 2014). Considering this notion of influence more carefully, one realises that the OECD countries as a group have tremendous soft power influence in the world given their historical positions as colonisers and empires. Indeed, all of the OECD founder countries had empires except for six member states: Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.¹³ Turkey, therefore, being part of a long-standing former world empire (the Ottoman Empire), has much knowledge and experience to contribute to the OECD group. While the country is valuable for its strategic location, this study posits that Turkey is invaluable to the OECD as a member state with soft power influence in several world regions (in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East). As discussed in chapter four, Turkey is often portrayed in the West as being *weak* and *ailing*, when in fact, Turkey is actually a very successful nation state.

Thus, accepting these hypotheses, the Republic of Turkey was included among the OECD’s founding membership due to its political identity as a participant in the Marshall Plan and European recovery in addition to its political and economic ties with its fellow OEEC members. Furthermore, as a

¹³ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UK, and the USA all have had empires.

long-standing former world empire (the Ottoman Empire) and as a successful nation state, Turkey has a great deal of knowledge and experience that it brings to the OECD. Turkey is also esteemed for its soft power influence in several world regions.

Relating this to the primary research question – *why does the OECD exist? What is its added value to the international economic architecture?* – it seems that the OECD has continued value for its political identity and association with the Marshall Plan and European recovery, not to mention the Organisation’s soft power influence in the world. This alludes to another aspect that distinguishes the OECD from its counterpart institutions: shared heritage.

The OECD has its origins in the Marshall Plan and European recovery, which over time, have become part of an idealised history and model of economic performance (as explained in chapter one). To this extent, the OECD acts as a frame of reference for nation states, helping to define their place in the world (Woodward, 2009: 63). It is simultaneously a form of national heritage (desired national history) and a form of shared heritage (desired common history). For members that are selected into the elite OECD grouping and wanting to distinguish themselves through commemorating the occasion of their acceptance,¹⁴ the OECD forms part of their national heritage; whereas, for member states that draw upon the OECD’s interdependent (group) identity, the OECD and the Marshall Plan form part of their shared heritage. The OECD effectively maintains the legacy of the Marshall Plan, upholding it as a rationale for economic development.

¹⁴ Japan is a good example. In 2014, the country celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its accession to the OECD. The Japanese Postal Corporation issued two stamps in commemoration of the occasion – one depicting the Château de la Muette, the OECD’s beautiful headquarters in Paris, and the other portraying the Organisation’s economic mission (Japan Philatelic Society Foundation, 2014). The stamps attest to the Japanese government’s special emphasis upon the milestone (communication with senior official, 18 April 2014). For Japan, OECD accession acts as “a symbol of the completion of the reconstruction from World War II and of re-joining the renowned developed countries” (ibid).

The OECD creates a common post-war narrative based upon key values (liberal democracy and market freedom) and norms (co-operation and development), with the former Axis Powers collaborating with the Allied Powers (Sullivan, 1997). More importantly, in establishing a shared past, member states have established a common future based upon the mutual goals of progress and prosperity (ibid). They have also forged a common identity as a group of modern (*advanced*) nation states (Hancock, 2008). It is this unified identity that is important to the research question.

When the OECD was established, Europe had a long history of war (between nations and social classes) and persecution of races and religions (Ashworth & Larkham, 1994: 4). Quite literally, the European identity had been shaped by war (Heffernan, 1998; Van Gorp & Renes, 2007: 413). Following World War II, Europe had the status of being “the most violent and war-torn of the earth’s regions” (Heffernan, 1998: 91).¹⁵ In fact, the very word “Europe” came into political use as part of a wider discussion about war (ibid: 92), and many European elite believed that war was a medium for human and social progress (Nef, 1950; Heffernan, 1998).

The OECD’s common identity based upon co-operation helped to change these perceptions of the past.¹⁶ After all, the OEEC/OECD was the first post-war European organisation for economic co-operation – the first attempt to regulate and stabilise social order in Europe (Hallstein, 1963: 15; Risse-Kappen, 1995: 491; Wegs & Ladrech, 2006: 121). Essentially, the shared heritage of the OECD helped to further transition the European identity from one shaped by war to one framed by collaboration (Van Gorp & Renes, 2007). More so than material gain, this new, co-operative identity affirmed the moral worth of the group,

¹⁵ The Second World War is considered to have been the bloodiest war in history, with over sixty million people killed (Morella, 2008: 5).

¹⁶ This new identity paralleled the European sense of post-war self-change after countries were extensively rebuilt (Lindemann, 2013: 344). Before the war, Europeans had a *loose* sense of common identity through the Concert of Nations and centuries of *Christendom* (ibid: 345).

bestowing members with a sense of purpose and pride. The notion of interdependence became established in public memory, situating OECD countries with respect to a more peaceful future (Sullivan, 1997; Rothman, 2012).

Countries can collectively fulfil their identity needs through co-operation, keeping in mind the fact that (social) identity is something that needs to be assured and re-assured in order to foster a sense of self (Erikson, 1968, 1974; Brown, 1988). Identity reinforcement is not a zero-sum game (Risse, 2002: 78). One country can fulfil its identity needs at the same time as another, and even more so if they are jointly reinforcing a shared identity (Wendt, 1994; Risse, 2002, 2003). This is especially true of former adversaries (Rothman, 2012). They can jointly create a narrative emphasising co-operation as a means to develop their new sense of identity, helping to overcome their former animosities (ibid). Together, they can dignify their identities and promote a sense of worth derived from their group membership (Brown, 1988) and built upon mutual respect (Fearon, 1999: 2; Rothman, 2012).

Turkey can, thus, be seen as an invaluable partner in fostering a post-war shared heritage of co-operation. Not only did the Turks have a reputation for *terrifying* other Europeans, including Austrians, but the nation has also been well known for its military strength (as established in chapter four). As an OEEC/OECD partner, Turkey could there upon be seen as beneficial in enhancing the European post-war image of co-operation.¹⁷ Ironically, therefore, despite Turkey's negative reputation for human rights and social welfare, the country has been able to positively contribute to the OECD (and European post-war shared heritage) simply by way of its lengthy militant past.

¹⁷ OECD members are expected to observe and uphold the normative understanding that democracies do not fight each other (Russett, 1993: 5). Since World War II, use of force has generally become considered an unacceptable response to disputes between democracies (ibid: 42; Farber & Gowa, 1995: 125).

Turkey as OECD Member

Turkey has many problems in defining its level of development and its position at the international level (communication with unnamed Turkish academic, 6 January 2016). It is at once both an advanced developing country (*emerging economy*) and a long-time leading world nation. What is more, Turkey's cultural and political practices challenge the fundamental values of the OECD,¹⁸ especially with regards to liberal democracy. In fact, the situation of Turkey demonstrates the problems in qualifying a country as a *liberal democracy* and an *advanced economy*, in as much as the concepts are subjective and open to interpretation, both politically and economically. They are also highly relative and, therefore, need to be examined within a particular cultural context. Cultural perceptions (such as being *eastern* versus *western* or *developed* versus *developing*) do not necessarily correspond with lived realities and often blind researchers to the actual circumstances of a country (interview with academic, 18 March 2014). In this way, while it is easy to criticise Turkey for being *undemocratic* and *underdeveloped*, one must look beyond such categorisations in order to understand what qualities Turkey *brings* to the OECD.

Ultimately, this study has determined that Turkey does not pose a serious anomaly to OECD (founding) membership. While Turkey is questionable as a liberal democracy and an advanced economy, the country shares similar valuations of the OECD as other founding members. Like its peers, Turkey expressed value for the OECD's role as an educator, as well as the OECD's role in scientific innovation and in cultivating social relations, such as with the *Key Partners* (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014). Turkey also expressed its dedication to economic co-operation and development – the founding aims of the OECD. Turkey spoke of its history in

¹⁸ For most of the OECD's history, Turkey has displayed only a superficial commitment to the Organisation's fundamental values.

complying with OECD recommendations and indicated its desire to collaborate with OECD peers (ibid).

How Turkey differs from its OECD peers is in the manner that it characterises itself (as an OECD member) and in how it perceives of the OECD's role in the world. In other words, Turkey is dissimilar in the way that it approaches its relationship with the OECD. In fact, during the interview, the Turkish officials spent a great deal of time trying to qualify Turkey's identity and its place in the world vis-à-vis the OECD. The other founder countries did not act this way and did not find it necessary to explain their identities to the interviewer. Moreover, Turkey was the only founder country that characterised itself by defining its level of economic growth.¹⁹ The Turkish officials appeared to invoke Turkey's history of economic growth as justification for Turkey's OECD membership and as proof that the OECD had helped Turkey to develop its potential (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014).

Relatedly, Turkey was the only founder country that characterised itself as being *strong* – one of “the strongest economies in the world” (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014). None of the other original OECD member states referred to themselves (or their economies) in this manner. Spain did invoke the word *strength*; however, this was not in reference to itself, but rather, in regards to the *strengthened co-operation* brought about by the OECD (as discussed in section 5.2). Hence, Turkey appears to characterise itself in a manner different than the other OECD founder countries.

Additionally, Turkey seems to perceive of the OECD and its role in a markedly different manner from its OECD peers. Figure 6.1 compares the various expressions used by the founder countries when making reference to the OECD. As can be seen, there is a perceptible difference between how Turkey and its peers express value for the OECD. The expressions of the

¹⁹ Belgium did, however, mention its post-war phenomenon as *the Belgian Miracle*, but it did not specify any particular levels of economic growth (interview with national official).

continental Europeans and the North Americans have been separated from that of Turkey in order to allow for generalisations to be drawn more readily.

As can be seen in Figure 6.1, Turkey alluded to the OECD in utilitarian terms (as *a tool*); whereas, the more central continental European countries used language that connotes structure and stability (such as *platform, house, support, and structure*), possibly stemming from the OECD's origins in European post-war reconstruction. The North American members, on the other hand, employed speech that refers not only to competition but also to affiliation and linkage, likely arising from their trans-Atlantic perspective of the Organisation. Therefore, while both the North American and the continental European members employed terminology reflecting social (group-based) notions of the OECD, Turkey expressed a singular view of the OECD by referring to it as *a tool*.

Figure 6.1-How delegates perceive the OECD's role in the world

| <u>Member States</u> | <u>References to the OECD</u> |
|-----------------------|---|
| Turkey | <i>a tool</i> |
| Continental Europeans | <i>a platform for benchmarking (structural policies)</i> <i>a house of rules for developed economies</i> <i>an irreplaceable support for the G20 process</i> <i>a body to start dialogue</i> <i>one of the structures of European post-war reconstruction</i> |
| North Americans | <i>the best practices club</i> <i>an independent, neutral organisation</i> <i>an institution that allows countries to come together and compare their public policies</i> |

Turkey perceives of the OECD as a tool, and this characterisation reflects its own national aspirations in helping to found the OECD in the early 1960s. At the time, Turkey saw itself as “part of the western world” (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014) following Atatürk’s modernisation reforms. It wanted to be seen as a western country. Helping to found the OECD was “a way to enhance this” (ibid). For Turkey, OECD membership was something to be used for a specific purpose. Indeed, by joining the OECD, Turkey could align itself with North America and Western Europe in the post-war era and still maintain its national sovereignty.²⁰ It could also be seen as a modernising country – a country in the *status of becoming* rather than a country in the *status of being*. Turkey’s valuations of the OECD reflect these goals for modernisation. Turkish officials expressed some of the highest regard for the OECD’s technological aspect as well as for the OECD’s ability to encourage the country to develop to its potential (as specified in chapter four). In point of fact, Turkish officials continue to portray their country in the *status of becoming*. Rather than using language to express Turkey’s current rate of economic growth, they adopted language to indicate Turkey’s future level of economic growth, noting that Turkey “is projected to have one of the highest growth rates among OECD countries for many years to come” (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014).

Though the Republic has been coloured by a history of problems with capitalism, democracy, and human rights, its OECD membership has been one way for Turkey to sport a more liberal identity and to reinforce its image as a *developing* country while still being considered a *leading* world nation.²¹ All considered, Turkey has good reasons for wanting to be characterised as a

²⁰ Similar to the case of Luxembourg, which was concerned about preserving its national identity and not being *erased from the map* (interview with national delegate), Turkey has perceived its identity to be under threat since the *Treaty of Sèvres* (1920). The country has been wary of being further carved up and obliterated by outsiders (as discussed in chapter four).

²¹ by being recognised as a less-fully developed member of a *leading* group of states

developing country. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is one example. When the Convention came into force in 1994, Turkey was listed alongside the other OECD founder countries in Annex II, which requires the signatories (developed countries) to assist developing countries in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Turkey asked for special recognition of its circumstances, and as of 2002, it is only listed in Annex I (as an economy in transition). Rather than having to *provide* financial and technological assistance to developing countries, Turkey is able to *receive* financial, technological, and capacity-building support in implementing the Convention.²²

Thus, for Turkey, OECD membership has helped to maintain the legacy of Atatürk and his goals for modernisation, including by way of the OECD's structural assistance, world-class policy advice, and peer-to-peer feedback. It perceives of the OECD as a tool – something to be accessed when needed. This helps to explain Turkey's lack of participation in the Organisation during the Cold War period. Turkey wanted to be seen as a Western country, and OECD membership was "a way to enhance this" (interview with national delegate, 24 September 2014). Nevertheless, Turkey also wanted to be seen as a developing country – a country in the *status of becoming* rather than a country in the *status of being*. In the post-Cold War period, Turkey is playing an active role in the OECD, demonstrating that the Organisation is more than an *economic counterpart to NATO*. The case of Turkey testifies to the OECD being important for socially reflecting members' goals and for associating members with modernisation.

6.3-Conclusion: The OECD's Role in the World

²² See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change- unfccc -and- the-kyoto-protocol.en.mfa> and <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/tp/03.pdf> for more details.

By way of conclusion, the viewpoints of the founder countries offer an outstanding opportunity to test the five-pronged (cognitive, normative, legal, palliative, and scientific) model of the OECD's role in the world, which has been further developed in chapter three.

Not surprisingly, the interviewees overwhelmingly expressed an appreciation for the OECD's normative role in the world. This accords with Woodward's judgment that the OECD's normative aspect is the "most important element" (2009: 64) of the model.

To be certain, a couple of the continental European countries remarked upon the OECD's important role in creating law – soft law (interview with national delegates, 1 October 2014; 17 October 2014), and several of the interviewees commented upon the OECD's *irreplaceable* support for the G20 process (interviews, 1 April 2014; 22 September 2014; 23 October 2014; 18 November 2014; 28 November 2014), thereby alluding to the OECD's palliative role in the world. Furthermore, the small powers (typically the intercontinental European countries) as well as the countries with less fully developed economies expressed appreciation for the OECD's scientific role in the world (as detailed in section 5.2).

However, apart from Turkey, there was surprisingly little acknowledgment among the founder countries of the OECD's cognitive role in the world. In fact, none of the founder countries expressly mentioned the OECD's two founding (organising) values – liberal democracy and free market capitalism. These values could have been taken for granted as understood benefits of OECD membership and, therefore, not expressly recognised. Were this study conducted during the Cold War years; however, it is presumable that the ideational (cognitive) role of the OECD would have figured more prominently among the interview responses, with democracy and capitalism more top of mind.

At any rate, the founder countries expressed the greatest value for the principal norms and constitutive rules of the OECD – namely *sharing* (co-operation) and *learning* (development) – thereby emphasising the OECD’s normative role in the world. In the post-Cold War era, therefore, there does not seem to be strong valuation for the OECD’s aspirational role in the world; whereas, there is strong valuation for the OECD’s normative role in the world, given the greater playing field brought about by globalisation. This impression is supported by the feedback of one interviewee, who expressed concern for ensuring that the *Emerging Economies* are also following OECD rules and principles “in their global interactions with other Emerging Economies” (interview with national representative, 1 April 2014).

In the end, a couple of the interviewees mentioned that the OECD appears to be struggling to define itself in the post-Cold War period, and they acknowledged that it is not good to have lots of overlap between the main international organisations (interview with national delegates, 20 October 2014; 23 October 2014). Nevertheless, none of the founder countries complained that the OECD lacks value. Overall, this foretells a continued role for the OECD in the world.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Coincidentally, attitudes about the value of the OECD have evolved in tandem with the thesis. When the thesis was at the proposal stage, there was a general understanding amongst trade officials that the OECD would soon become irrelevant in favour of the United Nations taking over (much of) its work (communication with senior official, 5 January 2012). Now that the thesis is in its final stage, felicitously, this no longer seems to be the case. The work of the OECD appears to be even more pertinent today, less than a decade after the 2007 global recession, at a time when governments are still trying to come to terms with the European sovereign debt crisis. With the future of the Eurozone project, and even the European Union itself, in question, the OECD's policy work no longer gives the impression of being superfluous. Indeed, considering the strained relations (and more limited forms of co-operation) between Russia and the USA, following the former's annexation of Crimea, co-operative endeavours between traditional OECD partners have renewed meaning.

By way of ending, this chapter offers a brief summary of the preceding chapters before revisiting the main research question. It, then, draws together key findings from the study in order to reach a conclusion. Overall, the chapter puts forward a new way of looking at the OECD and *soft governance* international organisations in general. In addition to this, it identifies areas of future research, culminating in the suggestion of a new hypothesis, which can be tested by others.

7.1-Summary of Chapters

Before reflecting upon the main research question, it is helpful to recollect key

ideas put forward in the preceding chapters – a direction to which this section now turns.

Chapter one has provided a historical basis for the OECD, showing that as a concept the OECD spans more than one organisation: it began as a plan (the Marshall Plan); emerged as a conference (the Conference for European Economic Co-operation); took shape as a committee (the Committee of European Economic Co-operation); matured into another international organisation (the OEEC), before being reconstituted as the OECD.

Chapter two has argued that a *subjectivist* (constructivist) approach is more appropriate than a rationalist approach for investigating shared understandings that actors have about the world in that it emphasises the importance of *collective knowledge* as well as the role of choice and interpretation in international politics. Rather than supposing international behaviours to be predetermined by interests, constructivism enables outcomes to be explained by way of broader correlations (than rationalist paradigms).

Chapter three has proposed that the OECD plays a significant (but underappreciated) role in scientific governance, teaching a mind-set about how science and technology can contribute to economic development and prosperity. Following World War II, alongside UNESCO, the OECD was one of the first international organisations to actively promote the governance of science in the world, establishing technical innovation as a benchmark.

Chapter four has found that Turkey challenges common notions of the OECD due to its authoritarian tendencies, erratic economy, and dramatic social inequalities. Consequentially, when describing the value of the OECD, Turkish officials did not mention *democracy*, *capitalism*, or *social welfare*. Instead, they expressed appreciation for the OECD's technical (scientific) aspect and for the OECD's ability to *draw out potential* that exists in countries, attributing an educating role to the Organisation.

Chapter five has exhibited a diversity of ideas that the founder countries have about the nature of the OECD. At the same time, it has illustrated their relative similarity of views about the value of the Organisation. Like Turkey, none of the other founder countries mentioned *democracy* or (free market) *capitalism* when speaking about the value of the OECD, but a few did mention the importance of the OECD's concern for social welfare. The chapter has identified a tendency among the small powers and members that have undertaken structural reforms to treat the OECD as an autonomous actor in its own right.

Chapter six has specified that in addition to being an economic organisation, the OECD is a political organisation, a social organisation, and a scientific body. Heritage is what distinguishes the OECD from its counterpart institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO), which have more universal membership. The OECD, with its origins in the Marshall Plan, has become part of an idealised history and shared identity of economic growth, which defines members' select position in the world, all the while affirming their moral worth as a group with respect to a more peaceful (shared) future.

7.2-Why does the OECD exist?

Enquiry into the main research question has revealed that the actual puzzle is not why the OECD exists but, rather, why the OECD continues to exist (beyond the need to promote democracy and capitalism as organising principles in the world). In other words, why does the OECD continue to exist¹ beyond the confines of the Cold War?

Most significantly, the study has found that the OECD is not simply an economic organisation. It is also **a social organisation**. Social relations are at the

¹ See Susan Strange (1998)'s categorical question: Why do international organizations never die?

basis of the Organisation, making the OECD's diplomatic aspect also quite important. This is what gives the OECD *added value* among its counterpart institutions. In fact, when asked about the value of the OECD, the founder countries expressed the most value for social features of the Organisation, such as networking.² In this way, it is not so easy to simply let the OECD become irrelevant by cause of social relations being at the crux of the Organisation. The OECD is creditable for the sort of relations that it cultivates, namely economic co-operation and development alongside peers. Member states have learnt to relate to each other in this manner over several decades, and the OECD symbolises their social pact.

Moreover, the study has found that member states value the OECD as an educator (an adviser, facilitator, and mentor) – a role that has given the OECD continued relevance over the years.³ At once, the OECD is able to make (sound) recommendations based upon the skilled expertise of its Secretariat and encourage member states to learn from each other through peer-to-peer exchanges. The OECD is credited with being able to recognise and cultivate (economic) potential. Governments look to the OECD for advice on economic growth and structural reform. Basically, the Organisation is a specialist in its own right.

Unlike most international organisations, the OECD was not an empty arena when it was established. It already had a bureaucracy in place, which had been carried over from its predecessor institution, the OEEC, under the direction of Secretary General Kristensen (who was appointed Secretary General of the OEEC and Secretary General designate of the OECD in July of

² As previously acknowledged, it is natural that the interviewees (who are primarily diplomats) would express regard for the *social* aspect of the OECD. Nevertheless, the finding is significant in that all of the interviewees (unanimously) expressed appreciation for the social aspect of the Organisation (more so than the economic aspect) despite many of the interviewees being economic and trade officials.

³ Similar arguments have been made about the European Union and the United Nations, facilitating an *educational turn* (Kaiser, 2012) for international organisations.

1960). In this way, the OECD already had a set way of doing things (institutional norms and values) and its own working culture – a culture of international experts. The OEEC had built up authoritative expertise based upon its history of success⁴ in helping (Western) European countries to co-operate and to develop their economies as part of the overall post-war European *long boom*. It had amassed considerable knowledge about the policies and practices of its member states in addition to a set of proven techniques (most notably peer review, peer pressure, and best practices) for achieving its goals and creating a *common ground* among members. To such a degree, the OECD inherited from the OEEC a highly skilled staff and a series of techniques and approaches in addition to a wealth of data. Its status as a pre-existing organisation, thereby, endowed it with the capacities and knowledge to be valued as an authority in its own right (with the member states looking to *it* for direction).

Nevertheless, the OECD does not just exist in and of itself. There is a growing body of literature acknowledging that the OECD is one part of a transnational network of international organisations. Furthermore, the OECD's pre-existing status means that it advances a narrative of successful European and trans-Atlantic co-operation, building upon the shared heritage of the OEEC and the Marshall Plan. In so doing, the OECD helps to maintain peace by fostering dialogue and, thus, greater understanding among member states. It also serves to recast the European identity from one shaped by war (conflict) to one framed by collaboration (co-operation), endowing its member states with a *moral* sense of purpose as champions of economic and social progress. Therefore, the OECD *adds value* today (among the main international organisations) by carrying forward a successful history of trans-Atlantic co-operation and the shared heritage of the Marshall Plan.

⁴ The OEEC gained recognition for liberalising trade and successfully establishing a European Payments Union.

Ironically, at the same time, the OECD is also the perfect example of an international organisation having power in its own right. While the literature frequently alludes to the OECD having *influence*, there is still a general impression that *power* resides with the member states, which fund and constitute the Organisation, thereby keeping it in operation. The OECD is considered to be the antithesis of hard power. Compared with its counterpart institutions, the OECD doesn't have its own funding capabilities, and it doesn't have the ability to (directly) sanction countries. Rather, the OECD is seen as a tool for its members – most commonly as a forum, but also as a platform for benchmarking and as a (reliable) source of data. However, due to the OECD's status as a pre-existing organisation that, in fact, preceded the membership of two of its founder countries (Canada and the USA), the thesis argues that the OECD has always enjoyed a position of authority that gives it power over its members, much like a teacher. The OECD's knowledge, capabilities, and experience are too great for it to be simply a tool. The OECD is more than a forum or a repository of data. It is an independent authority in its own right.

Indeed, this notion of the OECD having its own power arose spontaneously in discussion with the founder countries among those that had experienced significant structural reforms. They had worked directly with the OECD to bring about these adjustments and were, thus, very aware of the OECD's power to convince and to effect change. During the interviews, these countries specifically mentioned the OECD having the *power* to request information (of member states) as well as the *power* to make recommendations (with the expectation that they be taken into consideration). Based upon their first-hand experiences, the OECD has much more than influence. They perceive of the OECD as an organisation able to exert pressure.

7.3-Contribution of the Thesis

In this way, the study has found that *soft governance* international organisations like the OECD are also capable of autonomous power. An international organisation does not have to be a bank or have sanctioning abilities in order to have *real* power. Though the OECD is often derided as being little more than a *think tank* or a *talking shop*, these phrase names do not capture the OECD's authoritative aspect. The OECD does not just act through its member states. It has its own Secretariat of international professionals and a long-standing bureaucracy. The interviews with the founder countries have led to the understanding that the OECD is better appreciated as an *educator* – an authoritative expert in a position of power. The **doctoral contribution to knowledge** that this thesis makes, therefore, is that international organisations (even *soft governance* IOs) can have independent power distinct from that conferred by member states.

The OECD's pre-existing status is such that its authority predates the full participation of its members. It has a long history of developing its own techniques and expertise. Its world knowledge coupled with its extensive network of contacts (especially partner institutions) means that it is able to *pressurise* (strongly urge or put the squeeze on) countries when it feels the need, including when it wishes to urge them to enact structural changes. It may be convenient for the big powers to allude to international organisations in a rationalist fashion and treat them as utilitarian entities to be acted upon; however, this is only one perspective (albeit the dominant one). The OECD's membership is special in including small and middle powers amongst its selective grouping. When these smaller member states are given the chance to speak, they communicate a different perspective of international organisations such as the OECD, and this perspective is one of coercion – being strongly encouraged to adopt particular courses of action. This finding is significant for

lobbying efforts. If, over time, an image develops of international organisations (even *soft* IOs) having *real* power distinct from that conferred upon them by member states, then lobbyists can redirect more of their attention to *soft governance* international organisations like the OECD.

Moreover, the thesis presents a new puzzle about Turkey. While the literature contains several puzzles about Turkey's EU and NATO memberships, for instance, Turkey's OECD membership has been neglected by academics. Based upon archival research and face-to-face interviews with Turkish officials, the study offers a new way of understanding the country: as one often depicted in the West as weak and ailing but one that sees itself as (economically) strong, and becoming stronger, after undertaking Atatürk's modernisation reforms, and opening itself up to the world under the guidance of the OECD. The puzzle of Turkey's (founding) OECD membership can, in part, be explained by Turkey perceiving of itself as European and part of the trans-Atlantic as well as Turkey's extensive soft power in several world regions.

7.4-Significance for International Politics

When the thesis was in its initial stages, the intention of the study was to inquire into the nature of the international economic order, given Turkey's (founding) OECD membership. Turkey was to be a case study for examining how the *Old Guard* (the post-World War II economic order) could include at its foundation a country with a tenuous history of democracy and capitalism as well as an apparent disregard for social well-being. However, the study has since discovered how exceptional the OECD is for including a Middle Eastern and majority Muslim country like Turkey among its founding membership. The gesture attests to the Organisation's progressive spirit, and is deserving of respect.

The thesis acknowledges that Turkey is a secular republic. The country has not been isolated as a case study because its population is majority Muslim. Likewise, Turkey has not been isolated as a case study because it is (partly) a Middle Eastern country. Nevertheless, the review of the literature has found that Muslim and Middle Eastern countries are often left out of decision-making positions in international organisations because these countries are not regarded as democratic. Therefore, it would be wrong to encourage further alienation by urging for a country like Turkey to be excluded from the OECD – an organisation that focuses on issues that bring countries together, rather than issues that keep countries apart. This argument also fits with revisionist scholarship in International Studies, which seeks to problematize established views of the East, especially the Orient (Hobson, 2004), and decolonise international organisations and their practices (Grovoqui, 1996; Anghie, 2006).

At a time when there are many political tensions in the Middle East and many political tensions about religion in the world, the thesis simply wishes to draw awareness to the fact that there is a prominent international organisation (the OECD) that has always included a Middle Eastern and majority Muslim country among its membership. The OECD demonstrates that geographic region and religion do not preclude co-operation. This represents the way forward for other international organisations.

7.5-Areas of Future Research

In exploring what makes the OECD unique, the thesis has limited its in-person research to a study of what the *founder* countries value about the Organisation. Notwithstanding, the thesis intends to serve as the basis for a much larger project concerning (future) membership of the OECD. Many observers claim the OECD to be at a critical juncture in terms of enlargement, as specified in chapter one. They are concerned that the OECD will lose its relevance and

legitimacy if it doesn't enlarge. Contrarily, they feel that the OECD could lose its status and character if it does enlarge (especially if it admits countries that do not espouse the full values of the Organisation). Seeing that the thesis has focused on the points of view of the OECD *founder* countries, a complementary study into the **attitudes of prospective member states** would be welcome in order to discern why they are interested in joining the Organisation more than fifty years after it has been established and despite the substantial reforms (administrative, economic, legal, and the like) mandated by the process of OECD accession. Such insight would inform whether the views of prospective member states differ from those of the founder countries. More to the point, the study would distinguish what it is that forthcoming members value about OECD membership for the sake of assessing if these ambitions would recast the quintessential character of the Organisation.

There are currently four countries undertaking the accession process to join the OECD: Colombia, Costa Rica, Latvia, and Lithuania.⁵ None of these countries seems to embody the OECD tenet for both *like-mindedness* and being a *significant player*. Apart from Colombia,⁶ the four are not remarkable for the size of their economies, and Colombia has another impasse, in that its dedication to democracy is questionable.⁷ It would, therefore, be constructive to collect another data sample using the views of these four countries regarding their valuation of the OECD.

⁵ On 29 May 2013, The OECD entered into accession discussions with Colombia and Latvia, and on 9 April 2015, the Organisation opened accession discussions with Costa Rica and Latvia. As of 16 September 2015, Lithuania has reached the final stage of the accession process. Further details are available via the OECD's website at <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/enlargement.htm>

⁶ Colombia, nevertheless, is considered to be a *developing* country, with a population of about 50 million people (48.93 million). It now ranks among the upper middle-income countries, yet it has a poverty level of more than 30 per cent (30.6%). See the World Bank's development indicators for a profile of the country: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia>

⁷ Similar to the Republic of Turkey, Colombia is nominally a representative democracy (with regular, national elections), but its history of military rule and weak human rights (not to mention terrible civic violence) make it more of an *incomplete democracy* rather than a model democracy (Dix, 1980; Taylor, 2009).

The case of Turkey shows that the OECD is not a uniform group. The Organisation has always included member states that appear to be intrinsically different; hence, the nature of the OECD is such that it is built upon diversity, so further enlargement should not pose a barrier. The OECD's value lies in its ability to bring together large and small countries alike (*on equal terms at the table*) so that they can share their problems and learn from each other's experiences. Furthermore, not all OECD work pertains to every member state,⁸ so countries have some flexibility regarding the degree to which they choose to participate in the Organisation. Turkey has exemplified this, in that the country did not actively participate in the OECD for the first few decades. The case of Turkey thus demonstrates that future enlargement should not prove catastrophic, though qualitative interviews with prospective member states will help to explore this.

Relatedly, the broadening scope of the OECD means that the private sector is now increasingly impacted by the Organisation's policies,⁹ making it timely to conduct study into **what large corporations value** about the OECD and its work as well. Among the founder countries, it was the Netherlands that raised this point. The Head of Delegation pointed out that companies are paying increasingly more attention to the OECD as an organisation that creates *soft law* by causing the OECD to provide guidelines for corporate conduct, addressing such sensitive behaviours as bribery and corruption. Overall, the OECD is becoming more interesting for corporations to follow (interview with national representative, 17 October 2014). This seems reason enough to approach the various Chambers of Commerce of OECD countries to gain their

⁸ Historically speaking, this has always been the case; for instance, Iceland is not a member of the EU, and, therefore, does not participate in OECD work relating to the EU.

⁹ Due to neoliberal reforms (the increasing privatisation of public goods and services), the corporate sector is also more involved in public governance and, therefore, increasingly impacted by the OECD's policies.

members' views about the OECD and its work. Research into the future course of the OECD should not ignore the value judgments of the corporate sector.

Last but not least, considering that the notion of the OECD having (independent) power arose spontaneously during the interviews with the founder countries, it is a subject worthy of more extended enquiry in and of itself. The view was expressed by those founder countries that have undertaken significant structural reforms. It would, therefore, be beneficial to **survey all OECD founder countries that have undertaken significant structural reforms** in order to elicit their views regarding the OECD and power. Likewise, the same could be done with countries in the process of accession to the OECD, as they are usually required to undertake domestic reforms as part of the accession process. A study to elicit their views about the OECD and power would also be telling. The research need not be limited to the OECD, however. The same type of investigation could be conducted with other *soft governance* international organisations and international organisations that have robust secretariats.

Concluding Hypothesis

Having adopted a *hypothesis-generating case study*, which not only seeks to test the original hypotheses but also to produce new hypotheses inductively, the thesis concludes by putting forward the new hypothesis:

The OECD has independent (hard and soft) power distinct from that conferred by member states.

7.6-Closing Allegory

The thesis began with an allegory, reflecting upon how acts of selection are often made to seem random or natural when, in fact, they are meticulously calculated and constructed as such. By way of conclusion, the chapter returns to

the experimental art work of Martin Creed and his solo exhibition at the Hayward Gallery in London.

Having explored the nature of one important socio-economic grouping, the OECD, the thesis is in a position to better understand Creed's statements and to appreciate the relations that he physically constructs between entities. His groupings are, in fact, part of his message.

Creed brings together diverse – yet similar – items, arranging them so that they act in unison. In so doing, the objects take on new meaning, rather than simply being entities onto themselves. Together, as a group, they form a new entity that has its own symbolic value.

One fun example within the exhibit was Creed's grouping of cacti. He playfully turned a variety of different cactuses into cacti by arranging them so that they were in unison. Each separate entity was a cactus (of varying forms and heights), derived from different parts of the world. All of the cactuses were arranged in a line, progressing from the smallest to the tallest. The arrangement formed a new grouping: cacti. Together as a group, the cactuses were stronger than as separate entities. Simultaneously, the distinct forms of each cactus became all the more apparent from within the arrangement. Therefore, despite their diversity, the cacti illustrated that there is beauty in harmony and, thus, unity in diversity.

References Cited

The following sources are listed in the order of the Latin alphabet. They are not phonetically listed in the order of the Turkish alphabet. For example, <ş> (s-cedilla) is recorded under <s> rather than <shh>. Every effort has been made to retain Turkish spellings; nevertheless, sources are presented in the same way that they are referenced in the English literature.

- K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal (2000) 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance' *International Organization*, 54(3), 421-456
- J. D. Aberbach and B.O. Rockman (2002) 'Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews' *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35(4), 673-676
- D. Acemoglu and M. Üçer (2015) 'Why Turkish Growth Ended: An Institutional Perspective,' 18 November, <http://www.voxeu.org/article/why-turkish-growth-ended> (accessed on 19 November 2015)
- Z. Acer (2009) 'A Series of Studies for Proving the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire: The Reform Edict Sample' *Ozean Journal of Social Sciences*, 2(2), 89-96
- A. Adamopoulos (2015) 'OECD Proposes Ban of Draft Tsipouro in Greece' *Greek Reporter*, 20 July 2015
- J. Adams (2005) 'The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe' in C. Camic, P. S. Gorski, and D. M. Trubek, eds., *Max Weber's Economy and Society: A Critical Companion* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) 237-266
- S. Adar (2007) 'Turkey: Reform in Social Security' *Journal of European Social Policy*, 17(2), 167-168
- M. Adas (1989) *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)
- E. Adler (1997) 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics' *European Journal of International Relations*, 3, 319-363
- C. C. Aggarwal (2013) *Outlier Analysis* (London, UK: Kluwer Academic Publishers)
- F. Ahmad (1993) *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London, UK: Routledge)
- F. Ahmad (2014) *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, 2nd ed. (London, UK: One World Publications)

- S. Akçomak and S. Parto (2006) 'How "Black" is the Black Sheep Compared to All Others? Turkey and the EU' *United Nations University Working Paper Series*, 24, 1-37
- H. Akil (2015) Message de l'Ambassadeur, <http://paris.emb.mfa.gov.tr/AmbassadorsMessage.aspx> (accessed on 22 May 2015)
- F. K. Akkoyunlu (2014) *The Rise and Fall of the Hybrid Regime: Guardianship and Democracy in Iran and Turkey*. PhD Thesis Submitted at the London School of Economics and Political Science. London, UK
- K. Aksu, ed. (2013) *Turkey: A Regional Power in the Making* (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing)
- C. C. Aktan (1997) 'Turkey: From Etatism to a More Liberal Economy' *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, 22(2), 165-182
- M. Akyol (2011) *Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.)
- Y. Akyüz and K. Boratav (2002) 'The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis' *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Discussion Papers*, 158, 31 March
- A. Alesina and R. Perotti (1994) 'The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of the Recent Literature' *The World Bank Economic Review*, 8(3), 351-371
- B. Algan (2008) 'The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey' *German Law Journal*, 9(12), 2237-2251
- J. E. Alvarez (2008) 'Governing the World: International Organizations as Lawmakers' *Suffolk Transnational Law Review*, 31(3), 591-618
- S. M. Amadae (2003) *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press)
- Amnesty International (2015) *Report 2014/15: The State of the World's Human Rights* (London, UK: Amnesty International Ltd)
- A. Anghie (2006) 'Decolonizing the Concept of "Good Governance"' in B. Gruffydd Jones, ed., *Decolonizing International Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), 109-130
- Y. Arat (2000) 'Gender and Citizenship in Turkey' in S. Joseph, ed., *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press) 275-287
- Y. Arat (2009) *Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: Implications of a Democratic Paradox* (Berlin, DE: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development [UNRISD] and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung)
- M. S. Archer and J. Q. Tritter, eds. (2000) *Rational Choice Theory* (London, UK: Routledge)
- H. Arikan (2006) *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited)

- K. Armingeon and M. Beyeler, eds., (2004) *The OECD and European Welfare States* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar)
- Z. Arslan (2007) 'Turkey's Bid for the New Constitution' *Insight Turkey*, 9(3), 7-17
- W. Arts and J. Gelissen (2002) 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report' *Journal of European Social Policy*, 12(2), 137-158
- C. Arvanitopoulos (2009) *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy* (Heidelberg, DE: Springer-Verlag)
- W. Asbeek Brusse and R. T. Griffiths (1997) 'Exploring the OEEC's Past: The Potentials and the Sources' in R. T. Griffiths, ed., *Explorations in OEEC History* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing), 15-32
- G. J. Ashworth and P. J. Larkham (1994) *Building a New Heritage: Tourism, Culture and Identity in the New Europe* (London, UK: Routledge)
- E. Athanassopoulou (1999) *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass Publishers)
- H. G. Aubrey (1967) *Atlantic Economic Cooperation: The Case of the OECD* (New York, NY: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations)
- R. Axelrod and R.O. Keohane (1985) 'Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions' *World Politics*, 38(1), 226-254
- G. Aybet (1999) 'Turkey and European Institutions' *The International Spectator*, 34(1), 103-110
- R. L. Ayres (1981) 'Breaking the Bank' *Foreign Policy*, 43, 104-120
- I. Bal (1998) 'The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics' *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 3(3), 1-17
- L. Banning (1995) *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison & the Founding of the Federal Republic* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)
- K. Barkey (2008) *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- M. Barnett and M. Finnemore (1999) 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations' *International Organization*, 53(4), 699-732
- M. Barnett and M. Finnemore (2005) 'The Power of Liberal International Organizations' in M. Barnett and R. Duvall, eds., *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press) 161-178
- K. Basu (2000) *Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press)
- K. Basu (2010) *Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)

- N. Bayne (1987) 'Making Sense of Western Economic Policies: The Role of the OECD' *The World Today*, 43(2), 27-30
- N. Bayne and S. Woolcock (2007) 'What is Economic Diplomacy?', in N. Bayne and S. Woolcock, eds., *The New Economic Diplomacy* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate), 1-19
- D. Beach and R. B. Pedersen (2013) *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press)
- A. Becker Lorca (2010) 'Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation' *Harvard International Law Journal*, 51(2), 475-552
- G. Behrman (2007) *The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time when America Helped Save Europe* (New York, NY: Free Press)
- R. Beiner (2011) *Civil Religion: A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- E. Beiser (2013) 'Second Worst Year on Record for Jailed Journalists' *Committee to Protect Journalists*, 18 December, <https://cpj.org/reports/2013/12/second-worst-year-on-record-for-jailed-journalists.php> (accessed on 28 April 2015)
- E. Bellin (2004) 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective' *Comparative Politics*, 36(2), 139-157
- E. Benediktsson (2003) *Iceland and European Development: A Historical Review from a Personal Perspective* (Reykjavík, IS: Almenna bókafélagið)
- S. Berger (2004) 'Representations of the Past: The Writing of National Histories in Europe' *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 12(1), 73-96
- N. Berkes (1964) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, QC: McGill University Press)
- B. J. Bernstein (1980) 'The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?' *Political Science Quarterly*, 95(1), 97-125
- G. R. Berridge (2010) *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 4th ed., (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan)
- J. Bhagwati (1966) *The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill)
- BIAC (2013) *About BIAC*, <http://www.biac.org/aboutus.htm> (accessed on 16 March 2013)
- C. Bicchieri and R. Muldoon (2014) 'Social Norms' in E. N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=social-norms> (accessed 11 March 2015)
- P. Bilgin (2003) 'The "Peculiarity" of Turkey's Position on EU-NATO Military/Security Cooperation: A Rejoinder to Missiroli' *Security Dialogue*, 34(3) 345-349
- D. J. Blair (1993) *Trade Negotiations in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (London, UK: Kegan Paul International)

- E. S. Block and L. Erskine (2012) 'Interviewing by Telephone: Specific Considerations, Opportunities, and Challenges' *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 11(4), 428-445
- J. Bodin (1955) *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, M. J. Tooley trans., (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell)
- K. Bollen (1980) 'Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy' *American Sociological Review*, 45, 370-390
- K. Bollen (1993) 'Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures' *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(4), 1207-1230
- H. T. Bölükbaşı, (2012) 'Political Economy' in M. Heper and S. Sayarı, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge)
- N. Bonucci (2011) 'The OECD at Fifty: Some Observations on the Evolving Nature of an International Organization' *George Washington International Review*, 43, 239-254
- E. Borchard (1947) 'Intervention – The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan' *The American Journal of International Law*, 41(4), 885-888
- G. Bossuat (2008) 'The Marshall Plan: History and Legacy', in E. Sorel and P.C. Padoan, eds., *The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the Twenty-First Century* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing), 13-23
- D. Boud and A. Lee (2005) "Peer Learning" as Pedagogic Discourse for Research Education' *Studies in Higher Education*, 30(5) 501-516
- J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady and D. Collier, eds. (2008) 'Political Science Methodology' in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 1-34
- B. F. Braumoeller (2003) 'Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics' *Political Analysis*, 11(3), 209-233
- Z. Bray (2008) 'Ethnographic Approaches' in D. Della Porta and M. Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 296-315
- I. Bremmer (2010) 'The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?' *European View*, 1(9), 249-252
- C. Bretherton and J. Vogler (2006) *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge)
- C. Brölmann (2007) *The Institutional Veil in Public International Law: International Organisations and the Law of Treaties* (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing)
- R. Brown (1988) *Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell)
- A. Bryman (2001) *Social Research Methods* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press)

- M. Brzoska (1995) 'World Military Expenditures' in K. Hartley and T. Sandler, eds., *Handbook of Defense Economics*, 1, 45-67
- E. Budd (2004) *Democratization, Development, and the Patrimonial State in the Age of Globalization* (Oxford, UK: Lexington Books)
- A. Bugra (2007) 'Poverty and Citizenship: An Overview of the Social-Policy Environment in Republican Turkey' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 39(1), 33-52
- A. Buğra and S. Adar (2008) 'Social Policy Change in Countries without Mature Welfare States: The Case of Turkey' *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 38, 83-106
- A. Buğra and C. Keyder (2006) 'The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation' *Journal of European Social Policy*, 16(3), 211-228
- B. Burak (2012) *A Weak State with a 'Strong State' Tradition: The Case of Turkey*, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/08/a-weak-state-with-a-strong-state-tradition-the-case-of-turkey/> (accessed on 3 July 2014)
- A. Bürgin (2010) 'Ongoing Opposition in the West, New Options in the East: Is Turkey's EU Accession Process Reversible?' *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 12(4), 417-435
- P. Burnham, K. Gilland Lutz, W. Grant and Z. Layton-Henry (2008) *Research Methods in Politics*, 2nd ed., (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan)
- R. B. Burns (2000) *Introduction to Research Methods*, 4th ed., (London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd.)
- P. O. Busch (2009) 'The OECD Environment Directorate: The Art of Persuasion and Its Limitations' in F. Biermann and B. Siebenhüner, eds., *Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies* (London, UK: The MIT Press), 75-99
- M. Camps (1975) *"First World" Relationships: The Role of the OECD* (Paris, FR: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs)
- C. F. Cannell (1985) 'Interviewing in Telephone Surveys' in T. W. Beed and R. J. Stimson, eds., *Survey Interviewing: Theory and Techniques* (Sydney, AU: Allen & Unwin), 63-84
- M. H. Cardozo (1953) 'Foreign Aid Legislation Time for a New Look' *Cornell Law Review*, 38(2), 161-184
- P. Carroll (2015) 'Access, Influence and Policy Learning in the 1960s and 1970s: Australian, Japanese and New Zealand Membership of the OECD' Paper Presented at the *Warden of the West – the OECD and the Global Political Economy, 1948 to Present* Conference. University of Zurich, Zurich, CH, 27-29 August 2015
- P. Carroll and A. Kellow (2011) *The OECD: A Study of Organisational Adaptation* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar)

- N. J. Castellan, ed. (1993) *Individual and Group Decision Making: Current Issues* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.)
- F. G. Castles (1995) 'Welfare State Development in Southern Europe' *West European Politics*, 18(2), 291-313
- S. Castles (2006) 'Guest Workers in Europe: A Resurrection?' *International Migration Review*, 40(4), 741-766
- Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (2013) *Convention for European Economic Co-operation*, http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/026961fe-0d57-4314-a40a-a4ac066a1801/22243aaf-3f7c-429e-b98c-283989b2b5e9/Resources#769de8b7-fe5a-452c-b418-09b068bd748d_en&overlay (accessed on 2 December 2014)
- S. Cevik and H. Tas (2013) 'In Between Democracy and Secularism: The Case of Turkish Civil Society' *Middle East Critique*, 22(2), 129-147
- A. Chapnick (1999) 'The Middle Power' *Canadian Policy Journal*, 7(2), 73-82
- J. T. Checkel (1998) 'The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory' *World Politics*, 50(2), 324-348
- (2005) 'It's the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics' *ARENA Working Paper*, 26, 1-29
- (2007) 'Social Mechanisms and Regional Cooperation: Are Europe and the EU Really all that Different?', in A. Acharya and A. I. Johnston, eds., *Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press), 221-243
- (2008) 'Process Tracing' in A. Klotz and D. Prakash, eds., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan), 114-130
- N. Chomsky (1992) *Deterring Democracy* (London, UK: Vintage)
- J-C Chouraqui, B. Jones, and R. B. Montador (1986) 'Public Debt in a Medium-Term Perspective' *OECD Economic Studies*, 7, 103-139
- D. Chourchoulis (2015) *The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books)
- A. Çırakman (2002) *From the 'Terror of the World' to the 'Sick Man of Europe': European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth* (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.)
- U. Cizre (2004) 'Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone' *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(1), 107-125
- J. Clifton and D. Días-Fuentes (2011) *From 'Club of the Rich' to 'Globalisation à la carte'? Evaluating Reform at the OECD*, http://mpr.a.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33053/1/MPRA_paper_33053.pdf (accessed on 1 July 2014)

- J. Clifton and D. Días-Fuentes (2014) 'The OECD and "The Rest": Analyzing the Limits of Policy Transfer' *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 16(3), 249-265
- A. J. Cockfield (2006) 'The Rise of the OECD as Informal "World Tax Organization" through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges' *Yale Journal of Law & Technology*, 8(1), 136-187
- T. Cohn (2002) *Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate)
- F. Colombo, A. Llana-Nozal, J. Mercier and F. Tjadens, eds. (2011) *OECD Health Policy Studies Help Wanted? Providing and Paying for Long-Term Care* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- J. Comenetz (2011) 'OECD at 50: Multilateral Powerhouse Sheds Image as Rich Man's Club' *The Washington Diplomat*, May, 22
- Commission on Global Governance (1995) *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press)
- S. A. Cook (2007) *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press)
- A. F. Cooper (2015) 'MIKTA and the Global Projection of Middle Powers: Toward a Summit of Their Own?' *Global Summitry*, 1(1) 95-114
- M. Cooper (2002) 'The Legacy of Atatürk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy-Making' *International Affairs*, 78(1), 115-128
- A.F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott, and K. R. Nossal (1993) *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press)
- J. P. Costa (2003) 'The European Court of Human Rights and Its Recent Case Law' *Texas International Law Journal*, 38, 455-467
- Council of Europe *Official Report of Debates: 2004 Ordinary Session*, 4th Part, (4-8 October 2004) vol.IV, Sittings 25-32, 903-1236
- T. Cowen (1985) 'The Marshall Plan: Myths and Realities' in D. Bandow, ed., *U.S. Aid to the Developing World: A Free Market Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation), 61-74
- M. Cox and C. Kennedy-Pipe (2005) 'The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Rethinking the Marshall Plan' *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7(1), 97-134
- K. A. Craik (2013) *The Masque Archive: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Ben Jonson* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- N. B. Criss (1997) 'Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963' *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 20(3), 97-122
- R. Cryer (2011) *Research Methodologies in EU and International Law* (Oxford, UK: Hart)

- A. Cunningham (1981) 'The Sick Man and the British Physician' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 17(2), 147-173
- S. Cunningham (2008) *Archive Skills and Tools for Historians*, http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/archive_skills_and_tools_for_historians.html (accessed on 2 December 2014)
- P. D. Curtin (2000) *The World and the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- E. Czarney, J. Menkes and K. Sledziewska (2010) 'The Gravity Model and the Classification of Countries' *Argumenta Oeconomica*, 25(2), 79-94
- J. D' Aspremont (2008) 'Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials' *The European Journal of International Law*, 19(5), 1075-1093
- R. A. Dahl (1998) *On Democracy* (London, UK: Yale University Press)
- J. Dahl Rendtorff (2015) 'Case Studies, Ethics, Philosophy, and Liberal Learning for the Management Profession' *Journal of Management Education*, 39(1) 36-55
- E. P. Dal and G. O. Gök (2014) 'Locating Turkey as a "Rising Power" in the Changing International Order: An Introduction' *Perceptions*, XIX (4), 1-18
- N. Danforth (2015) 'The Menderes Metaphor' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 13(4), 99-105
- P. H. J. Davies (2001) 'Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services' *Politics*, 21(1), 73-80
- R. Davies (2014) 'The OECD – Promoting "Better Policies for Better Lives"' *European Parliament Briefing*, European Parliamentary Research Service, October, 1-8
- C. L. Davis (2013) 'Membership Conditionality and Institutional Reform: The Case of the OECD', Presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, 25 October, Claremont Graduate School
- A. Davutoğlu (2001) *Startejik Derinlik Türkiye' nin Uluslararası Konumu* (Istanbul, TR: Küre)
- A. Davutoglu (2015) 'Turkey's Vision for the G20' *World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2015*, Davos-Klosters, CH, 22 January, video 23:47, <http://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2015> (accessed on 23 January 2015)
- J. B. De Long and B. Eichengreen (1991) 'The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program' *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper*, 3899, 1-63
- Delegation of Sweden to the OECD (2013) *About OECD*, <http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/OECD/Sweden--the-OECD/About-OECD/> (accessed on 8 March 2012)

- D. Della Porta and M. Keating (2008) 'Introduction' in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 7-16
- N. K. Denzin (1984) 'Toward a Phenomenology of Domestic, Family Violence' *American Journal of Sociology*, 90(3), 483-513
- N. K. Denzin (2009) 'The Elephant in the Living Room: Or Extending the Conversation about the Politics of Evidence' *Qualitative Research*, 9(2), 139-160
- S. Deringil (2007) 'The Turks and "Europe": The Argument from History' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43(5), 709-723
- J. Derrida (1995) *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, E. Prenowitz, transl. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press)
- T. Dezso Czigler and I. Takacs, 'Hungary is Now a Distorted Democracy' *EUROPP Blog*, 15 May 2012, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/05/15/hungary-distorted-democracy/> (accessed on 4 April 2013)
- L. Diamond (2002) 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes' *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 21-35
- M. A. Diaye and A. Lapidus (2005) 'Why Rationality May be a Consequence of Hume's Theory of Choice' *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 12(1), 119-126
- G. W. Dick (1974) 'Authoritarian Versus Non-authoritarian Approaches to Economic Development' *Journal of Political Economy*, 82(4), 817-827
- W. Diebold Jr. (1948) 'East-West Trade and the Marshall Plan' *Foreign Affairs*, 26(4), 709-722
- A. Dismorr (2008) *Turkey Decoded* (London, UK: Saqi Books)
- R. H. Dix (1980) 'Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia' *Comparative Politics*, 12(3), 303-321
- J. C. Dixon (2006) *Where Does Turkey Belong? Examining Europeans' Attitudes and Liberal-Democratic Values in Turkey, the European Union, and the Muslim World*. PhD Thesis Submitted at Indiana University. Bloomington, IN, USA
- M. Dixon-Woods, S. Bonas, A. Booth, J. Andrew, D.R. Jones, T. Miller, A.J. Sutton, R. L. Shaw, J. A. Smith and B. Young (2006) 'How Can Systematic Reviews Incorporate Qualitative Research? A Critical Perspective' *Qualitative Research*, 6(1), 27-44
- M. Dixon-Woods, R. L. Shaw, S. Agarwal and J. A. Smith (2004) 'The Problem of Appraising Qualitative Research' *Qual Saf Health Care*, 13, 223-225
- D. Dodge (2003) 'The Benefits of Sound Economic Policies' *BIS Review*, 15, 1-4
- D. P. Dolowitz and D. Marsh (2000) 'Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making' *Governance*, 13(1), 5-24

- M. Döşemeci (2013) *Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- G. Dosi (1982) 'Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories: A Suggested Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of Technical Change' *Research Policy*, 11, 147-162
- J. M. Dostal (2004) 'Campaigning on Expertise: How the OECD Framed Welfare and Labour Market Policies – And Why Success Could Trigger Failure' *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(3), 440-460
- D. W. Drezner (2007) *All Politics is Global* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- S. Duke (1989) *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press)
- M. Durdag (1973) *Some Problems of Development Financing: A Case Study of the Turkish First Five-Year Plan, 1963-1967* (Dordrecht, NL: D. Reidel Publishing Company)
- R. Eccleston and R. Woodward (2014) 'Pathologies in International Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD Tax Transparency Initiative' *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 16(3), 216-229
- H. Eckstein (1997) 'What are Case Studies? How Should They be Performed?' in S. Van Evera, ed., *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 49-88
- H. Eckstein (2000) 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science' in R. Gomm, M. Hammersley and P. Foster, eds., *Case Study Method* (London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd.)
- M. S. Edwards (2012) 'The OECD's Positive Peer Pressure,' *Project Syndicate*, 25 July
- B. Eichengreen, ed. (1995) 'Main Springs of Economic Recovery in Post-War Europe' in *Europe's Post-War Recovery* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 3-38
- K. M. Eisenhardt (1989) 'Building Theories from Case Study Research' *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), 532-550
- K. A. El-Fadl (2003) 'Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment' *Fordham International Law Journal*, 27(1), 4-71
- D. W. Ellwood (2006) 'The Marshall Plan: A Strategy that Worked' *Foreign Policy Agenda*, 4, 17-25
- L. Emmerij (2009) 'UN Regional Contributions: Europe' *United Nations Intellectual History Project Briefing Note*, 18, 1-4
- F. Engels (1884) 1962 'On the Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State' in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Papers*, vol.2 (Moscow, RU: Foreign Languages Publishing House)

- E. I. Erdem (2011) *European Integration and Democratic Consolidation: Spain, Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective*. PhD Thesis Submitted at Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA
- H. Erdemir (2006) *Why Turks Turned their Faces to the West? The Westernization of Turkey, and Turkish Migration to the Federal Republic of Germany* (Ismir, TR: Manisa Ofset Bası)
- D. Ergil (2000) 'Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey' *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), 43-62
- E. Erikson (1968) *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York, NY: Norton)
- E. Erikson (1974) *Dimensions of a New Identity* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.)
- M. Esayan (2013) 'Ergenekon: An Illegitimate Form of Government' *Insight Turkey*, 15(4), 29-40
- H. S. Esfahani (1996) 'Institutional Structure, Government Policy & Economic Performance in Turkey' *Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries Working Papers*, 9620, 1-38
- G. Esping-Andersen (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press)
- European Commission (1973) *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 16(C 113), 24 December, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf (accessed on 5 March 2015)
- (1987) *The Single European Act*, last updated 26 November 2010, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_singleact_en.htm (accessed on 7 March 2015)
- (2012) 'Accession Criteria,' updated 7 September 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm (accessed on 6 March 2015)
- (2014) 'Conditions for Membership,' updated 19 November 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (accessed on 12 April 2015)
- European Court of Human Rights (2014) *The ECHR in Facts and Figures, 2013*, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_2013_ENG.pdf (accessed on 5 March 2015)
- European Court of Human Rights (2015) *Annual Report 2014* (Strasbourg, FR: Registry of the European Court of Human Rights)
- European Parliament (1999) *Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 Presidency Concludes*, http://aei.pitt.edu/43338/1/Helsinki_1999.pdf (accessed 6 March 2015)

- A. Evin and G. Denton, eds. (1990) *Turkey and the European Community* (Oploden, DE: Leske Verlog & Budrich GmbH)
- S. Falk Moore (1973) 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study' *Law & Society Review*, 7(4), 719-746
- H. S. Farber and J. Gowa (1995) 'Politics and Peace' *International Security*, 20(2), 123-146
- J. D. Fearon (1995) 'Rationalist Explanations for War' *International Organization*, 49(3), 379-414
- J. D. Fearon (1999) 'What is Identity (as we now use the Word)? Unpublished Manuscript, Stanford University, Stanford, CA
- J. Fearon and A. Wendt (2002) 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View' in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London, UK: SAGE Publications, Ltd.), 52-72
- D. Feldman (2002) *Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press)
- D. Filkins (2012) 'The Deep State' *The New Yorker*, 12 March, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/the-deep-state> (accessed on 6 May 2015)
- C. Finkel (2005) *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (London, UK: John Murray Publishers)
- M. Finnemore (1994) 'International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy' *International Organization*, 47(4), 565-597
- M. Finnemore (1996) *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)
- M. Finnemore and J. Goldstein, eds. (2010) 'Puzzles about Power' in *Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 3-17
- M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink (1998) 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change' *International Organization*, 52(4), 887-917
- M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink (2001) 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics' *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4, 391-416
- M. H. Folly (2013) 'The Truman Doctrine' in T. J. Lynch, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History*, <http://www.oxfordreference.com> (accessed on 1 November, 2014)
- R. Foote Rhyne (2003) *The Act of Choosing: A Context-Matching Theory and Its Practical Implications* (New York, NY: iUniverse, Inc.)

- K. Ford, N. Schmitt, S. L. Schechtman, B. M. Hulst and M. L. Doherty (1989) 'Process Tracing Methods: Contributions, Problems, and Neglected Research Questions' *Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 43(1), 75-117
- D. P. Forsythe (2012) *Human Rights in International Relations*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- M. Foucault (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, A. M. Sheridan Smith, transl. (New York, NY: Pantheon Books)
- (1973) *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, translated by A. M. Sheridan (London, UK: Routledge)
- (1977) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, translated by A. M. Sheridan (Toronto, ON: Random House of Canada)
- (1978) *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, translated by R. Hurley (New York, NY: Pantheon Books)
- (2002) *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London, UK: Routledge)
- C. R. Frank Jr. and M. Baird (1975) 'Foreign Aid: Its Speckled Past and Future Prospects' *International Organization*, 29(1), 133-167
- M. Franklin (2008) 'Quantitative Analysis' in D. Della Porta and M. Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 240-262
- J. H. Frey (1989) *Survey Research by Telephone*, 2nd ed., (Newbury Park, CA: Sage)
- F. Fukuyama (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man* (London, UK: Hamish Hamilton)
- F. Fukuyama (1995) *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York, NY: Free Press)
- G. E. Fuller (2011) *A World Without Islam* (New York, NY: Back Bay Books)
- G20 Research Group, University of Toronto (2010) *G20 Members*, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/members.html> (accessed on 9 April 2015)
- J. L. Gaddis (1974) 'Reconsiderations: The Cold War Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?' *Foreign Affairs*, 52(2), 386-402
- J. Gal (2010) 'Is there an Extended Family of Mediterranean Welfare States?' *Journal of European Social Policy*, 20(4), 283-300
- A. Gardner (2013) *Hungary Under Scrutiny Over Changes to the Constitution*, <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/hungary-under-scrutiny-over-changes-to-the-constitution/76643.aspx> (accessed on 16 March 2013)
- R. Gass (2013) 'Speaking Truth to Power: Reflections on the Future of the OECD' *OECD Observer*, http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3951/Speaking_truth_to_power.html (accessed on 8 March 2013)

- E. Gecer (2014) *Media and Democracy in Turkey: The Kurdish Issue*. PhD Thesis Submitted at Loughborough University. Loughborough, UK
- T. Geiger (2000) 'Europeanization on the Periphery: Irish Elite Responses to European Integration, 1929-1963' *Yearbook of European Studies*, 14: 105-133
- D. Gentner and M. Jeziorski (1993) 'The Shift from Metaphor to Analogy in Western Science' in A. Ortony, ed., *Metaphor and Thought*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 447-480
- A. L. George and A. Bennett (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
- A. L. George and T. J. McKeown (1985) 'Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making' in R. F. Coulam and R. A. Smith, eds., *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations. A Research Annual*, vol.6 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press), 21-58
- A. L. George and R. Smoke (1974) *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press)
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (2013) *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013* (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States)
- J. Gerring (2004) 'What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?' *American Political Science Review*, 98(2), 341-354
- J. Gerring (2007) *Case Study Research* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- J. R. Gillis, ed. (1994) *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- J. Gimbel (1976) *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press)
- G. Glazebrook (1947) 'The Middle Powers in the United Nations System' *International Organization*, 1(2), 307-318
- A. L. Glyptis (2007) *Kemalism as a Language for Turkish Politics: Cultivation, Reproduction, Negotiation*. PhD Thesis submitted at the London School of Economics and Political Science. London, UK
- L-A. Glyptis (2005) 'The Cost of Rapprochement: Turkey's Erratic EU Dream as a Clash of Systemic Values' *Turkish Studies*, 6(3), 401-420
- C. Göktepe (2003) *British Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, 1959-1965* (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers)
- G. M. Goldhaber (1990) *Organizational Communication*, 5th ed. (New York, NY: William C. Brown Publishers)
- K. Goldstein (2002) 'Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews' *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35(4), 669-672

J. Goldstein and R. Keohane, eds. (1993) *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)

L. Gordon (1956) 'The Organization for European Economic Cooperation' *International Organization*, 10(1), 1-11

N. Gould-Davies (1999) 'Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War' *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1(1), 90-109

Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs (1960) *Letter*, 28 April, File 39-1, from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to O.G. Stoner (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Letter*, 15 June, File 39-1, from Denis Harvey to Mr. R. E. Latimer, General Relations Division, Commodities Branch (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Memo*, 27 February, File 39-1 – OTTO36, from NATO Paris to External Affairs, Ottawa (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Memo*, 2 March, File 39-1, from NATO Paris to External Affairs Ottawa (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Memo*, 26 April, File 39-1, from Canadian Delegation in Rome to External Affairs Ottawa (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Memo*, 22 June, File 14-74, from NATO Paris to External Affairs Ottawa (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Memo*, 2 July, File 14-74, from NATO Paris to External Affairs Ottawa (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Memo*, 4 July, File 14-74, from NATO Paris to External Affairs Ottawa (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Memo*, 25 November, No.3098, File 39-1, from NATO Paris to External Affairs Ottawa (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Numbered Letter 85*, File 39-1, from the Canadian Embassy in Buenos Aires (Ambassador R.P. Bower) to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 25 February (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Numbered Letter 256*, File 14-74, from the Canadian Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden to External Affairs, Ottawa, 11 May (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Numbered Letter 323*, File 39-1, from NATO Paris to External Affairs Ottawa, 2 March (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

----- (1960) *Numbered Letter 324*, File T-19-100-6 vol.1, from NATO Paris to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 March (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)

- (1960) *Numbered Letter 624*, File 19-2000-1, from the Canadian Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden (Ambassador A. K. Graham) to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 28 December (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)
- (1960) *Transmission of Information*, File T-39-5, from Washington D.C. to External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 February (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)
- (1964) *Background Briefing: GATT Working Party on the Association between Turkey and the European Economic Community*, 16 September, File 4-581-42 (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)
- (1964) *OECD Consortium for Turkey*, 7 May, File 8053/T939, from H. K. von Mangoldt, Chairman, Consortium for Turkey to Paul Martin, Secretary General for External Affairs (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)
- (1965) *Memorandum: OECD Consortia on Turkey*, 22 December, File 8053-T939-vol.3, from the Canadian Embassy in Ankara to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)
- Government of Canada, Department of Finance (1962) *Memorandum*, 23 November, File 1082-9-10-3, from C. L. Reed to Mr. A. F. W. Plumptre, Re: OECD Ministerial Meeting – Greek and Turkey Consortia (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)
- Government of Canada, Department of Finance (1964) *Memorandum*, 28 December, File 1082-9-10-3, from A. F. W. Plumptre to Mr. L. D. Hudson, Re: Turkish Consortium – In Response to 18 December 1964 Memo (Ottawa, CA: Library & Archives Canada)
- Government of Turkey, General Directorate of Public Finance (2015) *Central Government Debt Statistics*, <http://www.treasury.gov.tr/tr-TR/istatistik-Sunum-Sayfasi?mid=59&cid=12&nm=167> (accessed 12 April 2015)
- I. Gözaydın (2006) 'Adding Injury to Injury: The Case of Rape and Prostitution in Turkey' in J. T. Parry, ed., *Evil, Law and the State: Perspectives on State Power and Violence: Probing the Boundaries* (Amsterdam, NL: Rodopi B.V)
- J. Granato, R. Inglehart, and D. Leblang (1996) 'The Effect of Cultural Values on Economic Development: Theory, Hypotheses, and Some Empirical Tests' *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(3), 607-631
- R. T. Griffiths (1997) 'Introduction', in R. T. Griffiths, ed., *Explorations in OEEC History* (Paris, France: OECD Publishing), 3-14
- I. N. Grigoriadis (2010) 'The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy' *Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy Working Papers*, 8, 1-12
- H. Grinvalds (2008) 'Lost in Translation? OECD Ideas and Danish Labour Market Policy', in R. Mahon and S. McBride, eds., *The OECD and Transnational Governance* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press), 188- 202
- H. Grinvalds (2011) *The Power of Ideas: The OECD and Labour Market Policy in Canada, Denmark and Sweden*. PhD Thesis submitted at Queen's University. Kingston, ON, Canada

- S. N. Grovogui (1996) *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-determination in International Law* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press)
- E. Gubin (1948) 'How to do Business Under the Marshall Plan' *Kiplinger Magazine*, 5, 5-16
- Y. Güçlü (2003) 'Turkey's Entrance into the League of Nations' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 39(1), 186-206
- G. Günlük-Senesen (2004) 'The Role of Defence on External Indebtedness: An Assessment of Turkey' *Defence and Peace Economics*, 15(2) 145-156
- M. M. Gunter (1990) *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.)
- (2000) 'The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Öcalan's Capture' *Third World Quarterly*, 21(5), 849-869
- (2012) 'Turkey: The Politics of a New Democratic Constitution' *Middle East Policy*, 19(1), 119-125
- Y. Gürbüz, T. Jobert and R. Tuncer (2007) 'Public Debt in Turkey: Evaluation and Perspectives' *Applied Economics*, 39(3), 343-359
- S. Gürsel (2013) 'Turkey as a Regional Power: Unfounded Ambition or Future Reality' in R. Kastoryano, ed., *Turkey between Nationalism and Globalization* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge), 199-215
- A. T. Guzman (2012) 'Doctor Frankenstein's International Organization' *Working Papers, UC Berkeley Program in Law and Economics*, 3 September, <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9tb831rs> (accessed on 17 February 2015)
- J. Gwartney and R. Lawson (2008) *Economic Freedom of the World: 2008 Annual Report* (Vancouver, BC: Economic Freedom Network)
- E. B. Haas (1961) 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process' *International Organization*, 15(3), 366-392
- P. Haas (1992) 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination' *International Organization*, 46(1), 1-35
- P. M. Haas, R. O. Keohane and M. A. Levy (1993) *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
- R. N. Haass (2003) 'Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World' *The Washington Quarterly*, 26(3), 137-148
- E. Hadzhieva (2015) *The European Union's Role in International Economic Fora, Paper 3: The OECD*, Study for the ECON Committee (Brussels, BE: European Parliament)
- L. Hagström (2015) 'The "Abnormal" State: Identity, Norm/Exception and Japan' *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(1), 122-145

- H. J. Hahn (1962) 'Continuity in the Law of International Organization, Part Two: Continuity from OEEC to OECD' *International Organization*, 6, 522-557
- W. Hale (1981) *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press)
- W. Hale (1999) 'Foreward,' in E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass Publishers) vii – ix
- P. A. Hall, ed. (1989) *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- P. A. Hall (2001) 'Organized Market Economies and Unemployment in Europe: Is it Finally Time to Accept Liberal Orthodoxy?' in N. Bermeo ed., *Unemployment in the New Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 52-86
- P. A. Hall and D. Soskice, eds. (2001) *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press)
- F. Halliday and J. Rosenberg (1998) 'Interview with Ken Waltz' *Review of International Studies*, 24(3), 371-386
- W. Hallstein (1963) *The European Community: A New Path to Peaceful Union* (New York, NY: Asia Publishing House)
- S. Halsey (1998) 'Toward the Marshall Plan: The Dialogue Between the Truman Administration and the Elite Press' *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 22(2), 107-130
- M. E. Hancock (2008) *The Politics of Heritage from Madras to Chennai* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press)
- S. O. Hansson (2005) *Decision Theory: A Brief Introduction*, 2nd ed., (Stockholm, SE: Royal Institute of Technology)
- V. Hardesty and G. Eisman (2007) *Epic Rivalry: The Inside Story of the Soviet and American Space Race* (Washington, DC: National Geographic)
- E. Hargittai (1999) 'Weaving the Western Web: Explaining Differences in Internet Connectivity Among OECD Countries' *Telecommunications Policy*, 23, 1-27
- J. Harned (1964) 'Atlantic Assembly – A Genesis' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 3(2), 183-189
- W. A. Harriman (1952) 'Dinner and Evening Discussion with William Averell Harriman, 1 October' *W. Averell Harriman Papers, 1869-1988*, File MSS61911, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC
- D. C. Harvey (2008) 'The History of Heritage' in B. Graham and P. Howard, eds., *The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited), 19-36
- O. A. Hathaway (2002) 'Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?' *The Yale Law Journal*, 111(1), 1935-2042

- E. Hatzivassiliou (2010) 'Greek Reformism and its Models: The Impact of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan' *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 28, 1-25
- G. Hecht, ed. (2011) *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War* (London, UK: The MIT Press)
- M. Heffernan (1998) 'War and the Shaping of Europe' in B. Graham, ed., *Modern Europe, Place, Culture and Identity* (London, UK: Arnold), 89-120
- T. N. Heinemann (2011) *Constructing Turkey: Emergent Economic Geographies of an Emerging Market*. PhD Thesis Submitted at the University of London (Queen Mary). London, UK
- D. Henderson (1996) 'The Role of the OECD in Liberalizing International Trade and Capital Flows' *World Economy*, 19(suppl issue 1), 11-28
- C. M. Henry and R. Springborg (2010) *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, 2nd ed., (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- M. Heper (1992) 'The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared' *Comparative Political Studies*, 25(2), 169-194
- M. Heper (2004) 'Turkey "Between East and West"' *UC Berkeley Institute of European Studies Working Paper*, 16 May, AY0405-16
- M. Heper and M. Selçuk Sancar (1998) 'Is Legal Rational Bureaucracy a Prerequisite for a Rational-Productive Bureaucracy? The Case of Turkey' *Administration & Society*, 30(20), 143-165
- A. Heraclides (2011) 'The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity' *Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe*, 1(51), 1-34
- A. Héritier (2008) 'Causal Explanation' in D. Della Porta and M. Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 61-79
- Z. Y. Hershlag (1958) *Turkey: An Economy in Transition* (The Hague, NL: Van Keulen)
- J. A. K. Hey, ed. (2003) 'Introducing Small State Foreign Policy' in *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour* (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.) 1-12
- O. Hieronymi (1973) *Economic Discrimination Against the United States in Western Europe, 1948-1958* (Geneva, CH: Librairie Droz S.A.)
- J. M. Hobson (2004) *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- M. Hollis and S. Smith (1986) 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making' *British Journal of Political Science*, 16(3), 269-286
- C. M. Hogan (2013) 'Black Sea' *The Encyclopedia of Earth*, <http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/150694/> (accessed on 25 May 2015)

- M. J. Hogan (1982) 'The Search for a "Creative Peace": The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan' *Diplomatic History*, 6(4), 267-286
- M. J. Hogan (1987) *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- A. Holt (2010) 'Using the Telephone for Narrative Interviewing: A Research Note' *Qualitative Research*, 10(1), 113-121
- J. D. Hoover (2011) *Reconstructing Human Rights: A Pragmatic and Pluralist Inquiry in Global Ethics*. PhD Thesis Submitted at the London School of Economics and Political Science. London, UK
- D. P. Houghton (2007) 'Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach' *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 3, 24-45
- Human Rights Watch (2010) *US: Review of the National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/08/us-review-us-national-contact-point-oecd-guidelines-multinational-enterprises> (accessed on 18 March 2012)
- I. Hurd (2008) 'Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform' *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*. April-June 2008, 14(2), 199-217
- I. Hurd (2011a) 'Choices and Methods in the Study of International Organizations' *Journal of International Organization Studies*, 2(2), 7-22
- I. Hurd (2011b) *International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- A. Hurrell (2005) 'Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality' in M. Barnett and R. Duvall, eds., *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 33-58
- M. Ignatieff (2001) *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- U. B. Ikpe (2000) 'Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria' *African Journal of Political Science*, 5(1), 146-162
- R. Inglehart (2007) 'Mapping Global Values' in Y. Esmer and T. Pettersson, eds., *Measuring and Mapping Cultures: 25 Years of Comparative Value Surveys* (Leiden, NL: Brill)
- R. Inglehart and C. Welzel (2005) *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- A. Insel (2003) 'The AKP and Normalising Democracy in Turkey' *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102(2/3), 293-308
- Institute on Governance (2014) *What is Governance?* Video 0:27, <http://iog.ca/about-us/> (accessed on 23 January 2015)

International Monetary Fund (2002) *IMF Survey*, 31(23), 16 December

----- (2005) *Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies*, from the Government of Turkey (Minister of State for Economic Affairs) to the Managing Director of the IMF, 26 April

----- (2015) *The IMF at a Glance*, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm> (accessed on 12 April 2015)

A. Irvine (2011) 'Duration, Dominance and Depth in Telephone and Face-to-Face Interviews: A Comparative Exploration' *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 10(3), 202-220

S. Jackman (2008) 'Measurement' in J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H.E. Brady and D. Collier, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 119-151

S. Jackson (1979) 'Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a European Recovery Program' *American History*, 65, 1043-1068

K. Jacobs (2006) 'Discourse Analysis' in M. Walter, ed., *Social Research Methods: An Australian Perspective* (Melbourne, AU: Oxford University Press), 135-158

T. Jakobi (2012) 'Regulating Regulation? The Regulatory Policy of the OECD', *Regulation and Complex Governance in Multi-layered Domestic-International Structures*, (Exeter, UK: ECPR Standing Group on Regulation and Governance Conference)

Japan Philatelic Society Foundation (2014) *Diplomatic Relations – OECD 50th Anniversary*, <http://yushu.or.jp/sakura/index2.html> (accessed on 24 July 2015)

R. Jervis (2006) 'Understanding Beliefs' *Political Psychology*, 27(5), 641-643

B. D. Jones (1999) 'Bounded Rationality' *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 297-321

E. Jordaan (2003) 'The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers' *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, 30(1), 165-181

P. A. Jordan (2003) 'Russia's Accession to the Council of Europe and Compliance with European Human Rights Norms' *Demokratizatsiya-Washington*, 11(2), 281-296

M. Jorgensen and L. J. Phillips (2002) *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd.)

P. Juillard (1998) 'MAI: A European View' *Cornell International Law Journal*, 31(3), 477-484

J. Julin (2003) 'The OECD: Securing the Future' *OECD Observer*, December, 48-51

A. Kadioğlu (2007) 'An Oxymoron: The Origins of Civic-Republican Liberalism in Turkey' *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 16(2), 171-190

- W. Kaiser (2012) 'The Transnational Turn Meets the Educational Turn: Engaging and Educating Adolescents in History Museums in Europe' *Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society*, 4(2), 8-22
- A. Kakridis (2009) 'Deus ex machina?: Truman/Marshall Aid, Engineers, and Greece's Post-war Development Discourse' *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 27(2), 241-274
- I. Kant (1954) 'What is Enlightenment? [1784],' P. Gray, transl., *Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 1071-1076
- L. S. Kaplan (1993) 'The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece' *Journal of the Early Republic*, 13(1), 1-21
- E. Karagol (2006) 'The Relationship between External Debt, Defence Expenditures and GNP Revisited: The Case of Turkey' *Defence and Peace Economics*, 17(1), 47-57
- M. L. Karaman and B. Aras (2000) 'The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey' *Journal of Economic and Social Research*, 2(2), 39-58
- O. Karasapan (1989) 'Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost' *Middle East Report*, 19, 4-10
- M. P. Karns and K. A. Mingst (2004) *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.)
- K. H. Karpat (1970) 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution' *The American Historical Review*, 75(6), 1654-1683
- C. Kassimeris and L. Tsoumpanou (2008) 'The Impact of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey's EU Candidacy' *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 12(3), 329-345
- P. J. Katzenstein (1996) *The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press)
- P. J. Katzenstein (2013) 'Small States and Small States Re-visited' *New Political Economy*, 8(1), 9-30
- K. Kaya (2014) 'Without Constitutional Amendment Erdoğan is Unlikely to Remain an All-Powerful President' *The Turkey Analyst*, 7(18)
- H. Kelsen (1944) 'The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization' *The Yale Law Journal*, 53(2), 207-220
- Y. Kemal (2007) 'The Dark Cloud over Turkey' *Index on Censorship*, 24(1), 141-147
- G. F. Kennan (1947) 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' *Foreign Affairs*, 25, 566-582
- J. F. Kennedy (1957) 'A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy' *Foreign Affairs*, October, 44-59
- J. F. Kennedy (1960) *The Strategy of Peace* (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers)

- R. O. Keohane (1978) 'The International Energy Agency: State Influence and Transgovernmental Politics' *International Organization*, 32(4), 929-951
- C. Keyder (2006) 'Moving in from the Margins? Turkey in Europe' *Diogenes*, 53(2), 72-81
- S. Kili (1980) 'Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey' *International Political Science Review*, 1(3), 381-404
- G. King, R.O. Keohane and S. Verba (1994) *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- S. Kinzer (2001) 'Dreaming in Turkish' *World Policy Journal*, 18(3), 69-80
- S. Kinzer (2010) *Reset: Iran, Turkey and America's Future* (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, LLC)
- A. Kiss and D. Shelton (2007) *Guide to International Environmental Law* (Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers)
- J. Klabbers (2005) 'Two Concepts of International Organization' *International Organizations Law Review*, 2, 277-293
- J. Klabbers (2013) 'Unity, Diversity, Accountability: The Ambivalent Concept of International Organisation' *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, 14, 1-22
- A. Klieman, ed. (2015) *Great Powers and Geopolitics: International Affairs in a Rebalancing World* (Heidelberg, DE: Springer)
- C. Knill and T. Balint (2009) 'Explaining Variation in Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the European Commission and the OECD' in M.W. Bauer, ed., *Reforming the European Commission* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge)
- S. J. Kobrin (1998) 'The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations' *Foreign Policy*, 112, 97-109
- A. Kojevnikov (2008) 'The Phenomenon of Soviet Science' *Osiris*, 23(1), 115-135
- H. Kösebalaban (2007) 'The Permanent "Other"? Turkey and the Question of European Identity' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 18(4), 87-111
- H. Kösebalaban (2014) 'Muslim Perceptions of Injustice as an International Relations Question' *Perceptions*, XIX (4), 19-42
- W. E. Kovacic and H. Hollman (2011) 'The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current, and Future Role' *Minnesota Journal of International Law*, 20, 274-323
- S. D. Krasner (2001) 'Abiding Sovereignty' *International Political Science Review*, 22(3), 229-251
- F. Kratochwil (1996) 'Citizenship: On the Border of Order', in Y. Lapid and F. V. Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), 181-200

- T. Kristensen (1967) 'Five Years of O.E.C.D' in Council of Europe, ed., *European Yearbook 1965*, 13 (The Hague, NL: Martinus Nijhoff) 100-113
- P. Kubicek (2008) 'Turkey's Inclusion in the Atlantic Community: Looking Back, Looking Forward' *Turkish Studies*, 9(1), 21-35
- R. T. Kudrle (2012) 'Governing Economic Globalization: The Pioneering Experience of the OECD' *Journal of World Trade*, 46(3), 695-732
- T. Kuran (2013) 'The Political Consequences of Islam's Economic Legacy' *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 39(4-5), 395-405
- Y. T. Kurat (1984) 'Turkey's Entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation' *Diş Politika/ Foreign Policy*, 10(3-4), 50-77
- J. Kurtz (2002) 'NGOs, the Internet and International Economic Policy Making: The Failure of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment' *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, 3(2), 213-246
- D. Kushner (1997) 'Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey' *Journal of Contemporary History*, 32(2), 219-233
- S. Kvale and S. Brinkmann (2009) *Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*, 2nd ed., (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.)
- M. Kwiek (2000) 'The Nation-State, Globalisation and the Modern Institution of the University' *A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, 96, 74-98
- S. Laçiner (2001) *Turkey and the World: A Complete Bibliography of Turkey and Turks in English* (Istanbul, TR: Kaknüs)
- J. R. Lambert (1961) 'Greece and the European Economic Community' *The World Today*, 17(4), 142-149
- J. M. Landau (1993) 'The First Turkish Language Congress' in J. A. Fishman, ed., *The Earliest Stage of Language Planning: 'The First Congress' Phenomenon* (Berlin, DE: Walter de Gruyter & Co.), 271-292
- R. H. Landrum (2012) 'Harry S. Truman and the Marshall Plan' in D. S. Margolies, ed., *A Companion to Harry S. Truman* (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell)
- S. F. Larrabee (2010) *Troubled Partnership: US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation)
- J. Law (2004) *After Method: Mess in Social Science Research* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge)
- G. Lawson (2010) *The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- J. Lawton Collins (1956) 'NATO: Still Vital for Peace' *Foreign Affairs*, 34(3), 367-379
- C. Layne (1993) 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise' *International Security*, 17(4), 5-51

- F. Le Blévenec (2007) 'History: The Big Move' *NATO Review*, 2, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/Partnerships_Old_New/Big_move/EN/index.htm (accessed on 23 January 2015)
- R. N. Lebow (2006) 'The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe' in R. N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner and C. Fogu, eds., *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press) 1-39
- H. Lee (2008) 'Outliers' in P. J. Lavrakas, ed., *Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods*, <http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/encyclopedia-of-survey-research-methods/n357.xml> (accessed on 9 July 2014)
- B. L. Leech (2002) 'Interview Methods in Political Science' *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35(4), 663-664
- M. Leimgruber and M. Schmelzer (2015) 'Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)/ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)' Paper Presented at the *Warden of the West – the OECD and the Global Political Economy, 1948 to Present* Conference. University of Zurich, Zurich, CH, 27-29 August 2015
- W. Leitsch (1983) '1683: The Siege of Vienna' *History Today*, 33(7), <http://www.historytoday.com/walter-leitsch/1683-siege-vienna> (accessed 6 March 2015)
- N. Lendvai (2004) 'The Weakest Link? EU Accession and Enlargement: Dialoguing EU and Post-Communist Social Policy' *Journal of European Social Policy*, 14(3), 319-333
- D. Lerner and R. D. Robinson (1960) 'Swords and Plough Shares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force' *World Politics*, 13(1), 19-44
- S. Levitsky and L. A. Way (2002) 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism' *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 51-65
- S. Levitsky and L. A. Way (2010) *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- J. S. Levy (1997) 'Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations' *International Studies Quarterly*, 41, 87-112
- B. Lewis (1994) 'Why Turkey is the Only Muslim Democracy' *The Middle East Quarterly*, 1(1), 41-49
- B. Lewis (2003) *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Toronto: ON: Random House)
- G. Lewis (1974) *Modern Turkey*, 4th ed., (London, UK: Ernest Benn Limited)
- R. Liljeström and E. Özdalga, eds. (2002) *Autonomy and Dependence in the Family* (Istanbul, TR: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul)
- C. Lin (2011) 'China's New Silk Road to the Mediterranean: The Eurasian Land Bridge and Return of Admiral Zheng He' *ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security*, 165, 1-23

- A. S. Lindemann (2013) *A History of Modern Europe: from 1815 to the Present* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)
- J. J. Linz (1964) 'An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain' in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki, FI: The Academic Bookstore) 291-341
- J. J. Linz (2000) *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.)
- J. H. Liu and D. J. Hilton (2005) 'How the Past Weighs on the Present: Social Representations of History and their Role in Identity Politics' *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 537-556
- B. Lombardi (1997) 'Turkey – The Return of the Reluctant Generals' *Political Science Quarterly*, 112(2), 191-215
- B. Lombardi (2006) 'Turkey: Myths and Realities: Guest Editor's Introduction' *International Journal*, 61(1), 1-18
- H. A. Long (1976) *The American Ideal of 1776: The Twelve Basic American Principles* (Washington, DC: Your Heritage Books)
- B. L. Long (2000) *International Environmental Issues and the OECD, 1950-2000: An Historical Perspective* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- L. Louis-Jacques and J. S. Korman (1996) *Introduction to International Organizations*. The American Association of Law Libraries (New York, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc.)
- D. Lowenthal (1998) 'Fabricating Heritage' *History and Memory*, 10(1), 5-24
- R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa (1989) *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey*, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Dover Publications, Inc.)
- S. Lukes (1974) *Power: A Radical View* (London, UK: The Macmillan Press Ltd.)
- S. Lukes (2005) *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave macmillan)
- S. Y. Ma (2007) 'Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic Implications of Historical Institutionalism' *International Political Science Review*, 28(1), 57-78
- A. MacDowall (2014) 'Illiberal Democracy: How Hungary's Orban is Testing Europe' *World Politics Review*, 18 December, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/print/14699 (accessed on 26 January 2015)
- C. A. MacKinnon (1982) 'Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory' *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 7, 515-544
- C. A. MacKinnon (1983) 'Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence' *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 8, 635-658
- J. Madison (1787) 'The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection' *The Federalist Papers*, 10

- J. Magid (2012) 'The Marshall Plan' *Advances in Historical Studies*, 1(1), 1-7
- K. D. Magliveras (2011) 'Membership in International Organizations' in J. Klabbers and A. Wallendahl, eds., *Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar) 84-107
- K. Mahubani (2012) 'The OECD: A Classic Sunset Organisation' *Global Policy*, 3(1), 117-118
- R. Mahon, ed. (2008) 'Babies and Bosses: Gendering the OECD's Social Policy Discourse' in R. Mahon and S. McBride, eds., *The OECD and Transnational Governance* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press), 260-275
- R. Mahon and S. McBride, eds. (2008) *The OECD and Transnational Governance* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press)
- A. Major (2014) *Architects of Austerity: International Finance and the Politics of Growth* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press)
- R. Mandel (1989) 'Turkish Headscarves and the "Foreigner Problem": Constructing Difference through Emblems of Identity' *New German Critique*, 1(46), 27-46
- E. Manisali (2011) *Turkey's Place in Europe and the Middle East – Economic, Political and Cultural Dimensions* (Istanbul, TR: Okan Üniversitesi Yayınları)
- M. Manoff (2004) 'Theories of the Archive from Across the Disciplines' *Libraries and the Academy*, 4(1), 9-25
- J. G. March (1994) *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen* (New York, NY: Free Press)
- J. G. March and J. P. Olsen (1998) 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' *International Organization*, 52(4), 943-969
- M. Marcussen (2001) 'The OECD in Search of a Role: Playing the Idea Game,' 29th *Joint Sessions of Workshops*, (Grenoble, FR: ECPR)
- (2004a) 'The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as Ideational Artist and Arbitrator: Reality or Dream?' in B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek, eds., *Decision Making within International Organizations* (London, UK: Routledge), 90-106
- (2004b) 'Multilateral Surveillance and the OECD: Playing the Idea Game' in K. Armingeon and M. Beyeler, eds., *The OECD and European Welfare States* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar), 13-31
- (2004c) 'OECD Governance through Soft Law' in U. Mörtz, ed., *Soft Law in Governance and Regulation: An Interdisciplinary Analysis* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing) 103-128
- M. Marcussen and J. Trondal (2011) 'The OECD Civil Servant: Between Scylla and Charybdis', *ARENA Working Paper*, 6, 1-34, <http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2011/wp-06-11.pdf> (accessed on 17 January 2013)

- M. Marini and B. Singer (1988) 'Causality in the Social Sciences' in C.C. Clogg, ed., *Sociological Methodology* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass)
- D. Marsh and G. Stoker, eds., (2010) 'Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches' in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 3rd ed., (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan), 249-266
- G. C. Marshall (1947) *The Marshall Plan Speech*, <http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/> (accessed on 22 November 2014)
- C. Marshall and G. B. Rossman (1999) *Designing Qualitative Research*, 3rd ed., (London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd.)
- K. Martens and A. P. Jakobi, eds. (2010) *Mechanisms of OECD Governance: International Incentives for National Policy-Making?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
- P. Massingham (2015) 'Knowledge Sharing: What Works and What Doesn't Work: A Critical Systems Thinking Perspective' *Systems Practice and Action Research*, 28(3), 197-228
- G. C. McGhee (1954) 'Turkey Joins the West' *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/george-c-mcghee> (accessed on 9 April 2015)
- G. C. McGhee (1962) 'Atlantic Unity – Key to World Community,' *DOSB*, 22 January
- H. McKinnon Wood (1943) 'The Treaty of Paris and Turkey's Status in International Law' *The American Journal of International Law*, 37(2), 262-274
- D. McNeill (2004) *New Europe: Imagined Spaces* (London, UK: Arnold-Hodder Headline Group)
- E. Meyersson (2014) *Turkey's Institutions Problem*, <http://erikmeyersson.com/2014/05/03/turkeys-institutions-problem/> (accessed on 2 July 2014)
- F. Michelman (1988) 'Law's Republic' *The Yale Law Journal*, 97(8), 1493-1537
- V. Miller (2011) 'The EU's Acquis Communautaire' (SN/IA/5944: House of Commons Library)
- J. Milliken (1999) 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods' *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2), 225-254
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Offices of Sweden (2004) *Swedish OECD Strategy – Overall Priorities and Organisation* (Stockholm, SE: Norstedts Juridik AB)
- Minority Rights Group International (2011) *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples* (London, UK: Minority Rights Group International)
- D. Mitrany (1933) *The Progress of International Government* (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.)
- F. Morady and I. Şiriner (2011) 'Islamism, Globalisation and Development in Iran and Turkey: Fundamentalism or Reconciliation with Capitalism?' in P. İktisat and K. ve Kalkınma, eds., *Political Economy, Crisis and Development* (Istanbul, TR: IJOPEC Publication), 153-184

- A. Moravcsik (1997) 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics' *International Organization*, 51(4), 513-553
- C. A. Morella (2008) 'Marshall Plan 60th Anniversary Symposium: Introductory Remarks' in E. Sorel and P. C. Padoan, eds., *The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the 21st Century* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- R. B. Morton and K. C. Williams (2008) 'Experimentation in Political Science' in J.M. Box-Steffensmeier, H.E. Brady and D. Collier, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 339-356
- M. Müftüler-Bac (1997) *Europe in Change: Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press)
- M. Müftüler-Bac (1998) 'The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34(4), 240-258
- H. Müller (2014) 'The Dire State of Labor Rights in Turkey' *The Turkey Analyst*, 7(17)
- C. N. Murphy (2000) 'Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood' *International Affairs*, 76(4) 789-803
- T. F. Nas (2008) *Tracing the Economic Transformation of Turkey from the 1920s to EU Accession* (Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers)
- J. U. Nef (1950) *War and Human Progress: An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization* (London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul)
- W. Nester (1995) *International Relations: Geopolitical and GeoEconomic Conflict and Cooperation* (New York, NY: Harper Collins)
- I. B. Neumann (1999) *Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press)
- I. B. Neumann and J. M. Welsh (1991) 'The Other in European Self Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society' *Review of International Studies*, 17(4), 327-348
- The Nobel Foundation (2014) *George C. Marshall – Biographical*, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1953/marshall-bio.html (accessed on 3 December 2014)
- C. J. Nolan (2002) *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations*, vol.1 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press)
- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Public Diplomacy Division (2014) *Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence*, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20140224_140224-PR2014-028-Defence-exp.pdf (accessed 12 April 2015)
- J. S. Nye, Jr. (1990) 'Soft Power' *Foreign Policy*, no.80, 153-171

- Z. Nyiri (2012) 'Transatlantic Trends: Public Opinion and NATO' 16 May, <http://www.gmfus.org/commentary/transatlantic-trends-public-opinion-and-nato> (accessed 3 March 2015)
- R. O'Brien, A. M. Goetz, J. A. Scholte and M. Williams (2000) *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- R. Ó Fathaigh and D. Voorhoof (2014) 'A Review of the European Court's Freedom of Expression Cases in 2013,' *Columbia University Global Freedom of Expression and Information Project Expert Meeting*, Columbia University, New York, 25-26 February
- N. O'Sullivan (2003) 'Power, Authority, Legitimacy' in R. Axtmann, ed., *Understanding Democratic Politics: An Introduction* (London, UK: Sage Publications), 41-49
- M. W. Osborne (1999) *A History of the Château de la Muette* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- J. S. Odell (2002) 'Case Study Methods in International Political Economy' in D. F. Sprinz and Y. Wolinsky, eds., *Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press), 65-90
- G. Oğuz (2012) *EU Enlargement and Turkish Labour Migration* (Tokyo, JP: United Nations University Press)
- E. Önderoğlu (2014) *Updated List of Imprisoned Journalists in Turkey Including Recent Releases – March 2014*, <http://www.osce.org/fom/116291?download=true> (accessed 29 April 2015)
- Z. Öniş (2010) 'Crises and Transformations in Turkish Political Economy' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 9(3), <http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/45-61.pdf> (accessed on 1 July 2014)
- Z. Öniş and B. Rubin, eds., (2003) *The Turkish Economy in Crisis: Critical Perspectives on the 2000-1 Crises* (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers)
- N. Onuf (1998) 'Constructivism: A User's Manual' in V. Kubáľková, N. Onuf and P. Kowert, eds., *International Relations in a Constructed World* (New York, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.), 58-78
- R. Opendakker (2006) 'Advantages and Disadvantages of Four Interview Techniques in Qualitative Research' *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 7(4), 1-10
- J. A. Oppenheimer (2010) 'Rational Choice Theory' in M. Bevir, ed., *Encyclopedia of Political Theory*, 3, (London, UK: SAGE Publications, Inc.), 1149-1157
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1960) *Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, <http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-operationanddevelopment.htm> (accessed on 29 July 2014)
- (1961) *The Iron and Steel Industry in Europe, 1960* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)

- (1963) *OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- (1982) *OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- (1985) *OCDE: OECD* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- (2001) 'Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs),' <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=303> (accessed 12 April 2015)
- (2004) *Economic Surveys: Turkey* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- (2004) *A Strategy for Enlargement and Outreach*. Report by the Chair of the Heads of Delegation Working Group on the Enlargement Strategy and Outreach, Ambassador Seiichiro Noboru, <http://www.oecd.org/globalrelations/globalrelationsstrategy/37434513.pdf> (accessed on 2 July 2014)
- (2006) *DAC in Dates: The History of OECD's Development Assistance Committee* (Paris, France: OECD Publishing)
- (2007) *A General Procedure for Future Accessions*, [http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=C\(2007\)31/Final](http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=C(2007)31/Final) (accessed on 13 January 2013)
- (2008) *OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, <http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/34011915.pdf> (accessed on 8 April, 2013)
- (2011) *OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- (2011) *OECD Family Database*, <http://www.oecd.org/social/family/> (accessed on 12 May 2015)
- (2011) *OECD Library and Archives*, <http://www.unesco.org/library/PDF/OECDLibrariesArchives.pdf> (accessed on 9 July 2014)
- (2011) *Secretary-General's Report to Ministers, 2011* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- (2011) 'What Can Parents Do to Help their Children Succeed in School?' *PISA in Focus*, 10, 1-4
- (2012) *The OECD's Relations with Its Key Partners*. OECD Week 2012. Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, Paris, France, 23-24 May 2012, <http://www.oecd.org/general/50452501.pdf> (accessed on 3 July 2014)
- (2013) *Best Practices*, <http://www.oecd.org/tax/transferpricing/annex2-bestpractices.htm> (accessed on 25 January 2013)
- (2013) *Budget*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/budget/> (accessed on 25 January 2013)
- (2013) *Global Relations*, <http://www.oecd.org/globalrelations/> (accessed on 18 March 2013)

----- (2013) *Global Relations – Global Forums*, <http://www.oecd.org/global-relations/globalforums/> (accessed on 18 March 2013)

----- (2013) *iLibrary*, <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/> (accessed on 7 January 2013)

----- (2013) *Legal Affairs*, <http://www.oecd.org/legal/participationofnon-members-and-accessionprocess.htm#B3> (accessed on 16 March 2013)

----- (2013) *Legal Instruments*, <http://www.oecd.org/legal/oecdlegalinstruments-the-acts.htm> (accessed on 13 January 2013)

----- (2013) *List of Departments and Special Bodies*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/list-of-departmentsandspecialbodies.htm> (accessed on 13 January 2013)

----- (2013) *Members and Partners*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/> (accessed on 14 January 2013)

----- (2013) *OECD Centres*, <http://www.oecd.org/germany/oecdcentres.htm> (accessed on 19 February 2013)

----- (2013) *OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements*, https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/CapitalMovements_Web_English.pdf (accessed on 22 February 2015)

----- (2013) *Organisation for European Economic Co-operation*, <http://www.oecd.org/general/organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-operation.htm> (accessed on 9 January 2013)

----- (2013) *Our Mission*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/> (accessed on 13 January 2013)

----- (2013) *Peer Review at a Glance*, http://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/peerreview_ataglance.htm (accessed on 16 March 2012)

----- (2013) *Relations with the Council of Europe*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/publicaffairs/relationswiththecouncilofeurope.htm> (accessed on 18 March 2013)

----- (2013) *Relations with Parliamentarians*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/publicaffairs/relationswithparliamentarians.htm> (accessed on 17 January 2013)

----- (2013) *Who does What*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/whodoeswhat/> (accessed on 19 January 2013)

----- (2014) *Better Life Index- Turkey*, <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/turkey/> (accessed 12 May 2015)

----- (2014) *How's Life in Turkey?* <http://www.oecd.org/statistics/BLI%202014%20Turkey%20country%20report.pdf> (accessed on 12 May 2015)

----- (2014) *OECD iLibrary*, www.oecd-ilibrary.org/about/ (accessed on 28 December 2014)

- (2014) *Society at a Glance 2014 – Highlights: Turkey – OECD Social Indicators*, <http://www.oecd.org/turkey/OECD-SocietyAtaGlance20142014-Highlights-Turkey.pdf> (accessed on 12 May 2015)
- (2015) *Active with Brazil*, <http://www.oecd.org/latin-america/countries/brazil/> (accessed on 9 November 2015)
- (2015) *Data*, <https://data.oecd.org/> (accessed on 18 November 2015)
- (2015) *Decisions, Recommendations and Other Instruments of the OECD*, <http://webnet.oecd.org/OECDACTS/Instruments/ListByInstrumentDateView.aspx> (accessed on 15 November 2015)
- (2015) *Member Countries' Budget Contributions for 2015*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/budget/member-countries-budget-contributions.htm> (accessed on 6 November 2015)
- (2015) *Members and Partners*, http://www.oecd.org/about/members_and_partners/ (accessed on 8 October 2015)
- (2015) *OECD and Enlargement*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/enlargement.htm> (accessed on 11 November 2015)
- (2015) *On-Line Guide to OECD Intergovernmental Activity*, <http://webnet.oecd.org/OECDGROUPS/Bodies/ListByIndexView.aspx?book=true> (accessed on 9 November 2015)
- (2015) *Resolutions of the Council on the Governance of the Organisation* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- (2015) *Secretary-General*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/secretary-general/> (accessed on 9 November 2015)
- (2015) *What We do and How*, <http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/> (accessed on 7 November 2015)
- (2016) *Data on Turkey*, <https://data.oecd.org/turkey.htm> (accessed on 11 April 2016)
- Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (1960) *Code of Liberalisation*, <http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/180996?item=OEEC.SBT-10-358> (accessed on 19 December 2014)
- E. Örüçü (2011) 'The Turkish Constitution Revamped Yet Again' *European Public Law*, 17(1), 11-23
- L. Osberg and A. Sharpe (2002) 'An Index of Economic Well-Being for Selected OECD Countries' *Review of Income and Wealth*, 48(3), 291-316
- S. Ostry (2008) *The Post-Cold War Trading System: Who's on First?* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press)
- M. Ougaard (2004) *Political Globalization: State, Power, and Social Forces* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave)

- Oxford University Press (2014) 'doctrine,' <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/doctrine> (accessed on 22 November 2014)
- E. Özbudun (2000) *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers)
- E. Özbudun and O. F. Gençkaya (2009) *Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey* (Budapest, HU: Central European Union Press)
- S. Ozel (2003) 'After the Tsunami' *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2), 80-94
- S. Özel and G. Özcan (2011) 'Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Turkey's Dilemmas' *Journal of Democracy*, 22(4), 124-138
- O. Özgüç (2013) 'Rousseau and Turkey' *FLSF, Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences*, 16(1), 121-148
- B. Özkan (2012) *From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey* (London, UK: Yale University Press)
- F. Z. Özkurt (2013) *The Impact of EU Conditionality on Democratisation in Turkey: Institutional Transformation and Policy (Re)formation of Minority Rights, Freedom of Expression, the Military and the Judiciary*. PhD Thesis Submitted at the University of Nottingham. Nottingham, UK
- F. Pagani (2002) *Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change. An Analysis of the OECD Working Method* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- L. A. Pal (2012) *Frontiers of Governance: The OECD and Global Public Management Reform* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan)
- L. A. Pal and I. D. Clark (2014) 'Channels of Influence: The Interaction between Canada and the OECD' Paper Presented at the 18th Conference of the International Research Society for Public Management. Carleton University, Ottawa, CA, 9-11 April
- O. Pamuk (2006) 'Nobel Lecture: My Father's Suitcase' *Nobelprize.org*, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2006/pamuk-lecture_en.html (accessed on 9 March 2015)
- S. Pamuk (1981) 'Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey' *Middle East Research and Information Project Reports*, 93, 26-32
- D. G. Papademetriou and P. L. Martin, eds., (1991) *The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration and Economic Development* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press)
- S. D. Parrish (1994) 'The Turn Toward Confrontation: The Soviet Reaction to the Marshall Plan, 1947' in S. D. Parrish and M. M. Narinsky 'New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports' *Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 9, 1-53
- S. Patrick and N. Egel (2015) 'Economic Coalition of the Willing' *Foreign Affairs*, 11 March

- M. J. Patton (2006) 'The Economic Policies of Turkey's AKP Government: Rabbits from a Hat?' *Middle East Journal*, 60(3), 513-536
- A. Paul and D. M. Seyrek (2015) 'Internet "Freedom" in Turkey' *European Policy Centre Commentary*, 2 March, 1-2
- K. K. Pease (2010) *International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, 4th ed, (London, UK: Pearson)
- M. Pelt (2006) *Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations, 1947-74* (Copenhagen, DEN: Museum Tusculanum Press and Mogens Pelt)
- A. M. Peña (2015) 'Governing Differentiation: On Standardisation as Political Steering' *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(1), 52-75
- A. Peräkylä (2005) 'Analyzing Talk and Text' in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 3rd ed., (London, UK: SAGE Publications, Inc.), 869-886
- P. Perchoc (2015) 'Turkey Economic Outlook' *European Parliamentary Research Service At-a-Glance*, June, 1-2
- P. Pierson (2004) *Politics in Time* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- T. Piketty (2014) 'Why We Don't Need 19th Century Inequality to Generate Growth' *Social Europe*, 18 June
- H. Pitlik (2007) 'A Race to Liberalization? Diffusion of Economic Policy Reform Among OECD-Economies' *Public Choice*, 132(1-2), 159-178
- M. F. Plattner (2015) 'Is Democracy in Decline?' *Journal of Democracy*, 26(1), 5-10
- E. Pollock (2006) *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- N. Pope and H. Pope (1997) *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After* (London, UK: John Murray Publishers, Ltd.)
- T. Porter and M. Webb (2008) 'Role of the OECD in the Orchestration of Global Knowledge Networks', in R. Mahon and S. McBride, eds., *The OECD and Transnational Governance* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press), 43-59
- D. Post and P. O'Reilly (2011) 'New Institutions for a New World: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Future of the Global Economic Order' *Brussels Forum Paper Series*, March, 1-5
- M. Prost and P. Kingsley Clark (2006) 'Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of International Organisations Really Matter?' *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 5(2), 341-370
- D. Quataert (2005) *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
- A. H. Qureshi (1991) *The Mechanisms of Economic 'Surveillance' in the Framework of International Organisations* (Manchester, UK: Faculty of Law, Manchester University)

- S. R. Ratner (1998) 'International Law: The Trials of Global Norms' *Foreign Policy*, 110, 65-80
- Refugees International (2015) 'Syrian Refugees and the Right to Education in Turkey,' 20 March, <http://refugeesinternational.org/blog/syrian-refugees-and-right-education-turkey> (accessed 29 April 2015)
- J. Rehman (1995) *An Analysis of the Rights of Minorities in International Law*. PhD Thesis Submitted at the University of Hull. Hull, UK
- M. Reisman (1990) 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law' *The American Journal of International Law*, 84(4), 866-876
- D. Reiter (2001) 'Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy' *International Security*, 25(4), 41-67
- Republic of Slovenia, Government Office for Development and European Affairs (2012) *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)*, http://www.arhiv.svrez.gov.si/en/areas_of_work/slovenia_member_of_the_oecd/organisation_for_economic_co_operation_and_development_oecd/ (accessed on 3 July 2014)
- Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) *Turkey's Relations with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/oecd.en.mfa> (accessed 27 March 2015)
- (2013) *Turkey-EU Relations*, updated 2013, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa> (accessed 5 March 2015)
- (2015) *Foreign Policy – Synopsis*, <http://www.ottava.be.mfa.gov.tr/MFA.aspx> (accessed on 13 May 2015)
- R. Rhoda and T. Burton (2013) *Why is Mexico in the OECD?* <http://geo-mexico.com/?p=8410> (accessed on 19 February 2013)
- W. H. Riker (1995) 'The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory' *Political Psychology*, 16(1), 23-44
- T. Risse (2002) 'Nationalism and Collective Identities: Europe versus the Nation State?' *Developments in West European Politics*, 2, 77-93
- T. Risse and K. Sikkink (1999) 'The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction' in T. Risse, S. C. Ropp and K. Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press) 1-38
- T. Risse-Kappen (1995) 'Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument' *European Journal of International Relations*, 1(4), 491-517
- A. Ritschl (2012) 'Germany, Greece and the Marshall Plan' *The Economist*, 15 June, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/06/economic-history> (accessed on 11 November 2014)

- B. Robellet Kuniholm (1980) *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- P. Robins (1991) *Turkey and the Middle East* (London, UK: Pinter Publishers)
- D. Rodrik (2011) 'Ergenekon and Sledgehammer: Building or Undermining the Rule of Law' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 10(1), 99-109
- (2013) 'The Wrath of Erdoğan' *Juncture*, 20(2), 129-130
- (2014) 'The West has Failed to See the Abuses of the Turkish Regime' *Social Europe Journal*, 27, www.socialeurope.eu/2014/06/turkish-regime (accessed on 27 June 2014)
- C. Rodríguez, A. Ávalos, H. Yilmaz and A. I. Planet, eds., (2014) *Turkey's Democratization Process* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge)
- L. Rodrigues and J. Black (2013) 'Managing Information and Communications in a Fast-Changing World' *OECD Observer*, [http://www.oecdobserver.org/news / full story.php/ aid/3943/Managing information and communications in a fast-changing world .html](http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/full_story.php/aid/3943/Managing_information_and_communications_in_a_fast-changing_world_.html) (accessed on 2 March 2013)
- A. Rose (2005) 'Which International Institutions Promote International Trade?' *Review of International Economics*, 13(4), 682-698
- G. N. Rosenberg (2008) *The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?* 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press)
- J. Rothman, ed. (2012) *From Identity-Based Conflict to Identity-Based Cooperation: The ARIA Approach in Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Springer)
- E. Rouleau (2000) 'Turkey's Dream of Democracy' *Foreign Affairs*, 79(6), 100-114
- H. J. Rubin and I.S. Rubin (2005) *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data*, 2nd ed., (London, UK: SAGE Publications, Inc.)
- J. G. Ruggie (1991) 'Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Institutions and Progress in International Economic Relations' in E. Adler and B. Crawford, eds., *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press) 201-234
- B. Rumelili (2004) 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation' *Review of International Studies*, 30(1), 27-47
- B. Russett (1993) *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- J. D. Sachs (2013) 'Why Turkey is Thriving,' *Project Syndicate*, 27 May, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/inside-the-turkish-economic-miracle-by-jeffrey-d-sachs> (accessed on 9 February 2015)
- E. Said (1977) *Orientalism* (London, UK: Penguin)
- U. C. Sakollioğlu (1998) 'Rethinking the Connections between Turkey's "Western" Identity Versus Islam' *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 7(12), 3-18

- J. Salzman (2005) 'Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development' *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 68, 189-224
- A. C. Samli (1964) 'Wholesaling in an Economy of Scarcity: Turkey' *Journal of Marketing*, 28(3), 55-58
- B. San (1996) 'The Council of Europe and Forceful Suspension of Democracy in its Member States: A Comparison Between the Council of Europe's Responses to the Military Takeover of 1967-1974 in Greece and the Military Takeover of 1980-1983 in Turkey' *Turkish Yearbook of Human Rights, 1995-1996*, 17/18, 15-42
- J. A. Sánchez and J. Pizarro Miranda (2015) 'How Local Ideas Spread in English: A Network Analysis of Think-Tanks on Twitter' *Elcano Royal Institute Working Paper*, 1, 1-23
- P. Sands and P. Klein (2009) *Bowett's Law of International Institutions*, 6th ed., (London, UK: Thomas Reuters)
- D. Sarooshi (2005) *International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press)
- J. C. Satterthwaite (1972) 'The Truman Doctrine: Turkey' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 401, 74-84
- G. Scarre (2002) *Utilitarianism* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge)
- A. Schäfer (2004) 'A New Form of Governance?: Comparing the Open Method of Coordination to Multilateral Surveillance by the IMF and the OECD' *MPIFG Working Paper*, 4/5 (Cologne, DE: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies)
- A. Schedler (1998) 'What is Democratic Consolidation?' *Journal of Democracy*, 9(2), 91-107
- E. H. Schein (1996) 'Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organizational Learning' *Sloan Management Review*, 38(1), 9-20
- F. Schimmelfennig (2009) 'Entrapped Again: The Way to EU Membership Negotiations with Turkey' *International Politics*, 46, 413-431
- G. Schlee (2013) 'Getting Back to the Basics' Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Report 2012-2013, vol.I, (Halle/Saale, DE: Max Planck Institute) 9-13
- A. M. Schlesinger Jr. (1965) *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company)
- M. Schmelzer (2013) 'Thorkil Kristensen' IO BIO, *Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organisations*, www.ru.nl/fm/iobio (accessed 29 November 2014)
- K. Schönwälder (2004) 'Why Germany's Guestworkers were Largely Europeans: The Selective Principles of Post-War Labour Recruitment Policy' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 27(2), 248-265

- J. A. Schumpeter (1947) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London, UK: Henderson and Spalding)
- T. A. Schwandt (1997) *Qualitative Inquiry* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage)
- C. Seale (1999) 'Quality in Qualitative Research' *Qualitative Inquiry*, 5(4), 465-478
- D. Secchi (2011) *Extendable Rationality, Organization Change and Innovation* (New York, NY: Springer)
- D. Seddon (2004) *A Political and Economic Dictionary of the Middle East* (London, UK: Europa Publications)
- M. Seeberg (2013) 'Foundations of Political Order in Emerging Democracies' *Political Studies Review*, 11(1), 39-51
- A. Sen (1973) 'Behaviour and the Concept of Preference' *Economica*, 40(159), 241-259
- (1977) 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory' *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6(4), 317-344
- (1979) 'Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?' *The Economic Journal*, 89(355), 537-558
- (1987) 'The Standard of Living: Lecture I, Concepts and Critiques' in G. Hawthorn, ed., *The Standard of Living* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press) 1-19
- (1992) *Inequality Reexamined* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
- (1993) 'Capability and Well-Being' in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press) 9-30
- (1998) 'The Possibility of Social Choice' in T. Persson, ed., *Nobel Lectures, Economics 1996-2000* (Singapore, World Scientific Publishing Co.), 178-215
- E. Serbest (2015) 'I Have a New Plan for a New Charter: Turkish PM' *Hurriyet Daily News*, 28 December
- E. Şhafak (2011) 'East, West, and Global Souls' *Campagna-Kerven Lecture Series on Modern Turkey*, Boston University International Relations, 13 May, <http://www.bu.edu/ckls/videos/video-elif-shafak-2010-2011/> (accessed on 2 March 2015)
- E. Shafir (1993) 'Choosing Versus Rejecting: Why Some Options are Both Better and Worse than Others' in *Memory & Cognition*, 21(4), 546-556
- D. Shankland (1993) *Alevi and Sunni in Rural Turkey: Diverse Paths of Change*. PhD Thesis Submitted at the University of Cambridge. Cambridge, UK
- D. R. Shanks (1985) 'Hume, on the Perception of Causality' *Hume Studies*, 11(1), 94-108
- K. J. Shannon (2012) 'Truman and the Middle East' in D. S. Margolies, ed., *A Companion to Harry S. Truman* (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell), 362-388

- A. H. Shissler (2003) *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey* (New York, NY: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd)
- R. W. Shoemaker (1966) "Democracy" and "Republic" as Understood in Late Eighteenth-Century America' *American Speech*, 41(2), 83-95
- K. S. Shultz, C. C. Hoffman and R. Reiter-Palmon (2005) 'Using Archival Data for I-O Research: Advantages, Pitfalls, Sources, and Examples' *The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist*, 42(3), 31-37
- H. A. Simon (1947) *Administrative Behaviour* (New York, NY: Macmillan)
- (1955) 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice' *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69(1), 99-118
- (1957) *Models of Man* (New York, NY: Wiley)
- (1959) 'Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science' *The American Economic Review*, 49(3), 253-283
- (1978) 'Prize Lecture: Rational Decision-Making in Business Organizations' *Nobel Lectures, Economics 1969-1980*, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1978/simon-lecture.pdf (accessed on 11 August 2014)
- (1996) *The Sciences of the Artificial*, 3rd ed., (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
- (1999) 'The Potlatch Between Political Science and Economics' in J. Alt, M. Levi and E. Ostrom, eds., *Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).112-119
- B. Simpfendorfer (2011) *The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World is Turning Away from the West and Rediscovering China*, 2nd ed., (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave macmillan)
- D. J. Simpson (1965) 'Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey' *Middle East Journal*, 19(2), 141-152
- G. Sirianni, S. Jacob, R. Mundry, and C. Boesch (2015) 'Cracking the Case: Wild Chimpanzees Select Nut-Cracking Tools Taking Account of Up to Five Different Factors' *Behavioural Biology*, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 2 January, <http://www.mpg.de/8820717/nut-cracking-chimpanzees> (accessed 18 February 2015)
- T. Skocpol (1979) *States and Social Revolutions* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- M. Skordeli (2012) 'The Way Forward: Sixty Years from the Accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO' *NATO Review Magazine*, 13 February, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Turkey-Greece/Greece-Turkey-60-years-NATO/EN/index.htm> (accessed 15 March 2014)
- A. Slaughter (2004) *A New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)

- A. Smith (1776) *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London, UK: Methuen & Co. Ltd)
- A. Smith (1790) *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (London, UK: A. Millar)
- M. Smith Anderson and M. Smith Anderson (1966) *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*, vol.146 (London, UK: Macmillan)
- D. Snidal (1985) 'The Game Theory of International Politics' *World Politics*, 38(1), 25-57
- D. Snidal (2002) 'Rational Choice and International Relations' in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London, UK: SAGE Publications, Ltd.), 73-94
- S. A. Sofos (2001) 'Reluctant Europeans? European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Politics' in K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias, eds., *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery* (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.)
- E. Sorel and P.C. Padoan, eds.(2008) *The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the Twenty-First Century* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- V. Sørensen (2001) *Denmark's Social Democratic Government and the Marshall Plan, 1947-1950* (Copenhagen, DEN: Museum Tusculanum Press)
- D. Soskice (1999) 'Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s' in H. Kitschelt et al., *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 101-134
- T. Sowell (1974) *Classical Economics Reconsidered* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
- P. B. Spahn (1997) 'The Marshall Plan: Searching for Creative Peace, Then and Now' *MPRA Paper*, 13248, 1-17
- E. E. Spalding (2012) 'The Truman Doctrine' in D. S. Margolies, ed., *A Companion to Harry S. Truman* (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell), 327-346
- G. Stedward (1997) 'On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing' in P. Burnham, ed., *Surviving the Research Process in Politics* (London, UK: Pinter), 151-166
- A. A. Stein (1999) 'The Limits of Strategic Choice: Constrained Rationality and Incomplete Explanation' in D. A. Lake and R. Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 197-228
- R. H. Steinberg (2002) 'In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO' *International Organization*, 56(2), 339-374
- J. E. Stiglitz (1999) 'Reforming the Global Economic Architecture: Lessons from Recent Crises' *The Journal of Finance*, 54(4), 1508-1521
- D. Stone (2001) 'Think Tanks, Global Lesson-Drawing and Networking Social Policy Ideas' *Global Social Policy*, 1(3), 338-360

- (2005) 'Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Transition,' in T. Hashimoto et al, eds., *Public Policy Research and Training in Vietnam*, 38-108
- (2007) 'Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes' *Public Administration*, 85(2), 259-278
- G. Strange (2011) 'Global Economic Governance Institutions and the Developing World: From Bretton Woods to Beijing?' *Research-to-Teaching/Teaching-to-Research Working Paper*, 7, 1-12
- S. Strange (1998) 'Why do international organizations never die?' in B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek, eds., *Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations* (London, UK: Routledge), 213-220
- D. W. M. Straw (2010) *Human Rights in Turkey: A Comparative Perspective on Violation and Resolution*. PhD Thesis Submitted at the University of Leicester. Leicester, UK
- D. W. M. Straw (2013) *Human Rights Violation in Turkey: Rethinking Sociological Perspectives* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan)
- J. E. Sturges and K. J. Hanrahan (2004) 'Comparing Telephone and Face-to-Face Qualitative Interviewing: A Research Note' *Qualitative Research*, 4(1), 107-118
- R. Sugden (1991) 'Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy' *The Economic Journal*, 101, 751-785
- S. Sullivan (1997) *From War to Wealth: 50 Years of Innovation* (Paris, FR: OECD Publishing)
- W. S. Surrey (1948) 'The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948' *California Law Review*, 36(4), 509-557
- G. Sütçü (2011) *Democratic Party and Democracy in Turkey: With Special Reference to Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes*. PhD Thesis Submitted at Bilkent University. Ankara, TR
- P. Sutton (2011) 'The Concept of Small States in the International Political Economy' *The Round Table*, 100(413), 141-153
- B. Taciser, ed. (1993) *Where Does Europe End?* (Ankara, TR: Mas Matbaacilik / Anfa Ltd. Sti.)
- O. Tansey (2007) 'Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling' *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 40(4), 1-24
- J. E. Tausig and E. W. Freeman (1988) 'The Next Best Thing to Being There: Conducting the Clinical Research Interview by Telephone' *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 58(3), 418-427
- A. Taylor (2002) 'I'll Call You Back on My Mobile: A Critique of the Telephone Interview with Adolescent Boys' *Westminster Studies in Education*, 25(1), 19-34

- S. L. Taylor (2009) *Voting Amid Violence: Electoral Democracy in Colombia* (Lebanon, NH: Northeastern University Press)
- C. Teddlie and A. Tashakkori, eds., (2003) 'Major Issues and Controversies in the Use of Mixed Methods in the Social and Behavioural Sciences' in *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.), 3-50
- D. Tentori and M. Zandonini (2013) 'Trends and Leadership Challenges in the Evolution of the Global Economic System' *Transworld Working Paper*, 9, 1-21
- S. Tepe (2005) 'Turkey's AKP: A Model "Muslim-Democratic" Party?' *Journal of Democracy*, 16(3), 69-82
- K. D. Thurston (2013) 'Preference and Practical Reason: An Evaluation of Sen and Hausman' *Pharmakon Journal of Philosophy*, 4, 21-27
- C. Timmerman, D. Rohtus, and S. Mels, eds., (2008) *European and Turkish Voices in Favour and Against Turkish Accession to the European Union* (Brussels, BE: P.I.E. Peter Lang)
- R. M. Titmuss (1958) *Essays on 'the Welfare State'* (London, UK: Allen & Unwin)
- R. M. Titmuss (1974) *Social Policy* (London, UK: Allen & Unwin)
- G. Toniolo (2005) *Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930-1973* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- K. J. Topping (2005) 'Trends in Peer Learning' *Educational Psychology*, 25(6), 631-645
- A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood (1927) *Turkey* (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons)
- T. Triadafilopoulos and K. Schönwälder (2006) 'How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany's Guest Worker System' *German Politics & Society*, 24(3), 1-19
- T. Trout (1975) 'Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War' *International Studies Quarterly*, 19(3) 251-284
- H. S. Truman (1947) 'Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey: Address of the President of the United States,' 80th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Document 171, Delivered 12 March, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf#zoom=100 (accessed on 12 November 2014)
- H. S. Truman (1947) 'Special Message to the Congress on the Marshall Plan – 19 December 1947' *Public Papers of the President, Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953*, <http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1849> (accessed on 8 October 2014)
- E. Tsang (2014) 'Generalizing from Research Findings: The Merits of Case Studies' *International Journal of Management Reviews*, 16, 369-383

TUAC (2013) 'About TUAC,' <http://www.tuac.org/en/public/tuac/index.phtml> (accessed on 16 March 2013)

B. Tuncer (1967) 'An Overview of the External Financing Mechanism of the Turkish Economy' *The Turkish Yearbook*, vol.VIII, 1-13

B. Tuncer (1975) 'External Financing of the Turkish Economy and its Foreign Policy Implications' in K. H. Karpat, ed., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974* (Leiden, NL: E. J. Brill) 206-225

Turkey Constitution Watch (2013) *About TCW*, <http://turkeyconstitutionwatch.org/index.php/about-analiz/> (accessed on 5 May 2015)

Türkiye İş Bankası (1984) *Papers and Discussion: International Symposium on Atatürk Series on the Centenary of Atatürk's Birth* (Ankara, TR: Türkiye İş Bankası Cultural Publications)

B. S. Turner (1974) 'Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses' *The British Journal of Sociology*, 25(2), 230-243

A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (1981) 'The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice' *Science*, 211(4481) 453-458

A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (1986) 'Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions' *The Journal of Business*, 59(4), S251-S278

E. Üçkardeşler (2015) 'Turkey's Changing Social Policy Landscape' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 13(4), 149-161

Union of International Associations (2013) *Yearbook of International Organizations, 1909-2013*, <http://www.uia.org/> (accessed on 1 July 2014)

Union of International Associations (2015) *The Yearbook of International Organizations*, <http://www.uia.org/yearbook> (accessed on 19 February 2015)

United Nations (1945) *Charter of the United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> (accessed on 2 July 2014)

----- (1961) *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1964/06/19640624%2002-10%20AM/Ch_III_3p.pdf

----- (1969) *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf> (accessed on 11 November 2015)

----- (2004) *Secretariat*, <http://www.un.org/documents/st.htm> (accessed on 9 November 2015)

----- (2011) *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change-unfccc-and-the-kyoto-protocol.en.mfa> (accessed on 23 January 2016)

----- (2013) *Member States of the United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/members/> (accessed on 8 March 2013)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2014) *OECD Archives*, <http://www.unesco.org/archives/sio/Eng/presentation.php?idOrg=1027> (accessed on 30 July 2014)

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2013) *Opportunities for Parties in Annex I to the Convention whose Special Circumstances are Recognized by the Conference of the Parties to Benefit from Support from Relevant Bodies and Institutions to Enhance Mitigation, Adaptation, Technology, Capacity-Building and Access to Finance*, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/tp/03.pdf> (accessed on 23 January 2016)

United States of America, Department of State (1947) 'Committee of European Economic Co-operation,' *General Report*, vol.I, Released 21 September, http://marshallfoundation.org/library/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/2014/04/Committee_of_European_Economic_Co-operation_General_Report_1947.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2014)

United States Congress (80th, 2nd Session) (1948) 'European Recovery Program,' Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Senate Report*, 935, <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/documents/report-committee-foreign-relations/> (accessed on 27 October 2014)

United States Mission to the OECD (2013) 'What is the OECD?', <http://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/overview.html> (accessed on 19 January 2013)

U. S. National Archives and Records Administration (2009) *The National Declassification Center Prioritization Plan* <http://www.archives.gov/declassification/ndc/final-prioritization-plan.pdf> (accessed 30 July 2014)

D. W. Urwin (1995) *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Pearson)

N. Uslu (2004) *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period* (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.)

S. Üstün (1997) 'Turkey and the Marshall Plan: Strive for Aid' *The Turkish Yearbook*, vol.XXVII, 31-52

B. Van Gorp and H. Renes (2007) 'A European Cultural Identity? Heritage and Shared Histories in the European Union' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 98(3), 407-415

M. A. G. Van Meerhaeghe (1980) *A Handbook of International Economic Institutions* (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers)

P. Vanderschraaf and G. Sillari (2014) 'Common Knowledge' in E. N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-knowledge/> (accessed on 13 March 2015)

- C. VanGrasstek (2013) *The History and Future of the World Trade Organization* (Geneva, CH: WTO Publications)
- I. Velody (1998) 'The Archive and the Human Sciences: Notes Towards a Theory of the Archive' *History of the Human Sciences*, 11(4) 1-16
- P. Vennesson (2008) 'Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices' in D. Della Porta and M. Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 223-239
- J. Verschaeve (2013) 'The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Unimportant or Under-Researched?' *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, 4(1), 134-136
- S. K. Vogel (1996) *Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)
- A. Von Bogdandy, P. Dann and M. Goldmann (2007) 'Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities' *German Law Journal*, 9(11), 1375-1400
- J. W. Walker (2007) 'Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey's New Foreign Policy Doctrine' *Insight Turkey*, 9(3), 32-47
- K. Ward (2013) 'The European Enlightenment and the Age of Reason' *EURESIS Journal*, 5, 171-190
- G. Warner (1974) 'The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan' *International Affairs*, 50(1), 82-92
- T. Wartenberg (1990) *The Forms of Power* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press)
- J. Waterbury (1992) 'Export-Led Growth and the Center-Right Coalition in Turkey' *Comparative Politics*, 24(2), 127-145
- J. Waterbury (1993) *Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- A. Watson (1982) *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States* (London, UK: Eyre Methuen Ltd)
- A. T. Waugh (1933) 'Nine Years of Republic in Turkey' *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 20(1), 52-69
- E. Webb (2007) *Civilizing Religion: Jacobin Projects of Secularization in Turkey, France, Tunisia, and Syria*. PhD Thesis Submitted at the University of Pennsylvania. Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- M. C. Webb (1995) *The Political Economy of Policy Coordination: International Adjustment Since 1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)

- M. Webber (2007) *Inclusion, Exclusion and the Governance of European Security* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press)
- M. Weber (1927) *General Economic History*, F. H. Knight, transl., (New York, NY: Greenberg Publishers, Inc.)
- (1930) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, T. Parsons, transl., (London, UK: Allen and Unwin)
- (1968) *Economy and Society*, G. Roth and C. Wittich, transl., (Totowa, NJ: The Bedminster Press)
- (1978) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds., 2nd ed., (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press)
- J. R. Wegs and R. Ladrech (2006) *Europe since 1945: A Concise History*, 5th ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan)
- A. Wendt (1991) 'Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations' *Review of International Studies*, 17(4), 383-392
- (1992) 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics' *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425
- (1994) 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State' *American Political Science Review*, 88, 384-396
- , ed. (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press)
- J. West (2011) 'The OECD and Asia: Worlds Apart in Today's Globalization?' *Revista de Economía Mundial*, 28, 67-92
- O. A. Westad (2000) *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass Publishers)
- J. Whalley (2009) 'Shifting Economic Power' *OECD Perspectives on Global Development*, September, 1-46
- A. Wheatcroft (2008) *The Enemy at the Gate: Habsburgs, Ottomans, and the Battle for Europe* (New York, NY: Basic Books)
- J. White (2014) 'Turkey at a Tipping Point' *Current History*, 113(767), 356-361
- E. Wigen (2015) 'Two Level Language Games: International Relations as Inter-Lingual Relations' *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(2), 427-450
- A. Wildavsky (1987) 'Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation' *The American Political Science Review*, 81(1), 3-22
- P. Wittek (1938) *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, UK: Royal Asiatic Society)
- R. Wolfe (1993) *The Making of the Peace, 1993: A Review of Canadian Economic Diplomacy at the OECD*, Economic and Trade Policy Branch Working Paper (Ottawa, CA: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada)

- (2001) 'Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development' in B. R.J. Jones, ed., *Routledge Encyclopaedia of International Political Economy* (London, UK: Routledge)
- (2008) 'From Reconstructing Europe to Constructing Globalization: The OECD in Historical Perspective', in R. Mahon and S. McBride, eds., *The OECD and Transnational Governance* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press), 25-42
- (2011) 'The OECD Contribution to the Evolution of Twenty-first Century Trade Law' *George Washington International Law Review*, 43(1), 277-293
- L. Wolff (1994) *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press)
- R. E. Wood (1986) *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press)
- R. Woodward (2004) 'Global Monitor: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development' *New Political Economy*, 9(1), 113-127
- (2006) 'Age Concern: The Future of the OECD' *The World Today*, 62(8-9), 38-39
- (2007a) 'The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century' in S. Lee and S. McBride, eds., *Neo-Liberalism, State Power and Global Governance* (Dordrecht, UK: Springer) 231-244
- (2007b) 'Global Governance and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development' in G. Hook and H. Dobson, eds., *Global Governance and Japan: The Institutional Architecture* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge) 59-75
- (2008a) 'Towards Complex Multilateralism? Civil Society and the OECD', in R. Mahon and S. McBride, eds., *The OECD and Transnational Governance* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press), 77-95
- (2008b) 'Why is the OECD Involved in the Heiligendamm Process?', in A. F. Cooper and A. Antkiewicz, eds., *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process* (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press), 263-284
- (2009) *The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)*, (Abingdon: Routledge)
- World Bank Group (2013) *Country and Lending Groups*, <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups> (accessed on 25 January 2013)
- (2015) *Turkey Overview*, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview> (accessed 10 April 2015)
- (2016) *Colombia*, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia> (accessed on 8 February 2016)

- G. Wright and P. Ayton, eds. (1987) *Judgmental Forecasting* (Chichester, UK: Wiley)
- M. H. Yavuz (2003) *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press)
- R. R. Yin (2009) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 4th ed., (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage)
- N. Yentürk (2014) 'Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure' *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Insights on Peace and Security*, 1, 1-20
- B. A. Yesilada (2002) 'Turkey's Candidacy for EU Membership' *Middle East Journal*, 56(1), 94-111
- F. Zakaria (1997) 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy' *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), 22-43
- M. J. Zickar (2009) 'Guide to Archival Research' *The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist*, 46(4), 57-59
- E. J. Zürcher (1991) *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party: 1924-1925* (New York, NY: E. J. Brill)

Appendices

Appendix 1

List of OECD Member States

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israël, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States

*The EU has the status of quasi-member (with a permanent delegation)

(OECD, Members and partners, 2013)

OEEC Member States

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom

(OECD, Organisation for European Economic Co-operation)

+ the German Federal Republic (1949)

+Spain (1958)

Appendix 2: The International Economic Architecture – Situating the OECD

Membership is theoretically universal

*main headquarters in USA



Economic & Social Council



Specialized Agencies





Europe




Membership is more limited

*main headquarters in Europe



Informal Blocs

*no headquarters



They support and are maintained by several entities, including:

regional institutions
(such as the EU and
NATO)

(national) governments,
central banks &
parliaments

other international
organisations

Note: Under international public law the private sector is not included

Appendix 3: OECD Resources

| Resources | 34 member countries | |
|------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Budget | EUR 363 million | EUR 10.7 million/ member (average) |
| Staff | 2,500 (Secretariat) | 74 staff / member country |
| Data | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - member & non-member profiles - regional, national and sub-national data - 475 public policy topics | |
| Network | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - heads of state and ministers - ambassadors - leaders in business, industry, academia, government and civil society - members of parliaments (MPs) - civil servants from around the world - other IGOs (including international development banks) - trade unions (through TUAC) | |

(Sourced from OECD website, 2015)

Appendix 4: The OECD

Permanent Representations to the OECD
(35 delegations)

COUNCIL
(35 representatives)

∧

SECRETARY- GENERAL

┌-----┐

Deputies & Chief of Staff

GENERAL SECRETARIAT
(multidisciplinary)

Operational Directorates (6)

Public Affairs & Communications

Committees,
Working
groups
Expert
groups
(250)

Departments:

Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local Development
Centre for Tax Policy and Administration
Directorate for Education and Skills
Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry
Development Co-operation Directorate
Economics Department
Environment Directorate
Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate
Statistics Directorate
Trade and Agriculture Directorate

Special Bodies (7) : Africa Partnership Forum, Development Centre,
Financial Action Task Force, International Energy Agency, International
Transport Forum, Nuclear Energy Agency, Sahel and West Africa Club

Appendix 5

Main Diplomatic Centres Worldwide

| <u>Location</u> | <u>Missions to the United Nations</u> | <u>Other Missions</u> |
|----------------------------|--|-----------------------|
| New York (USA) | Permanent Missions to the UNO (Responsible for relations with UN bodies, including) *Security Council *General Assembly *Economic & Social Council (ECOSOC) *Development Programme (UNDP) | -- |
| Geneva (Switz) | Permanent Missions to the UN Office at Geneva (Responsible for relations with UN & its agencies, including) *High Commissioner for Human Rights *Conference on Disarmament *International Labour Organization (ILO) *World Health Organization (WHO) *World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | WTO EFTA |
| Vienna (Austria) | Missions to the UN Offices at Vienna (Responsible for relations with UN bodies, including) *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) *UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) *UN Commission on International Trade Law | OSCE |
| Paris (France) | Delegations to UNESCO *UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization | OECD |
| Rome (Italy) | Permanent Missions to the FAO (Responsible for relations with UN bodies, including) *Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN *The World Food Programme | |
| Nairobi (Kenya) | Missions to the Office of the UN in Nairobi (Responsible for relations with UN bodies, including) *UN Centre for Human Settlements (UN-HABITAT) *UN Environment Programme (UNEP) | |

The Hague
(Netherlands)

Permanent Representatives to the OPCW
*Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Montreal
(Canada)

Permanent Missions to the ICAO
*International Civil Aviation Organization

London
(England)

Missions to the International Maritime Organization
*a UN specialized agency (IMO)

Madrid
(Spain)

Missions to the World Tourism Organization
*a UN agency (UNWTO)

Brussels
(Belgium)

--

EU

NATO

Strasbourg
(France)

--

CoE

Washington,DC
(USA)

--

OAS

Addis Ababa
(Ethiopia)

African Union

Appendix 6: The OECD's Reach

Global Relations

 **Paris, France**
(OECD headquarters)
-Global Forums (10)
(GRS)

Member States (34)
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israël, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States



Key Partners:

Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia & South Africa

Offices in Beijing & Moscow

Parliamentary Network: (members & non-members)

+

-Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
-NATO Parliamentary Assembly

OECD Centres:

Berlin, Mexico City,
Tokyo & Washington D.C.

Partnership Agreements with:

-Asian Development Bank
-European Investment Bank
-Inter-American Development Bank
-International Labour Organization

Regularly Works with:

-African Development Bank (ADB)
-Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
-Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
-Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
-Group of 8 / Group of 20 (G8/G20)
-International Monetary Fund (IMF) & World Bank (WB)
-United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
-United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
-United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
-World Health Organization (WHO)
-World Trade Organization (WTO)

Appendix 7

OECD Working Papers 1994

| | |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 38 publications examined | 4 contain references to Turkey |
| 4/38 = 10.5% (Turkey features in just 10.5% of the publications.) | |

How Turkey is featured in these 4 publications:

| | |
|--|--|
| 2 publications – Turkey is listed in charts providing statistics on all members, and there is data included for Turkey (See *) | 2 publications – Turkey is explicitly mentioned in the studies (for its particular policy practices) |
|--|--|

The 4 Working Papers:

| | |
|-----|--|
| #39 | <i>The Market for Dairy Products: Situation & Outlook *</i> |
| #60 | <i>Globalisation of Industrial Activities: A Case Study of the Clothing Industry</i> |
| #77 | <i>The Steel Industry in Transition: Financial & Privatisation Issues *</i> |
| #84 | <i>Health Care Reform – Controlling Spending & Increasing Efficiency</i> |

Some of the other Working Paper topics (which do not feature Turkey):

| | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| -regional policies | -environment and development | -agriculture |
| -direct investment abroad | -mobility in higher education | |
| -pollution estimates | -fiscal trends and targets | -foreign direct investment |
| -water resources management | -reduction of environmental chemicals | |
| -risk reduction of selected brominated flame retardants | | |

OECD Working Papers 1995

| | |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 71 publications examined | 7 contain references to Turkey |
| 7/71 = 9.9% (Turkey features in just 9.9% of the publications.) | |

How Turkey is featured in these publications:

| | |
|--|--|
| 3 publications – Turkey is listed in charts providing statistics on all members, and there is data included for Turkey (See *) | 2 publications – Turkey participated in the seminars organised by the OECD (with resulting publications) (See +) |
|--|--|

The 7 Working Papers:

| | |
|-----|--|
| #04 | <i>An Assessment of Financial Reform in OECD Countries</i> * |
| #14 | <i>Performance Standards in Education</i> + |
| #29 | <i>Aid to Central and Eastern European Countries</i> * |
| #33 | <i>Improving the Effectiveness of Technical Co-operation</i> + |
| #38 | <i>Cheap International Tariffs, OECD Countries</i> |
| #40 | <i>National Treatment for Foreign-Controlled Enterprises</i> |
| #63 | <i>Social Protection for Dependent Elderly People</i> * |

Some of the other Working Paper topics (which do not feature Turkey):

| | |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| -improvement of economic forecasts | -water resources management |
| -cleaner industrial production in developing countries | -long-term interest rates |
| -environmental subsidies | -employment: job gains and losses |

Appendix 8

Turkey's affiliations with all of the major European-based international organisations have been brought into question at one time or another. It is commonly claimed that following Turkey's World War II neutrality and upon the escalation of transatlantic tensions into a *Cold War*, the Republic was accepted into the ranks of the OEEC/ OECD (1948), the Council of Europe (1949), and NATO (1952) in order to act as a *buffer* against the Soviets (Müftüler-Bac, 1998: 243). Turkey has, thus, been known to get its way over the years by playing the "military/security card" (Bilgin, 2003: 347). Yet, the *democracy-security link* is relatively recent in the case of Turkey and has not always been a consideration for the country's inclusion in European institutions (Webber, 2007: 194). The OEEC/OECD aside, Turkey's admission to (and subsequent membership of) each of the aforementioned international organisations has generated a considerable amount of debate, as will be seen in kind.

Council of Europe :

Firstly, referring to Turkey's membership of the Council of Europe (CoE), some observers note that it is "remarkable" (Webber, 2007: 194) that Turkey was able to join an organisation dedicated to upholding democracy and human rights nearly one year before it had even implemented a system of free general elections. Specifically, Turkey became a member of the CoE (together with Greece) on 9 August, 1949, three months after the CoE was founded (on 5 May 1949). Turkey's membership was controversial in that it meant that *Europe* was being defined beyond its traditional geographical lines to encompass more of a *community of values* (Jordan, 2003: 282). Over the years, Turkey has often been portrayed as defying or resisting the norms of the CoE; for instance, between 1987 and 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided against Turkey in more than 2,400 of its cases that made it to proceeding (Costa, 2003).

In fact, Turkey has been the subject of more ECtHR judgments than any other member state⁴⁷² since the ECtHR was established in 1959 (European Court of Human Rights, 2014: 4). Following its military coup in 1980, Turkey was suspended from the Council of Europe (Evin and Denton, 1990)⁴⁷³ when a group of CoE members filed a petition, claiming torture and inhuman treatment in Turkey (San, 1996: 36). There was great debate about whether to expel Turkey from the CoE altogether (Müftüler-Bac, 1997: 80), considering that the country was not embodying democratic principles.⁴⁷⁴

NATO:

Secondly, Turkey's accession to NATO, in February of 1952, was not as quick or easy as many today would assume, given Turkey's lengthy and noted history in NATO (Göktepe, 2003: 9). Initially, Turkey was considered to be "an unlikely member" (Bilgin, 2003: 348). Limited democratisation was underway in the country (Webber, 2007: 194), and NATO founding members -- particularly Britain, Denmark, and Norway -- were reluctant to admit Turkey into the organisation (Kurat, 1984; Bilgin, 2003: 347; Göktepe, 2003: 9). The European members did not want to extend their security commitment beyond the North Atlantic region (Göktepe, 2003: 9). Principally, some NATO members did not want to have liability for Middle Eastern affairs (Chourchoulis, 2015: 16). While all Turkish political parties and the general public approved of Turkey's admission to NATO -- to the degree that it has been referred to as a 'national consensus' (Göktepe, 2003: 10) -- there was much more dissonance among NATO founder members.

⁴⁷² Russia did not join the CoE until June 1992, so it does not have the same lengthy history of ECtHR judgments as does Turkey.

⁴⁷³ The CoE suspension of Turkey's membership was not lifted until May 1984, when democratic elections were reinstated in the country (Evin & Denton, 1990).

⁴⁷⁴ Interestingly, Turkey's membership was not suspended during its 1960 coup, when Turkey's prime minister, foreign minister, and finance minister were all executed (Reiter, 2001: 57).

The Americans regarded Turkey as a *Mediterranean power* and wanted it to strengthen the alliance's *southern flank* (Chourchoulis, 2015: 12); whereas, the British argued that Turkey was a *Middle Eastern state* and favoured it having an association with NATO (ibid: 12). In 1951, the British objected to Turkey's entry into NATO and preferred to have Turkish forces under British command in Cairo (Göktepe, 2003: 9). Turkey refused, believing itself to be a *European power* (ibid: 9). All in all, Turkey's accession to NATO took much longer than its politicians had anticipated (ibid: 9). The Turks had to demonstrate their desire for solidarity with the United States and Europe by acting as a *dependable ally* during the Korean war (Bilgin, 2003: 347), thus winning the approval of all member parliaments. It was not until the post-Cold War period that Turkey's place in European security arrangements again came into question (Müftüler-Bac, 1998: 243), when the country's location no longer seemed as *strategic* (Öniş, 1995: 49).⁴⁷⁵ However, the debate has become fragmented since 2001 by cause of tensions rising in the Black Sea area as well as the Middle East (Uslu, 2004: 7).⁴⁷⁶

European Union:

Thirdly, Turkey's yet unrealised membership of the European Union (EU) prevails as "an enduring question" (Arikan, 2003: 1). Unmistakably, it constitutes "one of the most controversial external relations issues of the European Union" (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 413). Shortly after the European Economic Community was formed, Turkey applied for associate membership, in September of 1959. The negotiations were suspended within less than a year in face of a military coup taking control of the country, in May of 1960 (Sofos, 2001: 248; Webber, 2007: 194). After Turkey's political situation stabilised and the military groups finished contending for power (1961-1963), Turkey signed

⁴⁷⁵ Many presumed that Turkey had lost its geostrategic importance as an "integral component of the NATO alliance" (Öniş, 1995: 49).

⁴⁷⁶ It should be acknowledged that since the beginning of the 2001 war in Afghanistan, the Turkish public has become disenchanted with NATO. While the public's antipathy has eased somewhat since 2014, in general, Turks are said to have the least approval for NATO membership (Nyiri, 2012; German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2013: 30).

the Ankara Association Agreement with the EEC on 12 September 1963 (Karpat, 1970: 1680).⁴⁷⁷

Though the European public expressed concern over the Association Agreement,⁴⁷⁸ the Turks referred to it with passion – as much more than an economic affair (Döşemeci, 2013: 1). They looked upon integration with Europe as “the crowning symbol” (ibid: 1) of their accomplishments, revering it as “the consummation of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s vision” (ibid: 3) for Turkey “to reach the standards of contemporary civilization” (ibid: 3).⁴⁷⁹ Subsequently, the festivities faded shortly after the Association Agreement was signed, and many Turkish nationalists began to question the merits of the agreement (ibid: 5). It was not until the mid-1980s, following the country’s third modern-day military coup, that the government once again fixated upon its relations with the EEC.⁴⁸⁰ Turkey reoriented its policies toward a market-based economy (including the liberalisation of its import system as well as its foreign investment regime) and applied for membership in the European Common Market, expectant that its recent high rates of growth were satisfactory for membership (Öniş and Webb, 1992: 6). However, despite its efforts, Turkey’s application was rejected. The European Community deemed that Turkey was not ready for full membership (Yesilada, 2002: 95).

The country was considered to be “an awkward candidate” (Arikan, 2006: 1), problematic in that it was *different*, basically, a difficult case to deal with (ibid: 1). Recognised as *the other*, Turkey made Europeans feel insecure --

⁴⁷⁷ The *Official Journal of the European Communities* contains a copy of the text, which can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf

⁴⁷⁸ Turkey was not economically stable and there was great discrepancy between its economic policies and those of the European countries (Döşemeci, 2013: 2).

⁴⁷⁹ *Civilization* in this sense designates modernity and progress rather than a people (Döşemeci, 2013: 4).

⁴⁸⁰ This coincides with the *Single European Act* (1987), whereby EEC member states committed to creating a true common market (reducing all remaining economic barriers) by 1992 (European Commission, 1987).

insecure about themselves and about their European identity as a whole (Rumelili, 2004). It was not until the Helsinki Summit (10-11 December) in 1999⁴⁸¹ that Turkey received “candidate status” (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013: para 4), with eligibility for accession negotiations, which were launched on 3 October 2005.⁴⁸² At the heart of the debate about Turkey’s EU membership is the authenticity of its “European credentials” (Kubicek, 2008: 21). Quite understandably, a primary criterion for membership is that a country be *European* (Yesilada, 2002: 100), but *European* has not been expressly defined in the EU’s accession (Copenhagen) criteria (ibid: 100).⁴⁸³ In Turkey’s case, only 3% of its territory is located in Europe, while 97% is located in Asia (Deringil, 2007).⁴⁸⁴ This is not just a geographical issue; it is a culturally-rooted issue about the nature of *Europe* and what Europe should be (Sakollioglu, 1998; Kösebalaban, 2007: 87). According to the European Commission, enlargement is not simply a matter of deciding when a candidate country meets the criteria to join. It is also a matter of deciding “when the EU is ready to accept the new member” (European Commission, 2012: para 2).⁴⁸⁵

Over the years, the EU has cited border issues (security concerns), Turkey’s rigid stance towards Greece (Cyprus), and Turkey’s lack of protection

⁴⁸¹ A copy of the Presidency Conclusions is available through the University of Pittsburgh’s Archive of European Integration at http://aei.pitt.edu/43338/1/Helsinki_1999.pdf. It is interesting to note that Turkey was recognised as an EU candidate at the same time that the Council was looking towards a political settlement of the Cyprus problem in order to facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the Union.

⁴⁸² The European Commission provides a detailed history of the enlargement relations with Turkey: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm. It is said to be a “long road from Ankara to Brussels” (Akçapar & Chaibi, 2006).

⁴⁸³ Similar to the OECD’s accession criteria, the EU requires that countries have democratic institutions, a functioning market economy as well as the ability to take on the obligations associated with membership. The European Commission lists the criteria as part of its enlargement policy: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accesion-criteria_en.htm

⁴⁸⁴ Usage of the word *Europe* generally does not include Turkey (Nolan, 2002: 512), though as the preceding paragraphs attest, the country has a long history of economic and political relations with Europe.

⁴⁸⁵ Since 2005, this has led to a “persistent debate” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2007: 147), in both the EU and in Turkey, about whether the country should become a member of the EU at all.

for human rights and minorities as main reasons for delaying the country's accession (Arikan, 2006: vii). Further hesitancy exists in that Turkey is a large, mainly agrarian country⁴⁸⁶ with a relatively low level of economic development compared to most EU member states. Basically, there are notable socio-economic differences between the two groups (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 413). Support for Turkey's membership of the EU, therefore, has averaged at only around 30% -- lower than other candidate countries, to be sure (ibid: 413). Since Turkey first entered into an association with the European Community in 1963, twenty-two countries have joined the European Union. Turks are beginning to ask why they have repeatedly been excluded from EU membership over the past five decades (Arikan, 2006). Just as in the 1683 Siege of Vienna,⁴⁸⁷ it seems that the future of Europe will be defined by the Turks and whether or not they can gain entry (Wheatcroft, 2008).

⁴⁸⁶ Turkey would be the second largest member state upon accession (and likely to surpass Germany in the foreseeable future), which would alter the scheme of seats in the European Parliament and votes in the Council (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 413).

⁴⁸⁷ Walter Leitsch (1983) offers a colourful account of the event: <http://www.historytoday.com/walter-leitsch/1683-siege-vienna> .

Appendix 9

List of Respondents

This is an outline of all the individuals who have shared their views as reference for this study. Some interviewees have asked that their comments not be attributed to them or to their governments; accordingly, the data has been anonymised. In this way, the dates of the interviews have been provided in the body of the thesis for reference, but they are not listed herein.

Government Officials

Birgit Wilder
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Representation of AUSTRIA to the OECD
Paris, France

Laurent Tasquin
Attaché, Economie Mondiale, BELGIAN Federal Government
Brussels, Belgium

Ashleigh Searle
Programme Officer, Permanent Delegation of CANADA to the OECD
Paris, France

Ole Winkler Andersen
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Delegation of DENMARK to the OECD
Paris, France

Dr. Bettina Stuchtey
Head of Division VA2, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Government of
GERMANY
Berlin, Germany

Ambassador Einar Benediktsson (Ret.)
Government of the Republic of ICELAND
Reykjavík, Iceland

Nigel Hutson
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Representation of IRELAND to the OECD and UNESCO
Paris, France

Francesco Corsaro
First Secretary, Head of the Commercial Office
Embassy of the ITALIAN Republic to Canada
Ottawa, Canada

Tomohiro Kondo
Director, Europe Division, Trade Policy Bureau, METI, Government of JAPAN
Tokyo, Japan

Olivier Baldauff
Deputy Chief of Mission
Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG to the USA, Mexico, and Canada
Washington, DC

Ambassador Noé Van Hulst
Permanent Representative of the NETHERLANDS to the OECD
Paris, France

Inger Elisabeth Meyer
First Secretary, Royal NORWEGIAN Embassy
Ottawa, Canada

Jan Schuijjer
Senior Counsellor, Global Relations Secretariat, OECD
Paris, France

Javier Tena
Economic and Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of SPAIN in Ottawa
Ottawa, Canada

Aydin Aydin
Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of TURKEY
Ottawa, Canada

Nikos Tsotros
Head of Trade Statistics, BIS, Government of the UNITED KINGDOM
London, UK

Office of Public Affairs
Embassy of the UNITED STATES
Ottawa, Canada

Academics & Turkey Experts

Professor Raphael COHEN-ALMAGOR
Chair, School of Politics, Philosophy & International Studies, University of Hull
Hull, UK

Dr. Sophia DINGLI
Lecturer, School of Politics, Philosophy & International Studies, University of
Hull
Hull, UK

Professor Michael GRATZKE
Head, School of Languages, Linguistics and Cultures, University of Hull
Hull, UK

Dr. Dennis NGUYEN
Lecturer, Hogeschool University of Applied Sciences
Utrecht, Netherlands

Bashak ONAL
PhD Candidate, University of Hull
Hull, UK

Anna RAPPAPORT
Owner, Excelleration, LLC
Washington, DC

Amanda P. RILEY
Businessperson, Media Production
Bonby, UK

Appendix 10

A Copy of the Interview Schedule

My research explores the nature of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – its role in and influence over global economic governance. I am specifically interested in the question of the OECD's founding membership.

As an Original Member of the OECD,

1. What do you believe were some of the reasons behind your government helping to form the OECD?
2. Could you tell me a little bit about your country's role in forming the OECD?
3. In your opinion, what makes OECD membership valuable?
4. Do you believe membership in the OECD has benefitted your country? If so, how? If not, why not?
5. Do you believe the value of OECD membership has changed over the years? If so, how? If not, why not?
6. How would you describe your country's role in the OECD today?