

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

**Developments in Police Accountability: An Investigation into the Occupational
Culture of Senior Management of a Provincial Police Force.**

Being a thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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by

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Abstract

This research is a qualitative study that focuses on the occupational culture of the senior management of the public police in England and Wales. Empirical data is obtained from in-depth interviews of the whole senior management team in one English provincial police force. There is an examination of the legal framework of the accountability processes of the police with emphasis on the culture of performance management. The role of central control as the independent arbitrator in the accountability process is identified. It is argued that the use of central selection processes for senior managers in the police and the standard training for senior managers is the basis of improved management quality but the tensions of demands from local communities have led to a dilemma in the decision making and accountability processes. The recent development in the accountability process is explored through the perceptions of the senior managers. This is achieved by examining their perceptions against the background of police reform and change. The implementation of Best Value and the adoption of a local policing team model during fieldwork presented a background to examine senior managers in action. The role of civilian members in the management of the police is highlighted and it is argued that the accountability process is not totally effective on these managers who are not as visible as their police counterparts. This is disproportionate to the amount of power that they have within the police as an organisation. The emergence of a civilian senior manager's culture is highlighted as an important aspect of wider police occupational culture. The study concludes that the emphasis on micro detail involved in performance management distracts the senior managers from structural policies that influence police culture and behaviour on the streets. The

increase in internal accountability is identified as one of the strengths of the development in the accountability process through performance management. The introduction of techniques of measurement including performance indicators can lead to the alienation of police activity from diverse issues and stifle creativity. The more sophisticated the techniques get the greater the chance of it being acceptable universally within the police. The caveat is that the indicators must have a credible relationship to the police behaviour that is being measured. In order to create a change in the culture of the police it is essential for internal structures and subcultures to be understood as they are likely to hinder any well intentioned changes that contradict the core of the culture.

Preface

I have been interested in policing all my adult life. Also, I have been involved in theoretical and practical debates on how to deal with the limitations of the present police institution. The scope of debate has expanded, and the concept of policing includes all forms of social control, but I have been more interested in the aspect of the debate involving the public police.

I have taken the view that in order to address the problems of the public police it is necessary to get to the in-depth, intentional reasoning behind the decisions of the players within the system. I identified senior managers within the police as the key group of players within the system to examine mainly because of their influence and the lack of investigation into the group. The logistical problem of embarking on a research trying to understand the intentions behind decisions of the players is enormous. I have not been put off by the prospect of not achieving a reliable result but accepted this as the price to be paid for the information that will be revealed by dealing with this subject.

The fact that I am a serving police officer raises a number of issues that I fully discuss in Chapter 5, but the issue is worth investigation in order to enlighten us as to the intentions of the people within the system. This will enable us to understand the behaviour and decisions of senior managers. The interpretation that I bring to the occupational culture described in this study may be alien to some observers but the perspective of an insider differs. This is because of the biases and ability to see beyond the obvious to the intentions of managers. The conclusions from this

research are dynamic in nature because of the length of time that it has taken for this research.

The issue of leadership and diversity as individual themes and as a golden thread through all the other skills required has come to the fore recently. This is discussed in the light of my observations through the occupational culture of senior managers and the expectations from the public.

In pursuit of this research I have tried to be independent but I am sure that I have been influenced by environment and it is possible for me to reconsider my position on some issues as first impressions have been found to be wrong. This study is not meant to criticise individuals directly but it is the purpose to develop the performance of the police to the public. In light of this perspective the search is on to deliver a high quality of life policing style to the public through the development of senior managers in the police.

The views expressed in this study are personal and should not be used as an alternative to official statements. This is an academic examination of the intentions and attitudes of the people interviewed.

Chapter One

Introduction

This study is about the police and it deals with two issues. First, the impact of the 'new managerialism' on the culture of senior managers in the police. This is achieved by an empirical examination of the perceptions of actual senior managers in one police force. Secondly, the study focuses on the implications of this empirical study for broader debates about police accountability and governance. The developments in police accountability are described in relation to the culture of senior managers. The implications for the leadership and management of the police are examined in order to improve understanding and making of public policy in this arena. The tensions between the issue of political neutrality in policing and the demands of performance management culture are highlighted in order to contribute to the debate about where governance of police should be positioned.

The origins of this study can be traced to the tensions created by issues around management and governance of public service institutions. There is a distance between public expectations through political accountability and performance of the public service. The move to make professionals more accountable in the political sense has been a source of debates and crises. As a professional within the public service I feel the emphasis has been on the formal structures rather than on the informal ones. The lack of action in dealing with informal or occupational culture of the police meant that all formal changes have been less effective in practice. This is particularly relevant if it contradicts key tenets of

the prevailing occupational culture. One such occupational culture that has not been examined in depth is that of senior managers. This stems from the strongly held beliefs that personal responsibility is the solution to problems or issues that go wrong. This approach results in mistakes being repeated as only individuals and the policies relating to their behaviour are addressed in dealing with problems. This means that the effects of changes in policing to address mistakes are not primarily directed at the occupational culture that enables the mistakes to happen in the first instance. There is a move now to address this issue by focusing on improving police leadership through leadership programmes for senior managers. This process takes time and the environment in the field changes constantly. The changes in public perception and expectations fuel this process. This is because the public demands a higher standard of service from its public institutions and the levels of scrutiny available make the management of the police a reactive process. This study will contribute to this debate by highlighting the area to be addressed after the structure of informal control of staff by senior managers is identified. The unique nature of this research is the access to the perceptions of senior managers of the recent developments in the accountability process and the demands placed on them by the new process of accountability. The process of accountability can be improved by social engineering to develop and promote organisational change but with the caveat of identifying the views and concerns of the key players within the occupational culture.

The term 'new managerialism' is used to describe the new public management (NPM) that can be traced back to the government drive to introduce 'economy', 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' into the governance of the public sector. This can be traced within the police to the introduction of Home Office circular 114 of 1983. This circular extended to the police the government's 'Financial Management Initiative' that was introduced to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the public services. The focus moved from measuring 'inputs' to what the public sector organisations actually produced in terms of 'outputs' and 'outcomes' of their activities. The result was an emphasis on measurements through quantifiable numerical or statistical criteria in areas which traditionally were not measured. The process was not static and lessons were learnt from feedback from the field. The Audit Commission (AC) was actively engaged in promoting efficient and effective financial management in police forces. The publication of the 'Streetwise' report by the AC was influential and referred to as the basis of decision making in the management of policing. Loader and Mulcahy (2003) identified two organising themes of NPM as firstly, a move to make the police more business like in focusing on performance and secondly, a regime of audit and inspection. These two themes have developed rigorously with legislative activity in the area of police governance enacted to ensure compliance. The process was developed continuously and backed up by a great deal of legislative activity in the area of police governance. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Local Government Act 1999 and The Police Reform Act 2002 are the key pieces of legislation used to ensure the development of the 'new managerialism' process.

Jones (2003) identified four key long-term development trends in police governance as professionalisation, nationalisation, marketisation and pluralisation. These developments have resulted from changes in wider society and the police reaction to these changes. This has been conducted under the scrutiny of successive governments that have been faced with increased demand of accountability for perceived incompetence in delivery of public services. Reiner (2000) noted that the new Labour government that was elected in 1997 continued the same policies on policing that was started by the Conservatives but added on some new strands. The emphasis on crime reduction and partnership policing is one of the main early thrust of the new criminal justice policy. The establishment of control structures for the process of police reform through a performance culture regime is the link to the 'new managerialism' described above and will be discussed in detail later.. The influence of 'new managerialism' on police culture is the basis of this study.

The issues I focus on are whether this is a new form of accountability and the effect it has on the traditional modes of accountability. The effects of these developments on the senior managers and their culture form the areas of interest and are subjected to detailed examination. This study deals with the development of accountability from the perspective of senior managers and the impact of the changes in wider police culture. There is particular emphasis on the introduction of the Best Value regime within the police business processes.

In the course of this research certain issues are addressed. They include:

- The effects of recent developments in police accountability on the culture of police managers especially in relation to how they manage performance within their organisation.
- Do police managers manage performance differently as a result of changes in the modes of accountability outside the organisation and are there any special legal obstacles to any of these new developments?
- The principle of performance management within policing and the role of performance indicators.
- The dynamics of the relationship between police and support staff within the police.
- The link between internal and external mechanisms of police accountability.
- The implications for partnership working and multi agency approach to problem solving in the community.

These questions are not unique to the police as other public organisations face the same issues. As a result there is a need to observe the developments in other public organisations and police forces in other jurisdictions. The debate is whether the developments outside the police are the main source of the change in culture or whether these developments have been modified to fit the internal requirements of the police.

Therefore, the objectives of this thesis are as follows:

- To describe the internal structure of accountability within the police and its role in the larger debate about police governance and accountability,
- To examine the development of new public management and police governance,
- To identify how senior managers within the police manage performance and how performance measures influence police behaviour through a performance culture,
- To determine the culture of senior managers, and also their relationship with external institutions and the locus of this relationship,
- To identify recent developments in the modes of police accountability, the reasons for these changes and the implications for police leadership.

This research addresses these questions but concentrates on what the effects of the new emphasis on the new modes of accountability are on the management of performance within the police. This is within the wider debate of how to improve the performance of the public services without losing the democratic and legal basis and justification for achieving the results. The results will draw attention to the necessity to carry out close scrutiny of the practical effects of public policy on the people executing them. This research is approached from the perspective of the senior managers to establish whether the culture and participants within the police are monolithic. This will enable planners in the wider Criminal Justice System to reflect on the approach to be taken when planning strategic policy. The wide approach adopted by the present government to address the problem of crime and disorder in society requires this information to enable effectiveness of

policy. This will allow the evaluation of the strategic policy and plans to be assessed in order to learn from mistakes, while building on the successes of the past. The context of this research is that it takes place against the background of society with changing expectations and demands. These changes are a result of changing technology, public enlightenment, media and new forms of challenges to social order like terrorism. The ability to win public confidence is now a difficult task. The speed at which an incident can escalate and the potential effect on public trust puts pressure on all the people and processes involved. The issue of public trust and confidence are interlinked as the accountability processes come under scrutiny if the public are dissatisfied. The accountability processes are a means to an end of increasing public trust and confidence in the institution. This argument is also applicable internally within the police, as confidence and trust from members of staff is essential for the delivery of service to the public. This is why the occupational culture of the organisation impacts on the service delivery and public accountability.

Culture and Policing

'Culture' is used within this research in the wide sense, as a pervasive way of life within an organisation. Schein (1992) defines culture of a group as 'A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relations to those problems'. He suggested that the basic assumptions derive their power from the fact that they begin to operate outside of people's awareness. As a result culture is learned and evolves with

new experiences and can be changed if one has an understanding of the learning process dynamics. He linked culture to leadership and refers to leaders creating and managing culture. Reiner (2000) highlighted the fact that police culture is not monolithic, and this ensures the need to understand the internal structure within the police to locate certain aspects of its culture. This study operates within this framework and ensures that police culture in relation to senior managers is put into context. The context for this study is performance management and leadership as it relates to accountability and police governance.

I place emphasis on performance management and the development of processes like 'Best Value'. I explore the process of managerial emphasis on quality of service delivery and satisfying consumer demands. The implications for leadership required by senior managers in this new environment are examined, as well as the culture and subculture of the police in relation to accountability and performance management. The use of performance related pay for some senior managers within the police, the use of the concept of a family of similar forces, beacon status, league tables for forces and Basic Command Units (BCU) are all recent developments in the performance management culture. The role of culture of an organisation in the behaviour emanating from the institution is well documented and discussed later. Garland (2001) argues that an economic style of reasoning has developed as opposed to the social style of reasoning that was in existence previously. He further explains that the change is not wholesale replacement but a synthesis with the past and suggests that any analysis should reflect this. This changing culture affects the players within the system as it seems to disorientate them, due to what appears to be continuous changes, whilst

all the time the synthesis with the old culture is what is actually happening. The justification for new proposals is increasingly based on economic grounds of efficiency and effectiveness. It is the relationship of these rational choices and the political requirements of society that creates the tension that is faced by government. Accountability is the process in which this tension is addressed either before or after the decision making process. The dilemma involved in the making of choices during decision making ensures that senior managers have a difficult role.

The police do occupy a central position in the Criminal Justice System and attract attention as a result of their importance within the system. They play an essential role in safeguarding the rule of law and democracy, whilst being reliant on public support and cooperation. Therefore, the effectiveness of the police relies on public confidence which is reliant on the behaviour of the police towards the public. The accountability of the police is important because of their role in maintaining order in society through the use of legal powers that are supported by the state. The state is the main beneficiary of the maintenance of order by the police and the locus for complaint when the exercise of police powers does go wrong. Walker (2000) highlighted the ambivalent role of the state and as a result the state has to enact rules to constraint the use of police powers and also ensure that police powers are constantly reviewed in order to ensure effective performance. The discretionary nature of policing at enforcement and policy level makes decisions have political implications. Jones (2003) referred to the fundamentally political nature of policing. Previous researches have concentrated on the basis of police accountability and the different types of

modes necessary to ensure amongst other issues, legality and effectiveness in policing. This research investigates the legal implications of the recent development in the accountability process of the police and the role of senior managers within the process. This is analysed within the context of the changing culture of the police internally, externally and the wider Criminal Justice System. Arendt (1958) pointed out that the more public a group, the less power it is likely to have and real power begins to exist where secrecy exists. The idea of accountability increases the visibility of the activities of the police and its officials. The recent developments in public administration that include the openness of government to those governed will likely lead to changes in the power structures within society. It is within this context that this research is conducted.

Police Accountability

Accountability can be used in different contexts and as such can lead to misunderstanding. Accountability in one sense covers the attainment of a standard stipulated as the measure of acceptability. The standard stipulated can arise from internal or external institutions. This requires a process in order to judge if the standard has been complied with. Usually there is a repercussion for not attaining the standard. There is usually a relationship between the internal and external standards set and the processes for enforcing non compliance. In policing terms there is always a request for an explanation if any officer exceeds his or her authority. There is usually a legal or political process for the people who are complaining. The limited definition of accountability is used to refer to the consequences that follow a failure to meet acceptable standards. These

standards are sometimes defined but most of the time it relates to consequences of action or inaction as opposed to an objective standard. It is linked more to the primitive desire for vengeance if something goes wrong. Jones (2003) identified accountability of individual police officers as they go about their day to day activities and broader organisational policing policies and practices. This distinction is not new and in reality there is a need to address both if a mistake is made. This is when accountability process is activated after an incident as opposed to when police behaviour is influenced through the occupational culture through the use of rules. The policing policies and practice are developed in order that the individual is protected if the outcome of an action or inaction has negative results. He made a further distinction between internal and external mechanisms of accountability. The primary focus of this study is the internal mechanism but the influences of the external are examined. The earlier warning of Stenning (1995) against the over-reliance on external controls if they foster indifference or resistance within the police and weaken internal monitoring systems has to be noted. This is because these processes are inextricably linked and consequences that are unforeseen can develop to endanger the whole system.

Accountability is also used in the context of the various mechanisms employed to control the actions and inaction of all the individuals within the organisation. Mulgan (2000) noted that when accountability is used in this context it 'threatens to extend its reach over the entire field of institutional design'. When accountability is used in this wide context the psychological aspect of this concept allows it to be assimilated into the culture of the police and makes it

difficult to change. Therefore, perceptions of those involved in exercising power, especially in relation to discretion, are important.

Roche (2003) identified the problem with the use of the wide definition as the tendency to reach over the entire field of institutional design and all rules could be described as a form of accountability. It is this that actually makes the perceptions of 'the players' an important and legitimate subject to study. This is because if certain areas are left outside the definition their importance may not be recognised especially if it has been imbibed into the culture. This would not be visible to the casual observer. Roche in his discussion of accountability within the restorative justice system identified accountability in its classic sense as the obligation to explain or justify behaviour or decisions. He further states that if someone is not under such an obligation then s/he is not accountable. My argument is that even if formal or informal systems do exist it is the perception of the people involved about the accountability process that determines action or inaction. Roche deals with this point indirectly by his analysis of the dimensions of accountability. He identifies formal and informal, persuasive and directive, and finally retrospective and ongoing accountability. The formal and informal dimension refers to legal and cultural enforcement mechanisms. The persuasive and directive dimension deals with the ability to have influence as opposed to power to punish for non compliance. The third dimension is retrospective and ongoing accountability applies to the timing of the process. These dimensions are useful in analysing accountability but the various possibilities in terms of a process can confuse the understanding of accountability. Another useful observation is that accountability does not necessarily take place within superior

or subordinate relationships. The distinction between police and civilian staff is another source of analysing accountability because of the increasing changing nature of the make up of the two groups.

Accountability is necessary to improve the quality of performance, enhance legitimacy, complements other decision making factors and ensures stability within an organisation. Roche identifies seven principles of accountability:

- simplicity,
- timeliness,
- inclusiveness,
- motivational sensitiveness,
- independence,
- publicity,
- iterative accountability.

One of the themes of this thesis concerns the implications for police governance resulting from developments and change in emphasis to service delivery as the mechanism for accountability. The legitimacy of these developments is explored to determine if it is political or legal in nature. The wider issue of police accountability is still a raging debate although the emphasis has focused more on the internal or self regulatory processes. The demands placed on the senior managers as the self regulatory enforcers are examined and the developmental needs they require in order to deliver are discussed. The senior managers are the focus for the internal mechanism of accountability and as such their perceptions

influence their behaviour and decisions. They are also the loci for a significant part of the external accountability processes and enforce the external requirements in accountability.

Demand for Improvement in Public Services

Grout and Stevens (2003) warned of the need for reforms to the public service to recognize the special characteristics of public service. It is the special characteristics that need to be identified in order to improve the new decisions that follow the reforms that seem inevitable. These reforms have a practical methodology of trying to apply practices across institutions as a means of improving service delivery and improving public confidence. There is a business plan for the Criminal Justice System that the ministers from the relevant government departments have signed up to. The debate now is about what is best practice in delivering the plan to the public. The practical nature of the debate means that there is a tendency to be in a perpetual change mode as it is not possible to capture public expectation or confidence. Criminologists have identified the contradictory range of approaches in the recent developments within the field of criminal justice (Zedner, 2002, Garland, 2001). There have been developments in zero-tolerance policing and also community based initiatives including partnerships. Partnership working between various agencies was put on a statutory footing in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The pluralisation of policing including the expansion of the commercial security sector has also put pressure on public expectation. The need to demonstrate the success of government actions has led to a need for objective evidence to demonstrate the successes of agencies that the government is funding. These

performance measures continue to dominate the recent development as a source of evidencing or presenting the case for a line of action or inaction. The police have been in the forefront of performance measures and are probably more aware and used to the cultural experience than other institutions within the Criminal Justice System. The demand for improvement in public services is also forcing the government not only to try and make traditional providers more receptive to market principles in management but also expanding the market to provide competition. The pluralisation of policing is being accelerated and new institutions both private and public are being created to deal with the vacuum created by the inability to satisfy public demand. The police is an ideal institution to observe in this new era as the changes are not going to be as shocking to the old structures when compared to other institutions within the Criminal Justice System.

Due to time taken to complete this research it is difficult to make direct comparison with each interview. The changing environment in which the police exists, within the Criminal Justice System and wider public service sector continues to evolve as a result of a continuous drive for improvement. There is no defined end point and as such there is no clarity in the practice of these public institutions. The argument that things can always improve, is a useful assumption when addressing the performance of an institution that is underperforming. The use of this philosophy as an operating tool can be counter-productive especially since the Criminal Justice System has competing aims in addressing the problems of crime and the criminal. There is a temptation to continue this process but a line must be drawn in order to make the general points

of these changes. The need for continuous improvement makes the whole process difficult to assess as the reference point is difficult to establish.

Outline of Thesis

The thesis is divided into chapters. Chapter One is the introduction and also defines the relevant concepts that are to be used in this research. There is also the outline of the aims and objectives of the research. The wider debate about accountability, culture and new public management is started. The importance of the research is highlighted and the debates for the research are signposted.

In Chapter Two there is a review of literature of police research on new public management and a discussion about accountability. The link between external and internal accountability is highlighted in order to establish if there is a need to change institutional design of the police. The purposes of accountability are identified. The different modes of accountability are discussed and the interdependence of all these modes is highlighted. The recent developments within the accountability process in relation to performance management are examined.

In Chapter Three, the roles of senior managers as defined within the research are examined. These roles are related back to the activities of the police in society. The legal and cultural dimensions of the roles are discussed in order to establish a context in which senior managers can be evaluated. The internal relationships between senior managers are highlighted. The accountability process is refocused

from the perspective of the senior managers. There is a detailed examination of public sector management with special attention to the role of performance indicators. The role of Best Value as external source of performance management is discussed. The theory influencing performance management and review of practice is discussed. The role of the Home Office on police performance management through various agencies is examined in detail. The internal mechanisms within the police are discussed to see if there are differences between the management of other ranks and senior managers.

Chapter Four examines the relationship of senior managers and police culture. Police culture is examined and the silent role of support staff is highlighted. Race and gender issues within the culture are visited. The influence of division of labour and specialisation on police culture is addressed. The power locus within the police culture is located. There is emphasis on the structure and nature of the culture of senior managers as opposed to the wider police culture. The importance of the police/civilian dichotomy in relation to senior management is identified.

Chapter Five discusses the methodology of this research. The main research method used in this research is interviews with all senior managers within the police force studied. The underlying attitudes, perceptions and values of senior managers towards the research questions is obtained by in-depth interviewing. The chapter deals with the justification of the methodology, discussion of the research method, limitations of the research process and finally ethical and political issues involved in the research.

Chapter Six analyses the results of the interviews with the senior managers. The results are discussed under three sections. They are perception on accountability, performance management and culture of senior managers. The first two are dealt with in this chapter. The results are analysed from the perspective of the role that managers undertake within the organisation. The recent developments in the police force studied are used to put the responses of managers into context. Chapter Seven continues with the analysis of the interviews in relation to the culture of senior managers and highlights the themes identified.

Chapter Eight discusses the legal implications of all these developments. The ways to improve accountability of the police and the implications for other public institutions are highlighted. Practical suggestions are made to improve the status quo and to increase the impact of senior managers on the performance of the police. The strengths of the current developments are also highlighted. The implications for police leadership and management training are identified. The future developments in the area of accountability are highlighted and signposted for attention. Following the end of the chapter is the appendix that consists of the interview topic guide and the list of all those interviewed. This research will inform the ongoing debate about governance of police behaviour and its relationship to various sub cultures within the police. This is intended to assist policy makers in coming to a decision by informing them of the intended and unintended outcomes of policy decisions in relation to the police. This is relevant in particular in the cultural aspects that are peculiar to the police.

Chapter Two

Police and Accountability

This chapter deals with the review of the literature of police research on accountability and the new public management concept. At the outset, the key terms are defined in order to focus attention on what is being researched. There is a brief discussion about public policy, in which the issue of the police as a public institution is highlighted. Then, accountability is operationally defined for this study. There is also a brief historical account of the types and modes of accountability. The differences and link between external and internal accountability are assessed. The relationship between the different modes are identified and viewed from the perspective of public policy assessment.

Jones et al (1994) identified two traditions of research and writings on the police. The first concentrates on governance of the police, thereby concentrating on legal and political institutions and their relationship with the police. The other concentrates on what police officers do, how they do it and what shapes police behaviour and patterns of policing. Marshall, Lustgarten and Reiner are classed as writers of the first tradition. They claim that there are some new studies that are acknowledging the differences between the two traditions and synthesising both traditions in their analysis of police work and policing. They have tried in their study to bridge the two traditions. In this review I use evidence from both traditions.

Researches into police accountability, governance and regulation in the past three decades have been retrospective analysis of the legal and historical position of the

police. The adoption of an ideological perspective is useful in reviewing the past as a lot depends on perception of the evidence. The interpretation of the past has an affect on our perception of what is happening in the present and consequently there can be a search for evidence to confirm preconceived views. The result has been that the participants do not relate to what observers have stated as happening. This has led to the emphasis being placed on particular issues not consistent with what participants within the police perceive as relevant.

Police culture is revisited to see if the changes or expectations of those advocating accountability are having an affect. Several studies are referred to with Chan's (1997) work in Australia reviewed to see if there are similar developments in terms of using public policy to influence and direct police behaviour, and the implications for the process. There is a focus on the new modes of accountability in order to locate this current study.

This research is posited in the area of identifying if the normative explanation of events does represent what pertains in practice. It tries to explore public policy and the effects on the legal framework of accountability. There is a philosophical debate about the concept of knowledge, and its influence on public policy is one of the areas of interest. The influence of theory on public policy and the subsequent influence on practice forms the environment for this research. The debate about the changing nature of public policy based on developments in human concept of knowledge is a continuous one, notably amongst these changes is the notion of rationality (Parsons 1995).

Public Policy

Public policy focuses on the public and its problems (Dewey 1927). It is concerned with what Parsons (1995: XV) refers to 'how issues and problems come to be defined and constructed and how they are placed on the political and policy agenda'. Public policy forms the umbrella under which this study intends to contribute. This means that there will be a wide area to gather evidence from and the different methodological approaches for differing disciplines will not be focused on this is to enable a wider focus on the issue of public policy. In contrast to this approach I intend to be disciplined by the legal and criminological methodology. This will lead to some criticism, which is welcomed in order to develop our knowledge further.

Public policy is not usually constructed with one type of organisation in mind and as a result the theory that motivates public policy is usually generic to all public organisations. It is necessary to study the effects of policy on the organisations and culture that exists within them in order to evaluate the theory promoting certain types of public policy. The sequence of events is arranged in a rational way in order to be able to analyse public policy. There is an assumption that public policy is motivated by theory. Theory in this context is used in the wide sense and not in relation to a specific issue within specific policy. The dilemma facing countries in the Western society was highlighted by Fischer (2003) as the tensions from the two values of democracy and science. The open form which democracy promote opposes the closed domain of experts and elites that science champions. He advocated for citizen participation and for professional experts to become deliberative practitioners. For example, James and Raine (1998) point out the

redefinition of the criminal justice agenda as a political agenda resulting from three deeper and emergent changes. They are: the shift in attitude of the public towards crime, the changed stance within government in relation to its role within the Criminal Justice System and lastly the effects of the new criminological theory. All these changes were perceived as interrelated and self-reinforcing. It will be extremely difficult to operationally define the changes as the locus for the changes is difficult to locate. The pressure appears to emanate from the public being expressed in political demands on institutions by the governments. The process of accountability is important to ameliorate some of these pressures and to influence public policy. The science of the process should not be abandoned. This is where a theoretical framework will be useful to allow some study of these claims in practice.

The welfare consensus had united psychological, sociological and structural/political theories of the causes of crime. Responses were focused on addressing the behaviour of the individual offender and community development. The new criminologies focused on criminal events, attributing an element of choice to all offenders. There is a preoccupation with penalties for offences. New research focused on the econometrics of crime, sentencing, victimology and measurements of different penalties. The conclusion of the plurality model was to fit the marketing mechanism because it has within it a way of handling competition and a rationale of inequality. However, the consequence of the market mechanism introduced into the public service was to generate uncertainty at all levels in the system. The disaggregation of the state from social policy to intervention within a series of agreed and budgeted concerns and the replacement of collective

responsibility with the instrumentalism of the market combined with a deep fear of crime and loss of certainty generates the climate for a tough stance on crime by the public and government.

The reform of managerialism impacted on the criminal justice in the four distinct areas:

- organisational design and development,
- agency function,
- efficiency and productivity,
- staffing.

In the absence of an agreed goal for the Criminal Justice System the intermediate goals of cost efficiency and service effectiveness became pre-eminent. The three prerequisites for their success were absent. No market, no consumer and no competition. Rationalism in decision making was arguably inappropriate within a complex and pluralistic setting. The simplistic conversion of service users into consumers made no sense when the service user was an offender, the use of false competition created inequality and artificiality in the contracting process which in turn created a paper chase of new administrative demands. The new infrastructure needed for the new development meant the development of new bureaucracies.

The police are the organisation of choice for this analysis and it is hoped that lessons can be learned from the data generated and conclusions reached by other similar public bodies.

What is Police Accountability?

The Oxford English Dictionary defines being accountable as responsible; being required to account for one's conduct. This suggests an after the event responsibility, however it is difficult to perceive what happens at the end not influencing the original behaviour. The problems with the concept and its closeness to the idea of control seem to be the source of the imprecise definition of police accountability. The problems with defining police accountability have been highlighted (Jones and Newburn 1996). Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) made a distinction between accountability and control. They stated that the two may fuse together in practice; accountability being defined as 'liability to account for decision after it has been taken'. This is in contrast with control that is prior to any decision making. This is similar to the definition by Bayley (1983) that focuses on responsiveness of the police to feedback from the public.

The Patten Report (2000) refers to police being accountable in two senses, the "subordinate or obedient" sense and the "explanatory and cooperative" sense. The subordinate sense is taken to mean the public employ the police and hence needs measures to ensure that the service is delivered and getting value for their money. The explanatory and cooperative sense ensures communication between the public and the police. The Report suggested that there are many aspects of accountability and it should run through the bloodstream of the whole body of the police service.

The lack of consensus in the meaning of what is referred to as accountability was also recently highlighted by Jones (2003) who nevertheless made two important distinctions. The first refers to accountability of individual policing agents as they

perform their daily duties and the broader organisational policing policies concerning priorities, resource allocation and policing styles. The second distinction is between an internal and an external mechanism of accountability. He makes the point that external mechanisms can only be effective if they complement the internal ones. While this research concentrates primarily on the internal mechanisms, it is important to understand the external mechanism as this invariably influences the effectiveness and direction of the internal mechanism. I will add that the effectiveness of accountability lies in the ability of those with legitimate actions having access to the processes available to obtain redress as necessary. This includes the ability to draw their concerns to the organisation and the accessibility to the process.

What is obvious from the various attempts to define this concept is that it is a means of improving police culture and behaviour, and the interaction of the police with the public or community it serves. The concept of accountability deals with the maintenance and increase of public trust and confidence in the institution. In this study police accountability is defined in the wider sense to include the accounting for decisions taken and the subsequent influence on police decision making process arising as a result of being called to account. This is the relationship between external and internal mechanism of accountability. The ability for the external modes of accountability to be effective in challenging non compliance with standards and also the establishing of those required standards are important.

Police Powers and Discretion

Central to Jones (2003) first distinction in police accountability identified earlier, is the issue of police powers. Undoubtedly, the question of the role of the police forms the crux of the problem in any discussion of police accountability. Reiner (2000) argued that the issue of police powers and accountability are interdependent and intimately related. He identified the controlling of police actions in the light of their considerable discretion as the problem. Two reasons offered for police discretion are lack of resources for full enforcement, and the imprecise nature of the rule of law to concrete situations. In practice, the two reasons are difficult to distinguish as they are likely to influence each other. The only way to find out the reasons for a particular police action will be to observe the officers decision making processes rather than assuming the mechanistic logical conclusions that follows the rules.

Longley and James (1999) argued that discretion might be contrasted with two things: duty and rules. In contrasting discretion with duty, the public body has no choice as to what to do if particular statutory conditions are present. When discretion is contrasted with rules, both (discretion and rules) should be regarded as different points on a continuum. This is because rules need an element of interpretation and have an overt texture. The language in which rules are written is vague and judgement is involved in deciding what rules apply in practice. Rules usually produce what is known as proportional justice as similar cases are treated alike and tend to produce consistency. Discretion tends to produce creative justice, where cases are personalised to individual circumstances thereby allowing flexibility.

Davis (1969) defined discretion as when 'a public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice between possible courses of action or inaction'. Longley and James (1999) stated that this definition is too wide because it stresses the effective limits rather than the legal limits of official power. Galligan (1986) stated that in exercising discretion officials need to comply with the standards of rationality. In other words, decisions should be made for reasons that are rational in terms of our understanding. Kleinig (1996) in describing ethical issues in police decision-making provided four types: scope, interpretative, decisions about priority and tactical decisions. Neyroud and Beckley (2001) identified that the difference between street and management dilemmas lies in the complexity, the number of actors and the decision-making environment and time frame. They argued that any verdict on the impact of the exercise of police discretion depends heavily on the framework of analysis applied to it. They go on to identify four perspectives and embraced Davis (1996) view as most positive. This viewed discretion as the essence of informed professionalism in policing.

Reiner (1994) identified three broad approaches to explaining why police discretion operates as it does. They are individualistic, cultural and structural accounts. The individualistic explanations focuses on action-orientation and impatience with legal procedural restraints, as well as the race and sex discrimination which studies have documented. These are argued as the basis for a particular kind of person being drawn to police work. The cultural explanations account for police working practices as a result of informal culture of the rank and

file. There are a number of studies that have documented this sub culture and its effect on police behaviour (Wilson: 1968, Skolnick: 1966, Holdaway: 1983, Manning: 1977). The 'structural' explanation supplements the cultural rather than supplanting it in that it suggests that the core mandate and organisation of the police within the social order structure of police work.

Dixon (1997) in his in-depth review of literature and research on policing distinguished three significant conceptions of the relationship between policing and legal rules. They are legalistic-bureaucratic, culturalist and structural. The last two are similar to the above approaches by Reiner, as these are more sociological in origin. The legalistic-bureaucratic conception encapsulates the beliefs that the law is the major determinant of police activity and police institutions conform to a bureaucratic model. Within this model there is the perception that senior officers are able to direct activities of their subordinates by means of training, policy statements and internal regulation. Whilst these categories are not mutually exclusive, they are more like typologies in the assumptions made in the various studies on policing. Dixon acknowledges that these studies do not fit necessarily in each category. This classification allows for a theoretical framework to compare and analyse the existing literature. He further argues that legal regulation and police practices are linked and are inextricably intertwined. It is useful to have this theoretical perspective in mind when observing and analysing results from any study of police practices and behaviour.

The police accept the operation of discretion as a conventional wisdom. Reiner (1994) identified its recent origin to Lord Scarman's Report that advocated that

public tranquillity should have a greater priority than law enforcement. Reiner states that results from research demonstrated that police discretion is not an equal opportunity phenomenon. This aspect of differential use of police power has been a source of controversy especially when it cannot be demonstrated legally that the police were doing anything statutorily wrong.

The control of police discretion can be on two levels: the level of policy making and street level action of individual patrolling officers. This is where the issue of police accountability relates to police governance, which is a wider concept. There is the implication of influencing police behaviour prior to action. These two levels are not mutually exclusive as policies can be used to influence actions of individual police officers. The issue of police accountability comes within the issue of police governance. The processes of complaining about police behaviour and policy are governed mostly by legal rules. This is because the standards can be referred to as the standards. However, presence of the rules does not mean compliance and use of the processes available. This is the reason why the occupational culture and the enlightenment of the public as to the procedures and rules are important.

There has been emphasis placed on the use of rules for regulating government actions. Davis (1971) stressed that a key role for rules is the control of administrative discretion. He goes on to argue that the best way of improving justice for individuals in the governmental and legal system, lay in the area where decisions depended more on discretion than upon rules and principles, and where formal hearings and judicial review were mostly irrelevant. The goal is to eliminate unnecessary discretionary power in government, not to eliminate all

discretionary power. His key concern was with the rationalisation of those areas of policy and decision making that have a judicial regulation or review. This differs from traditional concern with the rationality of the judicial process. His idea of structuring discretion is adopted by implementation of rules. This is useful when the process whereby discretionary decisions are undertaken is visible. He further introduced the idea of 'check' on the exercise of discretion. This is similar to the professional discipline instilled by training and development to ensure discretionary power produces benevolent results. The problem is the perception and definition of benevolent. Police discretion includes the decision to act and not to act. The police decision not to act is more difficult to control or put in a structure.

Police discretion at street level is largely regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE 1984). There are phrases used within the Act, for example 'has reasonable grounds for suspecting' in section 1(3), 'has reasonable grounds for believing' in section 17 (2)(a) of the Act, to 'suspect must be given reasonable opportunity' in Paragraph 1 Annex A of Code D of the Code of Practice which all seem to imply the use of 'subjective' discretion. The introduction of the Human Rights Act 1988 and the subsequent interpretation of all previous statutes within its ambit tend to have undermined subjective discretion, but have the opposite effect if viewed from the perspective that a new consideration comes into the decision making process. Baldwin (1989) commented that the overall strategy of PACE was to give broad direction on such matters as arrests, detention, stop and search, search and seizure, and to compensate by reference to recording procedures and codes of practice.

The need for discretion in the exercise of police powers has been discussed and this leads into the subject of accountability. The first issue is why we need police accountability.

Why Police Accountability?

A discussion of the necessity for police accountability may illuminate the debate about the various types and modes of accountability. The amount of time and money spent on the process of police accountability requires an assessment of the why the process is necessary. A legalistic answer to this question would be specific and deal with the question without taking into consideration the wider social context within which the police is posited. Hewitt (1982) argued strongly for the need for police accountability stating:

It is hard to believe that the notion of the police officer as a citizen in uniform is widely accepted today. The professionalization of the police, the radical increase in their coercive powers which are not available to other citizens and the growing use of the police against 'subversives' have all intensified the separation of the police from the rest of the community. The problems of ensuring that police forces are answerable for their actions and that the law enforcers are not above the law have assumed a new and pressing importance.

The range of coercive police powers over the freedom of citizens, which have potential for abuse, has been identified as the most significant reason for holding the police accountable (Jones and Newburn 1996). They go on to identify the fact that the police service is responsible for the expenditure of a significant amount of public funds and as such should be held responsible for its effective use. There was the explanation that it was also necessary for development of public trust and cooperation thereby being more effective. Although it is logical to assume accountability and effectiveness are linked one does not necessarily mean the other

is accomplished. It is possible to have an accountable police without it being effective. This brings us to what Reiner (2000) argued, that in order to engage in this debate there is a need to establish what police do, before any analysis of their performance can be undertaken.

Day and Klein (1987) argued that as society and government have become more complex, the simple notion that voters elect representatives who hold civil service to account has become a less convincing justification theory. In surveying accountability in five different public services, they concluded that for accountability to be a reality it requires a mix of political/community accountability supplemented with the use of managerial techniques which focus on the performance of those who actually deliver public services. They advocated an engagement in civic dialogue to recreate something of high visibility and directness of the face-to-face accountability with which the debates surrounding the work began. It has to be woven into the social and political fabric.

The political reason for police accountability emanates from the fact that the government has to be accountable and the police as a public institution should also be. Jones (2003) identified a unique relationship between policing on one hand and the institutions of democracy and their legitimacy as the other as perhaps the most important reason. There are those that will argue that the police are independent of government and do have a different constitutional *raison-s'etre* from other government agencies. Legal change, political practice and increased professionalisation of the police have fundamentally changed the doctrine of

constabulary independence (Lustgarten 1986; Reiner 1991; Jones and Newburn 1997).

Reiner (1992, 2000.) identified four functions of accountability mechanisms in the regulation of police work: constitutional, co-optive, communicative and control functions. The constitutional function refers to the symbolic function in asserting the ideal of police subordination to democracy and the rule of law. The co-optive function relates to the effectiveness of the mechanism depending on the extent to which it is co-opted into the informal values of the police subculture. The communicative function represents the registering of signals that are necessary to spark off internal reforms. The control function refers to the fact that visible and demonstrated deviance must be sanctioned effectively.

Roche (2003) identified the instrumental values as a stronger justification for accountability even though the promotion of transparency is also of value. He describes the instrumental values as improving the quality of performance, enhancing legitimacy and complementing other means of generating good decisions. In order to assess the quality of an accountability mechanism he suggested seven criteria. They are simplicity, timeliness, inclusiveness, motivational sensitivity, publicity, independence and iterative accountability. The idea of iterative accountability requires that a person to whom an account is given is also accountable. These concepts are useful in evaluating the effectiveness of accountability.

The changes and developments occurring within society and the inability for public policy to focus in on the implications of policy have made the need for accountability imperative. It is the pace of these changes that requires adequate structures to be in place. The need for police accountability cannot be answered by simple legal rules, as there is a need for a more complex approach to the question of accountability. There is a need for a comprehensive approach to deal with the various reasons demanding police accountability. The accountability process is a means of bridging the gulf between promise and actual performance. It should be viewed as one of a number of processes within the system trying to improve the quality and legitimacy of decision making. It is important to note that accountability requires a democratic element in order to ensure that policy and actions addresses the concerns of public through established democratic routes. The new developments in the process of accountability have focused mainly on performance and service delivery to the public. There has been an explosion of public information about police funding, expenditure, plans, activities, outputs, inputs and outcome of policing. In conclusion police accountability is necessary for the reasons explained above and the processes for achieving it are reviewed in the next section.

The Different Modes of Accountability

In examining the literature there are many aspects of accountability. I will now explain the different modes of police accountability before discussing the development of the various emphases placed on them. I will argue that the emphasis on the different modes of police accountability can only be understood within the context of political developments and other developments in public

policy. Traditionally, any commentary on police governance usually use 1964, the enactment of the Police Act, to form a temporal demarcation for analysis purposes. The enactment of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 and Police Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) has made such demarcation redundant, although there has been no significant statutory changes. The modes of police accountability are not independent of each other and they all have legal force, either through statutes or through indirect rules that are made by legitimate authorities. The modes that will be discussed are the legal, democratic, organisational and financial. A further aspect to the analysis is the focus on policy and on police behaviour and practice. Whilst, I agree that both are linked and feed on one another through a time lag, I will be using this model in order to try and identify the key issues. At the end this section all the modes will be discussed and the legal implications of each for the police will be identified.

Legal Mode

Traditionally, to hold the police accountable it has been necessary to resort to the law. The judgement of Lord Denning in *R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn* (1968) illustrates the ultimate view of this mode of accountability:

No minister of the Crown can tell him that he must or must not keep observation of this place or that; or that he must or must not prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any Police Authority tell him to do so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone.

This builds on the idea that the constable is independent and has original authority as stated in the High Court decision of *Fisher v Oldham* (1930). In the case of *R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte International Traders Ferry (ITF) Ltd* (1995)

where the applicant applied for a judicial review of the chief constable's decision to scale down the police response to demonstrations against the company because of its involvement in the export of live animals from Shoreham. The Court of Appeal found that the chief constable was acting proportionately in the pursuit of the legitimate public policy objective of providing adequate levels of policing across the entire force area. It appears in issues involving law enforcement that the idea of constabulary independence is still sacrosanct. It was accepted that policing needs to respond to competing demands and enforcement decisions are ultimately the responsibility of the chief constable. The courts will only review if it was an unreasonable decision.

Commentators like Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) have argued that the idea of constabulary independence is sacrosanct and is the definitive theme of police governance. This implies that the law through the judiciary is the only legal recourse to get the police to render account. This argument, as highlighted by Jones and Newburn (1997) would protect a constable from the direction and control of senior police officers, as much as it protects them from influence external to the police organisation. They differentiated between the notions of unfettered discretion of individual constables from the concept of operational independence of chief constables.

Lustgarten (1986) has argued about the legal basis of 'constabulary independence' but accepts that it has become engraved into the psyche of police governance debates. Section 10(1) of the 1996 Act replaces section 5 of the Police Act 1964 and uses the same words, 'A police force... under the direction and control of the

chief constable...’ The chief constable and his assistants are appointed by the Police Authority, but only with the approval of the Home Secretary and subject to Regulations made under section 50 by the Home Secretary (s.11-12 1996 Act). Lustgarten observes that once a chief constable is entrenched in position, the person is almost impossible to remove. However, the recent resignation of the chief constable of Sussex police may be a sign that this might be an ideal of a golden age. The police authorities, with the approval of the Home Secretary have the power under section 11(2) of the 1996 Act to require a chief constable to retire in the interest of efficiency or effectiveness. Jones (2003) noted that the idea of ‘constabulary independence’ has been threatened by the two significant developments in the governance of the police. They are growing nationalisation of policing as well as the centralisation of policing policies through the application of market based reforms to the police.

Under section 88 of the 1996 Act the chief constable is responsible for the wrongful acts of constables. The section ensures that the general principle of vicarious liability applies to the police. This liability is usually strict liability because it arises from the employer-employee relationship, without reference to any fault of the employer. The employee remains legally liable for the tort. The essential requirements for vicarious liability are the existence of a tort, committed by a police officer who at the time was acting in the course of his or her employment.

Cragg and Harrison (1991) stated that a civil action for damages could be brought only where the police have committed a civil wrong. This list of civil wrongs

includes assault, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, malicious process, negligence, causing death, trespass, seizure of goods and damage to goods. This is in addition to officers being subject to the criminal law like any other citizen.

The courts are reluctant to interfere in police discretion. For example, a general duty in the police to suppress crime does not carry with it a liability to individuals for damage caused to them by criminals whom the police have failed to apprehend in circumstances when it was possible to do so as ruled in the case of *Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire* (1989). Nevertheless, occasionally the police can still be held liable for negligence despite the stringent approach of the courts. In the case of *Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria* (1996) the police force was held liable for negligence, despite the stringent test for such action established by the House of Lords in the Hill case. Lustgarten (1986) argues for less judicial intervention of police discretion, at both levels, doubting if it could regulate inaction by the police or significantly affect police misconduct. The use of private law is advocated as a better area for judicial intervention. The House of Lords held that in a situation where there were conflicting rights and the police had a duty to uphold the law, the police might, in deciding what to do, have to balance a number of factors and in so doing exercise their judgement and discretion. However, in the case of *Chief Constable of North Wales v Evans* (1982) it was held that the court can and would review the way the decisions were reached. Griffiths (1985) also frowns on judicial intervention of administrative decisions because of limitations by procedures and practices designed to exclude the basic materials of effective political and administrative decision-making.

Barnforth (1995) argued that administrative decisions should be made within the framework of principle rather than one of pragmatism. The law provides a statutory framework that articulates policy objectives but the actual decision making is delegated down to officials. Administrative justice has both ex ante and ex post elements. Decisions not only need to be justified and be open to challenge after they have been taken but there must be a mechanism for involvement of parties prior to the taking of decisions. He further argues that expectations of administrative justice can only be fulfilled by a system which generates a state of affairs that seek to ensure the legitimacy of public decision making. This can be achieved through the provision of procedures for an adequate level of public participation in decision making processes, as well as for redress of grievances where citizens wish to contest decisions taken on their behalf. Openness is a prerequisite for effectiveness of administrative justice. This provides the public the opportunity to challenge and improve the quality of decision making of government institutions and agencies including the police. Even within the legal mode of accountability the people are viewed as the ultimate clients.

The 1996 Act also provides for the investigation of complaints against the police. There are the senior officers, who relate to officers above the rank of Superintendent, and the standard procedure, which applies to the other ranks. This is a legal framework although the adjudicators are not judges. The framework allows for internal investigations with the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) acting as an external supervisor for the process. It has been suggested that the whole complaints process does not instil adequate confidence in either the complainants or the police (Brown 1997; 1998; Maguire and Corbett 1991; Reiner

1991, 2000). The Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee (HAC) published a report in 1998 (Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures) which recommended an overhaul of the system, supporting the principle of independent investigation and recommended that the Home Office commence a feasibility study on implementation. The report concluded that the complaint process should be more open and transparent, with disclosure of the report of investigations, and fast-track disciplinary procedure with a higher standard of proof than balance of probabilities in cases which will not be prejudicial to subsequent criminal proceedings.

On 1 April 1999 new regulations for dealing with police conduct and efficiency were introduced to replace the old discipline regulations. The major affect of the new regulations was to separate the performance of officers from the conduct. This distinction did not previously exist, and any practical effect of this regulation is yet apparent. There are still developments in the pipeline to change the structures but whether these will have any major effect on police behaviour is doubtful. Reiner (2000) identifies the 'low visibility' of the operational situations that give rise to most complaints as the key factor for low cleanup rates. Quinton (2003) in his study that evaluated the impact of the changes in police disciplinary process found there was no evidence to suggest that the new police misconduct procedures had affected the perceived risks associated with policing. There was also uncertainty found amongst officers about how misconduct was defined. This is because examples were used to illustrate rather than the old procedure that was prescriptive. It was concluded that the new procedure has relatively little impact after two years of implementation. So the developments in misconduct procedures

do not necessarily produce the outcomes that were envisaged at the time of planning. The problem has to be confronted on the procedural and behavioural levels to achieve the type of improvements that are required to improve public trust and confidence.

In April 2004 the new system for investigating complaints against the police came into force. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) replaced the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), which ceased to exist in March 2004. The new system deals with all officers, special constables, support staff and contracted escort and detention officers. The independence of the new commission is to address the criticism of the old system that police officers are investigating each other. There is another advantage in that all the complaints against staff are dealt with by one institution. This is more likely going to increase the confidence of the public in the system. There is no direct compensation for the victim from the making of complaint against the police but if action is taken the process might satisfy some people. The idea that justice has been seen to take place might reduce the pressure on the courts that should be the institution of last resort. The legal mode of accountability is developing to deal with complaints, especially complaints against individuals or groups of police staff, are dealt with by a system which the public have confidence in. The IPCC have employed their own investigators but they still have to rely on police officers to assist in investigations until they become embedded into the system. The police staff might be less responsive to these developments but if public confidence and trust are going to be increased then it is worth the risk. The legal mode forms the basis of the formal modes of accountability which are usually rule based.

Democratic Mode

The 1964 Police Act constitutionally established the tripartite structure of police governance with the Home Secretary, Police Authority and Chief Constables as the parties involved in the structure. This structure was maintained by the 1996 Act. Police Authorities have seventeen members composed of nine councillors from the relevant council, five appointed persons selected from a short-list prepared by the Home Secretary and three magistrates. The relevant authority for the Metropolitan Police is Metropolitan Police Authority that has twenty-three members. Twelve of the members are appointed by the Mayor of London, seven independent members and four magistrates.

Every Police Authority is charged with securing 'the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force for its area' (s 6). In discharging this function the authority has to have regard to objectives determined by the Home Secretary, any objectives set by the authority, any performance target established by the authority and local policing plans (s 7). The authority appoints and can remove a chief constable with the approval of the Home Secretary (s 11).

The Home Secretary is charged with exercising his powers in such a manner and to such an extent as appears to him/her to be best calculated to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the police (s 36). This power includes the setting of objectives, performance targets, decisions to take remedial measures after an adverse inspection report, setting of a minimum budget, demand reports from police authorities and the issue of the Code of Practice. The Home Secretary can cause a local inquiry to be held, make grants, make police regulations as to the

government, administration and conditions of service of police forces, make regulations as to standard of equipment as well as appoint Inspectors of constabulary. The Home Secretary may set up bodies for the purposes of undertaking research into matters affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the police.

The police have been subjected to close scrutiny in comparison to other local/national public service deliverers. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 required the police, local authorities and other 'responsible authorities' to consult and publish a Crime and Disorder Strategy based on local crime audit which must be closely focused on community needs. Williamson (2000) observed that this new Act forces chief constables who have hitherto viewed enforcement as their core responsibility to rethink crime reduction strategies. The Act has the effect of involving the police at local level thereby developing new links. This has the effect of bringing all the local services together. Whether it will make all the local services more accountable or bring accountability to the public to the lowest standard that is currently available is yet to be seen.

Further the most recent statute dealing with the police authorities' powers, the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA), strengthens police authorities' powers to request the early departure of, or to suspend, a chief constable in the public interest. The police authorities are also required to produce a three year strategic plan that is consistent with the National Police Plan. The Act also reinforces the Home Secretary's power by requiring a police force to take remedial action where they are judged by HMIC to be ineffective or inefficient.

Jones and Newburn (1997) suggested that as the new established police authorities become more sophisticated in monitoring performance information, we may well see police authorities play a more prominent role in the system of police governance in England and Wales. At that time, they made nine recommendations that they believe will improve the system. Included in these recommendations was the call for a minimum level of secretariat support for the police authorities in order for the authorities to conduct their functions independently. The recommendation for the participation of people of London in the authority in London has become a reality with the creation of the post of London Mayor and the subsequent creation of the Metropolitan Police Authority. This authority is not made up fully of democratically elected representatives from London as the Home Secretary still appoints independent members. Jones and Newburn like other commentators, still see the role of the Home Secretary in strictly representing the central government as opposed to the post being a source of democratic accountability on its own. This might be due to the remoteness of the local people to the Home Secretary, but the idea of parliamentary governance and requisite accountability cannot be ignored. This is the constitutional arrangement for the country and an argument based on the utility of the process without recourse to the whole framework of the state might be short-sighted. Two of the recommendations that are worth noting are the idea that the notion of 'constabulary independence' be defined by the Home Secretary, and the clarification of the roles in the tripartite structure in relation to financial and personnel management in order to avoid duplication. This has in practice meant the close working relationship between the chief constables and the police authorities.

The Police Community Consultative Groups were introduced by PACE s.106 and although there are many such groups, public attendance has been very patchy. It is arguable that these groups have any legal powers and have been described as consultative group, 'explanatory accountability without teeth' (Jones and Newburn 1996). There were high hopes for these groups following Lord Scarman's report into the Brixton riots in 1981. The intended result is for the police to have more interaction with the public on an on-going basis. However, these groups do not seem to have effect on policy as they are too remote from the decision making process. The recent development of adopting Independent Advisory Groups as consultative groups to advise on police operations and policies seems to be a new compromise. The members of these latter groups do not have the direct powers of democratic representatives that appear to worry some police officers. Whilst the role remains the same, it appears that consultation is more acceptable to the police rather than control that seem to be associated with democratically appointed officials. There are those that offer the view that these in addition to the existing democratic structures are improving the decision making process of the police by widening the process in order to reflect the diverse community that are being policed.

Organisational Mode

This mode refers to the structures that exist within the organisation that govern police behaviour. One of these structures is the occupational culture within which police officers are socialised into the organisation. It has been argued that the law, force policy and managerial dictats are refined and reworked within this crucible

(Holdaway, 1983, Manning, 1977 and Punch, 1979). The management style reflects on the occupational culture.

Schein (1985) distinguished between three levels of culture. They are artifacts, values and basic assumptions, he stressed that the term culture should be 'reserved for the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organisation'. Chan (1997) also found that this definition of organisational culture is particularly appropriate to police organisations. She used Sackman's (1991) four dimensions of cultural knowledge, which encompasses all forms of shared organised knowledge. The four dimensions are:

- dictionary knowledge,
- directory knowledge,
- recipe knowledge,
- axiomatic knowledge.

Dictionary knowledge provides definitions and label of things and events within the organisation, the directory knowledge, which contains description of the practical effective way of doing things within the organisation, the recipe knowledge, which prescribes what should and what should not be done in specific situations and finally the axiomatic knowledge, which represents the fundamental assumptions about 'why things are done the way they are' in the organisation. Chan identifies the advantage of formulating culture as knowledge as the ability to account for multiple cultures.

Handy (1985) identified four main types of culture which are person, role, power and task. He went on to emphasise that each can be a good and effective culture;

but people are often culturally blinkered, thinking that ways that are effective in one place are bound to be successful everywhere. Culture cannot be defined precisely but the principal factors that influence a choice of culture within an organisation are history and ownership, size, technology, goals and objectives, the environment and the people. This analysis would help to explain some police behaviour as well as actions and inactions.

The occupational culture has a direct influence on the officer as the effects of the culture are felt immediately after an action. Professional socialisation is the process of training and induction into police culture whereby the formal procedural rules and informal practices are acquired (Fielding 1988). The occupational culture forms one of the informal structures of the organisational mode of accountability. Organisations require reduction of uncertainties and good communications. In order to maximise these qualities; there is a tendency to appoint clones to senior positions (Brown 2000). The hierarchical structure of the organisation supports the internal structure of accountability. The managers can make other officers accountable for their actions. Police officers are increasingly supervised in some aspects of their work by support staff that do not enjoy the hierarchy structure. The role of this aspect of the occupational culture is well documented but the new changes in the staffing of the police have gone almost unnoticed.

The police employ a substantial number of support staff that will have had effects on the culture within the organisation thereby affecting the behaviour and actions of officers. The extent of this influence has not been studied. They are viewed

wrongly as not holding influential roles but this view is increasingly challenged as the police have become increasingly reliant on professional advice. There are more formal structures of organisational mode of police accountability and these include the code of conduct, efficiency regulation and health and safety regulations. The use or misuse of these formal structures is directly influenced by the informal structures within the organisation. The efficacy of the whole process of accountability relies strongly on the informal structures within the organisation.

Financial Mode

This mode of police accountability is a relatively new one and it possesses the qualities of all the other modes as it was motivated primarily by concerns around money, using terms as effectiveness, efficiency, value for money and Best Value amongst others. The modes do have legal force as they start off as either circulars or recommendations from government appointed inspecting bodies and end up as statutes. An example is Best Value, which is stipulated within the Local Government Act 1999 (1999 Act).

The introduction of Financial Management Initiatives (FMI) to the Police Service and the adoption of its principles by police management are viewed as the start of this new mode of police accountability. The motivation for government making policies is to solve problems and engineer a 'better' society by adopting them. Any policy has to be seen in the light of the paternalistic approach of government. This approach is based on the concept of the existence of objective criteria for evaluating these policies. Home Office Circular 114/83 titled Manpower,

Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service extended the system to the Police.

To this end the influence of management ideas and techniques on the practice, theory and analysis of public policy has been extensive. The sphere of social policy is an area of public policy where this development has been controversial. The central thrust of the management approach is the improvement of the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the public sector by the adoption of techniques often regarded as purely appropriate to the private sector. There are critics of this development of managerialism in public policy (Massey, 1993; Pollitt, 1990), but this has not halted the advance of this development among policy makers who are now more accountable financially.

The new public management (NPM) is the response of public sector organisations to the agenda set by government like the FMI. There was a shift of emphasis away from inputs to outputs and outcomes. This was followed by a substantial development in the use quantifiable measurement in numerical terms that later became performance indicators. This allowed comparisons to be made and benchmarking in relation to costs and outputs of public sector institutions. McLaughlin et al (2001) argued that NPM can be understood best as complex set of post-bureaucratic professional knowledge, that are sometimes contradictory, practices and techniques drawn from a wide variety of sources. They attributed the existence of a coherent NPM, firstly, to the neo-liberal think-tanks acknowledging the internal inconsistencies and conflicting goals in the Thatcherism's modernisation project. Secondly, the changing role of the state from provider to

regulator and supervisor, a range of public sector auditing and inspection agencies being established. Thirdly, a distinct group of transnational NPM advocates from across the political spectrum. They claimed that NPM had the following nine features:

- Increased emphasis on achieving results rather than administering processes,
- Setting of explicit targets and performance indicators to enable auditing of efficiency and effectiveness,
- Publication of league tables illustrating comparative performance,
- Identification of core competencies,
- Costing and market testing of all activities to ensure value for money,
- Externalisation of non-essential responsibilities,
- Establishment of purchase-provider split,
- Encouragement of interagency co-operation,
- The redesignation of clients as 'customers'.

The developments that followed these changes include the search for quality management processes and principles. The police responded to these changes by checking on the quality by assessing customer and staff satisfaction with police activities. Performance indicators were developed to assess customer satisfaction. The staff were surveyed and inspected in line with quality management principles.

The New Labour government that took over in 1997 adopted the view that public sector organisations should be less autonomous and more interdependent with a

central objective to be pursued. The 1999 Act introduced 'Best Value' and police authorities should:

- Challenge the services they provide, ask why they are provided and why it is being delivered and managed in a particular way,
- Compare the services within the organisation, service and/or wider market,
- Compete by assessing services against potential alternative service providers,
- Consult both internally and externally with customers and stakeholders.

The aim was to drive continuous improvement in the delivery of services to the public. This has been backed up by a regime of auditing and inspections culminating with the publishing of league tables and awarding of status for performance levels. The developments in this area are discussed in detail when I examine the issue of performance management.

A new growth area in research developed as a result of the development described above. This involved research to improve the data collected and ways of making decisions based on this information available. The term management as an independent skill to be learnt has become fashionable. There is the view that data can be obtained and so be more valid than earlier research that involved the subject or the observer having to make observations that can not be broken down into data. Weatheritt (1993) argued that performance information might be used to improve police accountability, and to promote greater responsiveness to those who use or otherwise benefit from the police service. The information can be used in other ways to fuel litigation against public institutions that keep this information. For example in *Kent v Griffiths* (1998) the Court of Appeal refused to strike out a

claim holding that the ambulance service did have a duty of care because the ambulance took 38 minutes to respond against the national average of 14 minutes. The performance information can be used to justify actions that were not perceived at its inception.

It has been argued that in seeking to improve the political model of control, managerialism may be undermining representative government thereby undermining one of the major reasons for accountability. Massey (1993: 200) argued:

Public administration cannot be judged by the same standards reserved for retailers, nor can it be run along the same lines. There are no generic laws of management that apply equally to the public and private spheres ... Managerialism is a weak bulwark to defend democratic government against malpractice, however many citizens' charters may be invented. The difficulty for observers in assessing the worth of the New Right's reforms is that of timescale and information. Government's own performance indicators have changed, becoming more managerial, whilst questions regarding morale, integrity and public service will take years to answer ... The emphasis of the New Right has been on management and control as a way to ensure the accountability of the state, devolving power out to the market and individual customers. In short it has been an attempt to get the state to wither away. This is not the way to protect liberty. The wisdom of America's Founding Fathers was clear upon this point: if only men were angels we could do away with government.

This point is reinforced by Jones and Newburn (1996) that financial accountability are not mutually exclusive of political modes as the neutral performance indicators can embrace crucial political assumptions about the nature of policing.

McLaughlin and Murji (2001) further argued that modernisation was a trope whereby the latest form of a potentially ceaseless dynamic for continuous managerialisation occurs. They identified firstly, a social democratic perspective and the second perspective draws upon and deploy managerial, communitarian and

risk discourse in governance, as the two theoretical frameworks to analyse the developments in governance.

The social democratic perspective views the liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and globalisation as undermining the core public institutions and values that cemented the social order of the romantic high period of the post war welfare state. The developments associated with neo-liberalism are highlighted as damaging to society. Reiner (1997) described the developments resulting from neo liberalism as having 'let the genie out of the bottle' because of the rise of individualism, celebration of diversity, choice, difference and fragmentation. Loader (1999) argues that policing is difficult to define making rationalisation nearly impossible to use a tool and the developments of managerial reforms will result in the fast tracking of consumerism and lead to privatisation of the core police functions. The second theoretical framework is characterised by the Foucauldian analysis to understand changes in policing and crime control. The argument is that a shift from the welfare state shedding and transferring responsibilities to the private sector and non-for-profit agencies, the citizen and the community. The local becomes the site for discourse.

The advent of New Labour into political office has been accompanied by the 'third way' ideology. The 'third way' politics and the policies that follow from the political ideology have received academic attention and analysis to enquire into the difference with what has happened in the past. The question is whether the third way is a new idea departing from Thatcherism and the past or a continuation of the conservative ideology. One of the key tools of delivery by the Labour

government is the idea of 'modernisation'. Modernising Government has initiated a new wave of NPM to entrench performance management across the public sector. The language for communicating the need for reform and the undertaking of reform via modernisation is politically neutral NPM.

The New Labour strategy approach to the police is not to deal with them as a special case due to the historical and political difference accorded, but are perceived as crucial to the modernisation of the Criminal Justice System. The police reform agenda has been created to implement all the reforms that are deemed necessary with the constant auditing, monitoring, target setting, evaluation and inspecting to ensure delivery. They identified three far reaching consequence of the managerialisation for the public police.

- managerialism has been internalised and all forms of discourse refer to it,
- managerialisation is driving a programme of civilianisation
- it is sweeping away the symbolism attached to the police.

Giddens (1994) identified five basic dilemmas that render the two meta-narratives of advanced liberal government, 'classical social democracy' and 'neo-liberalism' obsolete. They are:

- the impact of globalisation on the governing capacity of liberal democracies
- the rise of individualism and its threat to social cohesion
- the failure of modern conceptions of politics, in particular the left-right dichotomy, to capture the complexity of advanced liberal politics

- the failure of representative democratic institutions to give 'voice' to this complexity
- and the ecological challenge to indefinite economic growth.

These dilemmas are ongoing and crime and disorder faces these challenges within the wider public governance. Ericson and Haggerty (1997) pointed out that risks associated with crime are part of the burgeoning agenda of the grave risks that the citizens expect the modern state government to manage, contain and redistribute. The principal meta-dilemma confronting the 'third way' is how to include the 'truly disadvantaged' minority without alienating the contented majority who constitute the political base of support for parties of the 'radical centre' (Stenson and Edwards 2001).

Stenson and Edwards (2001) observed that academic theory and research on crime and justice issues have been central to the political debate over crime and the formulation of public policy. The strategies of crime reduction were described as providers of the new forms of public governance. They argued that the 'third way' or 'progressive governance' was influenced by the intellectual movement and discourse within criminology. They explained that criminology experienced a 'political turn' but the reality is that there has been a situation where theory and practice were intertwined and deciphering the relationship becomes difficult. This deciphering depends mainly on the perspective of analysis. The new challenges facing the world is pressuring the universal use of meta principles in informing public policy and the result in practice is the search for pragmatic approach that will result in electoral success.

External and Internal Mechanism of Accountability

The external mechanism of accountability is an artificial dichotomy used to describe the modes of accountability originating outside the police. The internal mechanism is a description of all the processes that are within the police and can be formal or informal. The formal processes are based on rules within or external to the police. The informal processes are the cultural nuances within the organisation that are imbibed in the normal working of the police. The focus of this research is the internal mechanism and the role of senior managers that are the enforcers of the processes. There is the impact of leadership and management on the internal mechanism which is investigated later on in the next chapter.

The relationship between the external and internal mechanisms of accountability has been highlighted with comments made emphasising the importance of each side. What is obvious is that there is a need for both and a clear understanding of the link is essential in order to achieve development in the area of accountability. There is a growing awareness that accountability has to be more than the narrow managerial calculus. Long (2003) has argued for a wider concept of police leadership than performance management. The influence of the external mechanism on the internal structure of the organisation cannot be more visible than concentration of police leadership in the area of performance management.

The law is the link between the two mechanisms as it provides the framework and the process for redress. It is essential to understand the importance of the legal mode of accountability as the boundary shaper of the process of accountability.

The government institutions like the Home Office and DETR although falling under the external mechanism they do have intrusive legal and financial powers to ensure compliance. It is the lack of independence of the police that makes the accountability process important as there is a possibility of confusing the performance with the democratic.

Jones (2003) referred to the work he did in collaboration with others and listed seven 'democratic criteria' that can be used to assess police governance. Although he was concentrating on the external mechanism of accountability these criteria are useful assessment tools. They are as follows:

- Equity,
- Service delivery,
- Responsiveness,
- Distribution of power,
- Information,
- Redress,
- Participation.

He clearly states that various models of accountability will place different emphases on each of the values. When relating these factors internally almost all these values apply but discipline or professional standard has to be included as a value internally. The internal mechanism has instrumental use in that it ensures uniformity in delivery, especially in relation to the exercise of discretion. The area where no formal guidance exists is where the culture of the organisation determines the nature of decisions made.

The link between external and internal mechanisms of accountability is that they are interdependent. It is difficult to trace the origin of the relationship but currently a direct change in one can affect the other. The internal mechanism is less open to scrutiny and influences the behaviour of staff within the police. The managers are the conduit between the external and internal mechanisms and the effectiveness of either depends on their ability to lead. Leadership within the police is therefore essential in the debate about accountability.

Development of Police Accountability

In order to understand the developments of police accountability it is necessary to examine police history to put it in context. However, at least three historical approaches exist. Reiner (2000) identified the traditional, revisionist and modernist. The traditional account views police as an inevitable and unequivocally beneficent institution and a cornerstone of national pride. The revisionist account viewed the police as a means of maintaining the dominance of a ruling class against the interests and opposition of the various sections of the working class that form the majority of the population. The modernist account suggests that both the traditional and revisionist accounts embody questionable assumptions and a more complex approach is adopted. What is obvious is that the same set of circumstances can be explained by using different perspectives.

The changes on the emphasis of the mode of police accountability have followed development external to the police and tend to be haphazard. It does not follow a consistent pattern as the motivation for the changes always varies. Neyroud and

Beckley (2001) commented that authors on policing tend to look at problems from one side and have been reactive as policing to the crises. They identified a boom and bust roller coaster ride effect of policing that is also reflected by these studies. Although they are interested mainly in ethics the observation about police studies is justifiable. Traditionally, the emphasis was on the legal mode, and this is still the first mode reverted to fuel any changes perceived as necessary.

The emphasis on the democratic mode was fuelled by the debate about local and central democratic control of the police. The argument was conducted against the backdrop of the Police Act 1964. McLaughlin (1996) identified the following as fundamentally undermining the campaign for democratic accountability:

- The policing of the miners' strike when police committees were forced to realise that they had no control over the financial cost of the operation,
- The failure of the Merseyside and Greater Manchester police authorities to remove chief constables with whom they could not work,
- The abolition of the radical Metropolitan authorities in 1985 and their replacements with more conservative and deferential bodies,
- The Northumbria Police Authority case in which the appeal court ruled that chief constables could be furnished with plastic bullets from a Home Office depot if their authorities refused to purchase them,
- Home Office circulars which were more mandatory and directive in nature and content and aimed at the minutiae of police policy,
- The lack of an effective means of discipline, and indeed remove, chief constables who made overtly political statements,

- Lord Scarman's refusal to recommend a democratically elected Police Authority for London or extra powers for the provincial police authorities.

The argument was for local democratic accountability as opposed to central democratic accountability. Central source for the democratic mode was argued against as if it was undemocratic. The whole argument for democratic accountability seems to be focused on local democratic mode. Jones and Newburn (1997) in their study of the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 stated that as the new police authorities become more sophisticated in monitoring performance information, we may well see police authorities play a more prominent role in the system of police governance in England and Wales. The whole system appears to work well until there is a period of tension and various explanations are put forward to explain the situation even though it is usually an exception. The debate about the democratic mode is alive but the emphasis is away until the panacea for a new policing crisis is perceived to be the democratic mode.

Varying terms have referred to the financial mode of police accountability. It is what Reiner (1993) referred to as 'calculative and contractual' in which chief constables of the future will be accountable primarily through a market mechanism. The combined effect will be the side stepping of the constabulary independence doctrine and the overriding factor in policing decision making will be attainment of the required target or face the dole queues. Jones and Newburn (1997) observed that in their study there was no evidence to support Reiner's prediction in relation to chief constables' decisions. However, it is not likely that evidence of such change will be apparent especially if there is no existing evidence

to compare it with. In order to explore the effects of these developments a detailed and thorough investigation of managers and operational officers' decision making processes is needed.

This new area is threatening to usurp the debate about accountability and governance of the police. Data is now the ultimate source of the truth. This has led to a move to quantify in whatever activity the police are involved in. The use of performance indicators has developed rapidly and there has been no pause to check the affect it has on the organisation it purports to give information to. A new body of knowledge referred to as 'evidence-based policing' is becoming more prevalent (Ekblom, 1999). This is not confined to the police as suggested earlier because it is a major area of development in public policy and more increasingly in social policy.

The use of performance indicators to the police has shifted the focus of accountability to financial. This development is driven to achieve an end purpose that is perceived to be devoid of political undertone and viewed as neutral. Some of the questions that arise from this development are as follows. What influence would this form of governance have on rules of police work and managerial decisions? Is this a more effective mechanism for governance of the police? What is the reason for having this mechanism and is the process having a more fundamental effect than was firstly envisaged? What are the theoretical and philosophical bases for this process? How well does it perform as a mechanism of police accountability and governance? Is there any need for clarification of what

the process entails and how does it relate to other mechanisms of police governance and accountability?

I only intend to address questions relating to the affect of the financial mode on the culture of the senior managers of the police force. Smith and Gray (1983) considered that the relationship between police behaviour and externally imposed constraints was indirect; they also stated that the task of understanding the nature of that relationship was the most important one for researchers in the field. The aspect of culture I am concentrating on is the judgement of police performance within the organisation. The bureaucracy that accompanies the concentration of efforts on performance and the overall affect on the front line policing is discussed. This will allow me to contribute to the debate about policing with the aim of building a more comprehensive picture in the debate about police accountability. I have identified the role of organisational mode of police accountability in the success of the other modes. The senior managers have a role to play in the occupational culture of the police. I will now examine what the role of senior managers is and how they manage performance of individuals and the organisation.

Chapter Three

Senior Managers and Performance Management

In this chapter I concentrate on the role senior managers within the police. This is embarked on in order to establish the normative and traditional explanation in order to compare the result from the data obtained. The senior managers influence the type of police and the nature of policing to a great extent. Stephens (1988) noted that the quality of policing depends partly on the quality of police management and supervision. Senior police managers for this research have been defined as any police officer of the rank of Superintendent and above. The ranks are as follows:

- Superintendent,
- Chief Superintendent,
- Assistant Chief Constable,
- Deputy Chief Constable,
- Chief Constable.

In relation to the support staff, they are defined as any manager in charge of a department or unit within the various branches of the organisation. These definitions span across organisational roles and other duties that have statutory origin. I will elucidate this point by describing why senior managers are required, the differing roles and duties they undertake.

I rely on my observations as a member of the organisation and studies by other observers. The scarcity of studies focusing on the role of senior managers within the police forces my reliance on studies dealing with the police in general rather than the internal groupings of senior managers. The emphasis of police research

is usually on the operational officers who are perceived as the source of problems of the police. As a result they are also perceived as the area for solutions for the problem to be directed. There is no direct analysis of the role of senior managers and their impact on the perceived problems with the police. There have been some studies that have focused on some grouping within the police, like Reiner on chief constables, but the emphasis have been on the study of the individuals rather than the occupational culture and the effects on the police as an organisation. The discourse moves between officers interacting directly with the public and the chief officers who have the directing legal powers. There are also some studies that try to dictate the best approach to deal with management problems but as will be identified later there are aspects of police work that will not be controlled effectively by management techniques.

The dominance of performance management culture especially in relation to success or failure of policing meant that police managers are responsive to any changes in the nature of the culture. There is a conscious defensive stance in order not to come under scrutiny but managers are increasingly using the information to assist in decision making. The aspect of senior manager culture of interest is the management of performance that is closely related to managing of people. This is studied from the perspective of senior managers in order to build a critique of the new developments in the modes of police accountability on the internal structure of the police. As a result the culture of the organisation, the structure and staff will be discussed in order to build a picture of performance management. Closely linked to this topic is management of resources and decision-making processes. These are reviewed in the light of recent development

in accountability to see if the internal aspects of accountability have changed the organisation as expected. The current developments in statute law are examined to see the relationship between law and the new emphasis on performance culture within the accountability process.

Senior police managers undertake various roles but there are some, which are statutory, and so only police officers can undertake them. Managers who are not police officers cannot carry out the Superintendent's role in relation to treatment of offenders in custody. This role cannot be delegated as both the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and all the Codes of Practice within the Act refer to the rank of Superintendent. There has been a recent development of reducing the rank of some of the authority to Inspectors. An example is the authority required for intimate search of people who are in custody. This can be referred to as operational role in a restricted sense. This means that a typology of senior managers can be made along this line. This can be referred to as Police and Support senior managers. There are some police officers who are not engaged in the operational role but they do have the powers and still have the responsibility to act if the need arises. This does not apply to the support staff managers as they do not have the legal authority to carry out these functions/roles.

There is another typology that depends on the organisational locus, as in headquarters and divisional based staff. The headquarters managers are usually dealing with strategic and organisational focus whilst the divisional managers are usually concentrating on the delivery of service to the public. This typology is

not mutually exclusive, for example there are some operational headquarters branches that directly interface with the public and deliver service. This typology is important in terms of the physical locations of managers and the ability to interact with other senior managers. The third typology is based on the degree of expertise that senior managers have and the ability to change roles within the organisation. The expert senior managers will have an area which expert decisions and advice are given. These managers do not have a role in other areas and will voice opinions rather than advocate policy in areas outside their sphere. As an example the senior managers in estate management or Information Technology will not deal with each other areas. The other side of the typology is the group of senior managers that are managers in the real definition because they can be deployed to any department. These managers are usually police officers and they tend to be in position for relatively short periods.

Senior managers are responsible for issuing the strategic direction of the organisation and ensuring delivery of services to the public. This is a wide responsibility and can be traced to the duty which the Chief Constable has under section 10(1) of Police Act 1996 (1996 Act). In order for the Chief Constable to carry out this statutory duty the Chief Constable has to operate within the law. Since the implementation of the Human Rights 1998 (1998 Act) the Chief Constable has to ensure that in the exercise of any powers that will affect citizens rights emanate from statutes enacted by Parliament. The Chief Constable is in a legal straitjacket on how powers are exercised in practice. The level of legal input into decision making is open to debate but any decision that comes under scrutiny is audited with the legal rules. In order to run the force the Chief

Constable issues directions to staff, which is the source of the duties within the organisation. One of such duties is the management of performance of staff within the organisation.

Although the emphasis is on performance management it should be stated that this is just one facet of the many roles undertaken by a manager. The importance of performance in the assessment of any organisation makes the study of this facet of senior managers' role justifiable. In order to understand the role of senior managers it is important to describe the organisational structure. Police forces do organise on a delivery or operational basis reflecting a geographical boundary that sometimes reflect political boundaries. Although, forces do determine the number of such divisions they are usually constrained by the number of forces in the country which is determined centrally. The police organisation being studied is organised along divisional and branch boundaries. The geographical area covered is divided into four divisions with a Chief Superintendent as its commander. The divisions are known as basic command units (BCUs) in national police terminology. BCUs vary in sizes across the country but they are grouped in families for the purposes of inspection by the HMIC. There are four branches that are managed by Chief Superintendent or the civilian senior manager equivalent. There are a varying number of departments within a branch. Each department is managed by a Superintendent or civilian equivalent. The function of the branch determines the role of the managers, but they all have to perform and manage performance in their role. This means that they all can be assessed against the role they are supposed to undertake. I will now discuss how senior managers are selected and trained.

How Senior Managers are Selected

Senior police managers are mostly selected from police officers and there is the opportunity to transfer forces in order to gain the necessary experience. There is a requirement to attend a senior command course (SCC) before attaining the rank of chief officer level (ACPO level). There is a selection process before police managers become eligible for attending the SCC. This is only applicable to police officers as civilians are recruited solely for their skills and expertise in the specific area of management. The support staff senior manager is recruited with previous experience from other police forces or public service. There is no career structure for them although there is an increasing number of training courses available for them now. The police authorities play a major part in the recruitment of senior managers of ACPO level. The Home Office is in charge of selection through the Assessment and Consultancy Unit. Chief Officers select the senior managers below ACPO level and the system utilised for selection varies between forces. It is difficult to have a benchmark for the process but they attend training courses to improve their skills. They do require national minimum training requirements in order to perform a role. These minimum training requirements usually emanate from recommendation from ACPO as a result of reaction to criticism or movement towards increasing professionalism within the police. This can therefore influence the selection of senior managers because only after completing the training requirements will they become eligible. There are certain roles that only a police officer can undertake and as such it will require a change in law to do otherwise. I will now examine the training regime provided for the senior managers and the extent to which it is

focused on what they do. The question is do the selection and training prepare them for the variety involved in the management within the police?

Management Training

The training for senior police is a mixture of in force, local educational establishment and courses from CENTREX (formerly National Police Training).

Van Maanen (1975) identified five features of police training that distinguishes it from others. They are formality, unusual length, a collective setting, a disjunctive mode of learning and personalised coaching methods. Although all police officers do go through the same initial training, the civilian support staff do not go through this socialisation. Senior police managers rarely undergo all the process of socialisation described above. The training that senior police managers undergo differs widely. So, there is no uniform management training that can be described for all managers. As a result different decision making processes can be expected.

Bradley et al (1986) suggested that police managers' thinking of themselves as managers was a problem in the police service. They identified the difficulties for this form of thinking as follows: difficulty of engaging in reflection of the familiar, common sense ideas and practice that inform day to day practice; difficulty involving the use of alien concepts and framework in reflection; difficulty of conceptualising the utility of management theory in the business of policing. These observations were of lower and middle management, but although it concentrates on police managers rather than support staff the observations are still relevant today.

The training of senior managers also concentrates on operational aspects of policing that are usually undertaken by police officers. This has meant that the support staff training requirement has not been addressed adequately. The system reinforces the dichotomy between support staff and police. The absence of a career structure for support staff at managerial level is further evidence of this gulf. A further feature of training for a senior police manager is the training is geared mainly towards a rank and expectations of what that rank should do. There are training courses for sergeants and inspectors that should equip them for junior managerial roles. Since there is no career plan for most officers and roles are organised as a reaction to need there is a mismatch between training and roles undertaken by staff. Therefore, managers undertake roles that they are not trained for.

Bradley et al identified the problem of the tendency of managerial training to be monolithic. They warned that for management ideas and concepts to influence police management they will have to attend to the variety of police managerial perspectives and help reconcile and bridge the different. This problem is more relevant to senior managers who are more likely to be involved in decisions that reflect the competing demands on the organisation.

The Accelerated Promotion Course (APC) was one of the courses that provided the training for officers highlighted for senior management. Recently, CENTREX have developed the Command Team Programme now the Senior Leadership Development Programme (SLDP), which involves studying from a

wide range of modules to enhance leadership skills. This programme was developed in response to training needs analysis conducted as a result of criticism of the old courses. The old courses were the 'junior', intermediate and special and senior command courses. These courses were regimented and not flexible to the needs of candidates. The Higher Potential Development Scheme (HPDS) is the new scheme designed to identify and train future police leaders and is modular based in delivery. The Strategic command course (SCC) and Chief Police Officers development programme are available for Chief Officers and others with such potential. There are formal courses for senior police managers and dip in courses available for senior managers. The emphasis on role based training instead of rank based is the trend in current police training. Senior support staff managers are usually recruited for their specialist knowledge and have the professional qualifications before or shortly after joining the police. Some police managers belong to professional associations and undertake professional examination. The training once in post is not frequent or structured. The training discourse concentrates on new officers and new legislation. The National Police Leadership Centre (NPLC) now was created to focus on providing training and development opportunities in leadership for police officers and staff. The National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) was established in 2003 with the purpose of increasing the professional capacity of the service in all aspects of operational policing, by promoting evidence based practices that has been professionally validated. The NCPE uses the concept of doctrine as its working methodology to spread best practice throughout the police. The police reform programme conducted under the central supervision of the Home Office have a performance management portfolio that ensures that delegation of

performance information now goes to Basic Command Unit (BCU) level. The establishment of the Police Standards Unit (PSU) as a hands-on institution to ensure performance variances between forces are closed down in line with the Public Service Agreement (PSA) for measuring Home Office performance.

A national approach is being developed to provide the drive for police leaders. NPT which is now the Central Police Training Development Authority (CPTDA) trades with the name CENTREX. Long (2003) noted that the philosophy of training of senior managers and leaders in CENTREX has changed to reflect the challenges posed by the environment in which senior police leaders operate. The concept of leadership is being promoted in terms of transformational as well as the traditional transactional style that was predominant in the training of older managers. The idea is that every officer is a leader and a concentrated effort to develop the emotional intelligence of leaders. The HMI has not concentrated on the training for senior managers yet but it will only be a matter of time before they do so.

There has been a reaction to the developments in performance management and use of performance information by the introduction of courses addressing these issues directly. The duration of courses involving senior managers demonstrates the pressures of work place demand not to lose staff for considerable periods. Senior police managers often work long hours that decrease their ability to reflect on what they do. There is a raft of publications, circulars and guidance notices that are circulated to allow senior managers to keep up to date on recent changes.

The training required by senior managers is complex and will need to be focused on the individual needs of managers. The 'pick and mix courses' available currently for managers form a good start but there is a need to build the profile of senior managers so as to identify the weakness in performance. The national approach tends to concentrate on the universal principles in order to appear widely acceptable. The weakness of this approach is that it does not challenge the managers who have a deeper knowledge base. In a bid to build a unified approach there is a move for the centre ground.

Leaders or Managers?

Waddington (1999) argued that senior ranks should see their roles as supporting the lower ranked officers by identifying problems arising from incidents and co-ordinating responses to them by mobilising resources well beyond the confines of the police service. There is a leadership requirement both within and outside the police as there is a need to obtain resources external to the police. The need to accept that policing problems are not limited to the police and solutions can be found outside. The issue of partnership is now more prominent in the activities that senior managers undertake. There is a pressure of work attached to this new development as the senior manager is perceived as a politician rather than a crime fighter. This might affect the credibility within the organisation especially in the crucial role of leadership within the organisation where credibility is essential.

Waddington further argues that the police should reflect the demands it faces and be bottom up. The idea of problem-oriented policing (POP) which is the dealing with underlying causes of problems with the aim of solving the problem as

opposed to responding to the effects of the problem is central to this bottom up approach. The problems are identified by the officers who are in the community. However, there is a need for senior managers to respond to demands external to the police that are not picked up by staff interacting with the public directly. There is the demand from the government, the media and other professional organisation that requires senior managers to be able to respond to these demands. While the arguments as demonstrated by Waddington are accepted there is a need to recognise that there are other demands and it is the role of senior managers to manage all these expectations. Also there is a need for an increased accessibility of the public to the police in order to bring problems to the attention of the police. This is where the accountability mechanism and the diversity strategy of the police are essential to the communication with the public. The issue of equity in terms of service delivery and allocation of resources are thorny issues in the adoption of this approach to policing choice making. The representative nature of police decision makers is essential to the building of a safe, just and tolerant society. This is where leadership is required to attain the goal, which as of present remains aspirational.

The increase in audit and inspection within the public sector has been described as characteristic of a political culture that challenges their autonomy and claim of self regulation and is less trusting of professional public sector workers (Clark et al.2000). Public sector organisations that are deemed to be failing under the requirements established by the government run the risk of being replaced by 'hit teams' brought in to improve performance. Central to this approach is the issue of leadership which is suggested to be lacking in these failing institutions.

This new regime is demonstrated within the police by the publishing of audit and inspection data publicly available for comparisons between forces and BCUs. As identified earlier the engagement of forces by the Police Standards Unit and the use of IQanta data to justify decisions are developments in this area.

Previously, the emphasis on leadership was reactive to an occurrence and explanations were sought in a retrospective way. The emphasis on monthly and annual audits has resulted in new challenges for police leaders and managers. There is now an increased tension between police 'management' and 'leadership'. Long (2004) charted the development of shifts from 'welfare' to 'managerialism' and the impact on police management and leadership. Hooper and Potter (2000) observed that being a leader today requires more subtle skills than in the past and a different emphasis as organisational cultures change. The changing nature of society makes some of the old assumptions too simplistic and lacking in depth when analysing the performance or successes of organisations.

In modern higher police training there is the acknowledgement of the distinction between 'leadership' and 'management'. Long (2004) traced the development of this philosophy to the work of Bennis (1989) who made the distinction that managers 'administer' whereas leaders 'innovate'. Management was linked to 'control' whereas leadership was described as inspiring 'trust'. The distinction between 'transactional' and 'transformational' leadership has also been made in order to prepare the leaders of the future. 'Transactional' leadership is about

keeping to the rules or what Barling et al (2000) described as a contractual agreement or a form of basic management which is based on 'contingency reward' and 'management by exception'. This is the style that requires hard skills as opposed to soft skills. It is mechanical and routine. This ensures that it is safe and devoid of risk taking on the part of the person that adopts this philosophy or approach. In contrast the 'transformational' leadership style is characterised by leadership skills utilising soft skills. Hooper and Potter (2000: 58) noted:

Leadership has to be transformational process, or as we call it a transcendent process, unlocking the potential contained in every human being, rather than simply being a contractual or transactional arrangement where people perform simply to gain personal rewards, financial or otherwise.

Long (2004) argued that there is a need for police leaders to be able to switch between leadership styles in order to be effective. The various aspects of policing require different leadership styles and there is no universal style that will deal effectively with all aspects of policing. This then requires police leaders to engage in the process and there is a need to plan, prepare and reflect in order to decide the appropriate leadership style. Panzarella (2003) noted that it is not only the case that a single model of leadership style is likely to be inappropriate to the entire organisation but also a single model is unlikely to be adequate for any individual leader. In practice the leadership style required for a spontaneous public order event like a riot and a planned community problem solving activity is different. There are a number of extraneous factors influencing the decision on leadership style and central to these factors is the experience and capability of the staff being led.

The National Competency Framework (NCF) is used by the government as the bedrock of the assessment process in the police. Long (2004) has already pointed out the fact that the framework is better suited to the 'transactional' leadership style. This presents a tension in the system as there is a demand for continuous improvement and effective performance that requires a 'transformational' leadership style but it will not be recognised within the culture of success in the organisation. The challenge is to objectively reward performance that does not appear to be reflected in the current performance measurement culture.

The risk involved in transformational leadership style in the performance culture is high because all the systems that measure effectiveness are currently not aligned to this leadership style. Leaders in the police will have to perform on different levels and react to different audiences in order to survive. What is obvious is the turbulence of the arena in which police leaders are required to operate. The central culling of police into an acceptable definition of what is performance by the Home Office on one hand, and the creative leadership of police leaders responding to local problems on the other. This causes the inevitable ambiguities in the mind of police leaders.

There are demands on police senior managers to them a manager of tangible things rather than concentrating on ethical or psychological efforts of the staff in the organisation. The pressures of police work on senior managers vary according to their roles and experience but it affects the ability to manage and lead the organisation. The tension between manager and leader is not so obvious, as practice leaves rare time for reflection. The lack of time for reflection and

need to manage change increases the pressures on senior managers. The demand for continuous improvement means that there is no static goal and demands keep increasing as the previous problems are dealt with. I will now examine what a senior manager is expected to do.

What is being managed?

Senior police managers have to deal with the same problem faced by managers of big bureaucratic organisations. They need to deploy resources efficiently and effectively, need to provide leadership and strategic direction, maintain the occupational welfare of the staff, provide proper career planning and personal development for staff and represent the organisation. The police differ from other organisation in that it is not solely in a commercial environment and it impacts directly on the administration of the Criminal Justice System. There is a public interest in the activities of the police and so is an extension of the power of the state. There is also the legal problem that senior police managers cannot directly order constables to use their powers as the powers are conveyed to the constables in a discretionary manner. There are a few exceptions like public order powers that are given to a particular rank or senior officer but mainly the constable have to exercise the power. The type of policing method can have a direct bearing on the exercise of police powers as it is possible for local policing to allow offenders if known to the officer to be proceeded against via summons but the same person may be arrested if a reactive policing method is used because the officers may not know the offender. The adoption of policing style is mainly the decision of senior police managers. This means that senior police managers can have a direct impact on the performance of the organisation depending on the

method adopted for policing the area. It is not possible to cover in detail all the aspects of police management. I will focus on what they manage by examining management from the external pressures on the police for action.

The pressure has been on public organisations to achieve economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The source of this pressure has been identified as the introduction of the FMI in the 1980s with the publication of Home Office Circular 114/1983. Prior to this the police have kept some performance information but after the circular the drive towards more information has persisted apace. Economy is concerned with the cost of the inputs used and making economic use of them. Efficiency deals with the cost of producing outputs. Effectiveness is defined as the results of the inputs and outputs. Flynn (1997) identified a fourth, which is concerned with the equality of access to services. He identified the two definitions of efficiency from economics. These are the productive efficiency and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency is measured by the average cost of producing goods and services. Allocative efficiency measures the extent to which the economic system produces that mix of goods and services that reflect people's preferences the customer allows the market to regulate what is produced. In the police there is no market and hence there is a problem with the issue of who controls the market. The idea of public accountability for the use of resources given to public services becomes important. Flynn observed that measurement and reporting of efficiency is an essential part of public accountability.

The police have been trying to address the issue of allocative efficiency by incorporating the demands of the local community in the police plans. The 1996 Act requires the police and the Police Authority to consult with the area being policed. The consultation with the public is nothing new as the PCLC have been in existence since the 1980s. The utility of these public bodies in terms of representation and participation has been criticised (Jones 2003). The management responsibility has been increased with the need to grasp the data and act on it. This was not the requirement for a police manager previously and obviously there is a void in the skill required to manage the police. The assumption is that the manager can control the level of input and how they are allocated. In the police this is difficult as a particular policy may involve many branches within the organisation. The issue of allocative efficiency is inputted into decision making but the measure of it almost impossible. This is because it will be difficult to measure whether the result of resource allocation reflects individual or collective set of preferences.

Productive efficiency is very difficult to access in the police because of the inadequacy of the tools of measurement. It has been argued that the emphasis on measuring and improving efficiency is a mistake because the scientific management approach to performance improvement is based on manufacturing where the product is easily defined and measured (Barzelay; 1992). The problem with the tools of measurement is being addressed but as Flynn noted 'it remains a problem for managers to be able to demonstrate whether reduced budgets result in reduced output, or that productivity has increased' as expressed by their consumption decisions. In a free market competition allows for price reduction

as producers compete against each other. Rules and other non economic factors limit the freedom of choice of what the police can purchase.

Effectiveness involves the measurement of the degree of how much the resources allocated to policing produce the desired result. In order to assess effectiveness it is necessary to agree on what the desired result is. Then there is the need to identify the measuring tool and to separate the impact of policing from other extraneous variables. Flynn argued that the issue of measuring effectiveness is partly technical and that there are two broad areas of outcome. One involves a change in state and the other a change in behaviour. The police are primarily focused on the change in behaviour, which is that of the criminal. However there has been a shift to change in state as the recognition that the fear of crime is a tangible issue on its own. There has been a move by the Home Office to develop a tolerant society, which by inference they think they can build. This idea is put into practice by police forces with the introduction of quality of life policing to address the concerns and fears of citizens. The variety of activities that police do can make this approach ambivalent in practice. It is difficult to crack down on drugs for example if the police require close co-operation with drug users. It also brings in the political aspect of what constitutes fear and concern and which should be given the priority when measuring effectiveness of the police. The presence of the information on police effectiveness does not prove useful for the readjustment in the allocation of resources, as there is no direct link between resources and effectiveness measurement. This is not to say that resources do not influence effectiveness but the measurement does not provide the direct link to be able to affect rational decision making within the organisation. Police

ineffectiveness is usually used as the justification for more police powers either as a corollary to demand for more resources or instead of it. Dixon (1997) pointed out that claims for increase police powers to increase effectiveness by police officers may have significant symbolic dimensions in that it draws attention to perceived crime threats or need for more police, or draw attention away from other public concerns such as corruption or indiscipline. The figures are useful for other stakeholders who are interested in the global picture and can inform public policy. The police have tried to address the effectiveness debate by launching the Quality of Service programme and trying to promote quality in the delivery of service. There was a move away at least intellectually from indicators that were strictly numerical. This has drawn support from those that perceive the police role as a care function but those who see the police function as public order maintenance have also relied on this to support their argument. The argument being that force functions is not represented by the performance information data available.

Loveday (2000) pointed out that police accountability has become less of a politically contested issue than it was in the 1980s and the focus is on police effectiveness, police management and related questions rather than consideration of how police service should be made accountable for what it does. If external issues of police accountability influence the police, then there should be a shift within the management of performance and the managers responsible for it.

Earlier, Weatheritt (1993) indicated that the issues surrounding the debate about performance measurement are both technical and political. The technical aspect

does involve the monitoring of police activity in terms of what are the inputs, outputs and outcomes. These will range from the money that is allocated and how it is spent to how far the public is reassured and the accessibility of the police. The measurement of the police activity is extremely complex and this is a problem of finding the correct instruments. The political issue arises as a result of the utility of the measurements in decision making. Since the decision made will rely on the neutrality of the measurement and the people doing the measuring there will always be a source for political disagreement. Wright (2000) noted that the focus on the instrumental, management-by-objectives and the new management philosophy has failed to deal with the crucial question of legitimacy. It is also true to say that part of the new management philosophy is responding to this criticism by increasing participation through partnership approaches.

Leigh et al (1999) in their study of police preparation for Best Value identified that forces were finding it difficult to benchmark because it was often hard to identify leading service providers and data were seldom comparable. Evaluation has two interrelated aspects. Firstly, the evaluation of policy and its constituent programmes and secondly, the evaluation of people who work in the organisations which are responsible for implementing policy and programmes. Parsons (1995) suggested that evaluation research addresses how a policy may be measured against the goals it sets out to attain, and the actual impact of the policy. He identified a number of main approaches to techniques of evaluation analysis as:

- techniques which measure the relation of cost to benefits and utility;
- techniques which measure performance;

- techniques which use experiments to evaluate policy and programmes.

The impact of policy is much more difficult to assess as there are more intervening factors and it is impossible to control them. This is the area the police are now being drawn into slowly as they move towards a strategic objective of engineering society. I will be concentrating on the evaluation analysis as this has more implications within the organisation with senior managers having a key role to play in the process. The managers do need the information to come to rational decisions. The use of management information systems (MISs) to provide information processed centrally by computers has been the development resulting from the rational objective approach to decision making. Parsons (1995) traced the development of MISs in the UK to development of the Management Information Systems for Ministers to provide better and more regular information to ministers about what is going on in their departments. The introduction of FMI to provide managers with information so that objectives can be met followed. The use of performance measurement as a primary source of evaluation of policy delivery developed as a core technique of this approach. Although the idea of evaluation is sometimes presented as a technical instrument without bias from the positivist perspective it is important to remember the need to control of public finances as overriding aim. Henkel (1991) observed that manager is superseding the professional, since evaluation process moved away from theory, which has moved away from positivism, and evaluation in practice that is highly positivist in believing that things can be measured. She states that political and technical arguments break down and spill over and therefore made the need for judgement and sensitivity more urgent now.

Performance Indicators

In order to improve the public services performance indicators have been used as the main tool of measurement. Performance indicators are published for stakeholders to make judgements about the performance of the police. Different stakeholders have different ideas about what is required from the police and how the police should go about it and so managers have to balance their requirements. Jackson (1988) argued that in order to improve performance in the public sector then measurement of performance is essential. He stated that performance indicators can:

- increase accountability;
- provide a basis for planning and control;
- provide important information to monitor organisational activities;
- provide information for strategic management post mortems;
- provide the basis of a staff appraisal system.

In order for performance indicators to work well, Jackson (1988) argued they should ideally have nine characteristics:

- they should be consistent over time and between units;
- they should be comparing like for like;
- they should be well defined;
- they should only measure what is the responsibility of the manager;
- they should not be independent of the environment in which decision are made;
- they should be comprehensive and reflect important areas of concerns;

- they should be limited to key areas of performance;
- they should be relevant to the specific needs and conditions of the organisation;
- they should be realistic in the targets they set.

He believed well designed and implemented measures can improve the value for money and improve delivery to the public. He sounded the note of warning that PIs are a means of assisting responsible management and not a substitute for good judgement, political wisdom or leadership. A critical perspective of performance measurement would maintain that PIs increases the capacity of the state to control organisations. Power (1994) viewed the emergence of PIs as signalling a shift in power within government and delivery organisations from professionals and administrators to auditors and accountants. I would suggest that it changes the language of the performance discourse to objective and tangible activities relegating the more sociological and political issues to the background.

In the police there are local performance indicators that are supposed to be used by police authorities and police to assess their performance. These are usually influenced by the PIs required at the centre. The Audit Commission publishes guides to devising a set of indicators, setting and monitoring local performance targets. The Audit Commission have a statutory duty to specify performance indicators for local authorities under the Audit Commission Act 1998. The local PIs are used within the local police plan and the processes to implement it. The police Best Value performance indicators (PBVPs) are developed by a centrally

coordinated group with representatives from the police authorities, police forces, HMIC, Home Office and Audit Commission. These indicators are now organised to reflect the developing Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) and are allocated to the relevant domain within PPAF.

Wright (2000) noted that the extensive scrutiny by the Audit Commission and the application of new systems for performance management and accountability so far appears to have failed to reassure some sectors of the public as to police effectiveness or legitimacy. He also argued that the disclosure of major difficulties may have had the opposite effect. The problems in comparing PIs in different organisations are listed in Jowett and Rothwell (1988) as:

- Differing objectives mean different organisations have differing performance indicators making comparisons difficult
- The degree to which inputs can be directly related to outputs varies from organisation to organisation
- The number of objectives pursued by each organisation
- varies greatly and this may tempt policy-makers to opt for short-term rather than long-term solutions to problems.

Bradley et al (1986) concluded that the value-for-money approach has a number of insidious effects upon the structuring of police activity because of the tendencies of favouring the use of quantitative measures over qualitative criteria.

Likierman (1993) stated that there is a danger in a rigid culture that 'what gets measured gets done'. The argument is that performance targets enforced by a

system of reinforcement focus managers' and workers' attention on meeting the targets rather than conformity with rules and procedures. The effect may be less attention being paid to issues of ethics and human rights that are easily addressed by concentrating on rules and procedures. Butler (1998) identified that the application of social market to policing has some fatal flaws. The main one is naive market relationship between what the police do and recorded crime rates. The idea being that if the police was more effective there will be less crime.

This will be reinforced if the rewards within the organisation are strictly aligned to it. It is therefore essential for the organisational culture to be scrutinised in order to see the approach of senior managers to performance indicators. Flynn (1997) highlighted the fact that considerable progress has been made in the development of performance management and measurement; however there are problems because of the different purposes that they are used for. He advocates for improvements in consultation when constructing the measuring tool. This he argues will enable the measurement to be a true reflection of performance.

The result of all these developments is the strengthening and embedding of the NPM as the process of managing the police. The issue of performance management is central to the modern performance culture. There is a demand for continuous improvement and is now being devolved to the BCU level within the police. The regime of audit and inspection that forms part of the new culture demands a new strategy from senior managers as they need to focus on what they will be judged on. This can sometimes be contrary to local demands and reality

but new managers have to manage this tension. It is the management of this tension that highlights the problem of ethics and professional integrity.

Also, the legal principle of 'constabulary independence' which allows the constable at the scene to exercise discretion at the use of police powers and the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the exercise of police powers are two legal obstacles to the pursuit of efficiency. The problem faced by administrative law of uniformity of decision making is sure to become a legal minefield of the future. The police manager not only has to reconcile the policy decisions but have to control the discretionary decisions of officers that will have financial implications for the BCU or the Force.

Why Measure and Manage Performance?

The police have to demonstrate like any other public sector organisation that they are accountable in the financial sense. They have to demonstrate that resources have been spent as agreed and in accordance with procedures; that resources have been used efficiently and used to achieve the intended results. In that case there have been figures compiled by the Home Office in order to respond to these questions. They are usually very basic and the police were not held accountable in detail. The Home Office (1999) stated 'performance measures and comparisons act as a powerful incentive to improve performance and demonstrates how the expectations and needs of national and local communities are met'. Performance measurement and management are essential for managers to be able to evaluate how they are meeting their objectives and to assess staff internally. They are also necessary for external accountability in order to

evaluate the organisation and to find out if the organisation is delivering a quality of service. They also can be used to evaluate if the money given to the organisation is being spent equitably, fairly and effectively. Therefore, the use of this information can be discussed under two headings of external and internal uses. The external uses will include accountability, stakeholder expectations, partnership organisations and professional status. Internal uses include individual and organisational performance.

External Uses

In principle public organisations are accountable to the public for financial propriety, demonstrating that money have been spent as agreed and in accordance with established procedures; that resources have been used efficiently, that resources have been used to achieve the intended result. The politicians are supposed to be accountable for policy decisions. This is enforced via the principle of ministerial responsibility.

In order to respond to enquiries regarding this aspect of accountability there is a requirement to measure performance. Flynn (1997) argued that accounting for money is relatively simple. He goes on to identify the relationship between management and professionals or experts as important in the dealing with the question of whether the service achieved what it was supposed to. He identified one aspect of the specialised occupations in the public sector is that people claim to know what works and what does not, without necessarily being able to explain or demonstrate it. To support this view he used Day and Klein (1987) study which found that doctors, police and teachers all make such claims. What is

obvious is that there is no practical way of obtaining data without using members of the specialised occupations even if they seem not to favour the general view in vogue. The use of performance management and measurement is particularly useful in financial accountability but its use is more controversial in political accountability. The lack of consensus and ambiguous nature of politics ensures that data can be used positively by politicians of opposing views.

The information required for external use is more about the organisation as a whole rather than individual performance. The argument is likely to be policy oriented. In the police there are some details which will not be revealed because of the sensitivity of the information and as such the evaluation will always be on partial information. Mannion and Goddard (2000) observed that there has been a general shift in the use of information on performance away from internal management control purposes towards the use of the data for external accountability and control. The use of league table type performance data is becoming more prevalent. The establishment of the Police Standards Unit within the Home Office will most likely increase this trend within the police.

Stakeholder Expectations

The police have a variety of stakeholders to whom they are answerable and they will have differing demands from the police. Police authorities and their national body, the APA, the Home Office, HMIC, Audit Commission, Treasury and the public are just a few in the long list.

The public are the beneficiaries of policing and they communicate their concerns via various political avenues. They have the ultimate sanction of election of the parliament and local councils. They can raise any issues directly by communicating with any of their representatives. They form part of the police consultative process via neighbourhood watch groups, crime prevention panels, Police and Community Consultative Groups (PCCGs), community groups and the media.

The stakeholders require different types of information in order to achieve their own goals. This is where the police face a practical problem in not being able to recognise what is required and how to deliver such information even if available. The recent problems with sexual offenders and the role of the media is an example of where performance information might be controversial.

Neyroud and Beckley (2001) concluded that efforts towards human rights will not be supported by performance culture imposed by tight control. They have argued for an enabling model that will involve increased professional autonomy and a more reflective practitioner. The lack of clarity in what is expected from the police from different stakeholders once again is identified as the lack of usefulness of new public management in the police.

Individual and Organisational Performances

There is an appraisal process within the police and it is now usually linked to the policing plan for the period in question. The performance information allows managers to plan training for staff and address individual performances. The

information helps the managers in achieving allocative efficiency. There is the information necessary to evaluate policy. The performance information needed to respond to individual needs of workers requires detail information. On the contrary the organisation requires information that is general and the idea of division of labour can be exploited to the full. In dealing with individual performance the figures may have to be as crude as the number of hours spent at work rather than the quality of performance.

The Local Government Act 1999 places a duty on Police Authority to deliver Best Value to the communities that are being policed. The general duty was to make arrangements for continuous improvements in the way they carried out their functions with regards to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The Best Value regime required a proactive intervention and planning in how police authorities carry out their duties. Police authorities are required to use the 4Cs (challenge, compete, compare and consult) to review all aspects of their business. They are also required to prepare a Best Value performance plan for each financial year. This plan is supposed to achieve the two percent efficiency gains target set for the financial year and it is continuous. The 1999 Act amended the 1996 Act to provide that the Best Value Plan to be incorporated into the annual policing plan. The 1999 Act introduced an audit and inspection regime for Best Value. The HMIC is empowered to inspect police authorities for the purpose of Best Value. Benchmarking and costing are two tools essential in the evaluation of Best Value. The issue of costing is more difficult to achieve because of the difficulty in costing activities. The publication of data and the cooperation between forces have meant that the process is used

more. All this have an effect at force level where all the mechanics of the process is put into place.

The PPAF is a joint initiative of the Home Office, ACPO, other policing partners and Association of Police Authorities (APA). PPAF is designed to reflect the breadth of modern policing with emphasis on the partnership approach to community problems. The framework will provide measures:

- of public satisfaction and overall trust and confidence in the police
- performance into context in terms of efficiency and organisational capability

Whilst PPAF is being developed an interim assessment framework is being used to compare policing performance. The framework when fully developed will be built around core measures that are well defined and then quality assured to ensure the reliability of the data. Within the framework policing responsibilities have been divided up into six outcome areas called 'domains'. The 'domains' of policing are:

- Citizen focus,
- Reducing crime,
- Investigating crime,
- Promoting public safety,
- Providing assistance,
- Resources usage.

The full assessment framework is on schedule to be in place for April 2005 and in April 2006 the data covering the breath of policing will have been collected to permit what can be described as a 'true' PPAF assessment. The PSU is currently

assessing performance against the thirteen interim performance indicators detailed in the National Policing Plan 2003-2006. The organisation is therefore under the performance scrutiny.

The performance culture is also now more visible at BCU level. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 requires audits of local crime and disorder problems, consultation with the local community and the development of a community safety strategy. The Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) have focused targets and action plans in order to deliver the strategy. The police play an important role and the HMIC inspect performance of the police within the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. The HMIC have a five year programme from 2001 to inspect all BCUs in the country. The argument is that performance between BCUs varies and inspections will highlight good practice and thereby improve all 'can raise their game'. The operational targets for BCUs are set within the Policing Plan with key performance indicators and targets identified. This is pushed through the performance and development review process (PDR) for individual officers and targets are identified. There are monthly review of performance against targets and a green, amber and red light signal given to establish progress. The green means that target is being achieved and doing better, the amber is on target and red is below target. There is usually a Superintendent in charge of performance and a unit within the BCU responsible for auditing and inspection of performance data. This move is new as the processes of performance management were headquarters based. The devolvement of management of performance is still ongoing and each station might end up replicating what happens at BCU level to ensure that they have the

information. The demand for performance information is getting more local and this places another tier of administrative burden on the police. The PSU have developed an analysis tool called 'iQuanta' that distils information collected from forces and produces charts and other outputs that performance can be tracked on. The Public Service Agreement (PSA) is the broad measure of performance agreed by the Home Office and the Treasury. PSA2 is the performance measure linked to reducing the performance gap between forces. This is the driver behind most of the data gathering and performance management developments in recent years.

Senior managers also attend monthly performance review of the forces performance where the progress of the policing plan is reviewed. The 1996 Act section 8(2) requires policing plan to have performance targets established by the Police Authority. The various branches in the force do have monthly meeting with performance issues discussed as a standing item on the agenda. The publication of HMIC inspection reports for Forces and BCU provides the impetus for driving performance if an area of weakness is identified when compared to others in the family of forces. The processes of reviewing performance, setting of targets and writing policing plans all have a ritual following the process that makes it part of the accountability mechanism. There are players involved in this annual ritual and they engage in a pattern that culminates in the yearly publication and inspection. The senior managers are more involved in the ritual of performance management and although the rational view is that the process will improve performance of the police the views of senior managers on this issue can help in identifying the role it plays within the wide police culture.

The whole process of performance management and the culture surrounding all those involved is now going to be discussed to determine if the wider police culture has changed. This is important as the demands to hold individuals and departments accountable for performance can skew the decision making involving choice to ensure a favourable performance result. Although this is one of the reasons for being accountable it can produce the negative effect on the occupational culture thereby affecting the ethics and moral choices of police staff. The next chapter examines the culture of senior managers with particular emphasis on the aspects relating to the process of performance management.

Chapter Four

The Culture of Senior Managers

Senior police managers exist within the wider police culture but there are some differences in the subculture that sometimes leads to their alienation from the wider culture. It is this, and aspects of culture that are of particular relevance to them that are explored in this chapter. The wider police culture is analysed in order to locate the occupational culture of senior managers. I examined the literature for the occupational culture of senior police managers in order to understand the effects of the emphasis on performance management within the police. They are member of the police staff in general and so it can be expected that the wider police culture will be represented within this group. Reiner (2000) has argued that the police culture is not monolithic identifying the different roles undertaken by the police create a distinct type that differs from the central culture. He had earlier stated that culture of Chief Constables varies with different perspectives such as the pattern of their previous careers. In his earlier study of chief constables, Reiner (1991) identified four types of chief officers:

- The Baron,
- The Bobby,
- The Boss,
- The Bureaucrat.

Each type had a different leadership style that influences the culture of the organisation especially the behaviour of senior managers in the organisation. Long (2003) observes that there has been a significant shift away from the forms of leadership associated with the first three types of Reiner's ideal type of chief officers. He further argues that the NPM has resulted in the bureaucrat typology

being located further down within the organisation in BCU commanders. One of the results of this form of culture is that the emphasis is placed on the 'management' rather than on 'leadership' elements of senior offices. I earlier made the point that senior managers can be grouped into different typologies depending on their role, status, legal power and expertise. The occupational culture relating to each group differ but there are aspects that are common to all senior managers.

An examination of the concept of culture is useful as a starting point. Schein (1992) stated that the concept of culture helps in the explanation of the more seemingly incomprehensible and irrational aspects of groups and organisations. He identifies four reasons why we need to understand the concept of culture within organisations. Firstly, it illuminates sub cultural dynamics within organisations. Secondly, it assists in understanding how new technologies influence and are influenced by organisations. Thirdly, it is necessary for management across national and ethnic boundaries. Lastly, organisational learning, development, and planned change cannot be understood without acknowledging that culture is a primary source of resistance. Although, the organisations that Schein studies are mostly multi-nationals the points raised are valid on the level of microanalysis of culture of public organisations as well. Culture is used within this research in the wide sense, as a pervasive way of life within an organisation. Schein (1992) defines culture of a group as:

A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relations to those problems.

He suggested that the basic assumptions derive their power from the fact that they begin to operate outside of awareness. This definition helps in analysing police culture. Handy (1985) describes four main types of culture that are called power, role task and person. He further states that cultures are founded and built over time by the dominant groups within an organisation. Senior managers do have significant powers but to describe them as a group dominant or otherwise is open to debate. If they do form a dominant group then their culture needs to be studied in order to address the changes that are required from the police in the 21st century.

Is the culture within an organisation monolithic or is it possible to have varying subcultures and how are the conflicts resolved if they arise. These questions affect the legitimacy of using the culture as the source of analysis of behaviour observed. Schein argues that these questions should be handled empirically. The assumption being that culture of an organisation can be isolated and studied. I am sceptical about this endeavour, as the individual contribution to the process is impossible to isolate. Sackman (1997) stated that from her research culture within an organisation could be both integrated and differentiated at the same time. As a result members of an organisation are unlikely to be restricted in their membership to one single culture or subculture.

Reiner (1992) drawing on earlier studies describes the core characteristics of the culture of police as follows:

- sense of mission,
- suspicious view,

- sense of isolation/solidarity,
- conservatism,
- machismo/sexism,
- racial prejudice,
- pragmatism.

Some of the core characteristics described have been highlighted for the negative effects of the aspects of culture. The utility of these characteristics are difficult to assess as they all have unethical undertones in the working meaning. This has influenced police training and thinking, thereby creating a drive to improve police occupational culture as a reaction to the negative characteristics highlighted. The problem with always concentrating on the negatives is the failure to acknowledge best practice that can improve service delivery if it is communicated throughout the police.

Meek (1994) identified the presumption that there exists in a real and tangible sense a collective organisational culture that can be created, measured and manipulated in order to enhance organisational effectiveness as the problem with some studies of organisational culture. She reiterates that the concept of organisational culture can be a powerful analytical tool in the study of complex organisations, but still warns about the misuse to reify the social reality of social life. She also identifies two camps in the theory of organisational culture using an earlier classification. They are those that treat organisational culture as a variable and the other views culture as what an organisation is. The latter view is aligned to the approach adopted by the anthropologist towards the study of culture. Culture is perceived as the product of negotiated and shared symbols

emerging from social interaction. This perception of culture means that it cannot be discovered or manipulated because of the complexity and at best can only be described and interpreted. There is a need to continue to gain more understanding of occupational culture even under the second camp as it can contribute to the partial understanding of some new developments affecting culture.

Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) identified the point that immediate work or peer group motivates and controls the individual's behaviour as opposed to the wider organisational culture. They identified the street and management cops culture within the police but they go on to emphasise the point that this dichotomy can be expected in any organisation in which authority and responsibility are dispersed when trying to respond to external and internal pressures for change. These pressures are sometimes contradictory and require management in order for organisations to progress on the agenda identified as necessary for progress. The two cultures were described as being different as they have different objectives. They identified increasing organisational stress as a major result of the loss of a unified police culture. The development of conflict internally is a result of the lack of unity in the culture. Also, it is always possible for external institutions to team up with the aspect of culture that suits their objective. This is visible in the legal demarcation of the ranks into Police Federation, Superintendents Association and ACPO.

The use of replacement and adaptation as a means of managing change and the tensions that it produces when adopted was highlighted. Replacement involved

the abandoning of old and inefficient working practice with new, more efficient ones. Adaptation is the use of a gradual approach to redefine or modify existing working practice. The management options adopted by managers will affect the culture that develops after the change. However, the culture prior to introduction of change is important in determining the tactical options available when making change.

Wall (1998) suggests that during the 1990s there has been an increasing adoption of the managerialist, 'businesslike' flavour. Reiner argues that the culture of the police does not depend on individual attributes but on elements in the police function itself. This argument does have implications for recruitment and training of senior police managers. It is necessary to find out how much influence the police functions have on senior managers and the occupational culture. In particular will there be a difference as a result of other influences apart from the role or function carried out. What are the individual attributes that can contribute to a different culture within the group?

Since there is no officially recognised group as the senior managers the occupational culture is a synthesis of the various individuals defined as such. The similarity in the function that they undertake in terms of performance management and the importance of performance culture in the public services justify the classification even though it may appear as an artificial categorisation. The senior managers as a group determine the strategic direction of the police and execute the policies in order to fulfil the obligations of the Chief Constable. As Bradley et al (1986) have suggested that there appears to be little evidence of

consensus about the actual and potential community input into police policy making process. The passing of the various statutes since then has not clarified the issue clearly and so the role of the group that makes these policies and their culture has to be scrutinised to see how the society is being policed.

Recently, Chan (1997) identifies four problems with current theories on police culture. The first criticism is the failure of existing definitions of police culture to account for internal differentiation and jurisdictional differences. The second criticism relates to the implicit passivity of police officers in the acculturation process. The third criticism is the apparent insularity from the social, political and organisational context of policing. The fourth criticism combines the first three in that an all powerful homogeneous and deterministic conception of the police culture insulated from the external environment leaves little scope for a cultural change. The length of time organisations have been in existence will have a bearing on the level of shared assumptions within the culture. This can contribute to the overemphasis of the structural influence as the individual may feel intimidated by the history of the institution. Chan proposed a new framework for the understanding of police culture which is an explanation in terms of interaction between the social and political context of police work (the field) and the institutionalised perceptions, values, strategies and schemas (the habitus). She highlighted that it can be argued that the discussion about how police reform should be achieved has been based on a faulty conception of police culture. She identified the idea that the culture is uniform, unchanging, powerful and separate from the formal structures as the weakness. Small and Watson (1999) have suggested a hierarchy of values consisting of risk avoidance,

comradeship, outcomes, masculinity, professionalism, opportunism and community standing. This is an attempt to try and identify the core assumptions that underlie the police culture.

Neyroud and Beckley (2001) have argued for an ethical policing approach will secure and protect human rights as the new rationale for public policing. There are no shortages of approaches for public policing but all rely on the senior managers implementing them. It is necessary to critically examine their role in the performance of the police. I will now discuss their relationship with other staff within the police and their influence on the wider police culture.

Senior Managers and Other Staff

Senior police managers' relationship with other members of the organisation is based mainly on written communication, consisting mainly of bulletins and minutes from meetings. Kinsey (1985) in his survey of Merseyside Police found that over a third of police constables (PCs) had not spoken to their chief inspectors within the past three months. He argued that that his results demonstrated a steady reduction in communication between the officers of chief inspector and above, and junior ranking officers. The survey also revealed critical attitudes of many PCs expressed towards senior officers and supervisors. This resulted in information supplied to senior officers being partial and selective. Three consequences of this kink in information were identified. Firstly, since policy is set by senior officers and junior officers implement it, the implementation is more difficult because of ineffective communication. Secondly, it fosters a culture of unethical behaviour and lastly it may encourage

and reinforce the belief that senior officers are 'out of touch'. The PSI research on the Metropolitan police by Smith and Gray (1985) echoed the findings in Kinsey survey. These studies were carried out when there were considerably more senior officers within the police and the demand on the police continues to increase. This will seem to imply that the situation will be worse than before.

The senior managers do interact with other staff but this is usually in a formal setting and seldom on a personal level. This situation varies depending on the role of the manager. Bradley et al (1986) observes that when superior rank is combined with superior age and experience it is bound to produce an irresistible, if not unchallengeable, basis for the defence of established managerial practice. This does not account for other officers who operate within the organisation with a support staff manager. It also cannot account for the many members of support staff that are supervised by police officers and who sometimes are involved in operational matters. The number of support staff has increased and they now participate in the management. This group of staff not catered for in earlier studies influence policies. The question is how many of them are there, which positions do they hold and do they change the structure of the organisation thereby affecting the culture? There is a total of about 860 support staff forming 30% of the organisation. In this study there are 11 civilians defined as senior managers and form 34% of the grouping.

Police and Civilian Managers

Jones and Newburn (2002) identified civilianisation as a key feature of the fracturing of the public police identity. There is no evidence to demonstrate that

support staff or civilians behave differently from police officers. This is to undermine the part that the nature of the role played in the culture of individuals within the organisation. In their discussion on civilianisation they included the special constabulary which appears to boost the number of civilians. There has been a policy of civilianisation encouraged by government in the past two decades with reinforcement added to encourage the process. The police have always employed civilians but the difference now is the role that they now undertake and where carry out these roles. They are mainly finance, training, computer and administrative roles but there is a disproportional representation within senior managers. The arguments for civilianisation are usually forwarded because of the value because of the relative low cost to employ. In the face of scrutiny this argument does not stand up to scrutiny because the wages that are paid can only appeal to the lower end of the labour market. This argument is closely linked to the fact that police officers are not professional enough and civilians bring this to the arena. There still is no dramatic improvement in the performance of the police as a result of introducing this specialist knowledge to their decision-making process. There is the possibility to have an incompetent police officer and this is also the case for civilians. Since there is a cost cutting exercise the police are not organised enough to have an organised attempt to attract direct from the labour market. There is the strength of bringing variety to the organisation that can only enrich the culture of the organisation. This enables the organisation to be more representative of the organisation assuming that it is not the same type of people that join the police are the ones joining as civilians. It will be important to see if the support staff managers differ from police officers in their management of performance.

Support staff can be recruited directly with the skills and so it is not necessary to train police officers. This has to be taken into context as the police recruit from a variety of background and there can be people within the organisation with such skills and aptitude, so sometimes it can be a waste of money. This is because it is easier to redeploy a police officer than a support staff senior manager is. There is the possibility that once in situ they are not likely to advocate for the termination of their contract. They will have to try and perpetuate the status quo unless radical employment contract agreement is drawn up at the inception of the contract. If they decide to leave the organisation at anytime there can exist a period where there is no other support staff to cover. This means in reality for every post there is a need to have a cover for the post in case of emergency.

A further weakness of the policy in relation to senior managers is the inability of support staff to move freely within the organisation because of the narrow scope of influence on the staff as a whole. A manager in charge of procurement cannot effectively control police staff when outside the scope of his specialisation but police officers do have the obligation to act and have the inherent power to control officers who have a lower rank. This lack of mobility is complicated by the fact that although they are senior managers there are some police activities that they can not be involved in because they are not recognised legally to undertake such decisions. A suggestion might be to make all civilians become special constables to ensure that they do carry more obligations towards the public over and above being a citizen. There is a public expectation of control when a police employee is around. As of present there is no legal obligation on

civilian senior managers above what they have as a normal citizen. Police officers always have this inherent power that will not necessarily be used but is there in case of emergency. Police officers also belong to a hierarchical organisation and as such can fit in at the appropriate level and act as required. In the wide sense of political accountability to the public support staff does not interact directly with the public because of their specialist role within the police. There is the problem of whether the public will respond to support staff when they want to hold the police responsible.

In the performance of the role of senior managers there will be occasions that not being a police officer will be a disadvantage but it will also be useful not to be one in certain situations. These situations will include occasions where police officers require assistance but are reluctant to confide in fellow police officers, this is quite common where the person is a victim and feels that police officers will not be sympathetic. Although for the victim it might not be ideal it is better than the organisation not being aware of the issue. There are certain roles that the possibility of exposure to the public is very low and as such a support staff manager can undertake the role effectively especially if it is mainly policy related. The current state of affairs is a mixture of both police and support staff therefore what is required is a management of the situation with an awareness of the weakness and strengths of both approaches. Any sudden change of policy will have impact on the culture of the organisation thereby influencing the performance and behaviour of the organisation.

The managers determine the direction and performance of the organisation. This means that they are in charge of the internal accountability systems of the police. I will now discuss the wider culture of the police and later focus it down to the relevant aspects of senior managers' culture. This will enable us to examine what senior managers are supposed to do and what they actually do. I will also discuss the structure of the organisation and the influence of structure on culture. Then I will also discuss the effect of roles and nature of work on culture.

There are some duties that require the authority of Superintendent and as such increases the contact of some senior managers with the other ranks. There are also some senior managers that are operational and have constant working relationship with officers of other ranks. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Team revealed astonishment about the lack of command and organisation during the initial response to the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The police officers that gave evidence were all convinced of the professionalism of the police action. The problem can stem from what the idea of professionalism means but what is amazing is the unity in the police whilst faced with evidence to the contrary. The question is whether this is just an exception rather than the rule. The theory of police culture about the police solidarity/isolation (Reiner 1992, Clark 1965; Cain 1973) seems to also apply to senior managers as well. Reiner (1992) distinguishes between 'management cops' and 'street-cops' that he argues gets highlighted when the police face external investigations. Waters (2000) quoted an ACC interviewed during the research as stating that dangerous things such as bullying and prejudice exist amongst the lower ranks. A view which seems to try

and reinforce old stereotypes of the negative behaviour only existing in the lower ranks and managers are the crusaders trying to save the public from this evil.

Chan adopted Brogden et al (1988) typology of changing police behaviour. The two approaches are tightening of rules and changing the informal culture of police organisations. The two approaches have been adopted simultaneously in the governance of police behaviour and it will be difficult to decipher the two in practice. It can be argued that they form a continuum but useful as a concept to understand police behaviour and a tool for implementing developments and changes. Rule tightening encompasses the changing of internal and external rules. The source can be internal, external and a combination of both. The senior managers are responsible for the internal source and also ensure that the external source is given recognition. The weakness of this approach is that it is based on the assumption that police organisations are bureaucratic and mechanical (Chan 1997; Colebatch and Lamour 1993). Police organisations have been described as quasi-military and hierarchical in structure. The implications being that the organisations follows rules and are command oriented; still the aims of rule tightening remain wholly unachievable. Chan suggested that the failures of rule tightening measures are often met with further calls for rule tightening. She further stated that it is the disillusionment with rule tightening that lead to the growing interest in changing of police culture. I would suggest that academic interest changed focus rather than people who wanted change. The question is the focusing the mind of the senior managers on the issue of interest. It is the variety of issues that are dealt with that facilitates the inability to direct

behaviour. I would argue that it stems from the lack of clarity on what the police do.

Brogden and Shearing (1993) argued that rule making must be complemented by strategies to change the culture from inside. They further stated when rules are not congruent with practice the police often find ways of getting around the rules. The fact that if the rules are adhered to nothing will get done practically is not visited. The practice of rule breaking is not a simple problem and there is a need for relativism in the assessment. The officer that travels to an incident over the speed limit breaks the rule but it happens and it is justified. There are a number of rules relating to recording of evidence that does not consider the considerable difference in human ability. It is understandable because the area of interest for academic scrutiny has been the abuse/misuse of police powers especially in relation to discretion of police officers.

Senior Managers and Discretion

Senior managers make decisions all the time in order to ensure that the goals of the organisation are achieved. There are alternative choices for managers to choose from when making a decision. There are some of these decisions that are statutory and legal in origin but senior officers have to decide. There are some administrative decisions that have effects on how operational officers do enforce the laws. They are also held responsible for the failures of the organisation and they represent the organisation in public. They directly influence the perception of the public and their leadership is demanded in times of public crisis. The public trust and confidence are directly influenced by performance of senior

managers. Their ability to anticipate the public concerns and to react to them is essential. The Home Office have been leading the drive to promote the involvement of citizens in decisions about how they are policed and seek to increase the citizen focus of the police. This is emphasised in PPAF used to assess police performance. All this puts demand on senior managers to lead and make new decisions against a background of changing expectations. The decisions of senior managers can therefore influence enforcement directly or indirectly. Coleman and Norris (2002) identified four major justifications for the existence of police discretion. They are:

- the finite resources available for police work,
- the need for interpretational latitude in interpreting the law,
- the need to preserve legitimacy,
- the need for efficiency.

Whilst all these justifications were described in detail, the internal accountability use of discretion by police officers were not discussed as the analysis is more external and more on the relationship with the policed, in terms of enforcement, rather than within the police. Discretion in police work is also essential for the internal accountability process within the police. This is exercised by senior officers who have a direct effect on the discretion exercised by the police officer on the streets. The more legal basis for police decision making the more discretion becomes necessary in decision making. As a result attention is required as to the influences on the decision making processes of police officers.

In making choices the managers exercise discretion, as discussed earlier, as a result there is the possibility of an arbitrary decision. This is because the exercise of discretion allows the decision-maker the ability to tailor the decision to the particular circumstances. The decision maker operates within a cultural context. The exercise of discretion by senior managers is usually in the policy area but they also exercise discretion when making decisions involving staff development and welfare. The decisions can affect both policy and individuals within the organisation. For example the policy to purchase fewer vehicles and concentrate staff on foot patrol can affect the enforcement of traffic laws and increase police activity in dealing with minor public-order situations. The police staff may have to conduct more foot patrol and it might affect some staff in a negative way. The redress to such a policy can be legal in the sense of judicial review of the decision or making the police accountable later through performance of the force or individual staff can complain through the grievance procedure. The question is what protection do managers have when exercising discretion and are they immune from legal scrutiny?

The emphasis on accountability has put pressure on senior managers to objectify their decision-making process in order to defend the decisions that are taken. Another pressure has come from management science and theory that try to identify the ideal methodology for making the right decision. Flynn (1997) argued that although structures are important, they are really expression of the process of co-ordination and control which are already in place and power relationships between individuals, groups, profession and function. The structure of the senior police manager needs examining as well as the culture that it

influences. This is because the management choices affect the culture of the organisation. As illustrated by Mintzberg (1983) who identified five fundamental co-ordinating mechanisms which organisations can use, they are:

- direct supervision,
- mutual adjustment,
- standardisation of inputs,
- standardisation of processes
- standardisation of outputs.

The choice of co-ordinating mechanisms is the key to organisational design and the emphasis placed on any of the mechanisms reflects a different culture. An example is if co-ordination is achieved by standardisation of outputs, then it has to be possible to measure the outputs. It should be noted that the increase in centralisation of policies is limiting the influences of managers on the culture as the choice of policies are governed by centrally agreed criteria. The advantage of efficiency savings that this brings is tempered by the little pockets of police areas where the policies are not directly relevant.

Flynn (1997) identified two further co-ordinating mechanisms in addition to the five identified by Mintzberg. Firstly, the market is viewed as a way of defining transactions between individuals which makes explicit what people will do in exchange for a 'consideration'. However, the introduction of the market must change the power relationship between the two sides before it changes the structure. Secondly, is the management by beliefs, based on Ouchi's (1991) idea that societies manage themselves by the development of a shared set of beliefs

about what behaviour is acceptable and police themselves in order to ensure the survival of the belief system.

The structure of an organisation is usually influenced by the fashion and accepted norms within the sphere of the core business of the organisation. The organisations in the public sector have an added influence of the political and financial direction of the state. Flynn (1997) concluded that changes in organisational structures have been consistent, trying to control how previously autonomous professions work, a tendency towards centralisation, introduction of competition and finally pressure on cost leading to 'delaying' or removal of management tiers. A result of this development is the fragmentation of organisations. Flynn advocated two responses to this fragmentation. The process of planning requires that the collection of organisations needs to be taken into account and the organisations have to collaborate with each other to achieve results.

There is the argument that local managers are better informed and as such should be responsible for resource allocation responding to local circumstances. This is the move for decentralisation and the opposite movement is recentralisation. This is used as argument for increased accountability of organisations. There is the idea of 'delaying' or streamlining of the tiers of management. This is usually a cost saving which results in staff taking on more responsibility closer to the delivery end of the organisation. This has resulted in the streamlining of senior managers and within the police the rank of Superintendent has lost more officers than any other rank. This has affected the flexibility available in the senior level

of management. This will have had an effect on the culture of work and senior managers within the police. Coupled with the policy of civilianisation there can be an atmosphere of hostility as a result of the new structure. I will now examine the role of senior managers in the internal processes of accountability.

Senior Managers and the Processes of Police Internal Accountability

I have embarked on the discussion of accountability on two interrelated headings. They are the formal and informal processes. The formal process is mainly the normative processes that are usually based on legal and administrative rules. The informal process is linked directly to the police culture that was discussed earlier. Senior managers police the formal processes and through the process of the occupational culture reinforce certain types of behaviour.

The formal processes of internal accountability within the police include all the formal process used by managers. The first formal source is the appraisal of individual staff. Every member of the organisation undertakes a performance and development review (PDR) every year. This is the formal means of setting targets and focusing the policing plans into individual action plans. The senior managers play a major role in the management of the process by using it for promotion and selection for specialist posts. The individual officer is held accountable for his performance in the post held. The appraisal system is one of the tools of control available for senior managers over the staff at street level. The setting of targets within the appraisal process is the current development to direct the activities of the organisation.

Practice directions are the rules and procedures to be followed in police activity. These are used as the standard for evaluating the actions of police officers. Police officers adhere to practice direction as a guide to best practice. If practice directions are not adhered to officers may be subjected to code of conduct enquiry. The police usually carry out internal inspections and audits to evaluate performance and policy. This information provides the managers with the evidence of organisational and individual performance. They also collate the information required by stakeholders. In the process of acquiring this information staff is aware of the areas of interest. The senior managers also communicate the values and direction of the organisation. Misconduct and Unsatisfactory Performance procedures form the major formal means of holding staff accountable. The misconduct procedure deals with unacceptable behaviour of officers. Complaint is defined by section 65 Police Act 1996, as any complaint made about the conduct of a police officer which is submitted either by, or on behalf of a member of the public and with his or her consent, and can only be received from members of the public who have had occasion to be well informed as to the fact of the incident. The process is directed to conduct of officers and not to policy or procedures of the force. The complaint can also stem from internal reporting from colleagues or managers. The disciplinary authority is usually the Deputy Chief Constable. Police Authorities are the disciplinary authority for officers above the rank of Superintendent and are therefore responsible for dealing with complaints and misconduct proceedings in respect of such officers. This process only applies to police officers and there is a different process for support staff. There is support staff members that operate directly with the public but disciplinary procedures are less structured than the

one for police officers. When the complaint is serious the Police Complaint Authority (PCA) has to be informed and they have a general supervisory role for the whole process. The impartiality of PCA has been questioned in *Sultan Khan V UK* where it was held that the police complaint process did not provide effective remedy for a breach of human rights in particular Article 13, which requires citizen to have effective remedy for breaches of rights. The idea of relying on the PCA as an independent supervisory body is now questionable legally. Senior managers do have a problem as this can only mean another stakeholder in the pipeline. This is being addressed by the introduction of the IPCC.

Unsatisfactory performance procedure deals with officers failing to deliver acceptable performance. There is a presumption that what is acceptable performance is identifiable and objective for managers. This reinforces the discipline culture of the police as there is a sanction by managers to deal with staff members that are not committing a crime or there is no misconduct issue. Section 77 of Police Act 1996 requires the police authorities and HM Inspectors to keep themselves informed as to the working of the complaints and misconduct procedures. Section 22 (1) of the 1996 Act requires the chief officers to submit a general report to the Police Authority each year for which their forces are maintained. Section 22 (3) further requires chief officers whenever required to do so by an authority to submit a report on such matters as may be specified by the authority. A report of this nature may be about both complaints and misconduct matters. How often this power is used in relation to misconduct and complaint matters is not obvious but the power does exist.

Closely linked to the above mentioned processes is the 'Grievance Procedure' which is the internal process of dealing with any disagreement that staff has with policy or with their treatment by the organisation. The process has three stages and the final arbiter is the Deputy Chief Constable. Senior managers are responsible for the effectiveness of this process as the utility of the process depends on staff believing that they are not wasting their time.

Police Complaint System

Senior managers manage complaints from members of the public by referring the appropriate ones to the PCA. The level of discretion involved in serious cases is limited but they can influence the way cases that are borderline are investigated. This is because they decide in the initial stages the direction of the investigation. This is where they interact with other officers and staff within the organisation and hold them accountable for actions. This is more of a perceptual power as most officers are not involved in complaints investigations. The Professional Standards Branch (PSB) is responsible for enforcing code of conduct and unsatisfactory performance within the organisation, therefore has this perceptual power within the organisation and is viewed with suspicion. The branch is not proactive and only reacts to complaints from the public or as a result of supervisory request. The Police Reform Act 2003 abolishes the PCA and the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) now replaces it. This does not affect the perception of the Professional Standards Branch within the police as they manage and deal with complaints. They are still viewed by other members of staff suspiciously because of the role they undertake. The new

complaint regime now extends to all members of the police force including support staff involved in delivery of services to the public.

Public and Private Law

If the police have committed a civil wrong against a citizen they can be liable for damages through a civil action. The main torts for which the police can be sued are:

- assault and battery,
- false imprisonment,
- malicious prosecution,
- malicious process,
- negligence,
- causing death,
- trespass to land/goods,
- misfeasance in public office.

Judicial Review is the process in which the High Court supervises the lawfulness of the actions of public bodies and individuals that carry out public duties and functions. Judicial review is not considered appropriate by the courts if there is another effective remedy (*R v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police ex p Calveley* 1986 QB 424 CA). The police are individual citizens who do have access to private and public law like any other citizen. However legal accountability usually occurs after the act and there is the issue of access and cost of litigation. All these make it difficult to pursue in practice.

Police officers are increasingly using Employment Tribunal in the area of equal opportunity legislation. Although police officers have no employment contract they have been able to gain access via Sex Discrimination and Race Relation Acts. This avenue is open to all staff and as a result is not against senior managers. However, when there is a case the senior managers have a role to play in defending the organisation and implementing the lessons learnt from the process. The extent to which this happens in practice is debatable, as all forces do not experience the same level of litigation.

There are the options of approaching the Police Authority, HMIC, Member of Parliament, local council representatives and the press as outside avenues that have formal basis but are perceived as extreme measures by the organisation. These options have the common denominator of the senior managers not starting the process and having to be defensive. If the issue identified is positive the reactions are clearly the opposite. All these processes are external to the police and the degree of control available is not known. This might be the reason for the unease of senior managers letting issues of internal accountability going outside.

Informal Process

The specialist knowledge that a senior manager possesses may be a source of control of staff within the organisation. The manager determines the level of performance acceptable and decisions made are less likely to be challenged if specialist knowledge is involved. The role of the manager within the organisation affects the ability to make staff accountable. The managers from headquarters and the centre are usually viewed with suspicion within the police.

The ability to control and direct effectively depends on how seriously the manager is viewed within the organisation. Closely linked to the above point is whether the manager is operational or office bound. The operational officer is perceived as giving orders and police officers being within a disciplined organisation will follow and question later. This latitude is not always extended to other managers especially if they have not been operational.

The length of time a manager has served within the organisation sometimes affects the ability of a manager to influence staff. There is a tendency to react positively to staff that have been within an organisation for sometime. The longer a manager has been within the organisation the easier it is for the manager to move within the organisation. This is particularly true of police officers that are usually moved between branches and unit in order to develop them as managers. It is also a means of weakening corruption and favouritism allegations labelled at police management. The downside to this policy sometimes referred to as tenure, is that it only applies to police officers and it sometimes makes civilian managers more powerful in the specialist knowledge sense. When there is a confrontation between police and civilian staff there is the temptation for police officers to revert to other forms of informal knowledge and power to isolate the civilian manager. This is an informal power that is not clearly obvious when analysing the culture and behaviour within an organisation. This type of informal process is closely linked to the notion of 'axiomatic knowledge' developed by Chan (1997). Axiomatic knowledge captures 'why things are done in the way they are' within an organisation and she further argues that axiomatic knowledge are often held by top management and forms the foundation for the

shape and future of the organisation (Chan 1997:68). The length of time a manager has stayed in an organisation has a direct effect on the axiomatic knowledge of the manager. The effectiveness of the manager can be directly influenced by this factor as they also are aware of both the process and personalities involved in why things are done the way they are.

The gender of the manager can be a source of informal power. The majority of senior managers are male and it can be argued that as a male you are likely to encounter someone with a sympathetic view as they can easily empathise. The accessibility of staff towards the senior managers can be affected by the lack of a particular gender in terms of communication and relationships within the organisation.

The rank of the manager does carry an acknowledged informal power for the holder of the rank. This is more relevant to police officers who are socialised into recognising the importance of rank. The support staff can also succumb to this culture by them trying to identify themselves along police ranks and their perceived equivalent within the police. Police officers do fail to recognise this power even when the support staff member is senior in position within the organisation.

The personality and the management style of a particular manager may influence informally their ability to make staff accountable for their actions. A strict and directing manager will allow very little room for discretion. The staff will have to follow the directions given by the manager. As suggested earlier the structure

of the organisation, the personality and the type of role undertaken by the manager all influence the culture. This source of informal power can account for why it is possible to get some policies implemented successfully in one area but not in another.

The lack of transparency in informal processes is a reason for the power it has within the wider police culture. Other members of staff cannot effectively predict what happens and in a risk averse environment compliance with the culture is the norm. There is no evidence to suggest that informal process is used for subversive purposes but the belief is that trying to be on the right side of managers is the way to survive even though what they require may need urgent feedback.

A number of recent developments have impacted on management culture of the police. I will now discuss a few of these developments and their implications. The new public management agenda within the police has developed without significant changes in the legal status of the constable and no protection for managers for their actions. There are some legal development like Health and Safety that put more responsibility on the managers without the necessary financial tools to ensure adherence to the law.

Senior Managers and Diversity

The lack of gender balance and ethnic minority has been a constant criticism of the police in general. Reiner had identified old fashioned machismo as a core characteristic of the police. Heidensohn (2003) pointed out that only with a few

exceptions academic insider account by men of policing showed an awareness of difference and complexity in the gender issue. She identified four themes as standing out from the record since the period of integration. They are:

- Models of equality,
- Coming to terms with police culture,
- Careers issues,
- New agendas.

Although the analysis is for the police in general it is more apparent in a discussion of senior managers culture where the old justification of not having women i.e. lack of macho power to do the job is less applicable. The argument is not justifiable at the operational level but there are some that use this argument. It is weak and does not have any evidence to show that males are more effective than women. As will be discussed later the opposite evidence does exist from the promotion examinations in the police.

The Gender Agenda is a document produced by the coalition of British Association of Women Police (BAWP) and their allies. The police have responded to the criticisms and have supported the principle. The question is if it makes a difference in practice. The senior managers are now aware of this issue. Silvestri (2003) highlighted that senior women officers claimed they had not planned their own career and can be easily outsmarted by their male colleagues. The issue has to be addressed on different levels as the presence of more women does not necessarily mean that gender issues will be dealt with appropriately. The senior managers are aware of the problem but the police occupational culture especially in operational and policy decisions still continue to be macho in

approach. There are more prominent senior policewomen in the service but there is still a long way to go. There are no targets in relation to gender as of present but as more women become chief constables the occupational culture especially at the managers level is bound to change. Newburn (2003) predicted that there will be a substantial increase in the number of senior police officers. The gender issue is also relevant to support staff where women traditionally deal with personnel and welfare issues. The drive to increase the profile and importance of gender issues needs to be inclusive of support staff. There are signs of this happening as the Gender Agenda programme consults and includes support staff. The trade unions are now also being included and as such the dominance of police staff as the only one that counts is being challenged slowly.

There is a history behind the racist nature of policing and the 'race' riots of the 1980s fuelled an extensive debate in this area. The debate keeps on changing as the expectations from the minority increases as the nature of the injustice and unfairness become apparent to them. Recently, the Macpherson Inquiry highlighted the apparent gulf between the police and some ethnic communities. Race equality employment targets and action plans were set for police forces under the initiative entitled 'Dismantling barriers to reflect the community we serve' that was published in 1999. The senior managers are responsible for implementing all these policies. There is little training or experience for these managers as they are responding to the demands of society rather than leading the debate. The recent BBC documentary 'The Secret Policeman' highlighted racist attitude and behaviour that exist within the service and there was another rush to

deal with the perceived problem. Senior managers appear not to be aware of the extent of all these problems and respond by identifying the processes in place.

What is common about diversity issues is that they are reacted to and perceived as a bolt on issue. The link with ethics and human rights are not made. Senior managers do have the culture of acting when the issues have a negative effect but they are less proactive in the plans to ensure that there is respect for diversity. This can be attributed to the culture of getting things done, especially things that are tangible and can be measured in the short term. The challenge of the future is to recognise the implications for improving performance by addressing diversity as a core to performance delivery to the public.

Human Rights Act

The introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (1998 Act) has put pressure on the new agenda, although this has not come through in litigation yet. Legal issues of liability are yet to be clearly defined. Police constable's powers emanate from various Acts but the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codifies a substantial number of them. The powers are available anywhere in England and Wales so in theory a constable duty to act is not limited to their force area. This means any effort to control the activities of someone with so wide powers will be difficult. A more difficult question is if they fail to act because of instructions and they are sued in their personal capacity but does not fall under the umbrella of section 88 of the 1996 Act.

The 1998 Act incorporated much of the European Convention of Human Rights into domestic law. Patten (1999) observed that the implications for policing are profound. This becomes relevant for senior managers in their decision making processes both for issues within and outside the organisation. The four principles of legality, proportionality, necessity and accountability are to be used in deciding when interfering with someone's human rights.

With regards to legality, the law has to be created properly and must be accessible to citizens. In *Malone v UK* (1984) the European Court did not think that Home Office Circular fulfilled the principle of legality in providing the authorising process for telephone interception. Therefore the originating power has to be legal and be enacted by the law making arm of government.

The second principle of proportionality involves the balancing of the community's interest of protection against the rights of individual that is to be violated. In *Handyside v UK* (1976) the judgement refers to ensuring action is 'proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued'. Starmer (1999) identified five elements of proportionality. They are:

- whether relevant or sufficient reasons have been advanced,
- whether a less restrictive alternative was available,
- whether there was procedural fairness in decision-making,
- whether safeguards against abuse of external authority exists,
- whether the restriction destroys the 'very essence' of a right.

Neyroud and Beckley identified five similar elements in their principles of policing model. These are honesty, stewardship, justice responsibility and finally justice and respect for personal autonomy. The question is if it is practically possible for senior managers to adhere to this normative process with the performance regime that is already in the public service? It should be difficult in practice to adhere to these requirements as the result of non-compliance is not immediate and enforcement relies on the public and staff being aware of their rights. Lester (2000) identified a flaw in the 1998 Act as the absence of a Human Rights Commission to give advice and assistance to alleged victims in bringing proceedings for breaches of rights, to bring proceedings in its own name, to act in amicus role, to conduct research, and to promote a culture of respect for human rights.

The principle of necessity has two threads. The first is that of 'absolute necessity', which is the test required when lethal force is used by the state. The second, is 'necessary in a democratic society' which is the justification required by the courts when interfering with conditional rights. Necessity provides a stray jacket for the exercise of discretion. The principle of accountability stipulates that citizens must have an effective remedy for breaches of rights. It requires an independent system of dealing with serious complaints against the police that involve a breach of rights (*Govell v UK*, 1998). *Malone v UK* (1984) suggests that independent supervision of key police powers like intrusive surveillance is required.

Neyroud and Beckley identified three ways of looking at the four human rights principles in policing. The first is to use them as a sequential decision-making process. In this model each of the principles stands individually as a filter through which decisions criteria go through. The second way is as a template against which to diagnose policy and practice. This model is to be used as an audit tool to check existing practice. The third model is to link them into a wider moral framework using their four tracks of ethics and the principles of policing. All these models of decision-making, audit and mechanism for 'ethical calculus' are not mutually exclusive and a combination is quite possible. They thought the effects of the 1998 Act will be far reaching and listed a few of the area that will be affected within policing. This study is mainly concerned with the activities of senior managers and the areas of interest are decision-making, accountability and control.

The question is whether the performance management culture is at odds with the culture promoting human rights. The rights of staff and the public are two separate areas that need examination. As argued earlier both internal and external factors influence the setting of performance targets and the evaluation of performance and policy, within the police. There is a change in normative law as a result of the 1998 Act, the issue is whether practice reflects this change. I have argued earlier that the enforcement of non-compliance with normative law is very difficult. Therefore there is a need for extra processes to reinforce what the normative law is trying to achieve. In the next chapter I discuss the results from the interviews and examination of official documents to identify what happens in practice in relation to management of performance.

Chapter Five

Developments in Policing Accountability: Research Method and Process.

This chapter describes the research methods I used in this study. The theoretical basis and justification of the research methodology used are examined and put into context of this research. There is also a discussion about the research process and the reaction of the subjects within the process. Reiner (2001) suggested that police research of a constructive and critical kind is now back on the agenda as a result of recent events like the Stephen Lawrence case that highlighted the failure of development of policies and rules to improve police practices. There is a need to investigate the reasons for how police perform and behave in a particular way. Therefore, there is a need to obtain clear understanding of the culture within the police to inform the processes of change. The research methods need to be able to capture the practice and the attitudes of the people that are studied.

The research design of this project was constructed to obtain a comprehensive view of how senior police officers perceive the process of accountability and the effect of their views on the management of police performance. The methodology of this study is discussed under four sub topics:

- justification of methodology,
- research method,
- limitations,
- ethical and political issues.

There is also a discussion about the problems encountered during the research process and lessons learned. This research takes place during the implementation

of Best Value regime resulting from the enactment of Local Government Act (1999).

Justification of Methodology

The main guiding principle is that research strategy or strategies, and methods or techniques employed, must be appropriate to the research question it purports to answer (Robson 1993). This study is both exploratory and descriptive in its purpose. It is exploratory because I am trying to discover new insights and also assess the recent developments within policing in a new light, from the perspective of managers. It is descriptive as I try to portray an accurate catalogue of the events. The purpose of the research helps in selecting the strategy. The research strategy is the general approach used in an enquiry and it usually determines the method used to obtain data. The methods or techniques used to collect data have been described by Robson (1993) as the tactics of the enquiry.

The choice of method may have been made on methodological grounds but the method itself will have consequences for the claims made on the basis of the research (Williams and May 1996). As a result there is a need for a careful reflection before a decision is made. Following the question posed by Shipman (1988), 'Is there sufficient detail on the way the evidence is produced for the credibility of the research?'. There is a need to provide sufficient information about the method used and the justification for its use.

Examining the effects of the recent developments in the modes of accountability on the perceptions and behaviour of senior managers within the police entailed obtaining data investigating fully the implications of my observations. It is my

theory about social reality that determines the approach I use during my research. There are different theoretical approaches used in criminological enquiries but I will now explain the main ones and how I rely on them. Each theory relies on various assumptions that I do not discuss in detail as I am only trying to explain my choice of method for this research. Williams and May (1996) identified three reasons for which a choice of method might be based:

- a commitment to an approach of knowing the social world,
- a technical decision being the most appropriate method to tackle the research question,
- there is no alternative reflecting a practical necessity.

There is continuous development in the approach of knowing the world, but classicism has been described as probably the earliest kind of criminology that is still read seriously as a potential contributor to contemporary debates (Bottoms 2000). Classicist authors, like Beccaria and Bentham, were essentially political theorists writing about the principles that should govern how crime is to be dealt with by the state. Crime is viewed as a normative category, since it is defined by the society and so does vary between societies. There is the scope for debate about what constitutes crime in any given society, the procedures for administering the criminal process and the punishment administered by the state. The traditional methodology employed was normative theorization, but empirical assertions were also made. These empirical assertions were based mainly on common sense observations and armchair reflections. Classicism was undermined by the advent of the natural science based positivist.

The positivist social scientist applies the hypothetico-deductive model to a world considered to exist independently of the human mind. Positivists tried to replicate the perceived successes of the natural scientist in controlling the natural world and have been committed to approaches of the natural sciences. Positivism has also included a commitment to value neutrality, quantification of observable events and a search for regularities using statistical theory to construct causal laws.

Bottoms (2000) explained that many of the approaches to the study of criminology in the late 1960s were a reaction to positivism. He went on to suggest seven assumptions that characterise positivism. They are as follows:

- It was assumed that the methods of natural science could and should be unproblematically applied to the social world,
- It was assumed that the foundations of all science, natural and social was sense data i.e. facts that could be observed with our senses,
- It was assumed that there was a sharp distinction between the 'facts' and 'values',
- Positivism had difficulty with the concept of 'crime' given that what was 'criminal' in a given society was defined by those in power, and that societies differed, sometimes markedly in what they defined as 'crimes',

- Because of its desire to follow as closely as possible the methods of the natural sciences, positivist criminology focused on the explanation of what criminal behaviour was. Its primary concerns being 'with how accurate facts can be obtained and how theory can thereby be more rigorously tested',
 - Research into the evaluation of criminal justice interventions adopt 'clinical trial' experimental methodology widely used in scientific medicine,
 - The 'positivist' preference for methods akin to natural sciences, for the hypothetico-deductive approach to explanatory research, and for the experimental method in evaluative research, all combine to produce a powerful preference for a quantitative over qualitative data.
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The development of positivism was a reaction to classicism as the dominant theory behind methodology. There was a shift in power as a result of this development and as a result some of the contributions of classicism have been subsumed into positivism. There is a continuous development in theory development about approach to know the social world and this influences the choice of method used to capture the social reality.

In approaching the social world to attain knowledge the positivist social scientist tries to apply the hypothetico-deductive model to a world considered to exist independently of the human mind. They have tried to replicate the perceived

successes of the natural scientist in controlling the natural world and have been committed to approaches of the natural sciences. Positivism has also included a commitment to value neutrality, quantification of observable events and a search for regularities using statistical theory to construct causal laws. Inductive theory was developed by natural scientists to address the over reliance of the explanation of the real world on pure logical deduction (Seale 1998). Although, induction was used as a positivist method, it has been proposed as an alternative by anti-positivist qualitative researchers (Glasser and Strauss, 1967). The researcher enters the field with as few pre conceptions as possible, depending on the accumulation of impressions which, with the aid of a facilitative human mind reveal the picture, so that new theories emerge from the real world.

Denzin and Lincoln (1994) wrote of five moments of qualitative research. The first moment was an objectivist and positivist programme. The second being the modernist and creative characterised by attempts to formalise qualitative research methods. The third moment claimed a multiplicity of theoretical orientations and paradigms. The fourth moment challenged the canons of truth and methods through critical examination of textual practice. The fifth is characterised by the continuing diversity and a series of tensions. The sixth moment was added later and was characterised by reflexive, experiential texts that were subjective, open ended, conflictual, messy and feminist influenced (Denzin 1997). Coffey (1999) noted that the periods or moments described by Denzin and Lincoln were too neatly packaged and that there might be more epistemological underpinning of ethnography than they allowed for in their categorization.

There exists a diversity of perspectives and practices in qualitative research. All new researches try to learn from experiences of all the studies done prior to theirs. This means that the process is always developing and fluid. This does not mean that anything goes but studies are critically assessed in light of new developments. The feminist research agenda is an example of this. This is the acknowledgement of developments in perspectives that questions already accepted viewpoints.

I accept the view that it is possible to observe behaviour of a group and the individuals within it, in their natural setting and learn from the way they perceive the world. It is difficult to access the behaviour of individuals and group in natural setting so I opted for ethnography as my research method for this research. I also examined documents in order to illuminate the data collected thereby strengthening the reliability and validity. The complex layers of rules and cultural complexities arising from the nature of police work and environment provides a challenging and fascinating reality to be examined through ethnography. One of the advantages of an ethnographic approach to this research was that it deals with the assertion made by Giddens (1984) that we cannot adequately describe social activity 'without knowing what its constituent actors know, tacitly as well as discursively'. This allows me to look beyond the obvious explanations of police behaviour that is pervasive to a less apparent explanation which might reveal new insights into analysis of social reality. The local nature of this research also lends itself to an ethnographic approach as the analysis is of a limited amount of subjects.

Willis (1982) stated:

An ethnographic argument shouts at us that however persuasive and inclusive some of the theoretical arguments concerning the formation of the subject may be, they can by no means fully account for real, solid, warm, moving and acting bodies in actual situations.

The interpretation of the data collected within this study requires knowledge of the police culture and this knowledge has to be in real time. By this I mean the researcher has to be in the organisation to be able to understand the language and the message that is being put across. The justification for the research method stems mainly from the inability of the positivist approach to obtain rich and detailed information about the subject. Holy (1984) argued that mere observation and reporting is not adequate because of the limited scope of things that can be truly observed. The unspoken agenda that exist within the police allows many aspects of police practices to go on unchallenged. The need for a cultural analysis of the data supports the choice of research method.

There is no control over events during or after the period of the research and as such direct causal claims cannot be made. The rich data that is gained can be used to answer the how and why questions that do not appear on the surface of primary research method like surveys. Ethnography is traditionally used to study social system or culture by using the method of participant observation. There is a recognition of the researcher is stepping outside himself to describe how and why he performs within his own culture. It is partly because of this difficult process that I am describing my approach as ethnographic. I am using also the term because of the qualitative data that I am collecting rather than the fact that I was a participant observer. I address the point of being a participant observer later in this chapter. The purpose and the questions asked in this research require

data to be collected from the subjects in a detailed manner. The flexibility of this approach allowed me to respond to changes in the field. I have explained that I will undertake a case study using ethnographic approach and the next section describes the research method.

Research Method

The main research method used in this research is interviews with all senior managers within the police force studied. The interview as the method is chosen in order to obtain data about the underlying attitudes, perceptions and values of senior managers towards the research questions. The research design in this project was constructed to obtain a comprehensive view of how senior police managers perceive the process of accountability and the effects of their views on the management of police performance. The major source for the data for this research is from the interviews carried out with them. Data is usually categorised into primary and secondary. The researcher collects primary data first hand by observation, surveys or interviews. The observation may be covert or with legitimate access and consent. Primary data also includes information or documentation that is not analysed for example computer databases, abstracts of unpublished works and in some cases complete documents (Stewart, 1984; Hodson, 1999). The secondary sources of data consist of information that is not primary data. I used official documents and publications. I will now describe how I used the method employed from the literature review that focused the areas to concentrate on.

In order to build a clear picture of what obtains in practice I reviewed case law and previous research. This enabled me to design my interview topic guide (Appendix 1) which formed the basis of my interviews. The first section of this research uses theoretical analysis to explore the developments and assess it in a new light. The studies by Chan (1997) and Dixon (1997) were used to this end. The research question posed by Chan was: why did years of police reform make so little difference to police racism? She had previously conducted research into the same police force examining the policy in relation to ethnic minorities, how it was implemented and the extent to which the policy was successful in achieving better police-minorities relations. This research asks similar questions but in relation to accountability and performance management. The research question posed is what effect the recent changes in emphasis on accountability had on senior managers within the police? A further question is what is the effect of this on the internal mechanisms of accountability within the police? These questions are both exploratory and confirmatory in purpose, therefore, the tight pre-structuring of method is not justifiable. The picture built from the literature review influenced the topic guide but the answer to the primary research question is new and there is a need to be open to fresh ideas. I now describe the issue of access and the practicalities of obtaining data before discussing the method used that is interviews.

I am an operational police officer and during the course of this research I completed a three and a half year secondment to the National Police Training (now known as CENTREX). During this period I was trying to get access to carry out this research as I was seconded out of my force. I initially tried to

carry out the research using chief constables as the subjects of the study but the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) through the relevant committee did not give their permission. I approached the chief constable of Humberside Police and he was supportive. I submitted a research proposal and conducted a presentation on the study to the Chief Officer Group (COG). The group consists of all the chief officers in the force and makes decisions on strategic issues. The presentation included what I required from the Force. I was also asked to provide a report on some other issues that are not directly related to this research. The Chief Constable who granted permission for the research retired soon after and the new Chief Constable continued the authority for me to have access to all the senior managers. During the course of this research the make up of senior managers has changed due to promotions, retirement and movement to other forces. Apart from the advantage of getting access the fact that I am a police officer does have other advantages especially in relation to analysis and drawing of conclusions from the data. This is examined in more detail later.

The local Police Force covers an area of 1,356 square miles and serves a resident population of about 900,000. The Force had four functional teams managed by a chief officer. The functional teams were corporative services, personnel, support and operations. There are a total of four chief officers including the chief constable. Within these teams were branch and unit managers. A branch consist a number of units. There are four divisions in the force and each one was managed by a police officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent. The Strategy Team formed the policy decision making group. This team consists of the chief officers, branch and unit managers, divisional commanders and the staff

association representatives. COG is a smaller group within the Strategy Team. Currently, there is another smaller group known as Strategic Support Group (SSG) which is made up of only branch heads. The structure of management within the organisation undergoes periodic changes as issues move from one function to the other but the number of managers and senior police officers has remained stable during the period of this research. There are approximately 2000 police officers and about 860 support staff within the Force. I now focus on the definitions of the various terms used within this study.

Support staff refers to civilian members of the organisation. There is a move from referring to them as civilians because of the derogatory connotation that it does have within the occupational culture of the police. The term support staff is used to integrate them into the organisation and deal with the discriminatory effect of existing terminology within the police. A senior manager is any support staff member who manages a branch or unit. If the senior manager is a police officer then s/he must be of or above the rank of Superintendent. Performance was not operationally defined for respondents but they were asked to distinguish between good and bad performance. Accountability was not defined for the purpose of these interviews but the perceptions of the interviewee to the concept was captured. The perceptions of managers were inferred from their responses and comments about recent developments in relation to what happened previously. The term operational staff refers to the officers that interface directly with the delivery of service to the public. The term headquarters staff refers to those operating from the centre as compared to those on divisions.

Following access being granted I made a personal approach to all the senior managers to be interviewed. This was a conscious decision to ensure that I explained the nature of the research but to ensure that I developed a relationship prior to the interview. When I commenced this research I was in the middle of my secondment. I went back to Force for two weeks every year to ensure that during the period of my secondment I did not lose total contact with the Force. This had the advantage of allowing me to keep in contact with managers I knew previously but also enabled me to meet the new ones. The effect of this was that it made the venture of personal approach to all the managers less daunting. It meant that I had to travel back to Force to make the personal approaches, arrange and conduct interviews. I had to make sure that I targeted the managers that I did not already have a working relationship with, in order to balance the field, as the personal relationships might have hampered my ability to obtain data from them.

This I found difficult as it involved identifying those senior managers within the Force with whom I did not have a personal relationship. However in reality most of the managers were clustered in the Hull area. The fact that I was also carrying out a study for the Force ensured that access was easier for the senior managers that I did not have previous relationship with. The data relating to the issues I dealt with for the Force is not included in this study and the topic guide (Appendix 1) identifies the questions relating to the internal report.

After the personal approaches to all the managers I arranged to interview them when their diary allowed. The fact that I was also conducting a survey for the Force made the arrangement easier. I had to choose a Thursday and Friday for

my preferred dates as I was away during the earlier part of the week. The plan was to try and fit two interviews in per day but that was only possible a few times. There was a problem with arranging interviews with operational officers who sometimes have to respond to incidents that are not planned. Resource and time limitation meant that I had to ration the time spent on the interviews. A total of thirty two managers were interviewed and eleven of them were support staff. The interview topic guide constructed as identified earlier was used. As with all interviews, structured or unstructured there is a risk of personal reactivity; in other words, my presence altering the nature of the responses. Whilst there might have been some toning down of language and sensitivity to diversity issues all the participants were mainly candid in their responses to me. A number of respondents made comment about the usefulness of the process, in that it made them think about their actions, and reflect on their behaviour, others welcomed the challenge of being 'put on the spot'. The views of the respondents to the process were consistent with the fact that a culture of debriefing does not exist at managerial level.

I used audio recording of the interviews and apart from a few mishaps like the tape recordings being interrupted by sirens sounding in the background, all went well. This allowed me to interact fully with the subjects and concentrate on the interview rather than concentrating on recording or documenting activities. The length of each interview ranged between two and three hours. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and typed. This skill was available within the police as interviews with suspects are typed verbatim. The interviews took place over a period of about five months, at the time of structural and ideological change

within the organisation. During this period there was a move to cut cost within the organisation , new members of staff were not being recruited and training was being cut back. There was also the direction to find two percent efficiency saving year on year. This period of organisational change meant that managers were required to manage in a period of uncertainty, making the results I obtained during the whole project unpredictable. This was because the planning for the study had used the old structures as the benchmark for the investigation. This meant that organisational response to change in terms of accountability became important.

The interviews were influenced by the fluidity of the performance culture environment that kept changing during and after the period of the interview. The questions seemed to provoke detailed responses when the topic of conversation moved into performance indicators and the reliance on the figures. Coffey (1999) argued that although the impact of the researcher on the research process is dealt with, there is a lack of critical engagement with the ways in which fieldwork relies on interaction, relations and situatedness of the researcher and the researched. Although I am part of the organisation I am researching the point she makes is still valid. I have explained the fact that I recognise the effect of this situation on the subjects and I have employed some strategies to address the different relationships that I have both over time and with different interviewees. There were strategies in place to deal with this problem within the organisation. For example I undertook an organisational task as well as the research in order to increase the level of participation. I have also used other sources of data to triangulate my data.

I examined official documents and continue to interact within the organisation thereby improving the nature of the data collected. These documents include the Policing Plan, Annual Reports, Performance Review Record, Best Value Review Reports and Police Performance Monitoring data. This allowed interpretative conclusions to be drawn about interviews which, taken on face value would not have revealed the importance of the approach till the passing of time makes comments relevant. McNeill (1990) noted that in modern societies written records are kept by all agencies and some may be available to social researchers. There was no problem in my accessing documents as I was not dealing with researching police practices but management attitudes and behaviour. This is less threatening and the managers were eager to evidence what they are saying in order to reinforce the point they were making.

Confidentiality and freedom to speak off the record were of concern to some respondents reinforcing the view that the organisation was not open and free in communication. In the empirical chapters that follow I have been careful to quote what respondents have said verbatim. This is to enable the full contextualisation of the replies from respondents. The interviewees were guaranteed anonymity but it was agreed that there are some interviewees that could be identified by the nature of their response. The guiding principle is anonymity unless the study requires the role of the interviewee to be revealed. Some respondents are easily identified, by the nature of their role and sometimes gender. Sometimes it is the lack of response to certain issues that highlights the prevailing culture within the organisation and therefore contributes to the nature

of organisational behaviour. For example there is reluctance on respondents to comment on their view of their manager's style but they describe the mechanical process rather than comment on the effectiveness of the process.

The data is not analysed in this section but dealt with under the following headings:

- Police Performance,
- Culture of Senior Managers,
- Police Accountability.

The analysis of the data is bound to be controversial because of the lack of consensus on the approach to be used in the analysis of qualitative data. There is a requirement that the analyst has to think clearly. Fetterman (1989) noted that within the context of an ethnographic stance, the analysis is as much a test for the enquirer as it is a test of the data. I have to accept that there are problems that exist as a result of trying to analyse the data but rigour and discipline is required in the analysis. The issue of personal bias and identity is examined under the section for political and ethical issues. I will now discuss the limitations of the research including the research design and methods.

Limitations

All approaches in criminological research have limitations. Jupp (1989) observed that ethnography and participant observation cannot show how meanings, definitions, actions and interactions have been shaped by wider historical forces or circumstances. I am able to contribute a little bit more as I continue to be a member of the organisation and I observe things in the light of new information

and knowledge. The use of interviews as the main method of obtaining data has limitations as there is the traditional warning of interviewer effect on the data collection. There is the issue of my gender, race and profession which can have a bearing on the data collected. The move of having a personal approach to each respondent is a means of trying to ameliorate the above mentioned effect.

When it comes to analysis of the data there are also identified pitfalls that affect the process. Robson (1993) adapted from Sadler's (1981) twelve deficiencies for the human as an analyst. They are:

- Data overload,
- First impressions,
- Information availability,
- Positive instances,
- Internal consistency,
- Uneven reliability,
- Missing Information,
- Revision of hypothesis,
- Fictional base,
- Confidence in judgement,
- Co-occurrence,
- Inconsistency.

In order to improve the quality of analysis it is important to be aware of these pitfalls and have strategies in place to deal with them as they arise or to be aware of their presence if risk assessment has been undertaken and the process is continuing regardless. I have not been aware of all twelve but I am conscious of

a large number of them being relevant especially since my interviews were conducted over a period of time and makes the pitfalls relevant. For example the amount of data from the interviews makes analysis very difficult and themes were used to bring order to the data. Another is the continuous development in the issues that constituted the basis of interviews, some respondents having being interviewed later than others had more understanding of the importance of certain issues especially performance management. This impacted on the analysis as the perceptions can change as a result of more information.

There is the further problem of interview analysis and the implications for the researcher. The problems here also arise around the interviewer and bias. The problem of interviewer bias cannot be ignored within the analysis of the interviews. Fielding and Thomas (2001) identified several sources for bias or error in interview analysis:

- Misdirected probing and prompting,
- Ignoring the effects of interviewer characteristics and behaviour,
- Neglecting cultural context in which researcher is located,
- Problem with question wording.

The inherent assumption that language is a good indicator for attitude, perceptions and action is the basis of the use of interviews as data for the managers studied. There is a problem that what is said in interview, in that it will not reflect what will be done. This argument is strong and there will be need to link respondents perceptions to what they say and then to link that to future behaviour. The justification for this type of study lies in the fact that people's perceptions and attitude do affect the behaviour and culture within organisations.

This is because the people within the organisations are always making judgements on the perception and attitudes of others. The evidence for this assertion in this study is the view held by managers that giving feedback to senior managers will result in retribution and can be viewed as career suicide.

Young (1991) suggested that detailed ethnography of police social practice is antithetical to the philosophies of control by which the police operate. He further argued that participant observation into the minutia of police practices might be approved theoretically in statements for general consumption, but in practice of institutional reality it will most likely be thwarted or subverted even as it is being agreed. The control environment of the police exists but I feel that it is over exaggerated when the subject of the research is perceived as damaging to the organisation. There is no established definition of what is damaging to the organisation and in practice it is a matter of perception and sensitivity of the senior officers of the force concerned.

The issue of internal and external validity of any research has to be addressed. Internal validity refers to the extent to which the study proves that the variable observed caused the effect that is found. The external validity on the other hand deals with the generalisation of the results found. Internal validity can be a problem for ethnographic research process. It is difficult to establish a starting point especially when the interviews and observations were not happening simultaneously. All the issues raised in the section of ethical and political issues identify validity and reliability problems but I have acknowledged and tried to limit the effects of these issues.

Stewart (1984) suggested that six questions must be answered whilst using documented information. This is to address the question of reliability and validity. They are:

- What was the purpose of the study or report?
- Who collected the information?
- What information was actually collected?
- How was the information obtained?
- When was the information collected? and
- How consistent is the information with other sources?

The documents used in this research are mainly official police documents and examples of Performance Development Reports (PDR) that are used to triangulate the data collected from interviewees. Whilst Stewart (1984)'s questions are a useful tool and essential if relying solely on documents as the source of data, its usefulness in this research is that it structures the approach to the documents in terms of reliability, but essentially this is not an issue in this study. This is because the documents are produced by the police and used as a source of public information. There is always an amount of sanitation for documents for outside audiences as the language and data have to be communicated at the level of the audience. There is no way of gathering the cultural impact of such publications because the scope of the data collected is set and things that fall outside the remit or are difficult to obtain are silently left out. However, these aspects can be uncovered by direct communication with the senior managers that culturally control the rules of compilation.

There is no perfect criminological research approach and as such criticism is healthy for motivation to search for the perfect approach. The numbers of variables and things that can go wrong are enormous. However, this should not detract us from continuing to carry out research. I am not advocating relativism but supporting the strategy proposed by Seale (1999) of pursuing explanations that have greater than lesser credibility as good accounts of the social world.

Ethical and Political Issues

Young (1991) identified that the researcher employing the method of ethnography is stepping outside him/herself to describe how and why he performs within his own culture. This requires a detached intellectual process and the need to recognise how modes of thought are translated into organised beliefs and action or inaction. He also further identifies the political and ethical problems attached to this form of methodology. The need to keep idiosyncrasies within the organisation and the illumination that these can provide in the analysis of the data can cause the wrestling of the locus of loyalty. The pressure of loyalty to the organisation is always very strong but since this study deals with management the results are more likely to change in techniques as opposed to identifying criminal behaviour which can be the case if the operational behaviour of the police was the action under scrutiny. The need for more training or suggesting improvements are less threatening than calling for inquiry. Young (1991) noted that the demand for loyalty within the police is more a case of demand for subservience.

Gilbert (2001) warned the researcher not to use research as a cover for spying and stated that it was unethical to do so. The fact that I was a police officer and the potential for bias is also addressed. Holdaway (1983) described his experience of being a policeman as valuable in sustaining the empathy necessary to research founded on participant observation. He argued that his research was based on reasoned and acceptable ethical decisions. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) noted that when operating in an overt manner, ethnographers rarely tell all the people they are studying about the details of the research. I did not conduct a covert research in that the participant knew that I was conducting a study but they were not sure what the results will be used for. This will have unsettled some interviewees especially those that do not have a previous working relationship with me. I tried to reassure respondents by asking for feedback about the process and not being structured in order to respond to the diversity of personalities that I encountered. I double checked on the consent to participate although I had access to undertake the research. Lofland and Lofland (1995) warned about self being used as the research site or source of data. They identify the need for a balance between reflexive fieldwork and self indulgence and recommended that the reporting of self should be confined to the methodological reporting.

The advantage of having an insider or police officer conducting an ethnographic research into the police is that a rarely used method of social research becomes possible. Holdaway (1979) argued that the length of time involved in observation in what may be an uncomfortable research situation dissuades sociologists from undertaking this method of research. McCabe and Sutcliffe (1978) as outsiders during their study into classification of crimes admitted that they did not always

grasp the nuances of what was going on in their presence. The insider account has the potential to create what Young (1991) described as full semantic analysis of the situation. This new dimension of information has implications and as such the insider faces some dilemmas as a result. The police will only allow certain insiders to undertake such research and also the researcher will have to continue to exist within the police long after the research.

The dilemmas the insider face creates some obstacles that are both practical and personal to the researcher. The practical obstacles involve access and sensitivity to subject matter. The practical ones are mainly institutional and involve the researcher knowing their way round the institution. The personal obstacles include dilemmas for the researcher especially the moral one as to whether to reveal certain aspects of the culture that are secret and closed to outsiders. The longer the organisation the longer the time it has to have imbibed these aspects into the normal culture that it is not even obvious to many of the people within the organisation. Also, the researcher is aware of the feelings amongst people in the organisation towards their culture. This leads to the point whether an insider can actually be objective. There are dilemmas facing the insider that I related to during this research but the ability to explain aspects of the culture that actually affect police behaviour that is not visible or accessible to the outsider makes the enterprise a worthwhile one. This will inform the analysis that outsiders engage in and a different perspective is developed. It is not a matter of competition between the two approaches but each should inform the other in order to build a clearer picture.

Williams and May (1996) argued that policy problems will frequently be predicated upon by the dominant political and social values that usually determine which research is funded. They also argue that at a more subtle level these values determine the official definitions. The changing political environment forming the background of this research cannot be ignored. The Home Office have created the Police Standards Unit that is focusing on police performance management and is changing the established culture of the HMIC and Police Forces. The expectation of the public from public services is increasing and this increases tension in the political environment.

The idea of the police and civilian dichotomy is another issue within the organisation that I needed to prepare for. I was aware of the institutional bias to staff members who were not police officers and this is imbibed in the wider police culture, I had to make sure that I did not approach this research with these assumptions and examined the level of this bias at the managerial level. I made a special effort to make more contact with the support staff managers and tried to ensure that the artificial barrier did not exist. I made a conscious effort to refer to them as managers. Apart from the result of time no interview with a support staff manager was interrupted whereas virtually a third of the police officers interviews were interrupted.

As a researcher with academic interest in the replies of my interviewees I had to be conscious of their perceptions as to my motives. This will definitely have an effect on our relationship. This could be viewed as superficial identity however the various interviewees had a perception of their abilities to contribute to the

subject matter in which they were considered experts in. The fact that I was reporting on some aspects of the study back to the Force, a fact I made no secret of will have constructed a different reality to various interviewees depending on their knowledge and role within the organisation.

Brown (1996) distinguished four permutations of the relationship between a researcher and the police. They are:

- insider insiders,
- outside insiders,
- insider outsiders
- outsider outsiders.

The insider insiders are police officers who conduct police research for organisational purposes or for personal development like a degree course. The outsider insiders are police officers who conduct research after deciding to leave or have left the force. The insider outsiders are researchers within police forces or government organisations but are not police officers. The outsider outsiders are researchers who are not commissioned by the police or governmental bodies. Reiner (2000) described outsider outsider researches as constituting the bulk of police research until recently. I am an insider insider and the problems that are identified with this form of research relationship were discussed earlier.

The fact that there was only one woman within the group also skews the ability to have a gender analysis on the responses that were obtained. Although there is only a single woman in the population being studied the view and awareness of the males towards this issue might be examined to observe their attitudes towards

the issue. The issue of gender is approached but not dealt with fully as there is only one woman within the senior management team of the Force. There is evidence to show that men and women are stereotyped and evaluated differently (Haffner ;1997, Dipboye et al; 1975, 1977). The traditional perception of a successful manager was very close to the perception of men in general (Schein 1973). The female candidates consistently outperform male candidates in the police OSPRE Part II Assessment Centre (Hartley et al; 2001). Wilson (1995) noted that women and leadership are not discussed, identifying the lack of integration of research on women and leadership in the leadership literature. This study cannot advance the status quo as the lack of female senior managers ensures that this difficulty persists.

Many of the respondents knew who I was and some were aware of my educational qualifications. Age, social class, race, ethnicity and many other personal characteristics all shape the research process (Warren 1988). The primary dimension of my identity was almost certainly my race. The fact that I am 'black' and the implications of that on the constructed perceptions of the interviewees is a factor that can have differing effect on the interviewees. Reiner (2000) identified the fact that a black or woman officer doing research on discrimination will probably generate a different pattern of results from a white male researcher. The need to be reflexively aware of factors that can cause bias from the point of view of response and interpretation is essential. Throughout the study I did not experience any behaviour or attitude towards me that I can attribute to my colour or as a result of my different cultural background. I tried to be aware of this factor as I was conscious that this might have an effect on the

research. On a number of occasions some respondents were interested in my experience as a black police officer and reflected on how rare people from ethnic minority background are represented in the organisation. I felt comfortable discussing this issue but it can be argued that if I was white there would be no interest in such issues. I think this is a strength in that I am the only one within our force that can have this unique experience as I can engage from personal experience on both the diversity and policing issues.

Respondents were all senior managers and as such did have institutional power. The perception of my power due to the access that I was given meant that there were some respondents that will have viewed my approach with suspicion. The fact that I was interested in what they had to say gave them the opportunity to communicate certain information that they felt they had not been able to do through the normal channels. The interviews were conducted during a period of change within the organisation and the view to the new approach was not all favourable. I was aware that some respondents used the interviews to articulate their personal views about recent developments and the instability and unpredictability of the whole situation.

This research analysis accounts for motivations sought rather than those gained and the meaning desired rather than those achieved. The habitus of those participating; age, personal history, family background, education and general cultural context have an effect on how the various ongoing changes affects them. Nature of job, and exposure within the organisation will affect the reaction to the changes in the emphasis on performance management.

The problems that I faced during the research can be summarised in terms of the changing environment, time and resources, lack of focus and changes in personal circumstances. These are not unique problems but the first one has a methodological implication for the research process.

The changing environment within the police during the time of my research stems mainly from legal developments. The main ones are The Human Rights Act 1998, Crime and Disorder Act 1996 and Police Reform Act 2002. Along with the development of Best Value from the Local Government Act 1999 the role of managers changed especially in relation to performance management. The changes are ongoing and managers seem to change their positions based on the activities that they are accountable for. The drive to quantify police activity and the introduction of the National Crime Reporting Standards (NCRS) into crime recording to ensure uniform recording in the country has led to the focusing of police activity mainly on that which is recorded. These changes have affected the respondents as they are interviewed at various times during the development of the changes. The changes in the role of managers and abstractions also make it difficult to obtain a static or constant view from them. The role and the status of managers seem to affect their perception of accountability. The managers that are still ambitious and looking forward to promotion are more cautious about their responses.

I have been moving on with my career within Humberside police and returned to frontline duties in summer of 2000, this has resulted in a slowing down of the

whole research process. However this has enabled me to have a better appreciation of the responses of interviewees and to put things into context. The massive impact of the continuous changes within the organisation are more apparent as there is no chance of viewing the results of changes as they occur so frequently and the nexus between change and results is difficult to establish. This has led to my problem of lack of focus as what I am researching appears to be historical and the people who provided the data are not still in situ. The time and resources problem is a consequence of working in an organisation that cannot meet the demands of the public and as such all resources are put under pressure even before any emergency action is necessary. There is hardly any time to reflect and this environment had an effect on my research. The deadlines were not adhered to as sometimes I had operational commitments.

The political context of all the present development and direction in police accountability cannot be fully discussed but the impact on the senior managers can be evaluated from their perspective. My aim is not only to report what respondents said, but to reconstruct how they made sense of what they were saying, and how their interpretation was made of the wider social and political context. While the interpretation may be markedly different from their own understanding of what they told me, and will almost certainly be expressed in very different language, my primary concern is to take a broader view of their account. Moreover, to try and give an explanation of the social reality and how it is constructed with the aim of influencing policy makers. The next chapter contains the details and analysis of the data obtained from the interviews with the senior managers.

Chapter Six

Managing in Practice: An Internal Account of Police Accountability

This and the next chapter examine and analyse the results from the interviews conducted with the senior managers. The two chapters are arranged under three main headings;

- Perceptions on accountability,
- Culture of senior managers,
- Performance management.

In order to explain the accountability of senior police managers in reality it is necessary to use a grouping within the respondents to illustrate the varying effect of the different modes of accountability. As stated earlier the managers have differing levels of exposure to the public, external institutions and to the law. As such their perception of accountability differs. This results in different groups emphasising different aspects of accountability. This does not mean that the police as a whole are not influenced by the system of accountability but the effect it has on decision making, especially in relation to performance, is the issue that is being examined.

The senior managers can be grouped using the function, role and task they undertake within the organisation. The groupings are as follows:

- Chief Officers,
- Divisional Commanders and Operational Superintendents
- Detectives
- Managers in Non- Operational Branches

- Support Staff

This grouping is used in order to explain the responses and different perspectives used by the Managers. Each interviewee is allocated to one group, although there are some managers that fall under more than one group. They are mainly support staff, grouped as one in terms of their status but can also be a member of another group because of their role. This is done in order to identify the fact that they are not constables, as such do not have the inherent powers of a police officer and they have a contract of employment.

The earlier explanation of police accountability identified the two different types (internal and external). In this study I try to examine the different types to see if it influences the decision making of managers or whether it has a normative effect.

This section concentrates on external accountability in checking the relationship of senior managers with the external institutions that the police are accountable to. The main headings are accountability to the Law, Government Institutions (Audit Commission, HMIC, Home Office and Department of Regions and Local Govt.), and Democratic Institutions (Police Authorities, Independent Advisory Groups, Parish Councils, City Councils). The word democratic is used to describe these institutions although not all the members are elected. However, most of the members are selected from the public. The new developments in terms of relationship with private policing organisations, new police family and partnership approach is commented on.

Chief Officers

As stated earlier there are four chief officers in this Force, three police and one support staff (currently four police and one support staff). In the day to day running of the Force they work as a team but there are varying accounts of the pressures of external accountability. In practice the accountability pressures that the Chief Constable faces are wholly external and he directs the force with the assistance of his fellow chief officers. In this respect the position of Chief Constable is unique within the Police Force as all other members of staff are constrained by the Chief Constable's authority. In practice the Chief Officers reflect on their decisions and how the officers within the Force will react. In this sense the Chief Officers are accountable to the staff in decisions that have internal effects.

The Chief Officer is liable for all the unlawful acts of police officers whilst carrying out their duties by virtue of section 93 of Police Act 1996 as amended by the Police Reform Act 2002. The legal liability of the Chief Constable is statutory and is acknowledged but not at the forefront of decision making as stated by the Chief Constable:

But mostly it isn't, mostly the decisions I have to make are within the context of driving forward the performance of the force within the resources of the Force with the people of the Force and therefore actually, the rule of law or Acts and Legislation, and, and regulations don't actually don't come into it very often ... They do sometimes 'cos some of the things I do are, actually do have legal, but then I ask for legal advice to make sure it's within the law, so basically my job is not legal law based, it's actually administration based really.

The legal influence although acknowledged is not reverted to until there is a problem and as such it is more a reactive tool. The reality of making difficult choices when making decisions is where the daily pressure arises. This pressure

depends on the leadership stance taken by the chief officer. What is obvious from the perceptions of the chief officer is that there are different aspects of his role that result in different leadership stance.

The Home Office has been described as strengthening its grip on the police by requiring police Authorities to achieve national policing objectives and subordinating chief officers by requiring that they are employed on short term contracts (Loveday 1994, Savage & Charman 1995, McLaughlin and Murji 1995.). This trend seems to be reinforced by the Police Reform Act 2002 that introduced a National Policing Plan and the three year Strategy Plan setting out the long and medium term strategies for the policing of the area. Waddington (1999) notes that the constitutional position of the police in Britain has been shaped by protracted struggle between competing principles and interests. They are political independence versus electoral accountability, central rather than local power, and manufacturing and mercantile interests versus the landed gentry. Whilst these interests may have been dominant at one time it changes with time and as a result appears to be a different argument even though the underlying competition remains the same. The Police Authority determines the content of the three year plan; this has to be submitted to the Home Secretary for comments (Section 6A of Police Act 1996).

The chief officers work closely with the police authorities and the time spent on planning has increased. There is the predominant view that chief officers have to be more prescriptive about their plans as opposed to reacting within an established budget that was to be increased annually. The financial constraints on the police

like other public services have meant that chief officers are more likely to be financially aware of their decisions. This pressure or perception of pressure on financial implications is not only resulting from Police Authority relationships but with publications by public watchdog organisations.

The Audit Commission and HMIC are perceived as professional advisors with information to assist the decision making of the Chief Constable. He described their relationship as follows:

Very much so, they are a professional advisor to me, they can find things that I can't find, they can make recommendations that helped me within the Force ...The Audit Commission want to be the people who bash the police Force, they want to get into our ribs and tell us we're not doing this right, that right, that right, they want to have much more power, ...but they, actually their expertise is in the financial and organisational side and they do add great value, they have great value in that and we value what they do, in exactly the same way I value the work of the Audit Commission and the District Auditor in the same way as I value the work of the HMI, but again as long as they don't tread over the wrong side of the line or else they're going to fall over the feet of the horse.

This perception of the HMIC and Audit Commission recognises the usefulness of their recommendations but does not put immediate pressure on the Chief Constable. The annual inspection by the HMI is a regular process within the accountability process and the chief officers are used to the process. The thematic inspections can be more challenging but the chief officers do not think they are as damaging as the annual inspection. The presentation of results in a league table form will have an effect on Chief Officers because they do not want their force to be at the bottom of any table. Apart from the local pressures that are building up there is the pressure from the centre in terms of the Home Office and the Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). A chief officer noted:

Let's start with Government and Home Office, they apply significant pressures to us because they control the purse strings, and in terms of accountability if we do not provide an effective and efficient police service, then we are in jeopardy and we are already seeing government top slicing budgets and they've said clearly that they will put the money towards those group of people, organisations that deliver what in their own mind be described as government policy and therefore, that leads to pressure on me as a senior manager in the organisation and the organisation generally because it doesn't just affect me it works its way right down through all the people in the organisation, they feel that pressure because it might simply mean that there's no money for overtime, but we all feel that pressure, we feel it more directly and we the ones that perhaps at my level that can seek to deal with that pressure, seek to alleviate the pressure moving down the organisation by managing it as it affects the organisation at first point of entry almost,...

The debate about democratic control of the police and the independence from political influence on operational policing matters is at the core of discussions about police control and independence. The legal position was laid down by the dictum of Lord Denning in the Fisher case, this has been criticised by Lustgarten (1986), but still it is used as the basis for constabulary independence. This has led to a tension between police relationships with Police Authorities, rather than the relationship with central government. The input of a democratically elected Police Authority into police decision making has been viewed with scepticism, especially during the 1980s. The chief officers have to work in partnership with the police authorities and this view is held by all of them.

Brogden (1982) argued that Chief Constables gradually exploited the tensions between the centre and the periphery in the British state, also their ambiguous constitutional position to a position of increased autonomy. The reality is that the nature of the relationship is fluid like, changing regularly and as such moves depending on the political climate and internal politics within the police. The need for increase in budget at the time of the interviews meant that the chief officers

were concentrating on how to increase the budget especially in relation to police numbers that had been decreasing progressively.

The relationship with the Police Authority is not viewed as antagonistic by Chief Officers as of present, but viewed as a partnership necessary for the running of the Force. However, there is still the guiding principle of the operational independence of chief constable in the relationship as the Chief Constable noted:

It takes place between the Chief and the Police Authority, now, not anybody else in the Force because I am accountable to them, they have a duty to provide an efficient and effective force under the Police Act...so I have control of resources and they have, the overall efficiency and effectiveness, again but that's a dance whilst they and I will not let them and they will not even attempt to get their fingers on operational matters, i.e. Chief constable what's happening about that investigation into so and so, they won't...they can't get near that, on the other hand if I have a major investigation running for a long time and money is having to be taken to support it, I need to go them in order to look at the financial implications of that...And so in truth there is a line and in any one case you can dance around, up to and around and about the line.

The role of the Police Authority is perceived as increasing in engagement with the force as opposed to passive commentators on police activity. The constructive relationship that is envisaged by a Chief Officer in terms of developing the performance of the police is described by one of the chief officers:

Want to get Police Authority member to be far more challenging when they consider the performance of the force and there's a whole agenda around making performance management information much more accessible to lay people, now I think that will happen as a matter of course, it will happen because the whole area of public accountability will need to get much more transparent, because otherwise how are you going to get informed feedback that's, you can use to demonstrate you're delivering continuous service improvements.

This relationship is based on objective assessment of police performance and will result in the objectification and evidencing of performance. This in turn will have

implications for the work culture within the police. The Police Authority members all have a Chief Officer contact and therefore can approach an individual Chief Officer for information. The role of the Police Authority is perceived as legitimate and necessary. A Chief Officer noted:

We all recognise at this level that we are at, that the Police Authority have got a statutory responsibilities and no matter what we think about them as individuals, that's irrelevant, what we do have to recognise is that they have a statutory responsibility that we've got to help them fulfil that statutory responsibility, so I don't see them as an ogre or a threat but I see that they are entitled to ask questions about the performance of Humberside Police and I am required to answer those, and I don't have any difficulty with that.

The Chief Officers interact more with external bodies and as such are open to external accountability pressures. These pressures are perceived as an influence rather than a mandatory instruction or control. The consensus is still that the police have operational independence even with all the changes that have taken place to undermine this concept. The structural effects of the demands from external institutions on policing are not perceived as control. These subtle effects on policing and the culture are not acknowledged as external control but as natural developments within policing. The chief constable chairs a business area within ACPO and as such is open to another source of external scrutiny. All the chief officers are members of ACPO and are involved in varying degrees in different business areas. Savage and Charman (2000) concluded from their research that ACPO had got its act together when compared to its role in the past and has moved on to a different level of organisational effectiveness which is expressed in a variety of ways with regards to policing policy processes. The influence on wider policing policy is consistent with comments from respondents but that was on a different level to the daily routine of managing a force. It appears that the more managerial effect of NPM especially in relation to micro management of key

performance indicators is a shift away from the comfortable culture of constabulary independence and periodic inspection.

The Chief Officers express the pressures of their decisions being subjected to review and as such the process of accountability merges together rather than operate in isolated bits of internal and external accountability. There are some decisions that are fully internal but the existence of formal legal processes to challenge these decisions makes Chief Officers think about the decisions they make. The formal aspects seem to be effective when they reinforce informal structures and ensures that decisions are taken with accountability as a processor to ensure better decisions are made.

The informal aspects of internal accountability is at its weakest with this group, as they the locus of power and others will use them as the source of their powers to control other staff within the organisation. However, they take the internal politics into consideration and they are of the view that they do understand what goes on in the organisation. They do have a sense of being accountable to the staff when they make decisions. There is also the view about the professional abilities of staff and decisions to complete organisational tasks are focused on staff that are perceived as capable of delivering or completing the tasks within the occupational culture. This informal accountability process is linked more to the culture that is examined later.

The introduction of a new philosophy within the Force is policing in Local Policing Teams and has the effect of reorganising the delivery of services to the public. This involves the increase in patrols within the community with increased

visibility in order to reassure the public. The chief officers have adopted this new philosophy in partnership with the Police Authority. The implication has been a drastic change in the estate strategy in order to ensure the delivery at local level. The perceptions of chief officers are that it will make the police more accountable. The police will be able to respond to local needs and react to feedback from the public. The chief officers want more public participation within policing but the process of engagement appears to be the problem. There is a perceived tension about what the government want the police to concentrate on and what the local demands are. The tensions are likely to be resolved by the outcomes of the process of accountability and the impact on the political process. The chief officers hope that local pressures will prevail and this will result in improvement of performance of the organisation. This appears to be a very positive approach to the problem that has resulted in the Home Office sending in the PSU to engage the Force and reassert the national objectives and NPM as more influential in the accountability process.

Divisional Commanders and Operational Superintendents

This second grouping consists of all the divisional commanders and the operational Superintendents who are delivering the policing to the area. They are mostly based outside the Headquarters and have direct dealings with considerably more staff than other Headquarters based manager. They also manage mainly police officers or support staff in a junior role. They fit the stereotypical description of police officers. This is the view that they are interested in detecting and arresting criminals.

In terms of Government Institutions like the Home Office, DETR, Audit Commission and HMIC these managers are responsible for the implementation of the recommendations. The legal and statutory mandate of government is recognised and usually there is no challenge to the authority to request improvements from the force. A senior manager noted:

I think it's two things, I mean I think initially it is because the Force, you know the nature of society, and government in this country is that you know the government is democratically elected and we recognise that and therefore if it's seeking for us to do things in a particular way then we recognise that we must do that. Within reason. Now sometimes there's some scope to limit what we do because it doesn't fit quite with reality sometimes or with how we're looking locally. But by and large government initiatives are honoured because we recognise the mandate that the government has to govern.

Apart from the legal authority of accepting some central authority there is also the view that operational effectiveness requires the involvement of central input as observed by a senior manager:

I think there was a really difficulty with the Home Office directing policing in this way, I understand why it is and the reason is that Chief Constables in the 70s and 80s particularly in the 80s did not recognise that the world has changed and that independence does not mean business independence it means independence of operational decision making...but while Chief Constables thought they were business islands, we make our own decisions about our own computer systems, our own records that was destroyed itself, decision making has been centralised now.

There is an acceptance among the present managers to view the relationship in terms of information necessary for decision making rather than as a political takeover. This view may change as the information that comes from the centre fails to match the local picture. The local commanders appear to be less concerned about the motives and the interference of external institutions. There is an amount of suspicion involved when dealing with these institutions, a Divisional Commander noted:

Yes I think I feel threatened. I think inevitably you want to do, be one of your division or your area of responsibility to come out looking as good as possible. I think er, I mean I do, we do take account, I do recognise the significance of Audit Commission and er HMI reports because of the authority behind them. However, I mean I do have some concerns about the kind of reports they produce because they end up with, with great bloody list of things they expect you to do. And they sometimes bear no relation to what you can afford to do and you get sometimes you know, you can get 6,7,8, 9,10 of these in a year.

The main criticism from Divisional Managers is usually about the utility of the various dicta coming from the centre about policing. The same commander quoted above noted:

I mean some of my, I mean I do get irritated by the government and government organisations that bombard you with best practice, this is what you must do. So, I mean I do recognise the moral and legitimate authority of the government to impact upon what we do. But sometimes I wish they'd be a little better organised about how they do it, and realistic as to what they can expect and be achieved and I think HMI, er the HMI office is a classic for that. And the Audit Commission to er, and I mean, like, in fact you're getting on a soap box, but the Audit Commission is you know, I use to, I can't remember who first said it, but you know they know the price of everything and the value of nothing, the Audit Commission, and if we're not careful, everything boils down to pounds, shillings and pence. And I'm afraid that life and policing and looking after people is a bit more than that. I don't think the Audit Commission recognises that. I mean the Audit Commission were the people who pushed us into centralised communication centres in the first instance. Now, one has to say, we're all beginning to er rue following their advice.

Another Divisional Commander commenting on the utility of these institutions raised an argument about their competency in dealing with the ever changing complex problem of policing:

I think that the more complex police business organisations become, the less able I have seen HMIC office become in itself, it is and , and I say the same thing about the audit, the local audit commission, district audit office, they are very useful, valuable and necessary, looking at core policies, which must be the same or, or equally across the board at core business functions and efficiency and upon maximising value and making sure that our Best Value processes are correct, that sort of thing, very valuable indeed because you can, they can apply the same scrutiny in the same areas. But once they move outside that, I find that their judgement is shallow, uninformed and of very little value, for example we had the er inspection by District Audit ...one of the things that was intelligence, what intelligence is available to have for patrol and his measure of improved success was improved volume of

intelligence items submitted, that was his, that was his only rational measure, which of course is wholly and hugely inadequate, means nothing, but that is because he is operating outside his arena.

The extent of public involvement in policing varies between Divisions, but where they are active their participation are not viewed as a glowing success mainly because they are not focused and too wide in their demands. They are still involved in the policing as they are perceived as useful to have on side even though the outcome may not be what is desired, a senior commander observed:

So they are useful PCLC's, but they don't really influence much of the debate on policing. Parish Councils to a limited degree. I mean the difficulty is that they're all too parochial and they all have their own self interests at heart. Of course they do. That's what they're elected for, I suppose. But you know you can't please 150 parish councils in the ..., all of whom want you to put a new police place in ...or Wetwang, or somewhere else. Well we can't do it. But then I mean, yeah they are useful organisations and as a loc, and it is important to tap into them if only because if they're supportive they, it, rather if only because if they are unsupportive they can make life bloody miserable.

In contrast there is another Divisional Commander who feels personal accountability to the public through the PCLCs he noted:

I'm also accountable to the public so that if our performance, our performance outputs in terms of crime particularly are measured and reported to the public and I think it is part of my personal responsibility to be available to the public to er account for our performance and how, the decisions I'm taking which affect that performance. So I go to at least one, we have nine, seven PCLCs in the city and they're will always be a Chief Inspector there and myself and the Superintendent will get to everyone at least once a year personally.

The PCLC meeting have varying levels of attendance and the divisional commanders are aware. They attend in order to reassure the public and some feel to be accountable to the public. There is a lack of agreement within this grouping about the utility of these meeting. In describing the relationship with the Police Authority, a Superintendent stated:

I don't see much a link between the Police Authority and the Superintendents of divisions, other than the fact that our paths might cross. There's more likely to be more contact now in deals because of the way we're organising the areas that we police, so we'll be responding to these area committees so we'll be more likely to be meeting by virtue of the fact that many members of the police controls are members of Hull City Council.

The adoption of a partnership approach to the solving of community problems has had an effect on operational managers. This can be traced back to the Consultation Paper, *Getting to Grips with crime; A new Framework for Local Action*. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created a new framework for the development and management of crime and disorder strategies. The effect of this is to get the police managers dealing with external partners than they had done previously. A Superintendent observed:

I mean, since partnerships have been in place and I can only speak for East Riding, and I've got a few months experience, but there is I think considerable influence on Divisional Commanders now and people like me from those Forums. Because our performance is probably scrutinised at least as much there as it is within the organisation...So it is not a one way process by any means. And I think there is true partnership in that sense. And we're able to use the resources of other organisations. To deal with some issues that are basically policing issues.

There is no emphasis on the legal aspect of accountability by this even though they are aware of it. They did not articulate the pressure from the law, although there is no history of senior police officers being held accountable personally. The Superintendents from the Hillsborough Stadium disaster are the only ones on record even though there are varying levels of incompetent decision making within the police. It seems that the enforcement of legal rules is essential for rules to influence behaviour. This is the reason why Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984) suggested that a democratically elected body should be responsible for setting policy on discretionary aspects of police work. There is still the problem of how

they will be able to work in practice if the Managers do not recognise the effects of non compliance. The managers do make comments about discrimination laws and the possibility of going to tribunal. They thought about diversity issues and as such were mindful of racial and gender issues.

The recent development of BCU inspections has brought the regime of auditing and inspection down to divisional level. The divisional commanders are now adopting an 'inspection ready' state. This involves the focusing of resources on the inspection parameters in order to receive the beacon status within the appropriate league table. The Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships is one of the performance issues that are part of the inspection regime. There is a whole new development at BCU level like the centre where performance auditing and inspection is managed. This is because it is possible to be in a performing force but still be a bad performing BCU. The result is the need to monitor performance of other BCUs in the relevant family. This has now taken precedence over other forms of accountability as the divisions are trying to build the necessary infrastructure to address the new development.

Detectives

This group consists of all the detectives, all of whom are police officers and who supervise and carry out the investigation of serious crimes. They are also responsible for the formulation of crime management policies. They are based within Headquarters, although they operate within divisions during investigations.

They usually come under the media spot light by the nature of the task they undertake and therefore are under more scrutiny than other managers. They have direct contact with victims and their families. They all have expressed the pressure of legal scrutiny in terms of personal and organisational liability. This is expressed by a senior detective:

Probably not as much as what I should be but I think you know that the Lawrence Enquiry and the, the move towards, litigation against individuals perhaps is, that's brought it to the fore, hasn't it more, so it's made us more aware of that, and I do feel the pressure slightly yeah.

This pressure affects the risks that detectives are willing to take when carrying out their investigations. The resource implications of this fact have not been investigated yet. The investigation of serious crime in reality depends on the number of investigations ongoing. The review of these investigations does not take this into consideration as each is perceived as a single investigation. Senior detectives hope that the number of serious crimes does not increase or come at the same time in the force. One of the detectives observed:

We've got quite a lot of incidents running in the Force and resources are really stretched so, and I've had discussions...what would the position be if the senior investigating officer said no, I'm not prepared to investigate this murder, with ten people because I don't want to be answerable to Macpherson Inquiry, I don't want to be in the Coroner's Court, I don't want to be at the ...public inquiry...your decisions are based on the almost wider public accountability via public inquiry and there's no doubt at all about that and I've seen that, and that's not only in crime investigation I may add.

The legal aspects of accountability seems to affect the detectives more in practice, but are they open to other external pressures? A detective expressed his contact with external institutions:

I have very little contact with, I don't go to Police Authority, but certainly decision that come from the Home Office about we're changing this, then I, I get the, you know, they've just changed the counting rules and all that. I get the problem of trying to solve that for the organisation, but not as a, no not

directly, perhaps the only, the main contact I have outside is with the Area Child Protection Committee, or did have when I was in Child protection.

The development of the partnership approach to deal with problems has meant that the police in practice have a number of partners in the public and as such improves the quality of their interaction with the public. However, most of the operational relationships are with other professional from other agencies and it ensures effectiveness rather than participation of public in the decision making process. The Child Protection Committee is an example of this type of body.

The Police Authority gets briefings on ongoing complex investigations especially in relation to the financial cost of the operation. One of the senior detectives noted:

Our strength should be in dealing with people who, and if we've got difficulties and issues for them then we should tell them that we should look for them for support in overcoming those problems, we shouldn't, we have been very, we were very good at saying to the outside world the police service is doing everything right all the time and, really keeping our substantial problems under the carpet. We're much, much more open with, particularly with the Police Authority. They do get confidential briefings over some of the big issues in the Force...we have learnt that they can be responsible, you know that partnership thing...it's that mutual trust isn't it.

The senior detectives are more result driven than any other branch in the police. They perceive the detecting of serious crime as a mission and are highly motivated in the achievement of the task. The wider duties of the whole organisation are not directly on their minds but they are aware of the implications. They are involved in policy making and are accountable within the organisation for this but they are mainly obsessed with serious criminal investigations. They have direct dealings with victims and are directly accountable to them during serious crime investigations. There is a perception that accountability excluding the legal aspect

was the responsibility of chief officers and divisional commanders. The external institutions do have relatively less effect on the detectives directly but this is not to say that they are not affected by the pressures and demands of these institutions. It is the fact that it is transmitted through the internal structures within the police. The effectiveness of this approach will be examined later when discussing the performance and the culture of senior managers.

Managers in Non-Operational Branches

The managers in this group work closely with Chief Officers and support operational staff in the delivery of service to the public. They also maintain standards and gather organisational data. They maintain and update policies. They usually operate mainly within the organisation. They represent the Chief Officers and the Force at the national policing forum.

The managers operate internally and when they are within the external arena they are there as a specialist, this is reinforced by a comment from one of the managers:

Within this branch for the branch manager, there isn't any tangible or intangible accountability outwards, it's different in the divisions in that you are more accountable to your public, or certainly you feel that you are and that probably is a much stronger feeling of accountability than internally...So there's no external accountability but there's obviously accountability upwards but that probably is a little bit hit and miss and that it would be difficult for the chief officers to know whether I was delivering or not anyway.

There is also the perception that the pace of change in non operational branches is not viewed as rapid as those in Divisions, a senior police manager in a non operational branch noted:

I think there are organisation pressures in the sense that, for example, we tend to get inspected every year by the HMI, whether its performance inspection a thematic inspection or it's a full inspection, I don't know whether I've got the

term right now, because they've changed the way in which they describe some of those. ...So I suppose there is a little bit of pressure that comes from those types of things but it's not, how do you measure the pressure, on a scale, it isn't a pressure that's right up at the top of the scale and it's something that's giving you headache, there is an element of pressure there, but it's low level if you like, it's not the same pressure, I don't think, that I would feel as if I was a Divisional Commander. I think there is more pressure from HMI's inspections and from other things because you're dealing with a much wider breadth of issues which are constantly changing and where you've got to be on top of it. So there's a lot more pressure on a commander at division, to be on top of things, which are constantly changing all the time, as opposed to me being a manager in a branch where the product of what we are doing is different but the issues are not changing, overall there isn't that breadth of change.

These managers of non operational branches do not have to justify their performance to outside institutions and as such the pressure on performance is mainly from within the organisation. They do not come into contact with the public directly in their role within the organisation. They are not exposed to legal sanctions as they do not deliver services directly to the public. They are more likely to be involved if a chief officer or a divisional commander is challenged. They provide the detail answer and professional advice required.

The branches form the collection point of information within the organisation and as such come under pressure when there is a demand. The lack of consistent approach from external institutions and the impact of changing demands from them affect the managers as demonstrated by a manager's comment:

We provide a lot of statistical information to the Home Office, through HMI office, and to some extent it's been a scatter gun approach. It's been a scatter gun approach because we haven't known what we are doing. We don't have a very refined definition of what policing is about. We have our own individual interpretations of what policing is about and if we stand an infinite number of police officers with an infinite number of typewriters you get an infinite number of different definitions of what policing is about, so the Home Secretary decided ultimately to determine key objectives. If the Chief Constables can't do it then I'll do it for you is how it was being, er, is how it was sold it was reported, how it was sold, and as such, Chief Constables were

required to put into track Policing Plans those objectives, now they weren't necessarily the ones that the Chief Constable would have for the organisation, when the writings on the wall, deliver it or have it delivered, we're just done it with, with the model that we've been developing on this course on cost and activities.

This group have the closest working relationship with chief officers and as such they are questioned by other staff as to the real intentions of chief officers. They do perform a vital role in the workings of internal accountability mechanisms within the organisation. They are very knowledgeable about the organisation as they are more likely to remain in position than other senior managers. There perceptions about accountability are mainly focused on the internal and legal aspects. They are aware of their role in the maintenance of standard within the organisation as a result of their policy making role.

Support Staff

These are not police officers and are accountable indirectly through the Chief Officer. Their views are similar to that of police officers in relation to the utility of the public involvement in decision making, a support staff manager noted:

I'm not convinced by putting what the public thinks it wants at the very top necessarily police them in the most efficient way because what the public want and what the public perceive about the police service is often very very badly informed, it's naive and that isn't to criticise the public, why should they know anymore than they do about the police, their view of the police is all gleaned from television and from the fact that, you know, their car got screwed last week, and I'm not sure that if we're only producing performance indicator information for the benefit of the public, I'm damn sure none of them read it, if they do they don't understand it, or they'll misinterpret it, I don't think that's the point of it myself, I mean it may be the point but I don't think that's the real value, the real value is telling us what we are doing.

There is an awareness of the work of external central institutions but they do not seem to put pressure on the Managers since they expect the visit as expressed by a senior manager:

I feel that in what we do I've got nothing to hide, there's everything to learn. Inevitably there is a pressure because you want to show the organisation in a good light, you don't want to let the organisation down. So in terms of making sure that we structure I like to anticipate what they're going to ask, have evidence available to demonstrate what I'm going to say to them, and that way forestall them needing to ask for it. But no I don't especially feel it as a pressure. I'm hesitating when I say it because inevitably if you're preparing for anything you want to do something.

The type of activity that the manager is involved in the organisation usually demonstrates their involvement in the accountability process. For example the managers involved in personnel have contact with police officers and they perceive their power and role in the organisation from this aspect. They do not perceive accountability in terms of public participation but in terms of how the chief officers will react. This is a difference to police officers who sometimes try to attribute accountability to public and political involvement. The support staff managers are also aware of the different rights that support staff have in terms of employment law and as such are more sensitive towards dealing with personnel issues. The lack of direct external accountability is a major difference between the police and support staff managers. It is possible for a senior manager with power over the direction of the organisation not having direct accountability for any of their decisions. In theory the Chief Constable be held accountable but usually this is only effective after events have gone seriously wrong.

Police Reform and Change

The police reform agenda is focusing inwardly within the police in order to improve outcomes of police activities. The use of Best Value as a driving mechanism for improving performance has been adopted by the Home Office, which has prepared guidance for Police Authorities and Forces on Best Value, Planning and Performance Measurement. Within the Best Value methodology is

an element of consultation which incorporates the idea of local democratic accountability.

The ex ante aspect of police accountability as suggested earlier is the involvement of the public prior to decision making. The Best Value methodology moves on this principle. There are still other government initiatives that are impacting on the police to ensure the quality of community involvement. The Race Equality Scheme is a statutory requirement arising from the Race Relation Act 1976 (as amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, and the resulting Statutory Instrument and Code of Practice).

All these developments encourage the police to further enhance the partnership approach and involve more people within the decision making process. The Police Standards Unit within the Home Office focuses on the reduction of variance in police performance. As a result there is a source for further intervention by the Home Office. The unit is a source of best practice that they collect from police forces which are perceived as the leaders in performance in the area of policing. The developments happening in police accountability is occurring within a wider agenda of reforming the public service by the current labour government. This move on from the Financial Management Initiatives (FMI) to the Next Step, which Drewry (2000) describes as "a continuation of previous initiatives, repackaged with a more populist spin-and perhaps reflecting the 'third way' between socialist interventionism and the minimalist state favoured by New Right neo-liberals". The Next Step involves the radical reform of public services using national

standards, devolution, flexibility and choice as the philosophy to be used to approach this reform.

Overview

There has been a raging debate about leadership in the public sector since New Labour came to power. This has intensified during their second term in office. The rise in audit and inspection across the public sector has been described as characteristic of a political culture that does not have full confidence in professionals and public sector workers (Clarke et al 2000). This debate has also engulfed the police as the AC and HMIC have produced official documents challenging the police professional approach and performance. The conclusion of Sir William Macpherson in his inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the subsequent police investigations (paragraph 46.1) were that the investigation 'was marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers'. The implication of all these criticisms is that the processes that were in place did not identify these failures and as such a new approach was necessary.

The information from the managers interviewed has to be viewed from the perspective that they are constantly changing roles especially the police officers and their reaction as of present is based on the role that they perform currently. The Support Staff do spend a longer time in post but they do not have certainty of employment as police officers do in the past but recently the majority of support staff have been in post because of the immobility between senior managers role.

The similar view in which the external government institutions are perceived by all the managers seems to be closer to the actual picture as this seems to be an institutional view rather than personal views. The lack of appreciation of the legal mode of accountability in the day to day running of the Force seems to weaken the use of rules to change behaviour. There will be a need to do something extra other than to have a legal rule making someone accountable. The enforcement of the rule or the use of internal leadership to support the rule is necessary.

It is obvious as well that there is no local competent authority to ensure police accountability in the decision making stage, but the idea of them being involved even though at a token level is a start. However, as they become more involved in Best Value Reviews and policing plans they are bound to increase their competence. This may lead to a more active role in the decision making processes of the police.

The ongoing problem is how to deliver what is expected as the public are aware of the failures of the police and are now expecting an improvement in service. The problem with all these moves is the parallel controversies existing within the police that have not been taken away. The senior managers are the ones that now have to deliver in practice even though there are no roles that they can put on hold as they are still responsible if things go wrong. The increasing number of new things to deal with is the challenge that faces the senior police manager. The implications for training of future police leaders are immense and the recruitment of new leaders become more difficult as the role is continuously changing. The senior managers made reference to the fact that the 'job I joined is not what it is

now'. It is difficult to see how people who do have a full understanding of what is happening can lead. The process of continuous change makes it difficult to train the leaders as they have to be flexible top change to every new demand and process or be branded as incompetent. The political nature of the demands also further complicates the expectation placed on senior managers. All those interviewed expressed concerns at the pace of changes that are being imposed on the police. They all still decide to continue with the business of policing as there is no time to be involved in debates.

The emphasis is now on performance within a prudent budget to provide the public with a strong and high quality service. The police are being driven within this overall push, but the management of performance becomes crucial to this latest development. This leaves the important dimension of ethics and morals that have to inform effective leadership. The culture of the managers should provide insight into the development of issues that require leadership and moral courage. The next chapter examines police performance from the perspective of senior managers and the reality is assessed with the reform agenda.

Chapter Seven

Managing in Practice: An Internal Account of Performance Management and Culture

The monitoring and assessment of performance has always been within the role of managers. They exercise professional judgement in undertaking this role. Senior managers account to the public on certain high profile cases and issues. Therefore it is important to understand their perceptions and understanding of performance management. Since they represent the organisation in society they are aware of the demands and standards required by the public. This is communicated to them in a number of ways; among others are the media, public meetings and the Home Office. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) is the main institution external to the police that monitor police performance. Since the bulk of staff within the HMIC have police background, training and experience the probability of a radical departure from the emphasis on what is perceived within the profession as priority is very limited. The perception of performance is not likely to be far from that which prevails within the police. Power (1994) observes that audits do as much to construct definitions of quality and performance as to monitor them. Other sources of external monitoring rely on information from within the police and other governmental departments for information. However, the questions that are asked are not answered because what the audience want answered is not the area that data is gathered. Sometimes, the data gathered may not satisfy the people requesting it because they are not detailed enough. Performance means different things to different audiences. It is the demand from these audiences that makes the focusing of policing difficult. It is important to make the distinction between the

performance of individuals within the police and that of the police force as a whole.

When dealing with the performance of individuals, the exercise of discretion by police officers makes measurement difficult. This relates to the ability to measure outcome or output from the decision making process of staff exercising discretion. It also applies to both the decisions to and not to exercise discretion. This is because there is no way of stating the required action required prior to the actual event taking place. However, there are some police activities that are easier to measure and predict, for example the number of hours spent on patrol, the time it takes to process a prisoner and the number of people arrested. Conversely the decision not to perform these activities does not necessarily mean inaction or poor performance. The plurality of the role police undertake and the different management practices required to supervise the various activities further complicates the issue of performance management on an individual basis. There are police officers involved in crime reduction initiatives, some involved in covert operations and others involved in the administration of the organisation. The principle of division of labour is evident in certain areas of police work but when it comes to the role of the patrol officers they are expected to be able to perform all the roles. This is also evident in some senior management roles. It is difficult to effectively breakdown their performance because they can be contributing to the effectiveness of varying end service.

The performance of the police can be examined from the perspective of their impact on the public and also internal impact within the police. The internal

impact affects the service delivery to the public. Most of the senior managers are not involved in direct service delivery to the public but they are supporting the service delivery. They are not involved in what is traditionally perceived as police work, the maintaining of law and order, the investigation and responding to criminal and suspicious incidents, but they are involved in creating the policies and ensuring the organisation functions smoothly, effectively and efficiently. As a result, they do have indirect control on the staff as they control the reinforcement mechanisms within the organisation. It is important to realise that all these debates are still developing as the systems for assessing performance improves. There is always going to be some aspect of policing that will be difficult to measure but the debates have to be aware of these limitations. For senior managers and other managers the performance of the team is used to assess and it is easier as there are established data recording processes within the organisation to ensure this.

The main aim of this section is to analyse the data collected as the senior managers view them rather than a theoretical construct of the reality. I report on the senior managers perspectives on what they do, what they think they are doing and their beliefs about the nature and importance of what they do. The following key issues from the data are discussed:

- methods employed by senior managers to evaluate performance,
- the attitudes of senior managers towards the structures dealing with performance,
- individual and organisational performance issues

- use of Professional Judgement, Performance Development Review (PDR), Performance Indicators (PI), Target Setting and their effects on the staff,
- the scrutiny of police performance by external institutions,
- use of Best Value as a performance management tool and benchmarking.

All these issues are interrelated and in discussing them I refer to them as the respondent used them rather than on a fixed theoretical division of the concepts.

Senior Managers and Performance Issues

There is always a yearly policing plan which sets out the key objectives and targets for Force. This plan usually includes the Best Value performance plan which introduces statistical measures into the process. The policing plan is also used by the Police Authority to monitor the performance of the police. In addition a three yearly policing plan is now introduced by the Police Reform Act 2002. The Home Secretary sets strategic directions for the police service by objectives and Ministerial Priorities. Police performances are monitored by associated performance indicators, policing plans, annual reports and HMIC. The introduction of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) has focused the police to have a half yearly control strategy that acts as an operating document for the activities of the Force and BCUs. The process has an in-built feedback loop for planning as intelligence from all police activities and the outside environment is feed in to direct the activities of the police.

The police are not given extra resources to deal specifically with the new emphasis on measuring performance. The bureaucratic results of trying to create

an audit trail and the focusing of precious time on collating evidence of performance internally has meant that other priorities have been put back until the structures are permanently in place. Auditing has been described as natural and necessary as policing as they deter waste, poor management and dishonesty in office (Power 1994). This has meant that in practice the management of performance has relied on a carrot and stick approach. The PDR is structure available within the organisation for the review of individual performance. This is supposed to be linked to the objectives and the targets set for the organisation.

A Chief Officer noted:

At all levels in the planning hierarchy the plans include targets, performance targets, so the Policing plan includes targets, which are based on, er, the vision statements, the Home Secretary's key priorities, the functional area plan will include targets, so mine includes targets that underpin the delivery of Quality of Life Policing and I monitor those on a monthly basis, OK, so the performance is monitored through branch heads meeting and there's a standing agenda item on the monthly branch heads meeting that I have, where we talk about performance. Performance is talked about in the weekly meetings, not every one of them, but it's there to be discussed at the weekly liaison meeting.

The importance of management of performance within the role of managers in the police force cannot be overemphasised. There are various processes available for the management of performance. This can be informal, as in the choice of staff roles which above the rank of Inspector is within the gift of Chief Officers and formal, like the PDR process. The use of the PDR as a process is now common practice and the theory of the process is always articulated when discussing individual performance. A senior police manager stated:

In terms of the performance development review staff appraisal scheme, objectives within the PDR process are linked in to the divisional policing plan, into the force policing plan, but each officer will have a different objective to actually achieve that's linked in with the policing plan and they will get judged on that at 6 months and when the review is carried out and at 12 months as well. So if you like performance does come back in terms of

the PDR process, a little bit different for each different individual because they play different parts.

This is supposed to be a continuous process with six monthly reviews and target setting. This is monitored and training gaps are supposed to be identified from them. There are mixed views as to the utility of the process in dealing with individual performance as opposed to organisational performance:

There are two issues here, if you're talking about performance in terms of achieving policing plan objectives, I think we're pretty good at that actually because we know what our objectives are, I know exactly where things are going wrong within the division and things are being put right to actually do it. If you're talking about personal performance of individuals, we rely very heavily on the PDR process to actually make sure that those ethical and moral issues are actually encapsulated within it, and that's the PDR process.

The difficulty of judging personal performance as opposed to organisational performance was raised as a dilemma mainly because of the different nature of the task and the different abilities of staff. There is the added point that performance is difficult to measure in qualitative terms. A manager stated:

It's always very difficult to measure performance in human beings isn't it? The difference is they don't have dials and gauges like machines do, even cars have dials and gauges. We can set people targets and we do set people targets, I was talking about this the other day. You can give that member of staff X number of these things to complete in a day and if at the end of the day they have completed X or X +1, then they've performed well. If they've produced X - 1 or 2, then that's poor performance and that's one way of doing it, but it isn't quite so easy with people, certainly with police officers, much of it has got to do with qualitative approach rather than quantitative, but I'm not sure how you measure that quality.

The inadequacy of the present assessment tool has meant that once the result is not what is expected, the argument about the adequacy of the tools for assessment is raised. This is a genuine argument as these tools do not deal with quality issues. This is where the manager's professional judgement starts and this is the source of institutional bias in the assessment of performance. There are

some managers that are sceptical about the use of organisational objectives and indicators to judge individual performance:

Well, I have got some concerns about trying to breakdown the performance of a police officer which is linked back to the organisational purpose and aim, which is about improvement, and providing a service that improves quality applied. To try and define that in terms of performance indicators, it's not possible, I think you might find that you've got so many performance indicators because the nature of the job is such and the interface with the community is such it's so varied, so multifaceted that I think that it would be almost impossible, I think you've got to go for some key indicators which, if you are talking about the constable, cannot be about necessarily the objectives of the force, but it's how they as an individual are contributing and some of those start to get into a bit more of the touchy feely things that are difficult to define in indicator terms, but some of them are not.

The PDR process however although similar to yearly appraisals that was being used previously, does not appear to be natural, and may need time to be imbedded within the culture of policing. This evidence supports the idea that the process of and adaptation to change within the police takes time. A manager noted:

The minute I say, come in for your PDR interview, they're stiff, they're rigid, they're nervous, they're worried, and I say, relax, it's not about this it's just a process, it's helpful, but nevertheless there's a sense in which this is something quite different, I've taken off my hat that says I'm your work colleague and friend, and they think I'm judgemental or whatever, and I think that's a problem in a sense you know that it's alright saying that I have said that formal PR processes are not bad thing, but they do to some extent they can act as a de-motivator as people feel, don't you trust me, of course I'm going to do the job, you know, why would I fill wretched forms in, you know we're not making cars here, you're not saying I've got to increase productivity etc and that's a sort of example I think in my view of where people do respond sometimes, probably more often than not, in a negative fashion to the formality of the process because they somehow seem to think actually it's a stick and not a carrot and there's nothing in it for them.

Assessment of the PDR process is difficult as the source for staff criticism of the process cannot be identified as to whether it is the process or perception of the

process that is the problem. This is further complicated because of the use of other assessment tools that staff are aware of. These tools are primarily informal and involve the managers making judgements about the competence of individual members of staff. This informal assessment of staff is ongoing within the normal daily running of the organisation as explained by a manager:

I evaluate their performance really as to, I have to say not in a formal way. Mentally I have a judgement about their performance and that judgement is based on individual themes that have occurred and the easiest one to use is my, it's confidential, the chief inspector is the new chief inspector to this area and he's also got some personal difficulties currently and when he came the room changed, you can feel the room changed and it was quite difficult to put your finger on why. So some of the methods I try and evaluate performance is by, when I go in the room and say, how are you doing, I listen to what they say and a lot of it comes out in what they say, and a lot of the times they will say, look between you and me blah, blah, ..., now I can't do anything with that information directly but I can in terms of forming a judgement. I'll just link it back to something that I've already said, when I tasked the sergeant to do the objective assessment as to why performance had decreased and I said to him, give me a formal response but if you have difficulty come back and give me an informal one, that was because I was suspicious about the performance of the chief inspector, and when the sergeant did come and speak to me informally with something that was difficult, he tells me about really what's happened. So that's the way I evaluate performance, but I can't really put my finger on it. I don't want to mislead you in saying that, I have a formal process of doing this, I just do it

This informal assessment is based on the old working practice of only reacting when there is a problem. There is no response to average or standard performance. The new development of continuous assessment and evidence gathering is still in its infancy and comments about the success may be premature. However, the old informal mechanisms are still in situ and it remains to be seen how senior managers will react if there is evidence to the contrary of either process of assessment.

Performance Management of Senior Managers

One of the themes of this thesis is determining how performance is judged, especially that of the managers, this is a circular problem that is difficult to resolve. This is because we have to rely on the manager above to define competency and as stated earlier the senior managers control the informal processes of performance management. This makes benchmarking extremely difficult and the issue of comparing performance controversial.

Managers in the main get things done by other people. This means that bad performance can result from managers not being able to get workers to perform or the workers need developing as they cannot do the work. Either way the manager is culpable, but the natural tendency is to look externally for blame. The role of senior managers in the performance of the organisation is crucial in that they harness the organisational drive to enhance the individual capacity that a worker has got in delivering performance. The process of assessment must be simple, relevant, increase performance and lower cost for the organisation. There is the possibility of wasting time on assessing performance and thereby hindering the actual role of the manager. This practical problem was highlighted by the comments of a manager:

So that I'll see them, sometime every week, sometime every couple of weeks and they'll make judgements about your performance in that meeting on work you've done in between to progress actions from other meetings. Beyond that they won't have a clue how I deal with people here, unless there were people who would go and grass me up, I don't suppose there are.

The informal nature of the initial judgement will always be difficult to defend objectively. The inability of managers to carry out all that is required in practice for managing performance has meant that a variety of approaches exist. The

approach that each manager uses is affected by personal and occupational reality factors. For example managers that are task orientated are more likely to rely on systematic approach rather than professional judgement to the judgement of performance. There has been an increase in the reliance of objective or evidence based assessment to distinguish performance. The use of targets and performance benchmarking has developed in the evaluation of senior managers. The use of basic command unit (BCU) as a unit of police command is a development along these lines. There is the perception that objective evidence cannot be used solely to judge performance of senior officers. Collier (1998) identified the fact that meeting of targets by the organisation is sometimes outside the control of the police. However, the demonstration of the effective use of resources at their disposal is. The concentration on the micro detail of police activity ensures that the macro issues are not addressed effectively as managers are preoccupied with trying to improve an aspect of performance that cannot repay the bureaucratic effort used to address the initial lack of performance. The search for an evidence based assessment for senior managers is more difficult than may first appear.

Although, senior managers are also assessed with PDR process they are not as hostile in their perception of the process as they view the perception of other staff. There is still a general perception that they are assessed on the ability to 'keep out of the shit' which is to ensure that nothing negative on a big scale occurs. The scale of the trouble depends strongly on whether a chief officer is woken up as a result of what has happened. The performance culture is not fully

embedded as managers are still concerned about other informal aspects of their role as illustrated by the comments of a senior manager:

My performance is judged not according to performance indicators, that's the first part, its judged by the state of the ship, the empirical effectiveness of people doing what needs to be done, our ability to solve problems when they come up our relationship with the public or relationship within the organisation and my relationship with my boss.

Senior managers appear to be more confident of their status within the organisation and as such are not overtly apprehensive about the change in performance management. They are well aware of the informal nature of assessment and know that there are things that are more important than the figures. The informal nature in the assessment and rewarding of senior managers is evidenced by these observations of a Chief Officer:

We probably do not go out of our way to formally recognise good management but there are all sorts of informal mechanisms which may be from the way you speak to an individual. If I think someone is doing a good job I will be more relaxed in the way I talk to them to someone I have no confidence in. If I've got no confidence in an individual that they are a good manager I would probably want to be a bit more directive and give them less room to manoeuvre. If I believe someone's a good manager I'm quite likely to be very hands off and occasionally just reassure myself that everything's okay just by the dip into what's going on...It's your credibility, how people are judged by the organisation and that in turn will bring, it might bring tangible rewards in the long run by ultimately getting through promotion systems or whatever. But I would say my recognition of a good manager is reflected in the way I deal with them. They have a better, an easier relationship with me than someone that I didn't.

The assessment of individual performance is difficult especially if the individual is not performing in the extreme areas, that is not performing very poorly or in an excellent fashion. The problem is that the majority of individual members of staff fall into these category and there is the perception that processes are there to deal with those that fall outside the norm. The main rules and regulations as suggested are perceived as always addressing the extremes and as such the

process of PDR is perceived as a panacea, but there are some more radical views being expressed, a senior manager noted:

The new regulations in terms of performance may well be able to deal with the extreme case, but we've already identified there are many degrees between the extreme case and I'm not sure that even then we're going to be able to handle that, and it's something that the police service has suffered from for years and years .. and it is inevitable that we will get people to join the police service fired up, wanting to perform, and after five or six years maybe they'll say it is not the job for me, but there is no easy way out, and I think that inevitably we will see over the next few years 10 year contracts, 15 year contracts not unlike the military.... That I think will not be a bad thing. I was sceptical about it in the past, but I think that provided we start at maybe something like 10 years, then that's to do with getting a return on our investment, it's expensive to train a police officer...

Performance Indicators (PIs) are the statistical tools for providing performance information that are used in management of performance. There is a raft of PIs emanating from within and external to the police. This enables comparisons to be made and this allows managers to have an objective way of defending their decisions on performance. The internal use of performance indicators is tempered by the fact that the managers are aware of the abilities and limitations within the organisation. The managers use of PIs within the organisation will now be examined, but I will also introduce the external use of PIs.

This discussion gets more complicated by the introduction of external institutions in the management of performance. The performance of the whole organisation is assessed by comparing the performance indicators with other police forces. The use of performance indicators as the external means of monitoring and comparing performance has meant the use of performance indicators within the organisation was inevitable. The external argument is that the use of PIs allows organisations to justify their performance to their electorate and customers. The

use of the Best Value process has accelerated this process and the police have reacted to this by developing the internal use of these information. I will now focus on the perception of the use of PIs and performance management internally and externally to the organisation.

Performance Indicators and Performance Management

There are differing views to the utility of performance indicators in the management of performance. The debate is ongoing and appears to be refocused as the practical problems of the tools are identified. The supporters of the use of PI are aware of the limitations but still think it is better to make use it rather than having nothing to work with. This argument is put forward by manager who observed:

Well, they are informing us about how successful we've been in some areas, but I think PI's are very, very embryonic, I think we're only 5 or 10 years into using PI's as an organisation. If you went back 10 years, we never measured anything did we? We had crime figures and there was a bit of competition but there wasn't much integrity in the crime figures earlier because the system for many years was open to abuse and there were no rewards or penalties that went with performance of the crime figures. So we're only like 10 years into producing PI's and I think we're just expecting far too much from PI's. If you look at PI's in their industries, if you look in terms of accounting, management accounts is probably closest correlation you'll get between PI's in the police service and PI's in industry. But management accounting goes back to the industrial revolution so we've had nearly 200 years of developing and refining management accounting techniques to produce the sophisticated management accounting that you now get in industry and you people who are trained as management accountants so there are recognised bodies who can make sense of it. What do they expect in 10 years, it's like in policing terms we've only reached about 1810.

Even supporters of the use of PIs think there is a need to make sure that it is relevant to policing, a senior police manager noted:

One of the hardest parts of the job in a sense is establishing a direct correlation between police activity and the performance itself, and it's obviously probably a much broader argument than that in an interview

like this. I have my own reservations about our ability to impact directly on things such as, let me say, recorded crime figures. I have those reservations on an individual level, but I recognise our corporate responsibility that we are targeted to reduce crime offences and nuisance as an overall corporate objective. I think the police can contribute to that, but I'm a little bit uncomfortable with the concept that it's something that's owned primarily or solely by the police. I think there are much broader society influences at stake in relation to those.

There is a need to accept that there is not going to be a unified acceptance of a process for the management of performance as some members of staff are going to feel disadvantaged either because of personal reasons, in that it does not favour their personality or the work they do, in that the process is not amenable to the type of role that they undertake. There is a need to recognise the effects of the change in culture to performance management on a micro level on the staff and some managers do recognise that the process will be unfair to some individuals. There is a perception that professional judgement will have to be used in order to ease the problems that are associated with the use of PIs on the individual level.

On the organisational level there are some managers that welcome the use of performance information although they are reluctant, the comments of a senior manager highlighted this point:

Now the culture I'm trying to change here, is to say if we use PI's let's not completely set aside, but just, just for a minute suspend all our reservations about PI's and comparably if we've got someone on a measure of PI's where the data collection is consistent and the, definition of the PI's consistent across all forces and a force or forces looks better than us, by those measures there's potential learning opportunity there and what I'm interested in is going and seeing how they do it different, OK, so it's almost taking the debate to the other end of the extreme, rather than looking for differences...but fundamentally you deliver the same sort of services as me, so we've got more in common than we have differences...It is like turning the debate around now and it's the only way to go in terms of Best Value. Because we've not only got to continuously improve services, but we've got to be able to demonstrate to interested third parties, not least of which is the Audit Commission and HMIC that we're delivering continuous service improvement.

There is the contrary argument that PIs does not actually perform the task of comparing performance between organisations, a senior police manager stated:

You know performance indicators are dangerous things to rely on because they don't give you a true picture or a, a real reflection of what's going on. Well I mean I, performance indicators are useful in giving you an indication of how well you're doing particularly if you use it to compare your performance year on year. But to compare it to somebody else's performance is very dangerous because there are so many other things that play a part, and you're not comparing like with like.

The use of performance indicators cannot be divorced from target setting which allows organisation to make sense of performance indicators internally. Setting targets is used to challenge the organisation and ensure improved performance. The setting of targets within the police is now routine and linked to the PDR of staff. This is done by breaking down the targets for the branch or the police as a whole into manageable numbers without reference to the processes involved in the delivery of the service. A manager noted:

So we have objectives, we have clear objectives, we have targets to deliver to from those objectives. Each one of us has targets to perform under. And the specifics of that, they're all aware of their job role and function, and it comes back again in marketing terms to delivering a certain product or a service to a given quality or standard, and in a certain timescale, and has got to be, if you like, quality assured by myself, you know, in that respect. So, you know, there's a checking process.

The use of PIs by managers to improve performance is not new within the police as there has always been some form of statistical data kept but the pervasiveness of performance is the discourse of police discussion is clearly obvious. The need for PIs to distinguish between individual performances has been what managers wanted but not to be judged by the figures, a senior manager noted:

If the team are performing well, is to make sure that you don't allow that to mask individual poor performance, but I would much rather think about performance indicators that would tell me whether or not that individual is performing as a member of the team as an individual

performing member of the team rather than team performing. I know that's not always easy but I think that it's possible and I think then that starts to bring you into areas such as peer assessment and, what do they call it now, is it 360 degree, then with all the challenges that that poses, then I think that, well it's relevant.

There are those that are not fully convinced of the benefits of using PIs because they feel it is not sophisticated enough to deal with some aspects of policing, a senior detective noted:

I think that performance indicators are too simplistic and they don't actually reflect the, reality out there, that, that if you can, if you can catch one man who's doing, who's actually committed five hundred crimes and will continue to do so, who's absolute prolific that if you put that one person away and spend a month doing it, then if, that five hundred, those five hundred crimes he's gonna commit every, every six month are not going to be crimes committed when he's sent to prison, so your crime rate's gonna come down and it's a question of convincing people that that is the case and that's why it's important to target the right people.

This uncertainty about the utility of performance indicator in its present state attracts criticism from all the various groupings of senior managers. There is the hope that the process is capable of improving, but whether this can be achieved is viewed with scepticism. A senior manager noted:

And to me that is always the difficulty. I suppose it's asking for the holy grail really, I'm saying I'd want to know everything before I make a judgement about one thing but there comes a point where you have to come off the fence. But I think the PIs we've got at the moment are stupid, they do not really measure the effectiveness of what we do and even if they did measure the effectiveness of what we do we don't influence it all anyway.

There are some managers who believe that the introduction of PIs is to try and deal with the credibility of the police in the public, one senior police manager stated:

Because I think, it actually all stems out from integrity issue really, my conviction is that trust is based on personal acquaintance because public service, any service, is about relationships. We talk a lot about product,

but we forget that it's the quality of the relationship we have with our communities is actually a vital part of the product because in an ideal environment, and I think my pyramid was the Home Secretary knows and trusts Her Majesty's Inspectorate and they know and trust 43 chief constables and the 43 chief constables know and trust all of their superintending ranks who know and trust their troops, the people who are really doing it, and there is a transparent honest, healthy flow of information up and down the links from the Home Secretary in effect right through to the probationer to the counter clerk to the traffic warden, even to the catering staff even though they are sub-contractors, and because everybody knows and trusts everybody else we have the confidence that is built out of the relationship, a good communicative relationship, which says we do not need PIs because know, I know my staff and I know what they are like and I know what they are doing, therefore, they do not need to tick boxes on a weekly or monthly basis.

This is the same argument advanced by Power (1994) that audits are necessary when accountability can no longer be sustained by informal relations of trust but must be formalised and be subject to independent scrutiny. The reason for this development is due to the transformation in the role of government and conceptions of governance. There is no strategy being adopted to bring back the trust or rebuild it as the move is to make auditing more rigorous. The important learning point is to see if the public feel more reassured because of these developments in auditing. This does not deal directly with the issue of citizen participation because the disconnect from the public cannot be overcome by producing performance data. The trust element that the process addresses may be counterproductive as the data is viewed as spurious and open to political tampering.

Whether PIs have an actual or perceived use the proliferation and publication of them continues to have an effect on the police internally. The managers that interact with the public or external bodies are aware of this and act to make sure the reputation of the organisation remains intact. There is an acknowledgement

that the police as an organisation have an image problem rather than a substance one and as such there is a need to adopt the process of change to convince the public. A Chief Officer noted:

But other agencies in the area and local authorities are aware of PIs and if they don't feel we are up to the top nationally, because they see the publications from the Audit Commission and everybody else, whether I am or not I don't know but I think I feel under some pressure, it may not be explicit but there's often quite a lot inferred because they don't like it if their local police is seen to be doing less well than anybody else. So the pressure comes locally predominantly and I would say that's the biggest driver.

The effects of the use of PIs on the behaviour of managers are not to be underestimated. Powers (1994) argues that auditing has moved from auditing delivery operations to quality of control systems. The effect of these developments is that those audited develop creative strategies to cope with being audited. The essence of PIs can be perceived as the extension of forms of discipline and control. The issue of control may be central to the use of PIs although it is explained through the non confronting language of accountability. A senior manager noted his observation about the effects of the use of PIs on managers:

But the real issues, the PIs aren't really measuring what we really want. The PIs are measuring technical issues which are open to, I'll say manipulation, but in many cases it's legitimate manipulation but they're confusing people's interpretation of what's going on. So I will say the introduction of PIs has changed the way managers behave, probably it's a question of degree rather than actuality because we've always had some rule of some PIs even before they were introduced formally.

The use of legitimate manipulation is nothing new within the police and this stems from the emphasis on the numerical result. This form of behaviour is what has been fuelling the rise in the number of police misconduct arising in the

miscarriage of justice and loss of public confidence in the police. A manager observed:

Yes I think it is because over a period of the last 30 or so years the police service has exposed itself increasingly as being an organisation which contains people who are habitually corrupt, who are habitually violent, who are habitually discriminatory, unlawfully discriminatory, that we've reached the position that we are now in where we have such a plethora of PIs because the real essence behind it is that people don't trust us. When we were a service that was regarded as being noble, honest, self-sacrificing, brave and all those things that I see in the earliest versions of Dickson of Dock Green, people were not interested in that level of scrutiny because they believed that the police were earning their money and were the trustworthy guardians of the Queen's peace, law and order, ...I think it is that, as this stone has rolled down hill and gathered all the detritus which has been digging around in our background, and it's gathered momentum and it's got bigger and bigger, I feel that it is because we are not trusted that we are being laboured by PIs rather than because people feel a need to know the detail of our activity.

There are cases of over zealous public officials trying to achieve the target or what is perceived as what the public expect and manipulating the system or results. These are usually justified on the grounds that it is for the benefit of society. The expectation placed on these officials is blamed. In education, there was the suggestion that academics have manipulated examination results to conceal matters from funding council quality assessors. Recently, a school teacher has been jailed for cheating in order for his pupils to improve their grades. At present, the control of behaviour of managers to increase their performance by manipulation of the PIs continues to happen, a senior detective stated:

Where there's life at stake I go for the Life, and if there's a chance that there's somebody out there that has said to somebody I'm going to kill a child, I'm gonna pick one and kill it, then as far as I am concerned, the burglaries, despite the fact that they are numbers in the key performance indicators, have to take second place, so informally there are the sort of things that are discussed, and divisional Commanders, because they've got drugs target to meet, want the drugs squad, but they're dealing with a higher echelon of, of drug dealer and I know that, Divisional Commanders have come and seen me personally and said you should be doing a couple, you

know, taking the half ounce out in, you know, kicking doors in ...to assist with our indicators and our figures.

The use of PIs has led to the old practice of competition in the numbers game, but also the concept of continuous improvement and this can affect the staff within the organisation. The change in the culture within the police is not going unnoticed by the senior managers. A senior police officer noted:

I think the tragedy is what's happened performance indicators have, by default, become objectives as opposed to being indicators, because the natural corollary is if you measure something it becomes something gets measured against. So what performance indicators should be in my view is a thermometer or barometer of good health or of overall performance and if you like it's the thermometer in the oven, the thermometer might say you're at 100 degrees you might want to be at 80 degrees, you might want to be at 120 degrees, but the decision of where you want to be, how hot you want the oven to be is yours, and not the person setting it. It's the target setting, it's that sort of thing and the problem too is that it very quickly becomes stale and old hat, people grow tired of being told they've got to do more, they've got to do it faster, they got to have people more satisfied and all the time if they perform well, they'll be told to perform even better. Even a Pavlovian dog won't respond to that for very long.

There are those who identify the possible effect of managing performance and bullying of staff. The link made between abuse of power and managing performance by some managers show the recognition that the new process will require power negotiations between vestiges from the old culture and the use of highly developed complaint mechanisms already in place within the police. The increase in the use of grievance procedure was used as evidence by a few managers. The effects of concentrating fully on performance are new and will be a culture shock for some staff, a senior police manager observed:

I don't think as an organisation we've maybe spelt that out, I mean there's a difference between managing and being positive and actually, I suppose putting pressure on people to perform and deliver what you want. There's a legitimate amount of that and then there's an amount that might cross a divide that becomes bullying and that's what I'm talking about. Then there's

the other type where people deride colleagues over something and that division is in fact bullying.

There is also another effect of the use of performance indicators as the core of the process of performance management and a senior police manager argued:

There is a danger with Performance Indicators that, in the old adage, about what gets measured gets done, so what's that, what actually gets crowded out are, particularly for a service where there is, it is dependent on successfully interfacing at a personal level... it is that the soft issues don't get enough emphasis because they are much more difficult to measure. There is also a pre-disposition in current PI's towards quantitative rather than qualitative measures because again quality is a lot more difficult to measure.

Whilst there is the argument that PIs may lead to what gets measured gets done, there is another observation that identified the effects of performance management on police performance as a whole. A senior police manager stated:

That's right, the major issue for me is why police performance generally is declining, is as performance indicators mushroom, it's diversifying our activity instead of concentrating it. There are so many difficulties, particularly like let's say the reducing crime performance indicators, because of the link with police activity and overall crime levels is, to me, a loose one, there are some that you feel like you're swimming against the tide. We're lucky at the moment because we've just had the reducing crime indicators for the past two or three years at a time of falling unemployment, increased prosperity generally, increased affluence, which to me are probably some of the key factors lying behind the fall in overall headline crime rates. When the trend reverses, as it inevitably it will, because these things are cyclical, we'll see crime bubble and do you then get a very dissatisfied public who say the police are supposed to reduce crime, look at it, it's going through the roof.

The use of performance indicators limits the use of professional judgement in that objective measurable factors are used in decision making. This is seen as interfering in the professionalism of the police and as such unconstitutional. The implication of this was raised by a Chief Officer who stated:

Years ago, the job at Chief Officer level was to juggle the competing demands for resources and you made a professional judgement about where you needed to put your resources. In many respects the introduction of PIs has taken away from us and the government are owning that. They say we want you to do this so we do it and then say but we didn't mean you to stop

doing that. I mean it gets a nonsense at the end and we've done much better reverting to professional judgement, if you like, and I wish there were reliable indicator that was valid nationally, but I don't know of one and this is the sort of debate that has led us in this force to talk about Quality of Life. Because it's not about counting crimes or counting detection or arrests, it's trying to say that we're here to give people a better life than they otherwise would have, very difficult to measure and a lot of it at the end of the day is apperception issue it's influenced by what's on television, what's in the media and all sorts of other things that are really hard for us to live with and at the end of the day there was nothing better than professional judgement of the people who see the big picture.

To sum up, there is a general acceptance of the use of PIs but virtually all the respondents identify weakness in using the process. The general acceptance seems to stem from the fact that performance management is viewed as the new route to progression and also there is the realisation that not a lot can be done to oppose it. This is because there is considerable pressure from outside the police that makes this development inevitable. The bidding for external funding requires an audit trail to demonstrate the use of the funds. This has lead to awareness that performance management is essential in then current environment. There is also an awareness that the perceived or real independence that existed in policing is not sustainable and more interference under the guise of improving performance is due to come.

No one stated that they would manipulate the figures but they all identified the possibility and some identified colleagues that they think have manipulated the figures. All the managers were aware of the developments of PIs but there were confusion as to the relationship with targets and external utility of performance indicators. There was a disparity on the personal use of PIs as a performance management tool although they will use it as a result of being instructed to do so. The discourse about performance as an issue of discussion has taken a more

central role in the discussion within and in dealing with the public. There are references to statistics and performance figures in replies to enquiries emanating from the public. The lack of clarity in the detail of knowledge about PIs can stem from the interval between interviews during which developments in the role of PIs especially within the development of the use of Best Value.

Senior Managers and Best Value

Best Value process was introduced by the Local Government Act 1999. Police Authorities have the responsibility for Best Value Performance Plans and the programme of Best Value Reviews. The Local Government Act amended section 54 of the Police act 1996 to give HMIC the power to inspect police authorities in respect of the way they have discharged their duty of Best Value. The performance indicators introduced are mainly a consolidation of the existing PIs with targets set over five years. Police forces are expected to achieve performance levels of the top 25 per cent of police forces when the targets are set. The idea of continuous improvement assumes that there is no end point to development within the available resources. There is a perception that Best Value will herald a new regime of performance management as expressed by senior police manager:

I think the debate will move on very quickly 'cos it has to under Best Value, that it will no longer be acceptable to measure an organisations performance through PI's or other measures in terms of just quantity, er, it is no longer acceptable in this organisation to do that, because one of the fundamental tenants of Quality of Life Policing is that we are listening to our customers.

The effect of Best Value on the organisation will be similar to PIs since the process relies on performance indicators but raises the question of business process of organisations as they are different. There is a need to harmonise all

the business processes in order to make meaningful comparisons possible. The

problem is identified by a senior manager:

Not really, I think the mechanism to begin to do that is Best Value as part of the corporate review, you've got to compare yourself where the performance indicators if anything against other organisation and well, we've gone through the exercise because we've had to, we've done bits of it before comparing ourselves in terms of performance in relation to crime but I've not seen much evidence up to now of the chief officers responding to the gap between ourselves and other organisations, despite often being a defensive reaction. I mean I've said you've got to compare like with like but the reaction in the past when we've been bottom of the crime league table has been we're basically comparing apples with pears here.

Some managers have already identified the problems with the process, a senior manager in a non operational branch stated:

Some of the financial ones don't tell you very much, you look at Humberside police in relation to Durham for example or Sussex and say that we we're are very expensive per head of population or per officer, but you've got to then look behind that kind of indicator to see why, you will find that Durham generates lots of income and you look at what most of what that is and its rental from the training centre, forensic training etc well don't do that. I suppose you could criticise us and say well you didn't plan ahead you ought to be providing some kind of training and getting the rent, but now we're in the position we're in and we can't easily start to generate hundreds of thousands of pounds every year and then, falsely I suppose deflate the figure that the public allegedly pay police officers.

The general consensus is that it is better to have a process than none at all and on that basis one has to accept these processes with the view that they will improve as time moves on.

The effect of Best Value is to expose the police as an organisation to more external scrutiny and as such a whole bureaucracy has grown along this issue.

There is a growth in the review of police activity leading to an increase in police resources diverted to Best Value process and a senior police manager observed:

Is a programme of fundamental performance reviews which we have to select on an evidence based process, so we have to, I mean the legislation

says weakest first, well how do you assess weakest, we go back to where we started, one of the issues is going to be currently collected PI's and where we've got it, although, I mean, because it's early days there isn't much of it, benchmarking data, you know, the areas are going to be what's the cost, what how, you know, how far can, can we change this service to hit difficult budgetary targets that we've got.

The problem like any government lead initiative is that there is no clear operational definition of what is expected and usually practitioners find out after the event. The interim is the confusion period where the good idea is being tried out in practice. Oliver (2000) points out that in an effort to demonstrate the good work of the police, there is a danger that the police service become more obsessed with performance indicators and the keeping of records to fend off criticisms rather than good policing. The whole process is bound to create a new culture which by nature has to be short term because of the time frame involved.

The advantage of the process is that it focuses strategic thinking which has usually been reactive rather than proactive. Although the process is relatively new it has made the Police Authority more involved in all police activity as they have the legal responsibility for Best Value. There is optimism about the use of Best Value to deliver to the public the best service but no matter how good the process is if the content is not of good quality the service cannot deliver to the public. In order to improve service to the public there has to be increase in the quality of the producers and no amount of inspection will create more supply if there is no capacity or quality in the staff.

Senior managers have been affected more by this process as they have to justify police performance to the Police Authority and to government. This form of external interference is bound to lead to a new culture as the senior managers are

going to feel more of the pressure which they usually control prior to all the emphasis on performance management. This will inevitably be pushed through the organisation through the middle managers. They are now likely going to come up with the old argument that the measurement does not reflect what the organisation does and that the measurement within other organisations cannot be relied on.

Overview

The legal basis for the performance management process stems from the Local Government Act 1999 and the Police Act 2002. They have consolidated and added a statutory basis for all the guidance from the government departments. The ability for the organisation to identify the contribution of staff establishes the moral basis for the measurement of performance. Senior managers have little control or influence on developments that occur outside the organisation but they have to react to the demands placed on the organisation. The improvement in service delivery that the government demands is to be assessed by objective performance measurements rather than the judgements of professionals. There is a perception of a change in the normal state of affairs as recognised by senior managers and a change in their role as the independence that they thought they had is being encroached on by recent developments. The managers with more experience do express concerns about the direction of changes perceived as being imposed by government. There have been questions raised about the general utility of the approach of performance management to enhance public approval. The link between what is expected and the method employed is an area that needs investigation. A senior manager identified this dilemma:

What we don't investigate enough is the relationship between how these things are perceived and police activity, because it might be that we are the best flaming Police Service going, but people out there are dissatisfied. It might be that we are the worst Police Service going, there are stacks of examples. I mean you talk about the Police Service as a 1960's, golden age, in many respects, the Police Service was absolutely poor, but people were more satisfied when they were, why? Was it lack of information about police performance, was it about society and trends generally, there are issues in there that is a challenge to Authority.

The idea that it is possible to have a highly performing police force with an unreceptive public is a real one and still makes the issue of public satisfaction sometimes independent of the efficiency and effectiveness of the police. If the public justification link is not clearly made yet who actually benefits from this regime. There is a need for further studies, which is outside the remit of this one. However, these issues indirectly affect the behaviour of senior managers.

The gradual erosion of the powers of professional judgement from managers is the main effect of this new emphasis on performance management. The dilemma faced is identified by an officer:

Yes, I mean we crow about and complain that Detective Superintendent X has exceeded his budget on the murder enquiry for so and so and so and so by £20,000 and we beat the table. Yet we continue to pump the money into there because we know he's going to go to Crown Court and the barrister says you've got to do this, this and this, so effectively we've got to do it. You're not managing anything are you? You're not budgeting for anything. I mean how do we know this year that we won't get 12 undetected murders to do? You need a crystal ball to say we can or we can't. The only real indicator of the demand we're likely to face is what's happened before, that's only ever the true indicator of what's likely to happen, what happened last year, because human behaviour tends to follow patterns. But we've no real way of knowing have we, or indeed of the type of complexity murder we've got. So many of the decisions we complain about and say we should have done this, we shouldn't have done that, they're not really decisions at all, they're not even decisions that you can make. You might pretend that you're putting some thought into that decision but really you've actually no options at all have you.

This means the managers are now under the pressures that they have put employees under previously. How they will respond to this changing environment is for the future but they are going to survive one way or the other. The survival of the managers can be relied on but the emphasis on what is policing might change in the future. There is no strategy within the police to make sense of the demands from outside bodies and as a result there is always a reaction to what is demanded even though they may be contradictory. As of present there is an increase in the perceived terrorist threat yet the focus of energy within the police is the emphasis on displaying improved performance. The changing nature of some aspects of policing makes this difficult.

The question is whether the police are different to other public services and can the professional judgement be objectively determined by the use of statistical information. There are some arguments for having different practices for the police as opposed to other public services. These include the cohesive nature of the police power and the open ended demand that can be placed on the police. The senior managers do not vocalise the difference with other public service in terms of performance management. They are hostile to the loss of professional judgement but aware of the political reality.

The Audit Commission audits the public sector and ensures that public financial management and policy accountability are scrutinised. McEldowney (2000) points out that the adoption of audit strategies for the public sector infiltrates almost every form of decision making in a wide variety of public institutions. The Audit Commission had a major impact on the management culture of local

authorities. The Audit Commission may take legal action against a local authority under section 19 of the Local Government Act 1982 to avoid loss through wasteful expenditure identified in audit reports. Expenditure is deemed unlawful if it does not have statutory authority or is so unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense as to amount to an abuse of discretion. The modernising of public institutions is a major theme of this current government and these developments within the police can be observed via the whole process of change in public governance.

The police are therefore not the only organisation in the public sector that is under scrutiny. The implications for society as the police appear to believe that they are pressured from outside the organisation and the law is mainly theoretical as operational realities tend to focus the attention of the organisation on task. Powers argues that as a result of auditing in the public sector there is a displacement from first order experts to second order experts such as accountants and managers. This tension was vocalised by several police officers within the group studied as they are aware of this shift but those with no direct policing experience can only see an objective argument. The argument is the best way of delivering police services. Powers also links the displacement to public distribution of trust. It is ironic that some senior officers do explain the new developments as a reaction to the public mistrust of the police. The new developments now move decisions away from the police that the public trust (even though declining one) to managers and accountants who the public trust less but at the instigation of the politicians who the public trust least of all. The reliance on performance means that there is a concentration on evidence to prove

police actions rather than concentrating on the problems. It is not all gloomy as the police are now more focused in what they do but as policing takes place in an ever changing environment it makes hard processes difficult to maintain as it is very difficult to adapt to changing situations. The mixture of professional judgement and long term process results may be a compromise to deal with the limitations of the present performance management culture.

The argument for professional judgement is difficult to pursue without appearing to collude with secrecy, institutionalism and professional privileges. So the lack of advocacy for professional judgement could be explained away as the acceptance of the inevitable in the name of change or as suggested above not wanting to appear to defend professionalism. There are some officers who appear to be willing to take the necessary decisions if faced with the option between professional judgement and target setting. This was clearly vocalised by a senior detective stating that during investigation of sensitive issues cost and efficiency becomes a secondary consideration. There is a need for trust to be built into whatever mechanism or combination of mechanisms to be used to deal with performance and in turn accountability. Accountability is mainly about the public trusting the institutions and the mechanisms involved in dealing with their contact. There is the increased possibility of having a performance management system that satisfies the auditors but not the public or the professionals as a result of lack of trust in the system. The use of statutes to drive the actual performance of organisations as opposed to determining the boundaries of performance is new and growing. The government is using the auditing as the reason for all this attention because they have devolved most of the services to local or agency

control. The auditing regime has its foundation in financial regulation and it is necessary for accountability. The strict adherence to this regime on the performance of organisation is bound to cause disorientation because it is strictly based on measurable and what financial value can be attached to.

The police reform agenda stems mainly around police performance and improving of standards by a variety of means. All the external institutions are using performance indicators as the measurement for performance yet the public continues to complain about policing. The criticism made by Oliver (2000) that measurement of policing having no statutory role is being addressed in order to move the argument on. The acceptance of performance indicators as the appropriate tools of measuring performance seems to be increasing. There is consensus on the fact that the police have to account for their work but the contentious issue is how to put it into practice. The senior managers appear to believe that there is nothing they can do about the current climate and the best thing to do is to get on with it. The effect of these developments on the culture of the police is now examined to determine what needs to be done to ensure that the desired outcome is achieved.

An internal Account of the Culture of Senior Managers

The culture of the police has been widely studied and described, but it is difficult to have a single concept that will be universally applicable for all aspects of police culture. This is because of the different working environment, roles and personalities of the people within the organisation. The culture of an organisation is not a static entity but changes regularly and over time. I am not trying to

provide a universal culture that encapsulates all senior managers but examine some of their perceptions in relation to current developments affecting the police to gain an insight into this group of people. This will enable me to assess the outcomes of the new development in accountability and also demonstrate the unforeseen consequences of these developments. The assumption adopted in this study is that senior managers are powerful and influential people within the organisation and as such are subject matter for any research trying to understand how the police work.

There is a perception that they are accountable to the law, their professional judgement and consciences (Reiner 1991). Although he was referring to Chief Constables this view is not far from what operates from senior managers that undertake their role on behalf of the Chief constable. If the belief is that there is need to trust the judgement and consciences of senior managers whilst delivering a service to the public it is essential that the culture in which they operate be examined. The occupational culture within which they operate should illuminate the debate about the development of police accountability.

The area of interest of this section is the perception of senior managers of the effects of changes on the wider societal culture on the police occupational culture. Then, there is an examination of their views to see if there are changes in the power structure within the occupational police culture. Do these changes just happen without changing the make up of senior managers or have they adapted in a chameleon fashion to the new demands and developments. Reiner has already argued that the financial pressure from the centre has pushed all chief constables

in the bureaucratic direction. Stating that they have taken the language and style of professional management theory in order to deal with the demands of the HMI and the external demand for performance indicators. This development is not all one way as there is more frequent use of all these management tools in the running of the police. But as stated earlier the police authorities now have legal control of policing for an area and the chief constables are now operating more like chief executives. The idea of operational independence that is the constitutional preserve of chief constables appears to be debateable since all the financial power stems from the Police Authority. However the criticism of the police still continues, and there is an ever changing search for a solution that appears to elude all that are searching for it.

The change in the culture that seems evident is the reliance of support staff at the senior management level. About a third of all senior managers are support staff and support staff forms 29 percent of the whole staff. The increase in the presence of support staff in senior manager positions has been gradual and now can be argued as having a culture independent of the wider police culture. The views of the whole group of senior managers are used in some cases but the differences between police and support staff are also discussed. This brings in the argument as to whether the police are suffering from the visibility of traditional image of senior police officers by the public. Young (1991) indicated that categories of prestige, power and status are allocated to macho acts. A support staff manager observed:

When I first came here and they did happen to be, I'm rationalising my comment now about things the police know about me, when I first came here there were many more police officers in personnel than there are now, it was commonplace to see male police officers standing with their

arms around young girls, but to actually see them, that does not happen now, there is much less touching of the women by men than there was 5 years ago when I came here.

The ideology of status that exists within a prestige structure is given prominence in the police, and gender is viewed in a specially significant way. The status of a member of support staff within the police is not one that is examined in depth as they are not viewed as actually being part of the power part of the organisation. I will discuss the increasing importance of support staff within the police and the criticism levied against the police might be structural in the role people undertake.

The criticism of the unrepresentative nature of police force was supported by this study in that there was only one female within the group. Further there were no members of an ethnic minority or openly gay members both within the police and support staff members. The fact that very few of those interviewed perceived this as a fundamental problem reinforces the view that their achievement is mainly down to individual ability rather than structural positioning within the organisation.

Young (1991) observed that policemen are overtly and consistently hostile towards women within the police and that the social control of these women is inevitably a burning issue. This hostility is not overtly present in the group of senior managers interviewed but since there was only one to contend with it is difficult to fully deny this observation. The reference to gender within this study is extremely rare and since it is the leadership of the organisation that was being interviewed it raises question as to the representative character of the police even

when support staff are included. The 'new policewoman' described by Young has been unable to filter through the system to become senior managers. The lack of numbers may be an important clue but the lack of progression is even more frightening. There are no female police officers in the senior management team of the force and there is a scarcity of females within member of support staff that are senior managers. The problem is difficult to address if the people in place do not recognise the impact on the whole organisation. A senior manager noted:

I think I am on the police side, in the sense that when I talk to other forces and I have more contact with senior female police officers in other forces than I do in my own force, so I see the void if you like. Not so much on the support staff side because my contact with senior support staff managers tends to be with the one female manager that we've got, so it's not highlighted really, it's more on the police side where I talk to Superintendents in other forces who might be doing a similar job to me, and some of those are female officers. There aren't senior female managers in this force at that level. So if you were going to champion female issues in the force, if someone needs to do that, then we haven't got somebody who might be sufficiently high enough to do that.

The perception exist that only women can deal with women issues and only someone from an ethnic minority can address problems with ethnic minority. This approach to the problem has made the issues regarding gender and race more complex as anyone from this background is perceived as the champion of such issues to the exclusion of what s/he might want to address. The problem also extends to the accepted behaviour within the organisation, a manager observed:

I thought as recently this week I observed something in a group, which was a mixed male and female group, and the minute taker in the meeting, in feeding back what he'd actually minuted, attributed an idea that had come originally from a woman as having come from the man that's thought of it, and the number of times I've heard that, I don't know why but it's almost like I wonder sometimes, and this isn't just about this organisation it is about

the male and female thing, that it's almost that we don't expect to hear anything of value, therefore, we don't hear it.

However, the police are not the only profession with this problem but the difficulty within policing is in the nature of how the police determine the nature of their work. The lack of female champions makes this approach difficult and a manager noted:

The issues have been recognised but how do you take it forward, where would you get the support from, how do you tackle it to best effect without ending up being marginalised. The people who I've spoken to seem to reflect similar things that you wonder sometimes whether what is being felt is real, whether it's imagined, whether you're being a little bit paranoid, over sensitive, you'll definitely be accused of being over sensitive if you raised it.

This approach addresses the overt display of sexism within the organisation but does not address the staff individual beliefs. The fact that this issue is not recognised fully is illustrated by this comment by a senior police manager:

Because of that the way that men in the organisation and perhaps it's more evident here because of the imbalance in terms of the workforce, there's certainly many more senior men than there are women, I think it's perhaps more evident. I think we've got a number of issues, one of which is women don't always realise that they are being treated as inferior for want of a better word, and this isn't always the case, but I have noticed that many of the men, and this does apply to some senior managers in the organisation, will appear not to even hear views that are expressed by women and I find that quite amazing. You hear a view expressed by a woman and then it's ignored, not even considered, ignored.

There is the problem that staff seems to resent the positive action as it is perceived that the gender or racial issue is the driver for the action as opposed to fairness and respect for diversity. Some senior managers are aware of this problem but are not sure that it is a priority as they cannot see the link between performance and service delivery and make up of staff. There was no overtly strong comment about this issue during the interviews. There is now a move to

try and address this by the use of the Gender Agenda group. Some of the most senior officers were conscious of the lack of females and minority ethnic staff but felt constrained by the lack of results through the traditional career paths. The majority of senior managers interviewed did not raise it as an issue of importance but they recognise that it is a problem. There was no champion for the idea of establishing a target for a more representative balance in the make up of the senior managers. There is a need to drive the changes from top down in order to develop the culture within the organisation. Nationally, there have been some developments in the increase in the number of female ACPO officers and a black police chief constable. However, the pace of development through representation will take decades to be more than a drip type change. There have been some developments in the gender area of diversity with the increase of senior police officers but the development is not replicated on the support staff side.

The Supportive Colleague

There is what I term the 'Judas Syndrome' which involves the betrayal of principles or people because there is no immediate gain to benefit the person. This is common when officers are not sure of the thinking of senior officers or colleagues. There are often no full and frank discussions as there is the clear perception that any form of disloyalty will bring about swift retribution. This enables old beliefs and structure to continue and reinforcement exists for all that collude with it. The reinforcement may be positive in the allocation of role or promotion, or negative as the lack of the former examples. A senior manager stated:

I've been used to an environment where a boss said 'jump' and you said 'how high? But we now give a different message out don't we? It's

supposed to be far more democratic but in practice autocracy still reigns and the hypocrisy leaves me feeling disappointed...

This develops and flourishes in an environment where trust is not a fully developed aspect of the culture. Since this involves the people who in the main develop and maintain the culture the study of trust is implicit in the understanding of the culture of senior managers.

There are various definitions of trust. Trust is defined as 'a firm belief in the reliability or truth or strength of a person or thing' or 'confident expectation' (in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary 9th Ed). Good (1998) identifies the issue of trust as based on an individual theory as to how another person will perform on some future occasion as a function of that target person's current and previous claims, either explicit or implicit, as to how they will behave. The aspect of trust that is of interest in this study is that to rely on the other not to penalise as a result of voicing an opinion. This is indirect as you cannot behave in a manner that is open unless there is trust that it will not be held against you. A visible evidence of this is the extent of feedback within the organisational culture.

There is the further genre of this when someone refuses to make comment unless they are directly affected. This is also a learnt behaviour that can be changed only by reinforcements for the development of this type of culture. This is a further extension of the 'covering of your back' that is viewed as essential to survival in the police. The extreme form of this behaviour is deceit to try and gain advantage by lying or uttering falsehoods. Hunt and Manning (1991) operationally defined lies as 'speech acts which speaker knows are misleading or false, and are intended to deceive'. They identified the moral context of lying as

important as its definition may be relative to membership status. Their study concentrated on patrol officers. They warned that organisations may increase its isolation, lose public trust and credibility and begin to believe its own lies. However lying is a feature of everyday living and sometimes the culture plays on what is to be defined as lies. The rationalisation of certain aspects of behaviour on the basis of higher principles allows some people to manipulate the process for personal benefit and to further sinister agendas. The occupational culture can sometimes encourage the lack of clarity and use of derogatory terms.

Managers try to negotiate meaning in the changing environment where demands are made without the necessary resources made available. The managers all gave views that are personal but will fold and not defend the view if reinforcement for that view is not forthcoming or it is a negative one. The excuse used to justify lies is to state that the organisation is being protected. The litigious environment in which we live does encourage the use of lies to defend and limit the anticipated consequences of repercussions. The managers all state that they do give appropriate feedback to people that they manage and paint a picture of good communication. It is accepted that some aspects of policing suffer as a result of financial and central direction but the managers have not been able to highlight the extent of their opposition.

Accepting work without actually knowing the implications for the organisation is common place and as such the prioritisation and politicisation of the role of managers is immense. The fact that there is no definition of what consists of police work and the fire brigade response to the request of the government via the

performance culture has meant the culture of deceit continues to flourish. As Reiner noted the quality of police officers has been steadily increasing in recent years but the demand for the increase in performance seems to point to the fact that increase in the calibre of those recruited may not necessarily be enough to satisfy the critics. He further argued that by blocking promotion opportunities from the ranks would reduce the quality and variety of applicants to routine police work. Although his argument was towards recruitment of the 'officer class' it is still valid to the slimming down of the managerial officers within the police. The increase in the number of support staff within the management has gone largely unnoticed but it has meant that the ability of the police to respond to any form of change has become more cumbersome as the flexibility required does not exist.

The Judas Syndrome is alive and well within the culture of senior managers as it does in the wider police culture. All the managers stated that they will accept feedback but a substantial majority stated that they will not give feedback upwards as a matter of course. The prevailing view is to continue working on and not do anything till there is trouble which means when things go wrong. This is the reactive state of affairs that most of the senior managers alluded to. The lack of time to reflect is allows the 'not dropping into the shit' state of affairs to prevail. The lack of attention to quality aspects of behaviour was also highlighted and the comments by a senior manager illustrated this point:

Some of them do find it difficult to say please and thank you and you've done a good job. It's because 'well, I'm a police officer and I just tell them to do it, don't I'. It's like the army 'What do you mean please and thank you, I've just told you to do a job, I don't have to explain why – just do it. I'm not asking you to think about it, I'm just saying – do it'. I think there has to be an element of that in it, I do believe that. Plus the fact that I think it's also

a case of, and it could be training, it could be down to training, perhaps the police management development training is different from anybody else's management development training, because I would have thought that the typical management development training programme of any organisation would be preaching these sort of things.

The observation from a support staff senior manager seems to expose the gap between support staff and the police. There is a perception by support staff managers that managers that are police officers are abrasive. This perception is reinforced by police officers adopting a particular stance when they get into managerial roles. This can be explained by the fact that this was what always happened and they are not aware of their shortcomings. But one will expect that their behaviour at work will extend back to their personal life and that feedback will be forthcoming from there. The role that they undertake might be perceived as the macho role and they are trying to adhere to the stereotype. Either way the support staff managers and other staff will increasingly give feedback and question senior managers. If the police managers are acting to conform to the role it might explain the 'Judas Syndrome' that involves the inability to risk and trust other senior managers.

There is extensive literature on police rule breaking but the idea of the syndrome described is not necessarily involving illegal activities but what can be defined as unethical behaviour. There are advantages to this structural mode for the police as it makes staff cover their backs and as such a number of decisions are motivated by this aim. This has led to a more process based organisation as trust is not a trait within the system. There is a fair amount of documentation and bureaucratisation within policing as a means of protecting individuals and the organisation. This has the tendency to make the organisation risk averse and

bureaucratic. The pressure of the new developments in accountability and all the bureaucratic procedures involved has increased the process. However, the police seem to think that it can stop this bureaucracy as the recent Task force against bureaucracy tries to address. Waddington (1999) described the police as epitomising bureaucracy by attempting to orchestrate behaviour of police officers through a dense set of rules and procedures. In addition to this is the measurement of these processes that further complicates the issue. The process does help in developing a standard practice but the problem is that we are not dealing with a standard problem and as such the weakness of the system is not identified until after the event. It also relies on the disadvantaged person to complain and be heard. The Lawrence complaint took over six years for the system to recognise that something was wrong. The senior managers were all happy to revert to process for answers and rely on best practice from the police. The move is to search for best in class by attending various conferences, courses and databases. There has been increasing use of division of labour at the senior levels to deal with management. There are various portfolio holders within ACPO to progress this approach. The tendency is for forces to be leaders in the field where they have devoted energy to progress. This usually results from the activities of chief officers within ACPO and other roles allocated to them by government. The senior managers all recognise the Judas syndrome but do not appear to be involved in it but are aware of the negative reinforcement when it is not subscribed to. Some have given examples and sometimes use the description 'out of favour'. There was the feeling of being exposed to legal scrutiny and a number of police managers referred to the pressure that accompanies the performance culture with being held liable legally for decisions. This has led to

the 'covering your back' aspect of the culture to come to the fore, and many respondents refer to the Hillsborough stadium disaster.

Savage and Charman (2000) argued that axiomatic knowledge expressed within the culture of senior management in the police is reinforced by the group elite made up of chief police officers. The idea of constabulary independence and its core assumptions are reinforced by the elites. The reality now is that ACPO now know what the agenda is and are on board with it but negotiating from inside. The senior managers are increasingly finding out that there are national guidelines governing all aspects of policing and the role requirement is being generated from a central point via the route of performance. The new developments are shaping the organisation to be further specialised and better trained. The standard is perceived as what is expected whilst managers are viewing the standards as aspirational. The gap between the two increases as the practitioners fail to keep up with the policy makers. Reiner suggested that a combination of the changing exigencies of large police organisations and pressures from the centre (via performance culture) has pushed chief constables in the bureaucratic direction. This is more obvious as all support staff managers are essentially bureaucrats. What I want to examine now is the role of support staff and the effect on police culture. What is certain is that the police have to be managed and whether it is done by support staff or by police officers each approach has shortcomings and it is the reluctance of government to learn from the past that seems to present us with the same problem over and over with differing solution adopted.

There are implications for the police as a substantial proportion of senior staff are staffed by a group that have different terms and conditions and a different occupational culture from their police colleagues. This area of police culture is put under scrutiny because of the increasingly contribution of support staff to the wider culture under the pressure of the performance culture to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police. This policy has been supported by the Home Office through circulars and drive of the policy of 'civilianisation'. There is the desire now to address some of the problems in policing towards the role of support staff.

Police /Support Staff Dichotomy

There is nothing new in the use of support staff within the police as they were employed in ancillary and clerical posts. The use of civilians in higher and senior management posts is a relatively new phenomenon. The increase in the numbers within the senior management is bound to have an effect on the culture of senior management within the police, except if the people employed are the same as the police officers that were there previously who have since retired as police officers. There is evidence to suggest that this is not a rear occurrence as some of the support senior management staff were previously police officers. It is not surprising that during interview they relied on past experience within the police force and were able to put developments within the police in a particular perspective. They were less likely to be critical of the police/ civilian dichotomy.

The developments in new technologies and policing methods have resulted in an increase of new functions and as a result there is need for more staff. The fact

that police numbers cannot be increased and the specialist demand of the functions have resulted in the increase in the use of civilians. As identified earlier the Chief Officers have become increasingly bureaucratic in order to evidence the performance and use of resources within the police there has been a need to bring in specialist in order to develop the organisation to respond to the requirements from the external stakeholders. The development here is a necessary development. Alongside this development is the idea of replacing police officers with support staff. The argument being that this process will release the officer for front line policing. At senior level the demand for the use of senior police operational officer is very low but when it is required the price for not being available is very serious. The problem is that of risk management as the probability of occurrence is low but the result if there is an occurrence is of high impact and the management of this have been to have senior officers in various other roles that could be called on when there is a demand. The infrequency in the demand for senior police officers to attend incidents has led observers to conclude that there is no need for them. This has essentially led to weakening the psychological and sometimes immediate backup that the police have in operational response. This operational flexibility real or imagined played a role in the culture and as such needs planning to cater for any interference with the status quo.

The retention of senior police managers did not appear to be a problem as they seem to be more stable than senior police officers who tend to change roles quite often. However, this does not seem to increase the confidence of support staff senior managers as one noted:

Where is your authority to do that because they've played this hierarchical game of going up to chief officers to get you know opinion sort of thing, and I think we have that sort of problem that senior police officers don't like the decisions that staff, senior support staff make, 'cos they don't see where the authority is and I don't think, I think the force is coming to terms with that, but I think in both forces I've worked in, that can be a problem.

The positive note of this manager could be as a result of having being in the organisation for a number of years or his expertise is now being recognised. The dichotomy still exists although there are positive actions to deal with this problem as one of the chief officers explained:

One of the important things that we did right from the word go was to make sure that when we brought the chief officer into the chief officer team, that chief officer was not responsible for support staff and I think that's the kind of important because if you do that you tend to get a separation, so that chief officer had a functional responsibility and that included police staff and support staff and we're all the same and therefore at least we set it off in the right vein.

There is recognition on the police side that there can be a problem as a result of the use of support staff and steps are taken to limit the disadvantages of the process.

There is also the view that support staff members do not understand the culture of the organisation and require guidance. A senior police manager stated:

I think it takes quite a long time for a support staff member to understand how the police service actually works and I think there's a degree of almost inbuilt sensitivity to issues that has occurred within the division. This can be misconstrued in the wrong type of way by people because they become too sensitive to it. I don't know whether it's because they see police officers walking round with uniforms on, but if you're new to an organisation, that can be a difficult thing to be accustomed to. But I think as time goes by, support staff members, maybe at a senior level, do get used to the way we try and make decisions very quickly and – how can I put this – I think a lot depends on the sensitivity of the individuals concerned, and whether or not they actually see things that are there or don't is a matter of opinion.

There is no special induction process for senior managers and as a result the member of staff relies heavily on their individual skill to integrate. This reinforces the reliance on the old power biases of the past. Even after being in the organisation for a number of years there is still the reference to the fact that they are civilians irrespective of the issue that is being discussed.

Home Office Circular 105/88 requested forces to 'foster the career development of civilian staff and other aspects of their personnel management'. At the senior manager level the opportunity for career development was virtually non-existent, a senior police manager noted:

Yes, branch to branch and moving upwards in the organisation. The promotion opportunities are not there; the development opportunities to move from row to row are not there because of the way in which are constrained by job descriptions, contracts and things like this. I know to an extent you can get over some bits of those, but the whole range of development opportunities is not there, the same as it is for police officers; so the expectation of what support staff can have and what their needs might be are slightly different to police officers. I think also there is an equal ops issue in parity, in whether we deal even-handedly with police and support staff when we do things, and I think we've got to make sure that when we write things like practice directions that we look at our staff as opposed to looking at police and support staff.

This is mainly due the specialist role undertaken by support staff as opposed to a mainly managerial role. The inability to undertake some police roles make the moving between roles difficult in the way the police is structured as of present. The training for senior managers as an issue is not addressed seriously and as such there is the reliance on experts (support staff) to excuse the need to train and to divert responsibility. The idea is that it is the responsibility of the manager to develop themselves and as such they define their capability. The whole issue of

police training is now being reviewed as the effectiveness of the whole process is being questioned. A support staff senior manager noted:

In terms of culture of the organisation, I mean, there's still some significant pockets of the organisation that sees it as a two tier organisation, that there's police officers and then there's support staff and, and we've just talked about training, er, there is a significant amount of training activity that goes on for police officers, you might argue about how well directed it is and what it actually achieves at the end of the day but, you know, there's a lot of time, effort and resource that goes into training of police officers, there's nothing in support staff or very little other than what's generated by the support staff themselves.

The idea that specialist knowledge becomes obsolete very quickly if not updated is not addressed as the mobility of police managers contributes to the lack of challenging demands on the experts. The evidence of this is the choice of outdated technology and systems even when the financial constraints are taken into consideration. The lack of emphasis on the training of the support staff is a further illustration of the culture that training is done when it is required by statute or as a result of weakness identified from a legal failing within the organisation.

The issue of retention of support staff in senior management within the police has not attracted much comment. In interviews and study of documents did not reveal a problem with retention of senior managers and as such raises the point whether the organisation has recruited the right people or that equilibrium has been reached which means that the support staff are not required elsewhere. The support staff senior managers did not refer to their different terms and condition of employment and appeared content with the status quo even though the availability for development within the organisation was virtually non existent.

This will inevitably lead to complacency that the introduction of support staff was meant to partially address.

The credibility of support staff senior managers with other ranks within the police is not a reality for most operational officers as they do not come into contact with senior managers that often. There is the comment that police officers do respond to the authority of rank but they do not respond to the authority of support staff managers. This can be explained by the fact that if there is no direct supervisory relationship with operational officers, the officers have no perception of who the manager is, unlike a senior police manager who will have a rank that will have a universal recognition within the organisation. The lack of support staff in management positions in the operational arena reinforces this state of affairs. The relationship with other support staff is different as they are more recognised within that hierarchy as most of the support staff is located in clustered areas within the organisation. The isolated support staff member is most likely similar to the police staff in that recognition of the manager will affect the manner of the relationship.

Partnership and Senior Managers

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created the legal framework for partnership working in addressing crime and public disorder. The effect of this is the change in the culture of operational senior managers as being involved with partner organisations more than they did previously. The presence of support staff within the police management has helped the police in dealing with this mandatory methodological approach to the problems of law and order. Charman and Savage

(1999) stated that the 1998 Act places responsibilities on parties associated with community safety to work in partnership with each other in auditing and responding to crime and disorder. This is to promote the community safety agenda that will make the public safe and result in political success for the 'third way' approach to criminal justice. The central pull of all these agenda is balanced with the argument that it is local representatives and professionals that are setting the agenda.

All the operational senior police managers do refer to partners and the leadership role the police have to undertake in dealing with problems at a local level. This has created another tier of accountability which means that the time spent within the organisation by senior operational managers has substantially reduced from the past when this was not the case. This has meant that the demarcation between the support staff and police officer has been reinforced as the basis of this partnership approach is rooted primarily in police officers as opposed to support staff. The extension of this new approach is the increasing importance of the role of local authorities and regional institutions that require police participation. An example of this development is the involvement in the management of major incidents by the local authority. The requirement for specialist advice from the police has meant that senior managers are increasingly involved outside the organisation than within. This has meant the requirement for different skills than were required when the role and scrutiny was mostly within the organisation. The use of Best Value as a methodology and as a performance tool has meant that senior managers have had to keep a watchful eye on other forces performance rather than solely on that of the force.

The issue of partnership working is spreading throughout the organisation and police officers are now working from different partner location in order to increase performance and deliver a quality of life service to the community. The Local Authorities are the biggest partner organisation for the police but in elite policing the Customs, Immigration and NCS have higher profile. This is another example of the central pull for new bodies to address problems at a different level. There are now courses for senior managers to prepare them for partnership working and the CRDPs are an area of focus. There are various strategic groups that sit in order to coordinate local action. All these development in partnership working and the central pull are identified by Savage and Charman (2000) as one of the challenges to the doctrine of constabulary independence. It appears that the police as an independent and free institution is becoming an historical fact as the processes that ensured its survival through policy and practice are being put under pressure from different development that are not part of a single planned attack.

Overview

The culture of senior police managers as stated earlier is not monolithic. The role and the status within the organisation reflect the aspects of culture that is given priority. The operational managers continue to have a culture closer to the wider police one. Support staff and non operational managers are more likely to be parochial about their role and have a decreasing affinity to the wider police culture. This is mainly due to the role that they undertake and the close nature in which they operate.

The cultural emphasis on performance is universal but the reality differs, depending on the accessibility of performance indicator tools to the tasks that are performed. The tasks that are easier to count attract primary attention and once the boundaries are set in relation to targets the process is set. The tasks that are not amenable to this process attract continuing attention as various measures are introduced to reflect performance.

Closely related to the performance culture are the reinforcement tools which include promotion, ridicule at meetings, allocation of roles, commendations and other unofficial acknowledgments. The ethics of the whole process is questionable but the participants, especially those that are in the position to give these reinforcements, do believe in the validity of what they are doing. The subjectivity involved in the allocation of reinforcement tools has led to the use of language as the major currency of the allocation. The performance of senior managers is not visible to their managers and as such they rely on second hand information and as such are more likely to be partial to what they are interested in. The Halo/Horn effect is when an assessor evaluates information in a either positive or negative manner. This effect is more likely to be prevalent in senior manager assessment as the level of information about performance is sparse and sometimes specialised in nature. It is difficult to assess how reliable legal advice is when it is not challenged or open to review. This is true of many aspects of senior management where specialist advice is given and supervision has no specialist knowledge to make an objective assessment. The effect of this on the culture is to make the professional relationship join the private relationship. It is

more difficult to examine a process or culture where most of what is involved is mental exercise. The openness and creativity of debate is stifled by the tendency to acquiesce and conform.

The questions to answer now are, what the implications are for the future of policing, the effect on leadership and creativity to problem solving within the police, the accountability process and the wider society in general.

Chapter Eight

Future of Policing: Reaction or Social Engineering

The environment in which senior managers in the police operate is a changing one. The pace of these changes has been increasing in recent years. This is due to the increasing pressure placed on the police by the demands of the public who have become more sophisticated in their request for explanation. The number of 999 calls have doubled in just eight years. A substantial part of public demand has nothing to do with emergencies or serious crime but is what can be described as quality of life issues like abandoned vehicles, nuisance and request for information. People in the community are ready to question the lack of police response to their needs. They communicate with their local politicians and require action. The current government appear to be responding to these demands by emphasising the customer focus on policing. The development in the debate on police accountability is a move within this wider upsurge in public engagement. The changing environment in which we inhabit as identified by Morgan and Newburn (1997) has made old structures out of date. The mobility of people and the increased globalisation of society put pressure on the police. Also the availability of information as a result of media proliferation and more open government means that the public are more aware. This means that the public can be aware of issues before the machinery of an organisation can decide on the appropriate response. The more information available the ability to benchmark increases. The temptation is to try and improve services by comparing how similar organisations carry out their business. This environment with the increase in accountability has had an effect on the culture of the police. The senior managers do get affected by the process of benchmarking as they are held to account. It is against this

background that I assess the implications of the perceptions of senior managers. I discuss the future tensions and debates in policing as the context to assess the results of my interviews.

Since the completion of the interviews with the senior managers there have been developments that have had a bearing on the culture and management of the police. These developments are changing all the time and some of them are outside the influence of the police. For example the governments move to make the whole government more accountable to the public directly in addition to the already established democratic structures. I focus on some of these developments especially those that have implications for police accountability and police culture and discuss them in relation to the findings of this research. These are dealt with by referring to them as implications for the future. This picture of the future of policing is painted with a view of ensuring that senior managers are ready for the dilemmas of the future.

In discussing the future development it is necessary not to ignore what are the constant themes that form the core of policing as a task. There is a tendency to over-emphasise new developments in a bid to highlight the changes at the expense of continuity. I agree with Newburn's (2003) observations that concentrating on changes in policing might deflect attention from the nature of stability and continuity in policing. I would like to re-emphasise the perceptions of senior managers that the changes are destabilising as a result of the frequency of change. I will approach all these developments as incremental changes and examine the implications for policing but from the perspective of senior managers. The role

that senior managers undertake is relatively the same however, the organisation as a whole as identified earlier faces increasing demands and expectations.

Police Role

The role of senior managers has not changed that much within the organisation but the demands placed on the police from the public, partners, the law and others within the policing family has meant that there is increasing pressure on managers. The incremental changes in policing are more evident at senior manager level because of their exposure both inside and outside the police. The development in accountability has ensured that senior managers are more visible and as a result their decision making takes this fact into consideration. As highlighted in their perception that they feel more accountable to the law and the public for decisions. This is more applicable to senior managers at the delivery end of policing where accountability processes exist. All managers are exposed to the performance management culture and this is used as a driver for change but there are some activities that are invisible to auditing but are essential to the welfare of the organisation. An example is visionary leadership like quality of life policing where the emphasis is on quality that cannot be readily assessed. The long term aspiration is to improve the professionalisation of staff thereby boosting performance but not in a mechanical way. It is more like using macro level analysis to leadership in that emphasis is placed on structures and ethics of staff rather than on micro like the exact number of criminals an officer deal with. The reality is that there is a mixture of micro and macro approaches to planning within the police but the effects on the culture can be immense. The micro approach in relation to performance management means that manager have to concentrate on

the performance of individuals. The variety of roles undertaken by staff means that it is impossible for a manager to know all aspects of those that they supervise. The element of trust then becomes important because it involves making a judgement without evidence and hoping that the worker fulfils expectations or their potential. The influence of culture on trust is important because the historical and organisational intelligence and experience hibernating within the culture influences those that make the decisions. This means that change is very difficult and can only exist when there is overwhelming evidence to challenge the trust that is implicit in certain sections of the organisation. Therefore, in order to effect change effectively within the organisation it is essential to identify these key people prior to them getting into powerful positions and influence their decision making. This can be done by training, exposure to other professionals and development of professional ethics that will improve motivation of decision making.

The latest government approach to policing is articulated in the white paper, *Building Communities, Beating Crime*. The paper restated the primary role of the police as the traditional roles of deterring, detection and reduction of crime. This in turn provides a narrower role for the police that will serve as guidance for managers in the police. The three broad objectives of the paper are:

- spreading neighbourhood policing to every community with improved police responsiveness and customer service,
- modernisation of the police workforce to ensure that the service is fully equipped and able to deliver these changes,

- greater involvement of communities and citizens in determining how the policing in their communities are carried out.

There is a commitment to increase resources in order to enable the reform agenda to have momentum. Bureaucracy is still identified as key blocker to the reform agenda. This theme has been running in all government initiative and there appears to be continuing complaints from professionals about the bureaucracy. There is no concept of the fact that every change requires a bureaucratic process in order to ensure evaluation.

I discuss the results of my interviews in relation to these developing issues:

- Pluralisation of Policing
- Partnership working and Community Involvement,
- Civilianisation,
- Policing and Diversity,
- Police Reform, Operational Effectiveness and Technology.

Pluralisation of Policing

This is a discussion of the wider concept of policing as opposed to the police. The idea of policing is perceived as a wider term that encapsulates the numerous providers of policing arrangements. There is the wider term used by Shearing (1996) of 'security networks' and Loader (1997) concurred by suggesting that what public police do will not amount to the security provisions, as security now includes whole range of new technologies and practices. The levels of policing

and security provisions available are proliferating and putting pressure on the established public police. It is this dilemma that senior managers have to manage in order to be accountable to the public. The increase in the agents responsible for policing arises from two interconnected reasons, they are:

- Increase in demand for policing services,
- Trying to make the public police more efficient.

The increase in demand also includes the demand for a high quality service. The public police cannot cope with the demands from the public and some customers are frustrated. This frustration has led some customers to search for alternatives. These alternatives vary in their services. There are some that have more resources and the ability to concentrate on only a single problem. These are usually professional at what they are doing and can concentrate on the business of policing to the exclusion of other problems in the wider society. They are usually funded by business and wealthy individuals. There are others that are located in the private arena to which the public have access. These are private security guards that operate in the public arena and rely on the public police for access to the criminal courts. Jones and Newburn (2002) have suggested that the decline of certain key secondary social control occupations is partly responsible for gap that private policing are filling.

The dilemma that this development produces is the proliferation of private policing and the effects on public policing. The governance of this private policing and the relationship between each other is a source for concern. Also, the management of their relationship with the public police and where they posited in the planning

process especially with CDRPs in local areas. This is further complicated by the level at which these private policing institutions are organised. There are some that are locally based and others are organised and managed regionally, nationally and sometimes internationally. There is also the possibility of a growing gap between the services provided to the public. The effectiveness of the public police might depend on how they manage their relationship with the other policing agents both private and public. The challenges for senior managers are likely to increase as the development continues. The inability of the public police to provide the services required by some customers has led to the gap being filled by the private sector. These customers are mainly businesses but groups of private individuals are increasingly buying in private policing. This has led to a dilemma of how the public police are to respond to these policing agents. In order to manage the relationship it will be essential to have a working knowledge of the systems outside in order to plan for the public police. The sporadic nature of where all these private police agents are located highlights a problem.

This is an area that police leadership has to address before the agents on the streets start to interact in this arena. There is the practical problem of what to do with the intelligence collected by these private agents and whether the public police can share information. Since they are both involved in policing it will make sense to work together to deliver to the public a high quality of service. This is important in the current policing arena that involves the policing of terrorism. The inability of government to control the location and mobilisation of the private police may make it more difficult to assess the effectiveness of the public police as other forms of policing will influence the general levels of policing in the area.

Senior managers have to be aware of the implications of the effects of private policing on the community and may need to bring them into the planning structure in order to ensure effective accountability. It will also help in dealing with the performance data that now uses the number of households and population to assess information. The relationship with other forms of policing therefore has an impact on the performance data and senior managers have to be aware of this in order to be effective. It is possible that the forces with a working relationship might be able to reduce crime better than the ones that ignore them. The mobility of criminals has made the issue of crime global and less local than it was previously. It is not possible to ignore developments in other policing jurisdiction. Market principles can sometimes be applied to crime as criminals are aware of policing arrangements and will move between jurisdictions in order to achieve the results that they want. Although the type of crime involved is not high in numbers the effects on society can be devastating. Crimes like terrorism, human trafficking, drug smuggling and frauds are examples of these crimes and they require international, national and local responses. The fact that these crimes are not always obvious at local levels until the community witnesses such atrocities means that it is not within the local planning processes. This is one of the reasons for central control and direction in the planning for these crimes. Senior police managers are aware of the risks and dangers associated with these types of crimes and the resources that are required to contain the problem. Local communities are increasingly aware of this pressure and the senior managers have to manage the awakening to the reality that sometimes there is little that can be done until enough resources and expertise are

put into place. It is the management of this reality that can be made easier by senior managers working with partners and involving the community.

Partnership Working and Community Involvement

One of the effects of the performance culture is the importance placed on the managers to know about performance data at the micro level and this has made the leadership role more difficult as the vision is now based on data superimposed from data at a macro level that may not replicate evenly at the micro level. The targets are sometimes ambitious for some forces and easy for others. The partnership working agenda is part of the government's macro approach to crime and as a result there is a need for a joint approach to deal with the problem of crime. There is now a business plan for the Criminal Justice System that cuts across three government departments, promoting a culture of centralisation through the guises of being more effective.

The police have had to operate within a changing partnership culture with a number of new and established partners. The macro analysis of the crime problem meant that agencies within the Criminal Justice System are working closely. Since adopting the National Intelligence Model, the Police invite partners to participate in the strategic assessment to plan for policing. There are also the Crime and Disorder Partnerships (CDRPs) that operate at BCU level. The requirement to work more with stakeholders outside the organisation adds to the dilemma of a performance culture that is more short term in view and puts pressure on long term partnership approaches.

The aspect of this partnership culture is the increase in the involvement of citizen ranging from:

- Neighbourhood Watch Groups,
- Volunteers,
- Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs),
- Crime Reduction Panels,
- Active Communities.

Garland (1996) describes 'responsibilization strategies' in which individuals and organisations outside the state apparatus are encouraged to engage in crime reduction and provide a first line of defence to crime. This is a continuing development and there is a whole area of commercial business involved in providing the necessary material to achieve this strategy of security. This has led to the proliferation of other forms of policing like CCTV, private policing and business watch groups. Jones and Newburn (2002) have argued that the shift from public monopoly to mixed economy of policing provision is not accurate. They identify the increase in demands placed on public police skews the picture as the public police are actually doing more with less resources. The increase in community involvement cannot be denied as it is obvious that it is cheaper to have a reduction strategy in place as well as an enforcement strategy.

The current government's policy of civil renewal relies also on community involvement with social cohesion as a means of delivering. The police are key to the practical implementation of all these ideas and senior managers have to think about developments that are occurring outside their control but have effects on the

organisations performance. The perception of the public at the announcement of any initiative is that they can have immediate access and the expectations generated affects the demands place don the police. It is challenging and the police can undertake the task but what is required is training and development for staff in order to face the challenges.

The senior managers have to manage the pressures that these developments have on the officers and support staff within the organisation. There are no additional resources available for the management of this demand and as such there is bound to be a gap between expectations and what the police can deliver. There is a possibility that the developments around community involvement can alienate the community further if this is not given priority within the strategic planning for the police. The task is not to inadvertently decrease the cohesion in society by policing in a manner that undermines the diversity of the society that we live in.

The implications of all these developments and the implications are captured by Baggott (2004) who argued on behalf of ACPO that:

There is a danger that the burgeoning reactive nature of policing, together with the way in which police performance is measured, could skew police activity away from its essential and evidenced role in social cohesion. Likewise, there is a similar risk that conflicting structures, measurements and initiatives between and within departments, result in the diffusion of effort and focus.

All the performance information provided to the public has not made a huge difference in the way the public view the public services. The public apathy towards politics and government continues to decline and the hard work involved in providing the information and improved participation has not provided dividend in comparison to the price paid in order to achieve it.

However, the public services have responded to publication of performance data in order to ensure that they are not at the bottom of the league tables. One of the benefits of the performance culture is that it has identified some organisations as not performing to standard and resulted in them addressing their performance and service delivery. Although the process has not been successful in delivering the trust of the public it has galvanised the public services and changed the culture to respond to the demands of performance management and benchmarking. The direct cost of the process of performance management is difficult to estimate and there are no studies conducted to evaluate the process. There is a perception among managers that the process has gone too far and it is affecting the overall performance. This is difficult to assess but what is clear is that the culture has been affected and there is a development as a result of the demands of the new arrangements.

The participation of the community in policing is a problem because the process takes time and investment that the police do not have. The police need to be more responsive and they need to have contact with the public in order to know what the public requires and how to engage their help when it is required.

The new white paper focuses on the provision of information to the community as a means of obtaining this goal. A greater participation of Police Authority in the delivery of effective policing within a national arena is also used. They will also hold the chief officer to account and oversee local consultation including the CDRP relationships. There is recognition that not all policing takes place at neighbourhood level and cross border, national and international policing

arrangements will be addressed. This is done by strengthening partnership and ensuring processes to establish units to deal with emerging problems.

The participation of the community in policing addresses the need for democracy in policing and to add to the legitimacy of the police that is perceived as ebbing away in recent years. Loader and Mulcahy (2003) refer to the 'lost faith' in the police by the British public. The concentration on the citizen focus and improvement in service delivery is a means of addressing this 'lost faith'. If the public are not convinced about the improvement in service once again the policy will be counterproductive because it will contribute to a culture of mistrust.

Civilianisation

As already highlighted the number of support staff within the senior management group is a key feature of the subculture of senior managers. Jones and Newburn (2002) observed the data available in Britain and came to the conclusion that there is no dramatic growth in police auxiliaries. The civilianisation of key positions and roles within the police as a policy can be traced to successive conservative governments of the 1980s. The impact of support staff at centre and headquarters is more obvious as they are clustered in the centre. They can sometimes be in position longer than their police officer counterparts and therefore become more powerful as the process is accelerated. The cost argument for the policy is now not as relevant as senior managers are on the same pay as senior police officers.

The professionalism that support staff contribute to the organisation ensures that they are now an established sub culture within the organisation. The inability of

the police to ensure that support staff managers are not recruited from other services is a worrying problem. The trend appears to be that the managers that stay for more than a year tend to stay on for a long period or until retirement. The numbers of posts for senior managers that are support staff are relatively small and the possibility for progression is very limited. The result is that staff retention is going to become an issue in the future if the economy expands and require the skills of managers currently working in the police.

The accountability of support staff is indirect through Chief Officers and the Police Authorities. As demonstrated from the interviews they hardly engage the public directly and performance management appears to be the only practical means of accountability. The legal access is only a theoretical proposition as there is usually no nexus between them and the public. There is still the perception among some managers that they are not actually part of the police despite all efforts by senior police managers to make sure that this aspect of police culture does not continue.

The use of what is now termed as the extended police family such as street and traffic wardens has been increasing. The coordination of these members of staff is now essential in order to achieve the strategic goals of the police. The use of special constables has also increased in profile and there is now payment to members of the special constabulary. There is a changing make up of staff available for deployment.

Policing and Diversity

One of the effects of performance management is the concentration of senior manager's time and effort on the micro information within the organisation. This is because the more the information and data available the more questions are raised about the data. The result is the changing and increasing nature of the data collected. This has led to a bureaucracy in the management of this information and data. There is the advantage of concentrating resources in the areas that are identified as priorities. The choice of the priorities and management information to account for measurement of performance remains controversial. This is inevitable as managers are expected to change to the new mode of thinking even though they have been the advocates of the old modes of thinking. This has the effect of limiting the ability to plan in the long term as the change in emphasis is continuous and regular. The senior managers interviewed perceived that there were too many changes and priorities for the police. This however reflects the diverse nature of the public that requires a sophisticated response to the demands made on the police. The lack of cohesion means that there are different expectations from the public of the police. The result is that any effort to have a single standard of performance is flawed as the public who are the consumers have different expectations from the police. In order to deal with the diversity in performance of the police it is necessary to make the public more cohesive. This however contradicts the society being a diverse one with tolerance as one of the main characteristics.

The issue of diversity is perceived as that of race and as such the point is missed that it is an issue of quality of service to the public. Even though the public have

been made up of diverse people the service delivery has been based on the philosophy that the public are the same. The challenge for senior managers is to recognise the diversity of the public that they deliver to and plan with this as a guiding principle. This will automatically capture the race, gender, age, disability and other diversity issues.

The current policy of creating targets for diversity issues and the use of selected groups to represent each area of diversity is not likely to deliver increase in public confidence if this is not matched by an increase in the service delivered to the public. This problem is already highlighted by the perception that there is an increase in crime although all the statistics on crime suggests otherwise. The need to address the improvement in service delivery is dealt with by the policies on police reform and improvements in operational effectiveness using new technology and new business processes.

Police Reform, Operational Effectiveness and Technology

The government in order to deliver more policing and reduce the fear of crime embarked on a police reform agenda. The Police Reform Act 2002 was the legislation used to bring the aspects of the reform that required change in legislation. The reform was about:

- Modernising terms and conditions of service,
- Focusing resources on core activities such as catching criminals and reassuring the communities,
- Giving the police the tools required for the job,
- Raising standards.

The key aspects of the reform agenda are providing reassurance, tackling criminality, leadership, science and technology, human resources and making it happen. The development in accountability through performance management has focused managers on the demands placed on the police as opposed to what they want to do. The impact of this on the wider police culture has been the adoption of an intrusive supervision in order to achieve the targets that are set. This puts considerable demands on the senior managers to achieve this in practice. A lot depends on the type of work and role that they undertake. The adoption of highly visible policing style in local policing teams meant that officers were less likely to work in teams and the demands of intrusive supervision remains mainly aspirational.

The developments in the professional requirements for operational policing make it difficult for yearly comparison. The example of a fatal road accident will now require family liaison officers and other specialists to attend and deal, even though it used to be dealt with less professionally previously. This has an impact on the resources that at best are diminishing as a result of professional developments. This is also true of criminal investigations in relation to vulnerable witnesses and the requirements to record and retain evidence placed on officers.

There are other developments that are supposed to release resources and help senior managers in managing resources. An example is the introduction of new technology such as the use of computers in fingerprinting identification and also developments in the use of DNA. The Home Office has established a national

DNA database and there are now targets in relation to the time for dealing with offenders with a DNA hit. The existence of organisational and cultural barriers to the optimum use of technology was identified by HMIC (2002). Technology is used to address the problems that confront the police and impacts on effectiveness. Ericson and Haggerty (1997) suggested that information technology has impacted on policing because of the design and implementation of a more coercive technology which is difficult to avoid or bypass. This has resulted in the police providing information for managing risk since they have the wider information about the whole society. It supports Ericson and Haggerty's argument that the public police make wider contributions to the regulation of society through the communication of risk knowledge rather than the traditional law enforcement or order maintenance. The economic principle of Best Value and efficiency savings planning is supposed to contribute to the increase in the effective use of resources. This pressure leads to senior managers looking towards technological change to produce the efficiency savings required. The pressure is for the home office to embark on expensive technological changes because it will involve duplication of resources if each force instigates a project. This will probably lead to an increase in national projects and put on the pressure of regionalisation or nationalisation of the police. Technological changes will affect the culture in which it operates and the introduction of technical solutions will have to be managed effectively by senior managers or the expected benefits will not manifest.

The major challenge impeding development is the problem of bureaucracy that accompanies all the methods of evaluating new policies. The demands for accountability mean that all new policies and procedures have to be evaluated and

the need to be scientific requires data collection. The legal framework within which the police operate also increases the bureaucracy that accompanies new developments. The challenge for senior managers is how to change the culture of the organisation from a risk adverse organisation to one that actually takes considered risks in order to limit the amount of risk passed onto the public. The white paper has concentrated on developing senior managers by ensuring that they receive development in training and also to bring in managers from outside the police to improve the culture. The lack of success in the changing of culture by the increase in the role of civilians does not inspire confidence in the adoption of this idea.

Implications for Police Culture

What is clear from the perception of senior managers is that there is no monolithic description of police culture. The issue of culture is more diverse as you go up the management ladder as the roles and rank begin to have effect on the cohesion of the group. It might appear to outsiders that they are the same but it is clearly obvious that they have different pressures on them and as such behave accordingly. This can be illustrated by the different perceptions of senior managers depending on where they are based that is headquarters or division. It is difficult to describe a culture as dominant within the culture of senior managers as various alliances do exist and rely on the structure of the organisation. It is not unusual to find a support staff manager disagreeing with another support staff manager whilst in agreement with a police manager.

This reinforces what Foster (2003) explains as 'how the nature of particular kind of police work and the environment in which it occurs are vital factors in shaping officers response'. The varying typologies of culture within the senior management make it difficult to categorise the managers. This is because at senior management they sometimes encompass a number of the typologies that are identified within the wider police culture. The dilemma that senior managers face are usually settled by external circumstances like the availability of resources and outside developments such as overcrowding of prisons, football violence, terrorism or riots on the streets.

The senior managers are made up of mainly men (only one female), white and overtly heterosexual, there is no popular perception that there is need for urgent action to deal with the imbalance. I address this issue further in the discussion about diversity. The issues are gender, racism, sexual preference and display of minority agenda. The wider question is whether the culture of senior managers can be changed to minimise the negative aspects of present culture and developing new positive ones. It is likely that the wider culture can be influenced if the culture of senior managers is developed. The idea of change seems to present the idea of having to stop doing what was done in the past for a new and better one. Further Chan (1997) has argued that police cultures are not immune to the external environment and the present prevalence of the performance culture in the psyche of senior managers is an example of this. But Chan had earlier argued that the external climate and management responses were not sufficient to lead to changes in racist and discriminatory practice. This means that influencing the culture of senior managers can sometimes not be enough to change wider police culture.

However, I argue that in order to change organisational culture the senior managers are the locus for change in the wider police culture. It is the leadership qualities that are latent within them that make the group powerful within the organisation. This means that in order to influence the wider culture the senior managers have to be convinced and attempts to leapfrog them to appeal directly to the wider police culture is limited. The limited occasions include the legal modes of accountability where individuals become personally liable.

The major reform advocated in the white paper relies on the senior managers changing established culture within the organisation. The relationship with the public to change to that of a customer is difficult to achieve without fundamental change to police culture that undermine the result of democratic process. The principle of constabulary independence was supposed to address this dilemma and also the legal recognition of the exercise of discretion. The constant review of working practices is putting pressure on practical policing as the speed in which changes occur does not allow the bureaucracy to respond to previous developments/changes. The customer approach will need to be reinforced into the managerial levels as the customer focus is not within routine police action. The lack of customer focus in ordinary day to day management of police work needs to be addressed. The use of civilian senior managers appears successful as their numbers within senior management have increased but the results from the interviews of their police colleagues appear to undermine their credibility within police culture. The expert knowledge that is residual in the group of senior civilian managers makes them key to all the changes that the government are putting into place.

Implications for Police Training

There is a perception amongst senior managers that they do not have time to waste on training because there are practical things to do and as such they do not have the time for training. It is therefore important for senior managers to have been trained effectively before they come to leadership roles within the organisation. The move away from rank based to role based activity training in the police has meant that training is more focused for senior managers. This specialised form of training means that there is a changing content base to these courses which destabilises the single type of culture within the organisation. The empowering style of police leadership training with facilitative techniques in both residential and the work place ensures a variety of approaches to police leadership. The emphasis now being on leaders understanding issues involved in leadership and approaching it from a practical way through case studies and simulation. There is an increasing acknowledgement in police training of the need for differing leadership styles with the ideal officer moving between leadership styles as is required in the field. There is now an emphasis on transformational leadership style as opposed to transactional. This flexible style appears to want the best of the entire world without the downsides. In practice once there is any challenge to one leadership style and this result in any form of negative or perceived negative censure, the safe option is adopted. The culture of the organisation protects that view as the self preservation aspect of the culture comes to the fore. This stifles the ability to take risks and promotes a risk averse leadership style. The perception of senior managers appeared to support this description of the failure of the police to manage change effectively. The wider culture of being risk averse is prevalent within the psyche of police managers. When relating this to the number of ongoing changes

that happened recently it is easy to explain the inability to force change in the police. This means that training of managers has to start from this stand point and prevent managers from adopting the established culture. Since most managers that are in situ were trained under the old structures and probably adopted the style contrary to their natural instincts it is difficult to see how the changes in the police can be practically delivered. In recognition of this problem there has been a move to deal with the problem through improving the skills of managers through structured measurable programmes.

The establishment of the National Competency Framework (NCF) in 2001 was designed to introduce a single framework for the assessment of performance by all those who work within the police service. There are behavioural areas and also role and rank specified activities. The framework is still being implemented and updated. About half the forces in the England and Wales have adopted it and use it for performance management as the basis for PDR. Long (2003) suggested that questions need to be asked whether the discourse of 'competency' is suited to the new shift of 'transformational' leadership. What is clear is that there is a demand for an evidence based objective criteria for the identification, recruitment, selection, development and promotion of staff within the police. The practicality is that there is no time available for the proper implementation of what is required. The gap that exists between what is required and what is practical is getting wider as demands on the police increase at one end. It increases at the other end also because there is a theoretical recognition of the lack of structure and planning for the police and as such more complicated requirements are suggested based on the

ongoing demands that are always changing. The result is the time lag in the delivery and the professional cannot see the relevance of what the training is about.

The task for police training is to deliver to senior managers a substantial and rigorous training prior to getting to post because training whilst on command is very difficult to achieve in practice especially if the culture does not support development through training. There is a need for senior managers to believe in the relevance of training provided but this requires a training environment that is responsive to the needs of the practitioners. The evidence from this study demonstrates that senior managers are not trained effectively prior to taking leadership roles and there is no time available when they are in post. This is because of the reactive nature of policing and the inconsistency of training philosophies.

Legal Implications

The requirement for statute to act as the legal authority in any public authorities' action or decisions that interfere with some human rights of individuals means that practitioners will now look for legal authority before embarking on any action. These changes practice of making decisions on what results is anticipated. The guiding principle is 'do I have the legal authority to conduct a particular activity'.

The idea that a member of the public can access legal recourse through the breach of their human right affects the decision making process. As already argued there is the tendency to be risk averse within the police culture and senior managers are not an exception. There is also a lack of clarity on the legal exposure of partner

organisations if a decision leads to litigation. Senior managers are not individually exposed as they are less likely to deal directly with the public. Complaints are usually policy based and the organisation becomes vicariously liable. An exception to the general trend is the operational commander and Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) that can find their policy decisions reviewed within the confines of a public inquiry. Senior detectives were very conscious of this mode of accountability and as such engage in bureaucratic recording of detail in order to demonstrate their lack of culpability.

Conclusion

This research has examined the effects of the recent developments on the senior managers within a local Police Force and found that there are changes in the perception of senior managers as a result of the performance culture imposed as a result of the government's policy to improve performance. My argument is that the changes in perception can be described as volatile in that managers are always changing their behaviour based on what they perceive is expected of them. I used the Lucas Principle as an explanation of this behaviour and restated the point that it is difficult to predict the way that they will behave because of the inability to predict effectively the government policy.

There is also the perception that the involvement of senior managers in the minute detail of performance hampers their ability to spend time on the structural and systemic issues that affect the police on a macro policy level. Consequently the managers are not able to provide effective leadership as they are concentrating on what individual officers are doing. The involvement of the community through

accountability and accessibility to the police is weakened by the emphasis on the internal structures. This is because there is less time available to interact with the public directly as the time is taken up with internal processes. Conversely, the internal accountability processes are strengthened as the senior managers are more intrusive in their management.

The wider police culture is identified as being influenced by senior managers as they put what is government policy into the language understood by others within the organisation. The increasing influence of support staff has been identified and that the police as an organisation are trying to be open and respond to the demands of the public. The use of performance indicators and data for micro analysis of performance is generally perceived as being used externally rather than for internal management. The use of the data for wider planning is more acceptable but the problems associated with the whole process makes them sceptical.

Finally, the leadership requirements for the police managers in the future is still a dilemma as the role of police is a changing one. The idea that a manager who is involved in dealing with anti social behaviour within the community requires the same training to manage and tackle terrorism at the same time appears to be contradictory. The training implications for the future leaders is complicated by the task of finding a methodology that will be adequate in identifying the abilities and skills required to deal with the complicated demands that face the police. The emphasis on development of generic skills has been found to be short of what is required and has not prepared the current police managers for the role that they undertake. There are always ongoing changes in the police because of changes in

the wider society that requires an updating of the role of the police. This is nothing new as a process but the substance is always changing. This will always attract comments of everything changing when what is happening is a creation of a new phase, as old and new ideas interact and a new one emerges.

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Police Reform Act 2002

Appendix

Interview Topic Guide

Questions relating to Thesis

Personal Information:

Length of Service, tenure and any other outside organisational experience. Number of people supervising; directly and indirectly, Personal Objective and personal details willing to be discussed.

What are the Organisational Objectives:

How do you become aware of the organisational objectives, what are they?

What role do you play in the development of these objectives?

How do you prioritise the activities you carry out to meet the organisational objectives

How do you go about achieving your objective?

Is there any relationship between your personal and organisational objectives?

Do you evaluate what you are doing and how?

Perception as to measurement/evaluation:

How do you differentiate between the performance of the staff you supervise?.

Do you try and identify performance variation and how do you address the result.

How do you know when there is a bad performance?

How do you assess your performance?

What is the performance culture?

Performance Indicators:

What do you understand as PIs?

What is the role of PIs in your planning?

What is the utility of PIs?

How relevant is PIs to the role you perform?

Do you use an alternative to PIs?

What exactly does PIs allow you to achieve?

Change of Direction:

How do you signal a change in direction towards a new organisational objective?

How do you know whether what you want is being achieved.. Compliance check.

Do you think it is necessary to check on progress once the intention for new direction is conveyed?

Accountability and Control:

Are you aware of the legal implications of actions taken when you carry out your role?

Do you justify the actions of the staff you supervise?

Do you feel responsible for the work of the staff you supervise?

What steps do you take to limit your responsibilities?

Are you assessed on the basis of the performance of your team? (Probe)

Do you inspect your team or wait for complaint to come?(Proactive or Reactive)

Training:

Who determines your training needs?

How useful is the training department in increasing your skills and professional development?

What is the utility of the training department?

Do you have a skills audit?

Questions Relating to Internal Organisational Development**Equal Opportunity and Awareness of Discriminative Practices:**

How do you recognise discrimination in the work place?

What training have you had in relation to equal opportunity?

Are you aware of the legislation in this area?

Are you confident in dealing with issues in this area?

What is your perception of support staff /police officers?

Any other issues that you want to raise