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Hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interaction as a challenge to regional organizational actorness and coherent collective security cooperation: a case of Nigeria, France and ECOWAS

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my late parents (Akolga and Cecelia), my late uncle (Akolgiyire) as well as Akentota.

Acknowledgements

Contents

Abstract

This thesis examines the challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, in manifesting actorness and in coordinating and owning West African sub-regional collective security. These issues are considered via a theoretical examination of the concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony and an empirical assessment of their application to the West African context. The main hypothetical claim that the thesis seeks to test is that the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interaction of Nigeria and France has undermined ECOWAS' ability to coordinate and own sub-regional collective security.

In order to undertake this analysis, the thesis takes existing theoretical frameworks of hegemony/counter-hegemony and actorness and refines and applies these to the West African context. Specifically, its framework of hegemony/counter-hegemony is tested against Nigeria and France, the two leading state actors in West African security governance, whilst the actorness framework is tested against ECOWAS. Using a grounded theory and case study approach, the thesis draws on data collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews, documentary analysis, and secondary literature. The main argument is that ECOWAS has demonstrated growing actorness in and ownership of sub-regional collective security, but that in both of these regards it is hindered by the interaction of Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony and France's extra-regional counter-hegemony. With particular focus on institutional penetration as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, the thesis further argues that Nigeria's sub-regional hegemonic influence emanates from the ECOWAS, through Abuja's smart power approach to sub-regional collective security. On the other hand, France's counter-hegemonic influence in African security governance emanates mainly from the UN, which limits its recognition in the sub-region, hence, its ascription as an extra-regional counter-hegemon. The thesis finds that whilst Nigeria's hegemony enhances ECOWAS actorness and ownership of sub-regional collective security, France's counter-hegemony remains largely state-centric and has thus undermined ECOWAS' collective security actorness and ownership. The thesis concludes that its main hypothetical claim is proven on the basis that France's state-centric approach has not been compatible with ECOWAS' collective security agenda which seeks international cooperation under the leadership of ECOWAS.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis analyses the challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in coordinating sub-regional collective security cooperation and its ownership. This is addressed relative to extra-regional state powers' interests in the security governance of the sub-region. The main argument is that the interaction between Nigeria and France has been pivotal in determining the politics of the sub-region and for that matter, ECOWAS' ability or otherwise to own and coordinate sub-regional collective security. Collective security ownership implies the ability of ECOWAS member states to deal with West African security challenges from within or in collaboration with external actors, without compromising the endogenous approaches of the sub-region.

In order to examine these issues, the thesis uses the concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Whereas the concept of hegemony is widely debated in the literature of international relations, counter-hegemony is less established. Counter-hegemony is therefore developed and applied simultaneously with hegemony in this thesis. This is meant to address the peculiar case of West Africa, where Nigeria's hegemonic claims from within West Africa are uncontested, given that it is far ahead of all other states on all power indicators. However, its claim is countered by France as an extra-regional state power with hegemonic interest in the sub-region; France is therefore designated as a counter-hegemon on the basis that it is the leading extra-regional state with influence in the sub-region. However, before Nigeria's hegemony and France's counter-hegemony are substantiated any further relative to ECOWAS' actorness on sub-regional collective security and ownership, we need to first consider the thesis aims, objectives, questions, and hypotheses, inter alia, that guide the research.

1.2 The thesis: purpose, hypotheses and contribution

This section of the thesis introduction articulates: the aim and objectives of the research project, the research questions, and the hypotheses. The section also articulates the thesis' claim to originality and, by implication, its contribution to knowledge in the field of international politics.

1.2.1 Aim and Objectives

The aim of this research is to develop appropriate theoretical conceptions of hegemony, counter-hegemony and actorness, which, when applied to West Africa, help explain the sub-region's collective security challenges, especially in the face of the growing actorness of ECOWAS. In order to realise this aim, the project pursues the following inter-related objectives:

- ✓ To develop a theoretical framework for understanding, and criteria for determining hegemony and counter-hegemony and their inter-relationship;

- ✓ To develop a theoretical framework for understanding, and criteria for determining actorness;

- ✓ To apply the above theoretical frameworks and criteria to the West Africa sub-region; and

- ✓ To ascertain how much counter-hegemony has impeded the development and coordination of West African collective security under ECOWAS.

1.2.2 Research Questions

To achieve the above objectives, the thesis seeks to answer the following core research question: to what extent does Nigeria's hegemony enhance ECOWAS actorness and ownership of sub-regional collective security and, conversely, does France's largely state-centric counter-hegemony undermine these things? Pursuant to this, a series of separate but related research questions are considered, specifically:

- ✓ What are hegemony and counter-hegemony relative to international cooperation?

- ✓ How do hegemony and counter-hegemony manifest in the context of West Africa?

- ✓ What is the concept of actorness?

- ✓ Is the ECOWAS an actor?

- ✓ How has Nigeria's hegemony enhanced ECOWAS' collective security actorness?

- ✓ How has France's extra-regional counter-hegemony impeded ECOWAS' collective security actorness?

1.2.3 Research Hypotheses

In addressing the research aim, objectives and questions, this thesis has sought to test the following hypotheses:

- ✓ The hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interaction of Nigeria and France has undermined ECOWAS' ability to coordinate and own sub-regional collective security.
- ✓ Nigeria's hegemony brings about sub-regional security cooperation and ownership under ECOWAS' actorness.
- ✓ France's extra-regional counter-hegemony impedes sub-regional collective security cooperation under ECOWAS' actorness.

1.2.4 Originality and contribution to knowledge

The thesis' claim to originality centres on a number of grounds. First, the thesis is built on a six-point hegemonic criteria framework developed out of John Hobson's five-point framework.[1] This broadens our understanding of the concept of hegemony and for that matter, counter-hegemony. As part of the thesis' contribution to knowledge, it is argued that contrary to the view that liberalism is a mandatory component of hegemony, as espoused by Hobson in his criteria, what is realistically lacking is consent in hegemonic aspirants' international engagements with less powerful states in a given region. The addition here is that different aspirant hegemons could have different visions that they seek to spread, of which liberal values is only one. The thesis also contributes to the debate on the scope of hegemony. This thesis argues that hegemony can only be a regional phenomenon and not global, hence challenging the widely held view of global hegemony. The contribution to knowledge stems from the argument in this thesis that global hegemony is limited not only by the challenges in manifesting coercive power extra-regionally, but also by a challenge of embedding a state's vision and ideas in other states outside of its region. This is demonstrated relative to West Africa, where an extra-regional counter-hegemonic vision has so far failed to be a hegemonic vision. This is not because of limitation in coercive power from extra-regional counter-hegemony but because of the prevailing internal hegemonic vision.

Crucially, the application of the concept of counter-hegemony is another claim to originality. Unlike hegemony, counter-hegemony is rarely used in the literature. Hence, here, it constitutes an addition to the theoretical literature in the field of international politics. The concept was first used by Gramsci but less developed unlike hegemony.[2] It

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[1] J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations* Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[2] A. Hunt, 'Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies'. *JL & Soc'Y,* 17, (1990), 309.

was later used by Robert Cox and like Gramsci, he focused on capitalist hegemony and socialist counter-hegemony.[3] This thesis develops the concept and applies it to explain international politics, specifically, challenges to regional organisational actorness. The study of regional organisational actorness challenges emanating from the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interactions relative to ECOWAS is empirically novel given that the organisation's actorness in this regard has rarely been tested in the academic literature. The thesis also exhibits empirical originality, and hence a contribution to knowledge, through the primary data obtained through interviews and primary documentation.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

In order to analyse the key issues in the thesis referred to in the introduction and to answer the research questions, three main theoretical concepts will be developed and applied in this thesis, namely: hegemony, counter-hegemony, and actorness.

Hegemony remains a largely contested concept in international relations discourse. The contestation stems from one main sticking point: what makes and sustains hegemony? The general reference point is power, which makes it possible for one state to dominate the other in terms of influence.[4] However, this does not end the controversy because power itself is characterised by different views relative to what it means and for that matter, the kind of power that defines hegemony. Even though there are different dimensions to the debate on power, this thesis focuses on the dichotomy between hard or material power and soft or relational power. This choice serves the purpose of using power to understand hegemony. This is because the debate on the concept of hegemony is mainly between coercive power and a combination of consent or what is lately termed soft power and that of coercive power.[5]

Hegemony, from the perspective of this thesis, occurs when soft and hard power are disproportionately combined to favour soft power. This is in line with Antonio Gramsci's notion of the concept. Gramsci is the name associated most closely with hegemony, after he used the concept to explain hegemony of a social class in society. For

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[3] R. W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method'. *Millennium,* 12, 2, (1983), 162-175.
[4] M. Beeson and R. Higgott, 'Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Comparative Historical Perspective'. *Third World Quarterly,* 26, 7, (2005), 1173-1188.
[5] G. Dirzauskaite and N. C. Ilinca, 'Understanding "Hegemony" in International Relations Theories'. *Development and International Relations Aalborg University,* 18, (2017).

Gramsci, a social group manifests hegemony in two ways: first as domination, second as 'intellectual and moral leadership.'[6] From this viewpoint, he explained hegemony as not just dominance by coercive power but also consent. According Gramsci, hegemony ought to be won by consent combined with coercive power. He qualified his notion of coercive power arguing that it is only applied when it is legitimate.[7] This is the notion of hegemony that informs this thesis.

In view of the fact that Gramsci focused more on hegemony at the intra-state level, and given that this thesis looks at hegemony from an international perspective, a neo-Gramscian view of the concept is applied. Neo-Gramscism is associated with Robert Cox who builds on Gramsci's notion of hegemony and applies it to international relations. Like Gramsci, Cox explains hegemony based on persuasion and coercive power. Even though Cox sees hegemony at the international level as an avenue through which institutions advance the interest of the hegemonic state, he acknowledges the need to consider common interest in pursuit of a particular international order by a hegemon for cooperation to be unhindered.[8] Sezai Ozcelik explains neo-Gramscian hegemony as introducing ideas and institutions and places emphasis on ideas or soft power in evaluating international behaviours of states. In effect, this approach is about how a hegemonic idea (vision) defines a state's actions and explains its policy making choices.[9] Understanding hegemony from this perspective will help us situate the respective foreign engagements of Nigeria and France in their hegemonic and counter-hegemonic pursuits in West Africa.

From this broader international perspective of hegemony, this thesis begins with John Hobson's five-point criteria on what makes a state a hegemon.[10] Hobson's approach is, however, refined and developed into six criteria. The claim of Nigeria's hegemony is tested against these criteria, namely:

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[6] A. Gramsci, 'Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Ed. and Trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith'. (1971). p.193

[7] Gramsci, 'Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Ed. and Trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith'.

[8] R. W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method'. *Millennium,* 12, 2, (1983), 162-175.

[9] S. Özcelik, 'Neorealist and Neo-Gramscian Hegemony in International Relations and Conflict Resolution during the 1990s'. *Ekonomik Ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi,* (2005).

[10] J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations* Cambridge University Press, 2000).

- Material power: *Such power can be said to exist when a state is considered among the top ranked powers militarily and economically in a given region;*
- Vision: *a stated anticipatory end result of an agenda embarked upon by a state with strategies for its execution through a gradualist approach*;
- Willingness: *a show of commitment not only by pronouncements but backed by policy and manifest action in pursuit of a vision(s) through cooperation;*
- Beneficence: *leadership shown by commitment to common concerns of the regional system in many ways but particularly material commitment that manifests sacrifice to promote soft power*;
- Recognition: *the manifest or tacit acceptance of the hegemonic status of a hegemonic aspiring state by key members of the international system* (region); and
- Institutional Penetration: *the existence of an international institution solely or jointly initiated by the hegemon whose acceptable vision is manifestly embodied in the institution in which it participates*.

This thesis proceeds to define a hegemon (state) and in doing so, it acknowledges the challenges in having a universal definition of a region.[11] This acknowledgement is based on the claim in this thesis that hegemony can only be a regional phenomenon, as the next section will argue. Based on this premise, a hegemon is defined as *a state which, in relation to a reasonably defined region, exhibits an unmatched combination of Material Power, Vision, Willingness, Beneficence, Recognition, and Institutional Penetration. The state in question may be located within or outside of the region in question.* In relation hegemony, a significant (though not necessarily leading) level of material power is necessary, but it is the non-material factors of vision, willingness, and recognition (of a state's hegemony) that are crucial. Specifically, the state whose vision prevails relative to would-be hegemonic competitors, will ultimately determine hegemonic status.

Having briefly set out what hegemony means for application in this thesis, it is important to point out that the geographic scope of hegemonic influence internationally is not settled. The divide on the scope of hegemony is between global and regional. The literature on hegemony largely centres on global hegemony, with the USA often being

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[11] See Chapter Six (section 6.2.1)

referred to as the global hegemon.[12] However, hegemony on a global scale is questioned in this thesis with the argument that hegemony is only achievable at a regional level on two grounds: first, that global dominance militarily in terms of winning all wars decisively, is not possible.[13] Secondly, it is relatively easier to influence a region or sub-region with a set vision than influencing the entire world. For instance, as will be seen in Chapters Six and Seven, there are factors that bring states within a given geographic area and beyond together, making it relatively much earlier to propagate a given vision.[14] On this basis, hegemony is able to bring about cooperation at the regional level, unlike any such attempt on a global scale.

1.3.1 The concept of counter-hegemony

Hegemony and counter-hegemony are closely related but nevertheless distinct. Whereas a hegemon owns the prevailing ideas or common sense, a counter-hegemon proposes an alternative. In this thesis, counter-hegemony is also explained using Antonio Gramsci's conception of it. Gramsci used the concept of counter-hegemony to explain the relationship between capitalist hegemony and socialism. He argued that socialism could eventually overtake capitalism through counter-hegemony.   In elaborating on counter-hegemony, Gramsci argues that a hegemonic class pursues and maintains hegemony through an intellectual group that he referred to as traditional or institutionalised intellectuals.[15] Gramsci explained counter-hegemony by noting that another group, which he referred to as the organic intellectuals,[16] form ideas or what is termed in this thesis 'vision' and will eventually build on its ideas to demand a change of the status quo, once a certain momentum is built. The counteraction between the organic intellectuals' alternatives and the hegemonic class' prevailing common sense is what Gramsci referred to as counter-hegemony.[17]

The concept of counter-hegemony implies that hegemony is always under a sort of threat. There are always those who disagree with the hegemon and will make efforts to

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[12] R. Falkner, 'American Hegemony and the Global Environment'. *International Studies Review,* 7, 4, (2005), 585-599.

[13] J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001).

[14] See Chapter Six (section 6.2.1)

[15] These are institutions such as universities and lecturers that propagate the view point of the hegemonic class.

[16] These are the technical personnel of the working-class of society.

[17] W. K. Carroll, 'Crisis, Movements, Counter-Hegemony: In Search of the New'. *Interface,* 2, 2, (2010), 168-198.

take over hegemony. Even though a hegemonic power can and ought to facilitate friction free regional governance, given that it has won the attraction of the majority, it may be obstructed by minority dissenters if counter-hegemony is triggered. This can make cooperation in a given setting quite challenging, given that a counter-hegemon ought to have some degree of support from member states, which are often divided between the counter-hegemon and the hegemon. Based on the similarity between hegemony and counter-hegemony, the concept is measured in this thesis in terms of the extent to which a counter-hegemonic state compares with the hegemon, based on a cumulative effect of the six-point criteria of hegemony articulated above. This is driven from Gramsci's notion that counter-hegemony is triggered when a social class (or a state, for the purpose of this thesis) is convinced that it has what it takes to topple the prevailing common sense. Accordingly, in this thesis, a counter-hegemon is defined as *a state which, in relation to a reasonably defined region, offers a credible competing combination of: Material Power; Vision; Willingness; Beneficence; Recognition; and Institutional Penetration and seeks to replace the existing hegemon within the region in question. The state in question may be located within or outside of the region in question.*

In relation to counter-hegemony, as with hegemony itself, significant (though not necessarily leading) material power is required, but for a state to be categorised as a region's counter-hegemon it is, once again, the non-material factors of vision, willingness, and recognition (of a state's hegemony) that are crucial. Specifically, a state whose vision contrasts with the existing hegemon's vision will be the counter-hegemon, even if the overall objective (e.g. regional development or solidarity) is the same. So, for example, whilst both Nigeria and France might be said to have a vision for West Africa which involves increased regional prosperity and peace, it is Nigeria's multilateralism Approach combined with near-universal acceptance of this by other West African states, which marks it out as West Africa's hegemon. In contrast, France's bi-lateral and pro-Francophone ethos and approach, and the far more limited acceptance of this across the sub-region, relegate it to the status of counter-hegemon.

As the above definition indicates, a counter-hegemonic state can be from within a region or from outside of it. The latter is termed an *extra-regional counter-hegemon.* This notion of counter-hegemony is particularly important in the West African context. This is a situation where hegemony is sought by an extra-regional state power in a region or sub-region already under hegemonic influence. It is argued in this thesis that extra-regional counter-hegemony can be possible based on an intrinsic historic link that has

brought about an enduring relationship between an extra-regional hegemonic-seeking state and states of the region in which it seeks hegemony. In the case of West Africa, colonialism and later neo-colonialism are argued to be the conduit through which extra-regional counter-hegemony is sought. Neo-colonialism is defined as *all forms of post-colonial influence that a former colonial power wields over former colonies that manifest asymmetric power relations.* This is the situation where the less powerful accepts the more powerful state's wishes in negotiations because of weak bargaining power.

It is important to recognise that what is termed in this thesis as 'hegemony' and 'counter-hegemony' is, for some other scholars, termed 'hegemonic rivalry'. This term is used, similarly to counter-hegemony in this thesis, in relation to challenges to an existing hegemony in a given international setting.[18] This understanding of hegemony suggests that there are two hegemonic powers with equal hegemonic influence in a given region, or alternatively that there are two hegemonic powers in two regions or sub-regions with hegemonic interest in a broader international setting, region or sub-region. For reasons which are elaborated on at length in the chapters that follow, this thesis rejects the notion of hegemonic rivalry, arguing that within a specified region or sub-region, only one state can enjoy hegemonic status.

It follows that, in relation to the West African setting, the focus of this thesis, use of the term hegemonic rivalry would presuppose that the sub-region is subdivided into two, whereby Nigeria is the hegemonic power in Anglophone West Africa and France the hegemonic power in Francophone West Africa. Contrary to this perspective, this thesis opts for the terms hegemony and counter-hegemony on the basis that the West African sub-region is most appropriately viewed as a single sub-regional setting which has one hegemonic power. This claim to singularity is exemplified by the ECOWAS organization. As explained in the thesis, within this single sub-region, even though France has significant influence amongst Francophone states, Nigeria is considered, even by these states, to be the sole hegemonic power of West Africa. This is especially so given the pivotal role of ECOWAS across the Francophone, Anglophone and indeed the Lusophony

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[18] S. R. Lefevre, 'Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age: Lebow, Richard Ned and Barry S. Strauss, Eds.: Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 295 Pp., Publication Date: April 1991'. *History: Reviews of New Books,* 21, 1, (1992), 43.; Also see:E. Weede, '12 Future Hegemonic Rivalry between China and the West?'. *The Future of Global Conflict,* 49, (1999), 244.; H. Hveem, 'Hegemonic Rivalry and Antagonistic Interdependence: Bilateralism and the Management of International Trade', *First Pan-European Conference in International Studies, Heidelberg, September.* 16-201992).

states that the organisation comprises.[19] It is thus concluded that hegemony and counter-hegemony best explain the case of Nigeria and France vis-à-vis ECOWAS and the West African sub-region more generally.

1.3.2 The concept of actorness

This thesis puts into perspective what the concept of actorness means with respect to regional or international bodies. While the concept of actorness will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six, at this stage, we only need to understand in brief the criteria adopted to explain ECOWAS' actorness as a sub-regional body. The concept as far as this study is concerned is the ability of an entity to demonstrate three criteria, namely, *autonomy, recognition, and capacity*.

First, *autonomy*, is said to exist when an entity is able to put in place administrative structures that encompass functioning legislative, executive and judicial arms. Besides, the functioning of these arms of governance must demonstrate the entity's supra-nationality, whereby member states align their respective state institutions to those of the regional entity. The second criterion is *recognition*. This complements autonomy because one of the means to determine supra-nationality is by assessing the extent to which member states recognise an entity's authority emanating from its autonomy. However, from the perspective of this thesis, internal recognition, though most important, it is not sufficient. Therefore, an entity must be recognised beyond its domain of influence by both states and non-state actors with respect to what it purports to do. Evidence of this must be manifested through collaboration between the actor and those that recognise it.[20] Finally, *capacity*: from the position of this thesis, the preceding two criteria do not give a full understanding of actorness. Before autonomy of an organisation can be said to exist, there is, first of all, the need for personnel to operate the administrative structures and to formulate the needed policies. Secondly, there is the need for material resources, specifically financial resources, to execute policies. Both make it possible for the organisation to act in line with its values and interest and not to be unduly influenced from outside, which can undermine autonomy.[21]

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[19] See Chapter Seven for details.

[20] F. Mattheis and U. Wunderlich, 'Regional Actorness and Interregional Relations: ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur'. *Journal of European Integration,* 39, 6, (2017), 723-738.

[21] T. Gehring and S. Oberthür, 'Organizations as Corporate Actors in the International System: Conceptualising the EU as a Corporate Actor in International Negotiations and Regimes'. (2010).

From this background, actorness is defined and applied throughout this thesis as: *an entity's ability to manifest its identity, aims, and objectives through demonstrable and exercisable autonomy, recognition and capacity.* Building on this actorness framework, this thesis considers whether or not international organisations – specifically ECOWAS – can be actors in the international system.[22] As will be argued in this thesis, such organisations can be – and ECOWAS is an – actor(s) given the influence on state behaviour and growing role in international politics that they/it has.[23] It is, thus, further argued that hegemony as developed in this thesis (consent based) can be a catalyst to regional organisations' growing independent actorness.

However, the thesis adds that, in view of the fact that state actorness still prevails at all levels, an interaction of hegemony and counter-hegemony, particularly, extra-regional counter-hegemony, can have an impact on regional organizational actorness. In other words, once there is counter-hegemony, consensus building becomes challenging, which can lead to cooperation challenges. These potential challenges emanating from hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interaction are, therefore, the focus of this thesis. Sections 1.4 to 1.8 of this chapter now apply the theoretical concepts outlined above to the West African sub-region. In effect, these sections provide a brief summary of the arguments that will be developed in greater detail throughout the remainder of this thesis.

1.4 West African politics vis-à-vis hegemony and counter-hegemony

The West African sub-region was colonised by three European imperial powers, namely, Great Britain, France and Portugal. However, whereas Portugal no longer wields significant influence over its former colonies in the sub-region, Great Britain and France - still two of the world's most powerful global state actors - do, albeit in varying degrees and through different approaches. The difference in the extent of influence between France and Great Britain is seen in their respective attitudes to Africa, which in turn are largely attributable to their approaches to and experience of classical colonialism and decolonization respectively.[24] As this thesis will demonstrate, colonial history still has a significant bearing on the dealings between West African states and their former colonial

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[22] In the literature, West Africa is variously described as a region or sub-region. But throughout this thesis, sub-region is used because of its collaborations with the continental body (AU) despite being independent.

[23] F. Söderbaum and B. Hettne 'Regional Security in a Global Perspective', Anonymous *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture* Routledge, 2016), 33-50.

[24] Interview with Kwasi Pratt

masters, particularly France. While France largely deals with its former colonies on a bilateral basis,[25] France's pronouncements on its relation with Africa suggest a shift from bilateralism to multilateralism and indeed, a reduced influence. For instance, according to Richard Moncrieff, when Nicolas Sarkozy came to power in 2007, he promised to put an end to what he referred to as post-colonial France's obscure practices or relation with Francophone Africa and for the purpose of this thesis, West Africa.[26]

However, France's recent engagement with the West African sub-region does not support this claim, nor does similar reassurance from subsequent French leaders.[27] For instance, Borchers cites Stefan Brune, an expert in France-African relations, as having argued that Paris' link with Francophone Africa remains a strong one. This is in spite of France's claim of a changed attitude to Francophone West Africa.[28] The same cannot be argued about Great Britain. Christopher Clapham argues that Britain did not show keen interest in maintaining strong relationships with its former colonies. He added that London only maintained what he termed as immediate post-colonial responsibility.[29] Taking into consideration France's attitude to the sub-region, as will be further shown in Chapters Five and Eight, it is argued in this thesis that Paris' involvement in West African politics is second to none.

The extra-regional power manifestation or hegemonic interest in West Africa by France has happened in the face of Nigeria's status as the hegemon of West Africa. The expectation would probably be for Nigeria to be ascribed as the counter-hegemon, in view of the fact that France's influence in the sub-region predates Nigeria's statehood. However, from the perspective of this thesis, the application of hegemony and counter-hegemony to the case of West Africa takes into consideration Nigeria's immediate show of interest in West African hegemony after independence. The key point that buttresses Nigeria's hegemonic ascription is the formation of ECOWAS under its instigation, mainly for collective action purposes that included all three main lingual divides

[25] Field interview with Kwasi Pratt
[26] R. Moncrieff, 'French Africa Policy: Sarkozy's Legacy, and Prospects for a Hollande Presidency'. *South African Journal of International Affairs,* 19, 3, (2012), 359-380.
[27] A. Chassany *Macron Promises Africa an End to French Meddling. .* Available online: https://www.ft.com/content/f648f248-d44a-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44 [Accessed 14/7/2018].
[28] J. Borchers *Why are Ex-Colonies in Africa so Important to France?* Available online: https://allafrica.com/stories/201705050790.htm. [Accessed 19/05/2018].
[29] C. Clapham, 'UK-African Relations: The Background to Labour's Africa Policy', Centre of African Studies, University of Cambridge), 1-42014).

(Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone) for deliberations on common concerns of the sub-region.[30] Nigeria's ability to achieve this is one of the biggest indications of its hegemonic status in West Africa. Nigeria's immediate post-independence hegemonic quest was to correct some of the colonial legacies of the sub-region mainly the division along colonial lines. Nigeria may be facing counter-hegemony and by implication having passive commitment from some member states to its vision. Nevertheless, it remains a hegemon, given that hegemony is not only about getting active participation from all member states in an international setting, as some may participate passively according to Gramsci.[31]

Besides the former colonial powers' involvement, what further complicates West African politics is the manner in which other great power state actors that have no colonial history with the sub-region, most notably the USA, have become involved in West African politics. The USA actively sought to accelerate the process of decolonization in Africa as part of its own global hegemonic ambitions.[32] By implication and taking into consideration its engagement with the sub-region subsequently, it is argued in this thesis that Washington's interest in West African independence meant that it had an interest in post-colonial West Africa as part of expanding its influence. Similarly, although only in more recent decades, the People's Republic of China and other emerging or re-emerging powers such as India and Russia have also sought to influence West African politics. This gives a picture of the extent to which external influence impacts on nearly all aspects of West African politics, but specifically and for the purpose of this thesis sub-regional security governance.[33] The question one asks is how does this impact on West African collective security vis-à-vis ECOWAS' quest to own it?

It is argued here that the ties that extra-regional powers have with the sub-region have been intensified by acute security threats in the sub-region in recent years. These prominently feature the USA and France as they show their hegemonic interest in the sub-region. The two states are of the view that West African insecurity could have global

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[30] B. Zagaris, 'The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): An Analysis and Prospects'. *Case W.Res.J.Int'L L.,* 10, (1978), 93.
[31] See Chapter Three (section 3.4)
[32] E. Nwaubani, *The United States and the Liquidation of European Colonial Rule in Tropical Africa, 1941-1963* Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2003).
[33] A. Musah, *West Africa: Governance and Security in a Changing Region* International Peace Institute, 2009). p.1

ramifications, hence their interest in the sub-region. For instance, according to Cyril Obi, the continuing violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, particularly the attacks on oil production facilities, the abduction of expatriate workers in the oil sector, and attempts by militant groups at stealing and taking control of oil revenue, are viewed as threats to the energy security of the West. This is because the sub-region supplies a considerable amount of oil to the USA and to a lesser degree Europe. This has accounted for high concern with West African security. France and the USA in particular are of the view that there is the need for their role to prevent West Africa becoming a safe haven for terrorists to attack Western interest.[34]

It is important to reiterate that, while it is true that West African security has a rippling effect globally, what is of more interest to states such as France and the USA is regional influence. With respect to France, it is also a matter of global relevance as a leading world power. This explains the argument of Freedom Onuoha that it is because the activities of Boko Haram pose a threat to French interest within West and Central Africa that Paris in May, 2014 called the so-called Paris summit on security with the Lake Chad basin states that are directly affected. He listed the Presidents of Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon alongside the US, UK and the EU representatives as those that attended.[35] It is from this perspective that Babatunde Obamamoye argues that '…overall, France's interest in the obstruction of Boko Haram cannot be separated from its desire to remain relevant as a high-level interlocutor in African affairs in the twenty-first century.'[36]

As pointed to earlier, apart from France, the USA also has a hegemonic interest in West African, relative to the security governance of the sub-region. Obi outlined the following as a basis for the USA's focus on West Africa which supports the hegemonic interest claim: first, the USA's perception that the sub-region is characterised by poor governance and porous borders, for which reason it seeks to propagate democracy in the sub-region. Secondly, the USA's position on the need to incorporate the sub-region into

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[34] C. I. Obi, 'Terrorism in West Africa: Real, Emerging Or Imagined Threats?'. *African Security Studies,* 15, 3, (2006), 87-101.
[35] F. C. Onuoha, 'A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone: Boko Harams's Transnational Reach and Regional Responses'. (2014).
[36] B. F. Obamamoye, 'Counter-Terrorism, Multinational Joint Task Force and the Missing Components'. *African Identities,* 15, 4, (2017), 428-440. p.432

its controlled global security framework.[37] The USA's specific interests in West Africa explain its quest to establish military bases in the sub-region.[38]

It is important in view of the USA's global standing, to indicate that it has not been able to establish a hegemonic or, indeed, a counter-hegemonic foothold in the sub-region. There are two main reasons for this: first Nigeria exerts anti-extra-regional state power influence in West Africa, mainly aimed at protecting its own sub-regional hegemony.[39] Second, France's hegemonic interest in the sub-region, anchored in its colonial links, constrains Washington, which does not have the advantage of historical ties. The consequence of the Nigerian and French factors is that, regardless of the facts that the USA is the world's most powerful state and that it has shown hegemonic interest in the sub-region, it does not only fall short of being a West African hegemon, it also falls short of being an extra-regional counter-hegemon. France's advantage of historical ties and the mechanisms it has put in place in its attempts to achieve sub-regional hegemony justify the claim that the USA has not overtaken France in terms of influence in the sub-region, hence the ascription of France as the extra-regional counter-hegemon in West Africa, ahead of USA.

1.5 Hegemony and counter-hegemony, the cases of Nigeria, the USA and France

This sub-section explains in further detail the ascription of: Nigeria as a West African hegemon; France as the extra-regional counter-hegemon; and the USA as neither the hegemon nor counter-hegemon of the sub-region. Whilst these matters are discussed in more detail in Chapters Four and Five, this section elaborates briefly on the designation of the three states by subjecting them to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria set out in section 1.3. It is important to reiterate that from the perspective of this thesis, to be the hegemon, a state does not have to rank first in each and every criterion, but has to rank first when the criteria are combined.

1.5.1 Material Power

In terms of hegemony and counter-hegemony, material power is exhibited when a member state of a region or extra-regional state with manifest interest in the region is

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[37] Obi, 'Terrorism in West Africa: Real, Emerging Or Imagined Threats?'. , 87-101 p.89
[38] See Chapter Five (section 4.2)
[39] See Chapter Four (section 4.2)

considered among the top ranked powers militarily and economically in the region. Proceeding from this definition, it is argued in this thesis that Nigeria is by far the biggest economy among West African states,[40] and by far the most powerful militarily.[41] However, considering the extra-regional dimension that this thesis takes, it is important to indicate that Nigeria is less powerful in terms of material power if compared to France or the USA which both rank among the top ten in global ranking economically and militarily.[42] Nevertheless, the claim that Nigeria is the hegemon in the sub-region is valid since it is essential to have a holistic view of all of the enumerated criteria and their regional impact in order to determine hegemony.

1.5.2   Vision

This thesis argues that Nigeria's main hegemonic vision is sub-regional integration, mainly on the economic and security fronts, and based on a bottom-up approach, that is, a West African sub-region that is devoid of extra-regional power influence emanating from colonialism. Hence, Nigeria advances a vision of a sub-region owning its governance processes and collaborating with the outside world according to the region's endogenous approaches. This position is based on Nigeria's role in the decolonization process of West Africa and indeed Africa more widely.[43] On the part of the USA, even though it does not have a region-specific vision for West Africa, it implicitly has a vision for the sub-region as part of the global hegemonic pursuit. In other words, as a state with global hegemonic ambitions, it envisions incorporating the sub-region fully into its proposed world order.[44] One example is its pursuit of a liberal international order (LIO). This is a US-led global agenda which is anchored in security cooperation and liberal democratic governance.[45] The focus of this global agenda of the USA is mainly in the areas of economic liberalism and cooperation, security cooperation, and democratic governance.[46] Besides Nigeria and the USA, France can also be said to have a vision for the sub-region. France's vision is to have a West Africa under its unimpeded exogenous policy influence so as to maintain its recognition as a global great

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[40] I. T. Terwase et al., 'Nigeria, Africa's Largest Economy: International Business Perspective'. *International Journal of Management Sciences,* 3, 7, (2014), 534-543.
[41] See Chapter Four (section 4.2)
[42] See Chapter Five (5.3.1)
[43] O. Abegunrin'Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of South Africa', Anonymous *Africa in Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century*Springer, 2009), 5-27.
[44] See Chapter Five (section 5.2.2)
[45] G. J. Ikenberry, 'The End of Liberal International Order?'. *International Affairs,* 94, 1, (2018), 7-23.
[46] See Chapter Five (section 5.2.2)

power. For instance, according to Laura Fenwick, as part of Paris' '…independence negotiations, French West Africa signed Cooperation Accords, ensuring the continuation of French influence.'[47] Notwithstanding the fact that both France and the USA seek the economic and security wellbeing of the sub-region that is of mutual benefit to them and the sub-region, their top-down approach[48] is in conflict with Nigeria's bottom-up approach.[49] Hence, Nigeria's vision opposes both states, especially France, given its desire to keep colonial influence.

1.5.3   Willingness

Based on the visions briefly outlined above, Nigeria has demonstrated a willingness to assume the role of West African hegemon. It has done so consistently since its independence in 1960, but particularly so from the 1970s. Abuja has explained its attitude in West Africa as one akin to a Monroe doctrine.[50] Nigeria has accordingly declared a zero tolerance to the presence of extra-regional military power not only in Nigeria but also in the whole of the sub-region.[51] Nigeria can, accordingly, be referred to as advocating a 'Pax Nigeriana,' which connotes Nigeria's view that it has the right to uncontested West African hegemony. This is a view that is not only expressed but also codified into policy, demonstrating that Abuja has always shown leadership in the sub-region.[52]

Apart from Nigeria, this thesis also argues that the USA has also shown willingness for West African hegemony as part of its global hegemonic aspiration. This claim is in reference to the USA's role in the West African decolonization process as part of its anti-colonialism policies. Juxtaposing that with the USA's drive to expand its influence globally, and taking into consideration its interest in West African affairs as shown earlier, it is concluded that the USA needed space to expand its hegemonic

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[47] L. Fenwick and P. Ukata, 'British and French Styles of Influence in Colonial and Independent Africa: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Senegal'. *Honors Capstone, April,* 23, (2009). p.3
[48] Situation where direction of sub-regional security governance comes from outside of West Africa.
[49] Situation where direction of sub-regional security governance comes from within West Africa respected by external partners.
[50] The Monroe Doctrine was a US policy of no tolerance to European colonial influence in the Americas from the early 1800s.
[51] L. Nathan, 'AFRICOM: A Threat to Africa's Security'. *Contemporary Security Policy,* 30, 1, (2009), 58-61.; A. A. Ahmad, 'US Africa Command: Military Operations Or Good Governance'. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 20, 6, (2015), 57-67.
[52] J. Warner, 'Nigeria and "Illusory Hegemony" in Foreign and Security Policymaking: Pax-Nigeriana and the Challenges of Boko Haram'. *Foreign Policy Analysis,* 13, 3, (2016), 638-661. p.641

influence and colonialism was seen as standing in its way.[53] That is to say, all states in the sub-region were under colonial rule and answerable to powers other than the USA, so an end to the practice was the only way Washington could win influence over West African states.

Evidence of France's West African hegemonic willingness is seen in its manifest desire to hold on to colonial influence after the end of classical colonialism. France's willingness traces back to its colonial approach. The first was France's direct or assimilation policy, which sought to incorporate French colonies, including West African states, into mainland France politically, economically, and culturally. This policy was later abandoned and replaced by the policy of association, which was meant to enable France to keep closer ties with its colonies. This explains France's strong post-independence ties with its former colonies, economically, militarily and culturally.[54] This points to hegemonic willingness and with reference to France's pre-independence pacts with West African states, as indicated above, this thesis concludes that it has hegemonic willingness in West Africa. In respect of this criterion, it is concluded that all three states have manifested hegemonic willingness. However, whereas France and Nigeria are more focused on West Africa, the USA is less sub-region-specific in terms of the scope of hegemonic willingness. This further justifies the attribution of hegemony and counter-hegemony to Nigeria and France, respectively.

1.5.4 Beneficence

This connotes sacrificial voluntary assistance towards a collective sub-regional goal partly to secure recognition from the member states of a given region. In respect of West Africa, Nigeria has used beneficence to achieve soft power as a means of entrenching its hegemony, facilitated by its material power. Nigeria's fulfilment of this criterion is evident in its financial contribution to the running of the ECOWAS commission relative to other member states. Between 2003 and 2011, Nigeria committed a total of $918.7 million for the running of the commission. It was followed by Ghana in a distant second placed, contributing $225.7 million and then third placed was Ivory Coast,

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[53] S. Metz, 'American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa'. *Political Science Quarterly,* 99, 3, (1984), 515-533.
[54] R. Roesch, 'Françafrique and the Prohibition of the use of Force'. *Amsterdam LF,* 7, (2015), 25.

contributing $107.5 million in the same period.[55] To put it more clearly, Nigeria's financial contribution to ECOWAS is over 60 percent of the organisation's total revenues from the introduction of community levies.[56] This and other unmatched contributions to sub-regional security engagements in the past and in recent times[57] are considered as beneficence. This is not based on solely the value of Nigeria's benevolence, but also on the fact that Abuja stands to gain less materially in return, since the majority of West African states are relatively much smaller economically.[58]

With respect to France, financial aid at present is largely aimed at keeping its domain of influence and, due to its Francophone bias, is not applied across the sub-region in equal measure.[59] The same argument can be made relative to its military support in times of crisis, even though it has been engaging in an expansionist agenda in the sub-region as it seeks to incorporate the Lusophone states into French influence.[60] The USA understandably does not contribute directly to the running of ECOWAS as a non-member state, but it does support the work of the ECOWAS, especially in areas that are in line with the USA's foreign policy. The USA has been supportive of the West African agenda of democratization as well as sub-regional security as part of its global war on terror. The USA spends substantial amounts of money in this regard and on many other areas, including financial support by way of aid to member states.[61] Similarly, France shows beneficence to the West African sub-region through aid. It has also been supportive when it comes to peace and security in the sub-region through interventions.[62] These interventions, though sometimes unpopular, have saved critical situations at least in the short term as in the case of Mali in 2013.[63]

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[55] B. Udo and I. Ekott *Nigeria, ECOWAS' Largest Donor, Continually Outsmarted by Smaller West-African Countries.* Available online: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsmarted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html [Accessed 07/01/2020].

[56] Udo and Ekott *Nigeria, ECOWAS' Largest Donor, Continually Outsmarted by Smaller West-African Countries.*

[57] See Chapter Four (section 4.5)

[58] See Chapter Seven (section 7.2.2.1)

[59] See chapter Five (section 5.3.4)

[60] See Chapter Five (section 5.3.2)

[61] A. Arieff, 'US Foreign Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: The FY2012 Request'. *Congressional Research Service Report,* 41840, (2011).

[62] S. Burgess, 'Military Intervention in Africa: French and US Approaches Compared'. *Air & Space Power Journal: Afrique Et Francophonie,* 9, 2, (2018), 5-25.

[63] I. Bergamaschi, 'French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual Yet Insufficient'. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development,* 2, 2, (2013).

Notwithstanding the beneficence of both the USA and France, Nigeria has a relatively wider scope of support from its material power along with its multilingual cooperation agenda. It has been involved in finding solutions to virtually every problem of the sub-region, including through considerable resources commitments.[64] This is not the case with either France or the USA, with the former adopting a Francophone-centric approach to the sub-region and the latter maintaining a global focus and only engaging with West Africa as and when necessary. It is thus concluded that, though Nigeria is less powerful in material (i.e. in this context financial) terms, it has committed more resources and covered a wider scope in the sub-region than either France or the USA or, indeed, any other state.

1.5.5 Recognition

Nigeria is considered from the perspective of this thesis as having been recognised as a West African hegemon by the sub-region's member states. Nigeria's ability to get consensus on the formation of ECOWAS across all divides (Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone states) points to its fulfilment of this criterion and of the hegemonic acceptance that it entails.[65] Besides, the recognition of Nigeria's West African hegemony is seen in the deference of leadership or the handling of special responsibilities by West African states to Abuja.[66] In contrast, the USA does not have hegemonic recognition in the sub-region, mainly because of Nigeria's opposition to extra-regional influence in the sub-region, as well as France's neo-colonial attitude of keeping its influence after colonialism. In combination, these policies have effectively defeated the USA's hegemonic agenda in the sub-region. Nevertheless, whilst France can be judged as having some degree of hegemonic recognition given the influence it wields among Francophone West African states, this is significantly limited relative to Nigeria. France may have influence over a significant number of states (Francophone), but two factors show its limitation: first, the states that France wields influence over also recognise Nigeria's hegemony. Secondly, no country can be said to wield hegemonic deference in West Africa if it does not get recognition from Nigeria, given its sheer significance and it being a member state of the sub-region.

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[64] See Chapter Four (section 4.5)
[65] See Chapter Four (section 4.7)
[66] See Chapter Four (section 4.6)

1.5.6   Institutional penetration

Key to Nigeria's pursuit of hegemony has been its role in ECOWAS. Nigeria initiated and supported the formation and sustenance of the organisation. The significance of this is that Abuja has moved beyond an expressed desire for sub-regional hegemony to institutionalising its vision of sub-regional integration in an ECOWAS that is based on inclusiveness and equality of states, thereby enabling ECOWAS to take charge of the sub-region's collective agenda.[67] In contrast, the USA has no such institutional penetration at the sub-regional level, meaning it has to rely on its leverage at the level of the UN in order to influence decisions pertaining to West Africa in times of crisis. However, because Washington does not belong to any of the sub-regional entities that run the day to day affairs of the sub-region, its institutional penetration remains limited.

France, unlike the either the USA or Nigeria, wields institutional influence both within and outside of the West African sub-region. With regard to the former, Paris has initiated the formation of parallel sectional (i.e. Francophone) sub-regional organisations in West Africa, organisations which it continues to support to this day.[68] One example is its economic engagement with the sub-region through the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). This entity continues to benefit from France's support, making WAEMU an effective entity through which France's direct link to West African economic affairs lingers.[69] Beyond the sub-region, France's leadership role in other organisations with global impact, such as the UN and European Union (EU), makes it possible for it to participate in West African affairs in a legitimate but counter-hegemonic manner.[70] Nevertheless, the French-backed institutions only comprise a section of the membership of West Africa. This is not the case in respect of ECOWAS, which has all member states of WAEMU as its members and through which sub-region-wide decisions are taken. This makes Nigeria the most influential in terms of institutional penetration as a hegemonic criterion, given that the majority of West African decisions do not require external involvement.

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[67] See Chapter Four (section 4.7)
[68] See Chapter Five (section 5.3.4)
[69] E. Ebi, 'Regional Currency Areas: Lessons from the West African Sub-Region and Nigeria's Policy Stance'. *Regional Currency Areas and the use of Foreign Currencies,* (2003), 145-150.
[70] Roesch, 'Françafrique and the Prohibition of the use of Force'. , 25

1.6 Overall hegemonic status in West Africa

As pointed out above, the attribution of hegemony and counter-hegemony is based on an aggregation of the all six criteria of hegemony previously articulated. From the immediately preceding discussion, it is concluded that Nigeria is the West African hegemon, despite its more limited material power relative to the USA and France. It has shown a wider scope of beneficence than its competitors, despite being relatively weaker in material terms. Nigeria's vision also led to the formation of the most effective and biggest sub-regional entity that takes care of sub-regional welfare, despite Nigeria's limitation in terms of external institutional leverage. Finally, it is concluded that the support in the establishment of ECOWAS manifests Nigeria's unmatched sub-regional hegemonic recognition. The ascription of Nigeria as the hegemon is crucially backed by the fact that no state can claim hegemony in West Africa without Nigeria's recognition, given its sheer importance. Having argued so, the thesis proceeds on the understanding that France is the counter-hegemon to Nigeria ahead of the USA, for the following reason: first, France is more focused on West Africa than the USA in terms of hegemonic willingness and beneficence. Second, France has a 'constituency' (Francophone West African states) through which it is connected to the sub-region facilitated by a (partial) sub-regional institution. This institution remains limited in scope, yet capable of manifesting challenges to Nigeria's sub-regional hegemonic purpose of ensuring full sub-regional cooperation.

1.7 ECOWAS' actorness

The criteria adopted to test actorness have been mentioned previously as being *autonomy, recognition, and capacity*. In this section, ECOWAS' actorness will be briefly tested against these criteria. This process will be repeated in far greater detail in Chapter Seven. The need to establish ECOWAS' actorness is to enable an impact assessment of the entity's actorness relative to introducing an external factor (counter-hegemony). This is only possible after establishing its degree of actorness so as to get a clearer picture of counter-hegemonic impact.

First, on autonomy, it is shown here that ECOWAS fulfils this criterion. This is mainly because it has functioning administrative structures including the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. These institutions, with the exception of the legislative arm (which is still more of an advisory body), have the necessary powers to act supra-

nationally and are largely respected by member states.[71] This is supported by the fact that the executive arm has been formulating policies in line with the integration agenda of ECOWAS. One key example is the free movement of goods and persons. On the part of the judiciary, it has also been active in adjudicating cases, mainly on human rights, between states and citizens. Finally, the legislative arm, even though it remains an advisory entity, has been actively contributing to policy formulation in the sub-region through the executive in its advisory capacity.[72]

Beyond autonomy, ECOWAS is also recognised both by member states and by external state and non-state actors. It is shown in Chapter Seven that policies emanating from the executive arm and judgements from the ECOWAS court are recognised by member states. Besides, external actors, mainly the UN and the AU and their member states, have been engaging with ECOWAS as part of facilitating its recognised sub-regional agenda of economic and security integration. It is, however, also pointed out that challenges of full commitment of member states remains and serve as a limitation to ECOWAS' recognition from within the sub-region.[73] Finally, ECOWAS' capacity as an actor is demonstrated in terms of its ability to take care of nearly all of its internal administrative cost. It has also engaged in peace operations both in the past and in recent times with little or no external backing, diplomatically and militarily. Nevertheless, it is also shown that ECOWAS' handling of peace keeping operations has manifested challenges of inadequate material capacity.[74] The capacity challenge can be explained by the high poverty levels of the sub-region, making ECOWAS reliant mainly on Nigeria's benevolence which is significant but inadequate.[75]

1.8 Hegemony and counter-hegemony vis-à-vis collective security cooperation and ownership challenges in West Africa

This section is the embodiment of the thesis as it illustrates the results of the interaction between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic regional governance relative to ECOWAS' actorness in coordinating unimpeded sub-regional collective security and its ownership. It is argued here that Nigeria's consent-based hegemony institutionalises

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[71] See Chapter Seven (section 7.3.1)
[72] See chapter Seven (section 7.3.2.1.2)
[73] See Chapter Seven (section 7.3.2.1)
[74] See Chapter Seven (section 7.3.3.1)
[75] See Chapter Seven (section 7.2.2.1)

hegemony and thereby gives room for ECOWAS to act as a supra-national legitimate entity. Some cases of ECOWAS' sponsored interventions led by Nigeria are selected for illustration in Chapter Eight. They include Liberia 1 and 2, Guinea Bissau 1 and 2, Ivory Coast 1 and 2 as well as Mali. It is shown that, other than where France has resorted to mainstream global governance to take over West African security in times of conflict on the preferred terms of Paris, ECOWAS is able to own the process with success. This is because Nigeria participates fully in ECOWAS interventions in respect of both troop contribution and financial commitment as part of its efforts at encouraging collective sub-regional participation.

Unlike Nigeria's role, France's counter-hegemonic role in West Africa although often quick and sometimes useful,[76] it does not support collective security cooperation and ownership under ECOWAS' actorness. This is because France prefers to act separately, even under a multilateral force intervention.[77] France's swift interventions in the sub-region are partly because it benefits from sole decision-making as a state. The same cannot be argued about Nigeria, which requires consensus building in a bureaucratic ECOWAS to enable it act in accordance with the hegemonic understanding adopted in this thesis (i.e. legitimacy-based hegemony). It is particularly so as the ECOWAS is also constrained by UN rules that largely require ECOWAS to use all non-violent means before the use of force as the last resort.[78]

Even though France is also obliged to secure the UN's prior approval before intervention, unlike Nigeria's reliance on ECOWAS' actorness as part of its consent-based hegemony, France may act on bilateral terms in line with its post-colonial military pacts signed with its former colonies in West Africa. Through these, it acts legitimately according to international law before resorting to the UN, where it also wields influence to get the kind of terms it wants in respect of West African military interventions.[79] The thesis demonstrates that France's influence in mainstream global governance institutions, most especially the UN, enhances its counter-hegemonic role in West Africa. Consequently, ECOWAS-led interventions - and by implication Nigerian hegemony - are circumstantially compelled to tolerate the influence of France. This is a manifestation of

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[76] M. I. Kanti, 'The French Intervention in Mali'. *African Perspectives: Reports,* 11, 38, (2013).
[77] See Chapter Eight (section 8.3)
[78] See Chapter Seven (section 7.3.2.2.2)
[79] See Five Seven (section 5.3.6)

the claim that France's counter-hegemony hinders ECOWAS' coordination and ownership of collective security, particularly in view of the fact that France is not obliged to act through ECOWAS.

France's interest-based alternative to acting through ECOWAS often leads to Nigeria's cessation of collective sub-regional security activity. As a state that has shown interest in all interventions in the sub-region, it is argued in this thesis that any abrupt end to participation by Nigeria is a deliberate move to show its indispensability and hegemonic status in the sub-region, whilst also guarding against the transfer of hegemony to France. In other words, it reflects the widespread demand for reforms in global governance institutions because it gives wide-ranging powers to great powers, of which France is arguably one.[80] Nevertheless, with reference to earlier arguments, four reasons are adduced to support Nigeria's West African hegemony, despite France's activities. First, whereas Nigeria's scope of interest cuts across the three lingual divides in the sub-region, France, at present focuses more on Francophone West Africa. Secondly, in view of the hierarchical structure of the UN, France's manifestation of influence in West Africa by virtue of its privileges at the UN is counter-hegemony, particularly, when such influence is not in line with the wishes of West Africa or ECOWAS, because hegemony is mainly about consent. Thirdly, unlike Nigeria, France's role in security operations in West Africa is generally passive and less successful, especially when Nigeria withdraws, indicating France's counter-hegemonic, rather than hegemonic status. Finally, there is a general dislike of neo-colonially linked ownership of the West African security agenda, which in turn defeats the ascription of hegemonic status to France in West Africa. This is a dislike that France is fully aware of, as Chapter Eight will show.

1.9   Chapter outline

This thesis consists of nine chapters. This chapter (Chapter One) has introduced the thesis. It then set out the research aims objectives, hypotheses, and research questions. The chapter explained the main concepts of the study that informed the research aim, objectives, questions, and hypotheses. The theories were then applied to explain the main arguments in the thesis, namely that hegemonic and extra-regional counter-hegemonic

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[80] M. D. Stephen, 'Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance'. *Global Governance,* 23, 3, (2017), 483.

interaction constrains regional organisational actorness in collective security cooperation and ownership.

Chapter Two addresses the issue of methodology. The research is based on a single case study and grounded theory. The chapter justifies these approaches with respect to West Africa. It also demonstrates how the various approaches adopted were practically applied throughout the study.

Chapter Three is the first of the thesis' theoretical chapters, focusing on the concepts of hegemony, counter-hegemony, and (more briefly) global governance. The chapter explains the concept of hegemony in the light of smart power as well as counter-hegemony. The issue of the scope of hegemony (global or regional) is addressed in this chapter, arguing in favour of regional hegemony. Finally, it sets out a six-point hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria to test the hegemonic standings of Nigeria, France and the USA in respect of West Africa.

Chapter Four applies the theoretical concepts developed in Chapter Three to the West African sub-regional context. The chapter demonstrates Nigeria's hegemony in the sub-region based on the six-point criteria.

Chapter Five first demonstrates that neither the USA nor France are hegemons in West Africa, by subjecting the two extra-regional powers to the six criteria. From a comparative analysis relative to these hegemonic criteria, France, rather than the USA, is adjudged as the counter-hegemon to Nigeria.

Chapter Six addresses the concepts of actorness and regionness, both of which are contested. The chapter starts out by outlining the criteria for actorness. It shows that several criteria explain actorness, selecting autonomy, recognition and capacity as the criteria to be applied in this thesis. Applying these criteria, it is argued in this chapter that organisational entities such as the ECOWAS can be actors. The chapter also defines the concept of a region from a geographic and cohesive factors perspective whereby the latter give regionness to geographic space.

Chapter Seven tests the actorness of the ECOWAS by subjecting it to the actorness criteria selected and defined in Chapter Six. It is argued that ECOWAS has shown actorness in terms of autonomy, recognition, and capacity. The chapter, however, shows

that ECOWAS' main challenge is in respect of its material (as opposed to its diplomatic) capacity.

Chapter Eight proceeds on the basis that: the ECOWAS is an established actor; the West African sub-region is characterised by hegemony and counter-hegemony; and mainstream global governance facilitates extra-regional counter-hegemony. This is applied to ECOWAS' difficulty in some cases in owning and coordinating coherent sub-regional collective security cooperation. Drawing on the theoretical and empirical arguments developed earlier in the thesis, the chapter argues that France's counter-hegemony to Nigeria hampers Nigeria's collective hegemonic security agenda and also ECOWAS' ability to coordinate and own sub-regional collective security.

Chapter Nine provides the conclusion to the study. It highlights the research questions and answers, the hypothetical claims and outcomes and contribution to knowledge. The chapter also provides suggestion on further research relative to ECOWAS' collective security.

Chapter 2 Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the research strategies, the research approach and the research methods adopted in this thesis. The chapter specifically justifies the choice of a qualitative approach as against a quantitative one. The chapter also explains grounded theory and case studies, which constitute the research strategy adopted for the thesis. The chapter then addressed issues of research validity, reliability, and ethics. Finally, the methods used for data collection are elaborated, as is the manner in which data was analysed.

2.2 Research strategies

2.2.1 Case Study Approach

One of the key research strategies used in this project was a case study approach. Specifically, an explorative case study approach was applied to West Africa. Several reasons justify this choice: first, the strategy allows for preliminary data collection prior to setting research questions and determining a hypothesis. This is considered as a prelude so as enable the researcher develop an appropriate framework of study.[81] Another reason for the choice of case study is its compatibility with multiple sources of data. This makes it possible for the researcher to access as much information as possible without being constrained by where and how one can get data, provided ethical issues are considered.[82] John Gerring defines a case study as 'an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units.'[83] This thesis adopts a single case study strategy. The choice is informed by the fact that a single case makes it possible for a more detailed study that satisfies the explorative approach. It allows for greater focus on the unit under study and for extensive exploration of the issues under investigation.[84]

It is important to justify why West Africa is adopted and studied as a single case when there are several other sub-regions in Africa. The justification centres on the uniqueness of the West African sub-region relative to the topic under study (hegemony

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[81] Z. Zainal, 'Case Study as a Research Method'. *Jurnal Kemanusiaan,* 5, 1, (2007). p.3

[82] P. Swanborn, *Case Study Research: What, Why and how?* (California: Sage publication Ltd., 2010).

[83] J. Gerring, 'What is a Case Study and what is it Good for?'. *American Political Science Review,* 98, 2, (2004), 341-354. p.341; J. Gustafsson, 'Single Case Studies Vs. Multiple Case Studies: A Comparative Study'. (2017).

[84] A. Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 5th edition (Oxford: Oxford university press, 2016).

and counter-hegemony). According to Robert Yin, a number of criteria exist for the justification of the choice of a single case study and one of them is the uniqueness of a given case.[85] The choice was therefore based on the uniqueness of West Africa with respect to hegemony and counter-hegemony. West Africa features Nigeria as the sub-regional hegemon and France as an extra-regional counter-hegemon to Nigeria; hence, the sub-region's unique position if compared to other sub-regions in Africa. For instance, other African sub-regions that could have been considered for this research with respect to the prevalence of security concerns are East and North Africa. However, with regard to North Africa, whilst France seeks hegemony in the sub-region, there is no clearly identifiable local hegemon, unlike the case of Nigeria (the hegemon) in West Africa. Similarly, with respect to East Africa, the region does not have a clear leader such as Nigeria that seeks hegemony or plays the role of a hegemon. Secondly, due to the limited number of countries colonized by France in East Africa, France's role there is negligible and at the same time, Great Britain does not seem to have a similar attitude to its former colonies to that of France. This further puts the West African sub-region in a clearly unique position to explore the ideas of hegemony and extra-regional counter-hegemony.

Another related reason for the choice of West Africa as a single case is that the sub-region is arguably the most significant in Africa in relation to the issues of domestic and transnational security, all the more so as the security concerns invite extra-regional states' interest in the sub-region. Their involvement in the security governance of the sub-region raises mixed feelings, which partly reinforce the prevalence of hegemony and counter-hegemony. On one hand, extra-regional states' involvement complements sub-regional security efforts, but on other hand, it has the tendency to undermine sub-regional ownership of security governance. This, by implication, manifests counter-hegemony, given Nigeria's support for ECOWAS' actorness.

One main weakness regarding a single case study is the argument by its critics that its findings cannot be generalised statistically.[86] However, Robert Yin argues that there is a distinction between analytical and statistical generalization and that case studies including single cases are generalizable analytically. He described his analytic

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[85] R. K. Yin, *Case Study Research : Design and Methods*, 5th edition (London ;Los Angeles, California: Sage, 2013).
[86] S. Stark and H. Torrance 'Case Study ', in B. Somekh and C. Lewin(eds.), *Research Methods in Social Science* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications., 2015), 33-40.

generalization approach as a two-step process whereby in the first place, research findings are portrayed to show how they fit into a given theoretical construct. The research findings' support or rejection of a given theory that is applied to a case study leads us to Yin's second step. This is the applicability of the findings to settings similar to the case studied.[87] The implication is that findings from the study of West Africa relative to the theoretical concepts relied on for the study are considered replicable in similar regions outside of Africa, specifically, regions or sub-regions with the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic features of West Africa.

2.2.2 Grounded Theory

The generalization of the research findings of this thesis is also supported by the combination of a case study approach and grounded theory. A Grounded Theory strategy involves the systematic gathering of data through which a new theory may be created or an existing one developed.[88] The generated or expanded theory is considered grounded on data collected through a continuous process of interplay between data collection and analysis, the two being undertaken simultaneously.[89] One of its biggest advantages stemming from this and hence a reason for its use in this thesis is that it facilitates ingenuity and supports creativity. This is so because the method's theory generation or development is empirically based.[90] Accordingly, findings are often apt for their intended use, as against theories that come about on the basis of logical deductions from assumptions considered a priori.[91] Another advantage of this research strategy is that, just as with a case study approach, findings from grounded theory research are generalizable. Glaser and Strauss, who first espoused the theory in 1967,[92] argue that the approach makes generalization possible in the sense that the process of theory generation or modification establishes a degree of generalization that is empirically based. It makes

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[87] R. K. Yin, *Applications of Case Study Research*, 3rd edition (London: Sage, 2012).; A. B. Starman, 'The Case Study as a Type of Qualitative Research.'. *Journal of Contemporary Educational Studies/Sodobna Pedagogika,* 64, 1, (2013).
[88] J. Kovacich and L. Amankwaa, 'The Application of Grounded Theory: An Example from Nursing Workforce Research'. *The Qualitative Report,* 22, 5, (2017), 1269-1283.
[89] A. Strauss and J. Corbin 'Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview', in A. Bryman, et al. (ed.), *Qualitative research* (London: Sage, 1999), 273-285.
[90] Strauss and Corbin 'Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview', , 273-285
[91] B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory : Strategies for Qualitative Research* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Aldine, 1999), 271.
[92] C. Marshall and G. B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research*, Sixth edition (Thousand Oaks, California; ©2016: Sage, 2016).

clear the boundaries of a theory's applicability with respect to its findings, which are easily explained and considered to have predictive power in terms of replicability."[93]

It is important to note that this thesis does not seek to create a new theory, but to extend an existing one. The thesis applies empirical data to test the phenomena of hegemony and counter-hegemony in West Africa. This is done in line with the grounded theory approach of data collection and analysis, that is, by comparing data from the field with the adopted theory or concept (hegemony and counter-hegemony) to empirically test how well it fits the case study setting (West Africa).[94] This will be further demonstrated in the data collection and analysis section (section 2.3.3).

2.3   Qualitative approach

This section explains the choice of a qualitative as against a quantitative approach to research. The main consideration that goes into the choice of either is how best to conceptualise the reality of what is being researched, largely based on the methods available to both approaches.[95] Whereas a quantitative approach usually involves quantifying relatively large amounts of data statistically in order to gain meaning – often through objective questionnaires - a qualitative approach involves discussions on themes and or trends in words, usually based on information from a relatively small participant group, using methods such as in-depth interviews.[96] In view of the fact that this thesis seeks information that is not available to the general public and therefore cannot be analysed statistically, a qualitative approach was chosen. In sum, because of the smaller numbers of appropriate research participants, the sensitive nature of the topic and its obscurity to the public, a qualitative approach was deemed most appropriate. Hence, qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews, and textual analysis of both primary and secondary data, were employed.

Moreover, a qualitative approach and data collection methods applicable to it provide greater flexibility than quantitative methods. For instance, even where interviews are used in quantitative studies, they often employ closed ended questions, arranged in

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[93] B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory : Strategies for Qualitative Research* (Chicago, Ill.: Aldine, 1967), 271. p.24
[94] A. Strauss and J. Corbin 'Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview', in A. Bryman, et al. (ed.), *Qualitative research* (London: Sage, 1999), 273-285. p.72
[95] K. F. Punch, *Developing Effective Research Proposals* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2016).
[96] M. L. Patten, *Understanding Research Methods : An Overview of the Essentials*, 6th edition (Glendale, Calif.: Pyrczak Publishing, 2007), 200.

the same order and format. This leaves little or no space for flexibility, potentially denying a study vital information. [97] Given that qualitative methods are about understanding peoples' experiences and views,[98] their flexibility makes it possible to take control of the structure of data collection. More importantly, they give room for depth relative to the information being sought by the researcher.[99] A further justification for the choice of a qualitative approach is that both case study and grounded theory are compatible with the approach in terms of data collection methods and analysis.[100] For instance, according to Glaser and Strauss, grounded theory involves the following qualitative data sources: documentary analysis, interviews, observation and more.[101] Similarly, in respect of case studies, Stark and Torrance indicated that data collection methods adopted by case studies are, inter alia, a combination of documentary analysis and interviews.[102]

From this background, two qualitative data collection methods, namely documentary review and interview, specifically semi-structured in-depth interviews, were used in this study. These are further substantiated in the next section relative to how interviews were used during the data collection stage of this project.

2.3.1 Interview Design

Building on the preceding comments on interviews as a qualitative data collection method, this section elaborates further on its choice and how it was designed. According to Kvale Steinar, an interview for research purposes is an event that brings about the construction of knowledge through a conversational interaction between the interviewer and the respondent.[103] Robert Burgess refers to it as a 'conversation with a purpose.'[104] An interaction for information involves a more exhaustive exchange or what is termed in the methods literature an in-depth interview. This is informed by the argument of

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[97] R. Kumar, *Research Methodology : A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners* (London: Sage, 2010), 415. p.138

[98] H. Elkatawneh, 'Comparing Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches'. *Available at SSRN 2742779,* (2016).

[99] V. B. Kampenes et al., 'Flexibility in Research Designs in Empirical Software Engineering.', *EASE.* 2008).

[100] This does not suggest that they are not compatible with quantitative method.

[101] Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory : Strategies for Qualitative Research*, 271

[102] Stark and Torrance 'Case Study ', , 33-40

[103] K. Steinar, *Doing Interviews* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2007).

[104] R. G. Burgess, *In the Field : An Introduction to Field Research* (London: Routledge, 1984), 254. p.102

Rossman and Rallis, who suggest that deeper understanding comes about through an in-depth, long interview as the interviewer and the participant "co-construct" meaning.[105]

The need to generate greater depth of information was informed by the choice of a semi-structured interview approach, as against an unstructured or structured technique. A semi-structured interview approach is defined by Steinar as '…an interview with the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena.'[106] Nigel Mathers et al. are more specific in describing semi-structured interviews as involving '…a series of open-ended questions based on the topic areas the researcher wants to cover.'[107] Several reasons accounted for the use of semi-structured interview in this project. First, given that this thesis is based on grounded theory, it is important that the methods used are compatible with it. Despite the fact that grounded theory supports several interview methods, semi-structured interviews are usually deemed to be the most compatible.[108] In part this is because structured interviews, as pointed out earlier, do not facilitate the soliciting of as much information as would otherwise be possible, because of the rigidity in the mode of questioning.[109] Meanwhile, at the other end of the interview spectrum, unstructured interviews can result in the structure of the interview being decided by the respondents. As Bill Gillham has argued, contrary to semi-structured interviews, unstructured interviews do not give the interviewer control of the direction of the conversation.[110] The success of semi-structured in-depth interviews is often dependent on having sufficient time to conduct the interview appropriately.[111] This enables follow up questions where an explanation is unclear to the interviewer.[112]

The advantage of follow up questions also makes this technique even more suitable to grounded theory. This is because questions can be adjusted after a few

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[105] G. B. Rossman and S. F. Rallis, *Learning in the Field : An Introduction to Qualitative Research*, 3rd edition (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2012). p.176
[106] Steinar, *Doing Interviews* p.8
[107] N. J. Mathers et al., *Using Interviews in a Research Project*NHS Executive, Trent, 1998). p.2
[108] K. Charmaz, *Constructing Grounded Theory : A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis* (London: Sage, 2006), 208.
[109] R. Edwards and J. Holland, *What is Qualitative Interviewing?* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2013).
[110] B. Gillham, *Research Interviewing : The Range of Techniques* (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2005), 173.
[111] B. DiCicco-Bloom and B. F. Crabtree, 'The Qualitative Research Interview'. *Medical Education,* 40, 4, (2006), 314-321.
[112] Mathers et al., *Using Interviews in a Research Project*

interviews, to reflect the reality and to elicit the necessary data from subsequent interviews. In the application of grounded theory, often preliminary questions are initially set from the review of literature. With the use of a semi-structured method, these questions can be reviewed in subsequent interviews if need be.[113] Indeed, one of the main criticisms of the semi-structured interview, according to Jennifer Mason, is the argument of proponents of structured interview to the effect that variations and stimulus in the interviewees' responses are an artefact or manipulation of the method.[114] Mason, however, defended the semi-structured approach, arguing that any form of interview is a form of social interaction and hence susceptible to a degree of bias, but whilst this can never be eradicated it does not follow that such a method is not worth trying.[115]

This thesis also opted for a face-to-face interview approach as part of enhancing a deeper engagement with participants.[116] This approach makes it possible for the interviewer and the interviewee to interact at a designated time and place, rather than for example, being in separate locations and connected by phone.[117] The face-to-face approach was selected in preference to telephone, message or email forms of interviewing. This is because the face-to-face approach makes it easier to read the demeanour of each interviewee and to assess the tone of respondents for inferences. Besides, with a face-to-face interview, recording is much easier, if permission for such is granted.[118]

Having decided on face-to-face interviews, the next issue to address was who to interview. The decision on this was also guided by the grounded theory approach, which places emphasis on targeting interview respondents who are experts on the topic being studied and hence able to provide accurate information.[119] On this basis, an elite interview approach was adopted. This is used as a way of getting an in-depth comprehension of a given issue under study. Participants are referred to as 'elite' not based on their social status, but mainly because they are considered as having access to information by virtue

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[113] J. Vickers, 'Exploring Engagement: A Grounded Theory Study of Young People's Interactions with Healthcare Professionals'. *Doctoral Dissertation, University of Salford,* (2016).
[114] J. Mason, *Qualitative Researching* (London: Sage, 1996), 180.
[115] Mason, *Qualitative Researching*, 180
[116] Mason, *Qualitative Researching*, 180
[117] R. Opdenakker, 'Advantages and Disadvantages of Four Interview Techniques in Qualitative Research', *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research.* 2006).
[118] Opdenakker, 'Advantages and Disadvantages of Four Interview Techniques in Qualitative Research',
[119] S. B. Thomson, 'Sample Size and Grounded Theory'. *Journal of Administration and Governance,* 5, 1, (2010), 45-52.

of the office they currently hold or held in the past.[120] The research design anticipated undertaking 10 to 12 interviews, taking into consideration the limited number of experts on the topic and the fact that reaching respondents could be challenging. This is supported by the fact that the number of respondents needed to reach saturation in qualitative interviews is not specified. It is generally argued in the literature that it all depends on factors such as the nature and scope of the topic and the extent and richness of the information obtained from each interviewee.[121] This viewpoint is backed by Wilmot, as he argues that the number of sampled participants is not as important as the criteria relied upon to select them.[122]

Being mindful of the potential challenges in getting the targeted number of participants, which is typical of interview-based research,[123] and considering the fact that the research deliberately targeted elite respondents, sampling was resorted to. It is important to note that sampling type has bearing on the validity of any inferences drawn from data collected from the sampled group.[124] For this reason, non-random and purposive sampling was used as it allows for deliberate targeting of those the researcher judges as best qualified in terms of possession of the required information. The non-random approach is particularly resorted to where suitable respondents are limited in number and where access could potentially be challenging.[125] The challenge of not getting access to all of the initial target sample is often resolved through snowball sampling, as was the case with this thesis. This is a sampling technique that involves gaining access to additional interviewees via those respondents that the researcher has already secured access to.[126]

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[120] P. Burnham et al., *Research Methods in Politics*Macmillan International Higher Education, 2008).
[121] M. Mason, 'Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies using Qualitative Interviews', *Forum qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: qualitative social research.* 2010).; J. Sim et al., 'Can Sample Size in Qualitative Research be Determined a Priori?'. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology,* 21, 5, (2018), 619-634.
[122] A. Wilmot, 'Designing Sampling Strategies for Qualitative Social Research: With Particular Reference to the Office for National Statistics' Qualitative Respondent Register'. *Survey Methodology Bulletin-Office for National Statistics-,* 56, (2005), 53.
[123] N. King and C. Horrocks, *Interviews in Qualitative Research* (Los Angeles, Calif. ;London: Sage, 2010), 248.
[124] Patten, *Understanding Research Methods : An Overview of the Essentials*, 200
[125] T. Carmichael and N. Cunningham, 'Theoretical Data Collection and Data Analysis with Gerunds in a Constructivist Grounded Theory Study.'. *Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods,* 15, 2, (2017).
[126] I. Dragan and A. Isaic-Maniu, 'Snowball Sampling Completion'. *Journal of Studies in Social Sciences,* 5, 2, (2013).

2.3.1.1 Actual field interviews

Proceeding from the preceding section, the research drew its interview respondents from technocrats, academics, policy makers, seasoned journalist and leading members of civil society organisations at both national and sub-regional levels.[127] These categories of people were considered most likely to have the required information on issues of regional governance and security. Specifically, they were considered to have information on the workings of the ECOWAS Commission with respect to its sub-regional domestic security vis-à-vis the relations between Nigeria and France in the broader scope of West African politics. The respondents were drawn from ECOWAS, the West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Institute (KAIPTC), the Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECEID) and former state officials. These institutions were chosen because of their concern with issues of peace, security and international relations in West Africa, Africa, and the world at large. In addition to their suitability, many of these institutions including KAIPTC, WANEP, LECEID and an ECOWAS desk at Ghana's foreign ministry are located in Ghana, even though their scope is sub-region wide. This made access relatively easier whilst the researcher was in Ghana.

Given the anticipated challenges of securing interviewees, a tentative interviewee list numbering 12 was drawn up, with each member of the list contacted by email. As expected, not all of those contacted responded positively as some declined, but through snowballing, other interviewees were brought into the research project. In total, 9 respondents were interviewed.[128] It is important to add that the fact that the target was not met did not affect the process or the amount of information gathered, given that in-depth semi-structured interviews were applied. This allowed for quality data through lengthy interview sessions and therefore addressed the shortcoming of not getting the targeted number of respondents. In other words, the interviews that were conducted were lengthy

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[127] See Appendix
[128] See Appendix

and in-depth, with each interview spanning an average of 45 minutes and covered several areas of interest. Data gathered from interviews is utilised in a dispersed manner throughout this thesis.

2.3.2 Documentary data

The other main source of qualitative data collected for this research was documentary data, an essential resource in the field of social science.[129] Through its use it was possible for a review of documents relating to ECOWAS and West African politics to be conducted. Both primary and secondary data was utilised. This approach afforded the researcher a further explanation of how Nigeria relates to France as an extra-regional counter-hegemon. The focus was particularly on documents that shed light on the impact of their respective attitudes to each other in relation to West African collective security governance under ECOWAS. The study of related documents, specifically primary documents, as will be shown in the next section, served as a complement to the interviews conducted. That is to say, the review of documentary sources helped to compensate for the limited number of interview respondents. Moreover, use of documentary data also served as a mechanism to verify information acquired from interview sources. [130]

2.3.2.1 Primary documentary sources

Primary documentary data are those that give first hand testimony or offer direct evidence on a matter that is being researched. [131] Ruth Sandwell defines primary documents as '…those records created in the past, at or close to the time under study, that have survived into the present.'[132] She cited government publications and documented records of organisations among others as examples of primary documents. [133] The implication is that once a researcher identifies where to access primary documentary data and determines what to look for, it can be considered to be amongst the richest forms of data in terms of accuracy from the perspective of the source it emanates.[134] The research

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[129] J. Mason, *Qualitative Researching* (London: Sage, 2002), 223.; P. Atkinson and A. Coffey ' Analysing Documentary Realities', Anonymous *Qualitative research: Theory, Method and Practice* (London: Sage., 1997), 45-62.

[130] G. A. Bowen, 'Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method'. *Qualitative Research Journal,* 9, 2, (2009), 27-40.

[131] J. Osang et al., 'Methods of Gathering Data for Research Purpose and Applications using Ijser Acceptance Rate of Monthly Paper Publication (March 2012 Edition-may 2013 Edition)'. *IOSR Journal of ComputerEngineering (IOSR-JCE),* 15, 2, (2013), 59-65.

[132] R. Sandwell, 'Using Primary Documents in Social Studies and History'. *The Anthology of Social Studies,* 2, (2008), 295-307. p.295

[133] Sandwell, 'Using Primary Documents in Social Studies and History'. , 295-307

[134] *Ibid.*

gathered primary data from documents on ECOWAS' peace and security issues via internet sources such as those from its website, LECIAD's website; as well as related materials from the websites of the African Union (AU) and the UN such as resolutions, communiqué and reports. Some of the documents reviewed were the ECOWAS treaties, its protocols and communiqués relative to West African peace and security. All of these helped to understand the peace and security trajectory of ECOWAS and how that has featured extra-regional interest.

2.3.2.2   Secondary Sources

The research was not limited to primary data but also included secondary data. In this context it is important to note that this thesis does not have a standalone literature review chapter. The decision not to include such a chapter was based on the diverse range of theoretical and empirical material covered in the thesis, ranging in the case of the former from hegemony and counter-hegemony to actorness, and in the case of the latter from the policies of Nigeria, France and the USA to the practices of ECOWAS. Consequently, a literature review chapter would have to either be so long as to be untenable or, if kept to a suitable length, practically without value. Accordingly, the decision was made to review the relevant secondary literature within the chapter to which it most directly relates. This made it possible to get a sense of the concepts adopted before subjecting them to empirical test.

The literature was obtained from books, articles, and papers written by academics and experts on the key concepts examined in this thesis and on West Africa and ECOWAS. This gave a theoretical, empirical, and historic perspective to the research and guided its direction. In other words, the researcher gained an insight through extant scholarly works which gave direction for further research and enabled the testing of new ideas.[135] Such an approach is supported by the argument of Corti and Thompson to the effect that the reusing of qualitative data gives researchers chance to study the raw materials of contemporary and past research so as to give the researcher methodological and substantive insight.[136] In effect, secondary sources of data made it possible to understand the key concepts of hegemony, counter-hegemony and actorness and to gain insight into

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[135] M. P. Johnston, 'Secondary Data Analysis: A Method of which the Time has Come'. *Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries,* 3, 3, (2017), 619-626.

[136] L. Corti and P. Thompson 'Secondary Analysis of Archived Data   ', in C. Seale, et al. (ed.), *Qualitative Research Practice* (London: SAGE Publications, 2004), 297-313.; K. F. Punch, *Introduction to Social Research : Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches* (London: Sage, 2005), 320.

Nigerian and French foreign policies on West Africa generally, and more specifically on ECOWAS and the sub-region's security issues.

Secondary data did not only guide the focus of this thesis; it also complemented the primary data. It specifically compensated for the researcher's inability to access French officials for interview due to distance, financial constraints, and language constraints. The use of secondary data as a solution to these challenges is articulated by Melissa Johnston in her definition of secondary data analysis as 'analysis of data that was collected by someone else for another primary purpose. The utilization of this existing data provides a viable option for researchers who may have limited time and resources.'[137] Notwithstanding the advantages of secondary data relative to time and resources, it also has its shortcomings. One such shortcoming is that, because the original data were not collected by the one using them, questions that were answered for the data may not have included some key areas of interest to the current research.[138] Despite this being a challenge, it could also serve as a pointer to gaps and as indicated in the preceding paragraph, can inform the direction of a research. The guidance from secondary data on the direction of this thesis is also reflected in how data was generally collected and analysed in line with grounded theory, as will be shown in the next section.

2.3.3 Qualitative data analysis

In view of the fact that this thesis is based on grounded theory, data analysis from interview transcripts and documents followed the grounded theory procedure. First, the analysis and data collection were undertaken simultaneously.[139] This approach in grounded theory makes it possible for the kind of data collected to be varied depending upon the initial responses from interview respondents or contents of documents reviewed. This has a potential consequence of changing the overall claim of a given piece of research work.[140] This approach, therefore, made it possible for this research to collect new data after it emerged from the beginning of data collection that the initial hypothetical claim of multiple hegemony in West Africa could not be proven. This led to a shift to

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[137] Johnston, 'Secondary Data Analysis: A Method of which the Time has Come'. , 619-626 p.619
[138] S. Boslaugh, *Secondary Data Sources for Public Health: A Practical Guide* Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[139] Y. D. Eaves, 'A Synthesis Technique for Grounded Theory Data Analysis'. *Journal of Advanced Nursing,* 35, 5, (2001), 654-663.
[140] J. M. Corbin and A. Strauss, 'Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative Criteria'. *Qualitative Sociology,* 13, 1, (1990), 3-21. M. B. Miles and A. M. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis : A Sourcebook of New Methods* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1984), 263.

what is finally being studied – hegemony and counter-hegemony. The initial notion was that the several extra-regional powers involved in the sub-region, particularly the USA and France, coupled with Nigeria's hegemonic interest, amounted to multiple hegemony. However, preliminary checks from data collection, showed that although the USA aspires to hegemony in West Africa, it cannot - for the reasons articulated in the previous chapter and discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five - be considered a West African hegemon. It was noted that France is the most influential extra-regional power, as argued in Chapter One; hence, the attribution of hegemony to Nigeria and extra-regional counter-hegemony to France. This demonstrates how grounded theory strategy shaped the thesis to reflect the data from the research setting.

Different scholars adopt different steps in the analysis of data under grounded theory. For example, Glaser (1978) and Charmaz (1995) propose a two-step coding,[141] whilst Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss advocate a three stage approach. The latter was adopted in this research, mainly because of its relative simplicity. Their three steps involve open coding, axial coding and selective coding.[142] These coding procedures were applied to all documents that were relied on for data, as well as interview transcripts. According to Corbin and Strauss, open coding means the categorization of concepts with words, sentences or phrases for further development. It is done simultaneously with data collection and for this reason data collected was constantly scrutinised so that emerging areas of interest could be uncovered.[143] In the analysis of data for this thesis, this first step was followed. Coding was conducted on a sentence by sentence basis in order to avoid the possibility of losing vital parts of the transcript data, something that may occur if coding paragraph by paragraph is initially employed. Having generated ideas and possible arguments in this way, the next step (but still part of the first stage of the analytical process) was larger scale coding, this time paragraph by paragraph to narrow down the themes formed from the sentence level codes.

Corbin and Strauss' second stage is termed axial coding, which means that data at this stage is constructed by connecting categories coded in stage one.[144] This stage is what

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[141] L. Calman, 'What is Grounded Theory'. *The University of Manchester,* (2006).
[142] J. M. Corbin and A. Strauss, 'Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative Criteria'. *Qualitative Sociology,* 13, 1, (1990), 3-21.
[143] Corbin and Strauss, 'Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative Criteria'. , 3-21
[144] Corbin and Strauss, 'Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative Criteria'. , 3-21

Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman refer to as the displaying of data, whereby the several categories identified in stage one are reduced to manageable categories for easy understanding of the data, enabling conclusions to be subsequently drawn.[145] As part of adhering to these steps, all coded categories were constantly compared to draw further meaning from the categorised data. The comparisons made, aided in narrowing down the themes to manageable levels by connecting the related concepts identified in step one. At this stage, key themes emerged, featuring issues of neo-colonialism, poor leadership, hegemony, counter-hegemony, governance and actorness as some of the key phenomena characterising the sub-region.

This brings us to the final step, selective coding, which involves drawing on the open and axial coding stages of analysis in order to identify a major theme for study.[146] Codes were further studied closely before what were considered to be the central phenomena emerging from the data were selected. This decision was made based on its prominence in the narrowed themes that emerged from stage two. The story of this thesis is thus built around the issue of West African cooperation and ownership of sub-regional collective security. This was informed by the fact that each of the themes indicated above has implication for international cooperation. Upon further reading and data collection, which in turn informed further honing and development of the research project, the central theme is analysed vis-à-vis Nigeria's hegemony, France's counter-hegemony and ECOWAS' actorness, all of which forms the bigger theme of the thesis.

2.3.3.1 Validity and reliability

Another critical aspect of research that must be addressed in any piece of work is its validity and reliability. The significance of ensuring research validity and reliability is that they guarantee research quality and integrity relative to its findings. Whereas validity is about how data collected are reflected in a given research work, reliability is about how much a research work has produced a stable and consistent result, relative to the method used. Reliability thus answers the question of whether a piece of research work, if repeated with the same method, will produce the same results.[147]

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[145] M. B. Miles and A. M. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis : A Sourcebook of New Methods* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1984), 263.

[146] Corbin and Strauss, 'Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative Criteria'. , 3-21

[147] H. Taherdoost, 'Validity and Reliability of the Research Instrument; how to Test the Validation of a Questionnaire/Survey in a Research'. *International Journal of Academic Research in Management,* Vol.

To ensure the validity and reliability of the research, the following measures were taken. Firstly, data was used in a manner that reflected the reality on the ground in order to satisfy the need for validity. This was done through strict adherence to the adopted research strategies – case study, but particularly grounded theory, which has a distinctive feature of having findings reflected or grounded in empirical data, as discussed earlier. For instance, with respect to documentary analysis which requires checks on authenticity, distortion and possible deception,[148] this was done through triangulation. This is comparing two or more sources of data for the purpose of checking validity.[149] Accordingly, misinterpretations were checked by comparing with interview transcripts and vice versa. Therefore, what was considered as reliable documentary data was used for the purpose of detecting bias in interview data or transcripts.[150] On the reliability of the research, this was ensured through the adherence to the research strategies specifically relating to data analysis. As such, the data analysis process was transparent, as shown in the preceding section. The iterative step by step process of data analysis was to ensured that: reliable conclusions could be drawn; methodological consistency could be maintained; and findings would be reproduced if research on the same case study and similar case study settings was conducted.

2.3.3.1.1 Ethical consideration

Another way through which research validity and reliability and, indeed, research quality can be ensured, is by adhering to research ethics. Generally, ethics in research centre on the following: first, informed consent, which is about free will on the part of a research participant.[151] This is particularly an ethical requirement with respect to interviews and some documentary analysis in the application of grounded theory.[152] As part of informed consent, full disclosure is required on the part of the researcher so that the participants know what they are doing and for what purpose.[153] Second, protection of

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5, 3, (2016), 28-36.; J. W. Creswell, *Research Design : Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method Approaches*, 4th International student edition (Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage, 2013), 273.; A. Lacey and D. Luff, 'Qualitative Research Analysis'. *The NIHR RDS for the East Midlands/Yorkshire & the Humber,* (2007).

[148] Burgess, *In the Field : An Introduction to Field Research*, 254

[149] R. Heale and D. Forbes, 'Understanding Triangulation in Research'. *Evidence-Based Nursing,* 16, 4, (2013), 98.

[150] S. Yeasmin and K. F. Rahman, 'Triangulation Research Method as the Tool of Social Science Research'. *BUP Journal,* 1, 1, (2012), 154-163.

[151] Corti and Thompson 'Secondary Analysis of Archived Data ', , 297-313

[152] C. Chong and K. Yeo, 'An Overview of Grounded Theory Design in Educational Research'. *Asian Social Science,* 11, 12, (2015), 258. p.258

[153] N. Gilbert, *Researching Social Life* (Los Angeles, Calif. ;London: Sage, 2008), 549.

participants from all forms of harm relating to the research. Finally, privacy of the participants, which relates to confidentiality and anonymity if it is requested.[154]

The research addressed these ethical issues by adhering to intellectual property rights with respect to documents. All documents used in this study were free to access online but were duly referenced in line with the University of Hull referencing standards. With respect to informed consent on the part of interview participants, all respondents in the interviews conducted were afforded the chance to give informed consent as is customary in social science research, especially when using grounded theory. Interviewees were free to opt for or opt out of participation upon full disclosure on the part of the researcher. They were given the fullest information regarding the research, including the purpose of the research, and data protection in line with the University of Hull ethics policy.[155] In addition to participants acting voluntarily, their safety was also taken into consideration, particularly relative to potential harm that a participant could suffer as a result of the information given. In addressing this, permission was always sought before attributing views to identifiable interviewees, and the identity of the researcher was fully disclosed.[156]

2.4 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has outlined the research strategy and design. It showed that the research was based on an exploratory single case study and grounded theory. The choice of a case study was based on what is considered as West Africa's uniqueness in terms of its politics and external engagements. The chapter has also indicated that the research hypotheses and research questions were guided by the nature of the case under study and the application of grounded theory. Both the case study and the grounded theory enabled an in-depth investigation into the ideas of hegemony and counter-hegemony. The research utilised two qualitative methods of data collection, namely, semi-structured in-depth interviews and documentary analysis of both primary and secondary sources. This

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[154] M. A. Powell et al., 'International Literature Review: Ethical Issues in Undertaking Research with Children and Young People'. (2012).
[155] *Research Ethics Policy* University Of Hull. Available online: https://www.hull.ac.uk/work-with-us/research/site-elements/docs/research-ethics-policy.pdf [Accessed 09/01/2020].
[156] R. K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World : The Process and Practice of Research*, 4th edition (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge Press, 2004), 474.

approach was designed to ensure that more data was gathered but also for triangulation purposes, which served as a check for accuracy.

Documents were gathered online, based on relevance to the thesis. Interview respondents were selected based on purposive sampling techniques and snowballing. Finally, the chapter has shown the procedure used for data analysis in the thesis. It was based on Corbin and Strauss' three steps of data analysis in grounded theory, which comprise, open coding, involving the categorising of data into themes; axial coding, which involves the reduction of the number of coded categories so as to narrow down the scope of analysis; and, selective coding, which draws conclusions by further narrowing the categories of analysis and determines points for further research. The chapter also outlined key ethical considerations in social science research, which were strictly adhered to.

Chapter 3 Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Governance

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides one of the frameworks through which West African collective security cooperation and ownership challenges are to be analysed. It specifically reviews literature on the concepts of power, hegemony and counter-hegemony relative to international governance. The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section looks at the concept of power from its broader perspective, that is the combination of hard and soft power, which is termed smart power,[157] arguing that focusing on either one alone limits our understanding of hegemony. The second section addresses the concept of hegemony. It will be argued that the concept is a contested one in a number of ways. Arguably, the main sticking point in the discourse on hegemony is the disagreement relating to what makes a state a hegemon. The section argues in favour of hegemony based on smart power as espoused by Gramscism, as against the solely hard power notion of the concept advocated by many realist theorists. From neo-Gramscian and neo-realist perspectives, the third section considers hegemony as an international phenomenon, as opposed to the intra-state perspective of classical Gramscism. The section goes further to argue that hegemony is only feasible at a regional, rather than a global level. The fourth section sets out six-point criteria of hegemony developed from John Hobson's five-point criteria. The fifth section addresses the concept of counter-hegemony, clarifies what it means in this thesis, and uses the six-point hegemonic criteria for its determination.

3.2 The concept of power and its relation to hegemony

To understand the concepts of hegemony, counter-hegemony, and hegemonic and counter-hegemonic governance, it is important to understand power. This is because of its close relationship with hegemony.[158] Power, as a concept, is very broad, with multiple dichotomies including material and non-material power, resources and outcomes, coercion and legitimacy as well as hard and soft power. Whilst recognising these

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[157] J. S. Nye Jr, 'Security and Smart Power'. *American Behavioral Scientist,* 51, 9, (2008), 1351-1356.

[158] D. Howarth, 'Power, Discourse, and Policy: Articulating a Hegemony Approach to Critical Policy Studies'. *Critical Policy Studies,* 3, 3-4, (2010), 309-335.; T. Diez, 'Normative Power as Hegemony'. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 48, 2, (2013), 194-210.; J. Lull'Hegemony ', in Dines, Gail and Humez, M. Jean(ed.), *Gender, Race and Class in Media: A Text-Reader*, 2nd ed. (London: sage publications, 2003), 61-66.

complexities, the focus here will be on the soft versus hard power dichotomy, since this is broader and essentially incorporates much of the other dichotomies to a large degree.

Power is extensively debated in international relations literature due to its significance. The concept is so significant that it is believed to be unsurpassed by any other concept debated within the international relations circle.[159] However, despite the centrality of power in international relations as a means for influence, the kind of power that best brings about influence is a matter of debate. Power is understood differently by different scholars. Therefore, the definition of power and its efficacy largely remains unresolved.[160] Joseph Nye put the problem of universal definition of power simply when he asserted, 'For a concept that is so widely used, "power" is surprisingly elusive.'[161] Nevertheless, Nye also observed that the elusiveness and difficulties encountered in trying to understand power 'do not make ... [the] concept meaningless.'[162] As previously noted, the hard power – soft power dichotomy, so closely associated with Nye's work, is central to this debate over power and it is to this that we now turn.

Even though material or coercive power features in other schools of thought (e.g. the English School), any examination of such a conceptualisation of power must initially focus on realism because it is amongst this group of scholars that it is most prominent. Power appears to feature more within the realist school of thought relative to state power. This is influenced by the realists' notion of an anarchic international system and the resultant difficulties for cooperation between states, due to distrust.[163] According to the realist school of thought, the international system is all about survival, hence states are always in competition and, some at least, aim to dominate. The issue of survival versus dominance for hegemony centres on the debate between defensive and offensive realists.[164] Whereas Kenneth Waltz, from a defensive neo-realist perspective, sees states

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[159] K. Kadera and G. Sorokin, 'Measuring National Power'. *International Interactions,* 30, 3, (2004), 211-230. p.211.
[160] J. C. Isaac, 'Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique'. *Polity,* 20, 1, (1987), 4-31.
[161] J. S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 322. p.3
[162] Nye, *The Future of Power*, 322 p.3
[163] B. C. Schmidt, 'Competing Realist Conceptions of Power'. *Millennium,* 33, 3, (2005), 523-549. Also see; E. H. Carr et al., *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*Macmillan London, 1946).; K. Booth'Realism Redux: Contexts, Concepts, Contests', Anonymous *Realism and World politics*Routledge, 2010), 15-28.
[164] G. H. Snyder, 'Mearsheimer's World—offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay'. *International Security,* 27, 1, (2002), 149-173.

as trying to attain sufficient power for survival in an anarchic international system,[165] John Mearsheimer, from an offensive neo-realist perspective sees states as building on their power to dominate and to eventually attain hegemonic status.[166] Despite the distinction, generally, realists' understanding of power is about the ability of one state to coerce another into submission. For example, according to Robert Gilpin, one of the main objectives of states is '…to increase their influence over the behavior of other states through the use of threats and coercion…'.[167] The term coercion is explained by David Lake as the ability of one state to threaten another with pain or punishment to get that state to comply with its demand without necessarily having the authority to demand so.[168] The realists' relative disregard of the need for legitimate authority is the theory's major weakness, as will be elaborated in the next section. The realists have held on to their view of coercion being the best means to cause compliance. They argue that for a state to be able to coerce, it must be materially powerful, for which reason they assess a state's power based on material endowment.[169] For instance, Waltz, lists population size, land mass, natural resource endowment, military power, economic might, competence and stability politically as the indicators of power.[170]

Building on Waltz's argument, it is reiterated here that the ultimate aim of realists' economic based power is to ensure coercive capacity by way of a formidable military force built from a strong economy.[171] From this background, Anne-Marie Slaughter in summarising power from the realist perspective, asserts, 'Realism can understand power in a variety of ways—e.g. militarily, economically, diplomatically—but ultimately emphasizes the distribution of coercive material capacity as the determinant of

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[165] K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1979), 251.

[166] J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001).

[167] R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*Cambridge University Press, 1981).; V. Ivanchenko et al., 'Power in International Politics: Does the World Go Hard? ', *University Consortium Annual Conference.* October 5-6, 2017, (Washington DC: 1-152017).

[168] D. A. Lake'Authority, Coercion, and Power in International Relations ', in M. Finnemore and J. Goldstein(eds.), *Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World* (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2013), 55-77.Also see:; B. H. Raven, 'The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence'. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy,* 8, 1, (2008), 1-22.

[169] J. Trunkos, 'What is Soft Power Capability and how does it Impact Foreign Policy'. *The Center for Cultural Diplomacy Studies,* (2013).; K. Petersen, 'Four Types of Power in International Relations Coercive Power, Bargaining Power, Concerted Power, and Institutionalized Power', *A Paper for IPSA, XXIInd World Congress of Political Science, Madrid.* 2012).

[170] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 251

[171] C. L. Glaser'Realism', in C. Alan(ed.), *Contemporary security studies*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford university press, 2010), 15-33.; Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 251

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international politics.'[172] Yet whilst there is considerable agreement that power is a key determinant of international politics, debate continues over how it is best understood. As Mearsheimer explains:

> At its most basic level, power can be defined in two different ways. Power, as I define it, represents nothing more than specific assets or material resources that are available to a state. Others, however, define power in terms of the outcomes of interactions between states.[173]

According to Carlsnaes et al., it was in the mid-20th century that the concept of power based on possession of assets came to be challenged by proponents of a concept of power based on outcomes and relations. In explaining this, they argue as follows:

> This causal notion conceives of power as a relationship (actual or potential) in which the behavior of actor A at least partially causes a change in the behavior of actor B. 'Behavior' in this context need not be defined narrowly, but may be understood broadly to include beliefs, attitudes, preferences, opinions, expectations, emotions and/or predispositions to act. In this view, power is an actual or potential relationship between two or more actors (persons, states, groups, etc.), rather than a property of any one of them.[174]

Mearsheimer acknowledges this relational conception of power and goes so far as to concede that 'non-material factors sometimes provide one combatant with a decisive advantage over the other', yet despite this he maintains that 'there is no question that the odds of success are substantially affected by the balance of resources',[175] Ultimately Mearsheimer rejects an outcomes based conception of power on the basis that: it makes it 'impossible to assess the balance of power'; it 'sometimes leads to implausible outcomes'; and it undermines the distinction between means and ends that it central to much of the debate in international relations.[176]

In stark contrast with Mearsheimer, Nye argues that having resources is one thing, but converting them into outcomes is another, and that accordingly power should be understood in terms of the latter rather than the former. He points to the need to make a distinction between power over others and power over outcomes, arguing that the latter

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[172] A. Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories'. *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,* 129, (2011). p.1

[173] J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 58

[174] D. Baldwin'Power and International Relations', in W. Carlsnaes et al.(ed.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002), 235-256, 237

[175] J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 58

[176] J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 60

is not always guaranteed by the former.[177] For him, resources only constitute power to the extent that they can bring about desired outcomes.[178] In part, Nye's rejection of a resource-based understanding of power stems from the fact that the utility of specific resources is often uncertain.   He asserts that '[a]nother problem [resource-based understanding of power] is determining which resources provide the best basis for power in any particular context. Power resources always depend on the context…Tanks are not much good in swamps; uranium was not a power resource in the nineteenth century…'.[179] But beyond this issue of context, a further, more fundamental argument against a resource-based understanding of power can be made, because coercive ability in the form of relatively greater resources do not ensure the ability of a state to get compliance from other states.

The challenge in getting compliance through resource-based power is the changes in geo-political dynamics and the associated global competition for influence. According to Samuel Huntington and Robert Jervis, after the end of the Cold War, for the first time, multi-polarity and multi-civilization characterised world politics.[180] What this means is that in an increasingly competitive world, the less powerful states under coercion may choose to disregard threats from its source in favour of powers that adopt non-coercive policies. Therefore, the over-emphasis on materially backed coercive influence by the realists is problematic, because coercion does not always guarantee compliance in a competitive world. Huntington and Jervis' point on multi-civilization depicts an even more complex world characterised by not only competition in material terms but also normative. Subjecting the realists' notion of power to this development further indicates its limitation. What a powerful state or hegemonic aspirant sees as right under the circumstance will most likely be viewed differently by other states.

It is from this view-point that Lake argued that coercion does not always work and asserted, 'Coercion can fail, obviously, in that A's threats and uses of violence may not always generate compliance by B. A may not be able to inflict sufficient pain to

[177] J. S. Nye, 'Soft Power', *Foreign Policy*, 80 (1990), 153-71
[178] J. S. Nye Jr, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 6th edition (New York: Pearson publishing company, 2007).
[179] Nye Jr, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* p.61
[180] S. P. Huntington and R. Jervis, 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order'. *Finance and Development-English Edition,* 34, 2, (1997), 51. S. Turner, 'Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order: The Danger in the Undefined'. *Asian Perspective,* 33, 1, (2009), 159-184.

outweigh B's loss of utility in complying...'[181] From the argument of Lake, coercion in such a complex world most likely will not succeed. This is because other power poles may adopt a different approach, which may be more acceptable to the weaker states. The accepted power may also lessen the punitive measures coming from its competitors that coerce.

The limitations of coercive hard power mean it is not sufficient to help us understand the concept of hegemony. For this reason, there is the need to incorporate soft power into the analysis. Indeed, for Nye and other supporters of his soft power proposition, soft power is equally, if not more important, than hard power.[182] According to Nye, a state's soft power is said to show when what it does is seen to be legitimate to others, especially those it seeks to influence. He therefore defined soft power as the '...ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies.'[183] Building on soft power and with reference to the realist limitation with respect to changing geo-politics, Kiymet Yavuzaslan and Murat Cetin argued to the effect that soft power '...has become more important so as to keep pace with today's requirements and the world order.'[184] The implication is that soft power is more appropriate in the contemporary competitive world with its associated challenges in using force to win influence and cause cooperation. Alternatively, soft power centres on getting others to reason along the direction of an influence seeking state through means other than coercive power. This explains why emerging powers in particular, but also traditional global powers, are now considering soft power in their quest for wider global influence.[185]

Soft power, as defined by Nye, can endear a hegemonic aspirant to other states based on the free will of those over whom hegemony is sought, rather than through

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[181] Lake'Authority, Coercion, and Power in International Relations ', , 55-77 p.56 Also see:; C. Layne, 'China's Challenge to US Hegemony'. *Current History-New York then Philadelphia-,* 107, 705, (2008), 13.

[182] Nye, 'Soft Power'. , 153-171

[183] J. S. Nye Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public affairs, 2004). p.x Also see:; E. J. Wilson III, 'Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power'. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 616, 1, (2008), 110-124.

[184] K. Yavuzaslan and M. Cetin 'Soft Power Concept and Soft Power Indexes', in H. et al. Danis(ed.), *Business Challenges in the Changing Economic Landscape - Vol. 1* (San Francisco: Springer, 2016), 395-409. p.395

[185] R. L. Armitage and J. S. Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS press, 2007).; A. Vuving, 'How Soft Power Works'. *Available at SSRN 1466220,* (2009).

coercion. However, it is important to note that, despite its intrinsic limitations, hard power can have a significant role to play in conjunction with soft power. This is because soft power can be exercised by way of inducement of a sort, where material power is used in ways other than for coercion to induce influence. Indeed, the biggest limitation of soft power arise where the responsibilities that come from the ideas being espoused by a power-seeking state require material power for their fulfilment. It is from this perspective that Giulio Gallarotti argued that soft power ought not to be limited to the intangible sources of power, but could also include the use of the realists' tangible resources, albeit devoid of coercion. He cited economic aid and the use of a state's military power in non-combatant services to others such as rescue missions among others as means through which one state can endear itself to another.[186] By implication, the only clear distinction between the two (soft and hard power) is that whereas one is about coercion, the other is about persuasion.

The preceding paragraph brings to the fore what Nye later termed smart power. The concept of smart power has generated keen interest in the literature of international politics. Its development has led to states adjusting their policies so as to build smart power for application in their external engagements.[187] According to Nye, smart power centres on how best to combine soft and hard power so that a state's foreign policy objectives may be achieved. In explaining it relative to the USA, he argued as follows: 'America's success will depend upon our developing a deeper understanding of the role of soft power and developing a better balance of hard and soft power in our foreign policy. That will be smart power.'[188] For Nye, such an approach helps address the inherent limitations of both hard and soft power and the misconception that his idea of soft power is alone sufficient relative to offering the real objective of power, namely, getting others to willingly act as one wishes.[189] In explaining the combination he further asserts, 'It is

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[186] G. M. Gallarotti, 'Soft Power: What it is, Why It's Important, and the Conditions for its Effective Use'. *Journal of Political Power,* 4, 1, (2011), 25-47.
[187] G. M. Gallarotti, 'Smart Power: Definitions, Importance, and Effectiveness'. *Journal of Strategic Studies,* 38, 3, (2015), 245-281.
[188] J. S. Nye Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public affairs, 2004). p.147 Alao see; M. Zweiri and R. Awwad, 'Obama's "Smart-Power" Strategy, One Year on: The Case of the Middle East'. *Digest of Middle East Studies,* 19, 1, (2010), 1-14.
[189] J. S. Nye Jr, 'Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power'. *Foreign Affairs,* (2009), 160-163.

an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels…' [190]

From our understanding of both soft and hard power, smart power can further be explained as being about firstly, state's attractiveness and the persuasive power over other states that stems from the attractiveness, and secondly, the idea that persuasive power coincides simultaneously with strong material power. Smartness can thus be measured in terms of how well these attributes are combined so that they do not conflict but complement each other.[191] It is important to note that despite the indispensability of hard power, Nye's focus appears to be more on how hard power can be used to complement soft power. This is explained by his focus on institution building for cooperation. The implication is that institutions will reduce the need for the use of hard power for its coercive purposes and offer an avenue through which influence comes about through soft power, in the context of institutional constraints.

From the preceding discussion on the concept of power, it is clear that power is a difficult concept to define, yet essential to any understanding of international relation/politics and, for the purpose of this thesis, hegemony and counter-hegemony. As used in the remainder of this thesis, power concerns the ability of an entity, be it a person or a state, to get others to act or do what the power-seeker wishes. This thesis proceeds on this understanding of power, rejecting the realist coercive approach to the concept. This is because, as will be shown in section 3.4, coercion relative to hegemony is problematic. It defeats the spirit of cooperation in the application of hegemony. This is the case when the less powerful are not committed to the dictates of the powerful but are only compelled to obey. This brings to the fore the need to combine soft and hard power disproportionately in favour of soft power to explain hegemony. In other words, hard power only enhances our understanding of hegemony relative to its contribution to the exercise of soft power and to the exercise of coercive power only on a legitimate basis. This thesis thus proceeds by defining smart power as *the combination of hard and soft power disproportionately in favour of soft power.*

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[190] Armitage and Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* p.7
[191] Nye Jr, 'Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power'. , 160-163

3.3 The concept of global governance

Having understood power, we now turn, albeit very briefly, to the issue of global governance since, from the perspective of this thesis, hegemony is intended to bring about cooperation for smooth international governance without a government. As such, hegemony is here considered to be a form of governance. It is important however to state that governance is a huge concept and a contested one,[192] but considered only briefly in this thesis for reasons of space. The whole idea of global governance is about solving common global problems through cooperation among states, mainly because no single state is able to solve such problems alone.[193] As a result, states have become closer than ever in terms of interdependence in the last few decades.[194] Correspondingly, there has been a proliferation of global governance entities to promote cooperation.[195] However, despite the key role both academics and practitioners ascribe to global governance in seeking to resolve global problems, it must be noted that the concept itself, along with the best means by which to manifest it in practice, remains contentious. Such debates notwithstanding, for reasons of space and topical focus, this thesis adheres to the Commission on Global Governance's view of the concept. According to the Commission, global governance is '… a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances.'[196] In the Commission's view a better world can only be created if states work together and use power collectively, engaging in 'formal institutions and regimes empowered to ensure compliance…'[197]

Despite adopting such a stance, it must be acknowledged that concerns exist regarding the manner in which many global governance institutions favour the world's

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[192] R. A. W. Rhodes, 'The New Governance: Governing without Government'. *Political Studies,* 44, 4, (1996), 652-667.; J. G. Ruggie, 'Global Governance and "new Governance Theory": Lessons from Business and Human Rights'. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations,* 20, 1, (2014), 5-17.; L. S. Finkelstein, 'What is Global Governance'. *Global Governance,* 1, (1995), 367.

[193] M. P. Karns and K. A. Mingst, *International Organizations : The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 603.

[194] T. T. Piece, 'Global Governance and Governance of the Global Commons in the Global Partnership for Development Beyond 2015'. (2013).; S. Norgrove, 'Transnational Challenges and Future Security Cooperation: The Australia-Canada Relationship'. (2013).

[195] Karns and Mingst, *International Organizations : The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*, 603

[196] Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* Oxford University Press, 1995). p.11

[197] Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* p.9-10

most powerful actors and therefore fail to serve their purpose of coordinating cooperation to deal with common global concerns. A report by the UN's Committee for Development Policy attests to this limitation. According to the report, current structures and rules pertaining to global governance are characterised by 'several asymmetries' when it comes to access and scope, as well as outcomes of global deliberations on common problems. The report further asserts, 'While developing countries must abide by and/or shoulder the effects of global governance rules and regulations, they have limited influence in shaping them.'[198] As a result, current global governance structures are challenged for being unrepresentative, a view expressed for example by Bradford Jr who argues that current global governance has so far failed to address the inequalities regarding power in the governance process.[199]

In light of these concerns, this thesis proceeds on the basis that current global governance institutions have often failed to take on board the contemporary circumstances of the world (geo-political dynamics) to enhance cooperation in line with the Commission's view of the concept of collective use of power. It is evident, therefore, that contemporary global governance institutions place importance on the primacy of powerful states over the legitimacy of governance institutions. This enables global powers to manifest coercive, state-centric hegemonic and sometimes counter-hegemonic influence abroad by virtue of their privileged positions in global governance institutions. This is a development that emerging state powers reject as they seek to establish hegemony in their respective regions as a solution to international and regional governance challenges. This leads us to the discussion of hegemony from a broader viewpoint that can bring about effective international cooperation.

3.4 The concept of hegemony

Having considered issues of power and governance, we now turn to one of the key conceptual concerns of this thesis, namely, hegemony. Despite the prominence of the concept of hegemony in many disciplines, it remains a contested concept in terms of what it is and how it is applied, particularly in international politics.[200] This relates to the debate

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[198] United Nations, *Global Governance and Global Rules for Development in the Post-2015 Era*United Nations publication,[2014]). p.vi
[199] C. I. Bradford Jr, 'Global Governance for the 21st Century'. *Brookings Institution/Centre for International Governance Innovation Governance Project,* (2005), 5-20.
[200] A. Antoniades, 'Hegemony and International Relations'. *International Politics,* 55, 5, (2018), 595-611.

over what constitutes power, considered previously. For the purposes of this thesis the debate will be largely but not exclusively limited to the positions of neo-realism and Gramscism/neo-Gramscism. This is because, whereas Gramsci is associated with the concept, neo-realist scholars have explicitly opined opposing views on the concept. This notwithstanding, other schools of thought such as the English School (ES) will be looked at to further our understanding of the concept as it has been applied internationally. According to Goda Dirzauskaite and Nicolae Ilinca, whereas neo-realists see hegemony as characterised mainly by hard power, neo-liberals have traditionally privileged soft power in their understanding of the concept and Gramscism/neo-Gramscism sees it as being about a combination of both, i.e. smart power.[201] It is for this reason that Howard Lentner argued that 'No settled definition provides the basis for ordered debate and the accumulation of knowledge about hegemony.'[202] Nevertheless, it is important to find a working definition to proceed on.

The term hegemony is derived from the Greek language and translates to mean guidance, leadership or rulership. It is generally understood to mean pre-eminence over others by a state, an organisation or even an individual.[203] Similarly, even though Lentner pointed to difficulty in defining hegemony, he indicated that the concept centres on 'two separate though related meanings: leadership and dominance.'[204] He associated leadership with consent and dominance with coercion. Lentner's notion of the concept can be traced to Antonio Gramsci as far as contemporary literature on hegemony is concerned.

The concept of hegemony as used in contemporary literature traces to the work of Antonio Gramsci.[205] According to Gramsci himself, what he meant by hegemony is consent-based dominance, in other words, acceptance by the majority of a population of an idea of a dominant social class. For Gramsci, the consent ought to be spontaneous and emanates from the prestige of the dominant class. From the perspective of Gramsci, the

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[201] G. Dirzauskaite and N. C. Ilinca, 'Understanding "Hegemony" in International Relations Theories'. *Development and International Relations Aalborg University,* 18, (2017).
[202] H. H. Lentner'Hegemony and Power in International Politics', in H. H. Lentner and M. Haugaard(eds.), *Hegemony and power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 89-108. p.108
[203] B. Fontana'Hegemony and Power in Gramsci', in R. Howson and K. Smith(ed.), *Hegemony Studies in Consensus and Coercion* (London: Routledge, 2008), 80-106.
[204] Lentner'Hegemony and Power in International Politics', , 89-108 p.90
[205] A. C. Beyer, *Counterterrorism and International Power Relations: The EU, ASEAN and Hegemonic Global Governance*IB tauris, 2010).

hegemonic class must be able to ensure that this consent remains either an active or passive commitment of the less dominant classes.[206] It is from this view point that Thomas Bates argued that Gramsci explained hegemony as a relational dominance devoid of force but based on consent through the power of ideas.[207] Aaron Zimmerman explains this, arguing that the issue of relational hegemonic dominance means that hegemony is established amid competing perspectives by various social strata in society. He argued that, from the perspective of Gramsci, a certain viewpoint must prevail in order to have an effective hegemony at equilibrium. He added that through a competitive struggle in ideas, one emerges as the dominant (prevailing common sense), enabling governance and keeping all social classes under control, thus serving the purpose of the dominant class (hegemon).[208]

The obvious challenge that comes to mind is how to get all social classes to comply with a proposed idea. This probably explains why Gramsci focused on consent rather than coercion, given that allegiance to a dominant social class is more easily won through persuasion than force. This is particularly so taking into consideration Gramsci's particular notion of consent which comes, preferably, with the active involvement of all social classes, despite disagreements within society. For instance, according to Jackson Lears, for Gramsci, consent meant the '… active commitment to the established order, based on a deeply held view that the rulers are indeed legitimate.'[209] Given Gramsci's emphasis on what we now term soft power, Robert Bocock defines hegemony as elaborate moral and ideological leadership attained through consent of major groups in a given society.[210] Similarly, according to Simon Rogers, Gramsci explained hegemony as a relationship not of sheer dominion by force but rather dominance with consent through the application of political and ideological leadership.[211] He noted that Gramsci used words like leadership interchangeably with hegemony in his prison notebooks, [212]

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[206] A. Gramsci et al., 'Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci'. (1971).
[207] T. R. Bates, 'Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony'. *Journal of the History of Ideas,* (1975), 351-366.
[208] A. Zimmerman, 'No Title'. *The Role of Organic Intellectuals in the Era of a Trump Presidency, Berkely Review of Education,* (2017).; J. A. Woolcock, 'Politics, Ideology and Hegemony in Gramsci's Theory'. *Social and Economic Studies,* (1985), 199-210.
[209] T. J. Lears, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities'. *The American Historical Review,* (1985), 567-593. p.569
[210] R. Bocock, *Hegemony* (Chichester: Ellis Horwood, 1986), 136. p.7
[211] R. Simon, *Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2015).; Fontana'Hegemony and Power in Gramsci', , 80-106
[212] Antonio Gramsci's Prison Notebooks are essays he wrote when he was incarcerated by the fascist regime of Italy. It is these notebooks that have been interpreted by different scholars.

emphasising consent.[213] It is in respect of Gramsci's consent-inclined conception of hegemony that Ian Clark argues as follows:

> …hegemony as a concept is presented as legitimate political practice, recognised and accepted by a relevant social constituency… this confers special rights and responsibilities on a state (or states) with the resources to lead. It thereby excludes… those many cases better conceived as instances of material primacy alone, lacking any social sanction. Hegemony then refers not just to a set of material conditions in which one state is predominant: it is not, in other words, primacy alone. Rather than something unilaterally possessed by the hegemon, it is a status bestowed by others, and rests on recognition by them. This is in return for the bearing of special responsibilities in the management of international order.[214]

This broad view of hegemony brings to the fore Gramsci's notion of hegemony which is in line with what is, as discussed earlier, contemporarily termed as smart power; Gramsci acknowledged the incorporation of coercive power in the application of hegemony. Consequently, despite his emphasis on consent, Gramsci conceded that in some cases hegemony may also connote domination.[215] Perry Anderson argued emphatically that Gramsci eventually incorporated coercion in his later application of the term hegemony. He called this a synthesis of consent and coercion.[216] However, even with the incorporation of coercive power, Gramsci did not depart from his strong views of legitimacy or consent. For instance, in explaining coercion relative to hegemony, Gramsci noted that the application of coercive power ought to be seen as legitimate and intended primarily to protect the system and not to be used to cause deference to a hegemon.[217] For Gramsci, hegemony which is based on sheer coercive power is a manifestation that the prestige of the dominant power is not sufficient to bring about active or passive deference and influence.[218]

There are two possible reasons that make hegemony based solely on consent or soft power less effective. Firstly, in a class-based society, getting a hundred percent consent by all classes is unlikely. Some degree of coercive power may be needed to get

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[213] Simon, *Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction* p.22

[214] I. Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[215] Simon, *Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction*

[216] P. Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci", New Left Review 100'. *Anderson100New Left Review1977,* (1977).; G. A. Williams, 'The Concept of'Egemonia'in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation'. *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 21, 4, (1960), 586-599.

[217] Gramsci et al., 'Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci'.

[218] D. Lung and M. Ball, 'The Concept of Hegemony'. *Available at SSRN 2961426,* (2015). p.5

hegemonic governance to function in the face of potential counter-hegemony emanating from the minority. This is particularly needed to avoid or to defeat confrontational counter-hegemony[219] from dissenters. In this respect, Thomas Bates argued that Gramsci incorporated coercion or hard power on the basis that ideas alone were not '…powerful enough to eliminate class struggle...' [220]   Secondly, from the definition of Clark, hegemony comes with some special responsibilities and as argued earlier, handling these requires some material power. This explains Clark's acknowledgement of the necessity of material power, despite placing emphasis on consent.

From the above discussion, this thesis proceeds from the perspective that hegemony must be based on smart power, that is consent, but with some coercive power resources to enable the hegemon to handle the burden of hegemony. Having given the historical background, hegemony from the perspective of Gramsci is now looked at from an international perspective so as to understand the scope of the concept and its application in this thesis.

3.4.1   Hegemony as an International Concept

This thesis analyses hegemony from an international scope. Gramsci himself focused his analysis on the intra-state level, but whereas some see Gramsci's notion of hegemony narrowly, arguing that his writings were localised to his setting, others have expanded its scope to encompass the international sphere. This is articulated by David Howarth as he argues to the effect that some commentators on the Gramscian notion of hegemony '…restrict his contribution to the particular (Italian) spatio-temporal context in which he was writing… More recently, his work is taken to represent a major theoretical contribution to our understanding of philosophy and politics which manages to exceed his particular situation.'[221] In line with the latter position, which supports the international scope of this thesis, Fontana argues that just as hegemony can be pursued by a social group, it may also be pursued by a state actor, an organisation or even an

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[219] Counter-hegemony is discussed in a subsequent section.
[220]   Bates, 'Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony'. , 351-366 p.351; M. C. Stoddart, 'Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse: A Critical Review of Theories of Knowledge and Power'. *Social Thought & Research,* (2007), 191-225.
[221] D. Howarth'Gramsci, Hegemony and Post-Marxism', Anonymous *Antonio Gramsci*Springer, 2015), 195-213. p.196

individual.[222] When states pursue hegemony it is over other states in the international arena for which reason hegemony could be looked at internationally.

The internationalization of Gramsci's concept of hegemony is termed as neo-Gramscism.[223] It is a term that is most closely associated with Robert Cox. Cox justifies his neo-Gramscism by arguing that for Gramsci, a concept ought to be elastic, which brings about precision only when applied to a particular setting. For him, 'this is the strength of Gramsci's historicism and therein lies its explanatory power.'[224] It is important to indicate that while Cox's internationalization of the concept is adopted in this thesis, his notion of hegemony is modified. He sees a hegemonic state as self-centred, maximising its power to its benefit with little benefit for the subordinate states, without compromising on consent built on institutions. Cox acknowledges that such an arrangement will be opposed by other states, but argued that hegemony is not just about relations between states alone but includes global civil societies through which hegemonic states are able to influence other states through their activities.[225] However, it is argued in this thesis that any form of hegemony perceived by the subordinate states as not serving its interest will not bring about effective cooperation, which is the goal of hegemony.

An approach to understanding hegemony internationally that is more likely to support effective cooperation and hence aligns with the approach adopted in this thesis is the one offered by Robert Gilpin. He also referred to Gramsci but in contrast to Cox he argues that hegemony only comes about when the hegemon is willing to make compromises in the interest of other states. In Gilpin's view, this is because, '…the hegemon can encourage but cannot compel other powerful states to follow the rules in the international system.'[226] In contrast to Cox, and arguing from a win-win sustainable hegemony perspective, Gilpin further asserts,

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[222] Fontana'Hegemony and Power in Gramsci', , 80-106
[223] F. Mendonça and D. Demuner, 'The Neo-Gramscian School to International Political Economy, Passive Revolution and Globalization'. *Brazilian Political Science Review,* 10, 3, (2017).
[224] R. W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method'. *Cambridge Studies in International Relations,* 26, (1993), 49. p.50
[225] R. W. Cox and T. J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*Cambridge University Press, 1996).; Hobson, *The State and International Relations*
[226] R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). p.73

If other states begin to regard the actions of the hegemon as self-serving and contrary to their own political and economic interests, the hegemonic system will be greatly weakened. It will also deteriorate if the citizenry of the hegemonic power believes that other states are cheating, or if the costs of leadership begin to exceed the perceived benefits.[227]

The notion that hegemony is about cooperation in dealing with common problems at the instigation of the hegemon is also is articulated by some realists in their adoption of hegemonic stability theory (HST).[228] The theory is a modification of the realist notion that cooperation at the international level is not possible.[229] The theory relates primarily to international political economy with the argument that international institutions formed for the purpose of cooperation among states are relatively more stable if there is a hegemon that provides leadership.[230] HST centres on the material power of the hegemon and its ability to coerce or induce compliance in the less powerful.[231] The main weakness of the theory is its emphasis on coercive power. It is for this reason that Robert Keohane described the analysis of the theory along realist lines as problematic and argued for the incorporation of legitimacy. He conceded that the theory's proposition that hegemony does facilitate certain kinds of cooperation among states at the international level is true, but added that there could nevertheless be cooperation without hegemony.[232]

Proceeding with this view that hegemony with legitimacy can facilitate cooperation and drawing on Cox's observation regarding the elasticity of Gramsci's concept of hegemony, our understanding of international hegemony (and subsequently counter-hegemony) can be further enhanced by reference to the debates in International Relations regarding great power politics.

3.4.1.1 Hegemony in great power politics
A debate over the nature of hegemony which is more overtly international in its interstate nature can be found in the international relations debate regarding the nature

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[227] Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*

[228] P. J. Katzenstein et al., 'International Organization and the Study of World Politics'. *International Organization,* 52, 4, (1998), 645-685.

[229] J. M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[230] M. C. Webb and S. D. Krasner, 'Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment'. *Review of International Studies,* 15, 2, (1989), 183-198.; D. Snidal, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory'. *International Organization,* (1985), 579-614.

[231] T. J. McKeown, 'Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe'. *International Organization,* (1983), 73-91.

[232] R. O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*Princeton university press, 1984).

and role of great powers. Rather confusingly in the context of this thesis, the literature does not always use the term hegemon or hegemony but, as will be seen from the paragraphs that follow, its analysis addresses the very issues which are central to this thesis. The literature focuses on the nature of power in international politics, mainly on soft power, hard power and smart power and the roles of coercion and persuasion in getting lesser powers to cooperate with great power(s).

According to Hedley Bull, the concept of great powers means three things: the first is an acknowledgement that no single state power dominates the international system; in other words, there is more than one power of comparable status. Second, these states are all 'front-rank' when it comes to military power. Finally, great powers are those that are recognised as such by both the less powerful and other great powers, and with this recognition comes special rights and duties reserved for such great powers.[233] He pointed out that the immediate task of great powers is to manage relations among themselves to avoid conflicts. They do so by agreeing on their respective spheres of influence in the international system, where they also manage the behaviours of their affiliate lesser powers. All of these are aimed at ensuring international order.[234]

Building on Bull's understanding of the concept of great power, Barry Buzan also points to material power but questions its precision in measuring great power/hegemonic status. He therefore places emphasis on the scope of recognition of the status. He argues that a great power/hegemon must be recognised not only by its peers but also by a good section of the international society. He justifies his argument for recognition beyond that of a great power concert on the grounds that heedless to broad-based recognition has accounted for instances where some states are co-opted into the ranks of great powers when they do not qualify in terms actual material capability. More crucially and key to our understanding of hegemony, from a great power viewpoint, he added that such a state or states must show willingness to play the role of a great power with respect to handling of their designated special responsibilities.[235] This leads us to the debate on which form of relation between great powers and lesser powers can bring about effective cooperation

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[233] H. Bull et al., *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, Third edition (Basingstoke, England ;New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
[234] Bull et al., *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*
[235] B. Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Polity press, 2004).

for the international order that the idea of great power/hegemony seeks to achieve. They range from sheer coercion, to coercion with some constraints and ultimately to solely social or relational induced recognition.[236]

The realists' understanding of power as a coercive, material phenomenon applies in their understanding of the concept of great powers/hegemony and how they relate to lesser powers. For instance, Kenneth Waltz explained the ascription of great power status as largely based on how material power enables such states to coerce lesser powers. Waltz's initial argument is that states are considered equal, whereby, 'None is entitled to command and none is required to obey.'[237] However, Waltz also recognised that through capability differences between states, hierarchy in the international system emerges. He argues that the most powerful materially states will often assume special responsibilities and seek to manage the international system. Waltz holds that in handling these responsibilities, great powers are able to cause other states to do as the great powers wish.[238]

Arguing along the view-point of Waltz, John Mearsheimer indicated that for a state to be considered as a great power, it needs to have adequate military resources to put up a major fight in what he terms '…an all-out conventional war…'[239] against the leading state power in the world. For him, such a war must cause significant damage to the most powerful, even if the relatively less powerful is eventually defeated.[240] Though Mearsheimer also places importance on economic power, he is of the view that possessing economic power such as large population, a large economy and advanced technology alone amounts to what he terms 'latent' power and that translating this into military capability defines a great power. Such capabilities are needed to enable a great power not only to compete among its peers, but also to coerce other states as part of pursuing its ultimate goal of becoming a regional hegemon. Mearsheimer understands hegemony from the realists' perspective as a state that can win all wars in the international system for which reason military power is paramount.[241] Adam Watson, though an English

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[236] J. Morris, 'From 'Peace by Dictation' to International Organisation: Great Power Responsibility and the Creation of the United Nations'. *The International History Review,* 35, 3, (2013), 511-533.

[237] K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1979), 251. p.88

[238] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 251

[239] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* p.5

[240] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*

[241] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*

School (ES) theorist, adopts a similar perspective in respect of great power/lesser power relations. Watson equated the great power concept to a single dominant hegemon in the international society.[242] According to Watson, the concept has two sides: firstly, military, technology and economic endowment; secondly, ideological dominance. Watson views hegemony from the perspective of the former (material power). Like Waltz and Mearsheimer, he based his position on the fact that great powers are able to influence others through inducements and pressures because of their material strength, leading to many states being unable to act in freedom.[243]

This notion that sheer coercive power, exercised in the absence of considerations of legitimacy, can facilitate international cooperation and form a basis for international order is rejected in this thesis. Contrary to the realist position, broad-based recognition of great power/hegemonic status will not be granted by the lesser power solely on the basis of material power or the ability to coerce. Indeed, any attempt to coerce in this manner is likely to lead to collective opposition. This is in line with Wight et al.'s argument that recognition of dominant powers is shown by either collaboration with or collaboration against the dominant power. In other words, weaker states either collaborating with the powerful state on its proposed vision if they agree with it, or collaborate among other weaker states against the vision of the powerful states if they oppose it.[244]

This brings us to a different understanding of how great powers/hegemons engage with lesser powers. Here, the role played by great powers in ensuring international order is also underpinned by their material power, but in exercising this, they must give an account of their behaviour, which is a form of constraint on the great power/hegemon. Advocating this viewpoint, Inis Claude indicated that great powers' responsibilities over their allies make it possible for them to exert influence on the internal affairs of their weaker ally states. But shifting away from a sheer coercive connotation of great power/lesser power relations, Claude argued that despite great powers' ability to influence lesser powers emanating from their material power advantage, the lesser powers ought not to be dominated by a great power/hegemon even though great powers are expected to be in charge of their less powerful allies. For him, by being in charge, the

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[242] A. Watson, *Hegemony and History* (London ;New York: Routledge, 2007), 127.
[243] Watson, *Hegemony and History*, 127
[244] M. Wight et al., *Power Politics* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), 317.

great powers not only have restraining power over the lesser powers, but they also impose restraints on their own self-interest. [245] Similarly, Robert Jackson argues that the behaviour of great powers/hegemons in the exercise of their special responsibilities is rooted in their material power but is constrained because its application is expected to be accounted for to the lesser powers as part of ensuring order. For example, he argued that all great powers must tailor their military and foreign policies along the principles of the UN, which lesser powers can legitimately expect from the great powers to reciprocate compliance to great powers' dictates.[246]

The restraint on the self-interest of great powers/hegemons means a hierarchical relationship that confines coercion within a framework of great power obligation and reflects the interests of the lesser powers. Problems arise, however, with this conception of hierarchy/hegemony when there is no clear-cut distinction between coercion on the one hand and legitimate authority based on social relations on the other. The greater the extent to which great powers remain in charge of the affairs of the lesser powers by virtue of their material power capability, the less the relationship can be viewed as social. This is because once hard power is rooted in the relations between the great power/hegemon and the lesser power, the relationship cannot be said to be a social one based on legitimate authority, even though accountability is expected of the great power/hegemon. This brings us to yet another perspective, one which is akin to relations based solely on soft power and focuses far more on social rather than material power in bringing about great power/hegemonic recognition.

David Lake considers socially relation-based recognition of authority as more important than coercion. He explains hierarchy in the international society as emanating from authority and not coercion. According to Lake, authority comes about from a bargain between a great power and the lesser power. This is a situation where the less powerful agrees to cede some degree of sovereignty to the more powerful, not based on coercion, but based on an arrangement in the international society. This arrangement, he argues, must be agreed upon by both the powerful and the less powerful and through this the

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[245] I. L. Claude, 'The Common Defense and Great-Power Responsibilities'. *Political Science Quarterly,* 101, 5, (1986), 719-732.
[246] R. H. Jackson and R. Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*OUP Oxford, 2000).

deferring of authority is legitimated. [247] Lake distinguished between coercion and authority, arguing that whilst coercion is about overpowering another without any form of legitimacy, authority emanates from a bargain that subsequently makes compliance obligatory. For him, respecting the obligation is reciprocated by the great power as it takes care of the lesser power states' needs. From his notion of legitimate authority, the lesser power recognises the fact that the great power reserves the right to punish disobedience.[248] The limitation of Lake's notion of authority is that it does not also show explicit social relations since it remains highly contingent on coercive power. Lake's reliance on coercion to keep the terms of a bargain weakens his view of social relations. His notion of bargain is unlikely to address common interests effectively, because the less powerful may be circumstantially compelled to accept the terms of the great power/hegemon, which is itself a form of coercion.

Ian Hurd gives us a deeper socially-induced notion of authority and, by implication, hegemony. Like Lake, he puts recognition of great power/hegemonic status emanating from social relations ahead of coercion, but in so doing he rejects the coercive aspect of authority, even if the right to apply coercion is based on mutual recognition. According to Hurd, legitimacy is obedience that is not motivated by fear of retribution or calculations of self-interest but by a '…sense of rightness and obligation.'[249] He argues that legitimacy gives rise to authority which, in any international hierarchical relationship, is based on social acceptance. The acceptance is based on the conviction that the hierarchical structures are legitimate and accommodate the interest of the lesser powers. From this perspective, whenever coercion is used due to disobedience, it indicates a lack of authority. Significantly, Hurd notes that the great power/hegemon in the international society are also subjected to the same rules as the less powerful regarding the social order that is put in place.[250]

Ian Clark makes a similar argument to Hurd, emphasizing the social relational aspect of great power/hegemonic recognition. He premises his argument on the ES idea

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[247] D. A. Lake, 'Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics'. *International Security,* 32, 1, (2007), 47-79.
[248] Lake, 'Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics'. , 47-79
[249] I. Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*Princeton University Press, 2008). p.30
[250] I. Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics'. *International Organization,* 53, 2, (1999), 379-408.

of an international society which, he argues, is inhospitable to coercion and primacy because of prevailing shared values within the society.[251] Clark states that recognition is not based on '…a set of attributes and capabilities possessed by the claimant.'[252] In further rejecting coercive power, he argues that in place of any form of balancing of the great power/hegemon by military means, hegemony should be institutionalized. Echoing Hurd, Clark argues that a great power/hegemon is obliged to obey its own rules and where it fails to do so a legitimacy deficit arises.[253]

The positions of both Hurd and Clark enhance our understanding of the concept of hegemony internationally. This is mainly because both of them are of the view that any form of influence coming from a great power/hegemonic state must be rooted in a social relationship. For both, a great power/hegemon must ensure that its edicts, whether from the state level or where hegemony is institutionalised, are legitimate and apply to all, including the initiating great power/hegemon itself. This notion, alongside the performance of special roles by great powers/hegemons, explains hegemony internationally from the perspective of this thesis. The only limitation in respect of Hurd is his view that interests are never reviewed by states once legitimacy is accorded, because these are always believed to be catered for in whatever the legitimate authority professes. This seems to assume that disagreement is not possible and to disregard the fact that deference to hegemony is voluntary and can be withdrawn at any given time. It is from this viewpoint that Clark questions Hurd's explanation of legitimacy that excludes interest of states, pointing to the general view among scholars of hegemony that legitimacy is partly accorded based on the interest of the states involved, for which reason compliance is voluntary.[254]

3.4.2   Criteria for Hegemony

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the notion of hegemony (and for IR scholars great power status more generally) remains contested. So far the discussion has focused very largely on the nature of power and the extent to which power, either as a coercive, soft or smart, is a necessary ingredient of hegemony. Having taken a clear

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[251]   I. Clark, 'How Hierarchical can International Society be?'. *International Relations,* 23, 3, (2009), 464-480.
[252]   Clark, 'How Hierarchical can International Society be?'. , 464-480 p.473
[253]   Clark, 'How Hierarchical can International Society be?'. , 464-480
[254]   Clark, 'How Hierarchical can International Society be?'. , 464-480

position on this, we are now better placed to set out a working definition of hegemony which can be applied throughout the remainder of the thesis. The definition adopted reflects the preceding discussion of power and coercion/social sanction but also goes far beyond these factors. It builds on the work of John Hobson, but modifies his theoretical framework through the amendment of criteria and the incorporation of the concept of regionness.[255] The definition of a hegemon is as follows: *a state which, in relation to a reasonably defined region, exhibits an unmatched combination of material Power, Vision, Willingness, Beneficence, Recognition, and Institutional Penetration. The state in question may be located within or outside of the region in question.*

Hobson's criteria, which will be itemised shortly, consider hegemony from a broader viewpoint, that is, hegemony based on consent but with coercive power capability. The justification for the adoption of Hobson's criteria of hegemony is thus based on their broadness and international scope. In his work, Hobson articulates five defining criteria of hegemony. In this thesis, his criteria are adopted, amended and expanded to serve as a framework to test hegemony. For Hobson, hegemony requires: military and economic dominance; the espousing of liberal ideals which brings about willingness for hegemonic pursuit; short-terms sacrifices for long term goals; some degree of consensus by states in according hegemonic status; and finally, futuristically looking through the establishment of international regimes for collective goals.[256] Despite utilising and developing his framework, it is important to note that Hobson himself did not expand in detail on his criteria. Consequently, his points are used as a guide and expanded by relying on the earlier discussion of hegemony in this chapter. Following this approach, this thesis adopts the following six defining criteria of hegemony.

3.4.2.1 Material Power
In order to be classed as a hegemon a state must, *inter alia*, possess power in the sense that it can credibly be classed as a leading military and economic power. According to Hobson, and in common with the vast majority of other scholars who have sought to define what it means to be a hegemon as shown in section 3.4, a hegemonic state must be very significantly endowed materially. Hobson referred to this as 'superior power base.'[257] For Hobson this enables a hegemonic state the ability to handle problems of the

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[255] Regioness is discussed in Chapter Six (section 6.2.1).
[256] Hobson, *The State and International Relations*
[257] Hobson, *The State and International Relations* p.39

international system, as will be seen in his other criteria. It is important to stress that this is a key factor in hegemonic pursuit, regardless of the school of thought. For instance, as discussed earlier, material power is a hegemonic characteristic for both realists and scholars of great power politics, mainly because of its coercive purposes. More importantly for this thesis, it is also seen as a contributory factor to acquiring soft power for hegemonic purposes. This corroborates the earlier argument that material power is capable of producing smart power. [258] This thesis thus proceeds by arguing that preponderant material power, or what is termed simply in this thesis as material power, is a criterion of hegemony. Such power can be said to exist *when a state is considered among the top ranked powers militarily and economically in a given region.*

3.4.2.2   Vision

In order to be classed as a hegemon a state must, *inter alia*, possess a vision in the sense that it can be seen to offer a clear agenda with objectives and strategies on which it offers hegemonic leadership. Vision as a criterion is a significant adaptation of one of Hobson's criteria, namely, that a hegemon must be a liberal state.[259] This is based on the fact that, while Hobson's preceding criterion (power) is not contentious, his second criterion is debatable. Hobson argues that hegemonic pursuit is contingent on a state's liberal adherence. For this thesis this is the point of departure from Hobson, particularly as he links liberalism to the will to pursue hegemony. While it is logical to assume that a liberal state will export its liberal values abroad, it is not always the case in reality. One example is France's post-colonial hegemonic pursuit in West Africa where its vision centres on cultural, economic and security cooperation.[260] It is also important to indicate that adherence to liberalism, both at home and abroad of those that have liberalism as a hegemonic vision can be questioned. An example is the USA before 1965 in respect of its internal liberal adherence and post-1965 in respect of its external liberal adherence.[261] There are also instances where domestic liberal states could pursue hegemony on a vision other than liberalism. China is a good example of a state that could pursue hegemony or is even doing so already, yet, it is not regarded as a liberal state.

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[258]   Hobson, *The State and International Relations*
[259] Though liberalism is a broad concept, it is simplified in this thesis to means democratic adherence and the rule of law.
[260] See Chapter Five (section 5.3.2)
[261] See Chapter Five (section 5.2.2)

It is thus argued that, notwithstanding the potential significance of liberal values to hegemonic pursuit, hegemony is not necessarily about propagating liberal democratic values. Such a view is rather narrow, which is why a broader criterion is used in this thesis – vision, that is, a futuristic outlook of the hegemon that aims at addressing a common concern or concerns of a given international system through cooperation on a wide range of issues. From this perspective, liberalism can be seen as but one amongst various potential visions that a hegemonic aspirant can champion. This thesis thus proceeds by arguing that vision is a criterion of hegemony and that vision can be said to exist *when there is a stated anticipatory end result of an agenda embarked upon by a state with strategies for its execution through a gradualist approach.*

3.4.2.3 Willingness

In order to be classed as a hegemon a state must, *inter alia*, show willingness for hegemony in the sense that it should expressly and through its policies and attitudes show hegemonic interest. One of the reasons why Hobson considers liberalism as a hegemonic criterion is his view that only liberal states have the willingness for hegemony. For him, liberal states have the willingness to establish a liberal world and non-liberal states are more inclined to imperialism.[262] Hobson's assumption is that liberal states will most likely pursue hegemony based on consent. In his view, that will make cooperation internationally possible, so that a hegemon can legitimately get other states to accept the liberal values it maintains at home. This can be seen in his contrast between hegemony and imperialism whereby the latter has to do with dictatorship or coercion which for him, non-liberal states opt for.[263] However, as noted in the preceding section, this thesis holds the view that non or weak liberal states may also pursue hegemony. It is argued here that the main motivation for hegemonic willingness is the need for international cooperation anchored in consensus building for mutual benefits. But the specific vision(s) that motivates cooperation may differ from one hegemon to another. It is for this reason that willingness is considered as a separate criterion as part of the adaptation of Hobson's hegemonic criteria. This thesis thus proceeds by arguing that willingness is a criterion of hegemony and that hegemonic willingness can be said to exist when a state *shows*

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[262] Hobson, *The State and International Relations*
[263] Hobson, *The State and International Relations*

commitment not only by pronouncements but backed by policy and manifest action in pursuit of a vision(s) through cooperation.

3.4.2.4 Beneficence

In order to be classed as a hegemon a state must, *inter alia*, show beneficence in the sense that a hegemonic state must be willing to sacrifice its material endowment for the benefit of the international system that it seeks to lead. The attempt by a hegemonic state to deal with collective action challenges using its economic and military power requires the making of sacrifices. In citing the work of Keohane, Hobson argued that 'A hegemon must be willing to make short-term sacrifices in order to secure long-term collective/global benefit…'[264] This brings to the fore the key impact of material power in hegemonic pursuit. In conjunction with the criteria of consent, sacrifice means using material power in a manner that promotes the hegemon's soft power. In other words, a hegemonic state comes to the aid of members of the international system with its military and economic power when necessary and in agreement with those it assists. This is expected of a hegemon given that it usually initiates the idea of cooperation mainly to promote its hegemonic vision in the long run. Hobson cited the USA's role as a global police force, among others, as an example of hegemonic sacrifices.[265] This thesis thus proceeds by arguing that beneficence is a criterion of hegemony and it is said to be fulfilled when there is *leadership shown by commitment to common concerns of the international system in many ways but particularly material commitment that manifests selflessness to promote soft power.*

3.4.2.5 Recognition

In order to be classed as a hegemon a state must, *inter alia*, secure the recognition of key states in the region over which it seeks hegemony. According to Hobson, it is expected that a hegemonic state must enjoy some hegemonic deference or what is termed in this thesis as recognition by key states of the international system, to be considered a hegemon. This reflects Gramsci's argument that a total consensus may not be achieved; not all states within a given international setting will accept the hegemon. Hence, Gilpin asserts as cited by Hobson, 'There must be rudimentary consensus among the major states for hegemony.'[266] What this means is that once the other criteria are met by a state and it

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[264] Hobson, *The State and International Relations* p.40
[265] Hobson, *The State and International Relations*
[266] Hobson, *The State and International Relations* p.39

also gains acceptance by sufficient key states, it can be considered as a hegemon. This thesis thus proceeds by arguing that recognition is a criterion of hegemony. Such recognition requires the *manifest or tacit acceptance of the hegemonic status of a hegemonic aspiring state by key members of the international system (region).*

3.4.2.6   Institutional Penetration

In order to be classed as a hegemon a state must, *inter alia*, institutionalise hegemony in the sense that a hegemonic state should support the formation of and participate in international institutions that support cooperation through the addressing of common challenges. With collective action being one of the primary objectives of a hegemon, Hobson argued that one of the defining criteria of hegemony is a state being future-oriented by establishing regimes to facilitate long-term international order or welfare. This is a means through which a state aspiring to hegemony can attain and sustain it by remaining committed to the welfare of the international system. [267] Yet whilst Hobson sees institutions primarily as a means through which to facilitate a collective agenda, in this thesis they are also identified as a means through which an aspirant hegemon can generate and maintain consent. The reason is that channelling hegemony through institutions established on laws means that ideas from the hegemonic power gain acceptance through due process and hence hegemonic vision and ideas become legitimated. This is because the process will require debate, so an idea is only accepted if the proponent is able to convince the rest. This thesis thus proceeds by arguing that institutional penetration is a criterion of hegemony. This criterion is fulfilled through *the existence of an international institution, solely or jointly initiated by the hegemon, whose acceptable vision is manifestly embodied in the institution in which it participates.*

As has already been established, hegemony means different things to different people, with contestation deriving largely from disputes over the nature of power, the role of coercion, and means by which influence over others can be gained. But beyond this a broader understanding of hegemony as developed into the six-criteria framework enumerated above provides for an analysis of the concept that goes beyond these issuues. In this context it is important to indicate that all six criteria must be looked at in combination. Moreover, a state need not be ranked highest in every criterion; it can still

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[267] Hobson, *The State and International Relations*

be considered a hegemon if, in combination, it most strongly possesses the criteria of hegemony identified.

3.4.3 Hegemony: a global or regional phenomenon?

Having understood hegemony and set out six testing criteria, this section examines the possible geographic scope of hegemony. The view of global hegemony held by Cox, Gilpin and Hobson in their internationalization of hegemony is challenged in this section on the basis that hegemony is practicable only as a regional phenomenon. This claim is built on the discussions in the preceding section on great powers, specifically relating to the principle of balance of power by great power states. The significance of the balance of power and how it can curtail global hegemonic attainment is often underestimated. It is for this reason that some scholars have ascribed global hegemony to a single state, often the USA in recent decades.[268] Nevertheless, it is argued in this thesis that we cannot talk about hegemony on a global scale. That is to say, global hegemony is never likely, given the innate nature of powerful states wanting to maintain their positions by ensuring balance of power in the international system. The argument here is that even if there is an uneven distribution of power, whatever remains of the idea of balance of power, especially with the advent of emerging powers, is sufficient to prevent global hegemony.

This position is supported by structural realists such as Waltz, who argues that powerful states in the international system will often square off and make allies with weaker states to counter-balance each other rather than combine forces, which would lead to power concentration and even hegemony.[269] Waltz further asserts, 'If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system.'[270] Watson termed the issue of alliance building by great powers as 'anti-hegemonial coalition.'[271] Similarly, Barry Buzan, an ES scholar with an interest in structural realism, argues that the ascription of states such as Russia among others as great powers after the second world war was chiefly

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[268] C. Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment Revisited'. *The National Interest,* 70, (2002), 5-18.; Beyer, *Counterterrorism and International Power Relations: The EU, ASEAN and Hegemonic Global Governance*

[269] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 251; H. H. Hama, 'Is the United States Still a Global Hegemonic Power?'. *International Journal of Social Sciences & Educational Studies,* (2016), 109.

[270] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 251p.126

[271] A. Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1992), 337. p.28

because they could potentially challenge the leading state, the USA.[272] What is important to note is that great powers actually do challenge a singularly dominant state in order to prevent global hegemony. As Christopher Layne has argued, 'One of the few ironclad lessons of history is that great powers that seek hegemony are always opposed – and defeated – by the counterbalancing efforts of other states.'[273]

Another significant factor to consider in arguing against the possibility of a single global hegemon is the position of the ES scholars. They have dismissed both the desirability and even the possibility of hegemony by a single state on a global scale. For instance, according to Clark, for the ES scholars, the idea of a global hegemon is a sort of '…counterpoint to, and deformity of, the ideal international society…' [274] For the ES, the international society is seen as a remedy to anarchy or the lack of order in the international system. As argued by Dunning, the idea of international society means that states take into consideration the interest of others in their actions. This is motivated by a sense of interdependence in which the survival of one state or community is contingent on the security of the whole international society.[275] Crucially in the context of the current discussion, international society is understood to be dependent on a balance of power, agreed upon and institutionalised by the leading state powers as a way of preventing wars among themselves and a means of facilitating the management of relations with and between lesser powers. This explains the point made in the preceding section, that great powers respect each other's domain of influence in the international system. For instance, according to Bull, great powers are able to act independently of the concert in their areas of influence, often without protest from the other great powers.[276] In another work, Bull makes it clear that great powers primarily seek two things: first, to counter-balance each other and act in concert on areas of common interest; second, to use the concert to enhance regional hegemony.[277] Though approached from a different theoretical perspective from

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[272] Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*

[273] C. Layne, 'China's Challenge to US Hegemony'. *Current History-New York then Philadelphia-,* 107, 705, (2008), 13. p.18; G. J. Ikenberry, 'Getting Hegemony Right'. *The National Interest,* 63, (2001), 17-24.

[274] I. Clark, 'Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony'. *European Journal of International Relations,* 15, 2, (2009), 203-228. p.207

[275] T. Dunne, 'Society and Hierarchy in International Relations'. *International Relations,* 17, 3, (2003), 303-320.

[276] H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 329.

[277] H. Bull, 'The Great Irresponsibles? the United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order'. *International Journal,* 35, 3, (1980), 437-447.

the ES, this is corroborated by Waltz. From a structural realist viewpoint, he argues that in many cases the attention of great powers is more on regional than global concerns.[278]

The discussion in the preceding paragraph supports the argument that global hegemony is not feasible on the basis that it will be prevented by the counter-balancing activities of other states, most notably other great powers. But there is another factor, separate though related, that prevents the establishment of global hegemony, namely the immense difficulty of projecting military power on a global scale, particularly with respect to regions dominated by rival powers. As a leading proponent of this claim, Mearsheimer argues that hegemony on a global scale cannot be attained. On the contrary, he argued that hegemony is only attainable at the regional level. [279] Mearsheimer described the notion of global hegemony as a misrepresentation of his definition of the concept as domination of a given system. In his view, besides having to deal with rival power, equally important is the difficulty of weaponry transportation, which he argues is hindered by having to cross seas.[280] With advanced technology, one could argue that this argument is weak. However, the impact of weapons that have to be transported to faraway places, cannot compare with a local power that can reasonably stand up to the global leading power. For this reason, Mearsheimer's point remains valid. Building on Mearsheimer's point, Thomas Mowle and David Sacko argue that although there may be a clear leading global power, the notion of global hegemony under a single state remains unattainable. Citing the USA, they argue as follows, 'If hegemony means controlling the world, winning every fight, and being accepted as rightful ruler, then the United States is not a hegemon. If hegemon means something less than that, then perhaps the United States is a hegemon.'[281]

Juxtaposing the preceding section with the hegemonic criteria set out for this thesis buttresses a central claim that hegemony can only be a regional phenomenon. This is not, however, to suggest that the impediments to global hegemony are entirely absent at the regional level, but the challenges to hegemony are more surmountable at the regional level. First, with regards to power projection, there is no question that states will always differ in terms of material power, globally or regionally. The implication is that

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[278] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 251
[279] J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001).
[280] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*
[281] T. Mowle and D. Sacko, *The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future*Springer, 2007). p.3

one state may surpass all other states in terms of material power and may seek hegemony globally relying on the benefits that this provides, including its contribution to soft power by supporting benevolence. However, due to balance of power, it is practically impossible to get the required deference globally for hegemony. For instance, in contemporary geo-politics, a global hegemon would require the recognition of key states such as China, India, Russia and other global powers which is most unlikely in view of their posturing for global prominence. Conversely, deference is relatively easily attained at the regional level because of the smaller numbers of states a hegemonic-seeking state will have to engage with and the greater likelihood of regional commonality. It is more likely that at a regional level, such a state can become a regional hegemon if it espouses an appealing vision, supported by material power endowment inter alia.

From the discussion in this section, it is concluded that the concept of hegemony cannot be a global phenomenon; rather, it is a regional phenomenon. This is explained by the limitation of the use of hard power globally and the tendency of states to counter-balance power. In particular, the global level is characterised by several powers with hegemonic interest in their respective regions. At the regional level, it is relatively easier to pursue hegemony due to the advantage of proximity, even if the region is characterised by competition. Therefore, throughout this thesis, hegemony will be considered to be regional or sub-regional in scope, since only at the regional level can a hegemon fulfil all the hegemonic criteria set out for analysis in this thesis.[282] Global hegemony is thus considered to be an aspiration that cannot, in all likelihood, be established, although it could be a source of counter-hegemony to regional hegemony, as will now be discussed.

3.5 The concept of counter-hegemony

This section explains the concept of counter-hegemony and its application to this thesis. The notion of counter-hegemony as used in this thesis is built on the discussion in the previous section that the concept of hegemony, from whatever angle one looks at it, is never global but regional. The unattainability of global hegemony gives us an idea of counter-hegemony at the regional level. This is based on the view that state behaviour at all levels, (global or regional) is the same. Therefore, the factors that deny hegemony globally may also be evident at the regional level, but in this more limited geographical

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[282] Region is defined in Chapter Six. p.158

context they are likely to be more surmountable. The implication is that, though regional hegemony is possible, it could be resisted from within or outside. One major consequence of this is the argument that winning universal hegemonic deference or recognition in a given regional setting is unlikely. For instance Agnew, in defining hegemony, alluded to the unlikeliness of complete deference, arguing that hegemony, which he defines as, '…the enrolment of others in the exercise of your power by convincing, cajoling and coercing them to believe that they should want what you want [will] never [be] complete and [is] often resisted...'.[283] Similarly, Ralph Miliband put it explicitly, arguing that 'hegemony is not something that can ever be taken to be finally and irreversibly won: on the contrary, it is something that needs to be constantly nurtured, defended and reformulated.'[284] In the same vein, Ali Balci quoted Ernesto Laclau as having argued that espousing a position of hegemonic dominance, 'can only mean repressing possible alternatives.'[285]

From this background, it is argued in this thesis that the limits of hegemony shown above open up space for what is termed *counter-hegemony*. The idea that the inherent obstacles to hegemony prevent it from ever being absolute or sanctioned by all, is integral to Gramsci's explanation of hegemony and how it is countered. Gramsci explained counter-hegemony using capitalism as the dominant hegemonic idea, which he argued is countered by socialism.[286] Gramsci illustrated his notion of counter-hegemony relative to these two ideologies, with reference to what he termed traditional and organic intellectuals. For Gramsci, traditional intellectuals or institutionalized intellectuals are those that represent and push for the propagation of the capitalist views of the hegemonic class, such as learning institutions. Organic intellectuals, on the other hand, are the rising social groups that work in the society in their personal capacities as specialist technicians of their class. For Gramsci, the organic intellectuals form counter-ideas and will eventually demand a change to the status quo once a certain momentum is built.[287] Similarly, John Moolakkattu draws on Cox's neo-Gramscian explanation of counter-

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[283] J. A. Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*Temple University Press, 2005). p.2;B. Charbonneau and W. S. Cox, *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9/11*UBC Press, 2010).

[284] R. Miliband, 'Counter-Hegemonic Struggles'. *Socialist Register,* 26, 26, (1990). p.346

[285] A. Balci, 'Writing the World into Counter-Hegemony: Identity, Power, and 'foreign Policy'in Ethnic Movements'. *International Relations,* 31, 4, (2017), 466-483.p.471

[286] M. Rupert, 'Reading Gramsci in an Era of Globalising Capitalism'. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,* 8, 4, (2005), 483-497.

[287] M. Filippini, *Using Gramsci. A New Approch*Pluto Press, 2017).

hegemony to argue that the ultimate goal of a counter-hegemon is to take over hegemony. He explained that '"organic intellectuals" not only produce ideas, but also form complex and competing strategies…'[288] He added that, like Gramsci, Cox is of the view that organic intellectuals play an important role in producing counter-hegemonic factions in a given setting.[289]

Of course Gramsci's work on hegemony focused on the national level, and Cox's on the global level, meaning that for each the focus was on a single-level of analysis. This is not the case in this thesis, since it is concerned with regional (one level) hegemony within a global (another level) context. Consequently, there is the need to make a distinction between counter-hegemony at the regional level and the claim of impossibility of hegemony at the global level, especially given that the balance of power is used as the basis for both claims. The distinction is based on the argument that global hegemony has, for reasons set out above, always been *prevented* from being established, whereas regional hegemony is feasible even though it is always likely to be *opposed*. Therefore, counter-hegemony as used in this thesis is only applicable to regions or sub-regions where there is an established hegemony. From this perspective, and notwithstanding the difficulties in defining a region,[290] a counter-hegemon is defined as: *a state which, in relation to a reasonably defined region, offers a credible competing combination of: Power; Vision; Willingness; Beneficence; Recognition; and Institutional Penetration and seeks to replace the existing hegemon within the region in question. The state in question may be located within or outside of the region in question.*

Whilst this definition deliberately and explicitly allows for intra-regional and extra-regional counter-hegemony, it is the latter that is the specific focus of this thesis. This is the case where hegemony is established by a capable state from within a region in the face of aspirational hegemonic opposition from a state located outside of the region. Such a scenario is envisaged by Mearsheimer when he argues that great powers do not

[288] J. S. Moolakkattu, 'Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations'. *International Studies,* 46, 4, (2009) p.442.
[289] Moolakkattu, 'Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations'. , 439-456
[290] See Chapter Six (section 6.2.1)

only prevent global hegemony; they also sometimes work against regional hegemonic aspiration.[291] He substantiated this by citing the USA and asserted,

> Thus, after achieving regional dominance, the USA has gone to great lengths to prevent other great powers from controlling Asia and Europe. There were four great powers in the twentieth century that had the capability to make a run at regional hegemony: Imperial Germany (1900–18), Imperial Japan (1931–45), Nazi Germany (1933–45), and the Soviet Union (1945–89). In each case, the USA played a key role in defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemons.[292]

This is what is termed in this thesis, *extra-regional counter-hegemony*. As previously discussed, for Mearsheimer, hegemony centres almost exclusively on coercive (and ultimately military) power, a view which is rejected by this thesis, but his argument still gives us the important point of extra-regional states attempting to prevent, subvert, and/or overturn regional hegemony. It is this notion that, in this thesis, is referred to as *counter*-hegemony.

The preceding discussion reiterates that hegemonic attempts are always resisted. It is therefore concluded that this gives room for potential counter-hegemony. This section shows that incomplete hegemonic deference or potential counter-hegemony do not deny a hegemon its status until it is obviously overtaken by the counter-hegemon. This is in line with Gramsci, Cox and Hobson, as they acknowledged that there could be hegemony without total deference. What is more likely to be a consequence of manifest counter-hegemony is that there will be hindrance to collective cooperation. At least, there will be hindrance to full commitment of member states within the region in question. Some member states will exhibit what Gramsci referred to as passive participation. This is particularly the case from the perspective of this thesis, where counter-hegemony comes from an external great power that has significant influence in global governance architecture through which it may embark on exogenous approaches to achieving its vision. It is from this perspective that West African extra-regional counter-hegemony will be analysed, that is to say, the case of a sub-region with a hegemonic power that is confronted with an extra-regional counter-hegemonic state.

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[291] J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Structural Realism'. *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity,* 83, (2007).
[292] Mearsheimer, 'Structural Realism'. p.83

3.5.1 Criteria for counter-hegemony

Counter-hegemony as it is used in this thesis is determined by comparing an established hegemonic state with other states, be they within or outside of the given region or sub-region of hegemonic interest. The comparison is based on the hegemonic criteria set out above. Hence, a counter-hegemon must be the closest to the hegemon when judged against the six hegemonic criteria set out above. Notably however, even though the counter-hegemon is determined by the cumulative effect of the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria, willingness to pursue counter-hegemony is particularly crucial. This is so because a state may have all that it takes to be a counter-hegemon by virtue of its fulfilment of the criteria bar this one, but may not actually show hegemonic interests. Under the circumstances, such a state cannot be considered as a counter-hegemon. Hence beyond the cumulative effect of the criteria, manifest willingness is particularly looked for with respect to counter-hegemony in a region or sub-region where hegemony has already been established.

3.6 Conclusion

To conclude, the chapter has indicated that the concept of hegemony in modern usage traces to Antonio Gramsci, who explained it as a relational based influence with some degree of legitimate coercive power. From Gramsci's view of hegemony, the chapter showed that neither hard coercive power nor soft or relational power alone is adequate to give us a proper understanding of the concept of hegemony. The chapter thus explained hegemony by drawing on the notion of smart power, which combines both hard and soft power in line with the Gramscian notion of hegemony. The chapter then applied Gramscian hegemony internationally, away from Gramsci's use of the concept from an intra-state perspective. This is a perspective that is associated with Robert Cox, which is called neo-Gramscism. It is argued in the chapter that the international approach will enable the application of hegemony regionally. Building on this, the chapter took the position that hegemony is a regional rather than a global phenomenon because the latter is not attainable but at best an aspiration. From this viewpoint, the six-point criteria are applied in a regional hegemonic context.

The chapter also explained the concept of counter-hegemony based, once again, on the argument of Gramsci that hegemony is not absolute in terms of getting all within a given system to defer hegemony to one actor. There are always opponents that will challenge the prevailing hegemonic idea and this forms the basis for counter-hegemony. At the international level, the chapter argued that counter-hegemony may be intra or extra

regional and like hegemony, counter-hegemony centres more on ideas than military might. It concludes that where counter-hegemony exists, cooperation in the international setting is challenged. The chapter also pointed out that great power politics or concert enhances extra-regional counter-hegemony through contemporary global governance architectures and showed how counter-hegemony is measured. It is argued that its measurement is about how well a counter-hegemonic state compares with the hegemon, based on a cumulative assessment of the hegemony/counter-hegemony criteria.

Chapter 4 Hegemony in Practice: The case of Nigeria in West Africa

4.1 Introduction

Central to the argument offered in this thesis is the claim that Nigeria enjoys hegemonic status in West Africa. It is, however, recognised that the ascription of West African hegemony to Nigeria is contested. Whereas some scholars attest to Nigeria's hegemony,[293] others have questioned it.[294] The disagreement stems from the different understandings of the concept as discussed in Chapter Three. This chapter makes a key contribution to testing the hypothesis that Nigeria is the hegemonic power in West Africa. The chapter consists of six substantive sections, each corresponding to one of the criteria of hegemony/counter-hegemony established in Chapter Three, namely: *material power; vision; willingness; beneficence; recognition; and institutional penetration.* In each section, the extent to which Nigeria satisfies the criterion in question will be analysed. An examination of possible regional and extra-regional 'criterion competitors' (i.e. states which match or even exceed Nigeria in relation to a particular criterion) will also be provided. It should, however, be noted that within this chapter, neither the USA nor France will be considered as criterion competitors, since their claims to such a status, and indeed their wider claims to hegemonic or counter-hegemonic status, will be considered separately in the next chapter, taking into consideration their '… relatively high level of global interests… '[295]

4.2 Nigeria: Material Power

Whilst Chapter Three showed that power is a contested concept and that the exact nature of its relationship to hegemony is similarly debated, literature on the subject also demonstrates that whichever way one understands it, power is an essential component of hegemony. To be a hegemonic power a state must be, to borrow Hedley Bull's phrase, in the 'front rank' of military powers within the region in question. As established in Chapter Three, for the purposes of this thesis power is defined in terms of military and economic endowment, given that the former is to a larger degree, contingent on the latter.

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[293] O. Ogunnubi and U. Okeke-Uzodike, 'Can Nigeria be Africa's Hegemon?'. *African Security Review,* 25, 2, (2016), 110-128.
[294] J. Warner, 'Nigeria and "Illusory Hegemony" in Foreign and Security Policymaking: Pax-Nigeriana and the Challenges of Boko Haram'. *Foreign Policy Analysis,* 13, 3, (2016), 638-661.
[295] Burgess, S., 2018. Military intervention in Africa: French and US approaches compared. *Air & Space Power// Journal: Afrique Et Francophonie*, *9*(2), pp.5-25. p.5

Thus, in terms of hegemonic aspiration, a state can be said to have sufficient 'material power' – and hence to satisfy this criterion when it *is considered among the top ranked powers militarily and economically in a given region.* Proceeding from this definition, it is shown here that Nigeria is listed among the top five most powerful states in Africa (Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia and Algeria), adjudged by the Institute for Security Studies to be by far the country with the greatest capability of playing a global role in terms of military and economic capability.[296]

Firstly, in terms of Nigeria's economic power, according to data from the World Bank, as of the end of 2018, Nigeria had a total GDP of $397.27 billion. This is the highest in West Africa and, indeed, Africa as a whole. The data also shows that its total population stood at 195,874,740 at the end of 2018, which also makes it the most populous West African state and indeed the African continent.[297] The African Development Bank corroborates these data from the World Bank, pointing out that Nigeria's share of West African total GDP is 70%.[298] The relatively huge economic size of Nigeria, which translates to its hard power, reflects its resource endowment such as its population, but more importantly its huge natural resources such as the country's extensive fertile land for agriculture and other uses. Nigeria occupies a land space of around 923,000 square kilometres.[299] This makes Nigeria one of the largest in Africa in terms of land mass. It is also the largest oil producing country in Africa, which is the biggest contributor to its foreign exchange earnings.[300]

These statistics explain the position of the Sahel and West African Club Secretariat in reporting that, 'Nigeria is up to now the most affluent area in West Africa because of

[296] L. Louw-Vaudran *Mail &guardian, 2015. Nigeria Will be Africa's First Global Superpower. .* Available online: https://mg.co.za/article/2015-04-02-nigeria-will-be-africas-first-global-superpower [Accessed 14/07/2019].
[297] The World Bank *Data - Nigeria (2018).* Available online: https://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria [Accessed 12/06/2019].
[298] African Development Bank *West Africa Economic Outlook (2018). Availabl*e online: https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2018AEO/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_West-Africa.pdf [Accessed 12/06/19]. p.1
[299] G. Enisan and E. Aluko, 'Process of Urban Land use in Nigeria'. *Int.J.Educ.Res,* 3, (2015), 87-100. p.89
[300] E. Graham and J. S. Ovadia, 'Oil Exploration and Production in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-Present: Trends and Developments'. *The Extractive Industries and Society,* (2019).; K. Myers and C. House, *Petroleum, Poverty and Security*Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2005).; R. G. Nyemah, 'Economics of Oil Discovery in West Africa: The Nigerian Experience'. *Regional Maritime University Journal,* 1, (2011), 43-58.

its agricultural and mining resources; it is at the centre of the region's integration into globalisation through its trade activities and the resulting financial flows.' [301] Chukwuemeka Eze, the Executive Director of The West African Network For Peacebuilding backs the above assessment of Nigeria's wealth, as he asserted in a field interview conducted as part of the research undertaken for this thesis that, '…if you talk about military power, if you talk about economy, if you talk about even contribution to the ECOWAS, Nigeria is still leading by, if you like, almost 50% if not more.'[302] In the same vein, Emmanuel Kotia also argued in a field interview that, '…if you talk about the maintenance of the ECOWAS headquarters and what Nigeria is able to do, it is because it is financially sound… nobody could have taken that burden.'[303]

Nigeria is not only the most powerful state economically in West Africa, it is also the most powerful militarily. It even has one of the most powerful militaries in Africa arguably due to its economic power shown above. For instance, the Global Fire Power Index put Nigeria as the fourth most powerful militarily on the African continent, only behind Egypt, Algeria and South Africa. As claimed above on the correlation between economic and military power, Nigeria's standing militarily in West Africa can also be seen from its defence spending over the years. As at 2011, Nigeria was the 7th biggest spender on defence in Africa. It spent 1% of its GDP in 2010 on defence and increased 2011's spending by 32% over the previous year.[304] According to Reuters, over 25% of Nigeria's 2012 budget was allocated to security related spending.[305] It is important to indicate that Nigeria's spending on defence is not consistent. It has fluctuated depending upon the circumstances of the state. Nevertheless, it has always been one of the biggest spenders, with one of the largest standing armies in Africa and the biggest in West Africa.[306] Nan Tian et al., give a historical and contemporary trajectory of Nigeria's

[301] Sahel and West African Club/OECD *The Socio-Economic and Regional Context of West African Migrations (2006).* Available online: https://www.oecd.org/migration/38481393.pdf [Accessed 15/07/2018]. p.17
[302] Interview with Chukwuemeka Eze
[303] Interview with Emmanuel Kotia
[304] GlobalSecurity *Nigeria - Military Spending.* Available online: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/budget.htm [Accessed *03/08/2019].; O. P. Olofin, 'D*efence Spending and Poverty Reduction in Nigeria'. American Journal of Economics, 2, 6, (2012), 122-127.
[305] J. Brock, 'Special Report: Boko Haram-between Rebellion and Jihad'. (2012).
[306] S. Sharoka, 'Armed Extraction: The UK Military in Nigeria'. *Platform, April,* (2013).

defence spending which supports this claim of inconsistent but relatively huge spending as they assert,

> Nigeria's military spending peaked in 1975 at $7.0 billion, having grown by 1943 per cent in real terms since 1966. After 1975 it fell rapidly to a low of $395 million in 1989, a 94 per cent decline. With military spending of $1.7 billion in 2017, Nigeria was the fourth largest spender in SSA, behind Sudan, South Africa and Angola.[307]

It is important to add that it became the second highest spender in Africa in 2018 only behind South Africa, with $2 billion defence spending.[308] However, it is worth pointing out that despite the fact that Nigeria is the biggest economy and military power, it is not without challenges. One of the main challenges of Nigeria at the domestic level is poverty, despite having an expanding economy.[309] This puts pressure on the government to reduce military spending and to focus more on poverty alleviation. For instance, according to Olofin, Nigeria's 'recent increase in defense spending…is an issue of concern to many Nigerians and other stakeholders in the Nigerian economy.'[310] Considering the poverty levels of Nigeria, Victoria Danaan argues that there is every indication that poverty is a major challenge to Nigeria's socio-economic progress. She further argues that poverty has been prevalent for a while and that several interventions have so far failed to bring about significant improvement in the wellbeing of the Nigerian people.[311] Many factors account for this, but one key factor is yet another major domestic challenge, namely high levels of corruption,[312] with Nigeria ranking 144th globally in the 2018 Corruption Perception Index.[313] Nevertheless, Nigeria remains the best placed of all

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[307] N. Tian et al., 'Military Expenditure Transparency in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *Sipri,* SIPRI Policy Paper No. 48, (2018), 1-37. p.5

[308] N. Tian et al., 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018'. .*Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,* (2019). p.5

[309] O. W. Olowa, 'Concept, Measurement and Causes of Poverty: Nigeria in Perspective'. *American Journal of Economics,* 2, 1, (2012), 25-36.; E. N. O. Ogbeide and D. O. Agu, 'Poverty and Income Inequality in Nigeria: Any Causality?'. *Asian Economic and Financial Review,* 5, 3, (2015), 439.

[310] Olofin, 'Defence Spending and Poverty Reduction in Nigeria'. , 122-127 p.122

[311] V. V. Danaan, 'Analysing Poverty in Nigeria through Theoretical Lenses'. *Journal of Sustainable Development,* 11, 1, (2018), 20-31.

[312] C. Ucha, 'Poverty in Nigeria: Some Dimensions and Contributing Factors'. *Global Majority E-Journal,* 1, 1, (2010), 46-56.; A. A. Nigeria, 'Corruption and Poverty in Nigeria. A Report, Published by Action Aid Nigeria Plot 477, 41 Crescent, Off Sa'adu Zungur Avenue, Gwarimpa Abuja. Acceptance'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 71, 6, (2015), 1130-1141.

[313] Transparency international *Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. .* Available online: https://www.transparency.org/country/NGA [Accessed 20/04/2019].

West African states to manifest material power. This is because all member states have similar challenges to Nigeria,[314] but with much smaller economies.

With the exception of extra-regional powers, Nigeria remains the only state in West Africa that can sacrifice significant resources for its sub-regional integration agenda. However, the two leading extra-regional powers, namely the USA and France, each with significant influence in the West African sub-region, can be cited as challengers to Nigeria's hegemony given that in their respective state capacities, Nigeria is far less powerful. From this perspective, it is argued in this sub-section that besides Nigeria's own domestic security challenges, it also has to face the challenge of extra-regional states' military presence in West Africa in their capacities as state actors. This is a challenge as Abuja has been acting on its declaration that West Africa is its domain of influence. Nigeria has, accordingly, made efforts to protect its military dominance in the sub-region, openly opposing the setting up of military bases in the entirety of West Africa and, indeed, on the African continent more widely. This is a long-established policy with, for example, Nigeria strenuously opposing France's nuclear test in Africa in 1960. Abuja expelled the then French ambassador and support staff, and closed its airports and seaports to French planes and ships.[315] More recently, and relating to Nigeria's own West African backyard, in 2007 it opposed an American attempt to set up a military base in Nigeria. For instance, in a report by Alex Last of the BBC, Nigeria openly opposed US attempts to establish a military base in the West African sub-region. The Nigerian government stated:

> …it would not allow its country to be used as a base for the US-African military command, Africom…President Umaru Yar'Adua said that Nigeria was also opposed to any such bases in West Africa. He said Nigeria would prefer to work towards the establishment of an African standby force under regional direction.[316]

A similar argument was made by President Goodluck Jonathan when he responded to a UN request to support terrorist victims in Nigeria. He advocated a UN intervention based on Chapter Eight of the UN Charter, thus emphasising the role of regional bodies in peace

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[314] A. Nurudeen et al., 'Corruption, Political Instability and Economic Development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Is there a Causal Relationship?'. *Contemporary Economics,* 9, 1, (2015), 45-60.
[315] BBC *1960: France Explodes Third Atomic Bomb.* Available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/27/newsid_2985000/2985200.stm [Accessed 03/05/2017].
[316] A. Last, 'Nigerian Doubts Over Africom Base'. *BBC News,* 20, 11, (2007).

operations. He rejected Chapter Seven on the justification that it connotes a peace enforcement of a sort.[317]Nigeria's position aimed at preventing any form of extra-regional state power military dominance in West Africa. Such an approach was aimed at maintaining its sub-regional hegemony to promote collective sub-regional security. This is supported by the fact that Chapter Eight of the UN charter mandates regional entities to deal with regional problems.[318]

Material power dominance is also significant to Nigeria as it enables it to promote its soft power. This will then serve the purpose of soliciting cooperation from those West African states over whom hegemony is sought. Nigeria requires material power to lead regional assignments such as military interventions. The material power of Nigeria thus makes it possible for it to exhibit a sense of responsibility that comes with hegemony. Indeed, in regard to soft power, Nigeria surpasses the USA and France. From this perspective, the challenge posed by the extra-regional state powers pertaining to material power dominance in West Africa does not undermine Nigeria's West African hegemony. This is so because first, this thesis does not consider hegemony to rely solely on hard power. Secondly, in terms of the impact of the material power of the various states that seek regional hegemony (i.e. Nigeria, the USA and France), on the basis of proximity, knowledge of terrain and a sense of ownership of West African problems, Nigeria is best placed to serve the interests of the sub-region, despite its relative weaker material position. This claim is also bolstered by Abuja's evident sense of ownership. For instance Nigeria has participated in nearly all military interventions in the sub-region and in doing so has always taken the lion's share of the burdens of interventions, be it relative to other West African states or extra-regional state powers, especially in the area of troops contribution.[319] What it means is that Nigeria has combined its relatively less material power with its soft power (vision and ideas) to take the place of a West African hegemon ahead of France and the USA.

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[317] Times Premium *Jonathan Rejects Foreign Troops in the Fight Against Boko Haram.* April. Available online: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/181582-jonathan-rejects-foreign-troops-in-fight-against-boko-haram.html [Accessed 16/04/2018].

[318] N. Jenne, 'Peacekeeping, Latin America and the UN Charter's Chapter VIII: Past Initiatives and Future Prospects'. *International Peacekeeping,* 26, 3, (2019), 327-353.

[319] See Chapter Eight (section 8.2.1)

4.2.1 Criterion Competitors

Among ECOWAS member states, no state is able to challenge Nigeria in terms of economic and military power. Economically, Ghana and Ivory Coast rank second and third within the sub-region, with respective 2018 GPDs of $65.556 billion and $57.725 billion; only 16.5% and 14.5% of Nigeria's GDP respectively. The rest of the 15-member ECOWAS states had a GDP of less than $25 billion in the same period. Similarly, in terms of population, Ghana and Ivory Coast come closest, but with 2018 populations of 29,767,108 and 25,069,229, they are a fraction the size of Nigeria.[320] On military power, Ghana, which is the distant second to Nigeria, spent $177 million in 2016 on defence and is projected to spend up to $213.8 million in 2021.[321] Hence, comparatively, no state from within the West African sub-region compares with Nigeria in terms of economic and military power.

However, as indicated earlier, beyond the sub-region, a number of states which are active in West Africa can easily be identified as criterion competitors. The USA and France will be considered separately in Chapter Five, but it should also be noted that the UK and China, both of which have some involvement in the sub-region, are significantly more materially endowed than Nigeria. For instance, with respect to China, besides being the world's most populous country,[322] its GDP as of 2018 was $13.4 trillion, second only to the USA on a global scale.[323] Militarily, China's spending stood at $170.4 billion in 2018 which was about 1.3% of GDP.[324] With regard to the UK, starting with its economic power, it had a total GDP of $2.8 trillion and a total population of 66,488,991 at the end of 2018.[325] On military power and specifically relating to spending as an indicator of military power, the UK in 2018/19 spent £38 billion on defence.[326] Proceeding from these

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[320] The World Bank *Data for Nigeria, Ghana, Cote D'Ivoire.* Available online: https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=NG-GH-CI [Accessed 17/08/2019].
[321] O. Nkala *Ghanaian Defence Spending to Hit $213.8 Million by 2021.* Available online: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/industry/industry-industry/ghanaian-defence-spending-to-hit-2138-million-by-2021/ [Accessed 04/03/2018]. para.1
[322] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 'World Population Prospects 2019: Highlights'. (2019). p.12
[323] W. M. Morrison, *China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States* Congressional Research Service Washington, DC, 2019). p.9
[324] The US department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019.,[2019]).* p.93
[325] The World Bank *Data on the United Kingdom.* Available online: https://data.worldbank.org/country/united-kingdom [Accessed 29/06/2019].
[326] The UK Ministry of Defence, *Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2018–19 for the Year Ended 31 March 2019,[2019]).* p.15

statistics, it is clear that both China and the UK far outweigh Nigeria in terms of material endowment. However, despite the relative power advantage, unlike the USA and France, neither of these states has shown interest in exerting hegemonic influence in West Africa. They can, therefore, be discounted as potential hegemonic opponents for the purposes of this thesis.

This sub-section has demonstrated that Nigeria satisfies the hegemonic criterion of 'material power' set out in Chapter Three. It has shown that Nigeria is by far the biggest economic and military power among ECOWAS member states. The sub-section has also shown that Nigeria is challenged in this regard by domestic factors but, more particularly, by extra-regional state powers that surpass it materially. It is, however, shown in the sub-section that Nigeria's relative material weakness is compensated for by proximity, knowledge of terrain and a sense of ownership of the sub-region's challenges. The sub-section thus concludes that Nigeria's hegemonic status affords it the prestige to bring along other West African states to support its sub-regional vision, which is another hegemonic criterion to which we now turn.

4.3   Nigeria: Vision

This sub-section sets out Nigeria's vision relative to its hegemonic pursuits in West African. This fulfils the hegemonic criterion of a vision for a given international setting (region). Vision is defined for the purpose of this thesis as *a stated anticipatory end result of an agenda embarked upon by a state with strategies for its execution through a gradualist approach.* As argued in Chapter Three, there are several visions and ideas for a hegemonic aspiring state to pick from. Nigeria's grand vision is to pursue multilingual sub-regional integration via an ECOWAS that has an endogenous approach to sub-regional concerns. The vision specifically aims at getting member states of the sub-region to eventually detach from the influence of former colonial masters. Nigeria adopts three main strategies to achieve this vision, all of which are all anchored in persuasion: firstly, adherence to the principle of the sovereign equality of states; secondly, non-discrimination in dealing with member states of the sub-region irrespective of former colonial ties (i.e. Anglophone, Francophone or Lusophone); and finally, (and only more recently), adherence to liberal values such as democratic governance.

Nigeria manifests respect for the sovereign equality of states through its membership of the ECOWAS, which operates on this very principle of equality. Although it can be argued that Nigeria's idea of ECOWAS was partly to legitimise its vision,

Nigeria strategically allows ECOWAS to act as a supra-national entity based on consensus building. One typical example of Nigeria deferring actorness to the ECOWAS as part of respect to member states was when Liberia requested its support at the inception of its civil war. Nigeria, not wanting to act unilaterally, referred the request to ECOWAS for collective institutional-led intervention.[327] Nigeria has since then often reiterated its commitment to the sub-region's agenda and the need for Abuja's leadership under the auspices of ECOWAS.[328]

Nigeria's strategy of enhancing both ECOWAS' actorness and regional ownership of every West African agenda is aimed at achieving its hegemonic vision. Pursuant to this, Nigeria objects to extra-regional state powers' involvement in the affairs of the sub-region, other than where such states are acting in furtherance to West African efforts under the auspices of international institutions such as the UN. In such circumstances, such involvement is viewed by Abuja as being more acceptable, since the UN invariably accepts ECOWAS' lead role in the affairs of the sub-region. Nigeria has thus kept faith with the UN for agency-based support for ECOWAS as part of achieving its vision. This can be explained by the fact that ECOWAS simultaneously stands a chance of benefiting from material resources of states that are channelled through the UN and at the same time can continue to own the operation on the ground, just as Nigeria desires.

The UN is seen as complementary to ECOWAS' efforts, without threat to Nigeria's hegemony aspirations. Accordingly, Nigeria is one of the largest troops contributing states to UN peacekeeping and has participated in UN-backed military interventions both in West Africa and outside of the sub-region.[329] Nigeria's preference for multilateral approaches over unilateral state power interventions, a consequence of its desire to promote its vision of endogenous approaches to sub-regional problems, can be

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[327] C. Tuck, 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia'. *African Studies Quarterly,* 4, 1, (2000), 1-16.; S. B. Olawale, 'The Nigerian Factor in Liberian Peace Process 1990-1993'. *European Scientific Journal,* 11, 4, (2015).
[328] ECOWAS Commission *ECOWAS Defence Chiefs Review Guinea-Bissau Mission.* Available online: http://www.ecowas.int/ecow*as-defense-chiefs-review-guinea-bissau-mission/ [Accessed 23/03/2017].; ECOWAS Commission ECOWAS a*nd Nigeria to Spearhead Renewed Efforts at Tackling Problems Associated with Transhumance. Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-and-nigeria-to-spearhead-renewed-efforts-at-tackling-problems-associated-with-transhumance/ [Accessed 21/04/2017].
[329] S. Abdurrahman, *Peace Support Operations in Africa. A Perspective from Nigeria*na, 2005).; A. M. Sule, 'Nigeria's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations'. *Peace Operations Training Institute, Williamsburg,* (2013).

seen as far back as its involvement in the crisis in the Congo in the 1960s. In contributing to this at the UN, Nigeria argued: 'We also believe that the Congolese people were right to appeal to the United Nations Organisation for help and advice in rebuilding their country, rather than to turn to any individual power.'[330]

Nigeria's second strategy for its vision is its non-discriminatory attitude in terms of the traditional Anglophone/Francophone dichotomy in West Africa, which Abuja sees as breeding mistrust. Nigeria's attitude is that once a decision is taken at ECOWAS, it is up to it to lead without regard to the various historical divides in the sub-region. It is on this basis that Paul Adogamhe argued that Nigeria has been consistent right from independence in 1960 on its foreign policy of offering support for Africa but particularly West Africa. This, he noted, led to Nigeria being described as a 'big brother.'[331] He explained 'big brother, quoting his previous work as:

> Big brother in cultural understanding of Africans is one who stands up for you when you are threatened by danger, one who shares money and kindness with you when you are need, one who protects you when you are attacked and one who takes your side when you are in trouble. A big brother is not a threat nor is a big brother a usurer. What the big brother does or gives is done or given gratuitously.[332]

The 'big brother' attitude means Nigeria has demonstrated an image of a fair power that stands up for the ECOWAS project so as to allay the fears of the Francophone states with respect to Nigeria's intentions for seeking leadership. The big brother posture is also understood as an attempt to persuade the Francophone member states to look inward for solutions to sub-regional problems in line with one of ECOWAS' key principles, solidarity and collective self-reliance.[333] Nigeria has, therefore, shown that it is not in its interest to be a coercive hegemon so as to get member states to engage with its vision of

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[330] Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations *Maiden General Assembly Statement at the United Nations.* Available online: https://nigeriaunmission.org/maiden-speech-at-the-un/ [Accessed 12/08/2018].para.8

[331] P. G. Adogamhe'Nigeria's Diplomacy: The Challenges of Regional Power and Leadership in a Globalizing World', in J. A. Braveboy-Wagner(ed.), *Diplomatic Strategies of Nations in the Global South* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 213-238. Also see; M. B. Marwa, 'Nigeria at 50: Contributions Towards Global Peace and Security'. *Journal of Public Administration,* 46, Special issue 1, (2011), 908-915.

[332] Adogamhe'Nigeria's Diplomacy: The Challenges of Regional Power and Leadership in a Globalizing World', , 213-238 p.226

[333] ECOWAS Commission, 'Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty'. *Abuja: ECOWAS Commission,* (1993).p.7

making ECOWAS look inward by owning its solutions to sub-regional problems. It is this line of reasoning that explains Nigeria's foreign policy of good neighbourliness.[334]

In addition to the two preceding, well established strategies for achieving its vision, Nigeria has recently adopted adherence to the tenets of democracy and good governance as well. Nigeria's democratization is partly strategic in terms of maintaining acceptance as a hegemon. Abuja took into consideration the fact that the sub-region's challenges are mainly political and terrorism-related, both of which can be attributed to lack or poor democratic culture.[335] Therefore, as a key player in the sub-region, it is argued that Nigeria realised that in view of the changing circumstances – namely the rise of democracy (even if sometimes weak) in the sub-region - its credibility as a hegemonic power will be enhanced if it is itself a democracy. In particular, member states of ECOWAS are bonded by its protocol on democracy and good governance.[336] Part of Nigeria's ways to achieve its vision is its post-1999 acceptance of democratic governance. This is especially so, since the UN has been, as Christopher Joyner put it, '…increasingly active in promoting the democratic process around the world, particularly in developing countries.'[337]   Nigeria's new-found support for democracy is aimed, therefore, at boosting its own international image and secondly at supporting Abuja's quest to represent Africa as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC).[338] This, in turn, is expected to enhance Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony, as it could enable it to more effectively resist extra-regional power influence in West Africa through such a UNSC position.

At the sub-regional level, it is important to recall that during the time Nigeria was non-democratic, so to were nearly all other members of the West African sub-region. In this context, Nigeria needed to offer a viable hegemonic vision, backed by its material

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[334] T. Ola, 'Nigeria's Assistance to African States: What are the Benefits'. *International Journal of Development and Sustainability,* 6, 2, (2017), 54-65.

[335] A. P. Schmid, 'Terrorism and Democracy'. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 4, 4, (1992), 14-25.; A. Puddington, 'Democracy is the Best Defense Against Terrorism'. *Freedom House News,* (2015).

[336] *Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security ,* (2001): .

[337] C. C. Joyner, 'The United Nations and Democracy'. *Global Governance,* 5, 3, (1999), 333-357. P.333

[338] S. C. Udeh and E. C. Okoroafor, 'Nigeria's Bid for Inclusion in the Permanent Seat of the Security Council of the United Nations: An Assessment'. *International Journal of Development and Management Review,* 11, 1, (2016), 126-149.

power and anti-colonial moral suasion, but this vision did not need to be one that was underpinned by democratic adherence to get support from West African states. As indicated earlier, this is not to underestimate the significance of liberal values as a hegemonic vision or as a catalyst to hegemonic pursuit, particularly if one juxtaposes the common interest that a hegemon must consider and the seeming global acceptance of the values of democracy and rule of law in recent decades. For instance, according to Philip Costopoulos and Pierre Rosanyallon, 'Nobody now disputes that democracy is the most desirable type of political regime.'[339]

Democracy is accordingly relevant in contemporary West Africa where all states have become democratic and to a larger degree adhere to the rule of law.[340] This makes Nigeria's democratic adherence, albeit weak,[341] relevant relative to its West African hegemonic pursuit. However, Nigeria's weakness in democratic governance does not deny it a hegemonic status in West Africa for two main reasons: first, the spread of liberal values is not its core vision. Secondly, in a sub-region that is new to democratic governance, Nigeria's two-decade old democracy can be described as a leading example in the sub-region, despite the inevitable errors it still commits in that regard. On the other hand, Nigeria's democratization serves its hegemonic quest by giving it the legitimacy both within the sub-region and outside of it to promote its West African vision.[342] An undemocratic state will not be able to effectively play the role of a West African hegemon over democratic states. From this perspective, Nigeria's liberal values were needed to place it properly as a sub-regional hegemonic power to deal with relapse in democracies, given that the sub-region is prone to coups, having experienced 44 successful coups between 1955 and 2004.[343] Nigeria's democratization has therefore given meaning to the ECOWAS protocol on democracy and good governance.[344] This is so because, as a leader that seeks to lead by example, it must manifest what is generally accepted by an institution

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[339] P. Rosanvallon, 'The History of the Word"Democracy"in France'. *Journal of Democracy,* 6, 4, (1995), 140-154. p.140

[340] K. Boafo-Arthur, *Democracy and Stability in West Africa: The Ghanaian Experience*Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Department of Peace and Conflict Research …, 2008).

[341] S. O. Usman and S. S. Avidime, 'Assessing Democratic Governance in the Nigerian Fourth Republic, 1999-2014'. *European Scientific Journal,* 12, 29, (2016).

[342] H. A. Saliu and J. Shola Omotola, 'Can Nigeria Get a UN Security Council Seat?'. *South African Journal of International Affairs,* 15, 1, (2008), 71-85. p.71

[343] P. J. McGowan, 'Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part I, Theoretical Perspectives'. *Armed Forces & Society,* 32, 1, (2005), 5-23.

[344] D. O. Omo-Ogbebor, 'Nigerian Foreign Policy Approach Towards ECOWAS'. *Journal of Human Sciences,* 14, 4, (2017), 4015-4022.

it promotes. These liberal values also serve as an avenue through which Nigeria can achieve its agenda on global prominence for influence both in West Africa and beyond, mainly because of the global acceptance of these values.

4.3.1   Criterion competitors

It is important to indicate that apart from the USA and France and their respective visions, which will be considered in Chapter Five, no other state within or outside of the sub-region has manifestly espoused a hegemonic vision for West Africa. This is either because there is no hegemonic interest, as in the case of China and the UK, or because there is no material power to push such an agenda in respect of West African states. For this reason, Nigeria again stands out as one of only three states with a vision for the sub-region.

This sub-section has demonstrated that Nigeria satisfies the hegemonic criterion of 'vision' set out in Chapter Three. The section has shown that Nigeria has professed a vision mainly around West African states' integration to reduced extra-regional neo-colonial influence in the sub-region. It is particularly important to note that the vision espoused by Nigeria is focused on West Africa as a whole and, as will be shown subsequently, its vision is largely accepted.

4.4   Nigeria: Willingness

With reference to the definition of hegemony in this thesis, it is shown in this sub-section that Nigeria has, since independence, shown willingness for West African hegemony. Hegemonic willingness for the purpose of this thesis is exhibited when a state *shows commitment not only by pronouncements but backed by policy and manifest action in pursuit of a vision(s) through cooperation.* Nigeria's claim to West African hegemony can be seen in both its public pronouncements and foreign policy direction. This can be conspicuously noticed in the statements of its political leaders over the years. For instance, according to Rosemary Nuamah, Nigeria's political leaders have always expressly considered their country as West Africa's 'natural leader.'[345] Olusola Ogunnubi also attests to Nigeria's claim to hegemony, but adds that Abuja has fallen short of declaring

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[345] R. Nuamah, 'Nigeria's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Domestic, Regional and External Influences', *report of a seminar held at the Centre for African Studies, Oxford University.* 11-122003).; A. Adebajo, 'Nigeria: Africa's New Gendarme?'. *Security Dialogue,* 31, 2, (2000), 185-199.

it officially.[346] This is, however, not entirely correct, taking into consideration the public statements repeatedly made by Nigeria's leaders.

Such a public statement was made, for example, by Shehu Shagari, former President of Nigeria (1979-1983). He stated, 'Just as…President Monroe proclaimed the American hemispheres free from the military incursions of European empire builders and adventurers, so also do we…in Nigeria and in Africa insist that African affairs be left to Africans to settle.'[347] Similarly, but specifically on West Africa, a former Nigerian Ambassador to the USA, Olusola Sanu, asserted, 'We have to be recognized as a regional power in West Africa. This is our region and we have a right to go to war. It is a Monroe doctrine of a sort.'[348] However, pronouncements, though significant for their indication of intent (and vision), are not enough to show the willingness of a state to pursue hegemony. As such, Nigeria's willingness to assume West African hegemony has to be shown also through its foreign policy.

Nigeria's willingness to pursue West African hegemony is not mere rhetoric. It is backed by policy. Nigeria's foreign policy amplifies its West African hegemonic quest, especially in relation to protecting its influence against external, and more specifically still ex-colonial, powers. For instance, according to Efem Ubi and Oluwatooni Akinkuotu, Nigeria's foreign policy is always based on its prevailing perception of the international environment, mainly on colonialism and its associated problems for West Africa.[349] Nigeria's West African hegemonic quest is specifically anchored in its concentric circles-based foreign policy. According to Ibrahim Gambari, the mastermind of the concentric circle policy, the inner circle focuses on Nigeria's national interest; the second circle centres on the interest of the ECOWAS sub-region; and the last concerns African continental interest, particularly in relation to integration.[350] Under the second section, Nigeria considers West Africa as its sphere of influence, where it seeks to actively engage states of the sub-region for peaceful coexistence, for the general wellbeing of the sub-

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[346] O. Ogunnubi, 'Effective Hegemonic Influence in Africa: An Analysis of Nigeria's 'hegemonic'position'. *Journal of Asian and African Studies,* 52, 7, (2017), 932-946.
[347] J. Mutwol, *Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa* (New York: Cambria Press, 2009).; Adebajo, 'Nigeria: Africa's New Gendarme?'. , 185-199
[348] A. Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). p.44
[349] E. N. Ubi and O. O. Akinkuotu, 'Nigerian Foreign Policy and Economic Development, 1999–2013'. *International Area Studies Review,* 17, 4, (2014), 414-433.
[350] B. T. Ashaver, 'Concentricism in Nigeria's Foreign Policy'. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 19, 6, (2014), 6-11. p.7

region, and to promote sub-regional self-reliance. This is supported by Cyril Obi as he argues that Nigeria's focus on West Africa was to reduce member states' '…dependence on foreign, extra-African powers, particularly France.'[351]

Abuja's pronouncements and foreign policy illustrate Nigeria's constant reassertion of its West African hegemonic ambitions and suggest a protectionist approach to its hegemonic pursuits. The implication is that Nigeria perceives an existing or potential external threat to its quest for hegemony in West Africa, which explains its Monroe doctrine analogy. This reflects the fact that Nigeria is not challenged in any significant way from within the West African sub-region and can, therefore, concentrate on attempting to contain external powers in what it considers as its domain of influence and leadership. Nigeria shows this sense of responsibility by taking West Africa's concerns upon itself, mainly in the areas of peace and diplomacy.[352] On the former, Aning, in a field interview, argued that 'Nigeria's drive to lead is demonstrated by its willingness always to put the troops on the ground…the money, the logistics, everything that is necessary for us [ECOWAS] to succeed.'[353] Nigeria sees this as a means through which its West African hegemony can be enhanced, which will in turn enhance its global stature and vice versa.

As argued in the preceding sub-section, Nigeria's shift to democracy also showed its hegemonic willingness. However, worthy of note is the fact that Nigeria's willingness to shoulder the inevitable burdens of hegemony pre-date its shift to democratic governance. As shown in the sub-section on 'vision', in the case of Nigeria, liberal democratic adherence is only recent, so it is evident that Nigeria pursued hegemony prior to its democratic conversion. The implication is that, notwithstanding the potential significance of liberal democratic values as a complement to hegemonic pursuit, it is not a precondition for hegemony. Adherence to liberal democratic ideals is but one of many potential hegemonic visions that may underpin hegemonic willingness. It might be considered that as a vision it is particularly well disposed to hegemony, given that both democracy and hegemony are premised on consent and consideration of others' interest.

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[351] C. I. Obi, 'Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Transnational Security Challenges in West Africa'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 26, 2, (2008), 183-196. p.188
[352] L. P. Blanchard and T. F. Husted, *Nigeria: Current Issues and US Policy*Congressional Research Service, 2013).; J. Odigbo et al., 'Regional Hegemony and Leadership Space in Africa: Assessing Nigeria's Prospects and Challenges'. *Review of History and Political Science,* 2, 1, (2014), 89-105.
[353] Interview with Kwesi Aning

However, it is important to recognise that persuasion and consideration of common interest could be the hallmark of hegemonic pursuit driven by any chosen vision. The assumption that liberal states will opt for consent or persuasion whilst non-liberals will adopt coercion fails to take into consideration the fact that an authoritarian state may well employ friendly foreign policies in pursuit of its hegemonic ambitions as in the case of Nigeria before 1999.

4.4.1 Criterion Competitors

It is important to indicate that besides the USA and France (discussed separately in the next chapter), no other state, either within and outside of the West African sub-region, has manifested hegemonic willingness. With respect to West African states, this can be attributed to the fact that none has the material capacity to shoulder the special responsibilities that a hegemon must carry. On the part of extra-regional state powers, the lack of interest can be attributed to feasibility challenges, having understood the reality in West Africa. These challenges are firstly, Nigeria's anti extra-regional dominance in the sub-region, and secondly, the fact that two powerful states, France and USA have some degree of influence and have manifested hegemonic interest in the sub-region.[354]

This sub-section has demonstrated that Nigeria satisfies the hegemonic criterion of 'willingness' set out in Chapter Three. It has shown that Nigeria has, since independence, been seeking to play a hegemonic role in West Africa. This can be seen from the public pronouncements of its political leaders and the direction of its foreign policy. The sub-section concludes that persuasive foreign policy remains the key to Nigeria's hegemonic pursuit. It points out that Nigeria's return to democracy did not mark the start of its hegemonic pursuit and it has not become its main sub-regional agenda, but it has enhanced its West African hegemony, which further manifest its hegemonic willingness.

4.5 Nigeria: Beneficence

Beyond the demonstrable fact that Nigeria is the most powerful state in West Africa and having shown its vision and willingness to be a hegemon, Nigeria has, as is expected of a hegemon, also demonstrated beneficence. For the purpose of this thesis, beneficence is defined as: *leadership shown by commitment to common concerns of the*

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[354] See Chapter Five (section 5.2.3 and 5.3.3)

regional system in many ways but particularly material commitment that manifests sacrifice to promote soft power. Even though Nigeria's sub-regional beneficence is wide-ranging in nature, the focus here is on the extent to which it has shown interest in the peace and security of the sub-region as a hegemonic benefactor.

On the peace and security front, what comes to mind first is Nigeria's role in the formation and activities of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was recently replaced by the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF).[355] Not only did Nigeria moot the idea of ECOMOG, but also through Nigeria's material power support, ECOMOG has played a major role in addressing West African conflicts.[356] As Brigadier General Emmanuel Kotia, a deputy commander and senior lecturer at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), explained during a field interview, during the Liberian civil war, the then Nigerian government took care of issues of allowances of soldiers of smaller member states. He added that Nigeria singlehandedly provided fuel for the whole period of the military operation and provided helicopters for the ECOMOG troops.[357] Similarly, under the ESF, Nigeria continues to commit both material and human resources to sub-regional peace and security initiatives, such as peace keeping and conflict resolution.[358]

Apart from peace and security, Nigeria's commitment of its resources can also be seen in its bilateral and multilateral dealings with member states of the sub-region. As indicated in the sub-section on Nigeria's vision, Abuja has often offered support in the economic and social concerns of the sub-region. Multilaterally, Nigeria has been committed to the running of the ECOWAS, first by accepting to host its headquarters and other structures, and secondly by committing its resources to ensure the organisation's success.[359] Prior to the inception of ECOWAS, Nigeria was already supporting the socio-

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[355] J. M. Kabia, 'Regional Approaches to Peacebuilding: The ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture', *BISA-Africa and International Studies ESRC Seminar Series: Africa Agency in International Politics, African Agency in Peace, Conflict and Intervention at the University of Birmingham, 7th April.* 2011).
[356] J. Adisa, 'Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the Burden of Community Spirit'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 5, 1, (1994), 83-110.; O. B. Amao and B. Maiangwa, 'Has the Giant Gone to Sleep? Re-Assessing Nigeria's Response to the Liberian Civil War (1990–1997) and the Boko Haram Insurgency (2009–2015)'. *African Studies,* 76, 1, (2017), 22-43.
[357] Interview with Emmanuel Kotia; Also see: C. C. Osakwe and B. N. Audu, 'The Nigeria Led ECOMOG Military Intervention and Interest in the Sierra Leone Crisis: An Overview'. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences,* 8, 4-1, (2017), 107-115.; Odigbo et al., 'Regional Hegemony and Leadership Space in Africa: Assessing Nigeria's Prospects and Challenges'. , 89-105
[358] See Chapter Eight (sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.6)
[359] See Chapter One (section 1.5.4)

economic development of West Africa on a bilateral basis as part of its efforts to win hegemonic deference and to integrate the sub-region. Julius Ihonvbere supports this claim, arguing that Nigeria succeeded with the formation of ECOWAS partly because of its benevolence, backed by its material endowment. He argued that in pursuit of its West Africa vision, Nigeria:

> …constructed a highway linking Idi-Iroko in Nigeria to Porto-Novo in the Republic of Benin at a cost of Nl.8 million to Nigeria. A N2 million, 25-year interest free loan was also granted to Benin, while Nigeria agreed to take over 30% of the equity and invest N7.2 million in a joint cement project in the Republic of Benin. It also undertook to participate to the tune of N20 million in a joint sugar project in Benin. …. In 1972, on a visit to Guinea, the Nigerian leader donated N50, 000 to the ruling party…[360]

However, as previously noted, Nigeria has not, in recent times, been able to show this magnitude of beneficence, mainly because of its own domestic challenges. It is for this reason that Emmanuel Kotia, in a field interview, argued that Nigeria may not be able to afford the kind of large-scale support for sub-regional military operations that it offered in the past.[361] Nevertheless, the reality, as will be shown in Chapter Seven and Eight, is that Nigeria is still committed to offering the economic and military leadership expected of a hegemon. For instance, as recent as 2012, the chair of the Authority of Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS, in urging other member states to contribute to the ESF, is quoted by Warisu Alli as having said, 'Nigerian forces are now the stiff backbone and vanguard of ECOWAS security.'[362]

What can be deduced from Nigeria's application of material power, both historically and in contemporary times, is that much of its bilateral engagement was aimed at wooing West African states, especially those from the Francophone side of the sub-regional divide, to accept its hegemonic vision of endogenous approaches to sub-regional affairs. Inferentially, it is argued here that Nigeria focused on the Francophone member states so as to make them look inward for West African solutions to West African problems, rather than looking to France. This was particularly important for Abuja, in part because of its own Anglophone colonial past, but also, as James Agalga explained in

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[360] J. O. Ihonvbere, 'Resource Availability and Foreign Policy Change: The Impact of Oil on Nigerian Foreign Policy since Independence'. *Africa Spectrum,* (1982), 163-182. p.169
[361] Interview with Emmanuel Kotia
[362] W. O. Alli, 'The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy'. *FES Peace and Security Series,* (2012). p.36

a field interview, because the Francophone states of the sub-region are more reliant on their former colonial master than the Anglophone states.[363]

This approach of Nigeria enabled it to achieve its long-term hegemonic goal through a soft power approach. The establishment of a sub-regional body now serves as an avenue through which issues of West African integration are discussed and executed. Nigeria's vision in relation to its pursuit of getting ECOWAS established was in line with the generally held view among African leaders over the years that first, sub-regional economic cooperation (SREC) would help reduce reliance on external powers, and secondly, that SREC will boost the negotiation position of these blocs at the international level.[364] In view of the fact that extra-regional power influence is Nigeria's biggest concern, it uses its material power to promote its foreign policy agenda on African integration, starting with West African integration. Nigeria's material power and the benevolence that comes with it explain its continuing 'big brother' role in the sub-region and the respect that comes with this.

4.5.1 Criterion competitors

It suffices to state here that given the huge disparity between Nigeria and the two closest member states of ECOWAS in terms of material power, no other West African member state can compete with Nigeria in terms of beneficence. In terms of extra-regional criterion competitors, China has supported West Africa economically, mainly through aid.[365] For example, apart from direct financial assistance, in March 2018 China offered to build a $31.6 million new headquarters for the ECOWAS to replace the one provided by Nigeria through a grant, on which a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed.[366] The following year, specifically in July, an implementation agreement was signed for the project to commence in January 2020.[367] It is important to indicate that the reaction of Nigeria to the offer is has not been ascertained as ECOWAS has led the

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[363] Interview with James Agalga
[364] K. O. Kufuor, *The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States* (London: Routledge, 2016).
[365] M. Davies et al., 'How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa'. *Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch,* (2008), 53-57.
[366] The ECOWAS commission *ECOWAS Signs MOU with China for the Construction of the New ECOWAS Commission Headquarters.* Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-signs-mou-with-china-for-the-construction-of-the-new-ecowas-commission-headquarters/ [Accessed 12/12/2019].
[367] ECOWAS *ECOWAS and China Sign Implementation Agreement for the Commission's New Headquarter Building.* Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-and-china-sign-implementation-agreement-for-the-commissions-new-headquarter-building/ [Accessed 12/08/2020].

engagements with China. Similarly, the UK has shown beneficence to the sub-region in different areas, including financial aid.[368] Beyond that, the UK has from time to time engaged with the sub-region in relation to military training and has even had cause to intervene once in support of an ECOWAS-led intervention in Sierra Leone.[369] The UK's support was manifestly expressed by the then UK foreign secretary Robin Cook, who revealed that the UK had supported ECOMOG with £1 million and was quoted by Alex Smith as urging other powers to do as the UK was doing by providing,''…financial and logistical support to the Nigerian forces so that they have a better opportunity of sustaining the legitimate government of Sierra Leone.''[370] However, even though these kinds of support are needed, especially in times of crisis, none of these states has involved itself deeply in every West Africa crisis situation as Nigeria does, even with its relatively far smaller material power. In fact, the statement of the UK Foreign Secretary confirms Nigeria's unmatched support in that case, as all support was asked to be channelled to the Nigerian-led ECOMOG.

This sub-section has demonstrated that Nigeria satisfies the hegemonic criterion of 'beneficence' set out in Chapter Three. The sub-section has shown that Nigeria is not only the most materially powerful among West African states; it has also demonstrated itself to be a benefactor to the sub-region as a whole. This strengthens the claim that Nigeria is the hegemon of West Africa. It has been argued in the sub-section that Nigeria has used its benevolence to build on its soft power to afford it the smart power that it needs to play the role of an acceptable sub-regional hegemon. Such behaviour on the part of Nigeria has enabled it to engender significant sub-regional acceptance for its hegemonic ambition, as the next sub-section demonstrates.

4.6 Nigeria: Recognition

This sub-section makes the argument that one of the reasons for Nigeria's persuasive approach to West African hegemony is that it leads to its recognition as a hegemon. Recognition is defined for the purpose of this thesis as: *the manifest or tacit*

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[368] I. M. D. Little, *Aid to Africa: An Appraisal of UK Policy for Aid to Africa South of the Sahara*Elsevier, 2013).
[369] J. Pickering, 'Policy Coherence in International Responses to State Failure: The Role of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone'. *Development Studies Institute Working Paper Series,* 06-76, (2009), 40.
[370] A. D. Smith *UK Continues to Back Sierra Leone - but for how Long?* Available online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk-continues-to-back-sierra-leone-but-for-how-long-1046167.html [Accessed 14/05/2018].para.3

acceptance of the hegemonic status of a hegemonic aspiring state by key members of the international system (region). This is in line with the argument of Shaw et al., to the effect that Nigeria is generally regarded as a West African hegemon by the sub-region's member states. They attributed the deference to Abuja's commitment to sub-regional concerns and its ideas towards their solution.[371] Daniel Bach supports the view that Nigeria enjoys consensual hegemonic deference as he asserts, 'both within and outside of the country, Nigeria's vocation to dominate and structure the sub-regional environment is no longer contested…'[372] This connotes hegemonic deference by West African states based on attraction to its vision and acknowledgement of its beneficence. It is important to stress again that hegemonic deference does not mean total deference from all other relevant actors, or even the same level of deference from all such states, but there must be deference from key states within the relevant international setting. In this respect, several key leaders of West African states have made pronouncements that can be interpreted to mean hegemonic deference to Nigeria.

Crucially, evidence of this comes from both Francophone and Anglophone members of the sub-region. For example, Major Yushau Salisu quotes former President of Francophone Senegal, Abdou Diouf, as saying, 'With Nigeria back to democracy, West Africa and indeed Africa as a whole have received a big boost in their efforts to achieve regional integration, extinguish local conflicts and promote economic development.'[373] This shows recognition of the special role that Nigeria plays and by inference of he fact that other states cannot play such a role. Similarly, the current Ghanaian President, Nana Akufo-Addo, from the Anglophone side of the West African divide, also conceded hegemony to Nigeria, when he called on Abuja to take the lead in the transformation of the ECOWAS sub-region. He called on Nigeria to show political will in that regard, specifically on the agenda of a second single currency for the Anglophone states and one Francophone state (Guinea Conakry) of the sub-region. The President asserted, "You have the numbers, you have the economic muscle and, dare I say it, you owe it to the

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[371] C. M. Shaw et al., 'Hegemonic Participation in Peace-Keeping Operations: The Case of Nigeria and ECOMOG [with Comment and Rejoinder]'. *International Journal on World Peace,* (1996), 31-66.
[372] D. C. Bach, 'Nigeria: Called to Hegemony'. *Grain De Sel,* 51, 8, (2010). p.8
[373] Y. A. Salisu, 'Nigeria's Rising Hegemony is Essential to Peace and Stability in West-Africa'. (2002). p.29

region and continent…"[374] It is on this basis that Alimou Diallo, in a field interview, asserted, '…. in West Africa, Nigeria is considered to be the super power and normally for governance to function, you need one country that has the required resources: human resources, military resources, and political resources to be the one that is driving the agenda. So, Nigeria has played that role...'[375]

The implication of the above discussion is that Nigeria is the recognised hegemon of West Africa. Even despite the neo-colonial tendencies that make some states, mainly the Francophone ones, look outward, there has not been a clear-cut denial of Nigeria's hegemony in the West African sub-region. What is significant to note is that the two West African states cited above are the second and fourth most 'important' countries of the sub-region respectively, in terms of material power. The import of the statements of these leaders is an acknowledgement that Nigeria is indispensable with respect to important sub-regional tasks, which is the main characteristic of a hegemon. By implication, it also means deference of hegemonic leadership of the sub-region to Nigeria.

The preceding argument notwithstanding, it has to be acknowledged that recognition of Nigeria's hegemonic status is not without some degree of challenge. This is attributable to the impact of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Whereas colonialism results in the various divides in the sub-region (Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone), neo-colonialism, the attempt by former colonial powers to influence the sub-region, has kept this divide lingering. As a result, an assessment of Nigeria's hegemonic recognition can be described as a mixed one. It is from this perspective that Jude Odigbo et al., argue that if one takes into consideration Nigeria's efforts towards its hegemonic aspirations in West Africa and the attitude of West African states, Nigeria is not commensurately recognised as a hegemon.[376]

This recognition deficit is mainly a result of the significant influence still wielded by extra-regional state powers, particularly France, that serves as a counter-hegemonic factor to Nigeria. The ascription of France as such is partly because of the continuing

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[374] Africa Times *Nigeria's Buhari Heads to Niamey for ECOWAS Currency Meeting.* Available online: https://africatimes.com/2017/10/24/nigerias-buhari-heads-to-niamey-for-ecowas-currency-meeting/ [Accessed 24/02/2018].para.4
[375] Interview with Alimou Diallo
[376] Odigbo et al., 'Regional Hegemony and Leadership Space in Africa: Assessing Nigeria's Prospects and Challenges'. , 89-105

reliance on Paris by Francophone West African states which, as a result, brings about divided loyalty between Nigeria and France. This makes the deference of many Francophone states manifestly more passive than active. This is corroborated by Alli as he asserts, 'Another obstacle to the sub-regional integration efforts remain the low level of political will and enthusiasm among some leaders, particularly of the Francophone states.'[377]

4.6.1   Criterion Competitors

It is important to add that though Nigeria does not have the full commitment of member states by way of hegemonic recognition, no state, whether within or outwith West Africa, enjoys greater recognition than Nigeria. This is mainly because any meaningful hegemonic recognition in West Africa would require Nigeria's recognition as well, given its overbearing significance.

This sub-section has demonstrated that Nigeria satisfies the hegemonic criterion of 'recognition' set out in Chapter Three. It has shown that Nigeria surpasses the threshold of hegemonic recognition that is needed for it to be accorded a West African hegemon, especially if its deference is combined with the rest of the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria. The last criterion further tests Nigeria's ability to manifest deference or recognition by bringing all member states under one institutional umbrella.

4.7   Nigeria: Institutional Penetration

Hegemonic standing is enhanced if an aspirant hegemon is capable of playing a key role in the formation of and participating in an IO that facilitates collective decision making and action in the relevant region. This is referred to in this thesis as 'institutional penetration' and is defined as *the existence of an international institution solely or jointly initiated by the hegemon whose acceptable vision is manifestly embodied in the institution in which it participates*. Nigeria demonstrated this by initiating the idea of ECOWAS and supporting its formation. Nigeria succeeded in getting the support of other member states of the West African sub-region for this purpose after a long effort.

The turning point was the end of the Nigerian civil war (Biafra war) which began in 1967 and ended in 1970. According to Cyril Obi, post-Biafra, Nigeria progressively

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[377] Alli, 'The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy'. p.37

shifted from a pro-British and pro-Western foreign policy that also characterised its immediate post-independence foreign policy to a much stronger Afrocentric foreign policy.[378] The policy adjustment can be explained by taking into consideration the role of external powers in the war that Nigeria found unacceptable. According to Haastrup and Luciathe, the civil war was caused by a secessionist attempt and it was a game changer with respect to Nigeria's understanding of its internal security and what good neighbourliness means. They elucidate this, arguing that the war brought to the fore the impact of external influence on West Africa to Nigeria's domestic security. They cited France, which passed through Ivory Coast to offer support to the secessionists and thereby, influenced Nigeria's domestic politics at the time.[379]

As a sub-regional hegemon or at least, an aspiring one at the time, Nigeria needed to act and it appears the formation of ECOWAS was its immediate task as part of its protectionist approach to West African hegemony. Nigeria's first move was to create an avenue for conciliation. It was specifically meant to build trust with its Francophone neighbours, given their distrust and uncertainty about the real motive of Nigeria in view of their relatively much smaller sizes.[380] Nigeria used its material power to achieve its long-term hegemonic vision by getting West African states under this single multilingual body. Nigeria's success in the formation of ECOWAS means its hegemonic vision of collectiveness and ownership of sub-regional affairs was set in motion. It established a sub-regional sense of purpose through ECOWAS, even if coherent cooperation remained a challenge. This avenue serves as a tool through which Nigeria's hegemonic vision can eventually be achieved in the long run. What is also significant to note is that such a bureaucracy makes Abuja's persuasive approach to hegemony possible, given that it respects its supra-nationality.

Rationally, just as any regional hegemon ought to do, Nigeria considered the opposition that comes with hegemonic pursuit. Hence, its approach of ECOWAS serves

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[378] Obi, 'Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Transnational Security Challenges in West Africa'. , 183-196; H. K. Kah, 'Kwame Nkrumah and the Panafrican Vision: Between Acceptance and Rebuttal'. *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,* 5, 9, (2016).

[379] T. Haastrup and E. Lopez Lucia, 'Nigeria and Regional Security'. *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper no.RSCAS,* 49, (2014).

[380] A. J. Omede, 'Nigeria's Relations with Her Neighbours'. *Studies of Tribes and Tribals,* 4, 1, (2006), 7-17.; D. O. Omo-Ogbebor and A. H. Sanusi, 'Asymmetry of ECOWAS Integration Process: Contribution of Regional Hegemon and Small Country'. *Vestnik RUDN.International Relations,* 17, 1, (2017), 59-73.; G. A. Obiozor et al., *West African Regional Economic Integration: Nigerian Policy Perspectives for the 1990's*Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1994).

as a catalyst to its persuasive approach to hegemony. The key factor was Nigeria's shift from an understanding of IOs as a means of overbearing influence by powerful member(s) to one premised on cooperation and persuasion. The latter approach, as the underpinning ethos behind ECOWAS, is arguably the main factor that endeared Nigeria to other members of the organisation, given that it led to an ECOWAS based on sovereign equality.[381] There is no recognition of one particular state having privileges or rights over others in the decision making process of ECOWAS under its structure.[382] Therefore, any leverage of Nigeria is only a manifestation of voluntary hegemonic deference. This further explains Nigeria's persuasive approach to hegemony despite its significant coercive power. It is for this reason that Kwesi Aning described Nigeria's hegemonic approach in a field interview as follows:

> Nigeria is one of the most fascinating hegemonic powers that I have studied. Hegemonic power is expressed I think in three ways: through raw power, through persuasion or through the generation of knowledge. Nigeria uses all three. More often than not, it is because it generates enough knowledge but it prefers to use persuasion. Nigeria consistently has given up direct powerful roles in ECOWAS so that even small states, like Togo and Benin and even the Gambia feel like they have a voice… I mean, it is fascinating that a country with such power will allow this to happen.[383]

Persuasion appears to be the only workable approach to hegemony for Nigeria given the interest shown in the sub-region by more materially endowed extra-regional powers, namely the USA and France. Nigeria realises that it is not able to rely solely on its hard power, but needs instead to complement this with an acceptable vision, strategies and moral suasion (soft power), assets it has sought to utilise through the institutional penetration provided by the ECOWAS. Under the circumstances, it can be argued that Nigeria's non-application of coercion is deliberate as a means through which it could achieve its agenda of multilingual integration under only one sub-regional entity (ECOWAS).

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[381] C. Hartmann, 'Governance Transfer by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)'. *SFB-Governance Working Paper Series,* 47, (2013).; ECOWAS Commission, 'Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty'.
[382] Interview with James Agalga
[383] Interview with Kwesi Aning,

4.7.1 Criterion competitors

There are no direct competitors regarding this criterion. However, there exists another sub-regional entity participated in solely by Francophone states. This organisation has been known since 1994 as Union Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (UEMOA)[384] having been in existence from the 1970s with different names.[385] As will be seen in the next chapter, even though it was formed on the instigation and actions of Paris,[386] the most powerful Francophone West African state, Ivory Coast, has also played a crucial role throughout its history.[387]Yet no Francophone state, not even Ivory Coast, is able to support a sub-region wide organisation without external support. For this reason, it is concluded that Nigeria has no intra-regional competitor with respect to this criterion. This is also true of extra-regional powers (excluding the USA and France, discussed in the next chapter), for whilst both China and the UK have global leverage at the level of the UN, their lack of hegemonic interest makes the impact of such leverage less of a concern.

This sub-section has demonstrated that Nigeria satisfies the hegemonic criterion of 'Institutional Penetration' set out in Chapter Three. As part of its hegemonic pursuit, Nigeria has taken a lead role in the establishment of an IO, ECOWAS, in which it participates as the lead actor. It is argued in the sub-section that Nigeria achieved this by applying both its hard power (material power) and soft power (ideas through persuasion) or smart power. The sub-section has further shown Nigeria's persuasive approach to sub-regional hegemony by adhering to ECOWAS' Westphalian principle of equality of states, partly as a way to compete favourably with extra-regional state powers that wield more material power than it does.

4.8   Conclusion

To conclude, reference is made to the claim in this chapter that hegemony depends on a combination of all six criteria of hegemony taken together. Whilst Nigeria is a moderate power relative to its extra-regional competitors, it has: a clear-cut, sub-region-specific vision; shows hegemonic willingness; has demonstrated sacrificial beneficence

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[384] It translates to mean, West African Economic and Monetary Union
[385] A. E. Agbodji, 'The Impact of Subregional Integration on Bilateral Trade: The Case of UEMOA'. (2008).
[386] S. Page and S. Bilal, 'Regional Integration in Western Africa'. *Report Prepared for and Financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, ODI, London,* (2001).
[387]   Page and Bilal, 'Regional Integration in Western Africa'. p.2

in a non-discriminatory manner; is largely recognised as a sub-regional hegemon; and, through ECOWAS, has a high level of institutional penetration, a strong prima facie case for its sub-regional hegemony has, as the table below illustrates, been made. Moreover, as will be shown in the next chapter, Nigeria only ranks less in terms of sheer material power compared to the leading two extra-regional powers with manifest willingness for West African hegemony, France and the USA. Nigeria, however, fares better than these two states in respect of translating this power into beneficence with sub-regional scope, despite its limited material power. Ascribing West African hegemony to Nigeria is also informed by the fact that it has a clear vision through which ECOWAS was established, which gives it institutional leverage and hegemonic recognition. Nigeria may not be privileged to wield influence in global governance institutions in the same way as the USA and France, but the fact that ECOWAS has sub-region-wide scope in decision making makes it the most important institutional actor. Nigeria is thus considered to be ahead of the other states in terms of recognition from within the sub-region, yet not considered to have full recognition, mainly because of the seeming less commitment to ECOWAS by states on the Francophone side of the sub-regional divide that is sustained by France's counter-hegemony.

Table 1: Nigeria's West African hegemonic standing

	Power	Vision	Willing	Beneficence	Recognition	Institutions
Nigeria	Medium	High	high	High	Medium	High

Chapter 5 Counter-Hegemony in Practice: The case of the USA and France in West Africa

5.1 Introduction

This chapter continues the process of testing the claim that Nigeria is the West African hegemon and that, whereas France has counter-hegemonic status within the sub-region, the USA, despite its global status, ranks below France in terms of hegemonic influence. Similar to the approach adopted in the previous chapter, this chapter consists of three main sections, each of which is divided into six sub-sections in which the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic claims of the USA and France are tested against the criteria set out in Chapter Three, namely, material power, vision, willingness, beneficence, recognition, and institutional penetration. The first sub-section tests the USA against these criteria. The second sub-section does so in respect of France. The third sub-section proceeds to provide a comparative analysis of each of these states in relation to Nigeria with reference to the discussion in Chapter Four.

5.2 Is the USA either a West African hegemon or a counter-hegemon?

As argued in Chapter Three, it is misleading to perceive hegemony as a global phenomenon. Hegemony can only be perceived from a regional perspective, if one takes into consideration the enormity of the task associated with hegemony. Nevertheless, the attempt for expansion of hegemonic influence extra-regionally has always been the character of regional hegemons and other state powers that are not necessarily hegemons but nevertheless class as great powers at any moment in time. [388] It is on this basis that the role of extra-regional powers in West African security and economic governance will be analysed. The specific focus is on the USA and France in view of their manifest hegemonic interest in the sub-region. Taking into consideration the fact that France is considered as the counter-hegemon in West Africa and not the USA, despite the latter being relatively more powerful, it is important first to address why the USA is not a West African hegemon and not the most prominent counter-hegemon to Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony. To substantiate this, the USA is now subjected to the criteria listed above.

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[388] See Chapter Three (section 3.4.3)

5.2.1 The USA: Material power

With reference to the definition of material power in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this section proceeds to test the USA's material power in West Africa. The USA has been the world's most powerful economic and military actor for decades. On the economic front, according to some accounts, it accounted for about 25% of the global economy as at 2015.[389] It remains the biggest economy in the world, despite stiff competition from China,[390] and it is for this reason that the US economy is usually described as the engine or heartbeat of the global economy.[391] By implication, the US economy is far stronger than those of all West African states including that of Nigeria. The USA is regarded as not only the most powerful state in an economic sense, but also the most powerful militarily, again, despite significant competition from states like China and Russia.[392] In addition to its presence in many parts of the world, US military spending relative to competitors makes clear its dominance. In 2018, Washington spent $649 billion on defence, which is more than the immediately following five countries put together.[393] According to James Miller and Michael O'Hanlon, the US figure represents almost 40% of total global defence spending.[394] Inevitably, therefore, the USA surpasses both France and Nigeria in this regard. However, this does not make the USA a West African hegemon in terms of how much this huge global power reflects in West Africa by way of its presence, to which we now turn.

While its economic impact in the sub-region is deferred to be discussed later in this chapter,[395] it is important to discuss Washington's military presence in West Africa. This will give us an idea of the extent to which its overbearing power is reflected in its quest for hegemony in West Africa and the extent to which it is accepted. Even though

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[389] U.S. Global Leadership Coalition *America's Global Economic Leadership A Strategic Return on U.S. Investments.* Available online: https://www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/07/USGLC-Americas-Global-Economic-Leadership-July-2017.pdf [Accessed 20/05/2018]. p.7

[390] World Economic Forum *The World's Biggest Economies in 2018.* Available online: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/the-worlds-biggest-economies-in-2018/ [Accessed 20/04/19

[391] S. Dées and A. Saint-Guilhem, 'The Role of the United States in the Global Economy and its Evolution Over Time'. *Empirical Economics,* 41, 3, (2011), 573-591.

[392] A. B. Carter and J. C. Bulkeley, 'America's Strategic Response to China's Military Modernization'. *Harvard Asia Pacific Review,* 9, 1, (2007), 50-52.

[393] Tian et al., 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018'. p.2

[394] J. N. Miller and M. O'Hanlon, *Quality Over Quantity: US Military Strategy and Spending in the Trump Years*Brookings Institution, 2019). p.2

[395] See section 5.2.4

the USA has shown interest in having a military base in West Africa, it at present has no permanent military base in the sub-region. However, it established one at Djibouti in East Africa in 2007 (United States Africa Command - AFRICOM).[396] It is currently the USA's only permanent military base in the African continent. [397] The USA not having a permanent military base in West Africa is attributable to ECOWAS member states' opposition to the idea. For instance, according to Ebrahim Deen, 'Regional institutions feared that AFRICOM's presence would undermine their influence while regional hegemons feared its stationing in neighbouring states would alter the balance of power.'[398] He further added: '…South Africa and Nigeria used their influential positions in SADC and ECOWAS respectively to lobby against the command being headquartered in their regions.'[399]

The justification for this opposition provides further evidence of the USA's limited hegemonic credentials in West African, because the objection is generally based on African, and notably for the purpose of this thesis, West African distrust of US motives for wanting to establish a military base. *The Guardian* quotes an official of the US State Department as having corroborated the distrust. Having toured the continent for the purposes of promoting the establishment of a military base, he asserted that in relation to Africa 'we have got a big image problem down there….'[400] He further added, 'Public opinion is really against getting into bed with the US. They just don't trust the US.'[401] An instance of the distrust was manifested when protest erupted in Ghana when a bilateral defence cooperation agreement between Ghana and the USA was misconstrued by the public to be a military base. The Ghanaian President, in line with the sub-regional position, made it clear that he will not permit a US military base in Ghana and that the agreement was not about establishing such an establishment.[402] It is however, important to indicate

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[396] L. Ploch, *Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa*DIANE Publishing, 2010).
[397] global Security.org *American Military Bases in Africa.* Available online: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/africom.htm [Accessed 12/04/2020].
[398] E. S. Deen, 'AFRICOM: Protecting US Interests Disguised as Military Partnerships'. *AlJazeera Center for Studies,* 20, (2013).
[399] Deen, 'AFRICOM: Protecting US Interests Disguised as Military Partnerships'.
[400] The Guardian *African States Oppose US Presence.* Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/25/usa.simontisdall [Accessed 12/04/2020]. para.4
[401] The Guardian *African States Oppose US Presence.* para.4
[402] News24 *Ghana Will Not Offer Military Base to US: President.* Available online: https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/ghana-will-not-offer-military-base-to-us-president-20180406 [Accessed 10/08/2019].

that apart from the USA's Djibouti base, it has bilateral defence cooperation agreements with some member states of West Africa, such as Senegal[403] and Ghana. The distrust certainly undermines ascription of West African hegemony to the USA. This is because a hegemon should be able to convince those over whom hegemony is sought that it means well for them on any agenda. This seems not to be case in respect of the USA relative to its quest for military presence in the West African sub-region.

This sub-section has shown that the USA is the most powerful state in the world economically, which explains its military power as well. The sub-section has also indicated that the USA is inferentially more powerful in the West African sub-region. However, it has demonstrated that in terms of presence and impact, at the level of West Africa, the USA is a limited actor. It is concluded that the weaker presence of the USA is attributable to lack of acceptance by West African states, which results in hegemonic weakness relative to this criterion of material power. How the USA compares with Nigeria and France in relation to this criterion will be analysed in section 5.4.

5.2.2 The USA: Vision

With reference to the definition of vision in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test the USA's vision relative to West Africa. The sub-section is based on the USA's global attitude over the years in relation to expanding its influence. The USA has, since 1945, been seeking opportunities across the world to widen its scope of influence. It is a vision that covers several areas of interest, including economic and security. This is embodied in its foreign policy over the years. According to Michael Mazarr et al, since 1945, the USA '...has pursued its global interests through creating and maintaining international economic institutions, bilateral and regional security organisations, and liberal political norms; these ordering mechanisms are often collectively referred to as the international order.'[404] From this perspective, it is argued in this sub-section that Washington's vision for West African hegemony is about incorporating the sub-region into these global security and economic governance structures.

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[403] Reuters *U.S. and Senegal Sign Defense Cooperation Deal.* Available online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-senegal-security-idUSKCN0XT1Q5 [Accessed 28/08/2019].
[404] M. J. Mazarr et al., *Understanding the Current International Order:[Building a Sustainable International Order Series]*Rand Corporation, 2016). p.iii

From the economic perspective, one of the main ways through which the USA attempts to influence the economies of states in West Africa is through institutional penetration. The USA has sought to influence the economic policies of member states of the sub-region mainly through institutional penetration, specifically through the Bretton Woods institutions. This will be considered further in Section 5.2.6. But in the context of this sub-section this is significant because such institutions are, in effect, an embodiments of the US hegemonic 'vision', both globally and regionally. In West Africa, Bretton Woods rules of engagement, including dictation of recipient states' economic policies and adherence to (largely US-determined) rules of good governance have been widely criticised, with less conditional alternatives, such as that offered by China, often receiving a more favourable response. [405] In support of this argument, Jan Wilhelm quotes a Senegalese economist, Ndongo Sylla, as having said, 'China offers African countries the opportunity to escape, from time to time, the grip of the IMF and the World Bank because China is not demanding conditionalities.'[406] This view is also backed by the fact that Chinese loans to Ivory Coast, a West African state and a member of the IMF, have risen from zero in the year 2000 to $2.5 billion as of 2015.[407] The shift towards alternative funding sources raises questions of mutual interest as far as the USA's economic vision is concerned. This is a manifestation of hegemonic weakness, given that a hegemonic vision must be seen as serving mutual interest.

Apart from promoting its economic vision in West Africa, the USA also seeks to promote its security preferences. This is linked to its promotion of democracy and the rule of law in West Africa as part of what is termed a US-led liberal international order (LIO). [408] The idea of linking US promotion of democracy to security is based on Washington's view, particularly prevalent after 9/11, that a lack of democracy breeds terrorism[409] a threat which has remained one of the biggest US security concerns abroad.

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[405] L. Mpondo et al., 'US Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Is it Ambiguous?'. *International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research,* 5, 4, (2017), 608-616.

[406] Deutsche Welle *The IMF Comeback in Africa.* Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/the-imf-comeback-in-africa/a-45489734 [Accessed 10/08/2019]. para.11

[407] Brookings *France-Africa Relations Challenged by China and the European Union.* Available online: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/02/05/france-africa-relations-challenged-by-china-and-the-european-union/?fbclid=IwAR22S-gFHVOCveBcwPJYBfkKw8ZM-4rmth_1x3cXLFmPCxkqk_K67MVEPTI [Accessed 10/10/2019]. para.4

[408] I. Parmar, 'The US-Led Liberal Order: Imperialism by another Name?'. *International Affairs,* 94, 1, (2018), 151-172.

[409] Federation of American Scientists *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.* Available online: https://fas.org/irp/threat/nsct2006.pdf [Accessed 13/02/2019].

As part of its LIO agenda, democratization, protection of human rights and reducing terrorism have characterised US foreign policy and, by implication, its global and hence West African hegemonic vision.[410]

It is, however, important to indicate that despite the USA's status as a leading proponent of such a stance, it is not itself without shortcomings in terms of human and democratic rights. It could be argued, for example, that it was not until 1965, when civil rights were extended to all minorities, that a more meaningful liberal adherence within the USA's domestic setting took hold.[411] This supports the rebuttal in this thesis that hegemony is necessarily contingent on adherence to liberal values, since prior to this point in time it was already evident that the USA had extensive hegemonic aspirations.[412] Even contemporarily, although the USA propagates democracy and the rule of law globally as a hegemonic vision, it does not appear to apply these values externally with any great consistency. In this regard, its liberalism in dealing with the outside world is in question, yet it is required to give meaning to hegemony from an international viewpoint. One example is US disregard of the UN in taking the lead in the Iraqi intervention, another is its maintenance of friendly relations with non-democratic states such as Saudi Arabia, and its post-9/11 unilateralist attitude towards the fight against terrorism and its detrimental impact on human right concerns.[413]

Such examples notwithstanding, the USA's accolade as a liberal state gives it the moral high ground to want to export democracy to the rest of the world, including West Africa. This is analysed from a security perspective relative to West Africa. Despite the limitation of US military presence in West Africa, Washington has been engaging with the sub-region both bilaterally and sub-regionally, as shown in the preceding section. Nevertheless, the reality in West Africa does not reflect adherence to Washington-styled domestic democratic governance. This because no West African state has always been democratic in the true sense since independence. For instance, according to Kwame Boafo-Arthur, 'From 1960 to 1989, West Africa…accounted for a very high percentage of

[410] S. Choi and P. James, 'Why does the United States Intervene Abroad? Democracy, Human Rights Violations, and Terrorism'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 60, 5, (2016), 899-926.

[411] S. C. Salvatore, 'Civil Rights in America: Racial Voting Rights'. *Washington, DC: National Park Service, US Department of the Interior, National Historic Landmarks Program,* (2007).

[412] N. M. Yazid, 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability, Hegemonic Power and International Political Economic Stability'. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration,* 3, 6, (2015), 67-79. p.70

[413] Center for Constitutional Rights (New York, *Report on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba*Center for Constitutional Rights, 2006).

military coups on the continent…Nigeria, the regional giant, tops…with six successful interventions, followed by Ghana with five successful interventions…Burkina Faso and…Benin have had four successful coups each.'[414] As pointed out in Chapter Four, some semblance of sustained democratic culture began in the 1990s. However, basic challenges still remain. For instance, The Gambia does not have a constitutional term limit to its presidency,[415] whilst in some other West African states that do have fixed terms, presidents have at times sought to amend their constitutions in order to stay in power after their terms expire. Some recent examples are Guinea[416] and Togo.[417] The implication is that, while it can be argued that the USA's vision of democratic governance is gaining roots in the sub-region, the USA has not been able to get sub-regional member states to fully embrace a democratic culture of the US standard.

The section has shown that the USA has a vision for the sub-region. It mainly centres on incorporating the sub-region into its liberal international order. This is an international order that covers both economic and security interests of the USA, that it propagates globally. It is shown that reaction to US promotion of its vision has been luke warm at best and in some cases, acceptance has been based on compulsion, which is contrary to hegemony. How, in relation to the vision criterion, the USA compares with Nigeria and France will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.2.3 The USA: Willingness

With reference to the definition of willingness in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test USA's hegemonic willingness relative to West Africa. Somewhat ironically, the USA's extra-regional expansionist attitude, manifesting its willingness to assume West African hegemony, has to be considered in the context of its historic anti-colonial foreign

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[414] K. Boafo-Arthur, *Democracy and Stability in West Africa: The Ghanaian Experience*Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Department of Peace and Conflict Research …, 2008). p.10-11

[415] D. M. Tull and C. Simons, 'The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa'. *Africa Spectrum,* 52, 2, (2017), 79-102. p.84

[416] Aljazeera *Is another President Attempting to Cling to Power in Guinea?* Available online: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/president-attempting-cling-power-guinea-190901192449519.html [Accessed 20/11/2019].

[417] Aljazeera *Togo Changes Law to Let President Stand for Two More Terms.* Available online: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/togo-law-president-stand-terms-190509180859448.html [Accessed 15/01/2020].

policy.[418] This position was so strongly upheld that the USA actively supported the decolonization process against the stance of some of its allies that were the colonial masters, mainly France and Great Britain. It did this even at a time when Africa was key to its European allies' economic recovery.[419] The Cold War undertone in its stance on decolonization further buttresses the point that the USA sought expansion and for that matter showed willingness for West African hegemony. In other words, the USA sought to prevent any possibility of independent African states and for the purpose of this thesis, West African states, taking the side of its key opponent, the former USSR. According to Steven Metz, it became clear to US policymakers that the instability and chaos on the Africa continent that was on the rise as a result of continued colonialism would enhance Soviet expansionism. He supported his claim by quoting Richard Nixon as having argued in 1960 as a presidential candidate that 'in the struggle with the Russians, Africa is the most critical area in the world.'[420] Building further on this point, Kwesi Pratt, in a field interview, attributed the USA's support to the decolonization efforts to its quest to carve out a sphere of influence in Africa, including in West Africa.[421]

Moreover, the USA was aware that its global hegemonic aspiration was not going to be possible if colonialism, which was dominated by 'rival' powers, continued. Of course, hegemonic pursuit is not undertaken just for its own sake; the criterion of beneficence notwithstanding, it entails a significant degree of interest, usually centring on economic, political, and security interest, and usually in this very order.[422] The USA is no exception in this interest-based hegemony. The USA's political interest in hegemony is evident in its attitude to decolonization, but its manifest willingness to assume West African hegemony is, as will now be demonstrated, also related to its economic and security interests.

US interest in West African affairs is significantly linked to its economic interest in the resource rich sub-region. Among several reasons given for the USA's active involvement in West Africa, Bethany Torvell is of the view that, the USA's major concern

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[418] W. R. Louis, 'American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire'. *International Affairs,* 61, 3, (1985), 395-420.
[419] E. Nwaubani, *The United States and the Liquidation of European Colonial Rule in Tropical Africa, 1941-1963*Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2003). p.506
[420] S. Metz, 'American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa'. *Political Science Quarterly,* 99, 3, (1984), 515-533. p.518
[421] Interview with Kwesi Pratt.
[422] K. Nkrumah, *Africa must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963).

is to secure oil supplies,[423] particularly since West Africa is one of the sources of the USA's oil imports.[424] For instance, in 2016, oil accounted for 90% of US trade with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Its trade with Nigeria, the biggest oil producer in Africa and one of the only two oil producing states in West Africa, increased by 118% between 2015 and 2016, mainly from oil imports from Nigeria.[425] As of 2005, Nigeria was the fifth largest supplier of oil to the USA. Out of Nigeria's oil output of 2.12 million barrels per day, 1.85 million were exported, with 621 million barrels going to the USA.[426] However, it is important to add that Nigeria's oil supply to the USA has seen a reduction in recent times as the USA's domestic oil production has increased.[427] This point notwithstanding, West African oil is still central to the USA at any point, since the transportation route to the USA is shorter and more secure compared to routes from the Middle East.[428] Apart from oil, another commodity that the USA imports in significant quantities from West Africa is cocoa. It imports this mainly from Ivory Coast and Ghana, the largest and second largest cocoa producers in the world, respectively.[429]

As the world's biggest economy, the USA needs energy security and other natural resources to maintain its status. The West African sub-region may not be indispensable to it as far as its resources are concerned, given that other sources are available, including indigenous ones, but US hegemonic interest in West Africa nevertheless partially grounded in Washington's recognition that, given the ever-growing competitiveness of world economics, it cannot afford to take the sub-region for granted. The USA wants to have several avenues through which it can satisfy its resource needs so as to make it

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[423] B. Torvell *Oil, Security and US Involvement in West Africa.* Available online: https://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/12/oil-security-and-us-involvement-in-west-africa/ [Accessed 25/08/2018].
[424] Obi, 'Terrorism in West Africa: Real, Emerging Or Imagined Threats?'. , 87-101
[425] US Department of Commense *U.S. Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, January-December 2016.* Available online: https://www.trade.gov/agoa/pdf/2016%20US-SSA%20Trade%20One-Pager.pdf [Accessed 07/05/2019]. p.1
[426] African Development Bank and the African Union, *Oil and Gas in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford university press,[2009]). p.70
[427] The Punch *US Cuts Nigerian Oil Imports by 62%.* Available online: https://punchng.com/us-cuts-nigerian-oil-imports-by-62/ [Accessed 30/07/2019].
[428] L. Mpondo et al., 'U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Is it Ambiguous? '. 5, 4, (2017), 608-616. p.610
[429] Lesley Ahmed et al., *U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Developments*,[2018].

possible not only to ensure energy security,[430] but to maintain sanctioning power over resource supplying states without having to suffer from its actions.[431]

The USA's economic motives for West African hegemony in turn explain its security interest in the sub-region. Given the volatile nature of West Africa, the USA anticipates a role for itself as far as the sub-region's security is concerned. According to Keith Myers, 'Policy-makers in Washington are…concerned that they may be called on to intervene militarily in the region to resolve conflicts and preserve oil supplies.'[432] It is for this reason that Obi argued that the USA seeks to incorporate the sub-region into its global security framework, making West Africa one of the sites for its global war on terror (GWOT).[433] In the same vein, and in line with earlier arguments, Salley Ibrahim et al., indicate that the USA has been making efforts through ECOWAS to gain a formidable presence in West Africa, often on the back of its GWOT and that it has been requesting to establish military bases.[434] Building on this, Sam Raphael and Doug Stokes note that the USA has increased its naval presence and that security assistance has expanded in West Africa and in their view, '…Washington has sought to entrench its hegemonic position in the region.'[435]

While willingness is a very important hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion since it is a precursor to many of the other criteria. If a state lacks the willingness to be a hegemon, it is most unlikely that it will become one. But conversely, a state may have the will to assume hegemony, but if it lacks the means then, once again, it is most unlikely to become one. Hence the fulfilment or otherwise of this criterion is determined by the success of a hegemonic aspirant relative to how it performs on the other criteria that are, in turn, all driven by hegemonic willingness. The success of the USA relative to the extent

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[430] D. Volman, 'The Bush Administration & African Oil: The Security Implications of US Energy Policy'. *Review of African Political Economy,* 30, 98, (2003), 573-584.

[431] Some examples include the US sanctions against Russia, Iran and Venezuela.

[432] K. Myers and C. House, *Petroleum, Poverty and Security*Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2005). p.2

[433] Obi, 'Terrorism in West Africa: Real, Emerging Or Imagined Threats?'. , 87-101; Brookings, 'A Trilateral Dialogue on the United States,
Africa and China', *Perspectives on China-Africa Oil Ties.* May 13, 2013, 2-182013).

[434] S. I. Ibrahim et al., 'The Decay and Withering Away of ECOWAS's Role in West African Regional Security'. *Geografia-Malaysian Journal of Society and Space,* 10, 3, (2017).

[435] S. Raphael and D. Stokes, 'Globalizing West African Oil: US 'energy Security'and the Global Economy'. *International Affairs,* 87, 4, (2011), 903-921. p.904

to which its West African hegemonic willingness has translated into hegemonic or even extra-regional counter-hegemonic status will be considered in due course.

This sub-section has shown that the USA has the willingness for West African hegemony as part of its global hegemonic agenda. It has also demonstrated that its willingness is based on its desire to contain growing competition to its global influence; its need for resources to maintain its superpower status; and finally its security needs, for which reason it needs to incorporate West Africa into its global security architecture. How, in relation to the willingness criterion, the USA compares with Nigeria and France will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.2.4   The USA: Beneficence

With reference to the definition of beneficence in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test the USA's beneficence relative to West Africa. The focus is on the USA's support for West African security and general socio-economic development. The USA's active engagement with West African states on security governance is relatively new as it relates mainly to the its GWOT. According to Stephen Burgess, 'Before 2002, the United States had never established a base in Africa, which stands in contrast to more than a century of French bases.'[436] This is backed by the argument of Jocob Mundy to the effect that ever since 2002, as part of the US GWOT, it has rolled out several counter-terrorism initiatives within the North West Sahara-Sahel region of Africa. The first was the Pan–Sahel Initiative (PSI) to support countries such as Mali, Chad, Mauritania and Niger in their border control. [437] In 2005, the PSI was changed into a $500 million Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), mainly to provide a regional terrorism response through military support and intelligence sharing, as well as support for democratization.[438]

More generally, the USA has been supportive of ECOWAS' peace and security engagements in the sub-region. For instance, according to Sean Murphy, when the ECOWAS decided to intervene in Liberia, '…President Bush directed the U.S. military

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[436] S. Burgess, 'Military Intervention in Africa: French and Us Approaches Compared'. *Air & Space Power Journal: Afrique Et Francophonie,* 9, 2, (2018), 5-25. p.16
[437] J. Mundy'Introduction: Securitizing the Sahara', in J. Mundy(ed.), *US militarization of the Sahara-Sahel: Security, Space & Imperialism*, 2010), 1-11.
[438] Mundy'Introduction: Securitizing the Sahara', , 1-11

to position a limited U.S. military force off the coast of Liberia for the purpose of supporting the deployment of Nigerian-led ECOWAS forces into Liberia.'[439] Colonel Victor Nelsonas is also quoted as having said in relation to ECOWAS' resolve to intervene militarily in Ivory Coast, 'We have worked up a plan, in cooperation with the State Department, to aid the soon-to-be deployed ECOWAS force tasked with creating a buffer zone between rebel and government forces.'[440]

Beyond its security involvement, the USA also supports the sub-region's socio-economic development through aid and grants. In 2013, the USA, through its representative to ECOWAS, gave assurance of its desire to keep on with its committed partnership with the organisation.[441] The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in particular has been collaborating with ECOWAS along the lines of the US government's global vision.[442] One case in point is the signing of a development agreement between USAID and ECOWAS aimed at supporting ECOWAS' efforts at democratic advancement in the sub-region. Under the agreement, the USA committed itself to grant up to $298 million over the period to support this endeavour, as well as to assist in developing the sub-region's economic, trade, and investment capacity, and to promote its peace and security.[443] On the issue of democratization and good governance, which the USA considers as needed to enhance its fight against terror, Washington also offers technical assistance towards building effective and accountable governance institutions in the sub-region, primarily through its West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI).[444]

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[439] S. D. Murphy, 'US Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia'. *The American Journal of International Law,* 98, 1, (2004), 193. p.194

[440] J. Fisher-Thompson *U.S. to Provide ECOWAS with Peacekeeping Support in Côte D'Ivoire.* Available online: https://reliefweb.int/report/c%C3%B4te-divoire/us-provide-ecowas-peacekeeping-support-c%C3%B4te-divoire [Accessed 11/03/2017]. para.2

[441] U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Nigeria *Ambassador James F. Entwistle's Accreditation to ECOWAS.* Available online: https://ng.usembassy.gov/ambassador-james-f-entwistles-accreditation-ecowas-december-12-2013/ [Accessed 30/03/2018].

[442] USAID *Regional Partner in Economic Growth: ECOWAS.* Available online: https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/fact-sheets/regional-partner-economic-growth-ecowas [Accessed 30/04/2018].

[443] USAID *U.S. Government and ECOWAS Renew Partnership.* Available online: https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/press-releases/us-government-and-ecowas-renew-partnership [Accessed 14/07/2019]. para.2

[444] U.S. Department Of State *The West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative.* Available online: https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/166329.pdf [Accessed 15/07/2019].

The extent to which the USA fulfils the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion of beneficence has to be considered from a security perspective. This is because, as pointed out earlier, the USA's support for the social, economic and political development of the sub-region is largely considered by Washington as a solution to the sub-region's peace and security concerns. The USA is clearly an interested party in the affairs of West Africa, especially in times of sub-regional challenges. While the USA's beneficence is accepted by the sub-region, its role is largely often complementary to that of either ECOWAS/Nigeria or France. This is mainly because of Nigeria and France's much longer active involvement in the sub-region, as shown in the preceding chapter with respect to Nigeria and as this chapter will show later in relation to France. Consequently, the USA does not stand in the front line of West African security governance, undermining any ascription of West African hegemony to it.

The discussion above shows that the USA demonstrated a degree of West African beneficence by engaging with the sub-region both on a bilateral and multilateral basis, offering support in finding solutions to sub-regional problems. This is certainly a hegemonic/counter-hegemon expectation. How, in relation to the beneficence criterion, the USA compares with Nigeria and France will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.2.5 USA: Recognition

With reference to the definition of recognition in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test the USA's recognition relative to West Africa. It is argued in this section that the USA struggles to get recognition as a West African hegemon. The mistrust demonstrated earlier in relation to its quest to establish a military base in Africa is a clear demonstration of this. As also shown earlier, the shift towards emerging powers, specifically China, relative to economic dealings also suggests that the USA struggles for recognition as a West African hegemon. For instance, the IMF has had cause to warn Nigeria against borrowing from China.[445] This is not only in relation to Nigeria but a trend in the sub-region more widely.[446] This is a clear manifestation of a shift away from reliance on the

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[445] Radio France International (rfi) *Focus on Africa: IMF Warns Nigeria about Chinese Debt.* Available online: http://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20190411-focus-africa-imf-warns-nigeria-about-mountain-chinese-debt [Accessed 15/01/2020].

[446] West African Brief *Chinese Loans to West African Governments* . Available online: http://www.west-africa-brief.org/content/en/chinese-loans-west-african-governments [Accessed 20/11/2019].

US backed Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank) towards China, based on the view that China's engagement allows for non-interference and respect for sovereignty, as opposed to the USA and its sponsored institutions.[447] The claim of the USA's weak hegemonic recognition is particularly backed by the fact that the USA does not have the recognition of Nigeria. This is significant because Nigeria is the most influential state in the sub-region and the most powerful as well. Apart from Nigeria, the refusal of Ghana, the second most powerful country in the sub-region, to accept a US military base[448] further supports the claim of low levels of US recognition.

This sub-section has shown that the USA has, over the years, been engaging with West African states across the sub-region's divides, especially in the area of security cooperation. However, as also argued in the preceding section, because the USA became actively involved in West African security governance relatively late, its recognition by member states or the bloc is often overshadowed by Nigeria or France. This is largely explained by the success of the counter-US policies of Nigeria and France, as will be shown subsequently in this chapter.[449] How, in relation to the criterion of recognition, the USA compares with Nigeria and France will also be analysed later in this chapter.

5.2.6   The USA: Institutional penetration

With reference to the definition of institutional penetration in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test USA's institutional penetration relative to West Africa. The key argument of this thesis in this regard is that the USA has weak institutional penetration in West Africa. This is because it has no collective decision-making avenue that it can use to its advantage at the sub-regional level. The USA is not a member of ECOWAS and as such, it does not take part in its decision-making process. Washington remains only an observer state at the ECOWAS commission and a partner that supports its policy implementations.[450] The implication is that Washington is left without a constituency or a group of states that it wields significant influence over in terms of decision-making structures. It is important to stress that the USA has not attempted to create such an entity in the sub-region. This

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[447] I. Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa* Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO, 2009). p.94
[448] See section 5.2.1
[449] See section 5.4.5
[450] U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Nigeria *Ambassador James F. Entwistle's Accreditation to ECOWAS.* Available online: https://ng.usembassy.gov/ambassador-james-f-entwistles-accreditation-ecowas-december-12-2013/ [Accessed 30/03/2018].

can be explained by the fact that the USA's vision for the sub-region is not sub-region-specific but global and largely continental with respect to Africa. This thesis argues that as a result of the latter, the USA focuses more on its influence in much broader international entities such as the UN on political issues and the Bretton Woods institutions on economic issues. The focus here will be on the USA's reliance on the Bretton Woods institutions, given that quite often its reliance on the UN in relation to West Africa is in support of one ECOWAS initiative or the other, as was the case, for example, in Liberia and Ivory Coast.

As argued earlier, on the economic front, the influential Bretton Woods institutions are the main source of US institutional influence in West Africa, mainly the IMF. According to Oatley and Yackee, the IMF is one of the most significant IOs in the world. They argue that its status stems from its architectural role in designing economic policies for the governments of its member states and more importantly, the vast financial resources it controls. Based on this, they concluded that the USA gets its foreign policy objectives achieved using the IMF lending conditionality.[451] The USA has therefore promoted its vision in West Africa through conditions put on loans that the IMF gives to its member states, which include all West African states.[452] These conditions include privatization of state enterprises and austerity or less spending among others[453] and they essentially reflect the US global economic vision of free market economics. Given that the IMF has influenced the economies of West African states, it can be argued that the USA has economic influence on the sub-region. The challenge, however, in respect of the USA's economic influence in West Africa, is the criticism of the IMF by less developed countries (LDCs), including West African states. The IMF's lending conditions are generally criticised as not making it possible for beneficiaries of its financial facilities to own their domestic economic policies. Its prescribed policies are also criticised as worsening the plight of these LDCs, which the loans are intended to solve.[454] Building

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[451] T. Oatley and J. Yackee, 'American Interests and IMF Lending'. *International Politics,* 41, 3, (2004), 415-429.; P. Nel'Making Africa Safe for Capitalism: US Policy and Multilateralism in Africa', in R. Foot, et al. (ed.), *US hegemony and international organizations: The United States and multilateral institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2003), 167-192.
[452] International Monetary Fund *List of Members.* Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm [Accessed 15/05/2020].
[453] M. M. Muhumed and S. A. Gaas, 'The World Bank and IMF in Developing Countries: Helping Or Hindering?'. *International Journal of African and Asian Studies,* 28, (2016).
[454] M. Parkinson and A. McKissack, 'The IMF and the Challenge of Relevance in the International Financial Architecture'. *Economic Round-Up,* Winter 2003, (2003), 1.

further on the reasons why LDCs are dissatisfied with the workings of the IMF, Andrew Schoenholtz asserts:

> … the I.M.F. has yet to resolve the major problem that it faces as an institution and that its most influential members refuse to recognise as they try to fashion a world economic order: dominated politically, legally, and institutionally by the market elite, the Fund has yet to make the cultural and political leap necessary to understand and work with, rather than against, the majority of its members who are in the Third World. Until the I.M.F. does so, it will continue to be harshly criticised and distrusted by the less-developed countries (L.D.C.s) …[455]

As pointed out earlier, this perception has explained the shift of West African states to China for lending. As a result, it is concluded in this sub-section that the response to and disapproval of the Bretton Woods institutions by West Africa states indicates, in terms of institutional penetration, a limited level of sub-regional hegemony. How, in relation to the criterion of institutional penetration, the USA compares with Nigeria and France, will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.2.7 The USA: Overall Hegemonic/Counter-Hegemonic Credentials

As illustrated in the table below, the preceding discussion does not support an ascription of West African hegemony to the USA. This is so, regardless of the fact that it has unmatched material power and a wish for West African hegemony, albeit from the viewpoint of its global hegemonic aspiration. This conclusion is based on the position that Washington's vision is not specifically focused on West Africa and, within the sub-region, has failed to generate widespread support. Moreover, even though the section has demonstrated that the USA has been a benefactor to the sub-region, it is also pointed out that its efforts in that regard are mostly a complement to existing initiatives in the sub-region, which does not make it the hegemon of the sub-region.

As a result, Washington has not manifested the privilege of hegemonic recognition in West Africa, even though it wields some influence in its bilateral engagements with sub-regional member states. Crucial to the argument that the USA is not a West African hegemon is the fact that it has no institutional influence in the politics of the sub-region. The fact that these institutions are meant to take care of the welfare of a given international system, means the USA has no direct role in the decision-making

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[455] A. I. Schoenholtz, 'The IMF in Africa: Unnecessary and Undesirable Western Restraints on Development'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 25, 3, (1987), 403-433. p.403

process of the sub-region, a limitation that is exacerbated by Nigeria's cool attitude to US sub-regional involvement. From the above discussion, it is concluded that the USA has, overall, a weak case in terms of its hegemonic credentials pertaining to West Africa. This will be further demonstrated in the subsequent comparative analysis (Section 5.4) in which it will be argued that the USA's hegemonic credentials look weaker still when judged against those of Nigeria and France. This thesis thus maintains that, with regard to West Africa, the USA is neither a hegemon nor a counter-hegemon.

Table 2: USA's West African counter-hegemonic standing

	Power	Vision	Willing	Beneficence	Recognition	Institutions
USA	high	low	High	Medium	Medium	medium

5.3   Counter-hegemony in practice, the case of France in West Africa

This section discusses French counter-hegemony in West Africa in practical terms, a prima facie case having now been made for discounting the USA as either a West African hegemon or counter-hegemon. The section proceeds on the premise that both the USA and Great Britain have ceded extra-regional counter-hegemony to France. From this perspective, this section proceeds to support this claim based on the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria set out earlier. This supports the hypothetical claim in this thesis that France is the counter-hegemon to Nigeria in West Africa.

5.3.1   France: Material power

With reference to the definition of material power in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test France's material power relative to West Africa. This is necessary because, like a hegemon, a counter-hegemon ought to be seen as a viable alternative in terms of the ability to take on regional or sub-regional responsibilities. As in the case of the USA and Nigeria, France meets this criterion. It is behind the USA but ahead of Nigeria in this regard. The following statistics demonstrate France's material power. France is one of the world's most industrialised states and the sixth biggest economy in the world as of the end of 2018. It ranks behind only the USA, China, Japan, Germany and the UK, with a

total GDP of $2.93 trillion according to the World Economic Forum.[456] Apart from France's economic power, it also has a considerable land mass of 547,030 square kilometres according to the Library of Congress[457] and a population of 67.2 million as of the start of 2018 according to European Union (EU) data sources.[458]

These endowments have been translated into military power too, making France one of the world's most powerful military actors.[459] This is supported by data from 2019 Global Fire Power Index, which ranks France as the fifth most powerful state militarily.[460] French military power can also be seen in its military spending, as it ranks among the top six states with the highest military spending globally, having spent $63.8 billion in 2018.[461] France's extra-territorial presence, specifically in West Africa, further illustrates France's military power, as the next paragraph will demonstrate.

France has, from the beginning of statehood of its former colonies in West Africa, tried to maintain its economic, cultural and military power. This section focuses on the military component of this stance, with the economic aspect deferred to section 5.3.6. From the military perspective, Paris has been able to maintain a military presence in the West African sub-region like no other extra-regional state power. It is in respect of this, that Eric Berman and Katie Sams argue that, '…in contrast with other colonial powers, France remained militarily engaged in Africa – albeit to varying degrees – following decolonization…'[462] It is important to stress that much of France's military engagement in Africa is in West Africa. For instance, Karl Sorenson cites the French defence ministry as having revealed in a report that Senegal signed a defence equipment agreement on 29th March 1974 and Togo signed a defence agreement on the 10th of July 1973. Later, Ivory Coast signed both defence and technical assistance agreements on 24th April 1980. Other signatories include, inter alia, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all of which are West

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[456] World Economic Forum *The World's Biggest Economies in 2018.*
[457] Library of Congress, 'Country Profile: France '. *Library of Congress – Federal Research Division,* May, (2007), 1-36. p.5
[458] EU (Eurostat), *EU Population Up to nearly 513 Million on 1 January 2018 ,*[20*18*]). p.2
[459] M. Pricopi and A. I. Motriuc, 'France's Military Importance for the European Union', *International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION.* Sciendo), 180-1842018).
[460] globalfirepowe *2019 Military Strength Ranking.* Available online: https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp [Accessed 16/01/2020].
[461] Tian et al., 'Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018'. p.2
[462] E. Berman et al., *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*United Nations Publications UNIDIR, 2000). p.291

African states.[463] This explains the revelation of the French defence ministry according to Paul Melly and Vincent Darracq that as of '…February 2013, of 10,025 military personnel deployed overseas, 4,610 were in West Africa, …'[464]

France's West African engagement generally is mainly limited to the Francophone states of the sub-region, and so it is also with respect to its military engagement. It is only recently that France is making efforts to expand its influence to the Anglophone states of the sub-region. For instance, as important as Ghana is in West African politics, it was only in 2018 that it had an official visit by a French President.[465] Needless to say, Nigeria has had frosty relation with Paris and has also declared zero tolerance of foreign military bases in the wider West African sub-region, as indicated in the preceding chapter. These factors support the point that France focuses more on its former colonies in terms of military engagements where it is generally accepted. However, from the perspective of the broader sub-region, French military power is not relied upon, leaving its engagement in the sub-region to bilateral interactions. This lack of sub-region wide engagement is evident in the practices of ECOMOG and its recent replacement by the ECOWAS standby force[466] which, according Emmanuel Kotia's account given in a field interview, is contributed to by member states as and when needed for an ECOWAS-sponsored operations, but with which France only engages, if at all, as a form of military force augmentation.[467]

The sub-section has demonstrated that France is one of the world's most powerful states materially and by implication, one of the most powerful actors in the West African sub-region. It has also been manifesting its power in the sub-region as part of its West African hegemonic aspiration. However, reaction to French ambitions is mixed. While it is largely welcomed among the Francophone members of the sub-region, it is not accepted

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[463] K. Sörenson, *Beyond Françafrique: The Foundation, Reorientation and Reorganisation of France's Africa Politics*Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2008). p.56

[464] P. Melly and V. Darracq, *A New Way to Engage?: French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande*Chatham House London, 2013). p.4; T. Chafer, 'The UK and France in West Africa: Toward Convergence?'. *African Security,* 6, 3-4, (2013), 234-256.

[465] France24 *Macron's Soft Power Push in Africa is Key to 'Making France Great again'.* Available online: https://www.france24.com/en/20180703-macron-soft-power-push-africa-make-france-great-again-global-influence-diplomacy?fbclid=IwAR1dpfEPq-fqxr62oh4kFm7zrmzjxlIKMhUpQmViDK7iX4Dq9tJXxQzNq5I [Accessed 10/08/2019].

[466] T. Jaye et al., *ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace-Building* (Dakar: Imprimerie Graphiplus, 2011).

[467] Interview with Emmanuel Kotia

by the Anglophone states. Crucially, the Francophone states are also part of all sub-regional counter-measures to extra-regional states' influence in West Africa. How, in relation to the criterion of material power, France compares with Nigeria and the USA will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.3.2 France: Vision

With reference to the definition of vision in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test France's vision in relation to West Africa. It is argued in this sub-section that France has a vision for the West African sub-region. France's post-colonial vision has been to hold on to its influence in Francophone West Africa, and to possibly expand further. This is aimed at maintaining global status as a great power. In this regard, it works at preventing both regional powers and extra-regional powers from reducing or taking over its influence in the sub-region. Margaret Majumdar and Tony Chafer corroborate this position as they argue that, 'Africa continues to be strategically important to France's role as a global power…'.[468] Similarly, according to Kwesi Aning, speaking in a field interview, the only place France can expand its influence is Africa.[469] While this can be said to be a continental vision, as argued earlier, the focus of France is on West Africa, which contains eight Francophone states.

As part of working towards its vision, France has manifested two main agendas. The first has to do with its attitude to the Anglophone states in terms of drawing them into French influence. This was mainly about weakening Nigeria in response to its hegemonic quest from independence. France, upon noticing Nigeria's attitude to sub-regional integration and its plans for ECOWAS, backed a secessionist attempt in Nigeria that culminated in the Biafra civil war. According to Ifedayo Elizabeth, 'Once the war erupted, France saw a golden opportunity to work for the dismemberment of the only Anglophone behemoth that served as a major obstacle to the achievement of its objective of complete and unfettered hegemony in Africa.'[470] Even though relations appear to have normalised between the two states, there remains distrust, undermining the potential for

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[468] M. A. Majumdar and T. Chafer 'Back to the Future? Franco-African Relations in the Shadow of France's Colonial Past', in T. Chafer and E. Godin(eds.), *The End of the French Exception? Decline and Revival of the 'French Model'* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 203-220. p.215
[469] Interview with Kwesi Aning
[470] I. T. Elizabeth, 'Nigeria's Security Interest in West Africa: A Critical Analysis'. *Journal of Research and Development,* 187, 1471, (2013), 1-9. p.43

cooperation. For instance, in a renewed secessionist attempt by the Biafra group in 2017, a Nigerian information minister is quoted as having accused France of supporting the group, stating 'let me tell you, the financial headquarters is in France, we know…You have to block the sources of finance."[471] It is important to state that this has been denied by France.[472] The second pillar of France's agenda pertaining to its sub-regional vision relates to the two Lusophone states in West Africa. It has made efforts at drawing in these former Portuguese colonies into its domain of influence.[473] For instance, as will be further elaborated in Chapter Eight, in 1997 Guinea-Bissau, a Lusophone state, joined the CFA franc zone, in which France wields significant influence.[474] This development among other, has led to a protest by Lisbon to France's attempt to influence its former colonies.[475]

It is important to address once again the claim in this thesis that hegemonic pursuit is not necessarily contingent on democratic liberal values as a vision. This sub-section thus proceeds to argue that democratic governance was not a precondition for France's West African hegemonic aspiration. Whilst France's experience of democracy has not been without its troubles,[476] its status as a western liberal democratic state has assisted in it gaining recognition as a global power with global responsibility.[477] However, perhaps due to France's history of supporting non-democratic regimes in the sub-region, its hegemonic pursuit in West Africa does not demonstrate a keen interest in propagating democratic values as a sub-regional vision.

For instance, for the many years that France has wielded influence in West Africa, nearly all Francophone West African states until the 1990s were either under military dictatorship or under one-party rule. Ivory Coast, for example, was ruled by Felix Houphouet-Boigny, under a one-party system from independence in 1960 until 1990 when multiparty democracy was permitted;[478] Similarly, Togo, was subject to military

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[471] The Punch *France Unaware of Financial Support to IPOB.* Available online: https://punchng.com/france-unaware-of-financial-support-to-ipob/ [Accessed 19/05/2019]. para.3

[472] The Punch *France Unaware of Financial Support to IPOB.*

[473] J. A. McKesson, 'France and Africa: Today and Tomorrow'. *French Politics and Society,* (1990), 34-47.

[474] K. Koddenbrock and N. S. Sylla, 'Towards a Political Economy of Monetary Dependency: The Case of the CFA Franc in West Africa'. *Maxpo Discussion Paper,* (2019). p.9

[475] Chapter Eight (section 8.3.4.1)

[476] Library of congress *From Empire to Democracy: Creating French Culture.* Available online: https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/bnf/bnf0006.html [Accessed 20/04/2019].

[477] See Chapter Four section 4.3, p.91)

[478] Country watch *Côte D'Ivoire Country Review* . Available online: http://www.countrywatch.com/content/pdfs/reviews/B36LQ863.01c.pdf [Accessed 24/01/2020].

dictatorship under Gnassingbé Eyadéma from 1967 until he died in 2005;[479] whilst Senegal, saw the election of an opposition leader for the first time in the year 2000.[480]

This sub-section has shown that France has a sub-regional vision of maintaining its influence over its former colonies of the sub-region and to expand this where possible. However, with reference to the discussion in the preceding section, the limitation of France's military influence mainly to the Francophone section of the sub-region suggests that its military dominance is not accepted across the board and its limited engagement with sub-region wide initiateves such as the ECOWAS standby force suggest that, contrary to France's sub-regional hegemonic vision, West African states want to take ownership of their security and not rely on extra-regional forces. This sub-section has also shown that liberal democratic adherence has played a limited role in France's hegemonic vision.

5.3.3   France: Willingness

With reference to the definition of willingness in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test France's willingness in relation to West Africa. It is argued in this sub-section that Paris' manifest hegemonic willingness for West African hegemony dates back to its colonial era and that it has continued into its post-colonial engagement with the sub-region via the route of counter-hegemony. France's colonial history with West Africa could be considered as its biggest advantage as a post-colonial hegemonic aspirant in the sub-region. The French colonial approach went beyond just pursuing economic benefits, to an attempt to integrate with its colonies. According to Aisha Bawa, Paris sought to make its African populations in its colonies citizens of France, a policy that was specifically aimed at spreading French culture to its overseas territories. She adds that this was done under strict regulation to prevent competition both from within and outside of West Africa, pointing out, for example, that books printed in local African languages and the importation of books in languages other than French, such as English and German, were all subject to a 12.5% tax.[481] Rempe Martin also argues that by 1946, France had

[479] D. Kohnert, 'Togo: Recent Political and Economic Development'. *MPRA Paper,* 63411, (2015), 1-35.
[480] BBC *West Africa - from Dictators' Club to Upholder of Democracy.* Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38757055 [Accessed 20/05/2018].
[481] A. B. Bawa, 'From Imperialism to Diplomacy: A Historical Analysis of French and Senegal Cultural Relationship', *London Art as Cultural Diplomacy Conference.* 2013).

introduced what was termed the 'Union Française', which could be found in section VIII of the French republican constitution. The arrangement, he noted, aimed at bringing together of the entirety of the French colonial empire under one state, for which West Africa was no exception.[482]

This approach has made it possible for France to remain closer to its former colonies than any other former colonial power in the West African sub-region. France's policy of so-called 'assimilation'[483] was subsequently adapted to one of 'association', a move that was similarly motivated by fear of potential challenges and a desire to maintain close ties with former colonies.[484] This shows France's willingness for West African hegemony. France's policy of association remains in place and through this Paris has been able to build a peerless bond with its former colonies in West Africa, so strong as to serve as a foundation for hegemonic aspiration.

Relations between France and its former colonies have been termed 'Françafrique.'[485] The term refers to the immense influence which is the main objective of French post-colonial relations with West Africa. According to Maja Bovcon, Françafrique simply means a 'sphere of influence' of France or its 'pré carré', which translate to mean backyard.[486] He adds that decision making under Françafrique involves '…institutional, semi-institutional and informal levels, and comprises political, economic, military and cultural spheres'.[487] This kind of arrangement shows willingness and serves as a foundation for a stronger bond between France and its former colonies in West Africa. It is particularly so that France's approach connects it deeply in nearly all aspects of governance of West Africa, a sub-region that is so important to France because it contains eight Francophone states out of the fifteen-member states of ECOWAS. France's

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[482] M. Rempe, 'Decolonization by Europeanization?: The Early EEC and the Transformation of French-African Relations'. *KFG Working Paper Series,* 27, (2011).p.7

[483] M. Crowder, 'Indirect rule—French and British Style'. *Africa,* 34, 3, (1964), 197-205.

[484] H. Labouret, 'France's Colonial Policy in Africa'. *Journal of the Royal African Society,* 39, 154, (1940), 22-35.; M. D. Lewis, 'One Hundred Million Frenchmen: The "assimilation" Theory in French Colonial Policy'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 4, 2, (1962), 129-153.; M. F. Oyabebefa and H. B. Buku, 'The Linguistic Consequences of French Colonial Policy of Assimilation in West Africa: Implications for National Growth and Development'. *Journal of Linguistics, Language and Culture,* 3, 1, (2016).

[485] M. Staniland, 'Francophone Africa: The Enduring French Connection'. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 489, 1, (1987), 51-62. p.52

[486] M. Bovcon, 'Françafrique and Regime Theory'. *European Journal of International Relations,* 19, 1, (2013), 5-26.; T. Chafer, 'Chirac and 'la Francafrique': No Longer a Family Affair'. *Modern & Contemporary France,* 13, 1, (2005), 7-23.

[487] Bovcon, 'Françafrique and Regime Theory'. , 5-26 p.10

willingness to assume West African hegemony is supported by Kwesi Pratt who, in a field interview, asserted that '…roughly speaking, West Africa is divided into two; French speaking and English speaking and the French appear to have some considerable influence in the region…'.[488] His particularization of France reflects France's manifest willingness for West African hegemony.

France's reluctance in incorporating democratic adherence into its West African vision can be explained as a manifestation of its hegemonic willingness. Conscious of the reluctance of the sub-region to fully accept democratic tenets, Paris was prepared to turn a blind eye to shortcomings in governance to enable it maintain its post-colonial ties. According to Gordon Cumming, France was consequently reluctant to use its aid packages to promote democracy in West Africa and was rather '… exceptional among western donors in her willingness to intervene militarily in support of African leaders who had shown loyalty to Paris though little in the way of respect for democracy or human rights.'[489] He cites a number of examples, including the decision of France in 1986 to protect the then Togolese dictator from an uprising by sending 200 French parachutes to the country.[490] Accordingly, as the *New York Times* reported, it was only in 1990 that France sought to enforce democratic governance in West Africa by declaring in its France-Africa summit of that year that its aid would from then on be linked to democratic adherence. This was after domestic criticism about France's indifference in propagating democratic values abroad.[491]

This 1990 policy declaration has had mixed outcomes. This can be attributed to the change in Ivory Coast and other Francophone states of West Africa, indicated in the preceding section, in relation to democratic governance. Yet again, as can be seen from those very examples, France did little to implement its proposed shift in attitude to the fullest, given that democracy generally remains weak in Francophone West Africa. For instance, according Peter Ngwafu, '…the greatest challenges or failures to embrace more democratic or transparent systems of governance in Africa since the 1990s have occurred

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[488] Interview with Kwesi Pratt
[489] G. Cumming, 'French Development Assistance to Africa: Towards a New Agenda?'. *African Affairs,* 94, 376, (1995), 383-398. p.389
[490] Cumming, 'French Development Assistance to Africa: Towards a New Agenda?'. , 383-398
[491] A. Riding *France Ties Africa Aid to Democracy.* Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/22/world/france-ties-africa-aid-to-democracy.html [Accessed 02/01/2020].

in Francophone African nations.'[492] This may be explained by France's understanding of consent-based hegemonic pursuit and consequently its West African hegemonic willingness. France's attitude suggests that it seeks consent to the extent that it overlooks issues such as a lack of or weak democracy, which is in the interest of those states over whom hegemony is sought. For Paris, hegemonic willingness necessitates selective blindness.

This sub-section has shown that France has a willingness for West African hegemony. This is mainly motivated by its perception of its security and economic interests and a determination to maintain its status as a global great power. How, in relation to the criterion of willingness, France compares with Nigeria and the USA will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.3.4 France: beneficence

With reference to the definition of beneficence in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test France's beneficence in relation to West Africa. France has been supporting West Africa through its provision of financial aid. However, this has been more on bilateral lines and concentrated mostly on the Francophone states of the sub-region. This point was emphasised in a field interview with Emmanuel Kotia, where he stressed this preference, although he added that, to a lesser degree, France also engages multilaterally through international entities, noting that Paris' support to the ECOWAS is often through the EU.[493] Bilateralism, however, is the norm. For instance, in 2011, of France's total aid package to Africa, 65% was given on a bilateral basis.[494] Similarly, according to data from French official sources, a quarter of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) that went to sub-Sahara Africa in 2016 was disbursed on bilateral basis. Cameroon benefited the most, receiving €215.12 million. This was followed by Senegal, which received €79.3 million, then Ghana with €68.11 million, Niger €66.21 million, Burkina Faso €59.26 million and Mali €54.25 million.[495] All the recipients are ECOWAS member states, with

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[492] P. A. Ngwafu, 'US Support for Democracy in Africa: Discrepant Orientations of Anglophone and Francophone Africa Towards Democratic Practices, Good Governance & Human Rights'. *African Social Science Review,* 8, 1, (2016), 2. p.35

[493] Field interview

[494] Melly and Darracq, *A New Way to Engage?: French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande* p.14

[495] France Diplomatie *Africa: A Priority for French Official Development Assistance.* Available online: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/africa/africa-a-priority-for-french-official-development-assistance/ [Accessed 17/01/20] para.3

the exception of Cameroon, and all are Francophone states except Ghana. This is an indication of France's focus on Francophone West Africa and of its attempt to widen its beneficence to the sub-region by including Ghana, an Anglophone state.

The main weakness of France in respect of this criterion is its focus on the Francophone states, depriving Paris of a sub-region-wide hegemonic character. This is exacerbated by another aspect of France's multilateralism, namely the nature of its engagements with West African sub-regional institutions, for while France engages with ECOWAS indirectly through the EU, it engages with UEMOA, the solely Francophone bloc, directly. Beyond bilateral aid to UEMOA member states, France has also in recent times offered grants directly to the UEMOA commission in support of its regional economic programmes. For instance, in 2016 France granted the organization CFA 17 billion which was about €27 million to support its economic programmes.[496] The then finance minister of France pledged, as part of the announcement, France's willingness to also support the economic integration agenda of UEMOA. He described the cooperation between France and UEMOA as an exemplary one.[497] The benefactor role of France, especially along Francophone line, is its main source of influence. As will be shown in sub-section 5.3.6, it is quite evident that all Francophone states of the sub-region but one, Guinea Conakry, accept France's beneficence via WAMU.

It is, however, also important to reiterate the point made earlier that the Francophone member states are also engaging with the rest of the largely Anglophone sub-region under the auspices of ECOWAS, resulting in a convergence whereby all sub-regional entities are subsumed under ECOWAS. This claim is supported by the fact that all WAMU members are also members of ECOWAS. Through this broader cooperation many key ECOWAS objectives have been largely achieved, such as the standby force,[498] free movement of goods and persons,[499] and the establishment of an ECOWAS common passport,[500] whilst others, such as the establishment of a sub-region-wide common

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[496] Ouaga.com *France Grants Budget Aid of 17 Billion FCFA to UEMOA.* Available online: https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://news.aouaga.com/h/96929.html&prev=search [Accessed 07/06/2020].
[497] Ouaga.com *France Grants Budget Aid of 17 Billion FCFA to UEMOA.*
[498] See Chapter Four (section 4.5)
[499] See Chapter Seven (section 7.3.2.1.1)
[500] H. Sibiri, 'Regional Integration through Common Policies: A Case-Study of the Free Movement Policy in the EU and the ECOWAS'. *Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs,* 4, 2, (2017). p.63

currency to replace the French backed CFA franc, are on course.[501] The implication of this is that while France's beneficence is accepted, there is a sub-region-wide effort to incorporate such support into the ECOWAS' centralised structures, hence reducing French state-centrism and by implication, its hegemonic standing.

This sub-section has demonstrated that France has been a benefactor to the sub-region but that its focus has been on areas where it wields greatest influence, namely amongst the Francophone states. It is concluded in this sub-section that until France's support assumes a fully sub-regional character, its role as a benefactor will remain limited and will be viewed with suspicion by some of the sub-region's Anglophone states. How, in relation to the criterion of beneficence, France compares with Nigeria and the USA will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.3.5 France: recognition

With reference to the definition of recognition in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test France's recognition in relation to West Africa. France's ability to keep its former colonies together under its influence means France has been accorded a degree of recognition in the sub-region. For instance, when ECOWAS delayed in intervening militarily in Mali in 2013, the Malian government called on France to act before ECOWAS came in later.[502] Similarly, in 2012 when the UN and ECOWAS, with the support of France, intervened to maintain peace in Ivory Coast following a disputed election, the incoming President Alassane Ouattara stated that he 'want[ed] to thank President Sarkozy and his government for the intervention they led in April under a United Nations mandate. Without France, there would have been in Ivory Coast a genocide…''.[503] Even though the role of France was widely criticised in the sub-region,[504] the statement of the President of the leading state among the Francophone divide clearly exemplifies recognition.

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[501] See Chapter Five (section 5.4.6)
[502] D. E. Stigall, 'The French Military Intervention in Mali, Counter-Terrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict'. *Mil.L.Rev.,* 223, (2015), 1.
[503] France24 *Defense Tops Agenda in Ouattara's First French Visit.* Available online: https://www.france24.com/en/20120126-ivory-coast-defense-tops-agenda-ouattara-visit-france [Accessed 19/07/2019].
[504] See Chapter Eight (section 8.3.1.2)

However, France's limited engagement with the Anglophone states and the fact that Nigeria also seeks sub-regional hegemony significantly undermine its recognition. This explains the fact that France's recognition in general, but especially on the economic front, is waning. This is a result of growing resentment over France's role in the economic and monetary policies of Francophone West African states. This is supported by steps being taken by France to review its relation with Francophone West African states in this regard such as the measures it has taken recently to reduce its control of the monetary policies of the CFA franc zone as the next section will show.

This sub-section has shown that France has recognition from a section of the West African sub-region. Nevertheless, France's fulfilment of the recognition criterion remains weak, in part because it does not extend to the Anglophone members of the sub-region, and crucially because it does not extend to Nigeria. How, in relation to the criterion of recognition, the France compares with Nigeria and the USA will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.3.6 France: institutional penetration

With reference to the definition of institutional penetration in Chapter Three and its justification as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion, this sub-section proceeds to test France's institutional penetration in relation to West Africa. In testing France against this criterion, its institutional connection to the sub-region will be looked at firstly from a security perspective and secondly, from an economic one. France's institutional penetration is both extra-regional and sub-regional. The former derives from its influential positions in the UN and EU, which it relies upon to bolster its counter-hegemony in West Africa, and the latter from its West-African-sponsored institutions, which undermine ECOWAS' multilingual integration agenda.

France relies on institutions such as the UN and EU, in which it wields significant influence, to further its hegemonic quest in West Africa, mainly in relation to the security governance of the sub-region. Firstly, in respect of the UN, France has taken advantage of its privileged position in the global body to push through its hegemonic quest. France has over the years had a prominent voice in relation to matters of West African security

at the level of the UNSC.[505] According to Dele Ogunmola, this advantage makes it possible for France to execute its bilateral military arrangement with some ECOWAS member states under the guise of multilateral peace missions.[506] Ricarda Roesch citing some of France's multilateral military missions in Africa backed by the UN, concludes that '...these interventions were not necessarily free from the French hegemonic aspirations.'[507] One case in point relative to West Africa is the French-sponsored initiative on counter-terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel, known as the G5 Sahel counter-terrorism force. This initiative was so significant to France that Paris got into a deadlock with Washington on whether or not the UN should sponsor the programme under chapter VII of its Charter. Whereas the USA opted for funding along bilateral lines, France wanted UN funding, arguing for this on sustainability grounds.[508] This further points to France's advantage of institutional penetration through its privileged positions in global governance institutions, particularly as ECOWAS was barely involved in the process.[509]

Despite France taking advantage of its influence at the level of the UNSC, it often wants to simultaneously manifest a state-centric posture. This makes France's approach to West African security somewhat contradictory and confused.[510] For instance, France has not been consistent in contributing troops to UN peace keeping. Even when France shows interest, which it usually does with respect to West African conflicts, it avoids contributing to UN forces.[511] Paris prefers to support UN forces with its national forces, which are not under a direct UN mandate. It is the only member of the UN that has deployed a national force to support a UN peacekeeping mission.[512] Even with this

[505] Sörenson, *Beyond Françafrique: The Foundation, Reorientation and Reorganisation of France's Africa Politics*; D. J. Francis, 'The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali'. *Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre,* (2013).; T. Tardy, 'France: The Unlikely Return to UN Peacekeeping'. *International Peacekeeping,* 23, 5, (2016), 610-629.; S. von Einsiedel et al., 'The UN Security Council in an Age of Great Power Rivalry'. *Tokyo: United Nations University Working Paper,* 4, (2015).
[506] D. Ogunmola, 'Redesigning Cooperation: The Eschatology of Franco-African Relations'. *Journal of Social Sciences,* 19, 3, (2009), 233-242.
[507] R. Roesch, 'Françafrique and the Prohibition of the use of Force'. *Amsterdam LF,* 7, (2015), 25. p.28
[508] 7DNews *US and France Divided Over UN Mandate for G5 Sahel Counterterrorist Army.* Available online: https://7dnews.com/news/us-and-france-divided-over-un-mandate-for-g5-sahel-counterterrorist-army [Accessed 20/01/2020].
[509] Field interview Alimu Diallo
[510] Sörenson, *Beyond Françafrique: The Foundation, Reorientation and Reorganisation of France's Africa Politics* p.50
[511] T. Tardy, 'Contributor Profile: France'. *EU Institute for Security Studies,* (2016). p.3
[512] Permanent mission of France to the United Nations *France's Role at the United Nations.* Available online: https://onu.delegfrance.org/France-s-role-at-the-United-Nations-10352 [Accessed 24/01/2018].

approach, France is selective, acting in accordance with the core interests of its foreign policy.[513] This can be seen in its active role in UN missions in the 2000s in a selected number of cases, including Francophone states in West Africa such as Ivory Coast and Mali.[514]

The state-centric posturing of France can also be seen in its involvement in African/West African-related EU security initiatives. Cristina Barrios attests to this and attributes it to France's reluctance to give up on its historical regional and sub-regional links, arguing that 'France's reluctance to let go of the past has impeded a truly European perspective on African security affairs'[515] She notes that France quite often uses the EU on an instrumental basis, as and when it serves France's interest.[516] However, France's role in the EU in relation to African security remains largely state-centric. Majumdar and Chafer argue that Nicolas Sarkozy's notion of moving from a 'Françafrique' to 'Eurafrique' approach has not worked and that, '…turning this vision into reality, in both regions, has proved problematic'.[517] The main obstacle to this switch was the underlying logic that France will not be able to pursue its hegemonic ambitions meaningfully if it is overshadowed by an institutional entity outside of the West African sub-region. Accordingly, France ensures that it maintains a significant degree of state involvement. Moreover, pursuant to its hegemonic aspirations, France avoids sharing its responsibilities with other powers, especially those that it seeks to out-power in the sub-region such as Nigeria.

Nevertheless, at the EU level, as part of its attempt to portray a multilateral attitude to its engagement with Africa and, more specifically, West Africa, Paris sought, for the first time, to collaborate with Great Britain over Africa. The two powers produced an EU common policy on Africa and the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in 2000 termed the ''Cotonou accord.''[518] France promotes this kind of cooperation at the EU and in so doing furthers its own state-centric agenda. A prime example of this was France's policy of getting the EU to accept its request to back its sponsored currency, the *Communauté*

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[513] International Peace Institute, 'European Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward.'. *Meeting Note,* (2018).
[514] Tardy, 'Contributor Profile: France'.
[515] C. Barrios, 'France in Africa: From Paternalism to Pragmatism'. *Fride Policy Brief,* 58, (2010). p.4-5
[516] Barrios, 'France in Africa: From Paternalism to Pragmatism'.
[517] Majumdar and Chafer 'Back to the Future? Franco-African Relations in the Shadow of France's Colonial Past', , 203-220 p.205-6
[518] Melly and Darracq, *A New Way to Engage?: French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande* p.11

Financière d'Afrique (CFA) franc in West Africa with the Euro. Prior to the inception of the Euro, the CFA franc was pegged to the French franc at a rate fixed by the Central Bank of France to keep it stable.[519] This arrangement did not change after Europe adopted a single currency. Given the centrality of this to France's connection to the sub-region, France needed to keep the CFA strong after it joined the Euro, which it did by pegging it to the Euro.[520] In a field interview, Pratt argued that the currency arrangement is clearly a means through which France, like no other extra-regional state power, wields influence in West Africa. He cited the fact that under the arrangement, some of the external reserves of UEMOA member states end up in the Central Bank of France.[521] The GEA-Africa Study Group specifically stated that the proportion of the reserves of these West African states that France keeps is as high as 50% and that Paris holds on to a seat in the monetary policy committee of the Central Bank of West Africa States (BCEOM) of CFA franc zone.[522]

In addition to the leverage that France gains through its membership of the UN and EU, it also benefits from institutional penetration from within the sub-region, particularly in relation to economic and monetary influence, and often in a manner that is contrary to the ECOWAS' agenda. Since the point that ECOWAS was formed, France has made efforts at weakening it as part of countering Nigeria's sub-regional influence. Olatunde Ojo quotes a former Commissioner for Economic Development for Nigeria as arguing that ECOWAS '…initiatives were frustrated by the agents of imperialism and colonialism who concentrate on what divides us rather than on what unites us.'[523] Ojo notes that the commissioner stopped short of mentioning who these agents were and neither does he indicate how they achieved their aims, but in Ojo's view, the commissioner was referring to France and the Francophone allies in a sub-region over which it exercises significant influence.[524]

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[519] Chafer, 'The UK and France in West Africa: Toward Convergence?'. , 234-256

[520] L. Konkobo *African Protests Over the CFA 'Colonial Currency'.* Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-41094094 [Accessed 21/05/2018].

[521] Interview with Kwasi Pratt

[522] GEA-African Studies Group, *ECOWAS Regional Integration Processes and International Cooperation*,[2014]).

[523] O. J. Ojo, 'Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS'. *International Organization,* 34, 4, (1980), 571-604. p.576

[524] Ojo, 'Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS'. , 571-604 L. Fenwick and P. Ukata, 'British and French Styles of Influence in Colonial and Independent Africa: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Senegal'. *Honors Capstone, April,* 23, (2009).

More generally France has taken advantage of its historic ties in its counter-hegemonic response to the ECOWAS. Kwasi Aning, speaking in a field interview, stated that one of the ways through which France counters Nigeria's hegemony is through the Francophone member states of the sub-region, especially the more powerful ones such as Ivory Coast and Senegal.[525] Nigeria has sought to bring West African states together irrespective of their historical colonial identities, based on a vision of multilingual sub-regional integration. As a former ECOWAS member of parliament explained in a field interview, pursuant to this notion it was proposed that Ivory Coast should host the headquarters of the ECOWAS but it declined to do so, leaving Nigeria to play host.[526] Moreover, in 1971 the Presidents of both Senegal and Ivory Coast made known their support for the formation of a solely Francophone economic bloc initiated by Paris.[527] It was known as Communaute Economique de I'Afrique de I'Ouest (CEAO)[528] and came into existence in 1973, hence predating ECOWAS. It initially comprised Senegal, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), while Benin and Togo participated as observers.[529] These two observing states in CEAO, alongside Portuguese Guinea are now full members of Union Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (UEMOA)[530] as the organisation has been called since 1994.[531]

France's sponsorship of this sub-regional body left Francophone West Africa states belonging to both ECOWAS and UEMOA. This manifests counter-hegemony in the sense that logically, ECOWAS will not be able to function optimally when a good number of its member states belong to yet another entity in the same sub-region, with similar objectives, particularly as the counter-hegemonic body (UEMOA) has external interest-based support from France. Denial Bach put it more explicitly, arguing that, '…the creation of… (C.E.A.O.) was an attempt by six Francophone countries - the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, and Mauritania, with the active support of

[525] Interview with Kwasi Aning
[526] Field interview
[527] D. C. Bach, 'The Politics of West African Economic Co-Operation: CEAO and ECOWAS'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 21, 4, (1983), 605-623. p.605
[528] It translates to mean: Economic Community of West Africa.
[529] C. Lancaster, 'ECOWAS: Problems and Prospects'. *CSIS African Notes,* 4, (1982). p.2
[530] UEMOA translates to mean West African Economic and Monetary Union, WAEMU
[531] S. Page and S. Bilal, 'Regional Integration in Western Africa'. *Report Prepared for and Financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, ODI, London,* (2001).; Chafer, 'The UK and France in West Africa: Toward Convergence?'. , 234-256

France - to counterbalance Nigerian influence within West Africa.'[532] C.E.A.O member states ensured that they reserved their right to free association and membership of their exclusive Francophone body. This can be found in article 59 (1) of the 1975 ECOWAS treaty which states, 'Member States may be Members of other regional or sub-regional associations, either with other Member States or non-Member States, provided that their membership of such associations does not derogate from the provisions of this Treaty'.[533] Article 59 (3) sought to remedy the excesses that might come out of such leeway. It states, 'To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established…'.[534] However, it is worth noting that in practice, avoiding conflict and ensuring effectiveness in a situation where two entities work simultaneously with similar objectives remains difficult.

While France is able to maintain its economic influence within the Francophone section of the sub-region, it is again argued here that its influence is largely limited, due to its inability to influence the other elements of the sub-region. Indeed, even some Francophone states are raising concerns over the sub-regional divisions that arise from current arrangements. For example, the French-backed-CFA is not only opposed by West African Anglophone states but, also by some members of the franc zone itself. They have called for its replacement, labelling it as a colonial relic.[535] This explains the consensus at the ECOWAS level for a single sub-regional-wide currency to replace the CFA franc. France, in acknowledging the criticism of the conditions under which it supports the CFA franc and the general support for the ECOWAS-proposed currency (Eco),[536] has decided to loosen its influence on the CFA. In a joint press conference by the Presidents of France and Ivory Coast in 2019, they announced a change of name of the CFA franc to the Eco.

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[532] D. C. Bach, 'The Politics of West African Economic Co-Operation: CEAO and ECOWAS'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 21, 4, (1983), 605-623. p.605; J. Bossuyt, 'Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Report'. *Maastricht: ECDPM,* (2016).
[533] ECOWAS *Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Concluded at Lagos on 28 may 1975* . Available online: https://www.refworld.org/docid/49217f4c2.html [Accessed 12/07/2017].
[534] ECOWAS *Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Concluded at Lagos on 28 may 1975* .
[535] L. de Bassompierre *Ivory Coast President Defends CFA Franc as Peers Call for Reform.* Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-04/ivory-coast-president-defends-cfa-franc-as-peers-seek-change [Accessed 16/02/2020].
[536] Ebi, E., 2003. Regional currency areas: lessons from the West African sub-region and Nigeria's policy stance. *Regional currency areas and the use of foreign currencies*, pp.145-150.

France made further compromises, agreeing that firstly it will no longer be represented at the Central Bank of the currency and secondly West African member states will no longer have to keep their reserves in the French Central Bank. However, the currency will remain pegged to the Euro[537] and for this reason this development has been rejected by the Anglophone states and also by the only Francophone state that is not part of the CFA franc, Guinea Conakry.[538]

This sub-section has demonstrated that France has influence in the West African sub-region as a result of the institutional penetration that it derives from organisations both within the sub-region and outside of it. However, with regard to the former, France's institutional penetration is limited by the facts that: it is indirect, in the sense that it is not actually a member of any West African organisation; it relates only to the Francophone states of the sub-region; and these Francophone states are also members of ECOWAS, an organisation within which France lacks leverage. France's external institutional links are based primarily on membership of the EU and the UN. This is significant in that the former brings with it considerable political and economic leverage and the latter significant political, quasi-legal, and at times military leverage, all of which lies beyond the control of the sub-region. How, in relation to the criterion of institutional penetration, France compares with Nigeria and the USA will be analysed later in this chapter.

5.3.7 France: Overall Hegemonic/Counter-hegemonic Credentials

The preceding sections have shown that France fulfils the criterion of material power. This is based on the fact that it is one of the most powerful states in this regard globally and by implication, in West Africa. The section has also shown that France has a vision for West Africa. The vision is essentially to retain its influence among the Francophone states of the sub-region and to expand its influence to West African states outside of its former colonies. This is, in large part, aimed at maintaining France's global status as a great power and this, in turn, explains its hegemonic willingness. Despite the fact that France has not expressly stated its willingness for West African hegemony, its

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[537] A. Salaudeen *France is Set to End the use of the 75-Year-Old Controversial CFA Franc in West Africa.* Available online: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/23/africa/france-stops-use-of-cfa/index.html [Accessed 24/03/2020].
[538] Channels Television *West Africa Divided as Nigeria, Ghana, Others Reject Eco Common Currency.* Available online: https://www.channelstv.com/2020/01/17/west-africa-divided-as-nigeria-ghana-others-reject-eco-common-currency/ [Accessed 15/05/2020].

behaviour, and in particular its colonial and post-colonial attitudes of closeness to the sub-region, provide ample evidence for it.

Apart from maintaining close relations, France has also been shown to fulfil the criterion of beneficence. France has been supportive of West Africa, but the fact that it almost exclusively concentrate on the Francophone states of the sub-region weaken France's position in in respect of this criterion. This weakness in turn undermines France's struggle to fully satisfy the criterion of recognition. While France is recognised largely, if in some ways to a declining degree by its former colonies in the sub-region, it is not recognised by the Anglophone states. This is a hegemonic weakness because, first, any recognition relative to hegemony in respect of West Africa without the recognition of Nigeria is far too limited, given Nigeria's sheer importance as far as West African politics is concerned. Secondly, the Francophone states that recognise France also recognise Nigeria's indispensability for West African sub-regional governance. This makes Nigeria more recognised than France, given that it also has the backing of the Anglophone states of the sub-region, which France does not have.

Finally, France has also fulfilled the criterion of institutional penetration. It has institutional linkage not only within the West African sub-region, but with external international institutions, both of which support its active participation in West African economic and security governance. Nevertheless, France's shortcoming regarding this criterion is that its institutional influence emanates more from institutions outside of the sub-region. This weakens its hegemonic standing, given that hegemonic influence must come from within, based on endogenous consensus-building and not dictated from outside with little local input. All of this evidence points to France as the West African counter-hegemon and to Nigeria as a West African hegemon. This claim is elaborated on further in the next section, which will make a comparison between Nigeria, France, and the USA relative to all six hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria.

Table 3: France's West African counter-hegemonic standing

	Power	**Vision**	**Willing**	**Beneficence**	**Recognition**	**Institutions**
France	high	High	High	Medium	Medium	medium

5.4 West African hegemony and Counter-hegemony: a comparative analysis of Nigeria, France and the USA

5.4.1 Nigeria, France, and the USA: Material Power

This sub-section compares Nigeria, France, and the USA regarding their degree of fulfilment of material power as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion in relation to West Africa. The discussion in this chapter reaffirms the fact that the USA is the world's most powerful state economically and militarily and, by implication, in West Africa. The USA is followed by France in a distant second and then Nigeria which, by virtue of it being the most powerful within the sub-region, is considered among the top ranked powers. However, in view of the fact that hegemony from the perspective of this thesis is determined by the cumulative effect of all six hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria and considering the fact that hegemony is not about the coercive aspect of material power, it is argued in this sub-section that the USA is not the West African hegemon, despite its material power. Similarly, France's material power dominance does not make it the sub-regional hegemon. This claim is based on the impact of material power in West Africa. From this perspective, it is argued here that Washington features less in West African governance than does Paris.

France's sub-regional over-shadowing of the USA is rooted in its colonial history, and the fact that it centred heavily on West Africa, whereas US concerns are much wider scope, stretching far beyond West Africa to a global perspective. France has shown interest in all major security concerns of Francophone West Africa.[539] It is from this perspective that Antwi-Danso, in a field interview, argued that it is difficult to bypass France when it comes to security issues in Francophone West Africa. He pointed out that this counters Nigeria's sub-regional collective security agenda and asserted:

> …the French have a tendency of not losing any part of their world to any other hegemonic power and as a result, I think that big respect comes from European powers and from the USA. When it comes to Africa, all these big powers cede the hegemonic role to France.[540]

This makes France the counter-hegemon in respect of this criterion (material power). It is considered as the counter-hegemon to Nigeria despite being the relatively more powerful materially, because as shown in the preceding chapter, Nigeria, like France, has

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[539] See Chapter Eight (cases 3 and 4)
[540] Interview with Vladimir Antwi Danso

shown interest and participated in all major security concerns of the sub-region, but it has done so without regard to the sub-region's lingual divides. From the security perspective, a juxtaposition of France's military presence in West Africa with Nigeria's zero tolerance for extra-regional state military presence in the sub-region means France is the counter-hegemon to Nigeria militarily. France's counter-hegemonic status on the security front is enhanced by the military pacts into which Paris has entered, enabling it to respond more quickly to sub-regional security challenges within its Francophone domain of influence. These enable it to circumvent the logistical, legal, diplomatic, and bureaucratic bottlenecks that often hinder interventions. This contrasts with Nigeria's situation, for whilst it is clearly not disadvantaged by distance, it does have to get ECOWAS to accept any intended sub-regional intervention, a process that will inevitably be characterised by deliberations and potential delay.

The preceding discussion suggests that France has strong hegemonic credential in terms of material capabilities, especially given the pact-based nature of its sub-regional military relations. Crucially, given the nature of hegemony as understood in this thesis, these arrangements can be seen as being consensual in nature, and France certainly portrays them as such.[541] However, this portrayal is questionable, given the circumstances under which many of the arrangements in question were reached and the circumstances under which they have been maintained. The asymmetric interdependence between France and its former colonies was far from a level negotiating playing field, especially at the time that independence was granted and the fact that some of these post-colonial security pacts were drawn up and signed in secrecy only calls their consensual nature further into question.[542]

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[541] J. D. Moroney et al., *Lessons from US Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries: The Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2011).
[542] D. A. Yates'France and Africa', in D. Nagar and C. Mutasa(eds.), *Africa and the World* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018), 95-118.; E. Lavallée and J. Lochard, 'The Empire Strikes Back: French-African Trade After Independence'. *Review of International Economics,* 27, 1, (2019), 390-412.

This sub-section has shown France's material power enhances its hegemonic standing, but conversely that its scope and impact is diminished by its limited sub-regional scope and its questionable consensual nature. Theoretically, a materially less powerful state with impact on a wider scope can prevail as a hegemon. It is, therefore, concluded here that, in the case of West Africa, whilst Nigeria may not compete with France on sheer material power, it does nevertheless stand ahead of it in terms of this criterion given the scope of its sub-regional impact and its more consensual approach. Moreover, it is important to reiterate that the ascription of hegemony is based on a holistic look at all six criteria and not based on an arms race; being more materially powerful does not automatically lead to hegemony.

5.4.2   Nigeria, France, and the USA: Vision

This sub-section compares Nigeria, France, and the USA regarding their degree of fulfilment of vision as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion in relation to West Africa. As discussed in Chapter Three, the concept of hegemony/counter-hegemony is about competing visions and ideas and also the strategies that underpin them. First, in respect of the USA, the scope of its vision is so broad that, in contrast to the visons of Nigeria and France, its focus is not on West Africa. This is the reason why Washington still does not feature in sub-regional governance as much as Abuja and Paris. Moreover, though the USA is not a former colonial power in the sub-region, its vision in the sub-region is nevertheless largely considered to be neo-colonial and thus contrary to the sub-region's anti-(neo-)colonial agenda. In contrast, given France's limited scope of influence globally relative to the USA, France does focus very much on West Africa. As a result, it features in West African governance and accordingly promotes its vision of maintaining its strong influence among the Francophone states. As such, France's standing relative to the criterion of vision is higher than that of the USA.

Even more so than France, Nigeria's hegemonic vision is West Africa-centric. However, whereas France relies on exogenous approaches in which solutions to sub-regional problems emanate from outside, Nigeria seeks to ensure that the sub-region relies on endogenous approaches to sub-regional concerns. The two visions depict a zero-sum game, in which the success of Nigeria means France's influence in the sub-region is diminished and vice versa. The difference in visions concerns not only ownership, but also scope. Whilst France is not a member of the sub-region, it maintains a significant degree of influence, but its West African vision does not encompass the whole sub-region

but instead relates predominantly to the Francophone element of it. [543] In contrast, Nigeria's vision, embodied in ECOWAS and accepted by all member states, encompasses the whole of the sub-region. In addition to differences in scope there is, as discussed earlier, a growing sub-region-wide antipathy towards France's vision. In conjunction, these factors identify France as the sub-regional counter-hegemon and Nigeria as the hegemon. As they pursue these roles, the sub-region has to contend with French activities which are contrary to Nigeria's sub-regional vision of multilingual sub-regional integration.

This sub-section has shown that, while the USA focuses less on West Africa than on its global vision, France focuses more on the sub-region. As a result, Paris' vision features in the sub-region more than that of the USA. Paris' vision has also received a more positive reaction from the sub-region relative to the USA. However, the sub-section concludes that ultimately Nigeria's vision for West Africa is the most fully accepted by the sub-region. This is because, like France, Nigeria focuses its hegemonic pursuit and vision exclusively on West Africa. What places Nigeria ahead of France in terms of vision is the fact that Nigeria's vision resonates throughout the whole sub-region, whereas France's vision is limited in scope and based on a questionable degree of consensus.

5.4.3 Nigeria, France, and the USA: Willingness

This sub-section compares Nigeria, France, and the USA regarding their degree of fulfilment of willingness as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion in relation to West Africa. The USA's West African hegemonic willingness is inferred from its global hegemonic aspirations. That is to say, it is not explicit, but can be seen in its attempt at shaping a global order economically and politically. Similarly, France's willingness is not expressly stated, but inferred from its attitude to its former colonies in the sub-region, starting from its colonial approach to its post-colonial engagements. While both states manifest hegemonic willingness, this manifestation is limited compared to that of Nigeria. As argued in the preceding chapter, unlike both France and the USA, Nigerian leaders over the years have made explicit their willingness to secure West African hegemony, and in addition have actively pursued policies which demonstrate this willingness.

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[543] F. T. McNamara, *France in Black Africa* (Washington D.C: National Defense University press, 1989).

The conclusion in this sub-section is that all three powers have shown hegemonic willingness in relation to West Africa, but in different ways, with Nigeria being more assertive. However, overall, it is also concluded that willingness is one thing and demonstrating it by fulfilling the other criteria enumerated in this thesis is another. For this reason, emphasis in this comparative analysis will be put on the other five hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria.

5.4.4 Nigeria, France, and the USA: Beneficence

This sub-section compares Nigeria, France, and the USA regarding their degree of fulfilment of beneficence as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion in relation to West Africa. Despite the fact that the USA is the most powerful state with active interest in West African affairs, it is reiterated here that Washington's global scope of engagement makes it less focused on West Africa compared to Nigeria and France. As such, its beneficence, especially in the area of peace and security which is the main focus of this thesis, is limited. In contrast, French beneficence is largely West-African-centred. This makes France yet again the counter-hegemon to Nigeria, regarding beneficence as a criterion. Therefore, the focus of this sub-section will be on a comparative analysis between France and Nigeria.

It is important to indicate that playing the role of a benefactor is expected of a potential hegemon or a counter-hegemon and both France and Nigeria do so. France's military interventions have saved some situations due the speed of its actions. In the case of Mali, it is believed France's early intervention helped prevent the takeover of the country by terrorists. [544] However, notwithstanding the positive side of France's interventions, it works against the ECOWAS agenda of ownership and collective security cooperation, which Nigeria stands for. This is explained by the fact that, unlike Nigeria, France is not obliged to act through ECOWAS and in practice, often does not. Moreover, unlike Nigeria, France's support as a benefactor in the security governance of the sub-region is not holistic. Paris focuses more on where it wields influence, namely amongst the sub-region's Francophone members, although it does also pursue an incremental agenda in which it seeks to gradually expand its influence across the whole sub-region.[545]

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[544] D. J. Francis, 'The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali'. *Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre,* (2013).
[545] See section 5.2.3.

This latter ambition notwithstanding, whilst France may be more materially powerful than Nigeria, at present it remains unable to translate such power into impact across the entirety of the sub-region. Taking the above factors together, France is not considered a West African hegemon, but rather a counter-hegemon to Nigeria.

This sub-section has shown that even though the USA has shown beneficence in West Africa, its relative weakness in this regard stems from the more focused presence of both Nigeria and France. In practice, the USA's beneficence, especially on the security front, is often in support of an initiative of Nigeria or France. This does not portray the USA as a sub-regional leader and so once again, when judged against the criterion of beneficence, it is placed below Nigeria and France in terms of its hegemonic standing. The sub-section has also argued that Nigeria has shown more beneficence than France. This is because, while France largely focuses on a section of the sub-region, Nigeria's beneficence is sub-region-wide and it has always stepped out to lead sub-regional endeavours. Nigeria is, therefore, placed ahead of France as far as this criterion is concerned.

5.4.5   Nigeria, France, and the USA: Recognition

The hegemonic recognition that the USA seeks, which is partly informed by its anti-colonial stance,[546] has not been fully attained. Its efforts in the West African sub-region remain largely complementary to initiatives of Nigeria and France, states that are more highly recognised in terms of handling sub-regional burdens. Abuja and Paris, being aware of the intentions of Washington, have sought to keep its sub-regional activities in check, and the success that they have achieved in this regard has meant that the USA has struggled to achieve hegemonic recognition. France, despite being an ally of the USA, protects its influence in Francophone West Africa against US dominance. According to Paul Gallis, 'France, while a key ally, has developed policies in pursuit of its national interests that challenge the United States on issues of importance to both countries.'[547] Building on this, Dele Ogunmola also argues that Paris' new approach with respect to Africa and, more specifically West Africa, takes into consideration the US factor. He

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[546] See section 5.2.3.
[547] P. E. Gallis, 'France and the United States: Allies and Rivals', Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress), 2000). p.1

attributed this to what he described as '…French mistrust vis-à-vis the United States with the American ascendancy in African affairs in recent times…'[548]

US hegemonic status in the sub-region is further weakened by Nigerian efforts to thwart Washington's influence. For instance, as discussed earlier, Abuja's zero tolerance to extra-regional forces in West Africa is partly responsible for the USA's inability to establish a permanent military base in the sub-region. Vladimir Antwi-Danso, Dean of Academic Affairs at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, corroborates this as he argues in a field interview that the USA '…has been knocking on the doors of Nigeria and Ghana to have a base, Ghana has repulsed, Nigeria has rejected…'[549] The implication of the preceding arguments is that, not only is the USA not the West African hegemon, it cannot be described as the primus inter pares of extra-regional powers in the sub-region. It is thus not even the counter-hegemon to Nigeria, as far as the hegemonic criterion of recognition is concerned.

The counter-hegemon as far as this criterion is concerned is France. This is so because, unlike the USA, Paris is still militarily present with permanent military bases, albeit scaled down in recent years, which manifest recognition. However, France's recognition is undermined by two factors. Firstly, as previously discussed, France elicits recognition from only a proportion of the sub-region, namely its Francophone members. By way of contrast, Nigeria's hegemonic standing is recognised throughout the sub-region. Moreover, Nigeria does not rely on a military presence in member states in order to manifest its recognition, because geographic proximity, its sub-region-wide willingness to act, and it anti-neo-colonialism vision resonate throughout West Africa. Secondly, with Nigeria's sheer size and significance in the sub-region, no state can be designated a West African hegemon as long as Nigeria maintains its opposition to extra-regional power dominance in the sub-region.

The conclusion in this sub-section is that the anti-USA policies of both Nigeria and France have so far denied the USA hegemonic recognition from the member states of West Africa. It is also concluded that Nigeria attracts greater hegemonic recognition

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[548] Ogunmola, 'Redesigning Cooperation: The Eschatology of Franco-African Relations'. , 233-242; P. J. Schraeder, 'Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining US-French Competition in Francophone Africa'. *Political Science Quarterly,* 115, 3, (2000), 395-419.
[549] Interview with Vladimir Antwi-Danso

than France does. This reflects the fact that, in a West African context dominated by the sheer size and influence of Nigeria, any constituency of recognition that does not include Nigeria falls short of fulfilling the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criterion of recognition as defined in this thesis.

5.4.6 Nigeria, France, and the USA: Institutional penetration

The USA has huge leverage at the UN as a permanent member of the UNSC and the organisation's largest financial contributor. However, it is important to indicate that almost all concerns of the sub-region, especially security, which require the attention of the UN, emanate from the structure of ECOWAS. It is for this reason that any efforts by the USA at the level of the UN in support of any initiative of the ECOWAS are considered as complementary in nature and not owned by the USA. This contrasts markedly with both Nigeria and France, which benefit from their involvements in ECOWAS and UEMOA respectively. This does not portray the USA as a West African hegemon, or even the leading counter-hegemon, when judged in terms of the criterion of institutional penetration.

Like the USA, France also has influence at the level of the UN, which it utilises as part of its hegemonic quest in West Africa. France utilises the UN more than the USA because of France's greater degree of focus on and recognition in West Africa. This gives France an indirect role in the decision-making process of the sub-region, not least through its ability to block UN initiatives related to West Africa through its use of the veto, or to significantly shape or reshape such initiatives through the threat of such use. France's leading role in the EU provides another extra-regional avenue through which it can pursue its hegemonic aspirations, and it has done so both through direct EU-West Africa initiatives and through securing EU support for French-led sub-regional institutional developments. These latter efforts further bolster France's institutional penetration into West Africa, though again indirectly, since it is not a member of any of the Francophone-centric sub-regional organisations that it has sponsored and continues to support. For Paris, these institutional structures have the further benefit of undermining Nigeria's sub-region-wide institutional initiative, ECOWAS. The difficulty for ensuring the effectiveness of ECOWAS stems from an overlapping of efforts and resources.[550] This is

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[550] GEA-African Studies Group, *ECOWAS Regional Integration Processes and International Cooperation*

particularly so as EUMOA widens its scope into peace and security, which was hitherto exclusively ECOWAS' mandate.[551] Chibuike Uche quotes the report of a committee of eminent citizens of the sub-region that reviewed the 1975 treaty of ECOWAS as having found that '…the coexistence of various economic groupings and other intergovernmental organisations in West Africa does seriously hinder ECOWAS' effectiveness unless their activities are rationalised and consolidated within the framework of a single economic community.'[552]

Whilst Nigeria does not have the leverage at the UN level which it seeks,[553] it does have leverage not only in ECOWAS but also in the AU, both of which the UN consults when taking decisions relating to Africa and, more specifically, West Africa. This is in line with the UN's partnership with regional and sub-regional entities. As a state within West Africa with a direct role in sub-regional decision making, Nigeria's sub-regional hegemonic aspirations are strengthened by its role in West African institutions, not least because this role demonstrates the extent to which its hegemonic influence comes with consent from within the region. However, Nigeria's disadvantage with respect to this criterion is its lack of influence in global governance institutions such as the UN, which has some degree of influence on regional governance.

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[551] V. Chambers et al., 'Final Report: Political Economy of Regionalism in West Africa–Scoping Study and Prioritisation'. *London: ODI,* (2012).

[552] Uche, *The Politics of Monetary Sector Cooperation among the Economic Community of West African States Members* p.16

[553] See Chapter Four (section 4.3 p.91)

It has been argued in this section that both the USA and France enjoy institutional penetration into West Africa. For Washington this exists only at the extra-regional level, primarily through the UN, whilst France's influence emanates from both within the sub-region, through institutions such as WAMU, and outside of the sub-region, via the UN and EU. Not only is the USA's lack of institutional links in the sub-region a disadvantage in respect of this criterion, but it is also notable that, within the UN, it is France that plays a dominant role in respect of the West Africa. This fact, in addition to France's sub-regional institutional penetration, thus place it ahead of the USA in terms of this criterion. With respect to comparison between Nigeria and France, it is concluded that, whilst Nigeria does not have the external institutional links of France, its institutional penetration within ECOWAS gives it stronger hegemonic influence. This is a consequence of the fact that ECOWAS is a sub-region-wide entity that has French allies as members and a proven willingness oppose extra-regional ownership of sub-regional affairs. The conclusion from this perspective is that any form of extra-regional institutional penetration that is contrary to endogenous approaches is likely to face sub-regional opposition and, since this is the form of institutional penetration on which France largely relies, consequently Nigeria fulfils this criterion of institutional penetration more fully than France.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the USA can be discounted as a West African hegemon. This is illustrated in the table below. The USA manifests weakness in hegemonic recognition and institutional penetration, and fares only moderately in respect of vision and beneficence, mainly because the sub-region is only a part of the USA's global hegemonic aspiration.

Having discounted the USA as a West African hegemon, the chapter went on to assess the hegemonic status of France and concluded that France, in relation to the six criteria cumulatively, is also not the West African hegemon but a counter-hegemon to Nigeria. While France eclipses Nigeria in terms of material power and has a vision for the sub-region and shows willingness for West African hegemony, it fares only moderately in respect of beneficence, due to its strong focus on the Francophone member states of the sub-region, and similarly in terms of recognition, which mainly comes from the sub-region's Francophone states. Finally, as can be seen from the table, France's institutional penetration is limited compared Nigeria's. This is mainly because the institution (UEMOA) in which France wields influence is not sub-region-wide in scope.

The chapter therefore concludes that France is the counter-hegemon of the West African sub-region.

It is, therefore, Nigeria that is identified as West Africa's hegemon. Whilst materially less powerful than either the USA or France, Nigeria is nevertheless able, through ECOWAS and the standing it has developed throughout the whole sub-region, to wield a high level of power across West Africa and, crucially to do so with considerable support from the sub-region's other member states. Such support stems from widespread acceptance of Nigeria's hegemonic vision and the breadth of its beneficence. Collectively, these factors have generated unparalleled recognition of Nigeria's hegemonic standing. Finally, whilst Nigeria lacks a leading presence in extra-regional institutions such as the UN, its role in ECOWAS, an organisation which encompasses the entire sub-region within its membership, more than compensates for this, since ECOWAS is exclusively concerned with the sub-region and in pursuit of this seeks to adopt an endogenous approach.

Table 4: Comparing the West African hegemonic standing of Nigeria, France and the USA

	Power	Vision	Willing	Beneficence	Recognition	Institutional penetration
Nigeria	Medium	High	High	High	Medium	High
France	High	High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium
USA	High	Medium	High	Medium	Low	Low

Chapter 6 Regions and Regionness, Actors and Actorness: A theoretical assessment

6.1 Introduction

This chapter locates international organisations (IOs), specifically regional ones, within the concept of actorness. The chapter makes the case that regional organizations are actors on the international stage. This serves as a foundation to give meaning to regional organisations' influential relations with state actors within their regional domains. The theoretical framework established in the chapter specifically serves as a framework to test (in Chapter Seven) ECOWAS' actorness and hence impact in the context of West African hegemony and counter-hegemony.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section explains what constitutes a region and regionness. It is shown that regions are defined variously, depending upon the subject lenses one wears. This thesis proceeds on a broader notion of a region but uses a geographic connotation as a basis for this. It will be argued that regions are usually defined largely along geographic lines but that this can be challenging in terms of demarcation. For this reason, this thesis distinguishes between a region understood in simple geographic terms and 'regionness', which combines geography and a notion of shared purpose. The chapter will also show that, in relation to regional organisations, a regionness is a key element of actorness.

The chapter's second section establishes international organisational actorness more broadly, drawing on international relation theories. It argues against the realists' notion that states are necessarily the main actors in the international system, drawing on neo-liberalist and constructivist theories, to argue that state actors can be influenced by non-state actors such as regional organizations. The final section offers working criteria of actorness. Based on a distillation of the various defining criteria considered in the literature, it identifies *autonomy*, *recognition,* and *capacity* as the criteria to measure the actorness of regional organisations.

6.2 Regions and Regionness

This thesis is concerned with a regional organisation, namely ECOWAS. Consequently, before we proceed to discuss the actorness of regional organisations, it is important first to establish what a region is and to understand how this idea, via the concept of 'regionness', relates to actorness.

6.2.1 Understanding a region through regionness

There is little agreement among scholars over a universal definition of a region.[554] Francis Baert et al. attributed the arbitrariness of the concept partly to the fact that it cuts across several academic sub-disciplines and has consequently come to be used differently by different scholars within those disciplines. They point out, for example, that the term 'region' is often considered by geographers as a sub-national entity, whilst for economists it is used as a focus on issues relating to currencies, trade and other economic related matters, and for scholars of international relations, regions are invariably considered as supranational sub-systems of the international system.[555] Yet despite the lack of clarity in the definition of the term 'region', invariably it is defined as a group of states within the same geographic location, although the question of where a region ends and another begins often remains a challenge.[556]

The challenge with respect to geographic definition of a region brings us to the idea of regionness, which partly shifts focus from the geographic connotation to a collective sense of purpose. As Andrew Hurrell has argued, there are no natural regions and what constitutes a region differs with respect to the specific problem or purpose in question. He therefore concludes that because all regions are constructed socially, they are politically contestable.[557] John McCormick pursues a similar point in arguing that states come together for a number of reasons: first by duress, as was the case in Europe under Hitler and Napoleon; secondly, through regional collective defensive considerations, as is the case of NATO; thirdly, through shared values, as with the Council of Europe; and finally, through collective security, as in the case of the United Nations.[558] These examples show the interplay between geography on the one hand, and circumstance or purpose on the other. They indicate that geography does not provide an absolute

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[554] C. J. Dawkins, 'Regional Development Theory: Conceptual Foundations, Classic Works, and Recent Developments'. *Journal of Planning Literature,* 18, 2, (2003), 131-172.

[555] F. Baert, T. Felicio and D. P. Lombaerde 'Introduction ', in F. Baert, et al. (ed.), *The United Nations and the regions: third world report on regional integration.* (London: Springer, 2012), 1-16.; P. Schmitt-Egner, 'The Concept of 'Region': Theoretical and Methodological Notes on its Reconstruction'. *Journal of European Integration,* 24, 3, (2002), 179-200.

[556] E. D. Mansfield and E. Solingen, 'Regionalism'. *Annual Review of Political Science,* 13, (2010), 145-163.

[557] A. Hurrell'Regional Powers and the Global System from a Historical Perspective', in D. Flemes(ed.), *Regional leadership in the global system* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), 1-15.; A. Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics'. *Review of International Studies,* 21, 4, (1995), 331-358.; D. B. Vukovic and D. M. Kochetkov, 'Defining Region'. *R-Economy,* 3, 2, (2017), 76-81.

[558] J. McCormick, *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction. New York: St*Macmillan, 1999). p.9

determination of membership of a given region and, in some cases, a collective sense of purpose is considered more important.

The above discussion implies several issues that are relevant to this thesis: the first is that the simplest understanding of a region is a group of geographically contiguous states. While this is correct, there remains the question of the outer limit of a given region. Because of this limitation, the thesis moves beyond region to regionness for a broader understanding, namely 'region with regionness'. This requires not only geographic proximity but also shared purpose. Consequently, it is possible that some states which are not within a geographically 'defined' area may, through their commitment to the shared purpose of the region, be considered for membership within its ranks. Conversely, a region with regionness may not necessarily include all states within a particular geographic setting, since some states might be excluded from or choose to be excluded from membership by virtue of their failure or desire not to be included within the shared purpose. From the above discussion and for the purposes of the remainder of this thesis, the term region is used in reference to a 'region with regionness'. Hence a region is defined as *a group of states, largely but not necessarily universally identified by geography, that share a sense of purpose for which reason they come together in common cause*.

Finally, a region will possess not only regionness but also actorness if: (i) the state members of such a region develop some form of organisational structure through which they can seek to address their shared purpose and (ii) where this organisational structure exhibits the characteristics of actorness. Björn Hettne argues that regionness enhances our understanding of actorness. He defined regionness as an endogenous process that brings about cohesiveness by shifting a collection of states from being a passive object to an active subject.[559] Hettne's definition presupposes application of effort to finding solutions from within a region to common problems, thus endowing it with actorness.[560] The implication is that an active subject thus sets out to achieve its objectives by putting in place prerequisites that bring about actorness.

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[559] B. Hettne'Beyond the 'new'regionalism', in A. Payne(ed.), *Key debates in new political economy* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 128-160. p.142
[560] B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum, 'Theorising the Rise of Regionness'. *New Political Economy,* 5, 3, (2000), 457-472.

6.3   Actorness in international relations

6.3.1   The state-centric view of actorness

Notwithstanding the association of actorness with regionness and, for that matter, regional organizations, the idea remains contested. This section thus focuses on the debate on whether or not IOs - and for the purpose of this thesis regional organizations - are actors in the international system. While state actorness is generally not questioned, from the 1990s, the debate on whether or not non-state bodies such as IOs are actors with influence on decision-making internationally has become keener.[561] Neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that actorness in the international arena is dominated by states. Waltz is of the view that there are other actors besides the state, such as IOs, but that the latter depends on the former for their actorness.[562] In building further on this point, he asserted,

> States are not and never have been the only international actors. … States set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors, stage their dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs…[But w]hen the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate.[563]

More stridently, neo-realists such as John Mearsheimer[564] and Joseph Grieco[565] argue that international institutions have little influence on the behaviour of states, arguing that they merely reflect global power distribution and the interests of great powers. There are two things that are clear from the realist position: first, they have questioned the effectiveness of non-state entities such as regional organisations as actors; second and more important to the argument in this thesis, for the most part they have not ruled out actorness of these entities, except to say their degree of actorness is negligible.

6.3.2   International organisations as international actors.

This section proceeds by building on the acknowledgment of IOs' actorness by the neo-realists. It is argued here that the neo-realist's underestimation of IOs' actorness

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[561] R. L. Schweller and D. Priess, 'A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate'. *Mershon International Studies Review,* 41, Supplement_1, (1997), 1-32.

[562] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 251; M. E. Brown et al., *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*MIT Press, 1995).

[563] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 251 p.93-5

[564] J. J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions'. *International Security,* 19, 3, (1994), 5-49. R. T. Cupitt et al., 'The (IM) Morality of International Governmental Organizations'. *International Interactions,* 21, 4, (1996), 389-404.

[565] J. M. Grieco'Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics', in W. M. Doyle and J. G. Ikenberry(eds.), *New thinking in international relations theory*, first ed. (New York: Westview Press, 1997), 163-201.

has not taken into consideration contemporary globalization, which has necessitated, in some cases, the ceding of sovereignty to IOs by states. This is a development that makes IOs impactful on their member states' behaviour and sometimes even considered more influential than some states. It is in respect of this that Thomas Weiss et al. argue that there has been what they term an 'unprecedented' increase in the number of non-state entities, which correspondingly increased the number of actors in the global arena. In making a case for their actorness, they asserted: '…we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of international organizations…that are not only willing and able to participate in global governance, but have also on many occasions helped solve problems and improve lives.'[566]

The section therefore builds on the position that non-state actors such as regional organizations can be regarded as actors. Bretherton and Vogler corroborate this position. They argued that there emerged in the pluralist approach[567] of the 1970s a critique of the view that power was centralized in sovereign states only. It challenged realism as too simplistic, by bringing to the fore some important areas in which non-state actors could be considered as not subordinate to states. They added that such inclusiveness reflects the global political condition of the time, whilst a state-centric analysis, with particular focus on "super power" relations, fails to sufficiently conceptualise what has become, in the words of Keohane and Nye, complex interdependence.[568] Indeed, even measured by the state centric yardstick of actorness, not all states can be considered as actors of equal measure to some IOs. This view is supported by Cosgrove and Twitchett, who equate some regional organizations to medium-sized state powers and considered them more influential internationally than what they termed as '…most newly independent, small underdeveloped states.'[569]

One area in which IOs have manifested actorness is their ability to promote cooperation among states. This became of interest to academic and policy makers especially after the end of the Cold War, when cooperation among states became even

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[566] T. G. Weiss et al., 'The Rise of Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Opportunities and Limitations'. *One Earth Future's Discussion Paper Series,* (2013). p.4
[567] This is about the fact that states governments wield power and at the same time non-state entities use their resources to influence states
[568] C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, second edition (London: Routledge, 2006). p.15
[569] C. A. Cosgrove and K. J. Twitchett, *The New International Actors. London, 1970* (New York: Macmillan, 1970). p.11

more important as a measure to find solutions to global problems. Baert et al., argue that the ever-growing interest in IOs is a result of a fast-changing international system that has necessitated increased state interdependence. For them, this is a development that has given regional and global actors an increased and key role on a wide range of governance issues, particularly in the areas of security and economics. They concluded that this has made security issues, in particular, less nationally bounded but an international concern.[570] It is from this perspective of interdependence and the key role that non-state actors play that Peter Willetts asserts that '…events in any area of global policy-making have to be understood in terms of complex systems, containing governments, companies, and NGOs interacting in a variety of international organizations.'[571] Building on the actorness of international or regional organisations Mathew Doidge asserts,

> Increasingly, globalization and transnationalization accompanied by the relative decline, but not withering away, of the nation state have led to a reorganization of certain activities on a regional level. This reorganization received a boost with the end of bipolar antagonism and the corresponding increase of interest in all forms of cooperation within the international system.[572]

O'Neill et al. point out that in recent years we have seen attention being shifted to three major themes on the issue of cooperation, namely, transnational norms and ideas; non-state actors; and the effectiveness of cooperation.[573] The quest for cooperation among states using IOs as a catalyst and its seeming widespread acceptance suggests that, to some degree, states have ceded actorness to such entities, thus constraining state actorness in favour of IO actorness.[574] These commitments from states, according to John Duffield, are often through formal treaties as well as agreements and conventions, which give supra-national power to these international entities.[575] With such treaties, the actorness of the IO is paramount, thus checking even hegemonic states. This is so because

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[570] Baert, Felicio and Lombaerde 'Introduction ', , 1-16

[571] P. Willetts, 'Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics'. *The Globalization of World Politics,* 2, (2001), 356-383. p.305

[572] M. Doidge'Regional Organizations as Actors in International Relations: Interregionalism and Asymmetric Dialogues', in J. Ruland, et al. (ed.), *Asian-European Relations*Routledge, 2008), 32-54. P.40

[573] K. O'Neill et al., 'Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate'. *Annu.Rev.Polit.Sci.,* 7, (2004), 149-175.; A. R. Higgott, D. R. G. Underhill and A. Bieler 'Introduction: Globalization and Non-State Actors', in A. R. Higgott, et al. (ed.), *Non-State Actors and Authority in The Global System* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[574] A. Andreev, 'To what Extent are International Organizations (IOs) Autonomous Actors in World Politics?'. *Opticon1826,* 2, (2007).

[575] J. Duffield, 'What are International Institutions?'. *International Studies Review,* 9, 1, (2007), 1-22. p.13

no hegemonic idea, even if it led to the formation of an IO, can be enforced without consensus building. In other words, ideas are enforced through persuasion and along institutional rules, deviation from which could attract criticism and disaffection, which ought not to happen to a hegemon.

Thatcher and Sweet have illustrated the above argument using the principal agent analysis to put into perspective the disputed autonomy of IOs or their actorness. In their application, states are considered as principals and IOs are considered agents. The latter are meant to serve the interest of the former through delegation. They point out that, for the principal (state) to benefit from the delegation, it must grant some degree of discretion to the agent (international or regional organisation) by sharing its authority. [576] Consequently, the agent, is able to pursue its own interests through policy formulation in line with its understanding of what is best for the principal (state).[577] The principal agent analogy can be situated under the constructivist perspective, which argues that IOs are autonomous once power has been delegated to them. For constructivists, IOs have the tendency of exercising the delegated power independently in pursuit of their purpose, even if this is counter to the interests of states.[578]

It is concluded, based on the preceding discussions, that states are not the only main actors in the international system. As indicated from the start of the chapter, whereas this thesis does not seek to argue against state actorness, it argues that IOs - and for the purpose of this thesis, regional organizations in particular – can be effective actors with impacts on states. This is in view of the fact that states have willingly ceded authority to these entities based, on which states' behaviours have been significantly impacted by the activities of the IOs to which they belong. Hence, Cupitt et al. argue to the effect that IOs do not only facilitate cooperation, but also influence state behaviours through the setting

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[576] M. Thatcher and A. S. Sweet, 'Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions'. *West European Politics,* 25, 1, (2002), 1-22.; P. Keil, 'Principal Agent Theory and its Application to Analyze Outsourcing of Software Development'. *ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes,* 30, 4, (2005), 1-5.

[577] R. Vaubel, 'Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations'. *The Review of International Organizations,* 1, 2, (2006), 125-138.

[578] E. Bayeh, 'Theories on the Role of International Organizations in Maintaining Peace and Security'. *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development,* 1, 7, (2014), 347-350.; M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*Cornell University Press, 2004).; A. Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories'. *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,* 129, (2011).

of agendas, as well as putting in place mechanisms for compliance.[579] While IOs'
actorness has been established, the issue of what makes any type of entity an actor remains
to some extent unsettled, which the next section seeks to address.

6.4   The criteria of international actorness

This section builds on the preceding two sections on the concept of regionness
and regional organisational actorness to set out criteria that can be applied to understand
and determine the concept of actorness internationally. There are different understandings
on what criteria constitute actorness. This is an area of academic contestation, with
scholarly criteria varying in terms of the content, number, and terminology. [580]
Consequently, this thesis considers a representative sample of the literature on actorness
in order to develop comprehensive actorness criteria. The criteria selected in this thesis,
autonomy, *recognition* and *capacity*, are justified on two grounds: first, that these three
indicators feature considerably as actorness indicators listed by virtually all scholars that
have written on the subject and hence can be considered quite indispensable relative to
ascribing actorness. Secondly, the selection of just three criteria removes duplications in
various scholarly criteria, thus enhancing our understanding of the concept of actorness.

John Vogler and Charlotte Bretherton have set out an elaborate set of criteria for
international organisational actorness. According to them, for an entity to be considered
as an actor, it must fulfil five criteria. Firstly, the entity must display a 'shared
commitment to a set of overarching values and principles.'[581] This is termed as shared
values in this thesis. They explained it as a set of values that an entity is identified with
and that there must be a manifest commitment to by both member states and the entity
itself. Secondly, they argue that the entity needs to possess 'the ability to identify
priorities and to formulate coherent and consistent policies.'[582] This is termed in this
thesis, as policy formulation capability. The third criterion for Vogler and Bretherton is

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[579] R. T. Cupitt et al., 'The (IM) Morality of International Governmental Organizations'. *International
Interactions,* 21, 4, (1996), 389-404.

[580] J. Huigens and A. Niemann, 'The EU within the G8: A Case of Ambiguous and Contested Actorness.
College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 05/2009, August 2009'. *EU Diplomacy Paper,* 5-2009, (2009),
38. p.8

[581] J. Vogler and C. Bretherton, 'The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate
Change'. *International Studies Perspectives,* 7, 1, (2006), 1-22. p.9

[582] Vogler and Bretherton, 'The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate
Change'., 1-22 p.9

'the ability to negotiate effectively with third parties and to implement agreements.'[583] This is termed in this thesis as negotiating ability. They explained this criterion as the ability to engage with other entities to negotiate on a given issue using the competence of the entity to advance its interest. However, beyond that it should be able to put into action agreements reached with third parties, which for them is a further indication of the actorness of a given entity.[584] The fourth criterion is the 'capability in the deployment of diplomatic, economic, and other instruments in support of common policies.'[585] This criterion is termed in this thesis as capacity as, according to Vogler and Bretherton, it relates to the utilization of an entity's diplomatic resources and economic leverage among others to ensure that its shared purpose is successful. It includes using its diplomats for negotiation and applying economic sanctions and economic inducements to achieve a common purpose.[586] Their final criterion is 'public and parliamentary support to legitimize action.'[587] This is termed legitimacy in this thesis, denoting the idea that all actions taken by the entity must be seen to have the approval of parliament and by implication the public of state concerned.[588]

Uwe Wunderlich also identifies five criteria of actorness. They are first: 'internal identity/self-perception.'[589] He argues that an actor must have a self-image. It must clearly state what it is and what it is not. The significance of this criterion stems from the fact that an entity's identity manifests its interest and its activities at the international level. His second criterion is 'external recognition'[590] namely the idea that an entity must be recognised by actors in the international system beyond its regional domain, to incorporate external entities as an actor relative to what it is identified with.[591] The third

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[583] Vogler and Bretherton, 'The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change'., 1-22 p.10

[584] Vogler and Bretherton, 'The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change'., 1-22

[585] Vogler and Bretherton, 'The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change'., 1-22 p.10

[586] Vogler and Bretherton, 'The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change'., 1-22

[587] Vogler and Bretherton, 'The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change'., 1-22 p.10

[588] Vogler and Bretherton, 'The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change'., 1-22

[589] U. Wunderlich, 'The EU–A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World', *Paper for Presentation and the UACES Annual/Research Conference, University of Edinburgh.* 2008). p.17

[590] Wunderlich, 'The EU–A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World', p.17

[591] Wunderlich, 'The EU–A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World',

criterion is 'international presence,' [592] explained as being similar to the preceding criterion, as it relates to how much an entity is able to use its recognition in the international system to actively influence the external environment, that is, the ability to get favourable outcomes at the international level that serve the entity's interest. The fourth criterion is 'some form of institutionalisation.' [593] through the creation of administrative structures and institutions for the day-to-day running of the entity. Finally, according to this framework, an actor requires 'a set of instruments and policy-making procedures,'[594] which 'enable an international actor to engage in external relations.'[595]

Erik Brattberg and Mark Rhinard set out four criteria for actorness. They are context, coherence, capability and consistency. They explain the first criterion, context, as the extent to which an entity is recognised by others as an actor within the international system and the perceived legitimacy of what it purports to do.[596] Their second criterion is coherence, which they explain as the ability of an entity to set out its values, make clear its preferences and to have institutions that represent its values and policy preferences as it seeks to assert influence internationally as an actor. Their third criterion is capability, that is, the entity's ability to put in place policy instruments and to mobilise other supporting resources to enable it achieve its policy goals. Finally, consistency, namely the extent to which agreed policies are carried out with particular focus on coordination among member states in the implementation process.[597]

Joseph Jupille and James Caporaso also identify four criteria for any organisation to attain actor status. These are: autonomy, recognition, authority, and cohesion. They explain autonomy as independence, or freedom from the influence of other actors. In their view, an entity can only be considered as an actor if it has a distinctive institutional apparatus that manifests independence from other actors in terms of decisions making and policy formulation.[598] They explain recognition as the acceptance of an entity as an

[592] Wunderlich, 'The EU–A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World', p.17
[593] Wunderlich, 'The EU–A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World', p.17
[594] Wunderlich, 'The EU–A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World', p.17
[595] Wunderlich, 'The EU–A Post-Westphalian Actor in a Neo-Westphalian World', p.28
[596] E. Brattberg and M. Rhinard, 'Actorness and Effectiveness in International Disaster Relief: The European Union and United States in Comparative Perspective'. *International Relations,* 27, 3, (2013), 356-374.
[597] Brattberg and Rhinard, 'Actorness and Effectiveness in International Disaster Relief: The European Union and United States in Comparative Perspective'. , 356-374
[598] J. Jupille and J. A. Caporaso 'States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics', in C. Rhodes(ed.), *The European Union in the world community* (London: Lynne Rienner Boulder, CO, 1998), 213-229.; L. Greiçevci, 'EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of

actor by others, manifested by the willingness of the other entities to engage with it. Based on this notion of recognition, Jupille and Caporaso are of the view that recognition is indispensable in according actorness. They explain authority as the legal basis on which an entity could act, and finally they identify cohesion as the extent to which an entity is able to articulate an internally formulated policy preference that is consistent. This criterion, according to them, addresses the question of how much an entity is able to coordinate policy preferences of member states in line with the entity's policy position.[599]

Brian Hocking and Michael Smith also explain international actorness by pointing to the following three criteria: autonomy, representation and influence. They explained autonomy as relating to how much freedom an actor has in pursuit of its core objectives. This centres on the independence of the entity from member states and external entities relative to its policy formulation. They explained representation as having to do with representing a definitive constituency in the form of people and territory. Finally, influence, which in their view is about how much sway an entity can exert under any specific given time and in specific context. The implication is that for an entity to be considered as an actor, it must be seen to wield influence in its constituency and to some degree beyond.[600]

Finally, according to Carol Cosgrove and Kenneth Twitchett, an international actor can be tested by three indicators. The first is the extent or degree of autonomy of its institutions with respect to decision making. They are of the view that the process should accord the institutional structures the power to initiate policies as well as the discretional powers to put the entity's interest ahead of member states' interest. The second is in relation to the extent to which an entity impacts the international system both among member states and beyond. This is referred to in this thesis as actorness with international impact. This criterion is in relation to getting states to comply with the policy direction of the central entity or IO. The third and what they consider as the most important is the ability of an entity to formulate or guide the foreign policy formulation of its member

EULEX Mission in Kosovo'. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society,* 12, 3, (2011), 283-303.; K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 42, 1, (1998), 3-32.
[599] Jupille and Caporaso 'States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics', , 213-229
[600] B. Hocking and M. Smith, *World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (London: Harvester Wheatshaeaf, 1990). p.71-2

states. This can be termed as foreign policy consistency of member states, masterminded by the administrative structures of an IO.[601]

The preceding section has only summarised some of the actorness criteria in key academic literature. It is shown from the explanations of the various criteria that some are virtually the same, albeit often named differently. In the following section these criteria are re-categorized into, autonomy, recognition and capacity, the three criteria which will be used to test the actorness of regional organizations in subsequent chapters.

6.4.1   The thesis' international actorness criteria

It is argued in this section that autonomy, recognition and capacity are, as actorness criteria, broad enough to incorporate the various criteria given by the selected scholars discussed above. This is justified by the fact that some of the criteria from the summary in the preceding section appear superfluous or have identical meaning so could be expunged. However, before further details are given on this, the subsuming of the various criteria into the selected three is summarised in table 5 and illustrated in fig.1 below.

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[601] Cosgrove and Twitchett, *The New International Actors. London, 1970*; A. Niemann and C. Bretherton, 'EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness'. *International Relations,* 27, 3, (2013), 261-275.

	Vogler and Bretherton	Uwe Wunderlich	Brattberg and Rhinard	Jupille and Caporaso	Hocking and Smith	Cosgrove and Twitchett
Autonomy	• Shared values	• Self-perception • Institutions • Policy making procedure	• Coherence	• Autonomy	• Autonomy	• Autonomy
Recognition	• Negotiating ability • Legitimacy	• External Recognition • International presence	• Context • Consistency	• Recognition • Authority • Cohesion	• Representation • Influence	• International impact • Foreign policy consistency
Capacity	• Resource Capacity • Policy capacity		• Capability			

Table 5: Summary of actorness criteria in the literature

Capacity

Material and human resources to implement organizational policies and programmes.

Recognition

Member states' and external actors' recognition and support for the entity's mandate.

Actorness

A combination of autonomy, recognition and capaity.

Autonomy (legitimacy)

Institutional presence and personnel with supra-national mandate

Figure 1: Illustration of actorness criteria in this thesis

From the illustration above, the selection of *autonomy*, *recognition* and *capacity* is justified on two grounds. First, these indicators, especially the first two, are widely considered among others as actorness criteria in the academic literature which shows their significance in attributing actorness to any entity. Secondly, the selection of these key indicators does away with the superfluity. This selection therefore simplifies the concept of actorness to ensure a precise, comprehensive, yet concise understanding. It is important to note that no entity is likely to be able to exhibit all three criteria of actorness in an absolute sense at any given time. Judgements regarding actorness must, therefore,

be based on the degree of fulfilment of the criteria.[602] From the perspective of this thesis, these criteria are sufficiently holistic to serve as the basis to ascribe actorness to any international entity. The justification for the re-categorisation shown in the table above is discussed next.

6.4.1.1 Autonomy

Autonomy is used in this thesis to mean the availability of administrative structures with the power to initiate or formulate binding policies. The structures must also spell out decision making procedures. Another important component of this criterion is the need for the mandate spelt out for the administrative structures to depict the entity's identity. This must be seen in the policies and laws that emanate from the structures. Proceeding from this explanation, autonomy is defined and applied in the remainder of this thesis as *the possession, by an entity, of administrative structures comprising executive, legislative and judicial arms with manifest supra-national power over its member states on decision making.*

From this perspective, and with reference to table above, the use of the term, autonomy by Jupille and Caporaso, Hocking and Smith, and Cosgrove and Twitchett does not need further explanation. This is because they have used it and explained it relative to institutional structures as contained in the thesis' definition of autonomy above. However, it is not the same with respect to the works of Brattberg and Rhinard, Uwe Wunderlich, and Vogler and Bretherton. It is important to single out coherence, which is different in terms of designation but fits into autonomy in view of the fact that Brattberg and Rhinard explained it relative to institutional structures and what these structures do. Similarly, Wunderlich's inclusion of self-perception and policy making procedure alongside institutionalization is a matter of duplication. This is because one way to understand the institutional structures of an entity is to take into consideration what it does. This, by implication, reflects what the entity perceives itself to be about and what others perceives it to be about. In the same vein, policy-making procedures can be seen as an integral part of institutional structures, for which reason they all fall under the broader notion of autonomy. Finally, shared values as explain by Vogler and Bretherton,

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[602] C. A. Cosgrove and K. J. Twitchett, *The New International Actors. London, 1970* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).

in the same way as self-perception or self-image, are often detectable in the mission statement, vision and names assigned to institutional departments. This explains why it is put under autonomy. For instance, the mention of the UNSC, immediacy suggests a unit in the structure of the UN that deals with peace and security.

6.4.1.2   Recognition

From the perspective of this thesis, recognition connotes a clear show of acceptance by member states and beyond, of the actorness of the entity. The acceptance must be demonstrated by according the entity legitimacy to do what it is identified with as part of its autonomy. Whereas internal recognition has to do with compliance by member states with the autonomous structures and rules and regulations that come from the administrative structures, external recognition manifests itself when states and non-state actors outside of the domain of an IO are willing to engage with it in its course of action. From this viewpoint, recognition is defined and applied throughout this thesis as *evidence that an entity is considered legitimate by both its member states and actors outside of its domain, manifested by the willingness of member states to adhere to the entity's policy 'dictates' and external actor's willingness to collaborate with it.*

With reference to the table, it is argued that based on this notion of recognition, Vogler and Bretherton's criterion of parliamentary or public support termed as legitimacy is considered as equivalent to internal recognition by member states of an IO. This is because institutions and what they do are based on the acceptance of member states through their expressed binding commitments, which give legitimacy and hence demonstrate recognition. Their criterion of 'negotiating ability' relative to third parties also falls under recognition. Negotiating with third parties presupposes that an entity is recognised externally, for which reason external entities are willing to collaborate with it. Building further on recognition and with reference to the table, Wunderlich's criterion of external recognition illustrates the external component of recognition in view of the fact that it has to do with an entity's acceptance as an actor by its counterparts. Similarly, his criterion of international presence also explains external recognition, given that getting favourable outcomes from international engagements is contingent on being accepted as a legitimate international actor.

In respect of Brattberg and Rhinard, their use of the term 'context' is considered to be a different nomenclature used in place of external recognition. For instance, they

explain it relative to the acceptance of an entity by its external counterparts. Their consistency criterion is also considered under recognition because their explanation of it relative to consistency in member states' domestic policies caused by the international actor is only possible if member states, out of recognition of the supra-nationality of an entity's institutional organs, comply by aligning national policies with the supra-national structures. Building further on recognition, the section turns to Jupille and Caporaso's criteria. It is argued here that three of their criteria (recognition, authority and cohesion) fall under recognition. For instance, from the perspective of this thesis, authority is considered as legitimacy which is accorded by member states of an IO and where legitimacy is accorded, it means there is recognition. Unlike Brattberg and Rhinard, who explain 'coherence' relative to institutions for which reason it was put under autonomy, Jupille and Caporaso used the terminology primarily to mean policy coordination among member states in line with the policy position of the central institutional structures. This is recognition, since only a recognised entity can achieve effective policy coordination among its member states as they will be willing or bound to comply.

Similarly, two of Hocking and Smith's three-point criteria, representation and influence, can be subsumed into recognition. First, in relation to their explanation of representation as a constituency, it is argued in this section that a constituency is understood simply by identifying states that share in an entity's shared purpose. This, by implication, demonstrates recognition because only states that recognise an entity can constitute the constituency it represents. Relative to his point on influence, categorising it within recognition is justified by the fact that where there is recognition and the scope of an entity's representation (constituency) is defined, it comes with influence over the constituency. Based on this, influence can be put under recognition given that it is demonstrated by compliance to the 'dictates' of an administrative structures. Finally, deducing from the discussions so far, two of Cosgrove and Twitchett's criteria, namely international impact and foreign policy consistency fall under external recognition and internal recognition respectively. This is so because aligning foreign policies, just like any other policies meant for member states' adherence, is contingent on recognition of the entity by its member states. In the same vein, as argued earlier, an entity is able to have international impact if it is recognised outside of its domain.

6.4.1.3 Capacity

Even though capacity has not explicitly featured in the reviewed literature on the criteria of international actorness, it is considered indispensable from the perspective of this thesis. Capacity as used here means an organization's ability to carry out its duties and not to be irredeemably constrained by material (including financial) and/or human resource deficits. It thus means that for an entity to be considered as an actor, it does not only need to have a functioning and purposeful administrative structure that shows recognised autonomy, but it must also be able to maintain that structure, first with the needed personnel and secondly, financially. The manifestation of these resources should also be reflected to a significant degree in the entity's external engagements, such as diplomatic missions and peace keeping operations. From this perspective, capacity is defined for the purposes of this thesis as *the possession by an entity of a considerable degree of material and human resources, enabling it to support both policy formulations and implementations.*

Proceeding from this definition, it is argued in this section that Vogler and Bretherton's criterion that centres on an entity's ability to deploy its diplomatic and economic (material) resources to achieve its objectives typifies capacity. Similarly, their second point on policy formulation can fall under human resources (personnel) capacity to initiate policies that address the core vision of a given entity. Building further on capacity, reference is made to Brattberg and Rhinard's explanation of their capability criterion. They explained it focusing on both policy capabilities and material resource endowment. They have specifically made the point that material resources facilitate an entity's execution of its agenda. This is a major justification of the inclusion of capacity as a criterion. In other words, agreements reached by diplomats of an entity that require material endowment to execute such as peacekeeping will be facilitated by capacity.

6.5 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter started with the challenges in respect of defining a region. It is argued in the chapter that although a region is often understood from a geographic perspective, such a perspective limits our understanding of the concept because of the challenge of where a region begins and ends. To address this challenge, the thesis adopted the idea of regionness, which unlike geographic proximity focuses on shared purpose as well. In this section, it was concluded that regionness enhances our

understanding of actorness. A region or sub-region, as used in this thesis, therefore, means a region with regionness. In order to make a case for regional organizational actorness, the second section of the chapter looked at the debate on what constitutes an actor in the international arena. The chapter argued against the realist view that only states are the major actors in the international system. The chapter showed that IOs and for the purpose of this thesis, regional organizations, have become actors with impact on state behaviour. The chapter, however, indicated clearly that it does not seek to dispel state actorness.

Proceeding from the argument in favour of regional organizational actorness, the chapter sought to develop a set of actorness criteria. Taking into consideration the fact that actorness criteria are also varied and somewhat contested, the chapter looked at a range of actorness criteria in the academic literature and aligned them to the three criteria adopted for application in this thesis, autonomy, recognition and capacity. Autonomy is defined in relation to administrative structures and supranational powers; recognition is considered in relation to how much member states adhere to the 'dictates' of the administrative structures and the extent to which external actors are willing to engage with the entity; finally, capacity is defined in relation to an entity's material and human resources. Adopting this approach, this thesis argues that an entity can be said to exhibit actorness - and hence to be an actor - when it has the *ability to show what it stands for (identity) by putting into practice and demonstrating all three actorness criteria. (autonomy, recognition and capacity).*

Chapter 7 Regionness and Actorness in Practice: The Case of ECOWAS

7.1 Introduction

Chapter Six set out the three-point criteria of actorness which are applied in this chapter to test ECOWAS' actorness. The chapter answers the research question pertaining to the extent to which ECOWAS has become an actor. However, before ECOWAS' actorness is tested, its regionness is established, a necessary step given the lack of clarity over the concept. The chapter has two main sections. The first section establishes ECOWAS' regionness, which is looked at in two sub-sections. The first sub-section analyses ECOWAS from a geographic perspective. The second sub-section analyses ECOWAS from the perspective of cohesion or shared purpose. The second sub-section examines ECOWAS' regionness. The chapter's second section focuses on ECOWAS' actorness in practice. It will be analysed based on the adopted actorness criteria: autonomy, recognition and capacity. The chapter will show that on all fronts, ECOWAS is to a large degree an economic and security actor. It is, however, also argued that the organization's actorness with respect to capacity is challenged. In other words, whereas its autonomy is not in doubt and to a large extent, recognition can be judged likewise, its capacity is somewhat deficient, mainly in respect of material endowment.

7.2 West Africa as a region with regionness

This thesis defines a region with regionness as: '*a group of states, largely but not necessarily universally identified by geography, that share a sense of purpose for which reason they come together in a common cause.*' Proceeding from this viewpoint, this section examines West Africa by considering firstly its geographic extent, its associated challenges, and secondly its cohesiveness. Together these factors explain the regionness under which ECOWAS operates.

7.2.1 West Africa as a geographic region

Geographically, the West African sub-region has a total land mass of 5.1 million square kilometres, which represents 17% of the African continent.[603] These are figures for the fifteen member-states of ECOWAS (Nigeria, Togo, Niger, Ivory Coast, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Benin, Gambia, Cape Verde and Senegal). However, the sub-region is often understood geographically as sixteen states, the sixteenth being Mauritania which, until the year 2000, was a member state of ECOWAS. As of 2015, the sub-region comprising all sixteen states had a total population of approximately 367 million, representing 5% of the total global population.[604] Given that the African population was 1.2 billion in the same period,[605] West Africa constituted 30% of the continent's population.

The geographic connotation of West Africa, sometimes with the inclusion of Mauritania and other times not, shows the challenges in geographic notions of a region. With respect to West Africa, this is attributable to the linkage of some member states to other geographic territories. For instance, of the sixteen countries in the sub-region, eleven of them lie along the Atlantic Ocean and five are part of the Sahel region.[606] The case of Mauritania is a practical example of how states can be divided between different geographic spaces and can therefore choose to join organizations of either side. Mauritania is straddled between West Africa and the Maghreb.[607] This explains why it was a founding member of ECOWAS by virtue of geographic location and left to join the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 also on the basis of geographic location.

All sixteen states have had different colonial experiences under different European powers. Accordingly, membership of the West African sub-region is composed

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[603] M. A. Ewi, 'The Complex Dimension of Terrorism in West Africa: Vulnerabilities, Trends and Notorious Terrorist Networks', *Being a paper presented at SWAC/OCED seminar on 12th June.* 2012). p.3

[604] Earth Resources Observation and Science, (EROS) *West Africa: Land use and Land Cover Dynamics.* Available online: https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrica/node/156 [Accessed 28/05/18 para.1

[605] E. M. Bah et al., 'The Africa Competitiveness Report 2017', *World economic forum.* 2017). p.5

[606] Ewi, 'The Complex Dimension of Terrorism in West Africa: Vulnerabilities, Trends and Notorious Terrorist Networks',

[607] African Manager *Mauritania: Former PM Wants Mauritania Back in ECOWAS.* Available online: https://africanmanager.com/site_eng/mauritania-former-pm-wants-mauritania-back-in-ecowas/ [Accessed 20/04/2017].

of Anglophone or English-speaking states, Francophone or French speaking states and Lusophone or Portuguese speaking states.[608] The diagram below shows West Africa geographically and an indication of countries and their former colonial masters.

Figure 2: Map of West Africa in 1922

Source: Online, available at: https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/map-of-west-africa-in-1922 (Retrieved online on 25/04/2019).

In view of the challenges in defining the sub-region geographically, membership of the ECOWAS organisation as a West African entity is not strictly based on geography, although ECOWAS' maiden treaty seemingly focused on geographic proximity. For instance, 'member state' was defined in article 1(2) of the 1975 treaty as: '... states that ratify this Treaty and such other West African States as may accede to it.'[609] It thus made provisions for those with geographic proximity to West Africa to join through which Cape

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[608] A. Bryden et al., *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa*Lit, 2008).p.viii
[609] ECOWAS *Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States*
*(ECOWAS). Concluded at Lagos on 28 may 1975 . Avai*lable online:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/49217f4c2.html [Accessed 12/07/2017].p.20

Verde joined in 1977.[610] This limiting clause was expunged in the revised treaty of 1993, on the basis of which Chidi Odinkalu argued that '…no question of regional contiguity necessarily arises…'.[611] Hence, even though West Africa has a geographic designation; membership of ECOWAS goes beyond location to incorporate shared purpose based on the organization's principles of solidarity and collective self-reliance.[612] This means that ECOWAS has prioritised its shared purpose, since strict geographic adherence in admitting members may exclude states that share in the agenda of ECOWAS and may wish to join. A case in point is ECOWAS' recent approval in principle of an application by Morocco, a North African country with no boundary with any West African state, to join the organisation. A senior ECOWAS official is quoted as having said, 'Morocco, along with Tunisia which is seeking observer status with the organisation and Mauritania, which wants to return to the body, will be invited to the next meeting….' [613] The implication is that a strict geographic definition of a region is not sufficient in forming an identity for it. It must always include the cohesive factors, which are arguably as important to granting membership as geographic considerations and to which we now turn.

7.2.2 Non-geographic cohesive factors of West Africa's regionness

Building on the framework set out in Chapter Six, this sub-section considers the significance of the idea of cohesiveness or shared purpose to explain West African regionness. It analyses three main inter-related non-geographic cohesive factors that ECOWAS as a regional entity embodies. These are: first, nexus of economic challenges and colonialism/neo-colonialism; second, the insecurity/conflict and poverty nexus; finally, the insecurity/conflict and colonialism nexus. A detailed examination of these issues lies beyond the scope of this thesis, but each will be examined in such a manner as to explain their relevance to ECOWAS' regionness.

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[610] Hartmann, 'Governance Transfer by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)'. p.9

[611] A. C. Odinkalu *Understanding Morocco's Application to Join ECOWAS.* Available online: http://saharareporters.com/2018/03/27/understanding-morocco%E2%80%99s-application-join-ecowas-chidi-anselm-odinkalu [Accessed 13/04/2019]. Para.7

[612] ECOWAS *Fundamental Principles & Achievements.* Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/fundamental-principles/ [Accessed 01/02/2020].

[613] BBC *Ecowas Agrees to Admit Morocco to West African Body.* Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40158089 [Accessed 30/08/2019].

7.2.2.1 Economy/poverty vis-à-vis colonialism/neo-colonialism

To explain ECOWAS' regionness, it is important to understand some of the cohesive factors that support a collective approach to sub-regional concerns. One such factor is the desire to address the economic deprivation and high poverty levels of the sub-region. The sub-region is arguably the poorest and the most politically unstable Regional Economic Community (REC) in Africa.[614] For instance, on poverty, a survey by the Afro Barometer from 2011 to 2013 and later from 2014 to 2015 on what is referred to as 'lived poverty'[615] found that the sub-region was the second worst of all sub-regions on the continent.[616] Similarly, according to the Human Development Index Report of 2016, with respect to Women's Human Development achievement in Africa's sub-regions, West Africa fared worst.[617] The report indicated that overall, the sub-region scored '…an average human development value of 0.461, which is below the African average of 0.524…'[618] Another indicator that supports the argument of the weak economic situation and high poverty of West Africa is the relatively small sizes of member states' economies. As of 2011, eleven member states of ECOWAS had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of less than $5 billion.[619] For this reason, nearly all member states of ECOWAS are listed among the Least Developed Countries (LCDs), with the exceptions of Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast.[620] Based on the picture of the economic situation in West Africa, Julian Frede described the socio-economic situation of the sub-region as follows:

> To shortly introduce the ECOWAS political and economic environment, it has to be emphasized that this organization operates in one of the most

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[614] R. Ann-Sofi, 'ECOWAS and West Africa's Future: Problems Or Possibilities'. *Sweden: Umea University,* (2008).; K. Aning and S. A. Bah, 'ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats'. *New York: New York University, Centre on International Cooperation,* (2009).

[615] They defined it as: 'an index that measures the frequency with which people experience shortage of basic necessities'

[616] R. Mattes et al., 'Africa's Growth Dividend? Lived Poverty Drops Across Much of the Continent'. *Afrobarometer Policy Paper,* 29, (2016), 1-20. p.7

[617] UNDP, *Africa Human Development Report 2016 Accelerating Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Africa,*[2016]). P.28

[618] *Ibid.*; O. J. Osai et al., 'Profiling Poverty in West Africa: A Sub-Regional Survey'. *AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities,* 2, 1, (2013), 180-200.

[619] R. Ranganathan and V. Foster, *ECOWAS's Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective*The World Bank, 2011). p.vi

[620] C. Nwoke, 'EU-ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreement: Nigeria's Role in Securing Development-Focus and Regional Integration', *African Economic Conference "Fostering Development in an Era of Financial and Economic Crisis". Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.* 2009).

difficult regions worldwide. It is characterized by harsh poverty, which can be found region-wide. Furthermore, political instability and even frequent open military conflicts are widespread.[621]

This situation is not new and the desire for greater prosperity motivated the process of economic integration that was the initial rationale for the formation of ECOWAS.[622] Economic considerations served as a cohesive factor that necessitated cooperation via a regional entity, particularly in the area of intra-regional trade facilitation. This is a cohesive factor that brought states within the West African geographic location and potentially beyond the sub-region together. One of the common concerns of West African states in respect of their economic situation and that of the sub-region more widely is their relatively small size, which hampers their engagements with much bigger powers outside of the sub-region on issues such as trade. This concern generally explains the idea of RECs such as ECOWAS, which was formed in the hope that it could bring about integration and the collective action and hence strength it would bring would result in greater prosperity.[623]

Another related shared feature is the legacy of colonialism and the negative effects of neo-colonialism, issues that relate directly to the poor economic situation of the sub-region. Some scholars and political leaders take the view that colonialism has impeded the economic development and integration of the sub-region. They also hold the view that neo-colonialism has kept the sub-region divided along the lines of colonial legacy, and that this division poses a challenge to economic integration. Both views will be substantiated in turns.

Firstly, on the impact of classical colonialism, Joshua Settles asserts, 'The development of colonialism and the partition of Africa by the European colonial powers

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[621] J. Frede, 'ECOWAS'capability and Potential to Solve Constraints to Growth and Poverty Reduction of its Member States'. *Unpublished Manuscript, University of Trier, Germany.,* 17, (2012). p.9

[622] D. D. Zounmenou and R. S. Loua, 'Confronting Complex Political Crises in West Africa: An Analysis of ECOWAS Responses to Niger and Côte D'Ivoire'. *Institute for Security Studies Papers,* 2011, 230, (2011), 20.

[623] R. I. Onwuka, 'Development and Integration in West Africa : The Case of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)'. (1977).; Kufuor, *The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States*; N. Fulgence, 'War on Terrorism in Africa: A Challenge for Regional Integration and Cooperation Organizations in Eastern and Western Africa'. *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs,* (2015).

arrested the natural development of the African economic system.' [624] This can be explained by taking into consideration the fact that the sub-region prior to colonialism was characterised by settlements based on ethnic groups that coexisted in peace and traded amongst themselves. These arrangements were distorted by colonialism, which did not support the earlier settlements and trade arrangements. The colonial arrangement promoted trade between colonial master and colonies and this has remained the trend to a large degree.[625] In this respect, Jadesola Babatola attributes the economic challenges of African states and for the purpose of this thesis, West Africa to former colonial masters' dominance over their economies during the colonial era and post-colonial era through arrangements that are supported by internal collaborators (neo-colonialism).[626]

The linkage between neo-colonialism and under-development of the West African sub-region was articulated by Olusegun Adewoye, 1977 chair of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, who cited neo-colonialism as one of the major problems facing the then young organisation (ECOWAS).[627] He argued that the West African sub-region was facing a classic case of neo-colonialism and asserted, 'We are all familiar with the history of the establishment and the consequences of colonialism on our continent.'[628] He added, 'We have the outward trappings of sovereignty: a multi-coloured flag, a national anthem… But the reality of Independence, in terms of the ability to control our economic destiny - which is what really matters - still eludes us.'[629] This kind of statement, coming from an official of ECOWAS only two years after its formation, gives credence to claims that colonialism and neo-colonialism are a cohesive factor in the formation of ECOWAS, particularly as economic integration formed the basis for ECOWAS. The need for economic integration was partly attributable to the colonial legacy that left West African states unintegrated. The French approach to decolonization, which left Francophone West

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[624] J. D. Settles, 'The Impact of Colonialism on African Economic Development'. *University of Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects,* (1996). p.1; R. R. Michel, 'The Integration of West Africa'. *Journal of Undergraduate Research,* 7, (2004), 1-14.
[625] Settles, 'The Impact of Colonialism on African Economic Development'.
[626] J. Babatola, 'Neo-Colonialism in Africa: A Perpetuation of Western Interest and Subjugation of Africa'. *Seminar Paper,* (2013).
[627] ECOWAS, 'Meeting of the Council of Ministers, Provisional Agenda'. *ECW/CM/(L) /1,* July, (1977).
[628] ECOWAS, 'Meeting of the Council of Ministers, Provisional Agenda'. para.4
[629] ECOWAS, 'Meeting of the Council of Ministers, Provisional Agenda'. para.6

Africa economically and politically tied to Paris,[630] discussed further in Chapter Four, is a prime example of this.

7.2.2.2 West African conflicts/insecurity and poverty nexus

Poverty stemming from colonialism and neo-colonialism has also had a profound effect on West African security, and consequently this constitutes another cohesive factor that contributes to sub-regional regionness. Peace and security issues were added to the mandate of ECOWAS in its 1993 revised treaty,[631] although that was not when peace and security first became a sub-regional concern. Prior to 1993, the *1978 Non-aggression Protocol[632]* and the *1981 Mutual Assistance Protocol[633]* were about sub-regional security, albeit focusing on external aggression against member states and peaceful co-existence among member states.[634] These agreements paid little heed to intra-state insecurity or its sub-regional ramification, unlike the 1993 revised treaty and subsequent protocols of the organization. In particular, the protocol relating to the *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security* focuses on intra-state peace and security.[635] Indeed, the whole idea of an elaborate peace and security mechanism was based on the notion that economic prosperity through integration is contingent on inter and intra-state peace and security.[636] Although peace and security is a later addition to the ECOWAS agenda, its inclusion shows that member states see insecurity as a common problem that required an expansion of the factors that unite them. It is particularly so that conflicts and insecurity were on the rise from the late 1980s. For instance, from 1989, the sub-region faced security-related crises such as civil wars, which threatened to undermine its political and economic stability.[637] Specifically, between 1989 and 2011, the sub-region faced four main civil wars: the Liberian civil wars of 1989-1996 and 1999-2003;

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[630] E. Lavallée and J. Lochard, 'Independence and Trade: New Evidence from French Colonial Trade Data', *ETSG 2012 Fourteenth Annual Conference.* 2012).

[631] ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Revised Treaty* (Abuja: ECOWAS Commission, 1993).

[632] United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Cooperating for Peace in West Africa: An Agenda for the 21st Century* (Geneva: United Nations Publications UNIDIR, 2001).

[633] ECOWAS, 'Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence'. (1981).

[634] S. O. Odobo et al., 'Analysis of ECOWAS Institutional Framework for Conflict Management'. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences,* 8, 6, (2017), 143.

[635] ECOWAS, 'Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security'. *A/Sp1/12/01,* (2001).

[636] A. Banjo, 'The ECOWAS Court and the Politics of Access to Justice in West Africa'. *Africa Development,* 32, 1, (2007), 69–87. p.72

[637] J. Ipe et al., *Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in West Africa*Global Center on Cooperative Security., 2010).

the Sierra Leonean civil war 1991-2002; the Guinea-Bissau civil conflict of 1998; and the Ivory Coast civil wars of 2002-2007 and 2010-2011.[638]

The above cases of insecurity in the sub-region and many more, including increasing terrorist attacks,[639] are attributable to the poverty of the sub-region. This claim is supported by Ipe et al., who argue that '…in few places in the world is this connection between development and security clearer than in West Africa.'[640] This conclusion is substantiated by taking into consideration the fact that unemployment and by implication poverty could be an inducement to enrolment to terrorist organisations, which pose the biggest transnational security challenge to the sub-region.[641] Besides, poverty inhibits democratization and by implication, is a recipe for instability. This is explained by the fact that West African sub-regional conflicts often take the form of post-election disputes and the rise of military juntas.[642] All of these are attributable to weakness or lack of democracy, which in turn can be attributed to the poverty of the sub-region. This conclusion is supported by empirical research findings to the effect that in the 1980s, democratization was impeded by high levels of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, of which West Africa is part.[643]

Whilst Michael Bratton disputes the universal applicability of this finding, he concedes that in recent times the evidence regarding Africa - and for the purpose of this thesis, West Africa - supports the finding that socio-economic well-being is a precondition of effective democracy.[644] He bases his views on Afro-barometer data on lived poverty among African states and his study of citizens' democratic values, attitudes

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[638] D. D. Zounmenou and R. S. Loua, 'Confronting Complex Political Crises in West Africa: An Analysis of ECOWAS Responses to Niger and Côte D'Ivoire'. *Institute for Security Studies Papers,* 2011, 230, (2011), 20. p.2

[639] O. O. Akanji, 'Sub-Regional Security Challenge: ECOWAS and the War on Terrorism in West Africa'. *Insight on Africa,* 11, 1, (2019), 94-112.

[640] J. Ipe et al., *Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in West Africa*Global Center on Cooperative Security., 2010). p.5

[641] B. Maiangwa, 'Jihadism in West Africa: Adopting a Three-Dimensional Approach to Counterterrorism'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development,* 9, 3, (2014), 17-32.; K. A. Annan and N. Mousavizadeh, *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace* (New York: Penguin, 2013).; Ipe et al., *Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in West Africa*

[642] Some examples include, Mali in 2012 (coup), The Gambia in 2016-2017 (electoral dispute), Burkina Faso in 2015 inter alia.

[643] S. P. Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave'. *Journal of Democracy,* 2, 2, (1991), 12-34.

[644] M. Bratton'Poor People and Democratic Citizenship in Africa', in A. Krishna(ed.), *participation, and democracy: A global perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2008), 28-64.

and behaviours. He found that the poorer the people, the less tolerant they were politically. He was also found that, without exception, those at high lived poverty levels were less demanding of democracy and its benefits.[645] Bratton's findings help explain the sub-region's challenges regarding effective democratic governance and its susceptibility to conflicts and terrorism. This gives ECOWAS an identity as a region because of members' common exposure to security challenges and the necessity for collective efforts to counter it through an emergent sense of West African regionness.

7.2.2.3   West African conflicts/insecurity vis-à-vis colonialism/neo-colonialism

This sub-section addresses the third cohesive factor on West African regionness, showing that sub-regional conflicts/insecurity is, partly attributable to colonialism/neo-colonialism. Moreover, recognition of this, and of the fact that the impact of colonialism/neo-colonialism extended beyond economics, served as one of the reasons for the formation of ECOWAS.[646] A case in point regarding the impact of colonial legacy and intra-state conflicts is Nigeria. Some scholars have attributed its internal conflicts largely to the impact of colonial rule. This is particularly so in its northern part of the country, where some scholars have traced the genesis of the conflict to the British application of a system of rule that was suitable for the mainly Muslim majority, but disliked by non-Muslims. A typical example is the introduction of the native court ordinance, which was acceptable only to the Muslims. This is because it was largely built on their pre-existing judicial structures, as part of the British indirect rule approach, which was resented by other religious groups.[647]

Scholars such as Ogbonnaya et al. have rightly cautioned against attributing Nigeria's internal disputes solely to its colonial past.[648] But it nevertheless remains a significant factor, for whereas pre-colonial era communities were arranged on a

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[645] Bratton'Poor People and Democratic Citizenship in Africa', , 28-64.
[646] J. Haacke and P. D. Williams, 'Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges: A Comparative Analysis'. *Crisis States Working Papers,* 2, (2009).
[647] D. N. Smith, 'Native Courts of Northern Nigeria: Techniques for Institutional Development'. *BUL Rev.,* 48, (1968), 49-82.; D. T. Alabi, 'Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria: A Critical Analysis'. *India Quarterly,* 58, 3-4, (2002), 273-302.; A. M. Yakubu'The Demise of Indirect Rule in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria', Anonymous *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa*Springer, 1993), 162-190.
[648] U. M. Ogbonnaya et al., 'Terrorism in Nigeria: Implications of Boko Haram's Movement for Security and Stability in the ECOWAS Sub-Region'. *African Security Review,* 23, 2, (2014), 145-160.

compatibility basis, with settlements and governance based on kingdoms of larger ethnic groups and culturally compatible smaller groups, this was not the case with colonial state demarcations. For instance, colonial demarcations of West African and indeed African states gave little or no consideration to the diversity of sub-region. In this regard, Nicholas Okai argues that 'Most of these borders were poorly carved, without recourse to history and the socio-political realities of those living on the continent.'[649] He further argues that this has brought about a situation where '… what is currently being flagged geographically as a state, in most cases does not comprehensively represent the cultural aspirations and the common identity that citizens would like to be associated with.'[650] This offers an explanation of tensions within West African states, sometimes manifested in religious, ethnic and political conflicts and in some cases leading to secession attempts.[651]

The preceding discussion identifies the interlinked factors around which West Africa's states cohere, and hence upon which its regionness is based, namely poverty, neo-colonial concerns, and peace and security. A post-independence over emphasis on national agendas by West African states, threatened to defeat the Pan-African agenda of continental unity, hopes for which faded further when independent states resorted to stronger ties with former colonial powers at the expense of forging regional links. But this development and its negative impact on West Africa's economic wellbeing later spurred the desire for West African collective engagement based on common concerns and through this grew a sense of sub-regional cohesion which serves as the basis for the regionness on which ECOWAS is based.

7.3 ECOWAS as an Actor

Having examined the regionness of ECOWAS, this section ascertains ECOWAS' actorness as a regional organization. This gives us an understanding of the extent to which ECOWAS has become an actor, based on its mandate to coordinate coherent cooperation

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[649] N. Okai'Introduction ', in M. Conteh, et al. (ed.), *Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An overview of regional experiences*, 2014), 8-11. p.9

[650] Okai'Introduction ', , 8-11 p.9; D. O. Chukwu and J. N. Onyekpe, 'Economic Integration: Does Modern West Africa Need any Historical Lessons?'. *Researchers World,* 5, 4, (2014), 188.

[651] Some examples include Nigeria with respect to the Biafra people; Ghana with respect to the western Togo land group, Ivory Coast on the issue of original citizens and new settlers inter alia.

and ownership of the sub-regional agenda. ECOWAS' actorness then serves as the basis upon which the overall argument of the thesis proceeds. This is so because establishing the degree of ECOWAS' actorness enables an assessment of the impact of France's counter-hegemony on ECOWAS as an actor in respect of the specific focus of this thesis (collective security coordination and cooperation under the auspices of ECOWAS). Actorness is defined in this thesis as an entity's *'ability to show what it stands for (identity) by putting into practice and demonstrating all three actorness criteria. (autonomy, recognition and capacity).'* This section will therefore test ECOWAS against all three actorness criteria in turns.

7.3.1 The Autonomy of ECOWAS

This sub-section proceeds to test ECOWAS' autonomy in line with the definition of this criterion in this thesis as *'the possession, by an entity, of administrative structures comprising executive, legislative and judicial arms with manifest supra-national power over its member states on decision making.'* Based on this definition, ECOWAS is tested to ascertain the extent to which it has a functioning and autonomous executive, legislature and judiciary.

It is shown in this sub-section that ECOWAS has over the years built its institutional structures for sector specific objectives. The organisation, thus, has the structures to act on policy formulation and decision making with autonomy. One of the reasons for the revision of the ECOWAS treaty in 1993 was the realization that having a viable organisation in ECOWAS would require member states ceding some sovereignty to it. Hitherto, decision and policy making had rested largely on the Authority of Heads of States and Government, which left the then ECOWAS secretariat, now commission, with just the role of execution.[652] As part of empowering the administrative organs of ECOWAS to make them more autonomous, a committee of eminent citizens of the sub-region was set up to look into the challenges of the organisation.[653] The recommendation of that committee was that ECOWAS be made a supra-national body.[654] This was

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[652] J. Vanheukelom, 'ECOWAS: Political Traction with Africa's Oldest Regional Organisation'. *ECDPM Policy Brief,* (2017).

[653] K. O. Kufuor, *The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States* Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006).

[654] Kufuor, *The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States*

incorporated in the 1993 revised treaty.[655] ECOWAS' supra-nationality is thus seen in article 7 of the ECOWAS *protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*.[656] It states, 'Without prejudice to its wide-ranging powers as provided under Article 9 of the Treaty…the Authority hereby mandates the Mediation and Security Council to take, on its behalf, appropriate decisions for the implementation of the provisions of this Mechanism.[657]

To further cede some state level powers to ECOWAS, member states agreed to the formation of new community institutions with supra-national powers.[658] The idea of supra-nationality was considered necessary in view of the roles that member states are expected to play to manifest the actorness of ECOWAS, such as implementing its policies at the national level.[659] In addition to the executive arm, the West African Community Parliament and Court were established as part of ECOWAS' governance structure, to broaden the scope of its mandate. This means it now comprises of the executive, legislative and judicial arms. It is important to indicate that this section will only outline the structures, their composition and powers, as a test of autonomy. A discussion of the policy directives from these structures and states' responses to them will follow, to test ECOWAS' recognition.

7.3.1.1   The Autonomy of the Executive

The Authority of Head of States and Government (AHSG) sits at the top of the hierarchy of ECOWAS' governance structure and constitute the executive. It is headed by a yearly, alternating leadership of the Heads of States of member countries.[660] The country presiding at a given time also enjoys the privilege of its foreign minister chairing a sub-structure of the executive arm known as the Council of Ministers. In addition to

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[655] J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe and A. J. Osuntogun, 'The Quest for a Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can the Economic Community of West African States Attain the Status?'. *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad,* 16, 3, (2013), 254-291.
[656] ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security*Economic Community of West African States, 1999).
[657] ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security*
[658] ECOWAS *Treaty* . Available online: http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-law/treaties/ [Accessed 20/03/2019].
[659] C. Elowson and J. MacDermott, 'ECOWAS Capabilities in Peace and Security: A Scoping Study of Progress and Challenges'. (2010).
[660] ECOWAS *Governance Structure* . Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/governance-structure/ [Accessed 20/06/2019].

these structures, with direct government officials of member states, there is also the ECOWAS Commission, which is the embodiment of the organization's autonomous structures. The Commission is headed by a President who is appointed by the Authority for a four-year, non-renewable term. The President of the Commission is supported by a vice President and thirteen commissioners.[661] The establishment of the ECOWAS Commission in 2007 was designed to provide 'greater functionality in accordance with global best practices.'[662] Under the executive arm, the Commission comprises several autonomous institutions that are headed by experts in different fields, who usually meet ahead of meetings of the AHSG, having undertaken background work and formulated policy initiatives.[663]

Alimu Diallo, an official at the ECOWAS Commission, in a fieldwork interview, detailed the decision-making procedure at the executive arm of ECOWAS on peace and security issues. According to Diallo, the Mediation and Security Council plays a key role in decision-making at the executive level. It operates at two levels, the ambassadorial and ministerial levels, which both fall under the bigger Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security which is headed by a commissioner. He explained that the ambassadorial level usually meets first in partnership with the Commission, noting that, it is at this stage that Peace and Security issues are deliberated. It is through these deliberations that memoranda are developed. These are then forwarded to the ministerial level, which meets and finalises the agenda for the summit of Heads of States and Government for endorsement.[664] This is in contrast to the period before ECOWAS established the Commission. For instance, prior to 2007, the AHSG was, as stated in the 1993 ECOWAS revised treaty, article 7, clause 3(a), responsible for determining the policies of the organisation as well as offering key guidelines of the Community. Under 3(b), they oversaw the functioning of all ECOWAS institutions and monitor policy implementation.[665]

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[661] ECOWAS *Governance Structure* .

[662] ECOWAS *ECOWAS Commission.* Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/institutions/ecowas-commission/ [Accessed 20/06/2019].para.1

[663] D. Omisakin and A. Olusegun, 'Regional Institutions and Policy Formulation Processes'. *WAI-ZEI Paper,* 1, (2013).

[664] Interview with Alimou Diallo

[665] ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Revised Treaty* (Abuja: ECOWAS Commission, 1993).p.8

Proceeding from the summary of the decision-making process in ECOWAS and taking into consideration the reduced role of the AHSG, the ECOWAS structures can be regarded as functioning and largely autonomous. The executive arm remains a combination of sub-regional civil servants, such as the commissioners, and member states' representatives at the ambassadorial and ministerial levels. This might suggest a lack of institutional autonomy from member states. However, given the powers given to the commissioners in the revised treaty to make policies, or at least make suggestions for deliberation, whatever is eventually agreed upon would have emanated from the decision-making structures of ECOWAS. It is important to stress that even where policy suggestions come from state representatives and are eventually carried through, they can still be said to have come from an autonomous ECOWAS executive structure, given that policies go through the organisation's decision-making process and are not decided by a single state and imposed on the organisation or sub-region. This was corroborated in a field interview with James Agalga, who argued that decisions are not taken by individual states but collectively through the ECOWAS structures and that once those decisions are taken, they become binding on member states.[666] Similarly, Antwi-Danso also argued in a field interview that ECOWAS has effective and autonomous structures. He cited the executive's peace and security initiatives and their independent collaborations with national security agencies as evidence of this.[667]

This section has shown the presence of an executive arm of ECOWAS with functioning decision and policy-making powers. It has shown that although decision-making is not completely devoid of member states' participation, the setting of agendas by the ECOWAS Commission makes it largely autonomous. Crucially, the structural arrangements make it difficult for a single state to impose its will arbitrarily on ECOWAS or its members; decisions and policies must pass through the institutions of ECOWAS, thus making the organisation an actor with respect to the autonomy criterion. The extent to which the executive arm has lived up to expectation is discussed in section 7.3.2.1.1.

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[666] Interview with James Agalga
[667] Interview with Antwi-Danso

7.3.1.2 The Autonomy of the Legislature

The idea of the ECOWAS parliament was first mooted in 1994 but came into effect in 2000, with its first session the following year.[668] The composition of the parliament at present is as follows:

> The Parliament consists of 115 seats. Each of the 15 Member State has five seats at least. The remaining seats are shared in proportion to the population. As a result, Nigeria has 35 seats, Ghana 8, Côte d'Ivoire 7, while Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal have 6 seats each. Other countries: Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo have 5 seats each.[669]

Parliaments are often considered the heartbeat of democratic institutions such as ECOWAS,[670] given that they make laws and it is these laws that define the identity of an entity. The attribution of these reasons to the establishment of the parliament is evident in the supplementary protocol on the Community Parliament's establishment, of which article 4(2) reads: 'The powers of the ECOWAS Parliament shall be progressively enhanced from advisory to co-/decision making and subsequently to a law-making role in areas to be defined by the Authority.'[671] Accordingly, a subsequent supplementary protocol in 2016 enhanced the powers of the ECOWAS parliament. For instance, article 9 of the protocol makes the referral of certain issues, such as the ECOWAS budget, amendment to treaties and yearly audit reports to parliament, mandatory. However, issues such as sanctioning power, admission of members, and defence, peace and security are not to be mandatorily referred to the ECOWAS parliament, though this can be done voluntarily. Parliamentary decisions are non-binding, except in relation to issues of

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[668] T. Musavengana, 'The Proposed SADC Parliament: Old Wine in New Bottles Or an Ideal Whose Time has Come?'. *Institute for Security Studies Monographs,* 2011, 181, (2011), 92.

[669] E. U. Kizito and U. N. Patrick, 'The Role of Parliament on Economic Integration in Africa: Evidence from ECOWAS Parliament'. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 4, (2012), 1-10. p.2

[670] S. M. Saiegh, 'The Role of Legislatures in the Policymaking Process', *trabajo preparado para Inter-American Development Bank Workshop on State Reform, Public Policies, and Policymaking Processes.* 2005).

[671] ECOWAS *Supplementary Protocol A/SP.3/06/06 Amending Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the Community Parliament.* Available online: http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/Supplementary%20Protocol%20Amending%20the%20Protocol%20Relating%20to%20the%20Community%20Parliament.pdf [Accessed 17/05/2019].

review of ECOWAS treaties and acts and human rights protection, on which its opinion is binding according to Articles 11 and 12 respectively.[672]

What is clear is that the ECOWAS parliament is currently limited in terms of legislative power. For instance, it currently draws its members from parliamentarians of member states, pending such a time that universal adult suffrage is put in place.[673] Consequently, as Kizito and Patrick argue, the ECOWAS parliament is essentially a step toward an ECOWAS of people through representation, but at present it is only an avenue for dialogue and seeking of advice on regional integration.[674] This position was confirmed by John Tia Akolgo, a former ECOWAS member of parliament, in a field interview. He noted that the legislative arm of ECOWAS is not yet a law making institution, but mainly an advisory organ.[675] What is crucially lacking at present is the ability of the legislative arm to exercise binding oversight over the executive and to make binding laws for the judiciary to interpret.[676] However, despite this limitation, by its presence and more importantly, the fact that it provides a legal avenue for deliberation on issues, with some degree of enhanced power, the parliament adds to the autonomy of ECOWAS from an institutional perspective.

The sub-section has examined the presence of the legislative arm and its role in the wider ECOWAS structure. It is pointed out that the ECOWAS parliament at present is advisory, without binding law-making power. The sub-section, however, concludes that the ECOWAS parliament remains a significant part of ECOWAS' actorness by its mere presence, but more importantly because of the advice it gives to the executive. The extent to which the legislative has lived up to expectation is discussed in section 7.3.2.1.2.

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[672] ECOWAS *Supplementary Act A/SA 1/12/16 Relating to the Enhancement of the Powers of the ECOWAS Parliament.* Available online:
http://file:///C:/Users/IBRAHIM%20AMOBIRE/Downloads/ENG-Supplementary-Act-on-Enhancement-Parliament-Feb-2017.pdf [Accessed 10/07/2019].
[673] ECOWAS *Governance Structure.*
[674] Kizito and Patrick, 'The Role of Parliament on Economic Integration in Africa: Evidence from ECOWAS Parliament'. , 1-10
[675] Interview with John Tia Akologo
[676] L. Bore and F. Henkel, *Disturbing a Cosy Balance?: The ECOWAS Parliament's Rock Road to Co-Decision*Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Africa Department, 2015).

7.3.1.3 The Autonomy of the Judiciary

This section examines the judicial arm of ECOWAS, the ECOWAS Community Court. The idea of the court is not new, as it was contained in the 1975 maiden treaty. The treaty created what was termed as a tribunal with the responsibility of settling disputes between member states. This has evolved over time with the adoption of the 1991 protocol that established the Community Court of Justice.[677] However, the court did not come into force until after the 1993 revised treaty. Even then, the court operated for the first ten years largely as it had previously, concerning itself mainly with disputes between member states and ECOWAS. [678] The coming into force of the 2005 supplementary protocol expanded the scope of the court. For the first time, individuals citizens of ECOWAS states were granted permission to access the court for justice relating to human rights, as contained in article 4(d).[679] It is also important to stress that the initial restriction mainly requiring citizens of member states to exhaust local remedies before resorting to the court,[680] no longer applies.[681] It is based on this that Bappah Yaya indicated that, as of 2004, ECOWAS was the only REC in Africa that had given its Community Court a regional stance, with the role of an arbiter between its citizens and member states, even before they exhaust national remedies.[682]

The core mandate of the court is to offer interpretations of sub-regional laws, conventions and protocols.[683] The court comprises five Justices, who are appointed by the AHSG upon recommendation from the Judicial Council. As part of owning the institutions, the Justices must be West African citizens. They must be qualified as

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[677] ECOWAS, 'Protocol A/P1/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice. '. (1991).
[678] E. Ojomo, 'Competing Competences in Adjudication: Reviewing the Relationship between the ECOWAS Court and National Courts'. *African Journal of Legal Studies,* 7, 1, (2014), 87-122.
[679] ECOWAS, 'Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending the Preamble and Articles 1. 2. 9. 22 and 30 of
Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 4. Paragraph 1 of
the English Version of the Said Protocol. '. (2005).
[680] ECOWAS, 'Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good
Governance, Supplementary to the Protocol
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and
Security. '. (2001). p.20
[681] ECOWAS, 'Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/06/06 Amending the Revised ECOWAS Treaty'. (2006b).
[682] B. H. Yaya, 'ECOWAS and the Promotion of Democratic Governance in West Africa'. *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy,* 2, 1, (2014), 85-102.
[683] ECOWAS *Governance Structure* . Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/governance-structure/ [Accessed 20/06/2019].

Supreme Court judges or have expertise in a specific area of international law, especially on regional integration. Crucially, the judges are accorded a great deal of power to be independent of member states in their work. For instance, 'The Judges cannot be constrained in the exercise of their functions by any Member State or Institution of ECOWAS. In addition, they cannot be subject to injunction by stakeholders of the Community…'[684] This shows the supra-nationality of ECOWAS, given that citizens of member states have an avenue in ECOWAS to seek justice when they feel they are being denied it at home, particularly as member states are compelled by law to obey the rulings of the Community Court.

It can, therefore, be concluded that the ECOWAS Court adds to the organisation's institutional autonomy. This is supported by the supra-national powers that it wields as an arbiter in disputes between states and their citizens; between states etc. The extent to which the ECOWAS court has lived up to expectation is discussed in section 7.3.2.1.3.

In line with the definition of autonomy in this thesis, it is concluded that ECOWAS has all the arms of governance needed for actorness. It is shown that they have the legal backing to be autonomous and to act as supra-national organs, with the exception of the legislative arm, which currently remains advisory in nature.

7.3.2 Recognition of ECOWAS

Recognition as a criterion of actorness was discussed at length in Chapter Six and defined as: '*an entity that is considered legitimate by both its member states and actors outside of its domain manifested by willingness of member states to adhere to the entity's policy 'dictates' and external actors' willingness to collaborate with it.*' This is tested in this sub-section relative to ECOWAS. This sub-section proceeds on the premise that while autonomy is about the independence of institutional structures, recognition is about the attitude of member states and non-member actors to the mandates of the institutions relative to their responses to the organization's policies and decisions. The former is examined by subjecting to scrutiny ECOWAS member states' responses and attitude to selected key sub-regional protocols emanating mainly from the administrative organs.

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684 ECOWAS *Membership of the Court: Composition.* Available online:
http://prod.courtecowas.org/members-of-the-court/ [Accessed 10/08/2019].para.2

The latter is examined by assessing how much ECOWAS is recognised by extra-regional actors, mainly the AU and UN, specifically in terms of how they engage with ECOWAS on both sub-regional and global concerns.

7.3.2.1 Member States' Recognition

In line with the principal agent theory which requires an entity to takes decisions and act on behalf of its members,[685] it is argued that ECOWAS' member states relate to the ECOWAS Commission on a principal-agent basis, whereby member states (principals) have granted discretionary power to the ECOWAS Commission (agent) to act. This arrangement in itself constitutes member state recognition of ECOWAS, as do member states' attitudes and responses to 'dictates' from the organisation's various administrative arms.

7.3.2.1.1 Member State Recognition of the Executive

This sub-section looks at selected policy directives of the executive arm and how much these have resonated with the member states. The first part will focus on security policies and the second part will focus on economic policies.

One case in point from the security perspective is the 2006 *ECOWAS convention on small arms and light weapons, their ammunitions and other related materials.*[686] This is operational in member states and the Commission has been acting on the mandate given to it by member states for the success of the sub-region's agenda of controlling small arms proliferation. Since the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) was put in place, the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security has facilitated the establishment of affiliate offices in all member states. It has also built the capacities of member states with support from international partners for effective implementation of ECOSAP.[687] The Commission has also held regular meetings with member states and monitored progress and challenges for appropriate support.[688] This collaboration between

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[685] See Chapter Six (section 6.3.2)

[686] ECOWAS, 'ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons their Ammunition and Other Related Materials '. (2006a).

[687] L. Darkwa, *The Challenge of Sub-Regional Security in West Africa: The Case of the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons*Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2011).

[688] C. P. Agnekethom, 'Political and Institutional Dynamics of the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa', *Disarmament Forum, The complex dynamics of small arms in West Africa.* 13-192008). p.15

ECOWAS and its member states shows recognition of the administrative structures, given that it is a policy from the Commission and accepted by member states for the collective good of the sub-region's peace and security.

A further example of ECOWAS' recognition is the *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*, a security-related protocol that functions as a supplement to the *Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*.[689] As a result of the former, the ECOWAS Commission in 2001, took a position of zero tolerance against military rule and associated human rights abuses. This was aimed at a constitutional convergence of member states based on the principle of democracy and good governance.[690] The sustained and improving democratization of the sub-region, with measures to deter deviation, demonstrates the impact of this directive and hence supports the argument that ECOWAS is recognised by member states as an instrument of sub-regional supra-nationality. The executive arm now possesses the authority to act in defence of democratic governance, with the ability to pass the necessary protocols and, where necessary, to act to restore democracy through legitimate coercive power. Accordingly, ECOWAS has suspended some member states for offences such as military overthrow of democratically elected governments, manifesting the recognition of the executive arm.[691] It is for this reason and an attestation to recognition of the executive arm that Bah et al. argues:

> West Africa, perhaps more than any other region, has one of the most robust and proactive decision-making organs, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC)…It has taken very intrusive and binding decisions including the deployment of peace operations to Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia in 2003, and has suspended several of its members from its Council for failing to comply with its norms.[692]

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[689] ECOWAS, 'Protocol A/P.1/12/99 Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. Management Resolution. Peace-Keeping and Security'. (1999).

[690] H. Born and O. Uzoechina, *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians* (Nigeria: Single Vision Limited, 2010).

[691] A. S. Bah et al., *The African Peace and Security Architecture: A Handbook* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014). p.43; African Union, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)* African Union,[2010]).; B. H. Yaya, 'ECOWAS and the Promotion of Democratic Governance in West Africa'. *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy,* 2, 1, (2014), 85-102.

[692] Bah et al., *The African Peace and Security Architecture: A Handbook* p.43

Indeed, ECOWAS has always been accorded legitimacy by its member states during military interventions, even when these have not been based on unanimity. Where dissent over initial deployment has arisen it is, as Marco Wyss argues, often a consequence of concerns over factors which do not relate to ECOWAS legitimacy, such as '…the nature of an individual crisis, as well as the political, strategic, and economic interests of…member states.'[693] One typical example is the case of the Liberian intervention to which some member states, mainly the Francophone members, objected. Nevertheless, the intervention went ahead under ECOWAS auspices, with initial dissenters later joining the mission.[694] This brings to question, cohesion as a component of recognition among ECOWAS member states. However, it does not take away the recognition of the executive arm, given that in an institution that is based on democratic principles, some member states may have dissenting views on an issue. Besides, some may also genuinely fail to comply on an issue due to lack of capacity. This does not mean lack of recognition, since the legitimacy of ECOWAS structures is not questioned. Member states' recognition thus stems from the fact that whenever it takes a decision on a breach of its core values, even in the face of opposition from some member states, those in support always act under the auspices of ECOWAS.

Apart from the recognition of ECOWAS in the areas of politics and security, it is also recognised by member states as an economic actor, striving for economic integration. The ECOWAS organisation has recently been making efforts through the Department of Industry and Private Sector Promotion to increase intra-regional trade from its current rate of less than 12% to 40% by the year 2030. This is an initiative of the ECOWAS Commission intended to be achieved through the West Africa Common Industry Policy (WACIP)[695] and is backed by member states, providing further evidence of recognition of ECOWAS. For instance, sector ministers of member states have resolved to promote the policy and to make it a means through which the sub-region can accelerate

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[693] M. Wyss, 'France and the Economic Community of West African States: Peacekeeping Partnership in Theory and Practice'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 35, 4, (2017), 487-505. p.495

[694] C. Tuck, 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia'. *African Studies Quarterly,* 4, 1, (2000), 1-16.

[695] E. Von Uexkull'Regional Trade and Employment in ECOWAS', in D. Lippoldt(ed.), *Policy Priorities for International Trade and Jobs* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012). p.416

industrialization.[696] This is only one of the latest sub-regional attempts at economic integration, which is built on a global trend that is moving towards trade integration regionally.[697] It is policies like this that led Jakob Engel and Marie-Agnès Jouanjean to argue that ECOWAS has some comprehensive trade policies that aim at bringing about coordination and boosting trade integration among its member states. They cited the idea of common tariffs which facilitate trade in the sub-region.[698] Similarly, Kwesi Aning, in a field interview, attested to ECOWAS' actorness in relation to trade, citing as an example the policy of free movement of goods and persons in the sub-region.[699]

One of the major ECOWAS initiatives in relation to sub-regional economic prosperity is the free movement of goods, services and persons. This can be found in article 2(1) of the 1979 protocol that gave legal basis to the idea. It states, 'The community citizens have the right to enter, reside, and establish in the territory of member states.'[700] The policy was set to be achieved in three main phases within a period of 15 years: firstly, the right of free entry and the abolition of visas; secondly, the right to residence and finally, the right to establishment.[701] Article 3 (2) of the protocol, which requires the abolition of visas and entry permits has been implemented by all member states, according to data obtained from the ECOWAS Silver Jubilee Anniversary achievements.[702] It is important to indicate, however, that there are challenges to the implementation of these policies at the national level as it is only partially implemented. Maj Gen O. B. Akwa acknowledges these challenges, yet argues that despite the

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[696] ECOWAS *ECOWAS Ministers Back Quick Implementation of West Africa Common Industrial Policy*. Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-ministers-back-quick-implementation-of-west-africa-common-industrial-policy/ [Accessed 12/11/2017].
[697] Von Uexkull'Regional Trade and Employment in ECOWAS',
[698] J. Engel and M. Jouanjean, 'Barriers to Trade in Food Staples in West Africa: An Analytical Review'. *Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London,* (2013). p.3
[699] Interview with Kwasi Aning
[700] ECOWAS, 'Protocol A/P1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons Residence and Establishment. '. (1979). p.4
[701] ECOWAS, 'Protocol A/P1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons Residence and Establishment. '. ; P. Apiko and F. Aggad, 'Analysis of the Implementation of the African Union's 0.2% Levy: Progress and Challenges'. *Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management (= Briefing Note,* 98, (2017).
[702] A. W. Butu, 'Impact of ECOWAS Protocols on Political and Economic Integration of the West African Sub-Region'. *International Journal of Physical and Human Geography,* 1, 2, (2013), 47-58. p.51-2

challenges, the visa abolition is an achievement in itself and a manifestation of ECOWAS' supra-nationality.[703]

With reference to the definition of recognition given in this thesis, it is concluded that overall, ECOWAS is recognised as an actor from both political/security and economic perspectives by its member states, as manifested by its ability to introduce protocols and policies that are largely accepted by them. Some cases in point are the protocol on democracy and the free movement of goods and services.

7.3.2.1.2 Member States' Recognition of the Legislature

As discussed in section 7.3.1.2, the ECOWAS Parliament remains largely an advisory body, although there are plans to further enhance the power of the legislature. Notwithstanding the apparent weakness of the institution at present, it can be said to have recognition from member states on two grounds: firstly, the contributions to the parliament's membership by ECOWAS member states from their respective National Parliaments attests to its recognition. Secondly, the parliament's current mandate to give advice when consulted, some of which is on a mandatory basis, also implies recognition amongst member states. The parliament is thus able to influence policy-making at the Commission level, offering opinions and advice, as its mandate allows it, and suggesting changes to documents referred to it,[704] often at the request of the ECOWAS Commission itself.[705] More importantly, acting on its own initiative, the parliament has often offered advice to the Authority on key security and political issues of the sub-region.[706]

It is concluded in this sub-section that the legislature is the weakest of the three arms. Its work, relative to what Parliaments do, which is law-making, is limited at present.

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[703] WANEP, 'ECOWAS at 40 – Achievements and Challenges - Statement by Maj Gen OB Akwa, Commandant KAIPTC (18 may 2015). '. (2015).; A. Adepoju et al., 'Promoting Integration through Mobility: Free Movement Under ECOWAS'. *Refugee Survey Quarterly,* 29, 3, (2010), 120-144.
[704] ECOWAS *Supplementary Act A/SA 1/12/16 Relating to the Enhancement of the Powers of the ECOWAS Parliament.*
[705] ECOWAS *Annual Report (2010).* Available online: https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Annual_report2010_last-version-ENGLISH-VF.pdf [Accessed 05/02/2019]. p.110
[706] ECOWAS *Annual Report (2010).* p.109

However, it is a recognised institution in the governance of the sub-region as an advisory body and with future plans for enhancement.

7.3.2.1.3   Member State Recognition of the Judiciary

In terms of recognition it is important to indicate that the Court has largely lived up to expectation in terms of defending human rights in the sub-region, especially when citizens have brought cases before it.[707] Several rulings have been made against member states in favour of citizens on issues of human rights. According to Alter et al., the Court has become most active, manifesting boldness in its adjudications on human rights.[708] For instance, as recently as 28th June 2019, the Court found the Republic of Senegal guilty of violating the human rights of one Sunday Charles Ugwuaba relative to the sub-region's free movement of goods and persons.[709] Similarly, on the 13th March, 2018, the Court delivered a landmark judgement in which it found that four Gambian journalists had had their rights violated by the authority of Gambia. The Court's judgement averred that some of the national laws of Gambia still criminalise free speech and must be repealed immediately, since in the view of the Court they contravene ECOWAS' revised treaty.[710] A further example showing the Court's supra-nationality and, for that matter, its recognition, was in 2017 when the Court, in a ruling on a case brought against Nigeria, ordered Abuja to pay N88 billion or $244 million in compensation to victims of its civil war which took place four decades ago.[711]

Rulings of the Court, as indicated above are binding on ECOWAS member states and as such they are obliged to comply with them. However, since recognition, as defined above, is largely willingness to accept the body's 'dictates', this must be demonstrated to

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[707] K. J. Alter et al., 'A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice'. *American Journal of International Law,* 107, 4, (2013), 737-779.
[708] Alter et al., 'A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice'. , 737-779 p.737
[709] ECOWAS court *Sunday Charles Ugwuaba Vrs Republic of Senegal (JUDGEMENT no ECW/CCJ/JUD/25/19).* Available online: http://prod.courtecowas.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/JUD-ECW-CCJ-JUD-25-19.pdf [Accessed 11/07/2020]. p.26
[710] ECOWAS court *Federation of African Journalists & 4 Vrs VS the Republic of the Gambia (ECW/CCJ/JUD/04/18).* Available online: http://prod.courtecowas.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ECW_CCJ_JUD_04_18.pdf [Accessed 10/10/2019]. p.6
[711] S. Opejobi *Biafra: ECOWAS Court Orders Nigerian Govt to Pay N88bn to Civil War Victims.* Available online: https://dailypost.ng/2017/10/30/biafra-ecowas-court-orders-nigerian-govt-pay-n88bn-civil-war-victims/ [Accessed 20/09/2019].

show the recognition of the ECOWAS court. To do so reference is made first to the case won against the Nigerian state. The government accepted the ruling of the Court as the *Premium Times* reported: 'About 47 years after the Nigeria civil war ended on 'No victor, no vanquish' terms, the federal government on Monday agreed to pay victims of the war N88 billion compensation for their losses.'[712] The Gambia, on the other hand, in responding to the ruling on its human rights violation waged a campaign for the curbing of the powers of the Court. Member states and non-state actors in the sub-region and beyond, however, rejected the call,[713] showing a much broader recognition of the Court.

However, there remain concerns regarding timely enforcement of rulings of the court by member states, especially when the rulings go against them. Nigeria is no exception in this regard.[714] The court has described this as one of its major challenges, given that, though its rulings can only be suspended by the Court itself, the power to punish disregard of any of the organization's obligations lies with the AHSG under article 77 of the ECOWAS revised treaty.[715] Nevertheless, the reluctance on the part of member states does not reduce the functioning and recognition of the Court for two main reasons: first, member states' participation in its legal proceedings is an attestation of recognition. Secondly, regardless of any delay in enforcement of a judgement, the state involved is still liable and considered guilty of the offence, both within the sub-region and beyond. Accordingly, it must eventually comply, based on states' prior acceptance of the binding status of the court's rulings.

In line with the definition of recognition in this thesis, the preceding three sub-sections have demonstrated that ECOWAS is recognised by its member states as an autonomous actor with supra-national powers. The next section will substantiate the external recognition of ECOWAS as an actor.

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[712] Premium Times *47 Years After Biafra Civil War, Nigerian Govt Agrees to Pay Victims N88 Billion.* Available online: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/247731-47-years-biafra-civil-war-nigerian-govt-agrees-pay-victims-n88-billion.html [Accessed 10/08/2019]. para.1
[713] K. J. Alter et al., 'A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice'. *American Journal of International Law,* 107, 4, (2013), 737-779. p.762
[714] M. Adigun, 'Enforcing ECOWAS Judgments in Nigeria through the Common Law Rule on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments'. *Journal of Private International Law,* 15, 1, (2019), 130-161.
[715] ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Revised Treaty* (Abuja: ECOWAS Commission, 1993).

7.3.2.2 Recognition of ECOWAS by external entities

Having established member states' recognition of ECOWAS as an actor, it is important also to look at its recognition externally. ECOWAS needs the recognition and engagement of international actors with respect to its mandate of regional integration. The focus of this section will be on intergovernmental external entities, namely the AU and UN, on the basis that recognition of ECOWAS by these entities can be seen to be indicative of similar recognition of ECOWAS by their respective memberships. Applying the definition of recognition, the following sub-sections will demonstrate that both the AU and the UN recognise ECOWAS and the legitimacy of its decisions, policies, and practices.

7.3.2.2.1 The African Union's recognition of ECOWAS

The African Union (AU) is the premier intergovernmental body on the African continent, having all African states as members. The AU's mandate, like that of ECOWAS, also covers economic and security integration. It is from these mandates of the AU that RECs of the continent derive their mandates. For instance, according to the AU, '…. RECs are closely integrated with the AU's work and serve as its building blocks.'[716] The implication is that the AU correlates with ECOWAS and ECOWAS operates in coordination with the AU. The AU's reference to RECs includes ECOWAS because, in 2006, the AU decided to suspend recognition of new RECs in Africa except eight, of which ECOWAS is one.[717]

The main areas through which ECOWAS engages with the AU are sub-regional and continental security. Just like ECOWAS, under the AU structure there exists a permanent decision-making organ for the purpose of conflict prevention, management

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[716] AU *Regional Economic Communities (RECs).* Available online: https://au.int/en/organs/recs [Accessed 17/04/2020]. para.2

[717] AU *Assembly of the African Union Seventh Ordinary Session 1 – 2 July 2006 Banjul, the Gambia.* Available online: https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9555-assembly_au_dec_111-133_vii_e.pdf [Accessed 12/01/2020].; R. Frimpong Oppong, 'The African Union, the African Economic Community and Africa's Regional Economic Communities: Untangling a Complex Web'. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law,* 18, 1, (2010), 92-103.

and resolution, called the Council of Peace and Security.[718] In this regard the relationship between the AU Council and RECs is spelled out in article 16 (a) of the peace and security protocol. It states that there shall be efforts to '…harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union.'[719] The AU has therefore recognised RECs' initiatives on policies to the extent that ECOWAS is permitted to initiate measures at resolving any sub-regional problem before involving the AU.[720] The avenue for collaboration between ECOWAS and AU does not only mean recognition by the AU as an entity, but also its member states given that the latter constitute the former.

Despite this, collaboration between the AU and ECOWAS has not proved wholly successful. In an assessment study report of the African Peace and Security Architecture of the AU, cooperation between the two bodies is described as sporadic and ad hoc.[721] One instance of poor coordination was when the current President of Togo was put into office by the military after the death of his father. He was asked by ECOWAS to resign and organise elections. Even though the AU joined ECOWAS, imposing further sanctions on Togo,[722] there appeared to be some contradiction between the two entities after he resigned. Whereas ECOWAS lifted its sanctions immediately, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU imposed sanctions on Togo the same day.[723] However, this kind of discrepancy is not based on antagonism between the two entities, but instead can be attributed to poor harmonization of the activities of RECs and the AU. It does not,

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[718] AU *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.* Available online: https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37293-treaty-0024_-_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_and_security_council_of_the_african_union_e.pdf [Accessed 13/05/2017].; G. O. Yabi, 'The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict'. *FES Peace and Security Series, Abuja,* (2010).
[719] AU *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.* p.23
[720] AU, 'Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa'. *Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,* (2008).
[721] AU, 'African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study'. (2010). p.25
[722] NBC News *Mounting Pressure Prompts Togo President to Resign.* Available online: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7032769/ns/world_news/t/mounting-pressure-prompts-togo-president-resign/#.XwryeihKhPZ [Accessed 20/11/2019].
[723] K. Striebinger, 'Coordination between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities'. *Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),* (2016).

therefore, weaken the recognition of ECOWAS, given that the AU and ECOWAS have collaborated on sub-regional peace and security without problems and that they continue to do so. For instance, the report referred to above added that, as and when ECOWAS and the AU did collaborate, the outcomes have been positive. The report cited the common position taken by both bodies on Ivory Coast in 2006 on President Laurent Gbagbo's extension of his term of office, in which the two bodies spoke with one voice.[724] In order to resolve the political impasse of that country, ECOWAS, in collaboration with the AU, agreed to extend the expired tenure of the then President by a year to ensure that an agreed road map to resolving the impasse was fully implemented. [725] Previous positive outcomes notwithstanding, there is a need for better harmonisation between ECOWAS and the AU, so that they continue to speak with a one voice at the continental level in dealing with West African crisis situations. The harmonisation is particularly needed at the level of the UN, where both entities have observer status, and both address the organisation on issues relating to West Africa.[726]

With reference to the definition of recognition in this thesis, this sub-section has demonstrated that ECOWAS is recognised by the AU. It has accordingly been collaborating with it on issues concerning West Africa. The sub-section further concludes that whilst there are collaboration challenges, these do not indicate a lack of recognition of ECOWAS by the AU but rather practical limitations concerning policy coordination. Indeed, AU structures explicitly recognise RECs, including ECOWAS, and they have collaborated positively many times.

7.3.2.2.2   The United Nations' recognition of ECOWAS

The preceding section considered the extent to which ECOWAS is recognised by the AU and, by implication, by its member states. This section further argues in support of ECOWAS' actorness by showing that it is also recognised by the UN. The UN's recognition of ECOWAS stems from its recognition of the activities of regional entities,

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[724] AU, 'African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study'. p.25

[725] Relief Web *AU Extends Gbagbo's Tenure, Names Peace Mission to Côte D'Ivoire.* Available online: https://reliefweb.int/report/c%C3%B4te-divoire/au-extends-gbagbos-tenure-names-peace-mission-c%C3%B4te-divoire [Accessed 12/07/2020].

[726] T. Ajayi, *The UN, the AU and ECOWAS: A Triangle for Peace and Security in West Africa?* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Development Policy, 2008).

albeit subject to conditions set out in Article 52(1) on the UN Charter with which both the UN and ECOWAS must comply.[727] This provision requires all activities of regional entities be compliant with UN principles, including prioritising peaceful means of dispute resolution. Article 53(1) states: 'The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…'[728]

It is in the light of this that the UN engages with ECOWAS through nearly all major UN departments and agencies. Most importantly, however, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has accorded to ECOWAS the status of an observer at the Assembly from the 20th of September 2004, following a request by ECOWAS on the 15th of September 2004. The UN, in approving ECOWAS' status, stated that it desired stronger cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS.[729] Recognition of ECOWAS by the UN is seen in the fact that ECOWAS has since had a representative at the UN headquarters,[730] enabling ECOWAS to articulate its stance on international issues that reflects its interest. In a field interview with Brigadier General Emmanuel Kotia, he indicated that ECOWAS member states '…come together to take a common stance at the international level in the interest of the sub-region.'[731] A case in point is the ECOWAS group at the UN, which comprises all permanent representatives of ECOWAS member states at the UN, who often collaborate to take a common stance on issues relating to the sub-region.[732] In this respect, Ambassador Kpayedo of Togo, in taking over as chairman of this group in 2017, noted '…the group's collective action on the political situation in Guinea Bissau and the

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[727] R. J. Yalem, 'Regionalism and World Order'. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),* 38, 4, (1962), 460-471. p.461-2

[728] UN *Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements* . Available online: https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html [Accessed 28/08/2019].

[729] UNGA *Observer Status for the Economic Community of West African States in the General Assembly (A/RES/59/51).* Available online: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/59/51 [Accessed 17/02/2017].

[730] See: UN *Permanent Missions to the United Nations.* Available online: https://www.un.int/protocol/sites/www.un.int/files/Protocol%20and%20Liaison%20Service/bb305.pdf [Accessed 12/07/2020]. p.234

[731] Interview with Emmanuel Kotia

[732] AllAfrica *Liberia: Browne Wants Sub-Regional Cohesion at UN.* Available online: https://allafrica.com/stories/201708080608.html [Accessed 12/07/2020].

transversal threats of terrorism, maritime piracy, organized crimes, climate change and food security.'[733]

Crucial to the point of UN recognition of ECOWAS is the fact that not only is ECOWAS represented at the UN, but the UN also has representatives in West Africa by way of institutions and personnel that collaborate with ECOWAS. One example is the United Nations' Office for West Africa (UNOWA), now the United Nations' Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). The UN West African office serves as a vehicle through which ECOWAS engages more closely with the UN.[734] This is a further manifestation of recognition. One of the key mandates of UNOWAS is to engage and assist regional entities such as ECOWAS in the field of peace and security. It has accordingly collaborated with ECOWAS on its efforts at maintaining peace in the sub-region. As part of such collaboration, both UNOWAS and ECOWAS jointly visited The Gambia as part of a collaborative effort at sustaining peace in that country after an electoral dispute.[735]

With reference to the definition of recognition in this thesis, this sub-section concludes that the UN's wide range of engagement with ECOWAS shows ECOWAS' external recognition. Its recognition by the UN also means it is recognised by all the major global state powers such as those in the P5. This claim is backed by the UN's endorsements to ECOWAS' interventions such as the recent one in The Gambia.

In line with the definition of recognition in this thesis, it is concluded that both internally and externally, ECOWAS is recognised as an actor. This conclusion is based on the fact that the structures of ECOWAS have the legitimacy to act on behalf of member

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[733] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Liberia) *Continue to Work Together,' Ambassador Brown Urges ECOWAS States.* Available online: http://mofa.gov.lr/public2/2press.php?news_id=2727&related=7&pg=sp [Accessed 15/05/2020]. para.7

[734] B. Miller et al., 'Women in Peace and Security through United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of National Action Plans, and Implementation'. *Igis Wp,* 13, (2014).

[735] UNOWAS *President of ECOWAS Commission and the UN Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel Concluded a High-Level Visit to the Gambia.* Available online: https://unowas.unmissions.org/president-ecowas-commission-and-un-special-representative-west-africa-and-sahel-concluded-high-level [Accessed 15/06/2020].

states and, more importantly, member states have to a large degree, complied. It is also concluded that ECOWAS is recognised by external entities such as the UN.

7.3.3 ECOWAS' capacity

This sub-section is also based on the theoretical discussion of actorness in Chapter Six. In that chapter, capacity was defined as: *...an entity with a considerable degree of material and human resources, enabling it to support both policy formulations and implementations.* It is from the perspective of this definition that ECOWAS' capacity is tested. Establishing ECOWAS' capacity will complement its autonomy and recognition to give us a fuller understanding of the organisation's actorness. The sub-section focuses on ECOWAS' ability to put into practice the policies and programmes designed by its autonomous institutions. The sub-section is divided into three parts, examining respectively, ECOWAS' financial capacity for running its administrative structures; ECOWAS' military or coercive capacity; and finally, ECOWAS' diplomatic capacity.

7.3.3.1 ECOWAS' financial capacity

ECOWAS has, to a significant extent, the financial capacity required to run its administrative organs. ECOWAS has put in place ways through which it is able to take care of its internal financial needs almost entirely. The most recent of them is the imposition of levies on imports of member states, which was introduced in the revised treaty of 1993. Article 72(1) states, 'There is hereby instituted a Community levy for the purpose of generating resources for financing Community activities.'[736] This was in response to the financial challenges previously faced by the organisation in implementing its policies and programmes. ECOWAS thus resorted to an autonomous means of revenue generation that had nothing to do with national budgets.[737] Faten Aggad and Luckystar Miyandazi indicate that in 2014, ECOWAS' funding through the levy of 0.5% on imports into ECOWAS states, along with other sources such as state direct contributions, constituted 95% of the organisation's total internal funding, with only 5% coming from external donor support.[738] This funding arrangement manifests ECOWAS'

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[736] ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Revised Treaty* (Abuja: ECOWAS Commission, 1993). p.42
[737] See C. Closa and L. Casini, *Comparative Regional Integration: Governance and Legal Models*Cambridge University Press, 2016). p.396
[738] F. Aggad and L. Miyandazi, 'Understanding ECOWAS Efforts in Promoting a Governance Agenda: Adapting Regional Norms to Lessons from National Crises'. *European Centre for Development Policy Management,* (2017), 3-20. p.18

capacity, given that it makes it possible for the organisation to support the autonomy of its institutional structures. That is to say, it enables the various administrative structures to come out with policies and programmes that are endogenous and not imposed from outside, possibly through funding arrangements. In support of this view, Antwi-Danso pointed out in a field interview that, '… there have been conferences, symposia, round tables, we (Ghana Armed Forces and staff College) organised an anti-terrorists round table here and ECOWAS pays for most of these things.'[739]

The demonstration of capacity from the perspective of internal funding makes ECOWAS arguably the most effective sub-regional grouping in Africa and, indeed, an actor with capacity. This viewpoint was supported by Alimou Diallo in a field interview when he argued in favour of ECOWAS' actorness from the perspective of capacity. He described ECOWAS as the most self-sufficient REC in Africa with respect to funding its internal activities. He corroborated the point made earlier, that ECOWAS has consistently funded over 90% of its activities. He added that ECOWAS has in many ways inspired the AU and this is one example.[740] This is attributable to the relatively advanced stage of West African integration, both politically and economically, compared to the AU. For instance, a similar levy to that of ECOWAS imposed by the AU is facing challenges, which Philomena Apiko and Faten Aggad attributed to the AU's lack of a continental free trade zone like the one in West Africa.[741]

With reference to the definition of capacity in this thesis, it is shown that ECOWAS has financial capacity in terms of running its administrative structures. As argued above, ECOWAS has been able almost exclusively to take care of the running of its administrative structure, which is a manifestation of financial capacity. However, ECOWAS is limited in the broader sense of financial capacity, in view of the fact that it faces challenges when dealing with activities other than administrative financing, such as peacekeeping. This limitation is elaborated in the next section.

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[739] Interview with Vladimir Antwi-Danso
[740] Interview with Alimou Diallo
[741] P. Apiko and F. Aggad, 'Analysis of the Implementation of the African Union's 0.2% Levy: Progress and Challenges'. *Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management (= Briefing Note,* 98, (2017).

7.3.3.2 Military capacity

ECOWAS' financial self-sufficiency in terms of running its administrative structures is a significant attribute of capacity. However, to demonstrate fuller capacity, it must also be able to demonstrate the financial capacity to fund peace-keeping missions in its volatile sub-region. Before analysing this, it is important to indicate that ECOWAS has a legitimate coercive mechanism for intervening militarily in member states, on which it has relied in the past. Prior to 1993 when the revised treaty clarified ECOWAS' mandate on interventions (as explained below), the 1981 Defence Protocol of ECOWAS allowed for a member state under attack from outside to request ECOWAS assistance. The protocol also permitted binding collective military intervention in response to such a request, once agreed by the decision-making structures of ECOWAS.[742] It was on this basis that ECOWAS led the Liberian intervention after Liberia's request to Nigeria was in turn referred to ECOWAS for action.[743] There were, however, controversies over relying on the 1981 protocol to intervene, mainly because the Liberian case was not about external aggression.[744] The 1999 protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, and Peacekeeping elaborates a clearer collective security mandate of ECOWAS. The protocol permits intervention in member states on grounds such as attempts to reverse military coups.[745] It is for these reasons that Chukwuemeka Eze noted in a field interview that ECOWAS has shown some strength and leadership with respect to sub-regional Peace and Security through its coercive option, which in his view is one of ECOWAS' tools of influence as an actor with capacity.[746]

ECOWAS, under ECOMOG, subsequently intervened in other states with some degree of success, as will be discussed in Chapter Eight. Nevertheless, ECOWAS' success in this regard cannot be compared with its ability to handle internal administrative costs. Indeed, while internal financing has improved over the years, the ability of the

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[742] ECOWAS *Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence* Available online: http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3827~v~Protocole_d_Assistance_Mutuelle_en_matiere_de_Defense.pdf [Accessed 20/06/2019].

[743] C. Tuck, 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia'. *African Studies Quarterly,* 4, 1, (2000), 1-16. p.4

[744] Tuck, 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia'. , 1-16

[745] ECOWAS, 'Protocol A/P.1/12/99 Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. Management Resolution. Peace-Keeping and Security'. (1999).

[746] Interview with Chukwuemeka Eze

organisation to handle interventions militarily has not. Diallo, in a field interview, indicated that ECOWAS' sole intervention in Guinea-Bissau recently was not without financial challenges. He asserts, '…Guinea-Bissau, we have deployed troops there, now for five years… purely ECOWAS funded troops, even though we have a huge debt… it is all ECOWAS troops, deployed in an ECOWAS country to maintain peace…'[747] Whilst this is a constraint, it could also be seen as a manifestation of capacity, albeit a limited one. The financial challenge faced by ECOWAS stems from its reliance on the sub-regional hegemonic power of Nigeria. This is because even though Nigeria is willing and often attempts to handle ECOWAS' financial burdens, with little support from other member states, there is often a constraint due Nigeria's growing domestic responsibilities. Consequently, the sub-region is unable to fully support its peace missions. Reflecting on this shortfall in capacity, Iwilade and Agbo confirm the sub-region's heavy reliance on Nigeria, asserting, '…ECOWAS has not yet developed full capacities that enable it to respond effectively to conflict situations in the region…[It] depends on the willingness of its regional hegemon (Nigeria) to bear the political, military, and financial costs…'[748]

With reference to the levels of poverty and economic underdevelopment discussed earlier in this chapter, ECOWAS' capacity challenge is attributed to the economic situation of the sub-region. For instance, according to Napoleon Bamfo, 'The unendingly dire financial circumstance ECOWAS members face has affected the capacity of those member states to support the organisation to carry out its security and peacekeeping functions that need heavy expenditures.'[749] This was corroborated in an interview with Emmanuel Kotia. He noted, for instance, that the ESF is facing problems such as inadequate equipment and poor commitment on the part of member states to contribute troops. He attributed these problems to the economic challenges of member states and argued that they are preoccupied with meeting domestic socio-economic demands.[750] Under these circumstances, ECOWAS' avenues for non-combatant approaches to

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[747] Interview with Alimou Diallo
[748] A. Iwilade and J. U. Agbo, 'ECOWAS and the Regulation of Regional Peace and Security in West Africa'. *Democracy and Security,* 8, 4, (2012), 358-373. p.364
[749] N. Bamfo, 'The Political and Security Challenges Facing 'ECOWAS'in the Twenty-First Century: Testing the Limits of an Organization's Reputation'. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 3, 3, (2013), 12-23. p.17
[750] Interview with Emmanuel Kotia

revolving conflict situations has been helpful. It is important to indicate that such non-combatant approaches, which are elaborated in the next sub-section, also involve personnel or the diplomatic capacity of ECOWAS.

With reference to the definition of capacity in this thesis, this sub-section concludes that the sub-region has been able to manifest some capacity. ECOWAS shows this first, its ability to bear its administrative cost. Secondly, its ability to engage in peacekeeping with some degree of success. However, the sub-section has also concluded that the general poverty levels of the sub-region and the over-reliance on Nigeria, make peacekeeping financially challenging for ECOWAS.

7.3.3.3 Diplomatic capacity

Apart from the coercive means at ECOWAS' disposal - in any case a measure of last resort and now a manifestation of ECOWAS' limited capacity - its responses to sub-regional security and political challenges focus more on diplomatic approaches. As indicated earlier, ECOWAS is bound by the UN's principle of peaceful resolution of disputes before resorting to force in dealing with crisis situations. It is important to state that in many cases, its diplomatic approaches have worked effectively. ECOWAS has thus proven to have diplomatic capacity over the years. One of the ways in which ECOWAS has done this is by engaging the Council of the Wise, which represents a traditional African approach to dispute settlement. The council comprises a 15-member team of eminent West African citizens, one from each of the 15 member-states to augment the organisation's diplomatic efforts, working in the background.[751] Apart from the work of the Council of the Wise, political leaders of member states also engaged diplomatically on behalf of ECOWAS. Some examples include Ivory Coast between 2002 and 2004, when a team led by Ghana, under ECOWAS, ensured a ceasefire. A subsequent peace agreement was signed after mediation in the years 2003 and 2004. Similarly, in 2007, an ECOWAS delegation on an Ivorian crisis led by former Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré also supervised a peace agreement. Other examples of ECOWAS' diplomacy

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[751] J. M. Kabia, 'Regional Approaches to Peacebuilding: The ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture', *BISA-Africa and International Studies ESRC Seminar Series: Africa Agency in International Politics, African Agency in Peace, Conflict and Intervention at the University of Birmingham, 7th April.* 2011).

include the organisation's diplomatic role in Liberia in the 1990s, led by Abdul Salami Abubakar of Nigeria.[752]

With reference to the definition of capacity, it is concluded in this sub-section that apart from ECOWAS' material capacity, albeit limited, it also has diplomatic capacity. This conclusion is based on the fact that ECOWAS only resorts to force as the last option, for which reason institutions such as the Council of the Wise are put in place to solve problems before they escalate. The conclusion is also based on the diplomatic roles played by some political leaders of the sub-region, with some degree of success.

The whole section has shown that ECOWAS is to a large degree an actor with capacity. It is not without resources to run its institutional structures. It is thus concluded that although ECOWAS' material capacity faces challenges, it remains an actor with capacity. This is because it has the structures and legitimacy to act and indeed, it has been doing so, despite the limitations. These limitations are somewhat ameliorated by the resort to diplomacy, which is the other component of capacity.

7.4 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has explained ECOWAS' regionness so as to understand the usage of a region in this thesis. In doing so, West Africa was initially discussed from a geographic perspective, showing that its geographic connotation is understood differently, given the general challenge of geographic demarcation of regions internationally. The chapter then looked at cohesive factors or issues of shared purpose that unite the states of the sub-region, to give a broader understanding of the idea of ECOWAS. It is argued in the chapter that ECOWAS is a symbol of regionness which combines both geographic considerations and shared purpose, for which reason other states can join, provided they share its core values. Three identified interrelated shared concerns of the sub-region were considered as driving the regionness of ECOWAS, namely, the colonial legacy or neo-colonialism, the need for economic integration, and peace and security concerns. Therefore, with reference to the definition of regionness in

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[752] C. Elowson and J. MacDermott, 'ECOWAS Capabilities in Peace and Security: A Scoping Study of Progress and Challenges'. (2010).; M. Caparini, 'The Mali Crisis and Responses by Regional Actors'. *NUPI Working Paper,* 849, (2015).

this thesis, it is concluded that the West African sub-region is shown to be a region with regionness. This is based on the concerns shared by its member states, which they attempt to address jointly as a region.

After establishing ECOWAS' regionness, the chapter then subjected ECOWAS to the three main actorness criteria, autonomy, recognition and capacity. It was shown that whilst ECOWAS has autonomy and is recognised both by member states of the sub-region and beyond, its capacity is limited. With reference to the definition of actorness in this thesis, it is concluded that ECOWAS is generally a growing actor, but not yet a fully-fledged one. The limitation is attributable mainly to the material capacity challenges of the organization. This is also attributable to the weak capacity of the majority of its member states, leaving the organisation to rely largely on Nigeria's benevolence. In other words, while ECOWAS has autonomy, and is recognised, its capacity is less relative to the other two criteria of actorness.

Chapter 8 Hegemony, Counter-hegemony and ECOWAS' Actorness in Collective Security: The Cases of Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast and Mali.

8.1 Introduction

This chapter takes the theoretical and empirical arguments developed earlier in the thesis and applies them to ECOWAS' actorness and collective security coordination challenges. It is argued that while Nigeria's West African hegemony supports ECOWAS' actorness, ownership and coordination of sub-regional collective security, France's counter-hegemony does the opposite, through its extra-regional institutional penetration and historical colonial ties with some ECOWAS member states. The chapter demonstrates this claim by looking at four cases of civil wars in the sub-region, namely, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast and Mali. This chapter is divided into two sections and each section is further divided into two sub-sections.

The first section discusses cases outside of France's former colonies (Liberia and Guinea-Bissau). Those cases demonstrate France's limited influence in the sub-region. They also show how France seeks to increase its influence outside of its former colonies, by undermining Nigeria's leadership of ECOWAS' peace and security initiatives as part of its counter-hegemony. It is concluded that this attitude of France leads to sub-regional collective security cooperation challenges. The second section discusses cases of former French colonies (Ivory Coast and Mali) to explain the extent to which France maintains its influence in those states. It is argued that this approach has led to parallel efforts in sub-regional security governance and to challenges to sub-regional collective security coordination and ownership.

8.2 France's counter-hegemony relative to non-Francophone states

This section addresses two cases, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, where France has limited or no influence but despite this, sought to manifest counter-hegemony to Nigeria's hegemonic leadership under the auspices of ECOWAS. The section will set out the facts of each case and then, following the analytical framework developed earlier in the thesis, will examine: how ECOWAS demonstrated actorness; the manifestation of hegemony and counter-hegemony by Nigeria and France respectively; and finally, how hegemony and counter-hegemony impacted on the actorness of ECOWAS and its ownership of sub-regional peace and security.

8.2.1 Case 1: Liberia: Facts of the case

8.2.1.1 The first civil war

The Liberian civil war started in 1989 and ended in 1997.[753] It started when Charles Taylor, a former ally of the then Liberian President, Samuel Doe, quarrelled with him politically and then moved to Ivory Coast. While there, he formed a rebel force and upon return in 1989, he waged war with his forces to overthrow President Doe.[754] Faced with this challenge, Doe requested Nigeria's assistance.[755] However, Abuja did not act alone but immediately sought an ECOWAS-led intervention to save the situation.[756] Nigeria indicated that it considered it morally wrong for the sub-region to look on as the situation worsened. Ibrahim Babangida, Nigeria's President at the time, is quoted as having said, 'Nigeria cannot fold its arms and stand back, while the Liberian crisis continued to claim more lives and also increasingly turned into an excuse for foreign intervention in African affairs…'[757]

Nigeria's position and referral of the matter to ECOWAS led to the establishment of a sub-regional Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in May 1990. The mandate of the SMC was to find a solution to the Liberian crisis and future crises in the sub-region.[758] The committee comprised five member states of ECOWAS, namely, The Gambia (chair of the committee), Mali, Ghana, Togo and Sierra Leone. The committee had an initial meeting in July 1990 and produced a peace plan for negotiation. However, upon noticing a fast deterioration of the situation, the SMC called its second meeting in August 1990 in Banjul. The outcome was announced by the chairman of the committee, the then President

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[753] This section only gives the basic facts of the Liberian case. For a more detailed account of the Liberian civil war see: C. I. Obi, 'Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire'. *African Security,* 2, 2-3, (2009), 119-135.Also see; T. M. Ahmed, 'United Nations Observer Mission and Ecomog Intervention in Liberia's Peace Process'. *Вестник Российского Университета Дружбы Народов.Серия: Международные Отношения,* 18, 4, (2018).

[754] S. D. Murphy, 'US Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia'. *The American Journal of International Law,* 98, 1, (2004), 193. p.193

[755] S. B. Olawale, 'The Nigerian Factor in Liberian Peace Process 1990-1993'. *European Scientific Journal,* 11, 4, (2015).

[756] C. Tuck, 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia'. *African Studies Quarterly,* 4, 1, (2000), 1-16. p.4

[757] A. S. Akpotor and O. B. Nwolise, *Revolving Issues in Nigeria's Foreign Policy*Ilupeju Press, 1999). p.104

[758] T. Z. Suifon *ECOWAS' Sub-Regional Peacekeeping: Learning through Experience.* Available online: https://www.wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/101/tp_ecowas_subregional_peacekeeping.pdf [Accessed 10/08/2019].

of Gambia, Dawda Jawara. While appealing for an immediate ceasefire, the committee called for immediate deployment of an ECOWAS peacekeeping mission.[759] The outcome was not unanimous; while the majority Anglophone states supported the decision, the Francophone minority opposed it. Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, two other major Francophone states that were not part of the SMC, also openly opposed the military intervention.[760] Nevertheless, the decision led to the establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which was mandated to ensure compliance with the ceasefire it declared and to secure a peaceful environment for a free and fair election.[761] President Doe was killed in September 1990. However, that did not end the insecurity and ECOMOG intervened immediately, remaining until elections were held in July 1997 under its supervision. Charles Taylor was elected as the next President and formed a government, but the ECOMOG mission continued until November 1999 once peace returned.[762]

Given initial disagreements, the first group of states that contributed troops to ECOMOG comprised predominantly Anglophone states. The only Francophone state that contributed troops at the start of the mission was Guinea Conakry.[763] It is, however, important to indicate that the peacekeeping mission subsequently saw several other Francophone states contributing troops at different times in the course of the mission. According to Mustapha Tijjani, 'The contributing nations and troop strengths varied, but included at one time or another Nigeria, which provided the bulk of the forces, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Tanzania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone.'[764] The ECOMOG mission also had the support of the UN under

[759] R. A. Mortimer, 'Senegal's Role in Ecomog: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 34, 2, (1996), 293-306.
[760] D. Carment and R. Draman, 'Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-Region: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia'. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,* 6, 2, (2003). p.8
[761] ECOWAS, 'Decision A/Dec.1/8/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group for Liberia'. (1990).
[762] Murphy, 'US Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia'. , 193
[763] L. Gberie, 'ECOMOG: The Story of an Heroic Failure'. *African Affairs,* 102, 406, (2003), 147-154.
[764] T. M. Ahmed, 'United Nations Observer Mission and Ecomog Intervention in Liberia's Peace Process'. *Вестник Российского Университета Дружбы Народов.Серия: Международные Отношения,* 18, 4, (2018). p.875

its Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL),[765] albeit retrospectively, given that UN, became involved only in October 1992.[766]

Even though ECOWAS sought the approval of the UN for the intervention when ECOMOG was established,[767] the UN was reluctant to support the mission on the initial position that the crisis was an internal problem of Liberia.[768] It is unclear what the position of France was, given that the request to the UN was not discussed at the UNSC. For instance, when the UNSC eventually met to discuss Liberia in 1991, resulting in the retrospective granting of approval to ECOMOG, the representative of Liberia asserted, '…seven months ago we made efforts to have the Council seized with the deteriorating situation in Liberia, which efforts were not approved…'[769] The subsequent approval and participation by the UN gave the intervention the much needed legitimacy from the international community, since military interventions by regional bodies in member states require a UN approval if the regional entity is not invited.[770] The main criticism of the intervention from within the sub-region was the reliance on the *1981 Mutual Assistance Protocol*.[771] This is because the protocol concerns support for member states under external attack.[772] As such, critics were of the view that it was not the right protocol to rely on for the intervention, because the conflict was an intra-state one.[773]

From 24th August 1990, when the ECOWAS operation officially began,[774] until the end of mission, Nigeria catered for virtually all the logistical and financial needs of the ECOMOG. Nigeria's burden was compounded by, first, the late involvement of the international community, and second, the financial inability of many West African states to make significant contributions to the mission. As a result, in addition to paying for the

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[765] '. Olonisakin, 'UN Co-operation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia'. *International Peacekeeping,* 3, 3, (1996), 33-51.

[766] Ahmed, 'United Nations Observer Mission and Ecomog Intervention in Liberia's Peace Process'.

[767] Suifon *ECOWAS' Sub-Regional Peacekeeping: Learning through Experience.*

[768] F. B. Aboagye, *ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management, and Peacekeeping in Liberia*Sedco Pub Limited, 1999).

[769] UNSC *Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand One Hundred and Seventy-Fourth Meeting* . Available online: https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/PV.2974 [Accessed 10/08/2020]. p.3

[770] See Chapter Seven (section 7.3.2.2.2 p.205)

[771] See Chapter Seven (section 7.3.2.2.2 p.183)

[772] See Chapter Seven (section 7.3.2.2.2)

[773] K. Van Walraven, *Containing Conflict in the Economic Community of West African States: Lessons from the Intervention in Liberia, 1990-1997*Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 1999). P.20

[774] Ahmed, 'United Nations Observer Mission and Ecomog Intervention in Liberia's Peace Process'. p.875

allowances of forces of smaller participating states,[775] Nigeria also contributed the most troops to the mission. For instance, Nigeria contributed more than 60% of ECOMOG forces from 1990 to 1993.[776] Similarly, as at February 1995, of the 8,430 troops in Liberia under UNOMIL, Nigeria's share was 4,908, Ghana's share was 1,028 and Guinea contributed 609. Tanzania contributed 747 troops, Uganda's share was 760, while Sierra Leone made a contribution of 359 troops. Finally, ten each were contributed by The Gambia and Mali.[777]

France, like many of the Francophone states of the sub-region, opposed the Nigerian-led, ECOWAS-sponsored intervention and worked against its success. For instance, Tony Chafer described France as a bystander during the intervention.[778] It is worth stressing that France did not stop at not supporting ECOMOG; its attitude was considered inimical to the success of the Nigerian-led ECOWAS mission. According to Carolyn Shaw et al., while ECOWAS and Nigeria opposed Charles Taylor, the rebel leader, in favour of a democratically elected leader, Doe, France and Ivory Coast were on the side of Charles Taylor.[779] It is important to point out that the claim that Nigeria and ECOWAS sided with the government is challenged. For instance, according to Lambert Edigin and Collins Edigin, ECOMOG was neutral. They based this claim on two reasons; first, that President Doe later opposed ECOMOG when he noticed its neutrality; second, after Doe died, ECOMOG continued for many years to bring about peace.[780] In respect of France, evidence of its support to the rebel forces is supported by the fact that its companies kept doing business with Charles Taylor. They exported rosewood from rebel-held areas, which served as a source of funding for the rebels.[781] This was corroborated by Ken Ahorsu in a field interview, as he argued that France refused to stop its companies from doing business with Charles Taylor, with the excuse that it did not have control over

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[775] See Chapter Four (section 4.5. p.97)

[776] Olawale, 'The Nigerian Factor in Liberian Peace Process 1990-1993'. p.193-4

[777] Ahmed, 'United Nations Observer Mission and Ecomog Intervention in Liberia's Peace Process'. p.875

[778] T. Chafer, 'The UK and France in West Africa: Toward Convergence?'. *African Security,* 6, 3-4, (2013), 234-256. p.244

[779] C. M. Shaw et al., 'Hegemonic Participation in Peace-Keeping Operations: The Case of Nigeria and ECOMOG [with Comment and Rejoinder]'. *International Journal on World Peace,* (1996), 31-66. p.36

[780] L. U. Edigin and C. O. Edigin, 'Nigeria's Foreign Relations in West Africa (1985–1993)'. *Nigerian Journal of Research and Production Volume,* 17, 2, (2010). p.5

[781] C. Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* Cambridge University Press, 1996). p.255

its private sector. He concluded that the move by France and other states fed Taylor's war machinery.[782]

8.2.1.2   The second civil war

The election of Taylor and the peace that came with it was short lived. Liberia returned to civil war in 1999. Liberians became disillusioned with Taylor's presidency, leading to political instability. The situation deteriorated quickly and by May 2003, two main rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) had taken control over a significant portion of the country and threatened to seize power.[783] Nigeria engaged the warring faction first diplomatically, on bilateral terms. Nigeria's effort led to successful negotiations, based on which a comprehensive peace agreement was signed when ECOWAS took over the peace process.[784] Under the ECOWAS supervised agreement, signed on the 17th June 2003, Charles Taylor agreed to relinquish power for the sake of peace, which he did on 11th August, 2003.[785] However, before Taylor resigned, the violence did not stop, necessitating UNSC Resolution 1497 on the 1st of August 2003, which authorised the establishment of a multinational force to support the implementation of the Accra ceasefire agreement. In doing so, the UNSC commended ECOWAS' efforts in Liberia. It also singled out Nigeria for praise for its diplomatic effort in Liberia.[786]

The ECOWAS mission for Liberia (ECOMIL) was already on the ground before it was joined by what became known as the UN mission for Liberia (UNMIL). Nigeria had deployed 300 troops in Liberia under ECOMIL in response to the UN's approval. Other member states, including Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Togo, Mali, Senegal, Ghana and the Gambia followed suit, with troop contributions bringing the number of ECOMIL forces to just over 3000. Nigeria's contribution was 1500. As in the first civil war, Nigeria was given the privilege of leading ECOMIL, as many of its force commanders were

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[782] Interview with Ken Ahorsu.
[783] Murphy, 'US Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia'. , 193 p.193
[784] S. Oshewolo, 'Unpacking Nigeria's Peace Efforts during the Second Cycle of the Liberian Conflict'. *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,* 8, 15, (2019). p.264
[785] C. Bhoke, 'The Trial of Charles Taylor: Conflict Prevention, International Law and an Impunity-Free Africa'. *Institute for Security Studies Papers,* 2006, 127, (2006), 20.
[786] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1497 of 1 August 2003.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1497 [Accessed 10/08/2020].

Nigerians.[787] Nigeria's leadership and by implication ECOWAS' leadership of a West African mission did not stop when ECOMIL was incorporated into UNMIL later on. In September 2003, the UNSC followed with Resolution 1509, establishing UNMIL which proposed the transfer authority from ECOMIL to UNMIL.[788] Many states across the world participated in this mission, but they did not deny West Africa's leadership role in UNMIL.

France's role in the second Liberian civil war was not very different from that in the first one. Paris' attitude was largely characterised by indifference. France did not participate in ECOMIL and it did not openly support UNMIL at the UNSC. For instance, of the 15 member states of the Council that deliberated and authorised UNMIL's second military intervention in 2003, there were 12 states that supported the authorisation and 3 abstentions, of which France was one.[789] However, France did contribute military forces towards UNMIL, alongside many other states outside of West Africa and Africa, including the USA, Russia, Pakistan, and Germany, whilst states including China, the UK, and India contributed police personnel.[790] Nevertheless ECOWAS, through Nigeria, maintained some degree of leadership in UNMIL, despite the wide global participation. For instance, according to Salihu Uba, throughout the UNMIL mission, Nigerians held several strategic positions including Force Commander (three times) and Chief of Staff.[791]

Having provided a brief factual account of the events of the first and second Liberian civil wars and the respective roles of Nigeria and France in particular, this chapter will now provide an analysis of these events and roles. In doing so it will follow the analytical framework of the thesis, looking firstly at ECOWAS' actorness, before

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[787] Oshewolo, 'Unpacking Nigeria's Peace Efforts during the Second Cycle of the Liberian Conflict'. p.266

[788] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1509 of 19 September 2003.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1509 [Accessed 10/08/2019]. para.1

[789] Oshewolo, 'Unpacking Nigeria's Peace Efforts during the Second Cycle of the Liberian Conflict'. p.266

[790] UNMIL *Frequently Asked Questions* . Available online: https://unmil.unmissions.org/frequently-asked-questions [Accessed 10/08/2020].

[791] S. Z. Uba, 'An Appraisal of Nigeria's Participation in UNMIL Peacekeeping', A paper presented at the Ministry of Defence Nigeria peace support …), 2016).

progressing to consider the roles of Nigeria and France in the context of their struggle for sub-regional hegemony.

8.2.2 ECOWAS' actorness in the Liberian case

Proceeding from the facts of the case, this sub-section shows ECOWAS' actorness in respect of the two civil wars with reference to the actorness criteria set out in Chapter Six, namely, autonomy, recognition and capacity.

8.2.2.1 Liberian civil wars and ECOWAS' Autonomy

With reference to the definition of autonomy in this thesis, this sub-section demonstrates ECOWAS' autonomy relative to the Liberian case. However, before showing ECOWAS' autonomy in respect of Liberia, it is important to stress that the first Liberian civil war was one of the reasons for the incorporation of security into ECOWAS' mandate.[792] The early stage of the incorporation of security explains why ECOWAS did not have an unambiguous procedure to address the call on it to act on the first Liberian crisis. Under the circumstances, ECOWAS manifested its autonomy by using the existing structures to establish the SMC. The decision of the SMC to intervene militarily under ECOMOG, another creation of ECOWAS for the Liberian situation, further demonstrated ECOWAS' autonomy. This is supported by James Agalga, who argued in a field interview that decisions on the Liberian intervention were taken by ECOWAS, demonstrating supra-nationality and autonomy.[793] This claim is based on the fact that the intervention went ahead despite the disagreement among member states and, even more so, that nearly all member states eventually participated in the mission. ECOWAS' autonomous structures and their supra-nationality was even clearer in respect of the second intervention. This is because, before the UN approval for the intervention, ECOWAS had brokered a peace deal between the warring factions that ECOMOG was tasked to maintain.[794] The acceptance of the agreement by the warring factions and the seeming lack of disagreement on ECOMIL manifest ECOWAS' structural supra-nationality.

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[792] See Chapter Seven (section 7.2.2.2 p.184-5).
[793] Interview with James Agalga.
[794] ECOWAS, 'Decision A/Dec.1/8/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group for Liberia'.

Whiles this section has shown ECOWAS' actorness in respect of autonomy, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' autonomy in respect of the Liberian cases will be discussed in sub-section 8.2.4.

8.2.2.2   Liberian civil wars and ECOWAS' recognition

With reference to the definition of recognition in this thesis, it is shown in this sub-section that ECOWAS has demonstrated it had recognised structures relative to the Liberian case. In respect of the first civil war, Nigeria's referral of President Doe's request for assistance to ECOWAS[795] can be explained as an act of recognition of the ECOWAS structures, especially as Nigeria had the capacity to act alone. Its role in the ECOWAS-led mission demonstrates this and yet it turned to ECOWAS rather than act on its own. Secondly, the participation of member states, as indicated in the preceding sub-section, further points to their recognition of the ECOWAS structures. The initial disagreement may appear to suggest weak recognition in view of the fact that some member states openly opposed the decision at the beginning.[796] Nevertheless, the participation of some of the states that had previously objected, specifically, the Francophone ones, provides evidence of ECOWAS' recognition by its member states relative to the Liberian situation.

In terms of ECOWAS' recognition outside of its member states, the first point to note in respect of the first civil war is the UN's retrospective support for the ECOMOG.[797] However, while the delay in approval raised questions about the legitimacy of the first intervention, it was different in respect of the second intervention, with closer cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS leading to the UN's support for ECOMIL and later to its incorporation into UNMIL.[798] Equally important is the fact that when UNMIL took over, ECOWAS' quest to own West African peace and security was not ignored, as Nigeria's continued leadership role in UNMIL demonstrates.[799]

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[795] Tuck, 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia'. , 1-16 p.4
[796] K. Nowrot and E. W. Schebacker, 'The use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone'. *Am.U.Int'L L.Rev.,* 14, (1998), 321. p.408
[797] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1497 of 1 August 2003.*
[798] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1509 of 19 September 2003.*
[799] Uba, 'An Appraisal of Nigeria's Participation in UNMIL Peacekeeping',

Thus ECOWAS' actorness has been shown in respect of recognition. How the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' recognition in respect of the Liberian case will be discussed in sub-section 8.2.4.

8.2.2.3   Liberian civil wars and ECOWAS' capacity

With reference to the definition of capacity, it is argued in this sub-section that ECOWAS demonstrated capacity in the Liberian case, both diplomatically and materially. The former relates to ECOWAS' diplomatic attempt through the SMC to resolve the first Liberian civil war through negotiation.[800] ECOWAS' diplomatic capacity was also demonstrated during the second civil war, given that the military intervention was also preceded by a diplomatic attempt to solve the problem.[801] In both cases, when diplomacy did not work, ECOWAS then manifested its material capacity, largely handled by Nigeria.[802] While Nigeria's role, on the one hand, showed ECOWAS' capacity, on the other hand, it shows ECOWAS' weakness in this regard. With Nigeria viewed as a reflection of ECOWAS' capacity, its contributions in both the first and second interventions indicate that ECOWAS could rely on Nigeria's commitment and resources in times of need. However, the limited role of the other member states weakened ECOWAS' capacity materially. For instance, logistical challenges remained, despite Nigeria's huge resource commitment.[803]

Whilst this section has shown ECOWAS' actorness in respect of capacity, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' capacity in respect of the Liberian interventions will be discussed in sub-section 8.2.4.

8.2.3   Liberia: Nigeria's hegemony and France's counter-hegemony

With reference to the adopted criteria of hegemony and counter-hegemony, it is argued in this sub-section that Nigeria and France demonstrated West African hegemony and counter-hegemony respectively, in respect of the Liberian civil wars.

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[800] S. Atuobi, 'ECOWAS and Mediation in West Africa: Toward an Enhanced Capacity'. *Harvard Africa Policy Journal,* 7, (2010), 29-40. p.32
[801] Oshewolo, 'Unpacking Nigeria's Peace Efforts during the Second Cycle of the Liberian Conflict'.
[802] Olawale, 'The Nigerian Factor in Liberian Peace Process 1990-1993'.
[803] Gberie, 'ECOMOG: The Story of an Heroic Failure'. , 147-154

In respect of material power, while Nigeria demonstrated its material power throughout the two ECOWAS-sponsored interventions, France showed no interest in ECOMOG and therefore did not manifest its material power. Nigeria, thus, fulfilled the hegemonic criterion of material power as far as Liberia was concerned. For instance, as pointed out in Chapter Four, Nigeria paid the allowances of soldiers from smaller states that participated in the intervention, such as the Gambia and Togo.[804] On the other hand, France manifested counter-hegemony to Nigeria's manifest material power as it acted in ways that kept the war economy of the rebel group active, ostensibly to derail the effort of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG. Paris may not have been involved directly in support of the rebels, but its attitude, such as allowing companies from France to trade with the rebels, supporting their finances, constituted counter-hegemony to Nigeria's material power manifestation in ECOMOG. This is mainly because it made it possible for the war to be prolonged as the rebels were encouraged to challenge ECOMOG's ceasefire monitoring mandate. For instance, according to Tijjani Ahmed, 'Charles Taylor's rebels attacked the ECOMOG forces…this unfortunately led to the application of force to repel the attacks. So an observer group was compelled to respond with force.'[805]

With regards to vision, Nigeria's commitment to the Liberian peace process, particularly under the auspices of ECOWAS, can be viewed as a fulfilment of its sub-regional vision of ECOWAS' ownership of sub-regional peace and security. This explains Abuja's push to prevent inaction of ECOWAS allowing an extra-regional state power to intervene in Liberia. This is supported by its involvement of ECOWAS at a point when security was not fully incorporated into ECOWAS' mandate.[806] It is also supported by its beneficence throughout the interventions. On the other hand, France's anti-Nigerian hegemonic attitude to both civil wars is also a promotion of its West African hegemonic aspiration through counter-hegemony. From the perspective of France, successful Nigerian leadership in Liberia would reduce its extra-regional influence in terms of ownership of West African security issues,[807] especially as Nigeria opposed extra-

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[804] Interview with Emmanuel Kotia
[805] T. M. Ahmed, 'United Nations Observer Mission and Ecomog Intervention in Liberia's Peace Process'. *Вестник Российского Университета Дружбы Народов.Серия: Международные Отношения,* 18, 4, (2018). p.876
[806] See Chapter Seven (section 7.2.2.2)
[807] *Ibid.* p.148

regional states' military interventions in West African conflicts.[808] It is quite clear that Nigeria's implementation of its vision prevailed and France's manifest attempt to achieve its vision, in sharp contrast to that of Nigeria, did not, as Nigeria led the interventions under both ECOWAS and the UN.

In terms of willingness, both Nigeria and France demonstrated this in view of their respective attitudes, discussed above. On the part of Nigeria, the claim of its hegemonic willingness is based on its key role in getting an ECOWAS intervention and the huge resources it committed to it. What also showed Nigeria's willingness was its desire to prevent extra-regional states from taking action in its sub-regional domain. On the contrary, counter-hegemony is attributed to France in relation to the Liberia situation. This is supported by its attitude and actions that aimed at undermining ECOMOG, such as its request for an arms embargo on ECOMOG and its abstention from voting when the UNSC voted to approve ECOMIL.[809] This can be explained as being in line with France's attitude of not wanting Nigeria or any other power, be it sub-regional or extra-regional, to undermine its West African influence.

Proceeding from the preceding paragraphs in respect of Nigeria's material contribution, it is clear that Nigeria also demonstrated beneficence in the Liberian case. Reference is specifically made to its force contribution and its financial and logistical support to the interventions.[810] In this respect, Chukwuemeka Eze argued in a field interview that no state provided as much support as Nigeria, as far as Liberia was concerned.[811] This is not the case in respect of France, considering its contrary stance to that of ECOWAS. This explains why France did not support the intervention. The counter-hegemonic aspect of France's attitude in respect of Nigeria's beneficence is that Paris' support for the rebel group militated against the objective of Nigeria's beneficence, which was to enforce the ceasefire to enable general elections.

Regarding recognition, Nigeria gained this to a larger extent than did France. There was recognition for Nigeria's indispensability or hegemony both from within the

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[808] See Chapter Four (section 4.3)
[809] Oshewolo, 'Unpacking Nigeria's Peace Efforts during the Second Cycle of the Liberian Conflict'.
[810] See section 8.2.1
[811] Interview with Chukwuemeka Eze

sub-region and beyond in relation to the Liberian case. Both ECOWAS and its member states acknowledged Nigeria's huge resource commitment. An example is Nigeria's leadership of the command of the forces for the most part in both cases. Nigeria's hegemonic recognition was even clearer during the second civil war. An example is its election to lead ECOWAS' diplomacy in resolving the second crisis, which culminated in the ECOWAS-brokered peace deal.[812] It is important to add that this role was also recognised externally, as Nigeria was singled out for praise by the UN for its diplomatic role during the second civil war.[813]

Nevertheless, Nigeria's hegemonic recognition faced challenges emanating from France's sub-regional recognition. Whilst less extensive or explicit than the recognition received by Nigeria, recognition of France's counter-hegemony is evident in the reluctance of the Francophone states to participate in the early stages of the first Liberian civil war. The position of Paris was that the Liberian intervention, dominated by Nigeria, was an enhancement of Nigeria's West African hegemonic standing.[814] According to Martin Lowenkopf, France was opposed to the idea of a Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention, to the extent that it opposed, albeit unsuccessfully, the placing of an arms embargo on Liberia by the UNSC. Paris insisted that such a move by the UN should be applied to ECOMOG as well. Lowenkopf thus asserted, 'The French gambit could also be seen as being aimed at reducing…Nigerian, influence in the region.'[815] However, although France's attitude threatened the success of the first intervention in terms of sub-regional cooperation, the subsequent participation of the Francophone states, not only in the second intervention, which was not controversial, but also in the first one, calls into question France's hegemonic recognition and reaffirms member states' recognition of Nigeria' sub-regional hegemony.

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[812] Priscilla Hayner, *Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility for Justice*Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre),[2007]).
[813] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1497 of 1 August 2003.*
[814] M. A. Sesay, 'Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia'. *Review of African Political Economy,* 23, 67, (1996), 35-52.
[815] M. Lowenkopf'Liberia: Putting the State Back Together', in I. W. Zartman(ed.), *Collapsed states: The disintegration of restoration of legitimate authority* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 91-108. p.98

Finally, Nigeria manifested the preceding five criteria as far as Liberia was concerned because of its soft power within the ECOWAS institution. Apart from Nigeria providing resources to back its widely accepted vision for the sub-region in Liberia, it also acted in line with the organisation's principle of equality of states in its dealings with ECOWAS. This is supported by the fact that Nigeria put state-centrism aside in favour of multilateralism under ECOWAS from the beginning, as it avoided acting unilaterally.[816] This, in addition to its material commitment, made its position attractive to ECOWAS member states. It is for this reason that Nigeria's ideas on the creation of the necessary institutional mechanisms such as the SMC and ECOMOG to deal with a novel situation largely succeeded. The proposals of Nigeria may have been challenged, but crucially these mechanisms worked in Liberia, became a part of ECOWAS' peace and security structures, and were used in later interventions.

This sub-section has demonstrated the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic manifestations of both Nigeria and France, relative to the Liberian civil wars with reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria set out in this thesis. How this impacted on the sub-regional cooperation and ownership of the peace process is discussed next.

8.2.4 Case Conclusions: Hegemony, Counter-hegemony and ECOWAS' collective security coordination and ownership - the case of Liberia.

With reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria and the criteria of actorness set out in this thesis, this sub-section shows how Nigeria's hegemony supported ECOWAS' actorness and sub-regional collective ownership of the Liberian peace process. The sub-section also shows how France's counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of sub-regional collective security in Liberia.

Nigeria exercised its material power in such a way as to enhance the autonomy of ECOWAS. For instance, it avoided acting unilaterally without the approval of ECOWAS, in line with its sub-regional vision of ECOWAS owning West African security. As such, Nigeria saw it as a responsibility to use its material power to pursue its vision of ECOWAS' actorness. Thus, Nigeria's hegemonic manifestation materially enhanced

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[816] Tuck, 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia'. , 1-16

ECOWAS' actorness in Liberia in terms of both recognition and capacity. The point on recognition is supported by Nigeria's referral of the first civil war to ECOWAS for a collective solution. That of capacity is supported by its material contribution to both interventions, which enhanced ECOWAS' material capacity. Nigeria's commitment of its national resources and its beneficence aimed at its vision attests to a hegemonic willingness in support of ECOWAS' actorness. This is supported by the fact that Abuja's declared main reason for wanting an ECOWAS intervention was to prevent extra-regional state powers from intervening to undermine its sub-regional hegemony.

In terms of Nigeria's hegemonic recognition and its enhancement of ECOWAS' actorness, Nigeria's soft power approach to getting an ECOWAS-sponsored mission for Liberia and its deferral of ownership of the process to ECOWAS were crucial, despite the initial challenges, to the participation of other ECOWAS member states in the missions. The argument here is that Nigeria's attitude made it possible for ECOWAS to own the operations. Nigeria approach, premised on the institutional leverage of ECOWAS and the exercise of smart power enhanced its vision of ECOWAS' actorness. In contrast to Nigeria's stance, France's counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of the Liberian peace process. For instance, while the absence of France's material power in Liberia did not prevent the ECOWAS-sponsored interventions, France's continuation of trade amounted to indirect material support to the faction opposed to ECOMOG, violating a section of the ECOMOG authorization document, and thus demonstrated a lack of recognition for ECOWAS as an actor. For instance, article 5 states: 'The Committee appeals to all members of the international Community not to assist any of the warring parties in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the ceasefire...'[817] France's actions, motivated by its desire to counter Nigeria's hegemonic standing, threatened the success of the ECOMOG mission and consequently undermined ECOWAS' actorness. As Lansana Gberie has argued, 'Regional rivalries and differences promoted mainly by France, a long-standing hegemonic rival of Nigeria in West Africa... complicated the mission...'[818]

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[817] ECOWAS, 'Decision A/Dec.1/8/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group for Liberia'. p.3
[818] Gberie, 'ECOMOG: The Story of an Heroic Failure'. , 147-154 p.148

France's general attitude to the civil wars in Liberia also pointed to a willingness for West African hegemony and hence a counter-hegemony to Nigeria. Moreover, its withholding of beneficence undermined ECOWAS' capacity in view of the logistical challenges ECOMOG faced in Liberia. This could have lessened had France supported ECOMOG materially, or at least desisted from supporting the war economy of the rebels. France's considerable degree of recognition from the Francophone states of the sub-region also impacted ECOWAS' collective security coordination. This claim is based on the initial challenges in building consensus for the intervention, which saw the majority of Francophone states aligning at that stage with France's opposition to the mission.[819]

In line with the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria as well as the actorness criteria set out in this thesis, this sub-section has shown that while Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony enhanced ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of the Liberian peace process, France's extra-regional counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS effective actorness.

8.2.5 Case 2: Guinea-Bissau: Facts of the case

8.2.5.1 First civil war

Guinea-Bissau was engulfed in civil war from June 1998 to May 1999.[820] It was triggered by General Ansumane Mané's military revolt against President João Bernardo Vieira's government.[821] ECOWAS became involved following a rapid deterioration of the situation. Unlike the situation on Liberia, in Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS had a much clearer mandate at the sub-regional level, given that peace and security was, by the time of the crisis, fully incorporated into its mandate. Accordingly, ECOWAS supervised a number of peace accords between the warring factions, though these were not fully adhered to.[822] This was followed by the November 1998 accord, part of which ordered the deployment of ECOMOG forces, partly to sustain the provisions of the accord. The

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[819] A. M. Sambo et al., 'Liberia's Post-1990 Ecomog Incursion: An Assessment of Anglophone–Francophone Dichotomy'. *Journal of International Studies,* 13, (2017), 47-65. p.52

[820] This section only gives the basic facts of the Guinea-Bissau case, for a more detailed account of the Guinea-Bissau civil war see: C. I. Obi, 'Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire'. *African Security,* 2, 2-3, (2009), 119-135. Also see; S. Massey, 'Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War'. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies,* 32, 1, (2004), 76-95.

[821] K. Jens and F. Tarp, 'Guinea-Bissau: War, Reconstruction and Reform'. *Working Papers WP,* 168, (1999), 42.

[822] C. I. Obi, 'Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire'. *African Security,* 2, 2-3, (2009), 119-135.

forces were also tasked to oversee the withdrawal of all foreign forces that were already on the ground and to disarm all combatants, so that all forces would operate under the command of ECOMOG.[823] The decision on the accord was reached by a seven-member state committee which was constituted by ECOWAS and included Nigeria. When the committee realised the need for military intervention, they decided to expand an existing ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone [824] to Guinea-Bissau. [825] The legitimacy of the ECOWAS-sponsored mission in Guinea-Bissau was boosted by the early approval it received from the UN through UNSC Resolution 1216.[826] Despite Nigeria's role in the decision making process, it did not participate in the military intervention in Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria's excuse was that it was faced with pressing domestic issues. Another constraint on Nigeria was its military role in Sierra Leone, alongside that in the second Liberian civil war, especially as it contributed the greater portion of the troops and logistics in both cases. It is from this perspective that Obi argues that 'The crisis in the country took place in a context where ECOMOG's capacity and will for regional peacekeeping had been severely sapped by the heavy demands of the…protracted operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone...'[827]

In sharp contrast to France's attitude to the Nigeria-led ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, it was supportive of ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau. France went on to justify its presence in that country as being based on its support for the ECOWAS-sponsored forces. [828] As noted in ECOWAS' Executive Secretary's report to the UN on the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau:

> To help those States honour their pledge and to speed up the deployment of additional ECOMOG troops, the French Republic offered to transport to Bissau troops constituting a battalion of 600 men. The French Republic also offered to defray the battalion's subsistence costs (per diem) and to provide it

[823] UNSC, 'Agreement between the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the Self-Proclaimed Military Junta'. (1998a).
[824] This was yet another civil war where ECOMOG intervened, however, this will not be discussed due to times and space constraints.
[825] Gberie, 'ECOMOG: The Story of an Heroic Failure'. , 147-154
[826] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1216 of 21 December 1998.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1216 [Accessed 14/02/2019]. para.4
[827] Obi, 'Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire'. , 119-135 p.127
[828] O. O. Olarinmoye, 'Civil War in Guinea-Bissau: June 1998- may 1999. '. *Global South Sephis E-Magazine,* 1, 3, (2004).

with basic logistical support. With this support, contingents from the countries in question were transported to Bissau from their respective capitals.[829]

Notwithstanding the support offered by France to ECOMOG, it did not adhere strictly to the ECOWAS accord that mandated the intervention. For instance, contrary to the accord's provision for all forces to operate under ECOMOG, France and its affiliates provided President João Vieira with a 600 man militia to protect him, whilst France itself '... maintained a base on the island of Babaque and its warships continued to patrol the territorial waters of Guinee-Bissau.'[830]

While French involvement did not result in confrontation between Abuja and Paris or the kind of antagonism seen in Liberia, it did anger Portugal, which had renewed its interest in its former colony by offering to play a role in finding a solution to the crisis.[831] Lisbon rejected Paris' justification and likened France's role to an occupation. According to Simon Massey, Lisbon's apprehension over Bissau's shift towards Paris, including its joining of the Franc Zone, was '… made clear through a series of diplomatic exchanges with Paris and Bissau [regarding] this "poaching" of its influence.'[832] The conflict lingered until President Vieira was defeated, leading to his surrender in May 1999,[833] which marked the end of the first civil war.

8.2.5.2 Second civil war
In 2012, Guinea-Bissau was again thrown into a civil war, triggered by another military coup which took place on 12th April 2012.[834] ECOWAS, at its extraordinary

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[829] Reliefweb *Report on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau Prepared by the ECOWAS Executive Secretary. .* Available online: https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea-bissau/report-situation-guinea-bissau-prepared-ecowas-executive-secretary?fbclid=IwAR2J5CwgE0VL7EHS2cWyZjzbBUoa_JsRvupZbpOxYjMxYH48I7Jq1KHtvms [Accessed 10/08/2020]. para.4
[830] Olarinmoye, 'Civil War in Guinea-Bissau: June 1998- may 1999. '. p.17
[831] R. Van der Drift, 'Democracy: Legitimate Warfare in Guinea-Bissau'. *Lusotopie,* 6, 1, (1999), 225-240.; M. Hall, 'The Conflict in Guinea-Bissau: The Diplomatic Intervention of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries' West African Seminar Series'. *University College London,* 5, (1999).
[832] S. Massey, 'Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War'. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies,* 32, 1, (2004), 76-95. p.78
[833] Obi, 'Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire'. , 119-135
[834] D. O'Regan and P. Thompson, *Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa's First Narco-State* (Washington DC: National Defence Univ Fort Mcnair Dc Africa Center for Strategic Studies,[2013]). p.3

summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Abidjan in 26th April 2012, condemned the coup. The Heads of States went ahead to initiate both diplomatic and military approaches simultaneously to address the crisis. While paragraph 29 of the summit's communique urged all actors in the conflict to cooperate with the mediation efforts of ECOWAS that were to be put in place, paragraph 30 ordered the deployment of the ECOWAS standby forces (ESF) with immediate effect, mainly to secure all agreements on transitional issues.[835] Unlike the first civil war, where Nigeria only participated in the process leading up to the deployment of ECOMOG, in the second war it participated in both diplomacy and the deployment of troops. Diplomatically, there was a proposal for the establishment of a seven-state West African 'contact and follow up group' on Guinea-Bissau,[836] which was to be chaired by Nigeria. The group had the mandate to deal with issues arising from the implementation of the decisions of ECOWAS contained in the communique.[837] On the deployment of troops, Nigeria was one of the contributing states - alongside Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and subsequently others - under a force termed the ECOWAS Mission for Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB),[838] with Nigerian forces numerically dominating the 600-strong mission.[839]

Significantly, in terms of external perceptions of the mission's legitimacy, the UN welcomed ECOMIB and its mandate in UNSC Resolution 2103.[840] Apart from the UN, ECOWAS' leadership role in resolving the crisis also had the backing of several other extra-regional non-state bodies, including the AU and the EU. UNSC Resolution 2048 attests to ECOWAS' leading role and the external recognition it attracted, '[t]aking note of the efforts by the AU, ECOWAS, CPLP and the EU in response to the current crisis

[835] ECOWAS, 'Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government - Final Communique'. April 26, (2012).
[836] O'Regan and Thompson, *Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa's First Narco-State* p.43
[837] ECOWAS, 'Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government - Final Communique'.
[838] Africanews *Ecowas Forces Start Withdrawing from Guinea Bissau.* Available online: https://www.africanews.com/2017/06/06/ecowas-forces-start-withdrawing-from-guinea-bissau// [Accessed 27/06/2019].
[839] Reuters *Angolan Troops to Leave Bissau Next Week: Official.* Available online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-crisis-angola/angolan-troops-to-leave-bissau-next-week-official-idUSBRE84U0OI20120531 [Accessed 12/08/2020]. para.14
[840] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/2103 of 22 may 2013.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2103 [Accessed 10/08/2019].

and the mediation efforts led by ECOWAS in response to the recent military coup...'[841] Specifically in respect of the EU, although ECOWAS solely funded ECOMIB from the start of the mission in 2012, from 2015 the EU provided financial assistance from its African Peace Facility (APF),[842] supporting the mission beyond the general election that ECOMIB supervised and the establishment of a transitional civilian government.[843] From this perspective, the ECOMIB mission was to a large degree successful in terms of stabilising the country, as adjudged by UNSC 2203.[844]

These sub-sections have given an account of the first and second civil wars of Guinea-Bissau, outlining the roles played by Nigeria and France, as well as other actors. What these actions tell us about ECOWAS' actorness will now be considered.

8.2.5.3   ECOWAS' actorness in the Guinea-Bissau

Proceeding from the facts of the cases, this sub-section shows ECOWAS actorness in respect of the two civil wars with reference to the actorness criteria set out in this thesis, namely autonomy, recognition, and capacity.

8.2.5.3.1   Guinea-Bissau civil wars and ECOWAS' autonomy

With reference to the definition of autonomy in this thesis, it is shown in this sub-section that ECOWAS demonstrated actorness relative to autonomy in the case of Guinea-Bissau. As in the Liberian case, ECOWAS used its structures and personnel to draw a roadmap to resolve both crises diplomatically and militarily. In respect of the first civil war, the signing of the peace accords under the supervision of ECOWAS is an example of the utilisation of its autonomous structures and personnel for diplomatic purposes.[845] As the conflict deteriorated, the decision on ECOMOG to support the enforcement of the November 1998 accord showed the supra-nationality of ECOWAS' structures, as it was a decision taken by the organization as an entity responsible for sub-

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[841] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/2048 of 18 may 2012.* Available online:
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2048 [Accessed 10/08/2020].para.4
[842] European Commission, *African Peace Facility Annual Report 2015* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union,[2015a]). p.17
[843] European Commission *ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB). Avai*lable online: https://africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/apf_factsheet_-_ecomib.pdf [Accessed 10/08/2019].
[844] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/2203 of 18 February 2015.* Available online:
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2203 [Accessed 10/08/2020]. para.9
[845] Atuobi, 'ECOWAS and Mediation in West Africa: Toward an Enhanced Capacity'. , 29-40 p.34

regional peace. In respect of the second civil war, ECOWAS again used its structures and led all other international entities in finding solutions to the crisis,[846] which supports the argument that ECOWAS exhibited autonomy. The organisation's supra-nationality in the second crisis was shown not only by the immediate military intervention, but also by the fact that ECOWAS ensured that power was immediately handed to an interim civilian leader until elections were held in line with ECOWAS' zero tolerance to undemocratic accession to power.[847]

Having shown ECOWAS' actorness in respect of autonomy, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' autonomy in respect of the Guinea-Bissau cases will be discussed in sub-section 8.2.5.5.

8.2.5.3.2   Guinea-Bissau wars and ECOWAS' recognition

With reference to the definition of recognition in this thesis, it is demonstrated in this sub-section that ECOWAS was accorded recognition as an actor in the case of Guinea-Bissau. The first point of reference to support this claim is respect shown for the request by ECOWAS that all foreign states militarily present in Guinea-Bissau withdraw or align with the ECOMOG forces. For instance, Angola, a non-West African state, withdrew[848] and the other West African states such as Guinea-Conakry and Senegal, alongside France, worked under ECOMOG,[849] demonstrating their recognition of the supra-nationality of the organisation. Similarly, Guinea-Bissau's cooperation with the ECOWAS roadmap to peace and the acceptance of key extra-regional actors such as the AU, the UN, and the EU are particularly notable examples of the recognition afforded ECOWAS' role in the conflict.[850]

Having shown ECOWAS' actorness in respect of recognition, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' recognition in respect of the Guinea-Bissau cases will be discussed in sub-section 8.2.5.5.

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[846] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/2048 of 18 may 2012.*
[847] M. Diallo, 'The ECOWAS 'Supplementary Protocol and Defence and Security Forces Relationships to Political Power', *a Workshop on Processes for Ending the Crises in West Africa: the Place of Political Dialogue in Reforming the Security Sector, Guinea Bissau.* 16-182005). p.8
[848] Reuters *Angolan Troops to Leave Bissau Next Week: Official.*
[849] Reliefweb *Report on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau Prepared by the ECOWAS Executive Secretary. .*
[850] Atuobi, 'ECOWAS and Mediation in West Africa: Toward an Enhanced Capacity'. , 29-40 p.34

8.2.5.3.3   Guinea-Bissau wars and ECOWAS' capacity

With reference to the definition of capacity in this thesis, it is demonstrated that ECOWAS manifested its diplomatic capacity in Guinea-Bissau, more than its material power or financial capacity. While ECOWAS showed capacity diplomatically in respect of its peace accords in both wars, its material capacity was limited. Moreover, the role played by French material power, especially in the first civil war, contrasts with that of the material capacity of ECOWAS, reflecting the material capacity of its member states when Nigeria is a non-participant. This explains the argument of Simon Massey that 'Without Nigeria, the Francophone bloc directed an ill-conceived, unrealistic and ineffective ECOWAS response to the conflict with active support from its extra-African sponsor, France...'[851] This argument is given further credence by ECOWAS' evident ability to bring much greater material power to bear during the second intervention, an operation that involved Nigeria both diplomatically and militarily. This explains why the sub-region was able to fund ECOMIB exclusively for the first three years. Nevertheless, ECOMIB was not without financial challenges, as Alimou Diallo pointed out in a field interview conducted as part of this project,[852] thus necessitating recourse to the support offered by the EU for the mission.[853]

Having shown ECOWAS' actorness in respect of capacity, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' capacity in respect of the Guinea-Bissau case will be discussed in sub-section 8.2.5.5.

8.2.5.4   Guinea-Bissau: Nigeria's hegemony and France's counter-hegemony

With reference to the adopted hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria set out in this thesis, this sub-section shows that Nigeria and France demonstrated hegemony and counter-hegemony respectively in the cases of Guinea-Bissau.

Nigeria's non-participation in the first ECOMOG intervention undermined its sub-regional hegemony from a material power perspective, with the fact that this abstention was in part a consequence of material overstretches resulting from involvements in other ECOWAS interventions further substantiating this limitation.

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[851] Massey, 'Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War'. , 76-95 p.94
[852] Interview with Alimu Diallo
[853] European Commission, *African Peace Facility Annual Report 2015*

However, conversely Nigeria's non-participation offered an opportunity to show its indispensability in view of the fact that the mission that it did not participate in failed.[854] Nigeria's hegemonic indispensability is further evidenced by the success of ECOMIB's intervention in the second Guinea-Bissau civil war, a mission to which Nigeria did contribute troops, a point stressed by Alimou Diallo in a field.[855]

Unlike Nigeria, France's material power was shown in the first civil war by way of its contribution to ECOMOG.[856] However, the fact that the first intervention is generally considered as a failure and that France did not directly participate in the second intervention, show France's limitation materially in Guinea-Bissau. The success associated with Nigeria's participation in the second war does not suggest Nigeria's superiority on material capacity relative to France. However, the point being made is that France's involvement in the first Guinea-Bissau war was passive, in the sense that, apart from the logistical support it offered to ECOMOG, it did not get involved directly, whereas in the second Guinea-Bissau war Nigeria did. Had France participated actively both logistically and by troop contribution, the mission might not have failed, given France's economic and military power, especially where this would have been coupled with the participation of sub-regional forces with knowledge of the terrain.

With regards to vision, Nigeria's support for the decisions and efforts of ECOWAS in respect of both the first and second civil wars reflect its sub-regional vision of ECOWAS owning West African peace and security. On the part of France, on the one hand, its attitude towards the first war supported Nigeria's vision, given that it supported ECOMOG, which it opposed in Liberia.[857] On the other hand, and more importantly for France, it was an opportunity to pursue the expansionist aspect of its West African vision, and hence counter-hegemony, by drawing the Lusophone states of the sub-region into its domain of influence,[858] by acting in support of a pro-France leader under siege.[859] The

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[854] C. Akale et al., 'Assessment of ECOWAS Interventions in Guinea
Bissau, Burkina Faso and the Gambia '. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS),* II, IV, (2018), 138-142. p.140
[855] See Apendix
[856] Reliefweb *Report on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau Prepared by the ECOWAS Executive Secretary. .*
[857] See section 8.2.1.1
[858] P. M. Ferreira, 'Guinea-Bissau: Between Conflict and Democracy'. *African Security Studies,* 13, 4, (2004), 44-56.
[859] Massey, 'Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War'. , 76-95 p.94

efforts of Nigeria and France to pursue their respective sub-regional visions in the cases of Guinea-Bissau is a manifest indication of their hegemonic willingness. However, while Nigeria's willingness was in line with its opposition to extra-regional state powers' ownership of West African security, France's willingness was largely counter-hegemonic, aimed at protecting its ally and, by implication, expanding its influence in a sub-region which Nigeria views as its domain of influence.[860]

In respect of beneficence, the fact that Nigeria limited its role in Guinea-Bissau's first civil war to diplomacy and the decision leading to the intervention, but did not participate militarily, showed its weakness in respect of this criterion. However, Nigeria's military participation in the second intervention manifested its beneficence towards the sub-region, as did its support funding of ECOMIB for three years.[861] French material support for the ECOMOG mission also demonstrates beneficence, the extent of this was limited given that it did not operate fully under ECOMOG.[862] Overall, while Nigeria participated directly in one way or another in the two wars in Guinea-Bissau, France participated passively in the first civil war and did not directly participate in the second, suggesting that whilst Abuja's beneficence may have been more limited in this case than in others, it was still greater than that demonstrated by Paris.

Nigeria's limited role in the first civil war inevitably resulted in the bestowal of a relatively limited level of hegemonic recognition. However, in the second intervention, its sub-regional hegemony was recognised by member states and extra-regional actors, as it was the biggest contributor both financially and militarily to a solely ECOWAS mission. While France was recognised by both ECOWAS and some member states of ECOWAS in respect of its contribution to ECOMOG in the first intervention, its recognition was also limited relative to hegemony for the following reasons: first, the mission was largely made up of Francophone states;[863] and secondly, France's support for participating states

[860] See Chapter Four (section 4.4 p.93)
[861] Obi, 'Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire'. , 119-135
[862] Olarinmoye, 'Civil War in Guinea-Bissau: June 1998- may 1999. '.
[863] Massey, 'Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War'. , 76-95 p.94

was not embraced by Nigeria, which would have constituted hegemonic recognition of France.

Finally, in respect of institutional penetration, Nigeria's hegemony in this regard is based on the fact that both interventions in Guinea-Bissau were determined and owned by ECOWAS, in which Nigeria's membership made it possible to take part in deliberations leading to ECOMOG intervention and indeed its ownership of the intervention. It is important to reiterate that ECOWAS' decisions and ownership of West African peace and security are part Nigeria's vision in every security-related issue in the sub-region. Conversely, France's justification of its presence during the first intervention, based on supporting ECOMOG rather than its capacity as an extra-regional state power, showed France's limitation in respect of institutional penetration. It also demonstrated Nigeria's sub-regional hegemonic stance, despite the challenges shown earlier in respect of getting French forces fully under ECOMOG command in the first intervention.

This sub-section has demonstrated the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic manifestations of both Nigeria and France relative to the Guinea-Bissau civil wars with reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria set out in this thesis. How this impacted on the sub-regional cooperation and ownership of the peace process is discussed next.

8.2.5.5   Case Conclusions: Hegemony, Counter-hegemony and ECOWAS' collective security coordination and ownership - the cases of Guinea-Bissau.

With reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria and the criteria of actorness set out in this thesis, this sub-section shows how Nigeria's hegemony supported ECOWAS' actorness and sub-regional collective ownership of the Guinea-Bissau peace process. The sub-section also shows how France's counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS' actorness and sub-regional collective security in Guinea-Bissau.

While Nigeria's non-participation militarily in the first civil war weakened ECOWAS' material capacity, its participation in the diplomatic approach enhanced its diplomatic capacity. This aligns with Nigeria's sub-regional vision of ECOWAS owning sub-regional security governance. Nigeria's hegemonic willingness may not have shown significantly in the first civil war, but its willingness was clearer in the second civil war

with its full participation in the ECOWAS-led-sponsored intervention. [864] Nigeria's attitude and actions constitute an acknowledgement of ECOWAS' autonomy and supra-nationality, thus furthering the organisations claim to actorness. Nigeria's beneficence was most evident in the second civil war, where Abuja was the principal diplomatic, financial, and military supporter of the ECOWAS intervention. Nigeria may have done relatively little in the first civil war to warrant or generate hegemonic recognition, but the attribution of the failure of the French-backed intervention to the non-participation of Nigeria did counter-balance this to a degree. [865] Moreover, since intervention in both civil wars occurred under the auspices of ECOWAS, these cases indicate widespread recognition and acceptance of Nigeria's sub-regional hegemonic vision, irrespective of Abuja's actual operational involvement, a point further bolstered by the acceptance of ECOWAS actorness emanating from Nigeria itself. Finally, and with an interesting degree of circularity, Nigeria's acceptance of ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of the sub-region's peace and security agenda serves to strengthen the organisation, but through this Abuja benefits, since its hegemonic standing is enhanced by the greater institutional penetration that this generates.

France's material commitments to the conflicts in Guinea-Bissau was inconsistent. It contributed significantly in the first civil war, though not under ECOWAS auspices, whilst in the second war it was most notable by its material absence. Paris' indirect or non-contributions did little to contribute to ECOWAS' material capacity to act. Moreover, France's role in the first intervention was designed to achieve its vision of expanding its West African influence rather than to enhance ECOWAS actorness or security ownership, hence its absence from the second conflict, a civil war that no longer featured a pro-Paris regime. Hence although France showed a willingness to assume West African hegemony in relation to Guinea-Bissau, its activities are best seen as counter-hegemonic in nature, designed to afford France an opportunity to expand its influence as a counter to Nigeria rather than as a manifestation of sub-region-wide hegemony. This limited hegemonic willingness is reflected in France's inconsistent beneficence, circumscribed as it is both

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[864] B. Odigie *ECOWAS's Efforts at Resolving Guinea-Bissau's Protracted Political Crisis, 2015-2019.* Available online: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/ecowass-efforts-at-resolving-guinea-bissaus-protracted-political-crisis-2015-2019/ [Accessed 10/08/2020]. para.4
[865] Massey, 'Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War'. , 76-95

geographically and in terms of purpose. This shows that France's use of beneficence is essentially for counter-hegemonic purposes. From the conclusions drawn so far, whilst France's role in the first civil was recognised by ECOWAS and some member states, France did not act entirely in line with ECOWAS' ownership of the mission. Moreover, France's passive participation contributed to the failure of the mission, hence it not only undermined ECOWAS' ownership of the mission but also ECOWAS' actorness. The Guinea-Bissau case also demonstrates France's lack of institutional penetration in the sub-region. One consequence of this is that Paris does not feel obliged to - and as such has rarely - put ECOWAS' actorness ahead of its own state-centric counter-hegemonic ambitions. However understandable this may be, it does once again identify France as a West African counter-hegemon, against Nigerian hegemony, as well as undermining ECOWAS' actorness.

In line with the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria, as well as the actorness criteria set out in this thesis, this sub-section has shown that while Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony enhanced ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of the Guinea-Bissau peace process, France's extra-regional counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS effective actorness and ownership of the peace process. The whole section has further shown that France is the counter-hegemon to Nigeria. The section did so by pointing to the fact that France has not shown interest in all sub-regional security issues, being largely ambivalent to events in the Anglophone states of the sub-region, mainly due to limited recognition. On the other hand, the section has shown that Nigeria has shown interest in both the two cases discussed in this section, manifesting its sub-regional hegemonic sense of responsibility.

8.3 France's counter-hegemony relative to former colonies: the cases of Ivory Coast and Mali

This section addresses two cases where France, due to its former colonial role, wields significant influence and examines the extent to which this enabled Paris to manifest counter-hegemony in the face of Nigeria's hegemonic leadership under the auspices of ECOWAS. The section will set out the facts of each case, consider how ECOWAS demonstrated actorness, examine the manifestation of hegemony and counter-hegemony by Nigeria and France respectively, and finally analyse how hegemony and

counter-hegemony impacted on the actorness of ECOWAS and its ownership of sub-regional peace and security.

8.3.1 Case 3: Ivory Coast: facts of the case

8.3.1.1 The first civil war

Ivory Coast's political challenges and decent into civil war stem in part from the 30 year rule of its first president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny,[866] and the struggles for power that occurred after his demise,[867] and the ethnic and religious tensions that characterised the country. More immediately, the first civil war was triggered by the government of Laurent Gbagbo legislating to the effect that to be eligible to stand for the elections both of one's parents must have been born in Ivory Coast.[868] In response, a section of the country's soldiers, mainly those from the northern part whose citizenship was questioned rose up and attacked several cities.[869]

ECOWAS responded first by condemning the violence and the coup attempt by the mutineers, constituting a contact group after an emergency meeting on the crisis in Accra with the task of finding solution to the crisis. The group, consisting of heads of states of the sub-region including those from Nigeria, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Ghana, supervised several accords, including the so-called Accra (II)[870] and (III)[871] agreements, with the aim of bringing about peace to Ivory Coast. However, these failed to end the distrust between the government and the opposition Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI), leading ECOWAS to decide on military intervention. This mission was termed the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI). It comprised an initial

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[866] This section only gives the basic facts of the Ivorian case. For a more detailed account of the Ivorian civil war see: C. I. Obi, 'Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire'. *African Security,* 2, 2-3, (2009), 119-135. Also see; M. Monyane et al., 'The Role of Regional, Continental and International Organisations in Solving the Ivorian Crisis: Gains and Challenges'. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences,* 5, 27 P2, (2014), 1073.
[867] Polynational War Memorial *Civil War in Côte D Ivoire.* Available online: https://www.war-memorial.net/Civil-War-in-C%C3%B4te-d-Ivoire--3.248 [Accessed 02/08/2020].
[868] M. Adjami, 'Statelessness and Nationality in Côte d'Ivoire'. *Geneva: UNHCR,* (2016). p.11
[869] Polynational War Memorial *Civil War in Côte D Ivoire.*
[870] Uppsala Conflict Data Program *Accra Agreement .* Available online: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/Ivo%2020030307.pdf [Accessed 17/03/2019].
[871] Their Words *Accra III Agreement.* Available online: http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/ci_2004_08-904699bfedda3dec3f5854c9b74c47a3.pdf [Accessed 10/08/2019].

troop contribution from member states totalling 1400 soldiers.[872] As part of the ECOWAS mission, Nigeria contributed forces and fighter aircraft and as Nigerian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dubem Onyia stated, Nigerian '…forces were being sent to Ivory Coast under the auspices of Ecomog…'[873] When ECOWAS' mandate changed from monitoring of the ceasefire to ensuring that the ceasefire was respected by all necessary means available to ECOWAS,[874] ECOWAS' Mediation and Security Council increased troop numbers to 3200, but at the same time the MSC appealed to the international community to support its efforts given the financial difficulties facing the mission.[875]

While ECOWAS was first to intervene diplomatically, it was France that acted first militarily, facilitated by its military base in the country. By September 2002, French troops were already on the ground.[876] As a close ally to France, Ivory Coast is host to several thousand French citizens, leading France to justify its initial intervention on the grounds that it was intervening to evacuate its citizens.[877] Paris subsequently engaged diplomatically in conjunction with ECOWAS, which led to the brokering of what became known as the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (LMA) in 2003.[878] However, the LMA agreement, which was backed by the Accra agreements listed above, also failed to bring the peace envisaged.[879] Consequently, ECOWAS sought direct military involvement by

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[872] D. Kode, 'The Complexities of Democracy-Building in Conflict-Affected States: The Role of ECOWAS and the African Union in Côte d'Ivoire'. *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm, Sweden,* (2016). p.14

[873] BBC *Grim Find After Ivory Coast Fighting.* Available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2283314.stm [Accessed 10/09/2019]. para.14

[874] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1464 of 4 February 2003.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1464 [Accessed 10/08/2019]. para.9

[875] ReliefWeb *Côte D'Ivoire: ECOWAS Approves Beefed-Up ECOMICI Contingent.* Available online: https://reliefweb.int/report/c%C3%B4te-divoire/c%C3%B4te-divoire-ecowas-approves-beefed-ecomici-contingent [Accessed 20/11/2019].

[876] World Peace Foundation, 'United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)'. *African Politics, African Peace,* (2017). p.2

[877] M. Bovcon, 'France's Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte D'Ivoire and its Ethical Implications.'. *African Studies Quarterly,* 11, 1, (2009).

[878] UNSC *Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.* Available online: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CI_030123_LinasMarcousisAgreement.pdf [Accessed 10/08/2019].

[879] M. Monyane et al., 'The Role of Regional, Continental and International Organisations in Solving the Ivorian Crisis: Gains and Challenges'. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences,* 5, 27 P2, (2014), 1073.

the UN, appealing to France and to the other African members of the UNSC to raise the issue for action.[880]

In response, several UNSC Resolutions were passed with the backing of France.[881] Amongst these, UNSC Resolution 1464 'Welcome[d] the deployment of ECOWAS forces and French troops with a view to contributing to a peaceful solution of the crisis...'[882] However, whilst France co-sponsored the UNSC resolution, its forces remainder outside of UN direction, creating a recipe for poor coordination and cooperation between the French forces and ECOMICI.[883] In May 2003 UNSC Resolution 1479 established the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), initially for a six-month period.[884] MINUCI comprised seventy soldiers with the mandate to play an observer role to monitor the implementation of the LMA.[885] The result was that Ivory Coast now hosted three deployments, MINUCI, ECOMICI and French forces, with the issue of differing commands still not resolved. Acknowledging this, as the mandate of MINUCI ended, UNSC passed Resolution 1528[886] which introduced the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) which, unlike MINUCI, was a peacekeeping force into which ECOMICI was incorporated.[887] However, the French operation Licorne forces were permitted under Resolution 1528 to still operate under a separate command and '… for a period of 12 months from 4 April 2004 … to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI…'[888] As a result, Nigeria cut short its participation in UNOCI.[889] The war ended in March, 2007 when an agreement was signed between the warring factions

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[880] Kode, 'The Complexities of Democracy-Building in Conflict-Affected States: The Role of ECOWAS and the African Union in Côte d'Ivoire'.

[881] K. Sörenson, *Beyond Françafrique: The Foundation, Reorientation and Reorganisation of France's Africa Politics*Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2008).

[882] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1464 of 4 February 2003.* para.8

[883] M. Wyss, 'The Gendarme Stays in Africa: France's Military Role in Côte D'Ivoire'. *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review,* 3, 1, (2013), 81-111. p.82

[884] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1479 of 13 may 2003.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1479 [Accessed 10/08/2020].

[885] A. Novosseloff, 'The Many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire'. *Available at SSRN 3261285,* (2018).

[886] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1528 of 27 February 2004.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1528 [Accessed 10/08/2019].

[887] V. K. Holt et al., *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*UN, 2010). p.143

[888] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1528 of 27 February 2004.* para.16

[889] Beegeagle's Blog *Flashback: Nigerian Air Force Alpha Jets, Troops Return from Abidjan, Cote D'ivoire.* Available online: https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/flashback-nigerian-air-force-alpha-jets-troops-return-from-abidjan-cote-divoire/ [Accessed 19/07/2019].

for an election be held shortly. However, the elections were not held until 2010 and the outcome disputed, leading to the second civil war.

8.3.1.2 The second civil war

The disputed election led to a relapse into another deadly conflict. ECOWAS and the wider international community accepted the declaration of the opposition's victory by the electoral body of Ivory Coast.[890] When the defeated president refused to hand over power, ECOWAS acted by suspending Ivory Coast and called on the president to hand over power or face force from ECOWAS, as requested by Ouattara, the victor.[891] ECOWAS then called on the UN to bolster UNOCI.[892] Nigeria supported the ECOWAS call, adding that the situation needed what its foreign minister, Odein Ajumogobia, called unambiguous international support via a UNSC Resolution.[893] Adopting an unusually pan-African stance, France avoided taking charge in a manifestly unilateral fashion because of Gbagbo's opposition to French interference in the affairs of its former colonies.[894] As a result, Nigeria and France co-sponsored UNSC Resolution 1975.[895]

Paul Melly argues that France rejected direct unilateral intervention as it did not wish to give credence to Gbagbo's accusations against France as being a neo-colonialist,[896] hence French forces operated alongside UNOCI as permitted under Resolution 1975. Paragraph 7 of the resolution called upon the warring factions '…to cooperate fully in the operation of UNOCI and French forces…'[897] This made it possible for French forces to eventually arrest Laurent Gbagbo. However, the arrest by French forces was criticized sub-regionally and continentally. For instance, Kwesi Aning is

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[890] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1975 of 30 March 2011.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1975 [Accessed 10/08/2020]. p.2

[891] J. D. Gagnon, 'ECOWAS's Right to Intervene in Côte D'Ivoire to Install Alassane Ouattara as President-Elect'. *Notre Dame J.Int'L & Comp.L.,* 3, (2013), 51.

[892] Kode, 'The Complexities of Democracy-Building in Conflict-Affected States: The Role of ECOWAS and the African Union in Côte d'Ivoire'.

[893] N. Tattersall *Nigeria Wants UN Backing for Force in Ivory Coast.* Available online: https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFJOE70N0BH20110124 [Accessed 10/01/2019].

[894] C. D. Pickett, 'French Political Economic Interests in Francophone Africa: Weighing the Merits of Dependency Theory and Modernist Theory in the Political and Economic Relations between France and Her Former African Colonies'. (2017). p.80

[895] G. Piccolino, 'The Dilemmas of State Consent in United Nations Peace Operations: The Case of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire'. (2014).

[896] P. Melly and V. Darracq, *A New Way to Engage?: French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande*Chatham House London, 2013).

[897] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/1975 of 30 March 2011.* p.3

quoted as having reacted to the news of French forces' arrest of Gbagbo, arguing, 'This is just the start of the crisis. The role of French forces undermines Ouattara's credibility.'[898] This raises issues of the legitimacy of France's role in West Africa. The next sub-section will provide an analysis of the facts of the case relative to Nigeria's hegemony and France's counter-hegemony and consider how this impacted on ECOWAS' coordination of cooperation and ownership of sub-regional security.

These sub-sections have given an account of the first and second civil wars of Ivory Coast. The sub-sections showed the roles played by Nigeria and France as well as other actors. The manifestation of ECOWAS' actorness from the facts is discussed next.

8.3.2   ECOWAS' actorness in the Ivorian case

Proceeding from the facts of the case, this sub-section examines ECOWAS actorness in respect of the two civil wars with reference to the actorness criteria set out in this thesis, autonomy, recognition and capacity.

8.3.2.1   The Ivorian civil war and ECOWAS' autonomy

With reference to the definition of autonomy in this thesis, it is argued in this sub-section that ECOWAS manifested autonomy in the case of Ivory Coast. The first point of reference is the activation of its structures in response to both events. The ability of ECOWAS to supervise peace agreements, such as the Accra accords that negotiated a ceasefire, advise on the revision of the new laws on citizenship restriction and called for a sharing of power[899] showed first, that ECOWAS' institutions functioned in respect of these events and second, the supra-nationality of the structures. These claims are supported by the deployment of ECOMICI, sponsored and decided upon by ECOWAS at the levels of the Defence and Security Commission and Mediation and Security Council. [900] This enabled ECOWAS to take charge of the crisis, which further demonstrates its autonomy regarding the Ivorian crisis.

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[898] Reuters *Instant View - Ivory Coast's Gbagbo Arrested.* Available online: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ivorycoast-gbagbo-view/instant-view-ivory-coasts-gbagbo-arrested-idUKTRE73A35U20110411 [Accessed 24/011/2019]. para.5
[899] Doudou Sidibe, 'Peace Processes in Côte d'Ivoire: Democracy and Challenges of Consolidating Peace After the Post-Electoral Crisis'. *Accord,* 1, (2013). p.4
[900] A. Mehler, 'From "Protecting Civilians" to "For the Sake of Democracy"(and Back again): Justifying Intervention in Côte D'Ivoire'. *African Security,* 5, 3-4, (2012), 199-216. p.11

Having shown ECOWAS' actorness in respect of autonomy, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' autonomy in respect of the Ivorian case will be discussed in sub-section 8.3.4.

8.3.2.2 The Ivorian civil war and ECOWAS' recognition

With reference to the definition of recognition as an actorness criterion in this thesis, it is argued in this sub-section that ECOWAS was accorded recognition relative to its role in the Ivorian case. Regarding the first civil war, reference is again made to the ability of ECOWAS to broker peace agreements, demonstrating that Ivory Coast recognised ECOWAS' supra-national role. Beyond Ivory Coast, ECOWAS' supra-nationality was recognised sub-region-wide, as shown by the support ECOWAS received from its member states. This is particularly so in respect of troop contributions, most particularly so by Nigeria.[901] Moreover, recognition of ECOWAS' legitimate role in the crisis went beyond West Africa. One example is the fact that ECOMICI was approved by the UN.[902] This showed external recognition of ECOWAS' lead role in finding peace to the Ivorian crisis.

Having shown ECOWAS' recognition both internally and externally, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS recognition respectively in the Ivorian civil wars will be discussed in sub-section 8.3.4.

8.3.2.3 The Ivorian civil war and ECOWAS' capacity

With reference to the definition of capacity as an actorness criterion in this thesis, it is shown in this sub-section that ECOWAS manifested some degree of capacity in its handling of the Ivorian wars. First, from a diplomatic perspective, it is important to stress that it was ECOWAS that started engaging the warring factions diplomatically in both civil wars. Specifically, the creation of the contact group by ECOWAS in the first case and the call on the UN to bolter ECOMICI, in both the first and second civil wars, which was heeded[903] are both examples of ECOWAS' diplomatic capacity. This claim is further supported by the fact that actors outside of the sub-region, such as the UN and AU

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[901] Ofeibea Quist-Arcton *Cote D'Ivoire: West African Leaders to Meet in Abidjan, Nigeria Deploys Fighter Jets.* Available online: https://allafrica.com/stories/200209260716.html [Accessed 14/05/2017].
[902] UNSC, 'Resolution 1464 '.
[903] Kode, 'The Complexities of Democracy-Building in Conflict-Affected States: The Role of ECOWAS and the African Union in Côte d'Ivoire'.

collaborated with ECOWAS in their diplomatic approach to resolving the crisis, for example, through the round table discussions leading to the LMA.[904] When this approach faced challenges in terms of actual implementation of the peace agreements on the ground, ECOWAS then demonstrated its material capacity when it deployed troops contributed and funded initially by only member states. However, it is important to point out that ECOWAS showed weakness in sustaining its material capacity when financial shortfalls forced it to appeal for assistance from the international community to maintain an effective and increased ECOMICI in respect of the first civil war.[905]

Having shown ECOWAS' capacity both diplomatically and materially, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS capacity respectively in the Ivorian civil wars will be discussed in sub-section 8.3.4.

8.3.3   Ivory Coast: Nigeria's hegemony and France's counter-hegemony

With reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria of this thesis, this sub-section proceeds to analyse the hegemonic and extra-regional counter-hegemonic roles of Nigeria and France respectively relative to the Ivorian civil wars.

The case shows that Nigeria manifested material power, as it contributed forces and logistics in support of ECOWAS' intervention.[906] In a mission that was initially solely funded by ECOWAS, Abuja was the biggest contributor to ECOWAS' activities.[907] Similarly, France showed material power in its roles in both civil wars, given that its forces remained in Ivory Coast throughout the crises. However, unlike Nigeria, whose role was in support of a West African community approach, Antwi-Danso argued in a field interview to the effect that France's role did not have prior sub-regional endorsement but was based on its bilateral military pact with Ivory Coast.[908] Nigeria's approach in the Ivorian case, yet again, was in line with its West African hegemonic vision of sub-regional cooperation under ECOWAS. Abuja's manifestation of this vision was clearer when it indicated clearly that its role was in support of ECOWAS and not a state-centric

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[904] UNSC *Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.*
[905] ReliefWeb *Côte D'Ivoire: ECOWAS Approves Beefed-Up ECOMICI Contingent.*
[906] Ofeibea Quist-Arcton *Cote D'Ivoire: West African Leaders to Meet in Abidjan, Nigeria Deploys Fighter Jets.*
[907] See Chapter Four (section 4.2).
[908] Interview with Vladimir Antwi-Danso

move. Conversely, France's role was aimed at achieving its sub-regional vision of preventing other powers, particularly Nigeria, from manifesting influence in its former colony. It is from this perspective that Kwasi Aning, in a field interview, also noted that France perceived Nigeria's role under ECOWAS as a further threat to its waning influence in Ivory Coast.[909] This explains France's sustained military role and its subsequent support for the ECOWAS mediation process in resolving the crisis.

In exercising material power pursuant to their respective sub-regional visions, both Nigeria and France demonstrated their hegemonic and counter-hegemonic willingness in respect of the Ivorian crisis. Their willingness explains the beneficence manifested mainly by their military roles. In Nigeria's case beneficence was demonstrated principally through material support for sub-regional initiatives, and as shown previously this is essential to the success of such activities given the inability of many ECOWAS member states to make significant contributions to such missions. Conversely, although France's beneficence was also exercised in support of a West African state, its state-centric approach, evident through its detachment from ECOMICI and MINUCI, did not give it a sub-regional character. For this reason, its beneficence was counter-hegemonic to the Nigerian-backed sub-region approach.

Recognition of Nigeria's West African hegemony during the crises manifested itself in a number of ways. Firstly, its inclusion in the contact group of states that led the peace negotiations on behalf of ECOWAS in respect of the first civil war.[910] Secondly, the key role that Nigeria played in supporting ECOWAS' submissions at the UNSC through its co-sponsorship of Resolution 1975.[911] Thirdly, acknowledging Abuja's indispensability to effective military intervention by ECOWAS, ECOMICI was realistically based on Nigeria's active support, demonstrating sub-regional hegemonic recognition. From a sub-regional perspective, the recognition of France's role was less clear or effusive. Its military involvement was directly tied to its bilateral engagements with Ivory Coast rather than emanating from recognition from the ECOWAS community

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[909] Interview with Kwasi Aning
[910] Kode, 'The Complexities of Democracy-Building in Conflict-Affected States: The Role of ECOWAS and the African Union in Côte d'Ivoire'.
[911] Piccolino, 'The Dilemmas of State Consent in United Nations Peace Operations: The Case of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire'. p.29

of states by way of prior approval. Nevertheless, diplomatically, France was recognised by ECOWAS as an influential state in Ivory Coast. This explains why ECOWAS' support to France's initiative led to the LMA agreement. It also explains why Nigeria and France co-sponsored UNSC Resolution 1975. Nevertheless, its limitation in respect of its military role, that is, acting independent of ECOWAS leading to coordination challenges, makes its approach counter-hegemonic in respect of recognition.

The recognition that France did received diplomatically, which emanated from its historical ties with Ivory Coast, derived in part from its external institutional penetration. French interest in Ivory Coast, borne of a desire to maintain influence in an ally state, paved the way for its military and diplomatic roles, which were themselves facilitated by its privileged leadership position at the UN. Yet France's position in West Africa remains that of a counter-hegemon pursuing a state-centric approach. This is evident, for example, in French denials that they had been responsible for Gbagbo's arrest.[912] Whether true or not, French denials amount to a tacit admission that its role, as a 'parallel' military force alongside UNOCI, did not have legitimacy as far as the West African sub-region was concerned. Had Nigerian forces carried out the arrest of Gbagbo under UN/ECOWAS auspices, it is likely that it would have been acceptable to the sub-region, given its hegemonic leadership position and its widely accepted vision for the sub-region.

This sub-section has demonstrated the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic positions of both Nigeria and France relative to the Ivorian civil wars with reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria set out in this thesis. How this impacted on the sub-regional cooperation and ownership of the peace process is discussed next.

8.3.4 Case Conclusions: Hegemony, Counter-hegemony and ECOWAS' collective security coordination and ownership - the cases of Ivory Coast.

With reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria and the criteria of actorness set out in this thesis, this sub-section shows how Nigeria's hegemony supported ECOWAS' actorness and sub-regional collective ownership of the Ivorian peace process.

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[912] Africa Research Bulletin, 'Côte D'Ivoire: Gbagbo Arrested'. *Africa Research Bulletin,* 48, 4, (2011), 18787–822. p.18788

The sub-section also shows how France's counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS' actorness and sub-regional collective security in Ivory Coast.

It was shown in the preceding sub-section that Nigeria contributed to the peace process materially in support of collective initiatives. This enhanced the material capacity of ECOWAS, which is dependent on contributions of its member states, most especially from Nigeria. The support of Nigeria to ECOWAS in the Ivorian case contributed to ECOWAS' ownership of the crisis resolution process, with the organisation being able to handle the cost of the first intervention for some time before the UN became involved.[913] This aligns with Nigeria's sub-regional vision of putting ECOWAS at the centre of West African peace and security initiatives, mainly to support cooperation. Moreover, as powerful as Nigeria is in the context of West Africa, acting under the auspices of ECOWAS displayed its willingness to forge a West African hegemony based on soft power. This is seen in its initial focus on diplomatic collective action, supported by material power to enable ECOWAS to act. This not only supported cooperation, but also enhanced ECOWAS' autonomy and demonstrated Abuja's recognition of it. Nigeria's enhancement of ECOWAS' autonomy was achieved through an approach which generated wider sub-regional recognition than did the policies adopted by its hegemonic rival France. The wider recognition garnered by Nigeria resulted in part from its institutional penetration from within the sub-region. This made its persuasive approach and application of soft power in support an ECOWAS-led mission in Ivory Coast more appealing to its fellow West African states, whilst simultaneously aligning with Abuja's hegemonic sub-regional vision. This enhanced ECOWAS' coordination of cooperation in the Ivorian case and preserved the autonomy of ECOWAS.

France's approach of operating independently of ECOWAS and MINUCI resulted in its material power manifesting in a state-centric fashion rather than in support of ECOWAS' capacity. The approach, underpinned by a vision dependent on the maintenance of close ties with former colonies, was adopted as a counter-hegemonic strategy, in the sense that the alternative, namely support for an ECOWAS-sponsored mission led by Nigeria would have undermined the notion of bilateral post-colonial

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[913] ReliefWeb *Côte D'Ivoire: ECOWAS Approves Beefed-Up ECOMICI Contingent.*

indispensability and at the same time strengthened Abuja's sub-regional position. While France's role was ostensibly supportive of ECOWAS, its actions undermined cooperation and the organisation's fuller ownership of the missions. For instance, while Nigeria engaged through ECOWAS from the beginning, France made efforts to get the UNSC involved in the very first month of the first civil war, though these were blocked by the USA.[914] Similarly, French beneficence to the sub-region did not support sub-regional cooperation over or ownership of security issues because, unlike Nigeria, France adopted a state-centric approach. Nevertheless, despite the impediments to cooperation under ECOWAS that French policies created, Paris was able to secure recognition of its role from its former colonies, the bedrock of its counter-hegemonic position.[915] Moreover, sub and extra-regional recognition was enhanced by Paris' external institutional penetration and the resultant ability to legitimise its role through the UN and to secure a UNSC mandate which, ironically, permitted it to act separately from UN forces.[916] Nigeria's caution prior to the UN's second approval of UNOCI, and specifically its unsuccessful request for what Abuja termed an unambiguous resolution to support collective global cooperation[917] reflects the concerns that it harboured over this and it further evidence of the manner in which the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic competition between Nigeria and France undermines ECOWAS' actorness and its ownership of sub-regional security issues.

In line with the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria as well as the actorness criteria set out in this thesis, this sub-section has shown that while Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony enhanced ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of the Ivorian peace process, France's extra-regional counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS effective actorness and ownership of the peace process.

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[914] H. Serequeberhan, 'French Re-Engagement in African Conflicts and the Ivorian Challenge'. *French Directory of International Relations,* 6, (2005), 323-339. P.327

[915] Interview with Vladimir Antwi-Danso

[916] UNSC, 'Resolution 1528'.

[917] Tattersall *Nigeria Wants UN Backing for Force in Ivory Coast.*

8.3.5 Case 4: Mali: Facts of the case

The Malian crisis was started by the establishment of a military junta in March 2012.[918] ECOWAS responded by immediately convening an extraordinary summit of the sub-region's leaders in Abidjan. The summit suspended Mali, condemned the junta, and threatened further sanctions and military intervention as a last resort. A high-powered delegation was also dispatched to Mali with Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, chosen to lead an ECOWAS initiated mediation process.[919]

Mainly due to the capacity challenges faced by ECOWAS member states[920] and partly because of ECOWAS' desire to adhere to the UN principle of exhausting non-combatant means in any regional peace process, ECOWAS delayed putting into practice its military threat, even as the political situation deteriorated and terrorists began to take territories in the north of Mali.[921] Consequently, the UNSC authorised an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in December 2012 to deal with the crisis. [922] AFISMA was composed of African troops deployed with support from voluntary contributions made at an event organised by the AU in January 2013. [923] Nigeria made the highest material contribution of any African state, committing nearly $34 million towards AFISMA and in addition the President of Nigeria indicated that '…900 combat soldiers and 300 Air Force personnel are already on ground in Mali as part of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).'[924] Extra-

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[918] This section only gives the basic facts of the Mali case. For a more detailed account of the Malian civil war see:M. T. Maru, 'African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA): Military Ahead of Politics'. *Al Jazeera Center for Studies,* (2013). Also see; F. Aubyn, 'Policing and Peace Operations in Africa: Reflections on MINUSMA'. *KAIPTC Occasional Paper,* 39, (2015).

[919] ECOWAS Commission *ECOWAS Chairman Ouattara Leads High-Level Delegation to Mali.* Available online: http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=084&lang=en&annee=2012 [Accessed 20/08/2020].

[920] M. Caparini, 'The Mali Crisis and Responses by Regional Actors'. *NUPI Working Paper,* 849, (2015a).

[921] M. Addaney, 'ECOWAS Mediation in the Malian Political Crisis'. *Journal on Contemporary Issues of Law (JCIL),* 2, 2, (2016).

[922] UN News *UN Security Council Authorizes African-Led Intervention Force in Mali.* Available online: https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/12/428892 [Accessed 10/08/2020].

[923] A. Boutellis and P. D. Williams, 'Disagreements Over Mali could Sour More than the Upcoming African Union Celebration'. *Global Observatory, Wednesday.May,* 15, (2013).

[924] B. Agande *Nigeria Expends N7bn on Troops, Logistics to Mali – Jonathan .* Available online: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/nigeria-expends-n7bn-on-troops-logistics-to-mali-jonathan/ [Accessed 10/08/2019]. para.2

regional states also made significant contributions to AFISMA, with France, the USA and Japan contributing $63 million, $96 million and $120 million respectively.[925]

As AFISMA was preparing to intervene, France acted on a bilateral basis in response to a request from the Malian government.[926] France justified its intervention on French and European security grounds, in view of the potential rippling effects of the Malian crisis. [927] The *Islam Times* described France's move as an 'abrupt side-stepping,'[928] of a planned ECOWAS-led African intervention, arguing that after the UN approved AFISMA through UNSC Resolution 2085,[929] 'diplomats at the UN and in West African capitals were talking about the combined African mission of some 3,500 troops being deployed … later this year.'[930] Nevertheless, France's intervention received a largely positive response amongst ECOWAS member states, given that it was intended to save the deteriorating situation[931] and that, according to Gerard Araud, France's UN Ambassador, the '… goal [was] to go back to implementation of Resolution 2085 as quickly as possible so that African forces and the Malian forces take care of the problem…''[932] However, despite these reassurances, in the event, France sought to stay after AFISMA was deployed. It regularised its stay based on the wording of the resolution that authorised AFISMA, which encouraged international support to AFISMA. As part of France's desire to remain militarily in Mali, like ECOWAS, it sought international

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[925] Maru, 'African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA): Military Ahead of Politics'.
[926] D. E. Stigall, 'The French Military Intervention in Mali, Counter-Terrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict'. *Mil.L.Rev.,* 223, (2015), 1. p.23
[927] S. Daneshkhu *Mali Puts Focus on French Foreign Policy.* Available online: https://www.ft.com/content/26766f90-5da4-11e2-ba99-00144feab49a [Accessed 21/08/20
[928] Islamic Times *Preplanned Mali Invasion Reveals France's Neo-Colonialistic Agenda.* Available online: https://www.islamtimes.org/en/article/231495/preplanned-mali-invasion-reveals-france-s-neo-colonialistic-agenda%20para%2013 [Accessed 21/08/20 para.13
[929] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/2085 of 20 December 2012.* Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2085 [Accessed 10/08/2020].
[930] Islamic Times *Preplanned Mali Invasion Reveals France's Neo-Colonialistic Agenda.* para.12
[931] D. Oyedele *Nigeria: ECOWAS Lauds France's Intervention in Mali.* Available online: https://allafrica.com/stories/201301140785.html [Accessed 12/07/2020].
[932] The Telegraph *Mali: African Troops due to Arrive in Days.* Available online: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9801837/Mali-African-troops-due-to-arrive-in-days.html [Accessed 12/07/2020]. para.5

support, mainly from its European allies, and this was duly granted by key states such as the UK, Germany, the USA, although these states ruled out troop contributions.[933]

Just as in the case of Ivory Coast, French forces were under a different command from those of AFISMA, but despite this the two forces, with the active participation of Nigeria in AFISMA, collectively repulsed the rebels from the north of Mali. As AFISMA's Nigerian commander noted, '[t]here has been a lot of cooperation and I am sure that is going to be continued, because the important thing is that we have a common mission to free northern Mali and that is their mission, too.'[934] The cooperation, however, was short-lived, terminated by a French proposal to the UN to replace AFISMA with a UN-owned mission. This request was heeded, and the UN authorised what became known as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).[935] Given reservations from ECOWAS and AU, the French idea was accepted subject to some key conditions, set out in a communique issued by the AU during its 358th meeting. In paragraph 13(i) of the communique, stated, 'the need for such a Mission to be provided with a robust mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, defined in consultation with Mali, the AU and ECOWAS.'[936] Paragraph 13(ii) was more explicit regarding the desire of ECOWAS, through the AU, to maintain ownership of the process, stressing:

> The need for the UN to consult closely and adequately with the AU and ECOWAS throughout the proposed transformation process of AFISMA into a UN operation, as well as the appointment of the future Special Representative of the Secretary-General who will lead the planned Mission in a spirit of continuity, with regard to the leadership of the Mission and the contingents.[937]

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[933] DW *UN Security Council Backs French Intervention in Mali.* Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/un-security-council-backs-french-intervention-in-mali/a-16521496 [Accessed 10/08/2018].

[934] African heritage *First Media Interview: Major General Shehu Usman Abdulkadir, the Head ECOWAS-Mission in Mali (AFISMA).* Available online: http://www.africanheritagemagazine.de/first-media-interview-major-general-shehu-usman-abdulkadir-the-head-ecowas-mission-in-mali-afisma/ [Accessed 20/11/2019]. para.9

[935] M. Caparini, 'The Mali Crisis and Responses by Regional Actors'. *NUPI Working Paper,* 849, (2015b), 15. Also see:; BBC *Mali: UN Approves New UN Peacekeeping Force, Minusma.* Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22296705 [Accessed 20/11/2019].

[936] AU *Peace and Security Council, 358th Meeting.* Available online: http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/cps-en-comm-358-afisma-7-march-2013.pdf [Accessed 10/05/2019]. p.3

[937] AU, 2013, Peace and Security Council, 358th Meeting p.3

ECOWAS asked the UN to let the mission's command remain in West Africa in recognition of the sub-region's track record in handling similar crisis in the past.[938] Jean Bossuyt further explained ECOWAS' reason for wanting to lead:

> In the case of Mali, the ECOWAS Commission was of the view that according to the principle of subsidiarity, it is up to the REC to lead the response, for reasons of proximity, knowledge of the context and direct interest in restoring political stability. In this view, the AU and the UN should be supportive actors (mainly in terms of resources), respecting regional leadership and prerogatives.[939]

ECOWAS' wish to retain leadership was not met, as MINUSMA took over from AFISMA on 1st July 2013,[940] leading to the AU, alongside ECOWAS issuing a further communique lamenting lack of pre-deployment consultation and the failure to take into consideration the foundation laid by the stakeholders of the African continent that spearheaded the ECOWAS-led mediation process. It concluded that '…the resolution does not take into account the concerns formerly expressed by the AU and ECOWAS and the proposals they constructively made to facilitate a coordinated international support for the ongoing effort by the Malian stake holder…'[941] The protest was based on the way the UNSC Resolution 2100 that authorised MINUSMA was worded. The resolution specifically assigned a supporting role to France, 'Authoriz[ing] French troops…to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities of MINUSMA until the end of MINUSMA's…to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat…' [942] This was corroborated by the French permanent mission at the UN which stated in relations to MINUSMA that 'France is the only UN

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[938] ECOWAS Commission *ECOWAS Defence Chiefs Seek West African Command for UN Mission in Mali.* Available online: http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=131&lang=en&annee=2013 [Accessed 28/03/2017].

[939] J. Bossuyt, 'Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Report'. *Maastricht: ECDPM,* (2016). p.25

[940] AU *AFISMA Transfers its Authority to MINUSMA.* Available online: http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/afisma-transfers-it-authority-to-minusma-01-july-2013.pdf [Accessed 11/04/2018].

[941] AU *Communique* . Available online: https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/5745/2013_371_COMM_C1E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 10/08/2019]. para.10

[942] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/2100 of 25 April 2013* . Available online: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2100 [Accessed 10/08/2020]. para.18

Member State to deploy a national force in support of peacekeeping operations. In Mali, French operation Barkhane supports African forces and the MINUSMA…'[943]

In protest at the UN-backed French state-centric role in Mali, Abuja announced it was withdrawing a significant portion of its troops from MINUSMA shortly after its deployment, '…. partly in protest after a non-Nigerian was named to head Minusma.'[944] This was a significant blow to the newly deployed UN forces. Nigeria's withdrawal of 850 men and women out of the mission's 1200 reflected its resentment over the Francophone grip of the situation,[945] with Senator Iroegbu, a Nigerian security analyst, expressing the government view that 'We feel aggrieved, cheated and disappointed, to say the least…it is an issue of racism and feeling that Nigeria should not be made to feel powerful.'[946]

8.3.5.1 ECOWAS actorness in the Malian case

Proceeding from the facts of the Malian case, this sub-section will demonstrate ECOWAS' actorness relative to its role in dealing with the crisis. This is done with reference to the actorness criteria set out in this thesis, autonomy, recognition and capacity.

8.3.5.1.1 Malian civil war and ECOWAS' autonomy

With reference to the definition of autonomy as an actorness criterion in this thesis, this sub-section examines ECOWAS' autonomy in respect of the Malian case. Firstly, similar to the reaction to the coup in Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS was first to react to the coup in Mali. Its swift condemnation of the coup and imposition of sanctions under the auspices of ECOWAS [947] indicated the functioning of its autonomous structures. Moreover, ECOWAS' engagement with extra-regional actors, especially in respect of AFISMA, was built on its decision to intervene militarily in Mali, [948] further

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[943] Permanent mission of France to the United Nations *France's Role at the United Nations.* Available online: https://onu.delegfrance.org/France-s-role-at-the-United-Nations-10352 [Accessed 24/01/2018]. para.5

[944] BBC *Nigeria 'to Withdraw some Troops from Mali.* Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23369865 [Accessed 10/08/2019]. para.11

[945] Bossuyt, 'Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Report'.

[946] A. Powles et al., *United Nations Peacekeeping Challenge: The Importance of the Integrated Approach*Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2015). p.198

[947] F. C. Onuoha and A. Thurston, 'Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns'. *Al Jazeera Center for Studies,* (2013), 2-5. p.2

[948] Caparini, 'The Mali Crisis and Responses by Regional Actors'. , 15 p.7

demonstrating its autonomous decision-making power. Finally, even MINUSMA, over which ECOWAS/AU and the UN disagreed, was a continuation of a multinational military presence built on the ECOWAS/AU initiative that produced the AFISMA mission which MINUSMA replaced. ECOWAS thus showed supra-nationality in respect of its member states and autonomy by getting them to support AFISMA. Conversely, the disagreement in respect of MINUSMA showed ECOWAS' limitation relative to the UN pertaining to its autonomous decision making.

Having demonstrated ECOWAS' actorness in respect of its autonomy, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' autonomy in respect of the Malian civil war will be discussed in sub-section 8.3.5.3.

8.3.5.1.2 Malian civil war and ECOWAS' recognition

Building on the preceding sub-section and with reference to the definition of recognition as an actorness criterion in this thesis, it is argued in this sub-section that ECOWAS' autonomous structures were recognised relative to its role in Mali. First, from within the ECOWAS membership, the centre stage that ECOWAS took in coordinating its member states, crucially Nigeria's response to the crisis under the sponsorship of ECOWAS, shows recognition of ECOWAS' supra-nationality. The emphasis is once again put on Nigeria because of its standing in the sub-region in terms of smart power; Nigeria's desire to act through ECOWAS is indicative of its recognition of the institutions sub-regional role and standing. Beyond the sub-region, ECOWAS' engagement with the AU, the UN, and member states of these bodies was an indication of external recognition. The AU's approval of ECOWAS' proposals, initiatives and leadership of the process, resulting in their collaboration over resourcing AFISMA is evidence of AU recognition, [949] as is their joint engagement with the UN, especially regarding AFISMA.[950] The UN's engagement with and acknowledgement of ECOWAS' Malian initiatives and efforts similarly shows New York's recognition of ECOWAS, although the subsequent disagreement between the UN and ECOWAS/AU over MINUSMA equally shows the limits of this.

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[949] Maru, 'African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA): Military Ahead of Politics'.
[950] UN News *UN Security Council Authorizes African-Led Intervention Force in Mali.*

Having shown ECOWAS actorness in relation to recognition, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' recognition in respect of the Malian case will be discussed in sub-section 8.3.5.3.

8.3.5.1.3 Malian civil war and ECOWAS' capacity

Building on the two preceding sub-sections and with reference to the definition of capacity as an actorness criterion in this thesis, this sub-section examines ECOWAS' capacity relative to the Malian crisis. Starting with diplomatic capacity, ECOWAS' long-standing diplomatic engagements, using its structural mechanisms and human resources to resolve crises provide manifest evidence of this. One example is the ECOWAS constituted mediation team, led by Blaise Compaoré, which constituted part of the peace process.[951] Moreover, as with other cases discussed, when diplomacy failed to yield the needed peace and security, ECOWAS also manifested material capacity, albeit to a limited extent in this instance. Whilst AFISMA was formally a continental collective action under the auspices of ECOWAS and the AU, the sheer dominance of ECOWAS member states, notably Nigeria, in terms of financial and military contribution attests to ECOWAS' material capacity.[952] Nigeria's contribution supports the claim that ECOWAS has material capacity, because it was made in support of and explicitly ECOWAS' agenda. At the same time, however, Nigeria's dominant contribution indicates a weakness in ECOWAS' material capacity, because of its huge reliance on Nigeria. This explains the delayed military intervention by ECOWAS and the need to call for material support from the international community for an effective ECOWAS intervention.[953]

Having demonstrated ECOWAS' actorness in respect of capacity, how the roles of Nigeria and France enhanced and undermined ECOWAS' capacity in respect of the Malian civil war will be discussed in sub-section 8.3.5.3.

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[951] A. Niang, 'Blaise Compaoré in the Resolution of the Ivorian Conflict: From Belligerent to Mediator-in-Chief'. *Social Science Research Council,* (2016), 1-30. p.5
[952] Agande *Nigeria Expends N7bn on Troops, Logistics to Mali – Jonathan* .
[953] France24 *ECOWAS Calls for UN-Backed Intervention to Reclaim North.* Available online: https://www.france24.com/en/20120707-mali-ecowas-tuareg-al-qaeda-rebels [Accessed 17/06/2020].

8.3.5.2   Mali: Nigeria's hegemony and France's counter-hegemony

      With reference to the adopted criteria of hegemony/counter-hegemony, it is argued in this sub-section that Nigeria and France demonstrated West African hegemony and counter-hegemony respectively in respect of the Malian case.

      First, on material power, it is important to indicate that both Nigeria and France manifested this quality in respect of Mali. While Nigeria focused on sub-regional and continental efforts in this respect, France focused on bilateral and global efforts. It is from this perspective that Nigeria is described as a hegemon in respect of material power, given its commitment to sub-regional collective success and ownership of the mission. This position is supported by the fact that Nigeria made the biggest force contribution to AFISMA and was one of the biggest financial and logistical contributors as well.[954] Conversely, France's material contribution to ECOWAS was only through the international voluntary contribution to AFISMA organised by AU. France was thus not directly part of AFISMA, hence the concerns about possible cooperation challenges between its forces and AFISMA.[955] This was a limitation in respect of France's material power manifestation from the perspective of sub-regional cooperation. Specifically, the attribution of counter-hegemony to France in respect of material power is based on two grounds. The first is the fact that, its military contribution was also limited relative to Nigeria in respect of their respective support to the multinational intervention. The second is the fact that France's support to the multinational effort in a parallel fashion amounted to duplication of efforts, given that an effective collaboration would have further enhanced a Nigerian-led AFISMA materially.

      With regards to vision, Nigeria remained consistent in its support for ECOWAS' ownership of West African security governance as part of its sub-regional vision. This explains its support for the AU and ECOWAS' quest to own AFISMA and MINUSMA in terms of leadership, the commitment of considerable material resources to the mission, and its protest when ECOWAS was denied leadership of MINUSMA. Similarly, France

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[954] Agande *Nigeria Expends N7bn on Troops, Logistics to Mali – Jonathan* .
[955] African heritage *First Media Interview: Major General Shehu Usman Abdulkadir, the Head ECOWAS-Mission in Mali (AFISMA).*

also acted in line with its West African vision to maintain a key role in the sub-region's security governance through state-centric and bilateral means. What determines the positions of Nigeria and France as hegemon and counter-hegemon respectively in this case is that fact that, from within the sub-region, it was Nigeria's vision that attracted greatest acceptance and support.

As argued in respect of the preceding cases, the prominence of both Nigeria and France regarding the Malian case indicates hegemonic willingness on the part of both states. First, the claim of Nigeria's hegemonic willingness is based on its key role in sub-regional and continental decisions relating to the crisis and the willingness to lead the ECOWAS/AU military intervention, manifested through its material contribution which as pointed out above, was unmatched in the continent. France's willingness manifested itself through its attempt to reserve a role for itself as a former colonial power, rather than through direct support of ECOWAS and/or AU initiatives, as illustrated through the operation of different commands during AFISMA. What identifies Nigeria as the hegemonic power in this regard is the fact that its willingness was embraced by the rest of the sub-region – and, indeed, the continent - whereas France's willingness was rebutted, albeit unsuccessfully, as is demonstrated by ECOWAS and AU opposition to later French-initiated UN involvement in the case.

Nigeria clearly showed beneficence in Mali through its material contribution to AFISMA and MINUSMA, and crucially it did this through support for an ECOWAS-centred sub-regional agenda rather than a state-centric approach. France also showed beneficence through its contribution to AFISMA and its own military contingent sent to Mali to contribute to bringing about peace.[956] However, France's beneficence from a sub-region perspective was limited, since it was exercised on a bilateral basis rather than through a sub-region coordinated ECOWAS/AU mission. In the Malian case, therefore, Nigerian beneficence can be categorised as hegemonic because it was exercised and embraced through the sub-region's institution (ECOWAS) and wider membership,

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[956] Aubyn, 'Policing and Peace Operations in Africa: Reflections on MINUSMA'. p.9

whereas France's, in contrast, was effectively imposed on the sub-region, at times in the face of explicit opposition to it.

From the preceding discussions of willingness and beneficence it should already be clear that Nigeria's sub-regional hegemonic standing was widely recognised by fellow West African states in the Mali case. Further evidence of this can also be seen in the privileged leadership position Abuja was accorded in respect of the command of AFISMA.[957] However, external recognition of Nigeria's hegemonic status was shown to be more limited, as evidenced by the UN's appointment of Rwanda, a non-West African state, to the leadership of MINUSMA.[958] However, what is important to note here is that this was contrary to the position of ECOWAS and the member states of the sub-region - including, of course, Nigeria. The external nature of this non-recognition does not void its significance, but given the strong intra-sub-regional support for Nigeria, it does reduce significantly its impact in terms of an assessment of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic standing. Recognition of France's role emanated from two sources, Mali's own bilateral acceptance of French action as the first state to intervene militarily, and secondly, the UN backing which it received for its maintenance of a command structure parallel to those of AFISMA and MINUSMA.[959] Since the recognition received by France came mainly from an extra-regional source and that it was in conflict with the collective sub-regional position, leads to France being classed as a counter-hegemon to Nigeria.

As the preceding discussions indicate, Nigeria's hegemonic standing with regard to the Malian case was significantly bolstered by the institutional penetration afforded it by ECOWAS. However, Abuja's failure to secure UN approval of its leadership of MINUSMA, and indeed the inability of ECOWAS/AU to further Nigeria's ambitions in that regard, shows that Nigeria and ECOWAS/AU have limited extra-regional institutional penetration. Once again, France's position is a mirror image of Nigeria's. It showed limited sub-regional recognition, due most obviously to its non-membership of

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[957] T. Haastrup and E. Lopez Lucia, 'Nigeria and Regional Security'. *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper no.RSCAS,* 49, (2014). p.3

[958] S. Rietjens and A. W. Dorn 'The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence: The UN's Laboratory in Mali', in F. Baudet, et al. (ed.), *Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali* (Hague: Asser press, 2017), 197-219. p.204

[959] UNSC *UN Doc. S/RES/2100 of 25 April 2013 .* para.18

ECOWAS, but also as a consequence of its well-established practices of operating outside of, and often contrary to, the organisation. But France's extra-regional institutional penetration, afforded through its privileged position within the UNSC, was highly evident in the case, both in what it gave to France – namely the ability to participate militarily independent of UN-sanctioned multinational missions - and what it took from Nigeria – namely operational leadership of MINUSMA. The leverage that France can exert through the UN is clearly important, but in terms of institutional penetration with regard to West Africa it is essential to recall that hegemony must be based on consent from within a given international setting, and in this regard Paris is sorely lacking. Conversely, whilst ECOWAS (at which Nigeria prevails relative to France) is, in many ways, subordinate to the UN (where France prevails relative to Nigeria), in the context of West African hegemonic rivalry, it is the former that is most significant. Hence, in relation to this criterion, Nigeria is the hegemon and France the counter-hegemon.

This sub-section has demonstrated the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic manifestations of both Nigeria and France relative to the Malian case with reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria set out in this thesis. How this impacted on the sub-regional cooperation and ownership of the peace process is discussed next.

8.3.5.3 Case Conclusions: Hegemony, Counter-hegemony and ECOWAS' collective security coordination and ownership - the cases of Mali.

With reference to the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria and the criteria of actorness set out in this thesis, this sub-section shows how Nigeria's hegemony supported ECOWAS' actorness and sub-regional collective ownership of the Malian peace process. The sub-section also shows how France's counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS' actorness and sub-regional collective security in Mali.

Proceeding from the argument in this chapter that Nigeria's focus has always been on sub-regional collective security cooperation, Nigeria's material power contributed towards ECOWAS' successful actorness and ownership of the Malian peace process. This was in line with Abuja's hegemonic vision of preventing extra-regional ownership of West African security governance[960] and its willingness to show leadership in support of

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[960] See Chapter Four (section 4.4)

ECOWAS' actorness. Nigeria's choice to act in a collective sprit under ECOWAS constituted a clear endorsement of ECOWAS' autonomy and recognition of the supra-nationality of the organisation's autonomous structures. Nigeria's beneficence in the Mali case, directed at building ECOWAS' material capacity, not only enhanced ECOWAS' capacity, but also gave it a sense of ownership of the intervention. Moreover, Abuja's smart power approach and built on persuasion, enhanced sub-regional cooperation. This consensus-based approach was needed in view of the historical Francophone/Anglophone divide, which has impacted negatively on past sub-regional cooperation efforts, such as the case of Liberia. Like the other cases discussed in this thesis, the Mali case shows that the relationship between Nigeria and ECOWAS is symbiotic. Nigeria's key role in Mali was facilitated by its membership of ECOWAS which offered Abuja a platform through which it could engage with fellow West African states, facilitate cooperative action, and in so doing enhance its own hegemonic standing. Meanwhile, Nigeria's approach to ECOWAS bolsters the organisation's sub and extra-regional standing by enhancing its actorness and hence its ability to take ownership sub-regional security issues.

While Nigeria's hegemony enhanced ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of the Malian peace process, France's extra-regional counter-hegemony undermined it. Firstly, whilst France made a significant contribution materially, and particularly militarily, to efforts to resolve the crisis, the fact that it neither handed command of its forces over to AFISMA nor aligned with it showed that Paris wanted to claim part ownership of the mission. Similarly, French forces were not incorporated into MINUSMA, despite the fact that it came into being at France's instigation.[961] This approach was in furtherance of France's West African vision of not wanting to cede influence to Nigeria and to be seen by the sub-region's members and the wider world as an extra-territorial leader in West Africa. But as shown, France pursues this vision at ECOWAS' expense. The state-centric, parallel approach described above diminishes ECOWAS' actorness by blurring lines of command and, as a consequence, reducing operational effectiveness. Meanwhile, by driving the Mali case through the UNSC and removing Nigeria from its leadership role

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[961] Caparini, 'The Mali Crisis and Responses by Regional Actors'. , 15 p.10

in the crisis in the face of direct opposition from ECOWAS, French policies also impacted very negatively of ECOWAS' ownership of major sub-regional security issue.

In line with the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria as well as the actorness criteria set out in this thesis, this sub-section has shown that while Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony enhanced ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of the Malian peace process, France's extra-regional counter-hegemony undermined ECOWAS' effective actorness and ownership of the peace process.

This section has contrasted France's attitude to non-Francophone West African states where it has less influence, and Francophone West African states where it has relatively more influence. It has shown that unlike the cases discussed in the preceding section, France has relied on its bilateral relations with the Francophone states and its extra-regional institutional influence to maintain a role for itself in West African security governance, depriving Nigeria of absolute sub-regional influence by impinging on a significant element of its sub-regional sphere of interest and leadership. This reaffirms France's counter-hegemony, given that France's mandate largely emanates from outside of West Africa and does not extend to cover all of it.

8.4 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter applied the theoretical frameworks of hegemony, counter-hegemony and actorness to four selected cases to test the hypothetical claims of the thesis. On the main claim, it has been shown that the interaction between Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony and France's extra-regional counter-hegemony has undermined ECOWAS' ability to coordinate and own sub-regional collective security. In proving this claim the chapter demonstrated the actorness of ECOWAS relative to each of the cases analysed using the actorness criteria set out in the thesis. It then proceeded to establish that there were challenges regarding cooperation and ownership of the sub-region, drawing a correlation between ECOWAS' established actorness and the collective security coordination and ownership challenge in respect of each case to the interactions between hegemony and counter-hegemony.

The first sub-hypothetical claim of the thesis, namely that Nigeria's hegemony supports sub-regional collective security cooperation and ownership through the actorness of ECOWAS, was also proven through an analysis of the four cases. It was

shown that Nigeria's hegemony emanates from within the sub-region and that Abuja focused on sub-regional collective approaches to all the cases. This approach gives Nigeria a wider sub-regional scope to manifest its hegemonic responsibility, which explains its participation in all four cases. In support of the claim that Nigeria's hegemony is supported by sub-regional cooperation and ECOWAS' ownership of West African security governance, it was shown that Nigeria did not intervene unilaterally in any of the four cases considered and throughout each Abuja put ECOWAS at the centre of its efforts.

The chapter also demonstrated the challenges Nigeria faces in the application of its hegemony and the impact that this has on ECOWAS, proving the second hypothetical claim that France's counter-hegemony impedes ECOWAS actorness in coordinating and owning sub-regional collective security. The chapter argued that France's approach centres on bilateral action, legitimised through extra-regional institutional support, mainly from the UN. Paris' need to resort to extra-regional actors in this way reaffirms the claim that it is the extra-regional counter-hegemon. It has also been shown that, unlike Nigeria, France has a propensity, at least initially, to intervene on a bilateral basis, although a multinational is adopted subsequently. Significantly, whether acting bilaterally or multilaterally, France maintains a state-centric stance; in no case has it acted under the auspices of ECOWAS. It is thus concluded that the diametrically opposed approaches of Nigeria and France undermine ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of West African security issues.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a general conclusion to the whole thesis. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections summarise the research findings of the thesis. In doing so, the first section summarises the answers to the research questions whilst the second demonstrates how the hypothetical claims of the thesis were proven. The third section highlights the thesis' contributions and the final points to the parameters of the thesis with a view to identifying areas of possible further research.

9.2 Research findings

This section summarises findings in respect of the central theme of the thesis which centred on an analysis of ECOWAS' actorness challenges in collective security coordination and ownership vis-à-vis the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interaction between Nigeria and France. The findings are presented by first summarising the answers to the theoretical and empirical research questions upon which the thesis was based.

9.2.1 What are hegemony and counter-hegemony relative to international cooperation?

In respect of this question, it is argued in the thesis that hegemony is best understood to mean leadership by a state that is characterised by the application of smart power to international engagements with other states. The thesis also argued that the concept of counter-hegemony, relatively new in the academic literature, is similarly best explained in relation to the exercise of smart power. It is argued in the thesis that hegemony and counter-hegemony go beyond being the materially most powerful actor in a region or sub-region; they necessitate a broader spectrum of criteria which cumulatively give a hegemon a smart power character. Thus, from a smart power perspective, a theoretical framework was developed to understand hegemony and counter-hegemony comprising of six criteria, namely: material power; vision; willingness; beneficence; recognition; and institutional penetration.

Using the above criteria as an analytical framework against which competing aspirants for hegemony can be judged, the thesis further argued that counter-hegemony comes about when a regional or sub-regional hegemon is challenged either from within or outside of the region or sub-region. The concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony are, therefore, distinguished in this thesis based on which hegemonic-seeking state

cumulatively fulfils these criteria better than its competitors in a regional or sub-regional context. The thesis proceeded to argue that where there is hegemony without counter-hegemony, international cooperation is smooth and effective. This is supported by the notion of hegemony adopted in this thesis given its association with persuasion rather than with coercive power. The thesis showed that conversely, where there is hegemonic and counter-hegemonic competition, as in the case of the West African sub-region, cooperation and effectiveness of sub-regional cooperation, including over collective security, is challenged.

Finally, in terms of this part of the thesis' theoretical framework, it is argued that hegemony and counter-hegemony are regional or sub-regional phenomena and not global. This view is supported in the thesis by the enormity of hegemonic responsibilities and the inherent character of great power states of all generations to prevent a global hegemony in favour regional or sub-regional ones.

9.2.2 How do hegemony and counter-hegemony manifest in the context of West Africa?

In answering this question, it is argued in the thesis that three states lead in terms of influence and interest in the West African sub-region: Nigeria; France; and the USA. The thesis further argued that the USA's wide spread influence globally does not manifest itself as strongly in West Africa relative to Nigeria and France. The thesis went further to conclude that, based on the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic criteria set out in the thesis, Nigeria is the West African hegemon and France is the extra-regional counter-hegemon. This position has been supported by an analysis of the strength of both states relative to each of the six criteria, as summarised below.

Firstly, from a material power perspective, Nigeria may not be as powerful as France, but Abuja has manifested material power sub-regionally across the board, whereas France's material power manifestation largely focuses on the sub-region's Francophone states. Consequently, in the specific context of West Africa, Nigeria is considered to be ahead of France in terms of material power.

Secondly, both Nigeria and France have visions for the sub-region in support of their hegemonic aspirations. Nigeria's vision is about West African ownership of sub-regional security governance through ECOWAS. France's vision is based on state-centric influence in the security governance the sub-region, a position it adheres to even when endorsing multilateral approaches to issues. Crucially – and despite the challenges facing

ECOWAS as it attempts to fully realise its role within Nigeria's vision - it is Abuja's vision that is most widely accepted by West Africa's member states. This puts Nigeria ahead of France in terms of sub-regional hegemonic vision, identifying, in terms of this criterion, the former as the hegemon and the latter as the counter-hegemon.

The conspicuous interests of Nigeria - expressed through official statements and foreign policy content – and France – evident most prominently through actual foreign policy – has resulted in a willingness for West African hegemony. This willingness to assume West African hegemony is manifested by the beneficence of both states in relation to West African sub-regional security governance. This claim has been supported by their respective material contributions to West African peace and security. But as with material power, Nigeria's willingness and beneficence are wider in scope than France's, with the former's being sub-region-wide and the latter's francophone-centric. Consequently, in relation to these two criteria, it is Nigeria that is shown to be the hegemon and France the counter-hegemon. The wider scope of Nigeria's willingness and beneficence has also resulted in it receiving more extensive sub-regional recognition of its hegemonic standing than France. Moreover, in view of Nigeria's sheer significance in the politics of West Africa, there can be no hegemonic state in West Africa that is not recognised by Nigeria. Consequently, with regard to this criterion, it is once again Nigeria that is able to shown the strongest hegemonic standing, with France standing as the counter-hegemon.

The sub-regional hegemonic standing of both states is enhanced by institutional penetration, but whilst in Nigeria's case this emanates from within the West African sub-region via ECOWAS, France's institutional influence emanates from outside of the sub-region, primarily via the UN and EU. The impact of Nigeria's institutional penetration is amplified by its indigenous nature, coupled with the fact that ECOWAS is exclusively concerned with the sub-region, meaning that whilst the UN is formally the predominant international organisation, in terms of this criterion it is yet again Nigeria that is the West African hegemony and France the extra-regional counter-hegemony.

9.2.3   What is the concept of actorness?

This question was meant to serve as the basis to understand ECOWAS actorness, based on which we can also understand the impact of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interaction on ECOWAS' collective security actorness. It is argued that regional organizational actorness, as in the case of ECOWAS, proceeds on the concept of regionness. Regionness denotes collective purpose, so in addition to it helping us move

away from a purely geographic understanding of a region which encounters problems in terms of determining where a particular region begins and ends, it also imbues a region with political meaning. Building on this notion, in this thesis, a region or sub-region is considered as a geographic entity with cohesive factors that bring states both from within the geographic location and beyond together for a common agenda. ECOWAS has thus been analysed in the thesis as a sub-regional West African entity with regionness which centres on economic and security integration. To understand actorness, a theoretical framework was also established. This holds that for an entity such as ECOWAS to be considered as an actor, it must fulfil three main criteria, autonomy, recognition and capacity.

9.2.4 Is the ECOWAS an actor?

In support of the hypothetical claim that ECOWAS is an actor, it was tested against the criteria enumerated above. The thesis first examined whether ECOWAS has autonomy. It showed that, through its decision making structures, comprising an executive, legislative and judiciary with supra-national mandates, ECOWAS has produced protocols that guide member states' domestic policies, that member states adhere to these, and that the institution has sanctioned member states in many of the cases where breaches have occurred. These practices demonstrate ECOWAS' autonomy.

In terms of the second criterion of actorness, the acceptance of the practices noted above constitutes recognition from within the sub-region of the supra-nationality of the institution. Moreover, the thesis demonstrated that recognition of ECOWAS' legitimate international actorness extends to extra-regional entities such as the AU, EU, and UN, at which ECOWAS has observer status.

Finally, in respect capacity, the thesis demonstrated that while ECOWAS has strong diplomatic capacity, it is challenged in material terms. This challenge is attributed to the high poverty levels in its member states and has resulted in ECOWAS' heavy reliance on Nigeria's beneficence. The thesis further argued that while Nigeria has always supported ECOWAS materially, it is increasingly constrained by domestic demands, based on which it is concluded that ECOWAS' material power capacity challenges remain unresolved. Overall therefore, the thesis concludes that ECOWAS is a growing international actor; it has a demonstrable ability to autonomously take and enforce decisions, this is recognised by its member states and extra-regional states and non-state actors, and despite its challenges, it has significant capacity to act.

9.2.5 The impact of Nigerian hegemony and French counter-hegemony on ECOWAS' actorness

The fifth and sixth research questions considered in the thesis related to how Nigeria's hegemony has enhanced ECOWAS' collective security actorness, and how France's extra-regional counter-hegemony has impeded it. In finally being able to consider these questions, the thesis was able to formulate an answer to its core research question, namely: to what extent does Nigeria's hegemony enhance ECOWAS actorness and ownership of sub-regional collective security and, conversely, does France's largely state-centric counter-hegemony undermine these things? In relation to these questions it is argued that Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony has indeed enhanced ECOWAS' actorness and that France's extra-regional counter-hegemony has undermined it. These conclusions are further explored below.

9.3 Hypothetical claims and research outcomes

Taking into consideration to the answers to the research questions summarised above, it is concluded that the three hypothetical claims in the thesis have been proven.

9.3.1 The hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interaction of Nigeria and France has undermined ECOWAS' ability to coordinate and own sub-regional collective security.

The main hypothetical claim of this thesis is that the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic interaction in the sub-region has undermined ECOWAS' coordination and ownership of West African collective security. This claim is proven on the basis that, whilst both Nigeria and France aspire to their different sub-regional visions and have, accordingly, shown a keen interest in ensuring West African peace and security, Nigeria's pursuit of hegemony has been underpinned by acting through and in support of ECOWAS, whereas France adopts a state-centric approach to West African peace and security. These different positions have caused disagreements at critical times for the sub-region, undermining ECOWAS' security governance role, its ability to coordinate international cooperation on sub-regional peace and security, and hence the institution's ownership of such issues.

9.3.2 Nigeria's hegemony brings about sub-regional security cooperation and ownership under ECOWAS' actorness.

Building on the diametrically opposed visions of Nigeria and France, it is also shown in the thesis that its second hypothetical claim, namely that Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony enhances ECOWAS' actorness and ownership of West African collective security, is proven. This position is supported by the sub-regional character of its vision and its efforts to achieve this through beneficence that cuts across the sub-region's Francophone/Anglophone/Lusophone divides. The thesis concludes that the attitude of Nigeria has enhanced ECOWAS' material capacity and through this has contributed to its actorness from a capacity perspective.

9.3.3 How has France's extra-regional counter-hegemony impeded ECOWAS' collective security actorness?

The converse of the conclusion in the preceding hypothetical claim proves the final hypothetical claim, namely that France's extra-regional counter-hegemony has undermined and hindered ECOWAS actorness in coordinating cooperation and ownership of West African collective security. This position is supported by Paris' preference to maintain a state-centric posture even when it also supports multilateral peace mission in the West African sub-region.

9.4 Contribution to knowledge

This thesis contributes to knowledge in a number of ways, through: a significant contribution to theoretical debate; the findings of empirical study; and generation of new primary data. The first aspect of the theoretical contribution is through the six-point hegemonic criteria framework that is developed. This framework enhances our understanding of the concept of hegemony through the enumeration and clarification of the criteria themselves and by dispelling the general proposition that liberalism is a mandatory component of hegemony, arguing that consent should be identified as the main focus of any study of hegemony. This position is based on the fact that different hegemonic aspirants can have different hegemonic visions to propagate, of which liberal values or democratic adherence is only one. Another important contribution to knowledge is the thesis' theoretical analysis of counter-hegemony, a hitherto under-explored notion, especially within the International Relations literature. The little that has been written about counter-hegemony focuses on capitalist hegemony and socialist counter-hegemony, whereas this thesis applies its framework on counter-hegemony to regional organisational

actorness challenges. Finally, in theoretical terms, the thesis also adds to the debate regarding the scope of hegemony, arguing that it is only achievable on a regional, as opposed to a global basis

The study of ECOWAS' actorness challenges IN Coordinating sub-regional collective security cooperation and ownership as a result of the interaction between Nigeria's hegemonic and France's counter-hegemonic is empirically new. This is based on the fact that its actorness in coordinating sub-regional collective security and its ownership has not been significantly and comprehensively tested in the literature. The thesis makes a further empirical contribution to knowledge through its application of its claim regarding regional hegemony to a study of West Africa, where an extra-regional counter-hegemonic vision has not been accepted by all member states unlike the sub-regional hegemonic vision.

The thesis also exhibits empirical originality, and hence a contribution to knowledge, through the primary data obtained through interviews and primary documents. Those interviewed were people with deep knowledge of West African politics and security governance. This made it possible for first-hand information to be obtained from the interviews based on which the research proceeded. The interview responses brought about the idea of hegemony and counter-hegemony as concepts to rely on to understand ECOWAS' actorness challenges. As pointed to in Chapter Two, the initial idea was on what was initially termed as multiple hegemony. This was substituted with the idea of counter-hegemony after it became clear from the interviews conducted that multiple-hegemony was not applicable to the West African sub-region.

9.5   Recommendations for further research

Further avenues for research arise from this thesis. It offers the prospect of a geographically broader research agenda, with the analytical frameworks developed in the thesis being transferred and applied beyond the contexts of West Africa and ECOWAS. Where, in other such contexts, there is a regional hegemon which is challenged, the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic and actorness criteria developed in the thesis can be used to analyse the challenges to regional cooperation to which this is likely to lead. Conversely, it also offers the prospect of more tightly focused, issue-based research. Hence, whilst this thesis focused on ECOWAS' collective security coordination and

ownership challenges, more specific aspects of these challenges might also be investigated. One case in point is the issue of international terrorism which is arguably the biggest security challenge facing the West Africa. This requires deeper sub-regional cooperation and thus constitutes an additional research topic to be undertaken in the future. This is based on the notion, formed from the findings of this thesis, that ECOWAS has shown actorness through its several sub-regional security mechanisms. The implication is that ECOWAS is able to address international terrorism in the West African sub-region. However, this can be negatively affected by the interaction between Nigeria's sub-regional hegemony and France's extra-regional counter-hegemony, for which reason a fuller and detailed analysis is required.

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Appendix 1: List of interviewees

Name	Designation	Date	Duration
Prof Vladimir Antwi-Danso	Dean of Academic Affairs, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff training School.	21/06/2017	36.36 minutes
Emmanuel Brigadier general Emmanuel Kotia PhD	Deputy Commandant and lecturer at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre KAIPTC .	12/07/2017	30.18 minutes
Dr Ken Ahorsu	Senior lecturer, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, LECIAD.	14/09/2017	45 minutes
Prof Kwesi Aning	Director Faculty of Academic Affairs & Research, KAIPTC.	1/06/2017	36.31 minutes
Dr Chukwuemeka B. Eze	Executive Director of West African Network for Peace Building, WANEP.	28/08/2017	31.37 minutes
Alimou Diallo	WANEP Liaison Coordinator to ECOWAS.	22/07/2017	59.10 minutes
James Agalga	Former Deputy Minister for the Interior, Ghana.	6/07/2017	42.35 minutes
John Akologo Tia	Former Member of ECOWAS Parliament and Former Information Minister of Ghana.	25/10/2017	31.32 minutes
Kwesi Pratt Jnr	Managing Editor of the Insight News Paper.	17/07/2017	30.02 minutes