The University of Hull

Beyond the Realist Pale
European Community-United States Security Relations 1973-1991

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of Hull

by
Adam Bruce Bronstone, B.A.(Manitoba, Canada), M.A.(York, Canada)

January 1995

Abstract

Beyond the Realist Pale:
European Communtiy-United States Security Relations 1973-1991

This thesis provides an indepth analysis of the 'agency-structure' and related 'level of analysis' debate(s) within International Relations Theory. This analysis will be conducted by examining the evolution of the European Community as a global actor through the prism of its transatlantic relationship with the United States over a twenty year period beginning in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War and ending with the post-Persian Gulf War Kurdish relief effort of 1991. The research will be based on existing secondary and primary sources as well as personal interviews. The thesis seeks to make a contribution to the existing literature on the transatlantic relationship as well as the theoretical debates concerning agency and structure. Three overall research questions are addressed: 1) The role of Agency as a variable to consider in the formulation of foreign policies and the conduct of international relations; 2) The ability for Realism to adequately incorporate the role of Agency within its theoretical framework, and with particular reference to the transatlantic relationship; 3) The validity of the existing and dominant (structural realist in orientation) literature concerning the transatlantic relationship given the possible inability of this literature to adequately incorporate Agency within its explanation of European Community-United States divergences. This thesis argues that the conventional wisdom as to why transatlantic differences occur with respect to a study of three security issues is insufficient for it fails to adequately account for the role of the Agent within the formulation of policy, and the differences that spring forward from these policies. A Realist approach to the European Community - United States relationship can explain, in part, divergences between the Western allies. However, it is concluded that this same Realist approach cannot adequately explain the role of Agency within these divergences and therefore fails to deliver a complete analysis of the reasons behind certain transatlantic disagreements over the past twenty years. While not pointing to a certain theoretical school of thought that can adequately account for the role of Agency in international relations, the thesis will attempt to point the reader in various directions in which further research on the role of Agency may be undertaken.

Acknowledgements

There are many, many people who, over the course of my studies, have aided in the development of not only my ability to analyze, think and question but also, and quite unknowingly, my doctoral thesis. There are simply too many of these people to thank individually for I would obviously leave a considerable number of them out through sheer forgetfulness. That would be quite erroneous, and thus I will thank all them collectively and hope that they accept my apology for not doing anything else. However, while there have been countless people - former students, peers, teachers, supervisors and colleagues - who have helped me develop along the way and while I do not wish to attempt to name all of them, there are a select few who have been more influential in my development at a student of politics and a doctoral student. These are the people who I now wish to thank individually, publicly, and personally.

First and foremost and I would like that thank the various people who taught, educated and guided me through my education, be it at the University of Manitoba and York University, Toronto. It is not enough to say that without these people I may not have been induced to specialize in Political Science as a study, continue that specialization by studying for a Master of Arts degree, and then assisting me in going on to a doctoral program at the University of Hull, United Kingdom. These people I speak of are Prof. Kenneth Reshaur, Prof. Geoffrey Lambert and Prof. James Fergusson at the University of Manitoba, and Prof. David-Leyton Brown and Prof. Stephen Gill at York University. As well, I would like to thank Mr. Michael Slack, the Administrative Director of the York Center for International and Strategic Studies at York University. Michael allowed and encouraged me to pursue my European interests through the Center and to utilize the vast resources of the Center to this end. As well, the year I spent as a researcher at the Center was and will always be remebered as an invaluable experience with respect to my intellectual and academic development.

Secondly, I would like to extend my gratitude to a number of fellow students and friends who have, over the past years, assisted in my own intellectual and academic development through intense debates and discussions concerning the study of Politics over a vast array of subject areas. These people include Joshua Goldstein, Maureen Heibert, Murray Greenfield, Ronald Reider and George Boukouris. Also, I would like to that Pat and Ray Reid of Toronto, as well as my close friends in Hull who have supported along the way during my four years. Finally, a thanks to Ben Williams, who has sat many hours reading over my thesis in search of grammatical errors (the lot of them) and put up with my impatience along the way. The errors that remain are solely mine.

It is a given that one's doctoral supervisors, if one is both blessed and cursed with having a dual supervision as I was, will be significant influences on you and your work in many areas. This has been the case with Prof. Juliet Lodge, Dr. Nicholas Wheeler and Dr. Costas Constantinou. While different in temperament, style and areas of interest, they combined to offer guidance that was instrumental in the completion of my thesis and the attainment of my doctoral degree. I cannot thank them enough for their help.

Last, but not least is my family. My family has always allowed me to decide my own fate, and then actively encouraged me as I traveled down the path that I had chosen for myself. They have always encouragd me to take the path that would allow me to better myself, even if that meant, at different stages, moving away from home to Toronto and, most recently, Hull. Without their support and encouragement, moving away for such an extended period and being able to complete my education would have been difficult to accomplish. Friends and advisors can never take the place of the support of one's family. Consequently, I dedicate this, my first major piece of academic work, to my parents and sisters. May they always be able to be proud of my accomplishments and actions. I do, however, take full responsibility for this work. All errors and misgivings are mine and my own, with no responsibility accruing to anyone associated with my work.

Adam Bronstone
Hull, United Kingdom
January 1995

Table of Contents

List of Appendices

List of Abbreviations

AOPEC	Arab Oil Producing Exporting Countries
BW	BusinessWeek
CoCom	Co-ordinating Comm. for Multilateral Export Controls
CR	Congressional Record
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DHA	Division of Humanitarian Assistance (Germany)
EAD	Euro-Arab Dialogue
EC	European Community
ECHO	EC Humanitarian Office
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
FBIS	Foreign Bureau of Information Service
FT	Financial Times
GATT	General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
G7	Group of Seven
Guard	Guardian Newspaper
HoC	UK House of Commons
HoL	UK House of Lords
IHT	International Herald Tribune
MEI	Middle East International
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NYT	New York Times
ODA	UK Overseas Development Admin.
OJC	Official Journal of the EC
OPC	Operation Provide Comfort
OPH	Operation Poised Hammer
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
SCA	UK Survey of Current Affairs
UN	United Nations
UNSC	UN Security Council
USG	United States Government
WCPD	Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
WP	Washington Post
WSJ	Wall Street Journal

MISSING PAGE/PAGES HAVE NO CONTENT

Chapter One:Theoretical Beginnings

I:Introduction

Before a detailed discussion of transatlantic differences in the area of security studies can begin, a theoretical basis for such a discussion must be set out. Also, prior to assessing the role of 'Agency' and concerns regarding the 'level-of-analysis' question with respect to the study of US-European Community relations, a theoretical underpinning to the thesis must be developed. As noted in the introduction, this basis will be from the perspective of not only the dominant theoretical tradition in International Relations, but as will be illustrated in the third chapter of the thesis, the dominant school of thought in the realm of transatlantic studies. This tradition is that of Political Realism, as defined by the works of academics such as, but not limited to, E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger.

II: High Point of Utopianism

In The Twenty Years' Crisis E.H. Carr points to the creation of the League of Nations as the high point of reason, rational thought and intellect in the Western world in the aftermath of the first world war. The League was an attempt to '...apply the principles of Lockeian liberalism to the building of a machinery of international order...'(Carr, 1939;28) Although aware of the pitfalls of such an experiment, the founders of the institution were of the belief that some type of utopianism, coupled with a pragmatism not found in previously thought of schemes for the deliverance of universal peace, would ensure the success of the League.(Ibid.) However, the language of many documents produced by the member-states of the League through its mechanisms or bilaterally were more utopian than pragmatic. Covenants to outlaw war and the fashioning of mutual security treaties to be generally applicable to other states were illustrations of this tendency.(Ibid., 30) Also, leaders of member-states found it difficult to persuade their respective citizens to their way of thinking, and condemnation of the characteristics of one country by another's leader resulted, as did actual aggression between countries.(Ibid., 39)

The League of Nations was based upon a number of universalistic notions, including a natural harmony of interests between peoples; international economy harmony and co-operation; a common interest in peace; and that intellectual reason would prevail over the use of force.(Ibid., 41-60) However, the absence of the United States and Soviet Union from the activities of the League, the exclusion of Germany and the subsequent inability of the institution to control violence and war, marked the beginning of the end for

the League of Nations, as well as the decline in the power of the Utopian tradition in International Relations.

III. The Rise of Realism

This decline in the intellectual attractiveness of Utopianism was succeeded by the rise of its critique, Realism, first as but a condemnation and then as a school of thought in its own right. This progress is evident in the writing of Carr, where he moves from an espousal of the critical aspects of Realist thought with respect to Utopianism, to the historical bases and core assumptions of Realist thought itself, with the latter being those concepts relating to power, morality and politics.

As to the bases of Realist thought, Carr defines Machiavelli as the first important realist (Ibid., 63), while others may conclude that Thomas Hobbes (Vincent, 1981;91) or Thucydides may have been.(Doyle, 1990;223) Nevertheless, one may agree that from the time of Carr to present those scholars that have come to define Political Realism include Carr, Morgenthau, and Kissinger. However, rather than presenting the ideas of each scholar separately, an elucidation of the assumptions and limitations of Realist thought will be presented as a series of concrete propositions, with a summary and brief notation of recent developments in this school of thought at the end of this chapter. The three propositions that will be noted as encapsulating the core assumptions of Political Realism include the notion of Politics as an objective science; the belief in a separation between the concept of power and morality; and that power can only be asserted through some type of physical presence. These propositions, and the 'claim to knowledge' of this tradition will be explicated below.

A. Proposition I - Objectivism

The modern founders of Political Realism agree on a number of core assumption, the most basic of these being that the study of international relations can only be done from a perspective free of universalistic and absolute principles. Carr's belief is that what truly separates Realism from that of Utopianism has been the former's ability to '...reveal [that] the relative and pragmatic character of thought itself...(Carr, 1939;67-68) Morgenthau's first of six principles of Political Realism also stresses this belief. The author contends that politics '...is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives...(Morgenthau, 1985;4) For both the environment one was situated in had more to do with the makeup of foreign policy and international political interactions than,

for example, universal principles of justice. Theirs was a belief in 'facts on the ground' rather than polite words at conferences.

Henry Kissinger also located himself within this tradition of placing greater faith in 'facts' rather than 'fantasies'. He asserted in his book A World Restored that while Metternich and Castlereagh were very skilful, knowledgeable and inventive foreign diplomats, the international order they assisted in creating was not one founded upon personal intuition. Instead, it was an order based upon the reconciliation between what is just, and what is possible. For Kissinger, as well as Metternich and Castlereagh, what was possible was dependent upon the resources, geographic position and determination of one's own state, as well as similar factors in other states that one has relations.(Kissinger, 1957;5)

Because of the objective nature of politics so defined by Political Realist thought, the interests of a state are not bound by any universal or absolute principles. For Morgenthau this, rather the objective nature of this school of thought, is the true mark of difference between Realism and other theories of international relations. He asserts that this theory's main signpost is that '...interest is defined in terms of power...'(Morgenthau, 5) For Carr this lack of objectivity exposes the true nature of the interests of statesmen claiming a universal interest could be found in a national policy. For him there is the realization that '...absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but...policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time...'(Carr, 87) Again, facts pertaining to the circumstances one is found in rather than fantasies or splendid words are the determining factors behind agreement on national policy. The breakdown of the League of Nations is illustrative of the fragility of the international system when supposedly based on such fantasies, rather than the facts.

B. Proposition II - Power Politics

If interest is defined in terms of power, and this is so because of the objective nature of international relations, then what type of power are Morgenthau, Carr and Kissinger speaking of? The former is explicit in his and Political Realism's recognition of the presence of moral and ethical considerations pertaining to relations between states. That these factors exist is not in doubt; that they are significant in the determination of international relations is. Because of this possible dichotomy between presence and relevance, Morgenthau notes that Realists are '...aware of ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political acts...'(Morgenthau, 10) Because of this tension, in place of the utilization of moral considerations is that of prudence; a prudence based upon the facts at hand and one's knowledge of the

circumstances one finds oneself prior to the onset of negotiations with diplomats from other states.(Ibid., 11)

Kissinger is resolute that while he regards the role of the practitioner as important in the successful conclusion of diplomatic negotiations, he too is aware that the characteristics of these same practitioners are not reliable enough to always guarantee such success. Kissinger, again with respect to Metternich and Castlereagh, notes that '...to rely entirely on the moral purity of an individual is to abandon the possibility of restraint...a denial of nuance, a rejection of history...'(Kissinger, 316) In truth, the two diplomats that he writes of were successful in establishing a peace because they knew better. Both statesmen understood that moral considerations alone could not serve as the basis of a credible and long-lasting peace, and therefore '...no attempt was made to found it [the international order] entirely on submission to a legitimizing principle...'(Ibid., 318) The recognition that states cloak their interests in terms of universal principles, the notion of a harmony of world-wide interests and other such high-minded ideals, while simultaneously attempting to benefit the most from these same policies, is for Carr enough of an illustration that '...morality is the product of power...'(Carr, 80)

C. Proposition III - Militarism

But if power, the interest of all states, cannot be based on universal norms, ethical and moral consideration, or notions pertaining to the harmony of interests that may be found amongst a number of states, then what type and kind of power are Political Realists speaking of? In Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis the author speaks of a number of types of power - military, economic and that which relates to the domination of public opinion by politicians. With respect to the first two, Carr posits that the second, economic power, is an instrument of political power only because of its '...association with the military instrument...'(Carr, 113) As to military power, this type of state resource is so definitive in its ability to dictate circumstances and international diplomacy that it may become an end in itself, rather than just an instrument of policy.(Ibid., 111) The reason behind this grand assumption concerning the status of military power is that the '...*ultima ratio* of power in international relations is war...'(Ibid., 109) And war can only be credibly threatened by one's access to a credible military capability, brought about by economic power. Carr cites Machiavelli, who stated in his work on the founding period of the Holy Roman Empire in modern day Italy that '...there could be no effective morality where there is no effective authority...'(Ibid., 64) Without the force of conviction, and strength to implement that conviction, the conviction becomes meaningless in face of rebellion.

A refinement of this postulation of the primacy of military might, and war, comes through the work of both Morgenthau and Kissinger. Both speak of the balance-of-power

as a guiding principle for the statesmen of their time, be it Metternich and Castlereagh, the founders of the United States, or the leaders of the Soviet Union and USA in the wake of World War Two. Morgenthau makes the point that federations such as the United States or Switzerland were not constructed through appeals to humanitarianism or the pacific element within men, but were '...joined through the pragmatic and prudent use of force...'(Morgenthau, 1958;85) If not for the shadow of force that could be brought to bear if disputes were not settled, then there would be no union of entities such as the United States.

Kissinger returns to the astute political judgement of his two diplomats. The author comments that both understand that what was needed to ensure peace in their time was some sort of balance between the various powers, with Britain maintaining a guarded distance, politically, but ready to join one alliance or the other if need be so as to maintain an effective balance of forces, diplomatically and militarily. Consequently, both statesmen knew that, historically, the balancing of power between rivals has and will continue to be the '...classical expression of the lesson of history that no order is safe without physical safeguards against aggression...'(Kissinger, 317-318)

D. Proposition Four -Claim(s) to Know

Propositions such as those found above concerning the nature of human nature, politics and the world in which man operates can be found in any explication of any tradition and school of thought, albeit with differing outcomes. What makes Political Realism possibly stronger, yet simultaneously more open to criticism, is this last proposition that centers around the tradition's self-proclaimed, explicit and implicit, ability to explain and understand the world as it is, rather than the one that one may wish to operate from. In brief, what marks the initial propositions of Realism is the theory's 'claim to know' with respect to understanding the world.

The most blatant recital of this claim to knowledge is that of Hans Morgenthau. In the author's opening comments to Politics Among Nations he states that there are two differing traditions in modern political thought. His is one that must work with the forces inherent in human nature, rather than against them; a tradition that has a concern for '...human nature as it actually is, and with historical processes as they actually take place...'(Morgenthau, 1958;4) To grasp the differences between this political thought and its antecedent, six fundamental principles will be singled out, for they have been often been misunderstood.(Ibid.) What follows is that - an espousal of the six basic points of Political Realism, as iterated by Morgenthau.

What is interesting to note from these opening paragraphs is the somewhat implicit, and explicit, arrogance of a claim to knowledge, information, facts, and vision on the part

of Political Realists compared to all other political theorists. Supposedly, only this small group of theorists understand the 'world as it is', or can comprehend that it is only through this perspective can the problems of the world be solved, and no other. Those theorists operating from the 'world as it ought to be' are viewing the world from such a perspective that they surely are unable to prescribe solutions, never mind recite a litany of its ailments; and if they do, or if one rejects the tenets of Political Realism, this is so because the latter tradition has been and continues to be 'misunderstood'. This begs the question of who misunderstood Realism and when, but this detail is not mentioned. Suffice it to say that Morgenthau will attempt to 'set the record straight' with respect to Realist thought, and the problems that have and continue to plague mankind.

Neither E.H. Carr nor Henry Kissinger appear to make such sweeping statements in their recitations of Political Realism, or their critique of other theoretical positions as being, bluntly, ignorant. Nonetheless, this same claim to knowledge is implicit in their work. For Kissinger Metternich and Castlereagh were the diplomatic success stories of their time only in part because of their skills and political abilities. In the main they were successful because they understood the world as it operated, and they implicitly utilized the core assumptions of Political Realism in order to fashion their long peace. Their concerns for a balance-of-power and the possible use of force were the main causal factors with respect to the stability of the European continent, and not the 'Europeaness' of their peers and their own diplomatic skills. Implicit in this analysis is that had either or both perceived the world from a different viewpoint, peace and stability would not have come to Europe, because their regard for 'excellence' and political abilities would not had been enough; there would have been nothing to fill the void left by Political Realism, save for references to universal harmony and abstract ethical and moral considerations.

Even though Carr notes a number of limitations in the Realist perspective, and those criticisms will be utilized by this author, a similar implicit claim to knowledge exists in his work. There is no doubt that the League of Nations, and the political thought which infused that institution, were faulty. There were and remain today many grievous assumptions in Utopian thought, many of those highlighted by Carr himself. Consequently, many statesmen and theorists were forced to abandon this theoretical tradition and search for another that may be more adequate with respect to the 'facts on the ground', as they were in the mid to late 1930s. To this end Carr turns toward Political Realism, and no other tradition. Of course it must be noted that Neorealism and variants of Behaviouralism and Scientific Realism were not as developed, if at all in the case of Neorealism, as Political Realism. As such, this latter tradition appears to be the obvious candidate for a person in Carr's position - a theorist searching for a theory. But is Political Realism *the* answer? Does Carr expand on his critique of Political Realism and examine any other tradition, or merely acknowledge the deficiencies of Realism and move on away?

It is this that appears to be so for Carr; there is either Theory A, or B, and if the first does not suffice, then surely, or almost by default, the other must; and one must leave it at that.

Of course the above is an exaggeration of the case against Political Realism, but comparisons between Utopianism, Realism and any other theoretical position do not take place in Carr's work. It appears that it is taken for granted that Realism can and will answer the questions provoked by the 1930s, or the 'Twenty Years' Crisis', as Carr notes. To this end Carr is like Kissinger, and both are slightly less than Morgenthau in the situating of Political Realism at the pinnacle of the modern theoretical ladder. It is this placement that this author refers to as the 'claim to know', and which appears to be acceptable to Morgenthau. Returning to his opening paragraphs, Morgenthau appears so convinced of the success of his project that he invites and welcomes the judgement of others. The author states that a theory such as his must be subject to empirical and pragmatic tests; by its purpose in its ability to '...bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible...'(Ibid., 3) And so this thesis shall pick up on this 'claim to know' and invitation to judgement; the task of the thesis, set out in its introduction, is to test the ability of Political Realism, the dominant tradition in transatlantic security studies, to comprehensively explain and understand three case studies of interaction between the United States and the European Community in the realm of security relations, form 1973 through to 1991. It will be a test based on empirical evidence and eye witness accounts; on facts and figures; on verbatim texts; on original documents, where and when available; on the 'world as it is' rather than how it ought to be; on the issues of war and peace; on the territory, so to speak, of the modern day Political Realist. This will be a test then, at the end of the day, that will judge whether or not Political Realism can exert a 'claim to knowledge', or unlike the Carrs, Morgenthaus and Kissingers of the world, one needs to continue to search for a theory, but this time a theory that *works*, compared to one that does not.

E. Historical Roots

Without doubt all of these positions with respect to the status of military power and the balancing of forces could return this discussion to not only the work of Machiavelli and Hobbes, who posited that men were in a continual state of war armed like gladiators ready to do battle, but the first Realist, Thucydides. It was his historical description of the Peloponnesian War between the Greek and Athenian empires that returns one to the very roots of Realist thought. Thucydides claimed that it was the '...growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused Sparta...' that prompted the war. The historian describes a situation of two bitter rival city-states locked into a state of war and buttressed by an arms race; a situation that, given a change in the correlation and credibility of forces, forced the

hand of one into taking a pre-emptive military action. Furthermore, this was a situation where the Athenians were self-assured of their abilities. Prior to the 'Melian Debate', the leaders of Athens told the former that the '...strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what have to accept...' Appeals to universal principles, a harmony of interest among city-states or universalistic notions of justice were not made, nor would they have saved the Melians; also, powerful states did not cloak their intentions in grandiose statements or their own appeals to higher goals; their interest was nothing less than the attainment of power through the use of military force, if need be. While Athens also appealed to other, more positive instincts within the human character (see Doyle, 1990;228), Thucydides makes the point that the Melian appeal to justice prior to being attacked fell on deaf ears.(Ibid., 234) This is to say that the Athenians understood that one could invoke sentiments concerning justice as long as one had a credible enough military power to make these sentiments strong enough to mention.

The same is true of the writings of Hobbes and, as illustrated by the use of his work by E.H. Carr, Machiavelli and his work The Prince. In both of these works there is a rejection of a significant role for universal ideals, moral and ethical considerations, and actions carried out by actors for the interest of all. Hobbes states that '...no man giveth, but with the intention of Good to himself...[as such] interests dissolve, and [actors] fall again into Warre...'(Hobbes, 1651;225) Because of the self-interested of actors (read:states) and tendency towards a continuous state of war, if not in actuality, peace will not arrive without the creation of an imposed Leviathan. The author asserts that '...if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice...without a common Power to keep them all in awe...then there neither would be, nor need be any Civil Government...'(quoted in Vincent, 1991;97) The reason why no overarching authority would be required is that peace would come without subjection.(Ibid.) However, the realm of relations between states is different from that inside one; and without the presence of a world authority anarchy rules, as well as notions tied to self-interest and the defense of the national interest. Since the state of relations in an anarchic world is one of poised gladiators (quarrelling states), then the type of power that is required for the very survival of a state is not that which relates to morality and ethical considerations, but military strength.

Machiavelli's The Prince is of similar thoughts whith respect to the state of Italian politics. Like those before him, Machiavelli's ideal Prince would be a person who rejects the notion that there are universal norms or ethical and moral standards that one should tie oneself to. This is so because '...some things seem to be virtuous, but if they are put into practice will be ruinous...(Machiavelli, 1977;XV) A Prince must do what is necessary and beneficial for himself and his subjects, not what is 'right' or morally just. To this end interest is defined in narrow terms of political power, and the Prince must do whatever is

necessary in order to retain such power. This is why the Prince must act and think in a very specific manner, according to Machiavelli. The Prince must not attempt to be 'good' or virtuous at all times; doing so will inevitably lead to his downfall.(Ibid., XV) Experience illustrates that those who are more fraudulent than truthful are apt to attain and maintain power longer than those who do otherwise. As well, the thoughts of the Prince should be singularly directed to the concept, practice and art of war. Machiavelli is adamant that the Prince should '...have no other object, no other thought, no other subject of study, than war...'(Ibid., XIV)

Machiavelli's priorization of war is based upon two generalized experiences that he shares with the reader. The first is that unarmed prophets always lose, whereas armed ones do not; and that when '...princes have thought more about the refinement of life than about war, they have lost their positions...(see VI and XIV) Nevertheless, Machiavelli is not as one-dimensional as he appears to be. There are elements of the author that presume that he has some sensibility in him with respect to this advice that he is lending to prospective rulers. Compassion, luck (virtu), judgement, humanity and generosity, albeit with a large degree of prudence, should be the various traits of a leader. As well, Machiavelli, while eventually coming down on the side of the use of force, at times speaks of the need to complement the 'beast' with than of the 'man' inside of him. This combination will be crucial for the maintenance of one's rule for '...one without the other has no lasting effect...'(Ibid., XVIII)

Therefore what is one to make of the theorist who has generally become known as one of the founders of Political Realism. Is he as 'nasty, brutish and short' as Hobbes, or replete with the notion that war is inevitable between groups such as Sparta and Athens such as the case is with Thucydides? Certainly there are aspects of Machiavelli that belie the image that has been created around him since the publication of The Prince. However, in the main Machiavelli is one who asserts that power is a goal that can usually only be attained and sustained through force, and that given the natural tendencies of men, the Prince should do everything that he can, whether that be a forsaking of principles or the committing of fraudulent act in order to reach his goal, minimalist as it is. To this end Machiavelli is no different from Hobbes or Thucydides, and the initial three propositions of Political Realism stated above. Consequently, these three historical figures, coupled with those from the middle part of the Twentieth century, have furnished the intellectual roots of what has become the dominant tradition in the field of International Relations - Political Realism. It is this tradition that will utilized as the 'sounding board' for the remainder of the thesis; testing, probing and judging it along the way to see whether this tradition is the conventional wisdom of transatlantic studies; whether this tradition can explain the growth of the European Community as an actor in world politics; and whether this tradition can account for, in three specific and different case studies, significant

differences between the European Community and its member-states and the United States of America.

IV:The Limitations of Realism

Because of the demands that will be placed upon Political Realism, the illustration of its core assumptions through the espousal of a number of propositions is *necessary*, but not *sufficient*. An initial recital of what are perceived to be the limitations of this same school of thought also requires some illumination, in order to assess adequately the abilities of Political Realism, or lack thereof. For this task this thesis has some already provided assistance; not only did Carr produce a concise work on the core assumptions of Realist thought, but also included sections detailing what he considered to be the limitations and failings of this same school of thought. Those, coupled with criticisms shared by other scholars, combine to allow one to focus on not only what is useful concerning Political Realism, but also what may require correction. Also, these initial limitations lend one some insight to the project of this thesis - an attempt to discover weaknesses within Realist thought with respect to the study of transatlantic relations within the field of security studies. As was done with the propositions of Realism, the work of a variety of scholars will be grouped together within similar propositions, thus allowing one, with some ease, to return to them at any stage throughout the thesis and examine the strengths, and weaknesses, of this tradition called Realism.

For E.H. Carr the critique of Utopianism by the theoretical forces of Political Realism does not suffice in itself. The exposure of the deficiencies within the latter project is also necessary for a richer understanding of the world of international relations. Consequently, Carr lists four major points with respect to the limitations of Realism, including the lack of a finite goal; the absence of an emotional appeal and a right of moral judgement; and a ground for action aside from that of prudence and circumstance.(Carr, 89) With direct reference to the project of this thesis, additional limitations in the Realist articulation of international relations also appear, including the reification of the State to the detriment of non-state actors as autonomous units of action and, somewhat like Carr, the disposal of the personal attributes of diplomats and the environment from which they are products.

A. Limitation I - Emotional Appeals

If interest defined as power is the primary goal of the State, or that military power can become an end in itself because of the state in which these actors operate in, then what do these actors aspire to, rather than just being and surviving the next military

engagement? While Machiavelli mentions the freeing of Italy from the Barbarians in the last chapter of The Prince, it is only that, a remark made at the end of a book that is considered by most academics as one of the pre-eminent Realist works of all time, along with that of Thucydides and Hobbes. The notion of existing for the sake of existing, however, goes well with the absence of an emotional appear to the masses, for if there is no goal, there does need to be an emotional appear to the masses. Consequently, the leadership of the State need not attempt to search for an appeal that would require a connection, even at the most superficial of levels, between the leadership and masses of the State.

This lack of an emotional appeal, for Political Realism, is crucial. This is so for if such an appeal was required of the State, then one must refute the first proposition of Realism, which is that it is an objective articulation of politics that requires an understanding of the circumstances one finds oneself in, the resources one has access to, and those that one may face from a potential rival. As well, it is then sensible that prudence is the dominant type of strategy that need be relied on, for absolutes and universal notions of anything are also not required. If one, however, determines that some type of goal, existential or real, is required, then the core assumptions concerning political life and behavior on the part of Political Realism are found to be wanting.

Nonetheless, Carr is of the belief that Realism exposes its own weakness in this area of concern. In his chapter on the limitations of this tradition, Carr notes that the very fact that many statesmen feel the need to cloak their true intentions behind the veil of enlightened self-interest illustrates the known deficiency of Realism by its own authors and practitioners. Did anyone truly believe that the United States assembled a coalition in the Persian Gulf in order to defend the democratic institutions of Kuwait, or was that simply a convenient way of President Bush not having to be truthful with respect to the energy concerns of the seizure of Kuwait by Iraq? The fact that President Bush felt the need to cloak the true interests of the United States by invoking democracy and the rule of law, he lends credibility to the very limitation Carr spoke of in the late 1930s.

B. Limitation II - The Other Power(s)

The rejection of universal concepts and ethical and/or moral rectitude gives way to the notion that international relations is dominated by a power that is military by nature, with other types of power, such as economic or that which relates to public opinion, secondary in their importance. This is a perspective of the world that, to a certain extent, is one dimensional. The qualification is implanted because within the study of Metternich and Castlereagh by Kissinger there is the invocation of not only the personal skills of the diplomats in question, but also the cultural milieu that both operated from and within.

Kissinger makes note of the belief in 'excellence', regardless of nationality, that assisted in allowing Metternich to pursue a European strategy that was as successful as it was. Had none of his counterparts throughout the continent had a belief in 'Europeanism' then his strategy would have failed, regardless of his close working relationship with Castlereagh.

Therefore there is an element of non-military causation within the work of one of the proponents of Political Realism in a post-1945 world. Nevertheless, Kissinger, as illustrated above, comes down on the side of military strength and the necessity to construct a balance-of-power for this European sentiment to take root; for without the former, the latter would could not be utilized to forward a peace for the continent. Consequently, one is left with a perspective of the world, of politics in general, that is as 'nasty, brutish and short' as that of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan. Leaving aside the absence of non-state actors in the calculation of interest in this school of thought, what is in the main also absent is any belief that values, belief systems and 'ideas', be they ideologies or cultural factors, can be as significant as the military attributes of a given actor. This statement does not call for the placement of these non-military factors on a level higher than those of a military nature, but on par with them. One could posit that a call for a balance-of-power formulation in continental Europe during the era of Metternich and Castlereagh might have failed without the presence of a 'European' ideal. Had the rulers and diplomats of the dominant actors of the time not had a belief in excellence that was not dependent upon the nationality of this quality, would have some semblance of 'trust', broadly defined, existed in enough quantity for Metternich's plans to take hold? Of course, this is a hypothetical query, but nonetheless important. Political Realism takes the position that military considerations influenced all other concerns, and made the latter possible. In itself that belief may be correct. But it may be as correct to state that non- military factors, whatever those may be, were such that the military considerations were allowed to become important. The answer is that no one truly will ever know which position is correct, and that revelation in itself exposes the limitations of Political Realism; the inability or lack of desire to accord a degree of respectable recognition to factors not deemed significant by its own theorization. Gaps within the Realist-specific research in each of the three case studies, along with evidence that will support the presence and significance of non-military factors in the calculation of policy, short and long term, will underscore this second limitation throughout the thesis. These gaps will also give rise to the need for additional and/or alternative theoretical models in the search for an explanation of EC-US security relations, and the differences that occur in this area of the transatlantic relationship.

C. Limitation III - Agents and Levels

Like that of non-military factors, what is also notably absent from Political Realism, per se, is a degree of respect for the actions of non-state actors in the realm of international politics. As is the case with morality for Morgenthau, Realists may counter with the position that they and their tradition are *aware* of the presence of non-state actors, and the tension between them, and traditional actors such as states. However, they might also add that while these non-state actors are present, they are not *significant* in the calculation of interests and outcomes in world politics. An example of this degree of relevance may be that there are many firms in a certain sector of the economy, but only those with a market share of a certain percentage are significant to developments in this sector. Consequently, other firms are present, but one need only concern oneself, and conduct research on, those firms that shape the market of the sector of the economy in question. As such, economists concentrate on developments in large firms that dominant rather than those at the level of 'small business', even though it is well known that the so-called engine of any capitalist economy is the traditional middle class businessman, and not the giant firm, and that many inventions are not made by large firms, but by small ones intent on developings new kinds of technologies. Simply put, did International Business Machines create many of the new technologies of the early 1990s in the area of minicomputers, or some small computer firm, with roughly one quarter, or less, of IBM's workforce, gross income, and market share?[1]

Can one translate this business example into the realm of international relations? Certainly it would be heresy to state that non-state actors dominate international relations. Common sense tells one that states, the traditional players in world politics, are the dominant and most significant actors on the world stage. To this statement little consternation would be provoked. The controversy begins when one goes below the nation-state and asks whether other actors are also able to influence international relations. To this end a Political Realist might contend that most non-state actors are seeking state-like tendencies, powers and responsibilities, and therefore their point is made for them. A Political Realist, in response, might also contend that, regardless of the desires or goals of these actors, the nature of the international system is such that only states, or nation-states, need be examined. As such, Morgenthau's major work is entitled Politics among Nations, rather than among actors, a term that could be broadly interpreted, and the subject under discussion is not 'world politics', but of an 'international' nature. While semantic, the coining of phrases that come to dominate a field of inquiry speak of the perspective(s) that are hegemonic within that field; for an understanding of relations above the level of

domestic politics, the terms commonly used denote a hegemonic position for Political Realism, and whatever other perspectives share its attributes.

Consequently, the third limitation of Political Realism that has a tremendous bearing on the ability of this theory to explain and understand relations between Western Europe/European Community and *any* other actor is that which pertains to the absence of non-state actors in its theoretical repertoire. This is so because, as already mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, of the unique nature of the state of politics in Europe, where states act with, for and at times against the non-state actions of the European Community, and where sovereignty is shared. In a world dominated and influenced only by states, sovereignty should be an indivisible principle; sharing is unacceptable, and possibly unexplainable. The evolution of European Political Co-operation, long with the many actions of the EC in the Middle East, Poland and Northern Iraq will come to illustrate the extent of this third limitation, just as much as the presence of non-military considerations will come to expose the second limitation of Political Realism, that being the almost absolute prioritization accorded to military and military-related factors in the calculation of interests, options and policies for international actors.[2]

This third limitation gives rise to a related concern which is the question of which level of analysis is the appropriate one for the study of international politics. To the Political Realist, the appropriate one is that of the international system, or more correctly said the environment in which actors (states) find themselves to be operating within. This level is the appropriate one given the factors that the above authors appear to contend are those that assist in the ranking of states in some type of hierarchical order; those states with the greatest resources, the best geostrategic position and other related elements will tend to be the most power, and dominant, actors in international politics. The reverse way of stating the identical point is that because there is the tendency to downplay, ignore or reject the role of 'agency' the only level that could be utilized for the analysis of international relations is that of the overarching environment, for there is no theory of the state and its constituent elements, per se. Political Realists have a theory of the State, but only insofar as the State is to be found within the realm of the international environment.

D. Limitation IV - Claims to Knowledge

In response to the explicit and implicit claims to knowledge by a variety of Political Realists that were presented in the final proposition of Realism is the doubt cast upon such claims because of an over reliance on historicism. Justin Rosenberg asks his readers in Empire of Civil Society '...what if northern Italy did *not* see the genesis of the modern international system...[and] what if Thucydides did *not* offer a balance of power explanation of the Pelopponesian War?...'(Rosenberg, 1994;61) The author, hypothetically,

posits that had these matters not arisen when they are claimed to have done, then there is a concern that may '...bear directly on the adequacy of the dominant realist theory of the modern system...'(Ibid.) Directly, Rosenberg comments that two specific liabilities with respect to Realism would appear if, at any time, the account of one its fundamental historical precedents would fall into disrepute. The first would be that the means by which Political Realists would be able to test whether or not specific events had universal applicability would not exist, and secondly, there would be a danger in posing as irreducible '...essential starting points...of the modern world...'(Ibid.) This new-found lack of historical depth in a Realist-based theorization of international relations would cause the second to occur, based upon the first.

While the Hobesian account of the Peloponnesian War and that of northern Italy at the time of Machiavelli are correct, Rosenberg makes the point that any theory of international relations that binds itself too closely to a few historical events, events that are subject to interpretation, re-interpretation, misinterpretation and abuse, are always going to be susceptible to queries such as those posed directly above. The recognition of the tenuous attachment between historical events and theories of world politics does not, nevertheless, invalidate Political Realism, but serves to illustrate the potential limitations of such a theorization, the weakness in the 'claim to knowledge' of this paradigm, and the realization that to fully comprehend international politics additional and/or alternative models are required.

E. Summary

As the above criticisms illustrate, Political Realism not only has a number of 'strengths', such as its ability to divorce itself from morality (in a universal sense) and other fields in the social sciences, but also 'weaknesses'. The reliance on 'circumstance' and the environment in which one operates in and from and the related and implied negation of personal attributes and non-systemic aspects of decision-making, as well as the implied absence of all actors save the State, are potential weaknesses. For every positive aspect to the tradition of Realism, a limitation is found. The question at this juncture is whether or not these limitations are critical enough to affect the ability of this school of thought to explain transatlantic differences in the area of security studies, and in three specific case studies. However, before this question is asked in full, and answered in kind, a number of other steps, noted in the introduction, must be first taken.

However, even though Carr notes a number of limitations within the body of thought that constitutes Political Realism, the limitations that are of the utmost concern for this thesis are those that relate to the the 'level-of-analysis' and 'agent-structure' debates. This is so because throughout the remainder of this thesis the Political Realist project will

be assessed and critiqued in its ability to explain and understand the sources of strain that run through the transatlantic relationship, in general terms, and in three specific security-based case studies. If, throughout this assessment Political Realism is found to be 'wanting' in its ability to explain comprehensively EC-US relations, then the assumptions of this theory will be subject to criticism, with a view to asking where should one direct one's attention in order to accomplish what Political Realism cannot. A large portion of what may hinder Political Realism, at the end of the day, may be its adherence to a systemic-level structure-biased notion of how the world and international politics should be explained and understood. In truth, Realism's claim to know is that this bias is correct, thus prompting one to ask the question - is this stance correct, and if not, what stance may be in the wake of the failures of Realism? As such, the 'levels-of -analysis' and 'agent-structure' debates, and the possible strengths or weaknesses of the Realist position in this debate, will be of central importance for the remainder of this thesis.

V:Recent Developments

Since the publication of the work of Carr, Morgenthau, and Kissinger, not to mention that of Thucydides, Hobbes and Machiavelli, the tradition of Political Realism has witnessed numerous challenges, such as the 'Great Debate' between Morton Kaplan and Hedley Bull in the mid-1960s, and theoretical developments concerning Realism in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These latter developments include the publication of two seminal works by Kenneth Waltz in 1959 and 1979, Man, The State and War and Theory of International Politics, respectively. Onwards from Waltz a number of so-called structural realists such as Stephen Krasner, Barry Buzan and Stephen Walt have taken up from where Waltz left off, to continue this movement forward within the boundaries of Political Realism, or its main variant, Neorealism.

However, as will be noted time and again in the second and third chapters of this thesis, the primary tradition utilized by scholars working within the field of transatlantic security studies is that of Political Realism, rather than variants such as Neorealism or Structural Realism. Consequently, while these developments are important for discussions within the field of International Relations theory, as seen by numerous debates within related scholarly journals, they are not critical for this specific inquiry until the concluding chapter of the thesis, and only then briefly. As such, the *only* theoretical tradition that will be constantly tested throughout this thesis with respect to its ability to explain EC-US divergences in the realm of security studies from 1973 through to 1991, and over three different case studies, will be that of Political Realism.

VII:Next Steps

As iterated in the introduction to the thesis, the next two chapters will be, to a large extent, reviews of literature in two areas of inquiry; European Political Co-operation and transatlantic studies. At the end of both chapters and the case studies that follow, the ability of Realist thought to explain developments in the first and dominate the second will be assessed, with a view to an answer to the questions posed at the outset of the thesis with respect to the ability of the Political Realist perspective to explain European Community-United States divergences in the area of security studies.

---

[1]Classic examples in the area of the computer sector of the US economy are 'start-up' companies such as Apple and Microsoft. Both were small, yet leading edge technology companies that have come to compete with companies like IBM, and forced the latter to improve their own technological base.

[2]Rosenberg is of the same mind when he posits in Empire of Civil Society that the state, and its position in the global system, is '...simply distorted without the recognition that the same agent is simultaneously central to the constitution and management of international *and* domestic politics...'(Rosenberg, 1994;34 emphasis added)

Chapter Two:European Political Co-operation and the Agency-Structure Debate

I:Introduction

As described in the introductory chapters of the thesis, the common thread that runs through this first section is the ability of Realism to explain why certain events occur, or in some instances, why they do not. In the first chapter the task was to illustrate that there is a debate as to the adequacy of Realism in solving the questions concerning 'levels of analysis' and 'agent-structure'. The third chapter will be devoted to reviewing literature concerning the transatlantic relationship with to assessing whether or not the Realist project can adeqautely explain EC-US differences. The task of this second chapter will be to ask whether or not Ralism can adequately explain the reasons for the formation and continual evolution of European Political Co-operation. Before assessing the possible differences between the European Community and the United States, the mechanisms that have been created and expanded to allow the EC to act on the world stage, and the theoretical explanation of these mechanisms, need to be explored first. The starting point will be a description of the context in which EPC was created, and a brief history of it from its inception in the early 1970s through to incorporation of EPC into Community structures by way of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. Reasons why EPC was created and continued over time will then be examined against a Realist articulation of the world. If there is doubt as to the adequacy of a Realist explanation of EPC then, given a review of the alternative theoretical explanations, the conclusion of the thesis will point to the theoretical paradigm that may be more useful than the others in developing a more comprehensive analysis of EC-US security relations.

II:The Context

While models of political co-operation at the European level had been attempted with some measure of success before World War Two, the true history of EPC dates back to French plans for a European Political Community, and the Defence Community espoused in the early 1950s. However, the momentum for both EPC and EDC was lost and both were rejected, the latter in 1954 by the French parliament even though it had been a plan promoted by the French Presidency. Simon Nuttal states in his book European Political Co-operation that one of the reasons for this defeat was that the agreement that would have established the EDC projected an organization that appeared to the Gaullists as 'federalist' in orientation. This would have limited the sovereignty of the member states in the area of foreign affairs.(Nuttal, 1992;35) Attempts had to be made to harmonize the views of the member states but, if that process failed, so too should discussion concerning

the topic. Provisions for maintaining the autonomy of the nation state were not, in the minds of the Gaullists, made to the extent that they could accept the provisions of the treaty. In the end they rejected it, and sounded the death of EDC and the work that had gone into the creation of EPC.(Ibid.) Consequently, the impetus for some sort of political co-operation took a more economic and gradualist approach, establishing the supranational ECSC and later the European Economic Community in 1958 through the signing of the Treaty of Rome. Political co-operation itself, as a means of forging a common or single European foreign policy was not an issue discussed at great lengths, or that took great leaps forward. This is the context for the formulation of EPC and provides a background for understanding the events that did unfold throughout the 1970s.

III:Onwards to European Political Co-operation

A. The Beginnings

By 1970 there was a distinct feeling among the political leaders of the EC that the Community was becoming an economic giant, but a political pygmy. At one point during the Hague Conference in December of 1969, the Italian Prime Minister, Mariano Rumor, stated that '...Europe As such, is absent from the world dialogue...'(Ifestos, 1987;150) This came on the heels of the French President's speech, where he called on the leaders of Europe to live up to their responsibilities to their citizens. Pompidou said that they, as the leaders of Europe, '...owe it to our peoples to revive their hopes of seeing Europe in control of its own destiny...'(Ibid.) All gathered in The Hague understood what Pompidou was calling for, and the final document of the conference reflected that. Paragraph three states that

> Entry upon the final stage of the Common Market not only means confirming the irreversible nature of the work accomplished by the Communities, but also means paving the way for a United Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its missions..(EC,1969;par. 3)

From that declaration of purpose, the leaders of the member states recognized that The Hague conference of 1969 provided the ideal backdrop for the initial steps towards political co-operation. This was reflected in their commitment to instruct their foreign ministers to report back to them by July of 1970 with an action plan which would push the Six towards greater political cohesion in the area of foreign policy. The result was the 'Luxembourg report' which was issued under the chairmanship of Walter Scheel.(EPC, 1982;30) The bulk of the paper was dedicated to the mechanisms by which a common

foreign policy would be constructed between the Six. This entailed the creation of numerous committees, the implementation of twice yearly meetings between the foreign ministers and, if warranted, the heads of state. The objectives were set down

> to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations a better mutual understanding on the great international problems;
>
> [and] to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonization of their views, the co-ordination of their positions, and , where it appears possible and desirable, common actions...(EPC, 1982;31)

The belief was that, through the mechanisms created objectives agreed, member-states of the Community would be able to '...speak with one voice [on issues of international importance]...'(Ibid., 30) The issues that were then considered to be of 'international importance' were limited, at the outset, to two issue-areas. The first was to be East-West in orientation, while the second an 'out-of-area' topic. Respectively, they were the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Middle East, be it the Arab-Israeli conflict or events in the Persian Gulf.(Ifestos, 154-55)

But the mechanism was set up in such a manner that the European Community, per se, was left at arm's length as regards co-operation. As an attempt to learn from past mistakes of the 1950s and 1960s EPC was formulated and remained, for many years, intergovernmental in operation. With respect to the involvement of the EC Commission, the report states that it will not be regularly associated with EPC, but '...should the work of the Ministers affect the activities of the European Communities, the Commission will be invited to make known its views...'(quoted in Nuttal, 53) Biannual meetings with the Political Committee of the European Parliament were to be the only links between these two institutions and laid to rest the overt possibility of EPC becoming a Community organ in the near future.

B. The Early Years - The 1970s

Simon Nuttal describes the first three years of EPC (1970-73) as the formative years, while the four succeeding years were ones when the 'house was being built'. He remarks that the first high points of the mechanism were the Copenhagen Report and the Danish Foreign Minister speaking on behalf of the Nine at the opening of the Ministerial phase of the Helsinki Conference of the CSCE.(Ibid., 81) The mandate for the Copenhagen Report was for the Nine to draw up a document that would '...enable them to them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs...'(EPC, 57) The Report

then clarified the working rules of EPC that were utilized throughout the 1970s until the London Report of 1981. They included the increase in meetings at the ministerial and senior civil servant levels, and the creation of a 'correspondents group', 'working parties' and the COREU system of telegrams designed to enhance the communication between the member states.(Ifestos, 169) Though still indirect, more regular meetings took place with the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, and the President of EPC was charged with updating the EEC Council on the former's activities through the permanent representatives of the member states.(Ibid., 171) While the association between EPC and the European Community remained 'distinct', as per the wording and intention of the Report, close contact between the Commission and EPC would be maintained when EPC matters '...[had] an incidence on Community activities...'(quoted in Ibid.) The Blumenfeld report of 1977 notes that the Copenhagen Report formalized the dichotomy between EPC and the EC because of the maintenance of the former's intergovernmental nature and its still weak links with Community institutions.(Ibid.)

After the Copenhagen Report, the Community and EPC faced a series of crises and challenges that illustrated the difficulties of maintaining, in some areas of policy, an arms length distance from the other, and still reaching common foreign policy stances on issues where sensitive national interests were at play. Examples of the latter were the Arab-Israeli October War of 1973; crises in Spain, Portugal and Cyprus; the adoption of the Gymnich Formula as a method by which the United States would be consulted before final EPC decisions were reached; and the effects of the break-up of the Portuguese empire in Southern Africa. Nuttal claims that while there were difficulties, the Nine did emerge from them '...if not stronger, at least wiser from the shared experience of working together under fire...'(Ibid.)

While some institutional changes were adopted during the period described above, the Tindemanns Report of 1972 was brought to a slow death after a period of four years. The Report had called for a number of far-reaching measures that were perceived by some of the member states as too communitarian in nature and would drastically alter the nature of EPC, its relationship with EC structures and the sovereignty of the member states.(Ibid., 143-144) This 'too far, too fast' approach, coupled with the oil shocks of 1979, the lack of a formal institutionalization of the mechanism and the creeping pale of Europessimism are those factors attributed to a general lack of interest in EPC activities. A mark of this lack of interest was the cancellation of the Ministerial meeting scheduled for November 22, 1978. Consequently, some member states began to utilize those institutions and agencies already established in one area of policy or another rather than EPC, be it NATO, Western economic summits or bilateral dealings as was the case of Anglo-American efforts with respect to events in Rhodesia.

C. The Early 1980s

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in late 1979, the Camp David Peace Accords, the Iranian Hostage crisis and the prospects of enlargement to include Greece, Spain and Portugal, became the next set of catalysts for change within the structure of EPC. The inability of the member states to react decisively and with speed to the first three made it clear that steps had to be taken to ensure that EPC mechanisms were optimally effective. Also, some of the member states perceived that institutional reformation was necessary to meet the enlarged membership and activities of EPC, as well as the specific needs of the countries soon be included in the mechanism. The Greek relationship to Turkey and Cyprus is a case in point. It was finally decided that a number of the key documents and reports of EPC would be sent to the Greek government and that the latter must accept these documents as the basis upon which Greece could be admitted. Anything less than total agreement might have jeopardized Greece's accession to EPC, as well as the European Community itself. But the Greek accession to EPC and the Community was handled gradually and smoothly to avoid the problems that were associated with the Norwegian experience. As such, there were no major problems, at least with the Greek membership in EPC, and it became a full member of the organization on January 1, 1981.

This success most likely paved the way for another high point in the brief history of European Political Co-operation: the publication of the London Report of 1981. Douglas Hurd, then a Foreign Office Minister for the United Kingdom, made two speeches concerning European foreign policy decision-making in the summer of 1980. In both he spoke of the need for rapid decision-making capabilities, a strengthened commitment to EPC, and a permanent staff for the Presidency. Effectively, Hurd was calling for the institutionalization of EPC.(Ibid., 175) Out of these proposals Lord Carrington, the UK Foreign Secretary, suggested that procedures for calling crisis meetings at forty-eight hours' notice at the behest of three of the ten member states be developed, and the German Foreign Minister, Genscher, called for security issues to be included under the umbrella of EPC concerns.(Ibid., 176) This recommendation also found favor with Carrington.

On October 13, 1981 the London Report was formally tabled for discussion as the third in a series of reports laying down the guidelines for the future of EPC and its mechanisms. While not groundbreaking, Nuttal does claim that it was a report that '...provided a useful compilation of procedures introduced over the eight years since the last Report and a signal that Political Co-operation was institutionally on the move again...'(Ibid., 177) These institutional innovations were the full association of the EC Commission; the enhanced emphasis of the role of the Presidency; and the establishment

of the Troika Secretariat to ensure continuity because of the six month presidential rotations. A permanent staff capable of handling the activism of the organization, a strengthened commitment to the spokesperson of the institution, and the breaking down of the barriers between EPC and Community institutions were the end results of these innovations.

When examining the communiqué that followed the close of the meeting where the London Report was adopted, Nuttal comments that there are two important phrases that stand out from the usual political rhetoric. Of these, the most controversial was the inclusion of security issues under the remit of the institution. The statement read that the

> Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has made it possible to discuss in Political Co-operation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of the security...(quoted in Ibid., 178)

While the Irish government was adamant on the exclusion of this point, because of its relationship with the United Kingdom, security issues never attained the prominence expected by Genscher when he initiated discussion concerning their inclusion. One example of a strict interpretation of the wording that allowed the Irish to block any dialogue dealt with the exclusion of the confidence-building aspects of the forthcoming Conference on Disarmament in Europe from any discussion within the EPC framework. The second important passage was that concerning the new status of the EC Commission. The communiqué read that the '...Ten attach importance to the Commission...being fully associated with Political Co-operation at all levels...'(quoted in Ibid., 180) While no institutional competence was given to the EC Commission, the arms length relationship between the two organizations diminished, and a turn of importance in their affiliation could be discerned, even with the national interests of some of the member states taken into consideration.(Ibid., 180)

The period following the London Report was marked by the ill-fated Genscher-Colombo Draft European Act and a period that Nuttal calls a 'bridge too far', extending from 1982 through to 1986. The Draft European Act was a compromise set of documents that spoke of political, institutional and economic aspects of European unity, with the German government in favor of the former, and the Italians responsible for the insertion of the latter six paragraph declaration on economic unity and the development of the European Monetary System. With reference to changes that would have affected political co-operation, Genscher proposed that a European Council should be created with responsibilities for European political co-operation and that the Parliament should be given the right to debate EPC matters. Issues relating to security and defence policy would also become the remit of the Council.(Ibid.,187) However, the Act ran up against considerable opposition from a number of the member states, and for differing reasons.

The Irish, Danes and Greeks were against the inclusion of security issues, while the French clung to the Luxembourg compromise of the 1960s that issues of extreme national interest should not be discussed if one state deems a given topic As such, While elements of the Draft Act could be found in the Franco-German initiative of 1985, and the subsequent Single European Act of 1987, the Act itself was condemned to failure after the issuance of the Solemn Declaration, a declaration intended to placate the Genscher-Colombo enterprise, through saying little more than that said in the Luxembourg, Copenhagen and London Reports of 1970, 1973 and 1981, respectively. The remainder of this period was spent dealing with crises in the Falklands and Poland, the evolving situations in South Africa and the Middle East following on the Venice Declaration of 1980, and a developing relationship between the Ten and countries located in Central America.(Ibid., 199-237) No further institutional changes were forwarded during the period as EPC become immersed in external concerns rather than internal quagmires.

D. The Single European Act - The Late 1980s

The 'bridge too far' became a reality with the passage of the Single European Act in 1987. Until this treaty amendment was agreed to by all of the member states, EPC had no formal legal basis. While the process and its mechanisms had evolved from a declaration in 1970 to one with a permanent Secretariat and a closer relationship with the EC Commission and Parliament, European Political Co-operation was by no means able to claim an international identity of any force. Agreement reached through the SEA achieved this goal for the first time in the history of EPC.

President Mitterrand's proposal on European Union, presented at the Fountainbleau in 1984, was the impetus for the ad hoc Doodge Report. The Committee was instructed to start its enquiry from the position that the European Community was in a state of 'crisis' and that concerted action on the part of the member states to formulate a real political union had to be taken.(Ibid., 242) While mostly devoted to institutional and internal concerns the Report did press for closer links between EPC and Community institutions and organs. The report stated that '...it is increasingly evident that interaction between these two frameworks [EPC and EC] is both necessary and useful. They must therefore be closely aligned...'(quoted in Ibid., 243) The real work of institutionalizing EPC within the structures of the EC would have to wait for the Single European Act.

The Franco-German 'surprise' draft Treaty on European Union, presented at the Milan summit, attempted to move the European Community back on the road towards the establishment of Union. While meeting with some resistance from a number of the member states, it was agreed that a conference would be convened to inquire into the completion of a single market, European Union and the French Eureka project.(Ibid., 247)

As such, the conference was obliged to examine a common foreign and security policy, besides the implementation of new internal institutional decision-making procedures. What was born of this venture was the Single European Act of 1987 that was agreed to by the member states on February 17 and 28, 1986. The treaty was sectioned into three Titles, with the third devoted to issues of political co-operation. Nuttall points to two passages within the text that go beyond the language of previous EPC reports, declarations and communiqués. The first is that the member states should undertake to inform and consult each other on '...any foreign policy matters...'(EC, 1986;18 emphasis added) Secondly, beyond the EC Commission being '...fully associated with the proceedings of Political Co-operation, consistency should be maintained between the policies of the Community and EPC.(Ibid.)

However, while the above are viewed by the author as progressive with respect to the relationship between EPC and the European Community, Nuttal also states a number of times that what was achieved in Title III was a compromise between the member states that at times simply restates what had already been said before in 1970, 1973 and 1981. The delays caused by legal problems in Ireland indicated that the '...Act was not considered to introduce any novelty in the practice of EPC...'(Nuttal, 257) Nevertheless, the eventual formation of a permanent Secretariat allowed EPC and its mechanisms to become more bureaucratic, but also more efficient in its abilities to deal with the new external concerns of the Community brought about by increased exposure on the world stage.

IV:Causes of and Explanations for EPC

The context in which European Political Co-operation was created, and has evolved over time, has been laid out above for the reader. It is at this juncture, therefore, that one must to turn to an analysis of this process of co-operation, and assess it at a number of levels. The questions posited at this juncture are 1) what are the various theoretical perspectives that attempt to explain EPC; 2) what is the status of those working from a Political Realist vantage point in relation to other paradigms; 3) does the status of Political Realism indicate to one the credibility or lack thereof of this tradition with respect to this topic given its stated 'claim to knowledge' concerning the way in which the world operates; and 4) given an analysis of the viability of a Political Realist project in the explanation of Political Co-operation, where does this lead one to with respect to the overall task of this thesis, the explanation of EC-US divergences in the area of security studies? To satisfy the demands of these four questions, an elucidation of mainstream literature concerning the creation and evolution of EPC will be undertaken at this stage, with a critique and assessment of this same literature to follow.

A. Traditional Approaches[1]

The first of these approaches is that of Werner Feld and his study of EPC behavior. The author concludes at the outset of his brief that all three of the main integration theories - federalism, functionalism and neofunctionalism - are unable to explain adequately and predict foreign policy actions. His approach, therefore, is the '...construction of a pre-theoretical causal model, based upon the national interests of the chief actor in the integration process - the member nation-states...'(Feld, 1981;22) For Feld the realization that the interacting units are the basis of the entire integration process assumes that a number of 'intervening' variables and their effect must be first considered. The first such intervening variable is the internal level of analysis. At this level of politics the perceptions of decision- makers, and the imposition of certain perceptions, contribute to an understanding of why certain issues are deemed to be of a 'high' or 'low' level of sensitivity. In turn, progress within the European Community is affected by whether a number of member states agree with this one member country as to the sensitivity of an issue, and therefore under what processes, mechanisms and by what rules this issue should be discussed, if at all.(Ibid., 24) A second intervening variable is systemic by nature, and operates at the level of international politics, which is then translated to the regional level in the case of the European Community. This link between the international and regional is acceptable for Feld because, like the international, regional systems entail a set of '...various parameter values and "rules of the games"...for the conduct of intra-regional international politics...'(Ibid.)

However, this is not to say that the international level does not affect what takes place at the regional one. Having the discussion shifted from the international to the regional does not also entail that the latter becomes isolated from the former. As is true of all other 'international' relations, those that occur at the realm of the regional are affected by those at the international level, through which the predominance of the latter is maintained, in a practical and theoretical manner. This relationship between the two levels is the third and last intervening variable for Feld. External forces and actors are not exogenous even to a tightly organized regional association such as the European Community. Regional systems, no matter how strong or weak, are never 'closed' to the inputs of outside agents. These external forces may also assist in the promoting of greater integration, or slow the process down through a desire for reflection.(Ibid., 25) Examples of the former with respect to Political Co-operation appear to be abound, for even Simon Nuttal, when establishing the context in which the various reports forwarding EPC were produced, mentions a number of crises that spurred on greater action and commitment to a strengthened EPC. The quotes from Carrington after the lack of action with regard to the

invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iranian hostage crisis, are only two of numerous examples that could support Feld's perspective. In a summary of this approach, Feld comments that his methodology deals with '...causal factors that stimulate or lead to regional integration and, perhaps, disintegration...[and] focuses on the variables which lead up to the threshold and beyond...'(Ibid.) This viewpoint, coupled with its concentration on the national policies and actions of the member states provides, a '...holistic dimension in terms of the international system that other integration theories seem to lack...'(Ibid.)

A second traditional approach to European Political Co-operation is found in Christopher Hill's edited work entitled National Foreign Policies and European Political Co-operation, published in 1983. Excluding the introductory and concluding chapters, the bulk of the work is an analysis of EPC, from the viewpoint of the member states of the European Community. William Wallace, in the introduction, sets the stage, mentioning integration theory as one possible explanation of political co-operation, and highlights intergovernmentalism specifically. Wallace states that because one can trace the development of EPC to the attitudes of the various member states and there was, at the time of the publication, no permanent secretariat, two central themes can be picked up on. The first theme is that '...in a very real sense, therefore, relations between the national governments are Political Co-operation...'(Wallace, 1983;3) The second is that the '...effectiveness of Political Co-operation thus...depends upon national governments alone...'(Ibid., 4)

Following on from this perspective, and in combination with the work done on the ten member states, Christopher Hill concludes the book by summarizing the position of the Ten with respect to a number of issue- areas. These issue-areas, including the 'security dilemma'; political economics; and extra-European situations and concerns. The first and third appear to be more relevant to this thesis than the second, given the nature of the case studies to be presented later. In both of these areas Hills notes that there are cross-cutting divergences and alliances between the member states. Ireland, Denmark and Italy are grouped together, as are Britain and France, while Italy is clustered with Luxembourg and The Netherlands.(Hill, 186 and 194) These various combinations, and more given the range of issues that EPC now covers, are bound to occur for Hill. This recognition emphasizes the role of the member states in the determination of Political Co-operation. However, Hill also comments how, given divergences over policy, EPC and its mechanisms have survived and flourished over time since their inception in 1970. Nevertheless, this continuity and evolution of Political Co-operation can be seen as the result of cost-free rationalizations that have encouraged attitudes to converge, but '...in themselves they [EPC outputs] do not constitute a qualitatively significant commitment...'(Ibid., 197) Agreement to the acceptable lowest common denominator should not

be viewed as 'integrationist', but the validation of intergovernmentalism. Consequently, this leads Hill to a conclusion based upon the primacy of the member states. The author also concludes that a time may come when EPC may begin to develop and evolve along 'communitarian' lines of organizational structure, de-emphasizing the role of member states. However, until that time does occur, Hill asserts that there are '...strong grounds for arguing that EPC can only develop if the member states continue to feel that it [EPC] is serving their national interests...'(Ibid., 200)

A third traditional account of Political Co-operation is provided by Caroline Webb in a chapter in her edited book Policymaking in the European Community. The first detail for Webb is a definition of the term 'intergovernmentalism' and its relationship to the processes of the European Community. To this end, Webb contends that this perspective can explain '...processes which have evolved in spite of the institutional arrangements of the Treaties and provisions such as the direct effect of EC law inside the member states...'(Webb, 1983;23) The abrogation of the Luxembourg Accords of 1966 is one of Webb's prime examples of the usefulness of this perspective, but the initial mechanisms of EPC could also be given as a credible example. The work on intergovernmentalism, Webb notes, began in the 1960s with the publication of Stanley Hoffmann's 'Obstinate or obsolete' article that examined the role of nation-states in the process of European integration. Failures in the areas of monetary union, as well as political co-operation in the areas of foreign and internal security, were indicators of areas where member states rejected the 'community' process and addressed the validity of the Neofunctionalist thesis. This explanation of certain failures also gave rise to the distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics, thus breaking down the original neofunctionalist continuum between the two. Hoffmann also posited that in certain areas of policy, like foreign affairs, nation-states would always be reluctant to hand over sovereignty to a supranational authority. The member states thus became 'gate-keepers' between '...their domestic political systems and the Community...'(Ibid., 24)

Based on this initial work of Hoffmann, Caroline Webb believes that while one can find many examples of intergovernmentalism in the processes of the European Community, from monetary and political union to the formalized European Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives, it is an approach that as long as it maintains its billiard-ball image, where '...monolithic governments are seen as preserving their hard shells against external penetration by international negotiating forums like the EC...it cannot be a complete answer..'(Ibid., 27) Consequently, Webb turns to the concept of transgovernmentalism as a means of correcting the flaws of intergovernmentalism without returning to classical integration theories for an explanation of EC behavior. This perspective, even with its inability to discern elements at the level of domestic politics, is able to explain the intersection of various interests at the national and regional levels that

disarm the notion of the state as a single entity.(Ibid.) However, the heart of this second theory of EC politics is dominated by the nation-state and its interactions with the systemic level of politics at the regional (European) level. In this respect it is also a perspective that can be situated within the confines of a traditional approach to explaining policy-making in the European Community.

A fourth 'realist' approach to European Political Co-operation is that of Alfred Pijpers' in Martin Holland's The Future of European Political Cooperation. In this chapter the author concludes that theories of integration, the consociational model of politics and those that explain EPC in terms of external threats or the existence of NATO as an obstacle to a more independent foreign policy are able to explain Political Co-operation.(Pijpers, 1993;10-16) Consequently, the author directs most of his attention to Political Realism and its characteristics with respect to the ability of this paradigm to accomplish what others could not. Pijpers concludes that most of the core assumptions of Realism are able to '...explain the basic features of European political and security cooperation...'(Ibid., 17) These features include the world as anarchic; states as the principal international actors; security as the central element of foreign policy; the maintenance of a balance-of-power; and the slight influence of domestic politics on foreign policy in general, and in this specific instance, European policy.(Ibid., 17)

As to the first attribute, Pijpers concludes that Realism is able to explain EPC because it is well known that the world in which the European Community and its member-states operate within is anarchic - devoid of a central organizing and controlling force that has a monopoly on the use of violence. The endemic presence of war that surrounds the EC is illustrative of this anarchy, while the rise of new economic and political centres of power will endeavour to make the world even more anarchic than it has been since the end of the second world war. To Pijpers, the EC was created in the wake and as an answer to this rise of new loci of power, which reinforces the notion of anarchy as being present, rather than otherwise, internationally.(Ibid., 18) Related to this point concerning anarchy, Pijpers comments that in a world that is anarchic, states are the primary international actors. Again, the creation of the European Community has not made this characteristic of the international system obsolete, but on the contrary, more important. The author cites David Calleo as an example of this thinking, for the latter states that '...the EC has not made the traditional states fade away. On the contrary, they have grown more viable...'(Ibid., 19) The intergovernmental nature of EPC and, from 1966, the shift in power away from the EC Commission to the Council of Ministers are indicators of the predominance, rather than lack of influence, of the member-states within the realm of the European Community.

Pijpers' third point is that in an anarchical world states hold as one of their primary concerns their security and survival. The absence of a military dimension within the European Community or EPC should not indicate that security concerns are not important for Western Europe. On the contrary, the establishment and evolution of NATO and other like institutions, coupled with the creation and maintenance of large national defense forces by countries such as Britain and France are indicators of the importance all of these states place with respect to the issue of security.(Ibid., 21) To this end all states, including those belonging to the European Community seek to establish a balance- of-power in order to maintain their security, individually and collectively. Membership in organizations such as NATO, the reluctance of all of the member-states to counter the military strength of the United States and Soviet Union through a unified European force, and a constant interest in counterbalancing the tendencies and actions of the United States are all perceived of as ways in which the EC member states maintain a tenuous balance- of-power between the East and West.(Ibid., 23-28)

Last but not least is the lack of influence that Pijpers accrues to domestic political concerns in the creation, formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The authors contend that this is so in the case of the European Community for three reasons, including the pace of security integration compared to that in the economic sphere of the EC; the disjunction between the EC and EPC; and the dynamics of the single market project and that of security issues with respect to the Single European Act of 1987.(Ibid., 28-30) In each instance Pijpers comments that issues of low political salience have been dealt with in a rather swift nature within the European Community compared to security concerns. Firstly, security issues are very much isolated from those of an economic and social nature. Secondly, at the time of writing the links between the EC and EPC were still of an arms-length nature, rather than something much closer that would indicate a 'communitarian' relationship between the two institutions, and thirdly a tremendous amount of space is given to issues relating to the completion of the internal market whereas only a limited amount of space in Title III is devoted to foreign policy. While the latter finally became incorporated into the main structures of the European Community because of the SEA, the author contends that economic and social issues were of greater concern, and isolated from those of a security nature, therefore illustrating the lack of a relationship between domestic and foreign political concerns.(Ibid., 30)

Conclusively, by linking Political Realism to European foreign policy, a number of the author's objectives are satisfied. The first is to create a link between International Relations theory and the study of EC foreign policy. By contending that Realism can explain this area of EC policy, the link has been established. Secondly, a 'realist' interpretation of EPC sheds some light on this too often thought of proposition that Political Co-operation is the prelude to a European Union of some kind. Bluntly said, a more pragmatic and

realistic perspective concerning foreign policy activities of the EC is discerned from the utilization of Political Realism. Third and lastly, while EPC loses some its 'Europeanism', it gains '...relevance in a historical sense...'(Ibid., 32) It is for these reasons that Pijpers asserts that the theoretical model best able to explain and understand European Political Co-operation is not any other than the 'most classical theoretical movement in International Relations - Political Realism.(Ibid., 32)

B.The Classical Tradition

The attention of Ginsberg (1989) and Ifestos (1987) in their work concerning Political Co-operation is directed at a number of so-called 'classical' theoretical perspectives such as some of the theories of integration, and the Elite, Domestic and Bureaucratic models of politics.(See Appendix 2.1 for Ginsberg's theoretical chart)[2] Ginsberg takes his reader through an exposition of two sets of schools of thought.[3]The first includes the Elite Actor, Domestic Politics and Bureaucratic Politics models of international relations, while the second contends with regional integration theories, interdependence and self- styled logic. Ginsberg summarizes the elite actor model as one that is based upon the interactions and behaviors and perceptions of political and interest group elites. In some respects there is evidence that would support this model, including the instrumental roles of Monnet, Spaak, Spinelli and de Gaulle in forwarding or preventing moves towards increased European integration.(Ginsberg, 1989;15) Bureaucratic politics stresses the influences of civil servants in the implementation and management of policy. This may take place at any level of government, be it the state or European, and the possible interactions between the two. The model also attempts to explain the effects of '...intergovernmental and transnational co-operation within the EC on EC policymaking...'(Ibid., 17) With respect to EPC, the bureaucratic model attempts to explain how national civil servants can exert their power and influence because it is a forum dominated by nation states and their bureaucracies rather than their counterparts in the European Community institutions. Lastly, the domestic politics model is one that endeavors to analyze politics at the level of subgroups within a polity. These subgroups may include party and special interest groups that could influence electoral decisions and the fate of one's domestic political future. The ability to sway local or national constituencies may be decisive in determining a country's position within the European Community. This is emphasized by Stanley Hoffmann who is quoted as saying that one reason behind the lack of integrative success at the regional level is that '...each member pays more attention to its own problems and less to the world beyond its borders...'(quoted in Ibid., 16)

As to the second set of theoretical positions, the first examined by the author is that of regional integration, an umbrella term for a number of theories. These theories range from federalism to functionalism and onto the neofunctionalism of such academics as Ernst Haas, Phil Schmitter, and Leon Lindberg. It is widely held, nonetheless, that the first two perspectives fail in their ability to explain the development of the European Community, much less that of Political Co-operation. Consequently, the dominant integrationist theory became Neofunctionalism, a response to the shortcomings of its obvious predecessor, Functionalism. Its main points can be broken down to a number of assumptions. The first assumption is that integration is defined as the '...process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states...'(Haas quoted in Ginsberg, 21) Secondly, the endpoint of the integrative process is a political entity with supranational powers, but that this endpoint is reached through a shift in loyalties over time, from 'low' to ' high' political issues, the latter being of extreme sensitivity regardless of the issue-area. Over time, 'spillover' from the 'low' to 'high' issues occurs because of the gradual increase in the scope of Community involvement, and it would be in the national interest of each of the member states to locate more power at the center, rather than at the national or subnational level. However, and in comparison to earlier variations of Neofunctionalist logic, spillover is not guaranteed and external threats or concerns must be accounted for along with those of an internal or domestic nature.(Ibid.)

By the late 1970s and early 1980s some Neofunctionalist theoreticians saw the necessity to 'upgrade' their approach to the actions and behavior of the European Community. Leon Lindberg, together with Stuart Scheingold, developed three premises that were publicized as those elements of Neofunctionalist thought required to take this perspective into the future. The first these is that integration should be '...seen as a symbiosis between EC and national bodies...'(Ibid., 23) This recognition of symbiosis should not place any primacy on the actions and behavior of the member states (interacting units) or the EC Commission and the other 'communitarian' institutions that surround it. Rather, the interaction between these two units of analysis should be emphasized, for while the EC is constituted by the member states, the states are legally bound to a series of rules and laws unlike most other international/regional organizations that many of them belong to. The second premise is that contradictions and crises along the integrative path should be considered to be normal. States enter into agreements like the Treaty of Rome for many reasons - reasons that do not always correspond. Also, given the international/regional position of the state, and the internal political conditions of the state, agreement on every issue should not be considered normal. Conflicts in these settings may be '...endemic as the result of joint activity is felt and as the prointegration

consensus shifts...'(Ibid.) The third and last of these premises is that not all extensions of Community can be explained by functional means. National interests and power should be considered at all times and with respect to all issues.

From Neofunctionalism Ginsberg moves to the Complex Interdependence tradition. The slowness of the integration process in Europe was not matched by writing on the subject of integration theory. As such, a disappointment was felt by some in academic circles. An explanation of the activities of the Community based upon Complex Interdependence (CI) can be viewed as a reaction to disenchantment with Neofunctionalism, as well as the institution itself. The Interdependence school situates foreign policy at the level of the international system rather than the national or regional levels. This analysis, for Ginsberg, sheds light on the '...complex EC role as an offensive and defensive player in the international community...'(Ibid., 29) This perspective suggests that the Community should be more concerned with issues at the level of the international system, rather than those of a regionally integrative nature. Its overt inclusion of economic and other non-political issues allows this theory to assist in explaining Community behavior and actions with respect to Eastern Europe, the Arab League and GATT negotiations. Also, and with regard to EPC Complex Interdependence, it can also explain a number of actions since its inception. The CI approach suggests that EPC was, in part, created to '...enable EC members to better handle the effect of the international system on the EC...thus, EC integration is driven by interdependence...'(Ibid., 30) Ginsberg anticipates that, with respect to EC foreign policy, Complex Interdependence could be used to illustrate that because of the demands of an interdependent world, and because of the desire to reduce the 'costs' of these demands, states co-ordinate in the realm of foreign policy. However, the author states that in reality little has been written on Political Co-operation and foreign policy by Complex Interdependent theorists.

C. Modern Theories of Co-operation

Roy Ginsberg's work on European Political Co-operation does not remain at the level of 'classical' approaches to explanations of this process and its mechanisms. He, along with Wolfgang Wessels in his work on EPC, combine to describe the core assumptions of the 'self-styled' logic and Consociationalism. The two-tiered approach to domestic models of politics of Simon Bulmer also will be examined in this section.

The 'self-styled' logic of Ginsberg is an attempt to focus on the EC as a unit of analysis in its own right, with the ability to disseminate its own interests on the international level of politics.(Ibid., 35) This theorization acts as a synthesis of a number of the other proposed models. The 'self-styled' school of thought acts as this synthesis because it takes as assumptions a globally interdependent world, where the Community

must react to external as well as internal demands, producing 'European' responses to these external demands and the global situation. Consequently, parts of the Complex Interdependent, Realist/National Interest and Neofunctional traditions are to be found within this one explanation of Community behavior. Ginsberg posits that while none of these later three positions can explain all joint actions, a better explanation, possibly the self-styled one, results when '...the context is a state-regional symbiosis...'(Ibid., 36)

Pijpers and Wessels, in their co-edited book European Political Co-operation in the 1980s, also review the major theories that have been utilized to explain the creation and evolution of EPC, including Realism/Neorealism, regime analysis and the integration theories of federalism and functionalism/neofunctionalism.(Pijpers, 1988;238-243) However, like Ginsberg, Wessels and Pijpers conclude that all have defects that limit their ability to do what they claim they can - explain and allow one to understand Political Co-operation in its present form. Subsequent to this brief critique of the four theoretical positions outlined, the authors, like Ginsberg, turns to a more 'modern' approach to political science, by way of the 'consociational' model of politics. Wessels and Weiler do so because of its potential ability to explain the relative stability of EPC, given enlargement and the widening of foreign policy interests between some of the older and newer members of EPC, and the relative instability of international politics since the onset of the 1970s - the decade of the birth of Political Co-operation.(Ibid., 243)

Wessels and Weiler admit that at first the selection of a theory used to explain the political experiences of smaller liberal democratic European states appears slightly odd. Consociationalism was forwarded to explain how states with cleavages of religious, class and socio-economic natures reinforced each other, and managed to preserve their stability. Crucial to this model is not why social cleavages are present, but their empirical existence. For the authors, this is where consociationalism coincides with Political Co-operation because EPC could be described as a '...transnational polity sharply segmented by its member states and indeed displaying the expected of immobilism...'(Ibid., 244) However, like small states such as Belgium, Austria and The Netherlands, European Political Co-operation has managed to transcend these tendencies towards stagnation and has developed and evolved over time in what most describe as a 'positive' direction.

On the level of EPC, increased fragmentation has occurred because of three conditions. The first two conditions are related to the enlargement of the European Community and, de facto, Political Co-operation. Britain and Greece, as well as Denmark and Ireland all have different and distinct foreign policies. Cleavages in this respect have widened over time rather than decreased. Thirdly, there is the growing confidence of West Germany in the area of international relations, the country's *Ostpolitik* being one example. In turn, the dynamics of European integration may have changed slightly insofar as German leaders have begun to point their country in a different direction than that

assumed in the past. These cleavages, combined with the breakdown of the liberal economic order because of the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the economic stagnation of the middle 1970s after the oil crisis of 1973 and the thawing of the superpower relationship in the 1970s that was heralded by the signing of SALT I, should have created conditions suitable for a collapse of political co-operation, rather than the continuation and evolution of them. Can, then, Consocialism explain this stability? That is the question asked by Pijpers.

In a situation where cleavages may force the breakdown of stable government, actors may substitute normal procedures for new and alternative methods, the promotion of co-operative ventures rather than a state of conflict, and the inclusion of all relevant parties, or minimally those who are perceived to be relevant.(Ibid., 245) Wessels and Weiler are interested in this process for, at times, these alternative methods employed to maintain stability often become institutionalized as they develop. To the author, the relationship between this model and EPC might appear obvious. However, the maintenance of the system depends on a perceived loyalty to the nation-state. This loyalty does not appear to be readily transferable to the European level save that of a loosely-held vision of 'European Union', even though different conceptions of this 'Union' may be constructed in the future. Also, consociationalism identifies other factors involved in the desire to maintain stability, including the existence of an external threat; existence of a relative balance of power; a low 'total load' on the apparatus needed to maintain stability; and cohesion.(Ibid., 247)

A third and 'novel' approach to European Political Co-operation is that of Simon Bulmer, who examined the domestic politics model, but within a two-tiered approach rather than the usual one-dimensional manner. Bulmer asserts that it is not useful, from his vantage point, to speak of a 'British' or 'French' view without understanding the sources of this view, or by underestimating the 'international' context which these policies are set in.(Bulmer, 1991;87) Bulmer's approach - intraorganizational bargaining - is one that begins from a domestic politics model, but also emphasizes the role of the external environment. Too often, the author notes, domestic analogies either ignore the external environment, or relegate them to an inferior status. Neither situation assists in understanding EPC, and its sources.(Ibid., 88)

The examples used by Bulmer to validate his model are the reactions of France, Britain and West Germany to South Africa, and of West Germany towards Political Co-operation in general. In the former example, the combination of commercial interests and lobbying by a number of pro-South African associations was one of the reasons behind the refusal of the British and West German governments to agree to sanctions, while the absence of both in France were partially responsible for its opposite stance.(Ibid., 88) The status of West Germany internationally, coupled with its history and geographic position,

are some of the external reasons behind the German government's continued support of Political Co- operation, and the strengthening of this mechanism. Bulmer also insists that '...West German governmental policies towards EPC have been influenced to some degree by domestic circumstances...'(Ibid., 89) A desire to increase the profile of the Free Democrats, and the want to combat anti-EC sentiment because of budgetary contributions, are also two of the many reasons why the government, and in particular Foreign Minister Genscher of the Free Democrats, sponsored the Solemn Declaration on European Union of 1983.(Ibid.)

V:Critique

A. The Realist Perspective

Even with the specific EPC analysis provided by Feld, Webb, Pijpers and Hill as to the validity of a Realist explanation of European Political Co-operation, Roy Ginsberg posits that '...we cannot draw on Neorealist or Realist theory for explanations of EC foreign policy actions...'(Ginsberg, 1989;11) The author states that while this traditional school of theory can aid in an understanding of why EPC was founded in the first place, it cannot explain the costs borne by the member states throughout time, and the trade-offs between national and European interests over policy issues.(Ibid.) A second reason for Ginsberg's pessimism is that if politics is a struggle for power, as Morgenthau claims it is in Politics Among Nations, then it is a description that hardly suits institutions such as EPC and the Community.

Ginsberg's comments can be directly traced back to the initial propositions and limitations of Political Realism that were outlined in the first chapter of this thesis. All of the above authors situated within the school of traditional theoretical perspectives, in one way or another, place a significant degree of importance on the role of the member states of the European Community and the affect that the 'international level' of politics has upon these states with respect to their interaction on a regional level, and within the confines of the European Community. In this respect all can be linked to the propositions of Political Realism. A belief in the state as the primary international actor and the international environment as a primary determining factor in the decisions of the leaders of these states are two of the core assumptions of Political Realism. The retention of a significant degree of sovereignty on the part of the member states, closely similar to the notion of indivisible sovereignty that is also found within Political Realism, along with the perception that 'power defined in terms of interest', are two more links between the work of Feld, Hill, Pijpers and Webb on one hand, and Morgenthau, Kissinger and Carr on the other. However, as Ginsberg also points out, these notions of sovereignty, indivisibility, the

dominance of interest-based calculations like those adhered to by Political Realists, power politics as the rule rather than exception with respect to the relationship between states, and the rejection of the influence of non-state actors such as the European Community in international relations are such that illustrates the limitations of the ability of Political Realist thought to explain the creation and, especially, the evolution of European Political Co-operation.

To continue to stress the inability of Political Realism to adequately explain the development of EPC, one need look no further than the historic relationship between EPC and European Community institutions such as the European Commission and Parliament. On one hand, EPC was distanced from the EC Commission and Parliament, the Parliament and the Commission consulted only when the work of EPC affected the activities of the Commission and the Parliament, and then only at prescribed biannual meetings. The wall that divided one process from the others was evident when the Foreign Ministers met for a meeting of Political Co-operation in one city and then, on the same day, flew to another to convene a Council of Ministers meeting. This was done at the insistence of the French, who wanted to maintain this separation of the two and the primacy of the nation-state in Political Co-operation and international affairs. However, this arm's length relationship between the EPC mechanisms and the Community, since the Luxembourg Report of 1970, has dissolved over time. The London Report of 1981 not only began the institutionalization of EPC, but also codified and formalized the relationship between Political Co-operation and the EC Commission. From the publication of the Report the latter became fully associated with the former. This tie between the two was strengthened by the enlargement process of 1981 and 1986 when Greece, Spain and Portugal entered the European Community. Nuttal stated that at the time of the negotiations concerning the enlargement of the EC it was '...assumed that membership of the Community entailed membership of Political Co-operation; the possibility of one without the other was not seriously envisaged...'(Nuttal, 171)

The final 'integrative' link between EPC and the European Community was when the Single European Act was agreed to by the twelve member states. Instead of placing Political Co-operation under a separate document, it was the third 'title' in an umbrella document that also dealt with amendments to the Treaty of Rome and thus all of the Community institutions. This 'title' called for a sizeable degree of consistency between Community and Political Co-operation policies and actions, to be ensured through two mechanisms. Firstly, regular briefings of relevant Parliament committees where its views would be '...duly taken into consideration...'(EC, 1987;18) Secondly, the holder of the Presidency and the Commission would be responsible for communicating the consistency desired between EPC and the Commission.(Ibid.) From this point onwards, until the Maastricht Agreement of 1991, Political Co-operation, while remaining more or less

intergovernmental in nature, was gradually incorporated within the structures of the Community, therefore being 'communitarian' in its own right. The above relationship between EPC and the EC counters the argument of those theorists such as Pijpers that it was not until the signing of the SEA that relations betwee these two mechanisms became more 'communitarian' than intergovernmental in nature, therefore assisting in refuting, or devaluing the credibility of the Realist perspective with respect to its ability to explain EPC.

Ifestos, in his lengthy and very detailed work entitled European Political Co-operation, attacks Realist assumptions from an almost identical angle. He contends that the intergovernmental nature of Political Co-operation can be viewed as abiding by the dichotomies of the nation state and conflicting with an integrationist effect to create a more 'communitarian' European Community. Some theorists assert that EPC and its processes reflected a '...trend which shifts emphasis towards non-Treaty institutions and away from (European) supranational solutions and the objectives of integration...'(Ifestos, 1987;209) However, while EPC remained outside the main Community institutions until the signing of the Single European Act in 1987, Ifestos notes that there is an opinion concerning the mechanism that regards it as 'integrationist' in a way that is not often thought of. EPC mechanisms have been described as structures where actors, while maintaining their loyalty to their nation states, reorientate themselves towards the development of a European position on a number of issues.(Ibid., 211) This could be seen in Nuttal's account of Political Co-operation where, over time, agreements are reached by the vast majority of member states over a range of issue-areas and topics. Consequently, Ifestos strengthens his claim that Realist notions of international politics are unable to fully comprehend, never mind explain, the evolution of European Political Cooperation and its relationship with EC institutions.

All of the above confirm the position of this thesis that while Political Realism will be able to explain a number of aspects of European Political Co-operation and its relationship to EC institutions and mechanisms, it cannot do so in a comprehensive, and therefore satisfactory, manner. To this end the contentions of Pijpers, more so than those of Webb, Hill and Feld come to mind as the least credible because his is an argument that says, simply put, that because the world operates in a 'realist' manner, the actions of the actors in this system can also be understood through a 'realist' interpretation. If nothing else, this appears to be no more than a restatement of Morgenthau's 'claim to knowledge', albeit a claim that rests on shaky ground, if nothing more.

B. Responses to Classicism

Alongside his comments regarding the weaknesses of Political Realist-based writings to explain the process of Political Co-operation are those that attempt to expose similar deficiencies in those models that he described as 'classical'. Overall, Ginberg asserts that all of these models are able to explain why policy actions are not taken rather than why they are. The lack of an agreed upon policy may be the result of diverging national interests and concerns, but there remains the need to explain a successful policy decision and action, given that the presence of national divergences should work against 'common' activities. In response, Classicists argue that these agreements would be based on interests that are temporal in nature rather than '...symbiotic links that take place between member governments and regional bodies in the everyday empirical world of the EC...'(Ibid., 18) In the face of the growing institutional and 'communitarian' evolution of EC foreign policy, as well as Political Co-operation through the Single European Act, there could be some difficulty in explaining away long term 'integrative' processes that take place within the structures of the European Community. To this end, the domestic politics model may also be inappropriate because of the secretive nature of EPC. Christopher Hill suggests that public opinion is not only ill-informed about EPC, but also too remote from it to affect it in any meaningful manner.(cited in Ibid., 19) For these reasons, the foreign policy actions of the member states may be caused regardless of, rather than due to, domestic political concerns.

The 'modern' theoretical models examined by Ginsberg - regional integration and complex interdependence - also fall prey to the criticism, but for different reasons. Noted earlier were a number of reasons why regional integration theories may be unable to explain EPC actions. These reasons included the obvious ones that EPC, until the Single European Act, and even after the signing of that document, remains intergovernmental and the preserve of member states. While there is a recognized need for 'consistency' between the EC institutions and EPC, EPC remains 'non-communitarian'. Because of this intergovernmental nature and the logic of 'spillover', the gradual encapsulation of 'high' political issues within the Community structures has not occurred since the inception of EPC in 1970 because of efficiency and national interests. While the adoption of the Maastricht Agreement may finally achieve these ends, the Agreement is unclear as to the eventual shape of a 'common' foreign and security policy and is to be reviewed in 1996 at the next Intergovernmental Conference. Therefore, even this process is not secured and, until that time, will remain to be guided by the Single European Act of 1987.

With regard to the school of Complex Interdependence, one of the critiques has already been mentioned. While it may be a theory of great applicability, in relation to EC

foreign policy and Political Co-operation, there is a dearth of literature to support this applicability. A second downfall of this perspective is that Ginsberg's own work illustrates quite conclusively that a vast majority of all EC foreign policy actions - almost eighty percent - can be attributed not to the forces of 'global interdependence' but the '...existence of the common market itself and its effects on outsiders...'(Ibid., 32) A third and final mark against this school of thought is that, in Ginsberg's perception, the theory itself, when related to questions of regional integration and the 'integrative' process, is too '...simplistic and holistic...'(Ibid., 34) Where does regional integration end and global interdependence begin? Is interdependence a loose form of integration? Is the distinction between the two the institutional framework integration is usually situated within? And can one accept one without the other? These are just some of the questions left unanswered by this tradition founded by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. To say that more work on interdependence and regional integration would solve these mysteries would be pure speculation on the part of scholars involved the areas of the theory in question. As such, there appears to be too many gaps for this perspective to adequately 'explain' EC foreign policy actions, and specifically Political Co-operation.

C. Retreat of the Moderns?

Like that of Complex Interdependence, the 'self-styled' logic of Ginsberg is a logic that is also underdeveloped, and does not point specifically to where one could begin to start asking serious questions concerning EC foreign policy and EPC. Ginsberg himself leaves his theoretical review without advancing this perspective. This being the case, how can this thesis utilize a theoretical position that, in its simplest form, appears to be nothing more than the child of a number of other theoretical positions instead of something new and unique in its own right?

European Political Co-operation appears to 'fit' with the picture drawn by theorists who advocate Consociationalism. In this model the member states are the fragmenting units of analysis, and an intergovernmental structure that has become formalized over time is the alternative to having foreign policy brought under the auspices of Community institutions such as the Commission and Parliament. On the other hand, the expansion of EPC and its activities and scope of issue-areas appears to negate the third condition stated above that related to low 'total load'. In short, more activities increase the load of the mechanism which could lead to increased institutionalization and formality, requiring some type of association with those structures that the fragmenting units, the states, sought to avoid at the outset. This end scenario would appear to be the opposite of what the initiators of the process of EPC intended. Therefore, and like that of the 'self-styled' logic proposed by Roy Ginsberg, the authors conclude that '...at this point we would

simply say that the consociational model merits further exploration in its possible relevance for EPC...'(Ibid., 248) While slightly further forward, one is left asking the same questions as were asked of Ginsberg: how can one point to a theoretical proposition for 'salvation' from other theoretical paradigms that is underdeveloped in the specific area of European Political Co- operation?

As is the case with the other 'modern' models suggested by Ginsberg and Wessels, there are problems with Bulmer's two-tiered approach to domestic politics. An essential concern is that '...it is not possible to trace every national government's position in every item on the agenda of EPC to domestic politics...'(Ibid.) Bulmer does state that this is '...a dimension which needs to be considered...'(Ibid.) However, while Bulmer's statement is true a problem exists with these 'alternative' theoretical models. This main problem is that there is very little to go on with respect to their relationship with International Relations as a study, and specifically the European Community as an international actor. Utilized mainly for the explanation of domestic political actions, these models are, as yet, not even within the margins of theoretical arguments and debates in International Relations, as illustrated by their exclusion from the first chapter of this thesis. Consequently, they may be useful with respect to the study of EPC, but much more research and scholarship needs to be accomplished before a valid assessment of these models can be made.

VI: Assessment

The attacks on Political Realist, traditional and modern theoretical approaches by, most notably, Roy Ginsberg, but others as well may leave one searching once more for a comprehensive explanatory model of European Political Co-operation. It is evident that while there should be a strong focus on the member states in this explanation, the informal and formal communitarian links between EPC and EC institutions illustrate the uniqueness of this process and its mechanisms. In turn, this uniqueness disallows state-centric and power politics-dominant concepts of international or regional relations from dominating and asserting a 'claim to knowledge' in this area of research. However, the problematic is that theories of integration and the school of Complex Interedependence bring the reader and this thesis no closer in its ability to discover which theoretical paradigm can comprehensively assess EPC. Both of these perspectives maintain a number of the state-centric qualities and core assumptions of Political Realism, and in turn the literature that epitomizes this tradition.

Consequently, one is left with 'modern' perspectives such as the 'self-styled' logic, a two-tiered approach to domestic politics and Consociationalism. All three appear to have some appeal with respect to explaining Political Co-operation. To this there is no doubt. The concern for this author and project is that none of them, as noted by the inventors or

promulgaters of these perspectives, are developed enough to challenge the status of the other traditions already alluded to. This is so even though it is obvious that none of these other models are able to do what is being asked of them - comprehensively explain the creation and evolution of EPC. However, for one to assert the place of one paradigm over another enough research has to have occurred with respect to the former, otherwise the credibility of this 'modern' school of thought may be placed in doubt.

This inability of any one model to comprehensively explain developments in the processes of EPC and its relationship to EC institutions and mechanisms is strengthened by a variety of statements and documents from Euroepan Community sources. While the initial reasons behind the creation of EPC was Europe's 'absence' from the international arena and the domestic interests of all of the member states reflect the slowness of the development of links between EPC and EC mechanisms (EPC, 30 and 272, Ifestos, 150), crucial member state-sponsored reports that assisted in these developments spoke a different language. One example of this dualism in the objectives of the member states was the mandate of the Luxembourg Report of 1970, which was to '...study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification...of the European Communities...'(EPC, 1982;28) This sentiment is echoed in the Copenhagen and London Reports. In the former it is stated that '...the Nine reaffirm their intention of transforming the whole complement of their relations into a European Union...'(Ibid., 59) The latter Report proclaims that '...this development [EPC] has contributed to the ultimate objective of European Union...'(Ibid., 272) This Report also mentions how membership of Political Co-operation was entirely dependent on one's status in relation to the European Community itself. The former was dependent on the latter, and not the other way round.

How is one to assess these conflicting positions of the member states and the overall weakness of *any* theoretical model to comprehensively explain European Political Cooperation? Possibly the best way to do so would be to opt out, and conclude that none of these models, least of all those of a tradition or classical nature, be utilized to their fullest in any attempt to explain EPC. Stress is placed on traditional and classical models because the ultimate fate of those of a more modern nature remains in doubt; until more research is conducted on any of the three it may be best for conclusive comments to be muted. In this respect Ifestos and David Allen are of like minds. The former comments that EPC is a process that is neither purely supranational nor completely intergovernmental in its relationship with member states or EC institutions.(Ifestos, 250) To this end he asserts that Political Co-operation falls somewhere in between these extremes and therefore could be described as a uniquely European development and the world's most '...advanced model of collective diplomacy and an important contribution to the search for new diplomatic techniques...'(Ibid., 251) David Allen is of a similar mind, for in a lengthy quote he posits that EPC is such that it too is a process that

> defies immediate categorisation, involving as it does elements of integration, intergovernmentalism, transnationalism and bureaucratic politics all operating within a framework that encompasses both international organisations and nation-states struggling to attain or maintain an independent identity in an interdependent world...(Allen, 1978;135)

VII:Conclusion

It is evident from the above exploration of the theoretical and practical elements of European Political Co-operation that none of the theories analyzed are able to explain the process of EPC in a comprehensive manner. It is also evident that those working from a Political Realist perspective are as unable to accomplish this task as any other, thus highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of this specific theoretical project that were first alluded to in the first chapter, especially its priorization of a systems-level and structure-biased approach to international politics. This evident inability of Political Realism is the first specific attempt of this thesis to judge it on its own merits, as desired by Hans Morgenthau, and exposes, injures and wounds this school of thought in that its 'claim to know' becomes less invulnerable than it might appear in the writings of Morgenthau and others like him.

The exposure of the failings of Political Realism appear because of the lack of concern for non-state actors in international relations, the rejection of unit and sub-uit levels of analysis to be analyzed, rather than only that of the international level, and other factors that may be broadly related to the concept of 'agency'. Whether this damage can be replicated in the proceeding chapters of this thesis is another matter, but nonetheless an initial degree of damage has been done to the credibility of Political Realism and its project, as defined in general terms in Chapter One and in specific this chapter. Where one directs onself from this juncture with respect to the theoretical underpinnings of EPC, and general EC-US relations, is a question that cannot be answered yet, but the map that will do so has begun to be drawn, only more research and analysis can assist in the finalization of this document, and the journey it will assist in its conclusion. However, even without a precise map with respect to where else one should direct one's attention, the 'levels-of-analysis' and 'agent-structure' debates and problems which Carr associates with Realism, begin to appear. The opening up of these related debates may guide one to the proposition that a level of analysis other than the systemic, and agents rather than structures, may be more useful in an explanation and understanding of EPC and, given the work that will be undertaken in the proceeding chapter, the sources of strain in the transatlantic relationship, not to mention what may type of assumptions may spring forward after a detailed assessment of the three security-based case studies. Only time and further

research will tell whether this need to accept the viability of other 'levels' and agents rather than, or in addition to structures, is at all warranted.

---

[1]Works that are perceived to be 'realist' in orientation but are either policy-oriented or primarily historical accounts of EPC are Rummel, R., The Evolution of an International Actor:Western Europe's New Assertiveness, Boulder, Co.:Westview Press, 1990; Rummel, R., Towards Political Union, Oxford:Westview Press, 1992; and for the historical approach see Nuttal, S., European Political Cooperation, Oxford:Claredon Press, 1992; and de Ruyt, J., European Political Cooperation, Washington D.C.:Atlantic Council of the United States, 1989.

[2]A similar work on theories of integration and European Political Co-operation to that of Ginsberg is Ifestos, European Political Co-operation. However rather than a detailed analysis of two similar works, only that of Ginsberg will be utilized at this juncture. Ifestos' work will be utilized for the case study on the Middle East, which is the fourth chapter of the thesis.

[3]For a similar but less detailed examination of these alternative models to understanding the European Community see Simon Hix, "The Study of the European Community:The Challenge to Comparative Politics", West European Politics, V.17, No.1, 1994.

Appendix 2.1

Classical and Alternative Conceptual Perspectives on EC Foreign Policy Activity

Perspective	Key Actors	Concepts/Processes
Classical		
National Interest	nation-state; national leaders and prime/foreign ministers	nationalism;state sovereignty, interest maximized; separate national traditions, vetos
Elite Actor	politicians, interest group elites and statesmen	elite perceptions, self-interest motivations, statesmanship, receptiveness to votes
Domestic Politics	political parties; interest groups, constituents	elections, pluralism, public opinion, fragmented power, cleavages
Bureaucratic Politics	national/European civil servants	organizational power to initiate/implement policy, break on elite power.
Alternatives		
Integration Logic	regional bodies and leaders, national leaders and elites	revised neofunctionalism, externalization, reactive diplomacy, foreign policy activity, symbiotic relationships.
Interdependence	subnational, national, regional	political economy, transnationalism, intergovernmental cooperation, pluralism, mutual sensitivity.
Self-Styled Logic	national/European elites, bodies, civil servants	convergence of interests, politics of scale, habits of cooperation, increased interdependence/clout, diplomatic style/policy initiatives.

Source: Ginsberg, R., Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community, p.40

Chapter Three: Agencies, Structures and Allies

I:Introduction

The preceding chapters have been an attempt to present a case for a Realist position with respect to the debates concerning two topics, the first being the 'level-of-analysis' and 'agent-structure' questions, while the second related to the creation, institutionalization and evolution of European Political Co-operation. The first chapter illustrated that to every perspective there may be a critique that highlights theoretical and practical 'gaps' within the initial school of thought and, consequently, room for discussion and reasoned debate. The second chapter was a step further in the direction of practical application and a critique of the initial theoretical tradition. When asked whether or not a Realist postulation could adequately explain Political Co-operation from its outset until 1987 and the signing of the Single European Act, a number of prominent scholars answered that this articulation of international politics could not do what was asked of it. However, the same conclusion was true of not only a Realist synthesis, but also other 'classical' and 'modern' models, including the various integration theories often utilized to explain European Community processes and behavior. Alternative models were advanced by Ginsberg and Pijpers, but without much success or confidence. Nevertheless, the 'claim to know' of the Realist approach has been found to be lacking in the area of European Political Co-operation, and therefore its ability to validate its position with respect to the level-of-analysis and agent-structure debates.

This 'claim to know' on the part of the Realist synthesis is the subject of this third chapter, before a move to the three case studies is made. To assess the validity and credibility of the Realist position with respect to the transatlantic alliance, broadly defined, a number of steps will be taken below. Firstly, a review of the dominant literature on policy divergences between the member states of the Atlantic Alliance will be conducted to establish the presence or absence of a 'conventional wisdom'. The second step will be an assessment of this literature and its reasons for these transatlantic divergences. At this stage a further series of questions should be asked, including 1) can the language of the dominant literature be located within the overall theoretical tradition of Realism? 2) is there a rebuttal to this 'conventional wisdom'? 3) to what other theoretical perspectives does this secondary literature point to? 4) how does this critique of the 'conventional wisdom' relate to the 'level of analysis' and 'agent-structure' debate of the first chapter in the thesis? Of all of these queries, the last of them serves as the key that binds the first three chapters together and moves the debate forward to the case studies with a central, clearly exposed idea. This 'binding' must be accomplished for the success of the thesis depends, to a certain extent, on a link being formed between its theoretical and practical

aspects. With this in mind, it is proper to begin a review of the transatlantic literature and the 'conventional wisdom' found within it.

II:Structure

Like the theoretical debate outlined in the first chapter, the literature concerning transatlantic divergences can be divided into a number of categories, having been written over several decades. The question becomes one of prioritization. Should one group the literature according to its theoretical analysis, or by time periods? Both may illustrate a 'conventional wisdom', but one may do this task slightly better than the other. A number of 'crises' plagued the transatlantic relationship during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, with the literature following accordingly. Recent work on this relationship points to the trend of the past continuing into the near future, with the 1990s marked by another 'crisis of confidence' between the member states of the European Community and the United States. Because of this recurring pattern of analysis many of the reasons behind these allied differences are no different in the early 1990s from those of the mid 1960s or early 1980s. It is because of this perceived continuity of periodic reassessment in the transatlantic relationship that a time period-based analysis, rather than a theoretically-based one, will be utilized throughout this chapter to assess the conventional literature of this relationship.

Because the method of analysis will be time period-based, the scholars and time periods to be examined shall be noted prior to the onset of the analysis. In the 1960s, Henry Kissinger and Ronald Steel will be examined, while in the 1970s, the work of Benjamin Cohen, and Nicholas Wahl will be critiqued. For the period of the early 1980s, Lawrence Freedman, Stanley Hoffmann and Michael Smith will be explored, while Joseph Joffe, Phil Williams and Michael Vlahos, will provide the focus for the late 1980s. Finally, the most recent developments of the early 1990s will be reviewed through the works of Roy Ginsberg and Kevin Featherstone, John Peterson and, finally, William Cromwell. While the reasons behind the use of the latter three authors will be explored in the relevant section, the reasons for the other authors noted above are both arbitrary in that one could have chosen a whole different set of authors who have contributed to this literature, and reasonable in that most of these authors have a long and distinguished career with respect to their contribution to an understanding of the transatlantic relationship. This is especially true of people such as Kissinger, Joffe, Freedman, Michael Smith, Hoffmann and Phil Williams. Others, such as Benjamin Cohen, Nicholas Wahl and Michael Vlahos have been included to illustrate how this literature has come to be expanded away from its originally narrow focus on military issues to include political economic concerns and those of a cultural and idea-based nature. The question then is not that these should be included

in this literature review, but what is the relevant influence upon this literature and its coventional wisdom of this latter group of scholars with respect to the former set of authors. It is precisely because of the search for this answer, and its effect upon the validity of the 'claim to know' of Political Realism concerning an explanation of EC-US relations and the 'levels-of-analysis' and 'agent-structure' debates that these latter authors are included in this literature review alongside the likes of Joffe, Hoffmann, Kissinger and the others.

All of the literature that will be explored share a number of common assumptions as to why these differences have occurred. Common factors include the shift in power, status and roles between Western Europe and the United States; their differing threat perceptions of the Soviet Union; the economic resurgence of the European Community member states and the relative decline of the United States since the late 1960s; the presence of nuclear weaponry and the onset of nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States; the evolution of détente; and geography and history. While these assumptions will be drawn out from the literature, the presence or absence of additional factors, causes and motivations behind transatlantic differences will be, at the end, the determining benchmark by which the 'adequacy' of the Realist articulation of international politics can and will be assessed.

Finally, prior to the onset of this literature review, one point needs to be taken on board, which is definitional in nature. It was noted in the introductory section of this thesis that scholars conveniently utilize the terms 'Western Europe', 'West European' and 'European Community', along with others, in the same context. As well, some authors define this relationship in terms of institutions such as NATO or, euphimistically, the 'Atlantic Alliance'. This may be so, especially in the 1960s and early 1970s, because of the lack of a foreign policy mechanism within the European Community prior to the establishment of EPC. While this easy usage of many terms for the same purpose should not be encouraged, it was noted in the introduction that because of the unique nature of the EC, in that there are EC institutions such as EPC, Council of Ministers and EC Commission that assist in the creation of foreign policy, the member-states are actively involved in the creation of their own foreign policy, as well as that of the European Community. Consequently, to narrowly define the 'EC' as one set of actors or another would belie the uniqueness of this organization in an attempt to make an assessment of it that much easier. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the use of terms such as 'Western Europe' are by the scholars being assessed, rather than the author of this thesis. The latter will attempt, whenever possible and necessary, to speak of the European Comunity - an organization that encompasses, on many occassions, the actions of its institutions and member-states; when this is not desired, it shall be highlighted.

III:The 1960s

Ronald Steel's The End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe is marked by its adherence to a number of the factors already listed above. The author contends that the senior-junior relationship between the United States and Western Europe after World War Two occurred as a result of the outcome of the war. This accident of history allowed the former to dominate the latter because of its political, military and economic strength. Western Europe was able to rebuild because of the largess of the United States, while the latter was able to pursue a goal of transforming the rest of the world in its own image. However, the relationship between these allies has had to change because '...the panic of the early 1950s passed and the Russian peril seemed to diminish...'(Steel, 1962;12) These factors, coupled with the vulnerability of the United States to nuclear devastation and the economic and political resurgence of Western Europe, have '...crumbled the old foundations of NATO and made its future appear dubious, and perhaps even undesirable...'(Ibid., 13)

Steel continues by laboring the twin points of European recovery and the lack, or perceived lack, of an overt threat from the Soviet Union on the part of the West Europeans, unlike American political leaders. On consecutive pages of his first chapter the author mentions that a politically strong Western Europe recognizes a threat from tensions between the two superpowers as a likely scenario. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, a crisis between the superpowers over a non-European theatre and with the West European leaders not informed of American policies prior to their adoption and implementation, is one example of this new thinking in Western Europe. It was a belief held not only by Charles de Gaulle of France, but, to varying degrees, Germany, Iceland, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and even Britain. For Steel, the new nationalism or regionalism of Western Europe is not a '...personal idiosyncrasy of Charles de Gaulle, but rather the result of twenty years of European recovery...'(Ibid., 17) Consequently,, de Gaulle's fall from power in France would not allow for the easy realignment of the Allied constellation. The reactions to American policies might not be as vocal and vehement as they were under de Gaulle, but they would not cease in their delineations of a regional identity and role for Western Europe.

However, Steel returns to a more terminal outlook of allied disputes. He asserts that these problems reflect deeper changes in the overall international order. Changes in the position, role, status and power of many states have changed since the end of World War Two, but the policies of the American political leadership '...remain frozen in the vocabulary of a post-war world which has ceased to exist...'(Ibid.) Consequently, disagreements over strategy and policy overshadow the more important battle between the

allies of NATO. It is these disputes that prove that it is the '...ends themselves which are now in question...'(Ibid., 16) In his second chapter, dedicated to the limits of the transatlantic alliance, Ronald Steel states that the advent of nuclear weaponry, and the proliferation of these weapons, has made the alliance between the United States and Western Europe uneasy. Because of the vulnerability of the former to an intercontinental attack by the Soviet Union, the notion of alliance formation as a means of preventing war has lost some of its credibility. The American guarantee through a policy of extended deterrence has placed the United States at risk for the sake of Western Europe. In turn this new risk has laid doubts in the minds of West European leaders as to the credibility of the guarantee itself. Steel notes that '...Europeans have become increasingly sceptical that the American guarantee is as credible as it has been in the past...'(Ibid., 35) The arguments over nuclear policy, and whether it is beneficial for France and Britain to have 'independent' nuclear forces, well documented in the third chapter of Steel's work, is, for the author, one that serves to obscure the relationship between the allies in 1962. Steel contends that the problem between the allies is a political one, and it is this problem that is '...at the root of the malaise...'(Ibid., 71) However, while developing the situation of the German 'problem', and restating his concerns over the diminished Soviet threat and the economic and political resurgence of Western Europe, Steel never probes too deeply into this 'political problem' that he speaks of, and ends his exegesis of the transatlantic alliance on this note. While the problems may be man- made, the task of discovering and implementing solutions will be more difficult then presumed possible, if at all.(Ibid., 143)

At the outset of The Troubled Partnership, Henry Kissinger comments that the promise of Atlantic partnership has been '...flawed by increasingly sharp disputes among the Allies...'(Kissinger, 1965;4) These disputes have come in the areas of disarmament, the Third World, trade relations, European unity and strategic policies. But Kissinger opines that disagreements over policy should be expected. What is fundamentally important about these disputes is that they '...involve basic assumptions about the nature of Atlantic relationships, the future of Europe and the relative influence of the various partners...'(Ibid.) For the author, these divergences between the allies cannot be blamed on the personality of France's Charles de Gaulle, and simplified to French anti-Americanism and attempts at grandeur in international affairs. The structural and policy-related problems affecting the allied relationship of the 1960s go beyond this level of superficiality and are related to a number of causes. The first cause of the structural problems of the alliance is the nature of the relationship itself. It was formed during, and immediately after, World War Two, when Western Europe needed, and survived because of, the leadership of the United States and thus a hierarchy was created between the partners. However, the relative positions, weights and strengths of the allies have changed since the end of World War Two and Western Europe is not the weak partner that it once was.

Nevertheless, the nature, and perceptions of, the relationship have not come to reflect these changes.

A second cause of structural divergences in the alliance has come about because of the advent and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The multiple logic behind alliance formation, for Kissinger, involves a number of compromises that were inconsistent even without the problems attributed to the nuclear age. These inconsistencies have, because of the dawn of this age become even more glaring than before. The author asserts that the control of nuclear weaponry implies a control at odds with a coalition of sovereign states. This, coupled with the complications of the very nature and repercussions of a nuclear war on any scale, affect the '...credibility of traditional pledges of mutual assistance...'(Ibid., 12) The outcome of nuclear control becomes either American unilateralism or Alliance futility, neither a worthy option. A third structural cause of these divergences is the effect that nuclear weapons have on the quality of strategic debate between members of the alliance. The combination of war as an unthinkable event, with the lack of assurance in a policy of deterrence in that one is never guaranteed of the wisdom of one's strategic and military policies, has created a series of pressure points that has had a '...demoralizing effect on Atlantic relationships...'(Ibid., 20) Kissinger claims that a gap between American technical studies concerning nuclear strategy and the ability of the allies to 'absorb' them has made '...meaningful consultation increasingly difficult...'(Ibid., 21)

The fourth and final factor is related to differences in historical perspectives and the strength of the allies. Two wars in slightly more than two decades on the same continent involving similar actors, compared with a country not directly affected by such violence, has made Western European states perceive themselves to be in a different position to that which American politicians and strategists place them in. For the author, this difference is '...crucial to understanding some of the strains in the Atlantic alliance...'(Ibid., 24) This strain is compounded by the disparity in the strengths and capabilities of the allies. While Western Europe has recovered, and this recovery should be matched by changes in the overall relationship, the United States is still the leader of that relationship. Consequently, the latter's actions affect, for good or bad, the nature, shape and direction of the relationship more than any one Western European state. This state of relative influence with respect to Alliance politics and East-West relations necessitates tremendous diplomacy on the part of the leaders of the United States if the West Europeans are to perceive themselves to be involved in the decision-making process of the relationship. If this diplomacy is not adept, Kissinger predicts that as past concepts of alliance formation are utilized, more harm could be caused in both the short and long term. Differing interests and perspectives on international politics only serve to enhance these differences, not inhibit them.(Ibid., 27) Kissinger is uncertain what kind of alliance and relationship will evolve in the future and what exactly is necessary for a constructive one to be ensured.

What he does assert is that, unlike Communist states and their relationships, Western Europe and the United States have the ability to maintain their ties in the face of policy disputes caused by structural factors.(Ibid., 251)

IV:1970s Literature

While the popular vision of the transatlantic relationship during the 1960s was dominated by a narrow security-based 'conventional wisdom' to be explored in some depth later in this chapter, the 1970s witnessed a growth in accounts of why tensions between Western Europe and the United States arose. The chapter will develop only a few which appear to represent the literature of the decade and the commonly identified sources of strain. Earl Ravenal, Benjamin Cohen and Nicholas Wahl are the three authors who shall represent these differing versions of transatlantic tensions and will now be examined in some depth.[1] Earl Ravenal's article is found in his edited work entitled Atlantis Lost. The author begins his analysis by stating that he considers the alliance as '...primarily a strategic problem...'(Ravenal, 1976;207) He contends that economic considerations are not more important than those of a political-military nature. This is because the factors that are constant over time in world affairs are those that are '...almost by definition political-military...'(Ibid.) As such, those types of issues that will determine the future of the transatlantic relationship are also political-military in nature, and are the ones that should be examined in greater detail. Ravenal asserts that American projections of the alliance are wrong, because they do not take a realistic account of the changes in the allied relationship. These include the increased political and economic integration of Western Europe and the shouldering, by Western Europe, of many of the burdens of collective defence. Also, the author contends that it was the Gaullist attack that precipitated the disintegration of NATO. Nonetheless, these cracks exposed by de Gaulle were already present. The French leader widened '...fissures that were inherent in the alliance from its inception, and extending cracks there were introduced when the Soviets achieved effective nuclear deterrence of the United States...'(Ibid., 209) As such, Ravenal covers most of those arguments elaborated by the 'conventional wisdom' concerning the reasons why differences exist between the allies. However, the author does not explore them further. Instead, he offers solutions to these concerns: concerns that include the strategic devolution of the United States from Western Europe and issues related to conventional force reduction negotiations. Ravenal speaks only of the ways in which these transatlantic differences can be solved because he, unlike many of his contemporaries, is of the belief that transatlantic tensions are solvable insofar as the solution to these problems is not to be found in the re-alignment of the Alliance, but US strategic disengagement from Europe.(Ibid., 207)

Ravenal cites an article by 'Z' in Foreign Affairs as an example of this conventional belief that allied tensions are solvable, and the alliance worth the effort needed to bring about these solutions. In this article by 'Z', there is the recognition that the resource dependency of Western Europe, coupled with the lack of consultation by the US with respect to the enhancement of military alertness are only two of the reasons why the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 has strained the alliance.(Z, 1974;238) Nonetheless, and in spite of these strains, 'Z' is confident that '...there is nothing insoluble about present difficulties in American-European relations...'(Ibid., 246) From this assertion the author concludes that the ties that bind Western Europe and the United States are such that they outweigh the conflicts between the two, be they political, military or economic, and allow the respective leaders to '...work for the best solutions...[as] the only way of avoiding the worst..'(Ibid., 248)

In comparison to Ravenal who advocates US strategic disengagement from Western Europe, Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Freedman (whose work will be examined below), advocate a renewal of the transatlantic alliance. Nonetheless, where these authors do meet on a theoretical level, like many others to be found in this literature review, is that they do agree that the problems plaguing the relationship is structural, conditioned by the environment which they operate within and centered around military and strategic issues - war and peace - to the exclusion of political-economic or ideas-based conceptions of difference. It is because of these similarities that one is able to place all three scholars in the same theoretical 'box', that being the tradition of Political Realism.

Benjamin Cohen's chapter entitled "The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck" in Wolfram Hanreider's The United States and Western Europe attempts to ascertain why the 'bargain' in international political relations between the allies has come 'unstuck'. The starting point for this breakdown in Atlantic relations was the August 1971 Nixon Shocks and the implementation of the New Economic Policy. This marked, in the eyes of those in the Administration, '...a new ball game with new rules...'(Cohen, 1974;107) For Cohen the economic policies of Nixon and the shocks of the summer of 1971 were the beginnings of the tensions, not the culmination of them, nor the reasons for them. Cohen's project is therefore an attempt to understand what the causes of transatlantic political economics differences were, prior to the policies of Richard Nixon, and what will be the relationship between Western Europe and the United States after the initial allied reaction to these policies.

The author seeks an explanation in a variety of models: bureaucratic politics; the revival of protectionist sentiment in the United States; and domestic political considerations. With each, Cohen finds enough problems to render them ineffective with respect to the questions that the author has sought answers for. The first approach contends that the US Government is not a single unit with only one viewpoint and policy,

but rather a multiplicity of viewpoints and policies that create confusion with respect to the formalization, enunciation and implementation of policy, be it oriented domestically or internationally.(Ibid., 121) However, given the nature of Richard Nixon's control over certain aspects of international policy, and the creation of an overall economic policy committee entitled the Council on International Policy, Cohen finds its difficult to believe that Nixon would allow '...inconsistency at the lower echelons of government to interfere with his overall game plan...'(Ibid., 123) He did not, the author contends, allow this to occur. The Nixon Shocks were a policy that were the '...product of a deliberate analysis and design...[they] represent a coherent vision of the world...'(Ibid.)

As to protectionist sentiment and domestic political concerns, Cohen admits that pressures on the government, built up by industry, could singularly '...suffice to account for the change of direction in policy...'(Ibid.) Foreign competitiveness in industrial sectors, perceived to be strengths of the American economy, coupled with a foreign trade deficit and 'unfair', apparently protectionist, trade tactics by some of the United States' major trading partners, has been reflected in a shift in the 'balances of forces' within industry, trade unions and the American political elite.(Ibid., 125) Trade bills, 'voluntary' export restraint agreements, and the imposition of quotas on certain foreign products are illustrative of this change in thinking, not only in industry but also Washington DC. Cohen is of the opinion that while Nixon should not be ignorant of domestic considerations, he is '...too consummate a politician to risk the general design of his foreign policy if he does not have to...'(Ibid., 126) As such, the author asks '...what, then, is the explanation ?...'(Ibid.) A more plausible explanation of the political economic tensions between the allies lies not in domestic considerations, nor bureaucratic politics, but the '...changing balance of power in international economic relations and in the US effort to redress that balance of power...'(Ibid.) As was the case for Steel and Kissinger with respect to post-war security arrangements, Cohen believes that political economic relations and structures between Western Europe and the United States were shaped in the aftermath of World War Two. Like the security relationship between the allies, the economic capabilities of these two actors have changed since the time when the United States controlled the amount of international reserves of gold and dominated world trade. However, the political economic structures created after the war have not evolved to reflect the changed nature of the relationship between the actors, and the actors and the international community. The endpoint of Cohen's analysis of this explanatory model is that '...the New Economic Policy has created a genuine impasse in Atlantic relations...'(Ibid., 132)

Cohen foresees two reactions to the policies of Richard Nixon and the counter-policies of the West European governments. A first possible outcome is a world that slowly disintegrates into aggressive and antagonistic trading blocs, principally Western Europe,

North America, and a Japan bloc in Asia. However, this situation could mean an end to the '...post-war atmosphere of co-operation across the Atlantic...'(Ibid., 133) The second possible outcome is one where the political leaders of the United States would acknowledge the changes that have occurred in the economic relationship between them and their major allies, notably Western Europe. The status of the dollar, trade deficits and trade policies must be resolved in order to ensure co-operation between the allies. This would be a '...more preferable resolution of the current impasse in Atlantic relations...'(Ibid.) No matter what, Cohen ends his assessment of the political economic dynamics of the transatlantic relationship of the early to mid-1970s by asserting that '...the old bargain unstuck. A new one, signifying real equivalence, is needed...'(Ibid.) [2]

The last of the works to be reviewed from the period of the early to mid-1970s is that of Nicholas Wahl in Ravenal and Chace's Atlantis Lost entitled "The Autonomy of Domestic Structures in European-American Relations'. Wahl stresses that there is a 'conventional wisdom' with respect to transatlantic relations in the spheres of political, military and economic issues. This wisdom is that '...common national interests, increasingly interdependent economies, and shared political and social beliefs have drawn Western Europe into close co-operation with the United States since World War II...'(Wahl, 1974;225) The reasons why this relationship has become strained over time amount to selfish nationalism, misguided leadership and errors of judgement on the part of both of the allies.(Ibid.) The consequences of these strains is that short term problems lend themselves to short term answers and the reaffirmation of the alliance between Western Europe and the United States. To Wahl, this answer is no answer, for the roots of the strains between these allies lie in the domestic political concerns of West European, as well as American, governments and political elites.(Ibid., 226-227) More general examples of the relevance of domestic structures are found in the positions of the leading governing parties in Western Europe with respect to European unity and the transatlantic relationship. In Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom there are forces and factors at the unit and sub-unit level of analysis that shape the responses of these governments to both issues. Wahl states that the same forces that limit progress toward Europe unity '...also limit the margins within which European governments can change their attitudes toward the United States and its Atlantic policies...'(Ibid., 227) The microcosmic example of this is the Franco-American relationship, selected because of the overt tensions between these two countries especially during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The relationship between France and the United States has grown more tense because the interests of the two no longer coincide as they did immediately after the war. Since that time sharp conflicts of interest have '...long focused more attention on a wide range of obstacles to agreement, including problems of communication...'(Ibid., 237)

Nevertheless, problems of communication will not be easily rectified for they are but symbols of more significant differences that exist between these two countries. These lie in stereotypes held by the leaders and citizens of both countries, as well as that which Wahl calls the ultimate obstacle, which is '...a kind of cultural ignorance...'(Ibid., 241) 'Cultural ignorance' is an ignorance of the weight given by both societies to certain values, beliefs and behavior, shaped by these same patterns of belief. For Wahl, a '...nation's customary and traditional political system is a paradigm for its society as a whole...'(Ibid.) France is a country that has been shaped by a monistic conception of the public good and the best measures in political and private life to achieve this end. On the other end of the scale of beliefs and perceptions is the United States, with a society dominated and infused with pluralistic notions of both the public good and how this good should be achieved. The two patterns of socialization permeate all sectors of life, be it in business, family, politics or voluntary associations. Because of these differing notions of the end goals of society and government, and the means to deliver such goals, tensions created through a lack of communication and domestic political constraints are enhanced and sharpened over time. Disagreements become disputes, while disputes become clashes of will between countries that are thought to be allies.(Ibid., 241-243)

The Vietnam War, combined with the economic difficulties of the early 1970s, the onset of détente between the superpowers and the appearance of a condominium between the United States and Soviet Union intended to freeze the Western allies out of East-West negotiations, are all factors that make it difficult for the 'conventional wisdom' to establish the nature of the alliance to be maintained.(Ibid., 245) Changes in the political leadership of Western Europe and the United States may alleviate some of these concerns, but the author has his doubts as to whether political change will be enough to challenge domestic and cultural forces affecting the transatlantic relationship. Wahl maintains that a change in the leadership of Western Europe may actually do the opposite. The presence of leaders who have little sentimentality for the alliance as it was constructed may press for European unity at the conscious or unconscious expense of Atlantic harmony. Similarly, the new business elite of Western Europe, shaped by the forces of the 1950s and 1960s rather than the 1930s and 1940s, are '...unencumbered by either residual feelings of inferiority or any real sense of debt of allegiance toward the United States or to the abstraction called the Atlantic community...'(Ibid., 247) Based upon this analysis of contemporary Western Europe, the answer for American policymakers lies not in an attempt to recreate the scenarios and situations of the past, for they cannot be returned to. A return to the images and perceptions of the 'conventional wisdom' will not be the solution. A recognition of the autonomy of domestic structures and the causality of cultural factors will be difficult, but one necessary for the transatlantic relationship between France and the United States, and the United States and Western Europe as a whole. The effect of this new relationship not

taking shape would only result in more tension, more conflict and divergences, and the possibility that the rationale behind the institutions created through the alliance may be challenged, is not an unlikely scenario. Better for the political leadership of the United States to 'let go' rather than attempt to 'reach out' to what is not there anymore.(Ibid., 247)

V:Developments in the early 1980s

As mentioned before, the period spanning the early 1980s was another where many western analysts questioned the alliance between Western Europe and the United States. The calling into question of NATO and the search for possible solutions by way of US devolution or disengagement from Western Europe, especially with respect to military and economic issues, was not uncommon. Out of the many voices during this brief period of alliance introspection, a few shall be reviewed as those that best represent their colleagues and a distinct perspective on why the alliance suffered yet another bout of recriminations and transatlantic disputes. The scholars selected are Lawrence Freedman, Stanley Hoffmann and a selection of articles written or co-authored by Michael Smith.

Lawrence Freedman, in his article "The Atlantic Crisis" published in the summer of 1982 states from the outset that tensions over monetary relations, the Middle East and the Soviet Union are apparent but that

> it remains unclear whether this conjunction of arguments [between the NATO allies] is a temporary phenomenon brought about by the strains of recession or by the incompatibility of the current crop of political leader or whether we are witnessing the symptoms of a much deeper crisis that is unsettling the whole set of assumptions that have governed Western policy-making over the past three decades...(Freedman, 1982;395)

What follows are a number of reasons why the transatlantic alliance was under the strain that Freedman alludes to above, his interpretation of these reasons, and possible solutions to the 'crisis'.

Freedman states that there is a body of scholarship that claims that alliance problems lie in the changing international context and the '...decline of a sense of Atlantic 'community' that mark the post-war period...'(Ibid., 396) However, the author contends that one should not overemphasize the harmony of interests and concerns that shaped the Western political leadership of the post-war era. Introspection and national or regional self-interest is not unique to either ally, or group of allies, in the early 1980s. Freedman cites surveys from the United States and Western Europe that illustrate the flaws within this approach that demonstrates a marked commitment to the alliance.(Ibid., 397) The author ends this section by asserting that because of the complex and interdependent world

that the allies are situated in during this period of time, transatlantic tensions cannot be '...eased simply by a reassertion of the Atlantic spirit...'(Ibid., 398) However, the author detaches himself from the above, and the debate over specific policy issues, because he contends that these policy differences are manifestations of a more significant problem between the allies that is affecting their overall relationship. Freedman would rather concentrate on and stress the features of the international system that '...make it more likely that the members of the Atlantic Alliance will disagree on a variety of issues...'(Ibid., 399)

Freedman moves from the notion of transatlantic 'spirit' to the economic malaise that has affected the allies in a number of ways. The stagflationary period of the middle and late 1970s, coupled with the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the relative interdependence of the West European and American economies, are reasons for increased co-operation and consultation. However, the opposite has occurred. These economic difficulties have highlighted the differences between Western Europe and the United States, rather than bringing them closer together, and separate policies have emerged. Some divergences have come about because of the relative independence of the United States in raw resources and material capabilities, while others because of calls for more nationalist solutions to global problems. Transatlantic disputes and arguments are, then, likely to be 'frequent and substantial'.(Ibid., 400) Freedman concludes that 'the Atlantic Alliance is essentially about security...'(Ibid., 401) As such, the economic difficulties described above, and the tensions created because of them, should have little or no effect on the overall relationship. However, because the military aspects of the alliance are linked by burden-sharing and the costs of weaponry, the '...connection between erosion of understanding in the economic sphere and the loss of cohesion in the security sphere [can be understood]...'(Ibid., 402) What makes these military and economic issues all the more troubling is that they have been caused by the overall change in the relationship between Western Europe and the United States. Like those scholars cited previously, Freedman too points out that the relative weights of the allies have changed since the end of World War Two, but that the structures of the relationship have not been adjusted to this new reality. In part, this failure to adapt has been caused by the desire of the political leadership of the United States to maintain the status quo for as long as possible. From this, Freedman moves from the issue of burden-sharing to that of nuclear parity. He suggests that many scholars attribute the transatlantic tensions of the early 1980s to the Soviet Union's achievement of nuclear parity and the lack of credibility in the concept of extended deterrence. While only the French argued this position in the 1960s the 1980s has witnessed a convergence of West European political opinions regarding this issue. An example of this unified policy stance is provided by Reagan's Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, when he met hostility on broaching the subject of the neutron bomb's

reintroduction into the nuclear arsenal as part of the United States strategic doctrine.(Ibid., 405)

The author, nevertheless, contends that while all of the above issues are important, in their own right, and the cause of some tension between the allies, they do not represent, in any combination, the key reasons why there are significant problems with the alliance. For Freedman, global perspectives concerning out-of-area issues and concerns create tensions that are distinctive from those cited above, and may be '...*the* key divergence, for by contrast the security arrangements within Europe still appear to be remarkably stable...'(Ibid., 407) Out-of-area concerns may be so for three reasons; the first possibly stemming from the complexity of these issues and the multiplicity of actors involved, making errors easier to commit. Secondly, the difference between the allies as regards resource allocation and consumption must be considered. Alliance disputes over oil in the Middle East, from 1973 onwards, are logical examples of this difference. The final reason may be due to the inability of Western Europe to project itself militarily abroad in the same way the United States can. As such, and with the possibility for disagreements with the United States '...incentives for low risk policies are intensified...'(Ibid., 408)

A fourth, implicit reason for these out-of-area divergences may stem from the relative position of the United States in world politics, compared with all that of the West European states. While it has been noted that the United States is not the dominant power it once was, it is still the alliance superpower, and the only country able to project itself in so many different ways throughout the globe. The United States perceives certain actions by third states like Angola, Cuba or Vietnam as destabilizing to the Western world. Right or wrong, this is the perception held by the American political elite, and the government takes what it believes to be the required action to counter moves that it perceives to be hostile to its and its allies' interests. These are the kinds of actions - excursions into third countries not directly associated with the European theatre - that have continually angered West European leaders and caused a number of prolonged rifts within the alliance.[3] Freedman's conclusion is that problems develop between the allies because of many reasons, including those related to changing governments and domestic concerns. There are those of a political economic dimension and those related to questions of roles and responsibilities within the alliance itself. The debates over burden-sharing is an example of the latter. All of these issues have become associated with each other because of the nature of the alliance, the growing complexity of the world and interdependence between the allies. However, while these factors must be taken into consideration in any attempts to understand the state of the alliance and solving the tensions of the early 1980s, Freedman states that one significant point should not be underemphasized. All of these tensions mentioned are '...largely a consequence of instabilities and uncertainties in the larger

structure of international relations...'(Ibid., 411) When scholars understand that, then the way forward for the transatlantic relationship can be discerned, and managed.[4 5]

Stanley Hoffmann's "The Western Alliance:Drift or Harmony" article from International Security is the next work to be examined. He states that there are three fundamental consideration to be accounted for when investigating the reasons for tensions between the allies. They are that the world has become a single strategic stage with third area concerns impinging on the security of Western Europe and the United States; the unfavorable balance of forces between the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact) and the United States (NATO); and the collapse of détente between the United States and Soviet Union.(Hoffmann, 1981;105) The author then notes that amidst all of the tensions between the allies one must start from the position that there are a number of issues over which agreement exists, including the presence of a resurgent Soviet military capacity through build-up of its conventional and strategic forces. Secondly, the allies are in general agreement that their combined military preparedness must be improved in light of the Soviet build-up. The decisions of 1979 regarding theatre nuclear forces are examples of this agreement.(Ibid., 107) Nevertheless, there are a number of issues where nuances are to be found, where the allies do disagree, regularly and with conviction. These divergences are similar to those stated previously, and include a global rather than local approach to third area conflicts; the precise nature of the Soviet threat be that military or ideological; and the degree that the outside world can influence the Soviet Union and its policies.(Ibid., 107-110) One can state the above areas of divergence briefly because, for the purposes of this chapter, the reasons behind these divergences are far more important. Hoffmann contends that tensions exist not because of difficulties in coping with Soviet behavior, but because of geographic, historical, domestic political, cultural and national reasons, with the first of them the 'fundamental factor'.(Ibid., 110)

With respect to geographic concerns, the logic of extended deterrence, mutually assured destruction and war-fighting as strategic options for the United States, appear credible to the leadership of that country, but not Western Europe. The vulnerability of Western Europe to a limited nuclear strike with no direct implications for American citizens and territories, questions the credibility of the American guarantee of extended deterrence. The build-up of conventional and nuclear forces by the Soviet Union, places even more strain on the logic, not to mention the credibility, of extended deterrence.(Ibid., 111) Geography, for Hoffmann, also explains the differing attitudes of the allies towards Eastern Europe. One of the reasons for maintaining a West European-Soviet Union détente after the demise of the Soviet-American détente can be traced to the perception, on the part of Western Europe, that Eastern Europe is not a '...Soviet *glacis* but a wound...'(Ibid., 112) Détente provides breathing space for the latter, in the hopes that reconciliation could begin sometime in the future.

The relationship between the allies after the second world war may also account for these differing patterns of action. The post-war period was marked by the hegemony on decision-making and capabilities of the United States and 'abdication' by Western Europe. The latter has led, for Hoffmann, to a Western Europe that pursues options shaped by economic and diplomatic capabilities rather than those of a military nature. The same cannot be said of the United States.(Ibid., 113) Hoffmann asserts that '...domestic difficulties...aggravate the effects of an unfortunate geography and a humiliating history for the Europeans...'(Ibid., 114) The author notes that many of the opposition and governing parties of Western Europe have tended to concern themselves with the behavior of the Soviet Union, but within a context of other important questions of foreign affairs. In the United States most of the debate concerning international affairs revolves around the actions of the Soviet Union and its allies in Europe. The tendency, then, is for East-West and Soviet-American relations to suffer from 'overkill', whereas a more 'relaxed' view is held by political elites in Western Europe. Whilst the US is described as straight as an arrow in its outlook and concerns, Western Europe is akin to a complex clock, with many small and interlocking pieces. Almost nothing could be more different than these two analogies.(Ibid., 115)

The final consideration for Hoffmann is the national character and political culture of a given state, or group of states. Within this category the author addresses two lines of cleavage between the allies. The first may be a matter of simplicity for Americans, but rather more complex for West Europeans. Alliances, as well as enemies, appear, for the former, to be 'black-and-white' or 'us-against-them', while for the latter it is a series of nuances, shifts and switches that is as much part of their history as it is their present condition.(Ibid., 116) The second cleavage concerns the perception of conflict. Throughout American political thought there can be found a streak of utopianism, naiveté and optimism. Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' and Carter's belief in a constructive relationship with the USSR are two modern examples of this tendency. By comparison, Western Europe is replete with a pessimistic, pragmatic and survivalist attitude, based to a large extent on the history of the continent.(Ibid., 116) These cleavages, coupled with the other reasons for transatlantic tensions already outlined above, create a situation where the allies have different conceptions of stability. While the United States opts for the maintenance of the status quo, Western Europe awaits inevitable changes to its continent. They 'expect less and demand less' for their hope is that when the inevitable does come, it comes in such a manner that their interests and concerns are '...not destroyed in the process...'(Ibid., 117)

The answers to these tensions are not readily available, but appear to be similar to those addressed above. The reform of the institutions of the alliance, especially NATO, and a *rapprochement* between the United States and all her allies, are only two of the necessary but insufficient moves that the United States, and her allies, must attempt. If not

accomplished, then tensions will grow as the history, experiences and perceptions of the two actors - Western Europe and the United States - continue to grow farther apart. For Hoffmann '...nothing short of that will serve the purpose of further European co-operation, and preserve the transatlantic alliance...'(Ibid., 125)[6]

In Western Europe and the United States: Uncertain Allies Michael Smith notes that one may state that, with respect to formal obligations and institutions, '...relatively little has changed in the Atlantic strategic setting over the past thirty-five years...'(Smith, 1984;44) However, for the author nothing could be further from reality. Smith argues that there is a very real danger of an ungluing of the Alliance and of the '...inherent contradictions in commitments and capabilities reaching breaking-point...'(Ibid.) From this perspective the author posits five reasons why tensions have arise between the allies in the transatlantic relationship.

The first of these reasons is the impact of détente on both sets of actors - the United States and Western Europe. Simply put, the institutions of the Alliance, principally NATO, were unprepared and ill- suited to act as vehicles for reform and reconciliation between East and West. This lack inability to perform certain tasks pushed some of the allies to question these institutions and their basic assumptions.(Ibid., 45) A second set of factors revolved around the contradiction between the global and regional interests of the various allies. As mentioned above and will be mentioned again, this tension stems from the position of the United States as a world superpower conflicting with that of the West European states as former empires and present day middle rank powers. The global perspective of the former appears to be at odds with the perceived regionalism of the latter.(Ibid.) Henry Kissinger's Pilgrim Speech in 1973 is a primary example of this belief, held by the political leadership of the United States. The third and fourth factors are concerned with problems associated with the sphere of the political economic relationship between the allies - the relative decline of the United States in this and other spheres of influence, obviously conforming with the political and economic resurgence of Western Europe. Global roles were changing, but the institutions and responsibilities of the various actors were not.(Ibid., 45-48)

The fifth and most dwelled upon factor pertains to the '...less tangible ties of elite responsiveness and ideological convergence...'(Ibid., 48) These are the elements of the relationship that sustained the alliance beyond the interdependence of the allies in the spheres of security and economic matters. Smith contends that, whatever the problems may have been throughout the history of the alliance, the commonly held values and assumptions of the relationship suffered similar strains. Or, most likely, there were strains in other spheres because of a questioning of the basic assumptions of the relationship. A Gaullist France was coupled with the resurgence of Italian Eurocommunism and Brandt's *Ostpolitik* to recover not only Western Europe's economies, but also its regional identity as

an actor in world affairs. Taken together with shifts in the political leadership of the United States, new perspectives on an old alliance emerged. The problems associated with the alliance in the early 1980s should be seen as issues in their own right and symptoms of '...divergent expectations and experiences...'(Ibid., 49) Because of these changing expectations, Smith asserts later in his book that the strategic and economic realms of the relationship have become and are '...inseparable both from each other and from the sphere of politics and ideology...'(Ibid., 81) In his conclusion, the author summarizes the role of values in the transatlantic relationship. While at one level he speaks of structural and issue-based reasons for tensions between the allies, he ends by saying that while one should not deny the existence of these structural factors they are '...confused, muted and often compromised at the level of strategy or the day-to-day business of Atlantic relations...'(Ibid., 120)[7]

VI:Current Trends I - The Late 1980s

In the late 1980s a number authors assert similar arguments to those posited by academics found writing in the decades of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s. Again, a few will be selected to represent this era of transatlantic relations: Josef Joffe; Phil Williams; and Michael Vlahos.

The first author of this time period to be analyzed, who represents a 'strict' interpretation of the causes of transatlantic tensions of this period, is Joseph Joffe, in his work entitled The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burdens of Alliance, published in 1987. Joffe concludes that the very nature and history of the alliance is one of crisis, because conflict '...is built into the very structure of this compact...'(Joffe, 1987;xiii) Nevertheless, the author is able to highlight a number of issue-areas that place more strain on the alliance than others. The first is that of nuclear weapons, and the strategic policies aimed to maximize the presence of these weapons. In part geographic considerations are related to this issue, given the proximity of Western Europe to the first line of defense and the most probable area of conflict and the distance of the US from this theatre. The combination of the destructive nature of nuclear weapons and the position of Western Europe has created a psychology of schizophrenia on the part of Western Europe and its leaders. Vacillating between a position that supports arms control negotiations to another that encourages 'massive retaliation' Joffe concludes that Western Europe is uncomfortable with American strategic perceptions of Europe as the primary theatre of operations. Joffe cites Kissinger's remark that the dream of every West European and American is the total avoidance of nuclear war. But for the former, if nuclear war is to come, it should be over their heads and between the superpowers, while the latter hopes for a war that is limited and contained in an area of the world distant from their country. Joffe

comments that '...such dreams are the stuff from which the Alliance's endless strategic quarrels are made...'(Ibid., xiv)

A second source of strain for the author is the '..inequality between the United States and Western Europe in power and resources...'(Ibid., xv) Joffe contends that the contrast between the roles of the West European states and the superpower status of the United States determines the range, quality and degree of international political interests held by each actor or group of actors. As the only western superpower, the United States has to react to any event that may tilt the balance of power between it and the Soviet Union. Regardless of the utility of intervention in any part of the globe, this is the perception held by the political leadership of the United States, but this is one not shared by the leaders of Western Europe. Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' speech recognizes that the former have regional interests, while the latter has global interests. Their positions in the international system dictate such differing interests. Joffe contends that when these responsibilities, real or not, diverge, interests are '...bound to clash...'(Ibid.) Arguments over out-of-area third country issues and events have been cited by other scholars as reasons for tension between the allies, and one even stated that these issues were the *key* reason for tensions and strains. Reactions to events in the Middle East, Africa, Central America and the Persian Gulf reflect Joffe's assessment of third country issues.

Another possible source of transatlantic strain is the inequality of vulnerability and the various responses available to those states who must seek security from others. One response is to assert that local or regional concerns should be placed in a broader context as they are more important than they initially appear. A second response is to seek to ameliorate dependency by negotiating agreements with their adversaries. Allies may feel the need to reduce their exposure to threats and agreements are one way in which this goal can be accomplished. The counter response of the guarantor is to avoid being identified with the claims or agreements of their allies, or view the latter with grave suspicion and as an illustration of the latter's weaknesses.(Ibid., xvi) This inequality of vulnerability also extends to the political economic relations of the allies, for these relations are symbolic of the overall strategic concerns of the allies. While it is true that Western Europe is an economic giant, these strengths have not changed the institutions that guide the liberal international economic order. Resentment and recriminations on the part of the former are, for Joffe, bound to occur because of what appears to be an unequal and unchanging relationship.(Ibid., xvii)

If the very nature and history of the alliance of Western Europe and the United States is one of conflict alongside congruence, then has anything changed in the 1980s from those crises of the 1960s and 1970s? For Joffe, the change has come in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and domestic political changes. The first the root of this new quarrel is the differing perceptions of the Soviet threat held by the allies. Instead

of viewing the invasion as an example of expansionist policies, West European leaders see the Soviet Union as an '...indispensable partner in détente'(Ibid., xix) For the author this crisis '...dramatized the limits of an alliance not only outside Europe but on the continent itself...'(Ibid., xx) The second of these changes in the 1980s relates to the rise of anti-nuclear forces in Western Europe, and the opposition to nuclear weapons on the part of the democratic Left in West Germany and Britain. In combination, these two forces may be viewed as dangerous signs of discontent within the alliance. When potential governing parties of major West European states begin to question the utility of possessing or basing nuclear weapons on their territory, will those same political parties question the open exercise of NATO's power? This is a question left unanswered by Joffe, for it is a question that no one in power wishes to be face.(Ibid.)

The heart of Joffe's thesis, nonetheless, lies in his explanation of why these changes have taken place in the 1980s. The author states that these tensions are the products of a superstructure of ultrastability in Europe. This perception of ultrastability dramatically burdens and de-emphasizes the benefits of the alliance. The question that remains is whether the allies can reverse this position, emphasizing the benefits of alliance formation and continuity rather than its burdens.(Ibid., xxiii) The remainder of Joffe's thesis is case studies and a conclusion that represents his introductory chapter. He ends his work by stating that Western Europe and the United States are natural allies, and that even with all the crises of the alliance throughout its history, this alliance could be described as one where '...shackles are strong and tight, they chafe - but they continue to hold...'(Ibid., 209)[8]

The opening paragraph of Phil Williams, Michael Brenner and Paul Hammond's article entitled "Atlantis lost, Paradise regained? The United States and Western Europe after the Cold War", sets out the various factors that will shape American foreign policy towards Western Europe in the near future. These factors, stated by the authors, are the dramatic changes in Europe since 1989, the lack of an intense ideological conflict because of the demise of the Soviet Union and the uncertainties that the United States and its allies face in a multipolar, yet not fully constructed post Cold War world.(Williams, 1993;1) From this state of the world, the authors highlight three factors that will influence the nature of the transatlantic relationship. The first of these is related to the calculation of interests by the United States with respect to Western Europe, and the her commitment to that area of the world. Without the threat of the Soviet Union, American interest is and will continue to be less than it was, previously. However, in political, strategic and economic terms, the United States is still bound up with Western Europe, making the relationship between the two more difficult then ever. Possible outcomes from this uncertain relationship could be the erosion of the Alliance and NATO: the exclusion of the

United States from a prosperous and aggressive continent eager to assert its place in world politics; or an unstable Europe bound to repeat the mistakes of past experiences.(Ibid., 4)

The second factor highlighted by the authors is psychological and reminiscent of other scholars who have spoken of the need for the United States and Western Europe to change their perceptions of themselves and each other to match the realities of a Europe post-Cold War, rather than post-World War Two. While the United States is still the dominant power in world politics, with associations and interests world-wide, recent Administrations have failed to comprehend that new answers to new situations are required. The prospect of being excluded from a prosperous Europe, of having the liberal international economic order collapse and other regions of the world contest American leadership may have repercussions for the United States globally, as well as respect to domestic political concerns.(Ibid., 7-8) Pressures to 'reappraise' the American role in Western Europe and European security are coming not just from these two sources, but can also be '...found...in US domestic politics and economics...'(Ibid., 8) The authors contend the without a major international threat such as the Soviet Union, there is the possibility for the United States to become more isolationist. Without the material capabilities to lead the rest of the world, foreign policy may receive less high-level attention than before.(Ibid.) The rhetoric found in the 1992 Presidential campaign, and its attention to economic issues and the almost total absence of foreign policy issues, is only one manifestation of what could become a long term policy whereby the United States Government could be pressured into disengaging from Europe altogether.(Ibid., 10)

To this end, the authors propose four alternative scenarios for American foreign policy in Western Europe. These are a reassertion of leadership; selective engagement; co-operative intervention and disengagement; and confrontational introversion.(Ibid., 11-16) None of these alternatives, however, are flawless and there are a number of costs, benefits, and risks associated with each of them. Compounding the choices presented is the fact that, unlike the previous 'crises' of the Alliance, this one is '...far greater than ever before, while the integrative mechanisms and pressures are far less...'(Ibid., 17) The present and near future situation is marked by a lack of clarity, and therefore intensely problematic for both the United States, and Western Europe. The main problem could be that while attempting to rebuild the societal fabric of itself, the foreign policies of the United States could result in a 'tragedy' where '...Atlantis [was] lost but paradise not regained...'(Ibid.)[9]

Michael Vlahos' article "Culture and Foreign Policy", in Foreign Policy, moves one step further then Williams' piece and is the last piece reviewed in this section. The emphasis of the author is to move the concept of 'culture' away from anecdotal remarks concerning the practices of certain nationalities to one that is slightly more concrete. Nevertheless, stereotypes that create anecdotal impressions are important because they can lead one to several truths. Firstly, other cultures tend to remain quite alien to our own.

Secondly, because culture is the source of people's reality and how they think and act, these '...cultural differences are much more than skin or stereotype deep...'(Vlahos, 1991;59) The third and last truth is that culture is '...bigger than countries...'(Ibid.) Cultural 'areas' such as North America or the 'West' have formed or are perceived to exist because culture is something that can exist in a number of states with relatively similar tendencies.

The situation in which Western Europe and the United States found themselves in after the war was such, that the leadership of the latter was able to shape two essential key words: the 'West' and the 'Atlantic Community'. These words were necessary for the notion of 'containment' was too depressing, possibly never-ending, and therefore could not have been the '...sole source of the US post-war reality...'(Ibid., 60) This creation of a powerful myth, reinforced with the political, strategic and economic might and capabilities of the United States, was utilized to bond Western Europe to the United States through the institutions of the western alliance, specifically NATO. But this ability of the United States to bind its allies together, has begun to decrease. However, Vlahos asserts that this process is not a simple case of new nationalism or nationalism renewed. A variety of factors have contributed to the resurgence of an identity for Western Europe, and the continent as a whole. These include the demise of the Soviet Union; the unification of Germany; and the reorientation of Central and Eastern Europe states towards their western counterparts.(Ibid., 64) The impact of diverging cultures and cultural areas will shape their politics and partnerships in the years to come, the most important areas continuing to be North America; Western Europe; and Asia centered around Japan. However, having taken what they wanted from the former, the latter two will cease to look at the former for inspiration. Vlahos predicts that these three blocs will be '...at best...associates, not friends...[because] as culture areas go their own ways, so increasingly will their politics...'(Ibid., 68)

The aftershocks of this decline in the importance of the United States will be felt domestically and internationally. The United States will disengage from certain activities as events unfold and as states recognize that they do not need to have direct American involvement. The United States will have fewer obligations and global commitments in this world of independent cultural areas. Domestically, a 'Big Change' may very well occur. As mentioned by Williams, the political leadership and citizens of the United States will concentrate on domestic issues rather than those of world politics, and he concludes that for the US to once again lead others, it '...must learn to lead itself...'(Ibid., 78)[10]

VII:Current Trends II - The Early 1990s

In a paper detailing an overview of recent trends in EC foreign policy literature, Roy Ginsberg points out that there is a growing body of scholarly work on the specific subject of EC-US relations in the early 1990s, rather than in the broad area of transatlantic rlations. However, he mentions that most of this work can be divided into a number of categories. There is that body of work that amounts to chapters in edited books, articles in refereed periodicals and occasional papers[11] , and that which is economic based or lacking in theoretical interest.[12] The works that are noted to be most comprehensive are those by Harrison (1992); Cromwell (1992); Brandon (1992); Smith and Woolcock (1993); Featherstone and Ginsberg (1993); Haftendorn and Tuschoff (1993); and Steinberg (1993).(Ginsberg, 1993;5) Of these, the work by Steinberg, commissioned by Rand Corporation, is very much policy-driven and that of Smith and Woolcock appears as a monograph on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. That of Henry Brandon is, while security-based, is theoretically limited in its appeal. Consequently,, those works that appear to be able to represent this most recent body of literature are the co-authored book by Ginsberg and Featherstone, and the single authored works of John Peterson and William Cromwell; it will be these works that will be assessed with respect to whether or they adhere to the conventional wisdom of transatlantic relations already in the dominant literature of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

John Peterson, in his book Europe and America in the 1990s, takes a multi-theoretical approach to explaining EC-US relations in areas that include security, trade and domestic politics. Peterson utilizes Neorealism, Complex Interdependence, Liberal Trade theory, and Reformism in an attempt to assess the ability of all four of these models to explain the future of the transatlantic relationship. Through the utilization of all these paradigms the author is intent on illustrating that '...theories of international relations are valuable heuristic tools which can often be deployed to yield powerful explanations for real-world outcomes...'(Peterson, 1993;4) However, the author does not contend that his work is an 'exercise in theory building'.(Ibid.) Nor does Peterson desire to encourage the use of one of these models in preference to others. Rather, it is an elucidation of many for the sake of the future research interests of the reader.(Ibid.)

Peterson explores each in turn, explaining how the theories could be utilized to explain the given issue-area. In the concluding chapter the author is critical of all four. He cites the limitations of each, especially those of Liberal Trade theory and its relevance to international relations and the idealism of Reformist theories of the state.(Ibid., 222) However, Neorealism and Complex Interdependence have a number of faults that Peterson does not deal with in any depth. He cites previous work in this area of International Relations as proof that such criticism exists.(Ibid., 216-219) Peterson

concludes by asserting the need for 'new institutions for new international realities'.(Ibid., 210) Changes in the structure of the Group of Seven, United Nations and the strengthening of the mechanisms of the Group of Twenty-Four are required to make the most of the capabilities of the United States and European Community, and their global partners. Peterson contends that the 'new world order' of President Bush is an idea worth pursuing, but only if institutional change occurs; and this change will only occur if the '...US and EC take the lead in its design and implementation in multilateral institutions and demonstrate that it is worth the price of admission...'(Ibid., 216)

Peterson takes this approach to the next stage in EC-US relations because, like other scholars before him, he recognizes that the factors straining the allied relationship are ones that are interest-based and systemic rather than idea-based and present at the unit and/or sub-unit levels of analysis. For Peterson, the 'new transatlanticism' is a product of a series of factors that he takes up in greater detail in chapters that follow. This new transatlanticism has been caused by factors that include the demise of the Soviet Union; the onset of a multipolar and increasingly interdependent world; the lessening of the impact of politico-military issues and the growing importance of a politico-economic nature and domestic concerns. The author contends, with respect to the first two factors, that the '...potential for conflict in US-EC relations has also increased as a result of the emergence of three distinct features of the post-Cold War world...'(Ibid., 9) These include the demise of the USSR; the broadening of security issues to include such matters as trade, finance, direct investment and the environment; and domestic debates concerning the roles of the EC and US in their new circumstance.

However, Peterson, over the course of his chapter on these factors, devotes the majority of space and time to the first two issues and barely returns to the last of the three that deals with domestic considerations. Peterson talks of the 1992 Project to create a Single European Market, the perceptions in the United States of 'Fortress Europe' towards US business, and the disagreements between the allies during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations as indicative of this political-economic and not political-security world, and its new allied tensions.(Ibid., 11-17) The isolationist streak within American foreign policy, coupled with the lack of unity illustrated by the member states of the EC during the Persian Gulf War, tilts Peterson towards another pessimistic conclusion with respect to future relations between the allies.(Ibid., 17-21) Lastly, 'integration and fragmentation' are the author's third set of factors contributing to allied strain. Ethnic fragmentation, alongside global integration through technological forces, world trade patterns and financial markets, as well as the diminishing utility of military-strategic power are factors that require new solutions on the part of the EC and US.(Ibid., 21-24) Peterson, as noted above, contends that the EC must create new mechanisms that balance member state national interests with community-wide co-operation and external harmony with its

allies.(Ibid., 24-26) Consequently,, the reformation of NATO, CSCE, GATT and the UN Security Council will be necessary to manage the strains being inflicted upon the alliance, and maintain this relationship into the next century.

The work of Roy Ginsberg and Kevin Featherstone follows on from the former's work on the European Community as a foreign policy actor.(Ginsberg, 1989) The task of this work is to go past that discussion and take on board the fact that the EC is an actor, concentrating on how this actor relates to its most important ally, the United States. The framework for this analysis is outlined in the second chapter of the book. The co-authors stress that while there are theories relating to intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and other domestic theories, the two main paradigms by which one may begin to examine EC-US relations are rooted in the study of International Relations. These two models are Neorealism/Neo-mercantilism and Complex Interdependence.(Ginsberg, 1993;58) As to the former there are four reasons cited that limit its utility. These include the greater variety of actors than Neorealism may account for; a variety of interests rather than the traditional distinction between 'hi' and 'low' politics; the non-zero-sum nature of the relationship in all its aspects; and the neglect, on the part of Neorealism, of the complex and sensitive linkages that exist between the EC and United States.(Ibid., 59-61) Neomercantilism fails for identical reasons, and additionally its narrow economic focus which accords priority to states.(Ibid., 62)

On the other hand, the Complex Interdependency theory of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye appears to 'fit' with the realities of the European Community, and its relationship with the United States. This theoretical model draws together political, military and economic aspects of relations, stresses the linkages that exist between and across issue-areas and policy spheres, and asserts the utilization of non-military factors in the conduct of foreign policy. To Ginsberg and Featherstone, the EC-US relationship could be easily defined within the context of this approach. The use of military means to ascertain a desired settlement in unthinkable; multiple channels clearly connect US and EC actors; and whether or not there is a hierarchy of issues, the agenda is composed of multiple issues.(Ibid., 66) Consequently, the remainder of their study is based upon this framework of analysis, and not one of a more internal nature, or constructed from the perspective of Neorealism and Neomercantilism.

After a discussion of similar topics analyzed in other works on contemporary EC-US relations, Ginsberg and Featherstone conclude with a re-evaluation of their framework for analysis, Complex Interdependence. Overall, the authors contend that '...taken together, the political, economic, and social evidence...sustains the notion that the totality of US-EC relations are best placed in an analytical framework which recognizes their mutual interdependence...'(Ibid., 247) The Keohane and Nye approach is such that this mutual interdependence can be, and is, recognized. Nonetheless, three gaps within this

paradigm are revealed. The first is that a concept of bargaining may be useful as to total the results of interdependence, while the second is the need to distinguish between actor responses. The third and final gap is the inability of interdependence theory to take account of elite and mass public perceptions.(Ibid., 247-48) Finally, there is, again, a call for better transatlantic decision-making processes and the adaptation of existing institutions to new realities; each required if the EC-US relationship is to prosper rather than disintegrate into rivalry.(Ibid., 248-266)

This continuity from Peterson through to Ginsberg and Featherstone is evident not only in their solution to allied strain, but, for obvious reasons, the strains themselves. Like Peterson and other before, the co-authors speak generally of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany as two contributing factors that have brought about the understanding that the US and EC '...have arrived at a new juncture in the history of their partnership...'(Ginsberg, 1993;1) The co-authors note that the history of this relationship can be separated into three periods: one of hegemonic control on the part of the United States; the decline of US hegemony; and, finally, a post-hegemonic order noted by the presence of multiple poles, rather than a single one dominated by the United States.(Ibid., 13) The first period was marked by the ability of the US to assist in the political, security and economic revitalization of Western Europe while containing the Soviet threat through its nuclear capabilities. Interdependence was not an issue because these circumstances left '...little room for EC manoeuvre on the international stage...'(Ibid., 11) The period of hegemonic decline was seen through the distractions caused by the Vietnam War, the Nixon Shocks concerning the gold standard, the resurgence of Western Europe and Japan in economic terms, as well as the onset of a series of trade disputes between the allies over a variety of issues.(Ibid., 25-28) Lastly, the post-hegemonic world has come about because of internal EC developments such as Project 1992 and the Single European Market and the enhancement of EPC.(Ibid., 29)

In turn, the co-authors supplement these changes with a list of additional factors that have assisted in this change from a hegemonic to a post-hegemonic order. These factors include the rise of China as an international power; the increase in the number of states because of decolonization; the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the related vulnerability of the United States in this area of policy; the rise of non-state actors such as OPEC and finally, the advent of East-West détente in the 1970s.(Ibid., 12) The need to enhance the institutions that govern the EC-US relation, because of these changes, additional factors and new influences, is therefore an obvious response on the part of Ginsberg and Featherstone. As well, the ability to conclude that this new work on the allied relationship can be incorporated into the 'conventional wisdom' of the dominant literature on the transatlantic relationship is also obvious. While the co-authors speak of economic, trade, and monetary issues as well as strategic concerns, theirs is a perspective

dominated by events at the level of the international system, only slightly more broadly defined than those authors who may be said to be working from a strict Realist model of international relations.

The last work is that of William Cromwell, entitled The United States and the European Pillar. This book charts the evolution of the transatlantic relationship from the early 1960s through to the present, with an assessment of the growth of political co-operation within the European Community in the 1980s, and, rise, of regional issues, such as the Middle East, in the allied relationship. To this end, Cromwell asserts that there are a number of factors that explain why transatlantic relationship has become increasingly strained. Cromwell ends his chronological description and begins his analysis at the point where he recognizes the impact of regional issues on the relationship. He notes that many of the factors that led to tensions were interest-based variant, but, alongside of these conventional concerns, were those of a different understanding of regional crises. While no specifics are given, Cromwell contends that this different understanding - a greater reliance on indigenous forces as catalysts for change - drives the EC towards different conclusions and solutions than to those of the United States.(Cromwell, 1992;131 and 197-98)

At the end of his work, Cromwell, like Peterson and Ginsberg and Featherstone before him, devotes space to the subject of the 'United States and the New Europe in the 1990s'. The author states that the '...stunning political changes in Eastern and Central Europe during 1989/90 fundamentally altered the familiar political context of European international relations that had evolved since World War Two...'(Ibid., 199) This, along with the desire of the EC to play a stronger role in the development of Central and Eastern Europe through EC institutions and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, coupled with the shift away from traditional institutions such as NATO, has forced the United States into '...redefining the American role in a post-cold war Europe...'(Ibid., 220)

Straying away from his interest in the security aspects of the alliance, Cromwell also speaks of the problems associated with the lack of clarity, unity and singularity found in the mechanisms of the European Community. This lack is compounded by the development of the EC as a major economic actor and the domestic consolidation of this strength, most likely through the completion of the Single European Market. Cromwell posits that the very existence of an independent European policy-making entity, combined with reduced European Alliance dependency and a more diffuse range of post-cold war issues and actors will '...provide expanded opportunities for the forging of distinctive European positions...'(Ibid., 247) However, the above sounds no more different from Ginsberg and Featherstone than the latter's work is from the scholarship of John Peterson. Nevertheless, Cromwell asserts that his is a work that '...challenges the traditional

American assumption, embodied in the concept of Atlantic partnership, that a more closely knit Western Europe would view its interests on global issues in essentially similar terms as the United States...'(Ibid., xiv) Cromwell does attempt to 'do something different' through two mechanisms. The first is a more pessimistic consideration of institutional linkages and reforms, involving the redistribution of power between the United States and European Community. The author insists that there is little hope for the Transatlantic Declaration between the EC and US and President Bush's exhortation for '...new mechanisms of consultation and co-operation on global political issues...'(Ibid., 244) Nevertheless, co-operation may be possible in the end because issues of concern, for one or both of the allies, will be addressed '...more on their own merit rather than as instances of a wider East-West confrontational pattern about which Washington and European capitals had often disagreed...'(Ibid., 246)

The second manner in which Cromwell attempts to 'do something different' is in his assessment of regional crises and concerns occurring during the Cold War. Instead of appealing just to traditional factors, like geography, political-military and strategic concerns, Cromwell contends that the cause of allied strains were the differing '...attitudes and approaches toward the Soviet Union and communism in general...'(Ibid., 246) The author posits that one may be able to perceive that the clashes between the United States and the France of de Gaulle were not caused by a clash of personalities, but by fundamentally different conceptions of the international political arena, and the roles, responsibilities and duties of the major actors and allies in this political arena.(Ibid., 26-38) These differing conceptions are played out, for Cromwell and the allies, in the regional issues that are taken up in chapters seven and eight. Therefore Cromwell does begin to 'do something different', however undeveloped this examination of EC-US relations into the 1990s is, and may serve well as a starting point for future projects in the area of transatlantic relations.

VIII:Assessment

A summary of the literature review conducted above illustrates the repeated presence of a number of factors that are cited as being the principal reasons behind transatlantic differences, strains, tensions and troubles since the onset of the 1960s. Of the seventeen authors surveyed in some detail, a number of broad propositions can be listed as those that represent all of these scholars, which include:

1) the economic resurgence of Western Europe and the relative decline of the United States since the end of World War Two;

2) the onset of the nuclear vulnerability of the United States, either through the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the initiation of nuclear parity between the US and Soviet Union, thus lessening the credibility of the American guarantee of extended deterrence;

3) the differing and relative positions of the United States and its West Europe allies, which are based upon the relative position of both in the international arena, giving rise to the presence of global interests for the US, and regional ones for Western Europe;

4) with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of its empire, along with the freeing of Central and Eastern Europe into democratic countries, the lack of common enemy between the allies;

5) the differing geographical, geostrategic, historical and experience-related backgrounds of the United States and Western Europe;

6) the influence of international events on the allies, and the differing responses on the part of both to these events, partially due to a number of the above listed factors.

To this end parallels can be drawn between these propositions and those of Political Realism in the first chapter of the thesis. The link comes by way of a reliance on interest-based factors in the explanation of allied tensions. Just as Political Realism asserts the primacy of objective factors, so too do these propositions with a reliance on history, geography and other like factors that are unchangeable. As well, Political Realism accords a priority to that level of analysis to be found at the realm of the international - a level that positions states in a hierarchical order that assists in the determination of the perspective that the leadership of that state must take on board, almost without regard for other levels of analysis, and the factors that may accompany these levels. The above propositions place a tremendous degree of importance on the international system, whether this is in the form of the place of the US and Western Europe in this system, international events that influence the allies, or the dichotomy between global and regional interests that are shaped by the combination of these events and the place of each ally internationally. Thirdly, many of the scholars presented above utilize the nuclear issue, or in general appeal to the primacy of the political-military dimension of the transatlantic relationship over that of the political-economic. It is only in the wake of the Single European Market project that a number of thee analysts speak of political-economic issues in the same vein as political-military ones. One of the core assumptions of Political Realist thinkers from Thucydides to Machiavelli and on to Morgenthau in the late 1940s and early 1950s is the priority that is

placed on the narrowly-defined security dimension of politics in general, and international relations in specific. Examples of this point in the foundational literature are that Hobbes spoke of a perpetual state of war and Machiavelli stated that war should be the only study for a leader. Similarly, Morgenthau defined the military issue as *the* issue for students of international relations, and Carr spoke of economic power only in terms of its political-military value. The need for a common enemy in the guise of the Soviet Union corresponds well to the priority that most of these academics place on the military issue. Thus a strong link between this literature and Political Realism can be established without too much difficulty. Minimally, this conclusion illustrates two points, one being that the dominant tradition in transatlantic security studies is by far and away that of Political Realism. This tradition or world perspective theory appears to be hegemonic, if not unassailable, in its control of the transatlantic security 'agenda'. The second point is that this hegemony makes the task of this thesis - the exposure of vulnerability in Political Realism with respect to this transatlantic relationship - that much more difficult. This will be so because in order to illustrate that there are weaknesses and limitations in the application of Political Realism to the EC-US relationship, an overwhelming amount of evidence must be found to counteract this dominance.

However, this task may not be as difficult as the case has just been made. This may be so for two reasons, the first being a summarization of some of the other assumptions not presented above, and secondly, the assertions of some of those scholars utilized to create the above conventional wisdom concerning transatlantic security relations. As to the first, there are a number of scholars reviewed in the chapter, albeit an overall minority, who posit that additional to the above presumptions there are other factors that should be considered in an comprehensive understanding of EC-US security relations, and why differences between these allies have and may continue to exist well into the foreseeable future. Nicholas Wahl, Michael Vlahos and William Cromwell posit that not only do so-called interest-based factors influence the pattern of relations between the allies, but so do cultural predilections; attitudes and beliefs of leaders and their publics; and ideological convictions. The inclusion of these factors may illustrate two opposing points. A first point is that because they are espoused by a minority of scholars they are perceived as being 'fringe' factors in the comprehension of allied relations. Secondly, even though these factors may be, rightfully so with respect to the conventional wisdom, seen as fringe factors, the very espousal of such factors gives rise to the potential of these influences being noticed and researched because they are at odds with the conventional wisdom; simply put, they may be noticed because they stick out from the rest of the crowd, so to speak.

A second major reason why the task of critiquing Political Realism may be because of some of the assertions of some of those scholars who would, rightfully so, be placed

within the tradition of Political Realism. Earl Ravenal, Lawrence Freedman and Josef Joffe all assert, in one way or another, that the crisis facing the transatlantic relationship at the time of their writing is much more than cosmetic and because of specific time-dependent issues and concerns. Ravenal, as an example, states that the French leadership of the 1960s opened fissures in the alliance that were '...inherent in the alliance from its inception...'(Ravenal, 1976;209) Similarly, Freedman notes that allied tensions will not be eased simply by a return to or reassertion of an 'Atlantic' spirit reminiscent of the early post- World War Two period.(Freedman, 1982;398) Lastly, Joffe claims that conflict between the allies is '...built into the very structure of this compact...'(Joffe, 1987;xiii)

The recognition of the need to examine the EC-US security relationship at a sub-structural level of analysis lends credibility to the work of Nicholas Wahl, Michael Vlahos, Michael Smith and Williams Cromwell. Such recognition strengthens this author's belief that not only are there limitations to the Realist paradigm with respect to the conventional wisdom concerning transatlantic divergencies, but that one should seek out scholars working from different theoretical paradigms to ensure to a richer understanding of EC-US security relations. The question then is that, of these four scholars, and the literature they represent, which may be more useful in leading one to that richer understanding, and why?

To begin with, the dominant problematic with all four of these authors is either their work is underdeveloped in that it is either a chapter in an edited text or an article in a journal as is the case of Wahl and Vlahos, respectively, or not developed enough in spite of being contained with a single authored text as is true of Smith and Cromwell. Thus which one should one choose - a strong argument in a short article or a snippet of one in a long text? The answer is neither; rather it lies in the ability of any of these scholars to take on board what has already been noted as one of the primary limitations of Political Realism and is a central element of this thesis - the role of Agency, be it ideas, beliefs, values, ideologies or cultural predilections, in the explanation of EC-US relations. For this reason the work that appears to best reflect the interests of this thesis is that of Michael Vlahos.

First and foremost, while Michael Smith does speak of the need for elite responsiveness and an ideological convergence to occur for the transatlantic relationship to remain strong, as well as the underlying value -based component of Alliance institutions such as NATO, he devotes much less time to these factors compared with those of a more interest-based variant. Also, with respect to those values that underpin certain institutions, Smith speaks of those that bind, rather than strain, the relationship, such as a mutual commitment to democracy.(Smith, 1984;81) Finally, Smith returns to the issue of values in his concluding remarks, but only tangentially. He comments that a 'power and security' approach to an explanation of EC-US tensions is '...not sensitive to the growth of economic and social connections between the [allies]...'(Ibid., 119) However, while he pursues the

issue of economic relations and institutional mechanisms, he does not return to the matter of 'social connections', thus limiting the appeal of this work.

Secondly, while William Cromwell is adamant that the establishment of new mechanisms of co-ordination between the Allies will not fully solve all of the disagreements between them, he is not explicit as to what will, and why these disagreements arose originally. Alongside recent changes in the international system, such as the collapse of Communism and the desire of the European Community to play a more active role in international politics, Cromwell posits that Allied tensions have come about, in part, because the EC has traditionally reacted differently from the United States to international events because of the former's different set of assumptions concerning the world. Cromwell points to East-West and Middle Eastern crises as instances of divergence because of interest-based factors as well as a reliance on local forces on one hand, and a different approach to Communism on the other.(Cromwell, 1992;246) However, while being more explicit than Michael Smith with respect to the role of 'agency' in the calculation of international politics, Cromwell still offers only a very narrow window into his theoretical framework, thus limiting the overall utility of his work.

Nicholas Wahl is more explicit than Smith and Cromwell on the role of agents - ideas, beliefs, values and ideological and cultural perspectives - in the determination of international relations and the West European-United States relationship. Wahl speaks of 'cultural ignorance' between the United States and France that is not only symbolic of a deeper malaise in this bilateral relationship, but also the multilateral relationship between Western Europe and the United States. As such, Wahl is not only more explicit than Smith and Cromwell in his use of 'agency', but also devotes more space to the issue. However, the primary limitation of this piece is not its brevity, but its lack of a future research agenda. In asking Wahl where he would proceed from his conclusions, there is no explicit answer within his work, thus leaving us with a richer understanding of West European-United States relations - but one that remains time dependent rather than universal in its potential appeal.

By comparison, Michael Vlahos not only concentrates more of his research on the role of agents and sub-structural levels of analysis in the explanation of EC-US security relations, but does so more explicitly than the others. His article, aptly entitled 'Culture and Foreign Policy', is clear in its agenda - to assert that culture is more than what it is often defined as, that its importance in the understanding of transatlantic relations is grossly undervalued by the mainstream literature, and that we have been exposed to the myth that Western Europe and North America, specifically the United States, share enough values that we should all feel part of the 'West'. Finally, he not only contends that a tremendous amount of American power was based around this myth of the 'West', but that as the separate parts of this myth realize and re-assert their own identities, their

individual politics will also be re-asserted, which over time will lead to an increasing divergence in their reactions to international events. Again, Vlahos stands out in comparison to the other three scholars not only because of their limitations, but also because of the explicitness of his project, his assertion of things to come between Western Europe and the United States, and his analysis of the triangular relationship between these two actors and an Asian bloc centered around the leadership of Japan. Thus, Vlahos charts a course that not only attempts to explain the past, but also the future. If one is searching for work with an explicit future research agenda that speaks loudly for the role of agents and a sub-structural level of analysis approach to International Relations, then the work of Michael Vlahos is that work.

While the scholarship of Michael Vlahos represents a possible future research agenda for *this* thesis, more work is required at the level of specific cases to illustrate that the Political Realist-oriented conventional wisdom concerning EC-US security relations has numerous limitations. Case study analyses remain critical to the project of this thesis in order to assert that the research agenda of Vlahos, and the literature that he represents, is not only useful in contributing to a richer understanding of EC-US security relations, but necessary. As such, the next step in this thesis will be three security-based case studies that take place in a period of time between 1973 and 1991, a time period that incorporates the Cold War and post-Cold War periods of the modern era. It will be in these studies that Political Realism will be put to an even greater and detailed test; a test of its propositions, strengths, weaknesses and limitations with respect to not only the case study in question, but European Community-United States security relations in general.

VIII:Conclusion

Can Realist perspectives and variations on its themes adequately account for those factors that are claimed to influence transatlantic tensions; facts that are not systemic by nature, but present nonetheless in the literature? It is, quite possibly, a rhetorical question, but one that must be asked, for this is the goal of this chapter - to see whether the dominant theoretical perspective of International Relations theory can 'claim to know' why transatlantic tensions occur, without resorting to massive theoretical modifications or the incorporation of other schools of thought. From the assessment above the answer appears to be that Political Realism is unable to comprehensively 'claim to know' why the transatlantic allies, in a general sense, diverge over time with respect to security-related issues of concern. This is illustrated not only by the presence of the work of Wahl, Cromwell and Vlahos, but also the statements found within the works of Freedman, Joffe and Ravenal, scholars who, as already mentioned above, are decidely Realist in orientation and thought with respect to the issue at hand. In turn, the possible inability of Realism to

explain, fully, sources of transatlantic disagreement weakens the position of this school of thought with respect to the correct 'level' of analysis one should priorize during and for research, and the primacy of 'structure' compared to that of 'agency' in determining actions and the nature of relationships. Consequently, a space appears with respect to these questions of 'levels' and the 'agent-structure' problem as to which level should be utilized and, based upon that finding, whether one should lend primacy to the importance of 'agents' or 'structures'; knowing that the credibility of the use of the level of the system. and an emphasis on structure has already been weakened to the point that it may be appropriate in the near future to utilize another level and, possibly, agents rather than structures in attempting to understand and explain EC-US relations.

However, there is one caveat to the above argument concerning the use of a level other than that of the system and agents rather than structures. This caveat is that there is an overall lack of scholars contributing to the work of Vlahos and the others in this category, thus illustrating the marginality, at this juncture, of this perspective on alliance relations and politics. Nevertheless, the presence of this work strengthens the claim of Michael Smith, in his work Western Europe and the United States:The Uncertain Alliance that '...no school of thought has a monopoly on the field of European-American relations. Nor could it be otherwise, given the essentially contestable nature of much of the Euro-American system...'(Smith, 1984;120) The step forward from this analysis, coupled with that of European Political Cooperation and the debates over agency, structure and levels of analysis, is to apply this critique of Realist thought to three security case studies, as outlined in the introductory chapter in order to assess the viability of the Realist position concerning levels and structures, and whether or not a reassessment of this position, at the end of the day, may be in order. The link between these studies and the preceding chapters of the thesis will appear if, after such analysis, a Realist synthesis based upon the propositions of the first chapter are unable to adequately account for transatlantic tensions. And again, like the chapters before, no single alternative theoretical tradition, no matter how appealing it may be, will be offered as the solution to the inadequacies of Realism; rather, an attempt will be made to point to theoretical traditions highlighted in the literature as possible solutions to the vacuum that may be, at the end of this project, left because of the weaknesses, deficiencies and limitations of this same Political Realist project.

---

[1] See also Buchan, A., "Europe and the Atlantic Alliance: Two Strategies or One?" in Journal of Common Market Studies, V.1, No.3, 1962.

[2] See also Diebold, W., "Economics and Politics:The Western Alliance in the 1970s" in Hanreider, W.(ed.), The United States and Western Europe. Cambridge, Mass.:Winthrop Publishers, 1974; Calleo, D., The Atlantic Fantasy:The US, NATO and Europe. London:John Hopkins Press,1970.

[3] See chapters five and seven that deal with case studies on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian Gulf as illustrative of out-of-area conflicts and the divergences between the allies.

[4] See also the introductory and concluding chapters of Freedman's The Troubled Alliance, London:Heinemann Educational Books, 1983.

[5] See also Joffe, J., "European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis", Foreign Affairs, V.59, No.4, Spring 1981; Art, R., "Fixing Atlantic Bridges", Foreign Policy, V.46, Spring 1982; Hassner, P., "Recurrent Stresses, Resilient Structures" in Tucker, R.(ed.), The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics, New York:Praeger Publishers, 1983; Weiss, S., "A Critical Phase in Transatlantic Relations", Strategic Survey, V.9, No.2, Spring 1981; Allen, R., "The Atlantic Alliance At a Crossroad", Strategic Review, V.9, No.4, Fall 1981; DePorte, A.W., "The Uses of Perspective" in Tucker, R.(ed.), The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics, New York:Praeger Publishers, 1983.

[6] See also Chace, J., "Europe:Is There a Price to be Paid?" in Ravenal, E. and Chace., J. (eds.), Atlantis Lost, New York:New York University Press, 1976; Duchene, F., "The European Commuity and its Global Responsibilities" in Kaiser, K., Schwarz, H., (eds.), America and Western Europe, Lexington, Mass.:D.C. Books, 1977; Hillebrand, M., "The Future of the European Community as a problem in American-European Realtions" in Kaiser, K, Schwarz, H., (eds.) America and Western Europe, Lexington, Mass.:D.C. Books, 1977; Kolodziej, E., "Europe: The Partial Partner", International Security, V.5, No.3, Winter 1980-81; Pierre, A., "America faces Western Europe in the 1980s" in Ravenal, E., Chace, J., (eds.), Atlantis Lost, New York:New York University Press, 1976; Bull, H., "European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO", Foreign Affairs, V.61, Spring 1983;Cohen, E., "The Long Term Crisis of the Alliance", Foreign Affairs, V.61, No.2, Winter 1982/83.

[7] See M. Smith, "From the 'Year of Europe' to a Year of Carter: Continuing Patterns and Problems in Euro-American Relations" in Journal of Common Market Studies, V.17, No.1, September 1978; Dankert, P., "Europe Together, America Apart", Foreign Policy, V.53, Winter 1983/84; Knudsen, B., "Europe and America: Foreign Policy in the 1980s", Paris:Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1984.

[8] See also Chapter 4 "EC-US Relations" in Ginsberg, R., Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale, London:Adamantine Press Limited, 1989;Treverton, G., Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe,New Yortk:Cornell University Press, 1985.

[9] See also Williams, P., "The United States' commitment to Western Europe: strategic and political disintegration", International Affairs, V.59, No.2, Spring 1983;Williams, P., Brenner, M., Europe and the United States: US security policy toward Europe in the 1990s, Bonn:Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1992;Palmer, J., Europe without America, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1987;Calleo, D., Beyond American Hegemony, London:Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987.

[10] See M. Vlahos, "The Atlantic Community" in N. Wessell (ed.), "The New Europe", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, V.38, No.1, 1991;Pinto, D., "The Great European Sea Change", Deadalus, Fall 1991; Russett, B., "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: or is Mark Twain Really Dead?, International Organization, V.39, No.2, Spring 1985; Gill, S.(ed.), Atlantic Relations:Beyond the Reagan Era, New York:Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989.

[11] See D. Allen and M. Smith, "West Europe in Reagan's World", in R. Rummel (ed.), The Evolution of an International Actor:Western Europe's New Assertiveness, Boulder:Westview Press, 1990; V. Erdman-Keefer, "The Corn War:A Euro-American

Trade Dispute", in R. Rummel (ed.), The Evolution of an International Actor:Western Europe's New Assertiveness, Boulder:Westview Press, 1990; R. Ginsberg, "EC-US Political/Institutional Relations", in L. Hurwitz (ed.) The State of the European Community, Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 1991; R. Ginsberg, "US-EC Relations" in J. Lodge (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, New York:St. Martin's Press, 1989; K. Featherstone, "The EC and the US: Managing interdependence" in J. Lodge (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, London:Pinter Publishers, 1993; S. Sloan, "A New Transatlantic Bargain?" in R. Rummel (ed.), The Evolution of an International Actor:Western Europe's New Assertiveness, Boulder:Westview Press, 1990; C. Kelleher "A New Security Order: The United States and the European Community in the 1990s", ECSA Occasional Paper, June 1993;

[12] See R. Schwok, US-EC Relations in the Post-Cold War:Conflict or Partnership?, Boulder:Westview Press, 1991; P. Coffey, The EC and the United States, London:Pinter Publishers, 1993; G. Yannopolous, Europe and America, 1992, London:Manchester University Press, 1991.

Chapter Four:The Year of...

I:Introduction

Before launching into the first case study, concerning the actions, reactions and policies of the European Community and the United States to the Arab- Israeli crisis from the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the Venice Declaration of 1980 a number of criteria regarding the selection of this event have to be established from the outset. These are important as they establish the framework of reference for this case study, and the other two that follow, the peculiarities of each, considered own their own merit. Firstly, one must understand the selection of this case study, in preference to any other. As will be true of all of the case studies, selection is, to a certain extent, idiosyncratic. Selection depends on one's research interests and depth of knowledge of a variety of issues and events. Thus one selects those case studies with which one is more familiar. Nevertheless, there are less idiosyncratic reasons for the singling out of the Arab-Israeli crisis. One of these reasons can be derived from the objectives of the 1969 European Community summit in The Hague. At this gathering the nine member states agreed that 'Europe' should strive to begin to 'speak with one voice' on issues deemed to be of 'importance'. Of the many international occurrences at that time only two were selected, and the first of these two topics was the Arab-Israeli situation. An all too obvious reason for this choice may be that a number of EC member states have had and continue to have an interest in this region of the world, for political and economic considerations. These considerations, coupled with the instability of the region (between 1948 and 1973 there had already been three full scale wars and one war of attrition between Israel and its Arab neighbors), could be seen as the background for agreement between the nine member states.

A second reason may be found in the work of Susan Strange, and her development of four structural bases of power. One of Strange's structural bases of power is that of Security. This structure is defined as one that '...lies with the person or group able to exercise control over...other people's security from violence...'(Strange, 1987;565) Strange concentrated her work on the material capabilities of an actor in the determination of the ability of one actor to dominate or control other actors. However, one may be able to make the point now that will be examined below, that the security of one region may be at times subject to the stability of another region. Given the interests and concerns of some of the EC member states in the Middle East, a strong argument could be found here for the extension of Strange's definition of Security as a basis of structural power to include this case study.

Now that the logic behind the selection of this event as a study for this thesis has been elucidated, questions must be posed so as to establish a framework of reference for this study. These questions are:

> 1) Can a coherent EC policy be discerned where EC institutions were present alongside those of the member states?
>
> 2) If such an EC policy can be found to exist, was this policy different from that of the United States?
>
> 3) Can a conventional wisdom, based around the Realist project, comprehensively explain allied differences with respect to the Arab-Israeli situation?

As was true of the first three theoretical chapters, and of the case studies that follow, a fully developed alternative theoretical perspective, if warranted, will not necessarily be developed at the conclusion of this chapter. Instead, alternative and additional perspectives will be explored in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

II:The Context

Henry Kissinger had labelled 1973 as the 'Year of Europe'. It was to be a year where the allies would rededicate themselves to the Atlantic Alliance through increased co-operation, consultation and commonality in foreign policy objectives. It was to be, throughout the Alliance, a year of peace and renewed prosperity. However, the much hailed 'Year of Europe' would actually become a 'year of confrontation' over numerous issues, including the Middle East and, in specific, the Arab-Israeli conflict. These disagreements between the allies were exacerbated by the October Yom Kippur War and the will of the Nine of the European Community to 'speak with one voice' in foreign affairs through the mechanisms of European Political Co-operation.

The first days of January 1973 saw the European Community expand from six to nine member states, with the inclusion of Britain, Denmark and Ireland. This growth, coupled with the EC's 1972 commitment to full political union marked, for Henry Kissinger, then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the '...end of the matter-of-fact American pre-eminence in the West that had characterized the period since 1945...'(Kissinger, 1982;131) Kissinger noted that the Community's expanding economic capabilities would enable it, in the not too distant future, to compete with the United States in many areas of political economics such as trade. He also saw in the relationship between the EC and US many common linkages through history, culture and moral values which might allow the two entities to re-energize their combined purpose of maintaining and expanding a free world based on these same commonly held principles. However, he was not wholly optimistic. Kissinger doubted that '...Europe would unite in order to share

our burdens or that it would be content with a subordinate role once it had the means to implement its own views...'(Ibid.) Kissinger saw, as the realistic outcome of Europe's political and economic growth, a want to '...undertake a larger cooperative role in the West's affairs [which would] fulfil its own distinctive purposes..[and therefore] a common focus had to be achieved...partnership had to be evoked rather than assumed...'(Ibid., 131-32) This need to realign the Atlantic Alliance on a different basis from that on which it was constructed in the early years after World War Two made Kissinger approach President Nixon and asked him to dedicate 1973 to issues revolving around this evolving relationship. Thus the 'Year of Europe' was born, and it was Kissinger who would invoke it.

In the maiden speech of this policy objective, the reconstitution of the Alliance, Kissinger states that

> Nineteen Seventy-three is the year of Europe because the era that was shaped by decisions of a generation ago is ending. The success of these policies has produced new realities that require new approaches...
>
> [but]...the United States has *global* interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have *regional* interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in a new era neither are they automatically identical...
>
> [and]...we are prepared to work cooperatively on new common problems we face...[issues involving energy policy] could be an area of competition; it should be an area of collaboration...(Ibid., 153 emphasis added)

Henry Kissinger was of the belief that his speech was positive with respect to the future relationship between the United States and an expanding European Community. However, his remarks concerning the differentiation of roles and interests between the two actors, specifically with respect to regional and global issues, were not taken in that vein by a number of EC leaders. Notably, President Pompidou and Foreign Minister Jobert of France were angered by these remarks. The leading editorial in the influential paper *Le Monde* echoed this anger the day after the speech was made, stating in an editorial that '...[it appears that] President Nixon makes light of the existing European institutions...[and] it remains to be seen whether Europe can best find its own individuality through opposition to the U.S.,...or by continuing to go along with the U.S...'(Ibid.,161) Clearly some in Western Europe did not view Nixon's European initiative and Kissinger's Pilgrims Speech as events that would assist in the development a the new relationship between the United States and the Community;

The themes of continuity, commonality, divergence and disagreement will be those that carry through this examination of the various actions, reactions and policy

prescriptions of the United States and the member states of the European Community with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict from the early 1970s through to 1980. Key points in time throughout this decade alluded to below will be President Nixon's 'Year of Europe'; the allied reactions to the Yom Kippur War of 1973; and finally, the 1980 Venice Declaration of the European Community.

III:Reactions, Actions and Allied Policies

A. Pre-1973 Plans

In the early 1970s, the United States pursued a strategy of influence upon the government of Egypt. Henry Kissinger states numerous times in his personal memoirs that Egypt was the pivotal Arab state with respect to any type of peace in the Middle East. The turning of this state towards the US was crucial if both were to become more engaged in the search for peace. Until the time of Anwar Sadat's accession to leader of his country, the Department of State forwarded a number of plans with respect to some kind of negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Rogers Plan of 1969, coupled with initiatives pressing for a limited disengagement on the part of Israel from the Suez Canal area, were not undertaken with much enthusiasm. As such, all were eliminated from discussion as 1973 approached.(Kissinger, 1982;195-201) The only point that is of interest from this pre-1973 period of US benign neglect of the Middle East is the decidedly pro-Israeli stance of the United States. This position is noted in Kissinger's portrayal of President Nixon as well as the response from Sadat with respect to the US-Soviet communiqué of May 1972. Border changes that would appear to favor Israel are noted by Kissinger as being the American position agreed to by the Soviet leadership, and resented by Sadat.(Ibid., 204) As well, Kissinger asserts that Nixon, against his personal predilection against the Jewish community of the US, stood by Israel '...more firmly than almost any other President save Harry Truman...'(Ibid., 203)

Diverging from this position was the European Community, albeit to only a certain extent. The years prior to the October 1973 war were marked by what is noted as a change in West European policy towards the Middle East and, in particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Prior to this decade the West European approach had been an attempt at a balanced, if not neutral, approach. However, three official documents of the European Community confirmed the move towards a more pro-Arab stance. The first was the Schuman Document, the second the May 1971 communiqué, and the third a report on the future energy requirements of the European Community. As to the first, the Schuman Document spoke of recent efforts by the Presidency of the European Community to forge consensus between the EC member states on a Middle Eastern policy, as well as recent

Presidency visits to a number of the countries directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the document was so sensitive that West Germany and The Netherlands refused to allow its publication. The EPC declaration of May of 1971 stated that the Six member states '...confirm their approval Resolution 242...which constitutes the basis of a settlement, and they stress the need to put into effects in all its parts...'(EC, Bull 6-1971;31) To restate, UN SC Resolution 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israel from territories seized during war and a just settlement of the refugee problem.(See Appendix 4.1 for UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338) The latter refers to the status of Palestinian refugees situated in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip of Israel after the 1967 war. Alone, Ifestos asserts that these actions were the beginnings of a new Middle East policy for the EC member states, as perceived by the member states themselves.(Ifestos, 421-23)

The third and final EC policy of the pre-1973 period was the publication of a report that would lead, eventually, to the creation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. In November 1972 The EC Commission, at the behest of the Council of Ministers, produced a document entitled 'Necessary progress in community energy policy'. Because of the Teheran and Tripoli reports of the OPEC states in 1970, and the need for long term stability in the flow of energy to Western Europe from its various supplies, the Commission suggested two policies. The first was the creation of greater dialogue and dissemination of information amongst the EC, Japan and the United States.(EC, 1972;13) As to oil exporting countries, the document suggests that the EC take a role in the development of these countries through enhanced multilateral contact. The first firm point to be made is that there should be the impetus, because of the interdependence of Western Europe and the Middle East, to '...create a consultative procedure with the exporting countries permitting better reciprocal information and discussion...'(Ibid.) Also, the need to seek out alternative energy sources and diversify Western Europe's supply routes were mentioned in another section of the report. David Allen points out that this report laid down the basis of what eventually became the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Allen also states that the EC should receive some credit for its '...pre-crisis anticipation of the eventual need for a new relationship with the Arab world...'(Allen, 1982;69) This document only confirmed the pro-Arab tilt of the European Community.

The tilt towards the Arab states, and public disapproval on the part of the United States, came in the summer months of 1973. In June a report sponsored by the Secretary-General of the United Nations outlined the history of UN involvement in the Middle East since June 1967. A number of General Assembly resolutions affirming the content of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the work of Mr. Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations, on behalf of the UN, was forwarded and supported by Britain and France.(HoC, Oct. 31, 1973;210) Two of the resolutions spoke of the need to recognize the rights of the Palestinians while the third, Resolution 2799 (XXVI) called on Israel to

'...respond favourably to the Special Representative's [Mr. Jarring] peace initiative...'(UN, May 18, 1973;51) This is in light of the absence of the Syrian Government from all of the meetings organized by Mr. Jarring. Negative votes by the United States of these resolutions because of the biased nature of the entire document and its apparent lack of reaffirmation of UNSC Resolution 242, was the public acknowledgement of this divergence; divergence prior to the October 1973 War.[1]

B. October Wars and Small Steps (1973-1975)

The surprise attack on Israel by a number of Arab states elicited a variety of responses from the United States and its West European allies. The first, albeit a secretive one, was a comment from President Nixon to his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Nixon admitted that in spite of his personal feelings with respect to the pressure placed upon him by various Jewish lobby groups inside the United States, the US must be committed to the achievement of an Israeli victory. The statement that '...they're [the Israelis] going to win - and they'll win it, thank God, they should...'(Kissinger, 1982;467) is indicative of this level of support. This was coupled with the supply of needed armaments to Israel from NATO/US bases in Western Europe and the move to a higher state of world-wide alert for American armed forces. The latter was in response to the unilateral dispatch of fifty military observers to the region by the Soviet Union. The contemplation of sending US ground forces to the Middle East to support Israeli forces, as noted by Kissinger when the Arab states appeared to maintain their surprise attack advantage, is another indication of the importance placed upon an Israeli victory by the US Administration.(Kissinger, 1982;588-89)

Nixon's 'Israel must win' stance was shared by a number of US Senators and Congressmen. In the Congressional Record a number of politicians deplored the Arab attack on Israel; called for American assistance with respect to the survival of Israel; and attacked the United Nations for its inability to contain the situation.[2] Also, concern was expressed with respect to the US-Soviet and US-European relationships in light of the war. As to the former Congressmen Baker said that '...we must also recognize that the solution of this crisis will be a true test of the détente between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China...'(CR, V.119, Part 26, p.33689) Senator Edward Kennedy, dealing with the latter, said that the United States is guilty of a lack of communication with respect to the alert of US troops and a greater understanding of differing interests and desires must be accounted for. However, Kennedy asserted that '...the spectacle of our NATO allies treating us like lepers caused deep hurt in Washington...'(CR, V.119, Part 27, p.35711) He continued to say that this rift '...reveals some basic disagreements on the loyalty to be expected among NATO allies...[because]

Russia's role...as Arab sponsor and would-be oil broker can hardly be of no consequence to NATO...'(Ibid.)[3] This sentiment was coupled with an equal response to the stance of Western Europe in late October and early November on the decisions of the United States, as well as the potential influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. After the world-wide alert of American forces, President Nixon explained that this decision was '...a precautionary alert. The purpose of that was to indicate to the Soviet Union that we could not accept any unilateral move on their part to move military forces into the Mid East...'(Times, Oct. 27, 1973;8) Consequently, the US, as mentioned earlier, began to airlift war material from US/NATO bases in Western Europe. However, this airlift was met with disapproval from most of the member states of NATO. Britain indicated that it would not agree to the use of NATO bases on its soil and West Germany allowed airlifts until they became public knowledge. Only Portugal, a non-EC member states at that time, agreed to support and assist the decision of the United States. To this end Nixon, Kissinger and other senior official made it known that the United States was quite angry with its European counterparts. On October 30, at a meeting with members of the European Parliament, Henry Kissinger stated that '...what concerns us is for two weeks while the US had to make significant decisions, the Europeans acted as though the Alliance did not exist and seemed more interested in gaining marginal advantage than in cooperating with the US...'(FT, Oct. 30, 1973;1) By 'marginal gain' Kissinger was referring to the oil considerations of Western Europe. While not noting any comparisons between the US and Western Europe, an article in the Financial Times already mentioned oil-related statistics. This illustrated that, on average, the UK, France, West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg received seventy percent of their oil imports from AOPEC states.(FT, Nov. 6, 1973;8) The highest was Italy with almost eighty percent and Belgium-Luxembourg at just under sixty percent of oil imports.

The second and third policy initiatives of the United States were both short and long term in scope. The second was the attempt to convene a Middle East peace conference in Geneva, while the third was a September 1975 promissory note, or memorandum of understanding, between Israel and the United States on future negotiating positions. As to the second, the peace conference was to be based on a limited multilateral session with further, in-depth, bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of the directly related Arab states. It was to be a process of 'step-by-step' gradual negotiations rather than the development of a grand approach. As to the substance of this conference, what is noticeable on the part of the United States are two related points. The first is the status of the Palestinian people and their representatives, the PLO, and the second the deliverance of an unconditional veto to Israel with respect to future participants to the conference.

First and foremost, the entire issue of Palestinian representation, for the United States, was framed within a Jordanian context.(Kissinger, 1982;625) Henry Kissinger

states that in the runup to peace conference negotiations '...the idea of a Palestinian state run by the PLO was not a subject for serious discourse...'(Ibid., 625) Secondly, there was much discussion, as noted in Kissinger's memoirs, over the content of the formal invitation and agenda that would be sent out to all of the participants of the late 1973 Geneva conference. The Arab states, notably Egypt, pressed for either the inclusion of the Palestinians as independent participants or as a priority topic to be discussed as part of the agenda of the conference. What was asked for was that the participants debate the '*..timing* of Palestinian participation...'(Ibid., 758) As a compromise, Kissinger recalls that he proposed that the wording be changed to '...the *question* of Palestinian delegation...'(Ibid.) The matter of the agenda became a question of whether certain words would assume the Palestinian issue and their participation as a foregone conclusion, or an issue for further discussion between the formal participants.(Ibid., 790) To this end the Israeli government was adamant that such an issue would not be a foregone conclusion, nor a matter to be discussed in the narrow sense of only the Palestinians. Consequently, the US agreed, without any reluctance, to an agenda that would discuss the possible attendance of '...other participants...'(Ibid.) The Palestinians were not mentioned, thus reflecting a pro-Israel stance. However, this was nothing new. Previous US-Soviet summits had taken place with communiqués on the Middle East being agreed to without any mention of the Palestinians, or in a manner that was undefined and therefore uninformative as to US Middle Eastern policy.(Ibid.) Lastly, US policy towards the Palestinian people is based upon the demand of the former on the PLO, isofar as US recognition of the Palestinians as 'people' with 'rights' is conditioned upon the agreement of the PLO to UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the recognition of Israel with secure borders. The fact that Resolution 242 speaks of the Palestinians as 'refugees', rather than a people, says much of the US position on this group, and the former's respect for this group as an independent entity in the Middle East.

The third aspect of this three part policy is the September 1975 guarantee from the United States to Israel with respect to future peace conferences and military attacks. One part of the note speaks of various arms trade arrangements between the two countries; the second and third aspects concerning military threats to Israel and negotiating positions. As to the former, protection from and support in the case of against a military attack from a world power was guaranteed in that the US agreed to 'consult promptly' in the case of a threat to its 'security or sovereignty by a world power'.(Spiegel, 1985;302) The second article reflects the diplomatic aspect of this relationship. The United States commits itself to '...consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states...'(Ifestos, 610) The reiteration of this commitment to include additional groups and/or organizations, implicitly the PLO, is mentioned in the next sentence. The conditions placed upon the PLO for its recognition by the US is also stated in the first section.

In response to these pro-Israeli policies, the European Community developed, in part, its own two track strategy that dealt with the immediate and long term consequences of the October War. The first was a series of declarations outlining the position of the EC with respect to the war itself. The statement of October 11 iterated the support by the member states of UN SC Resolution 242, whereas the communiqué of November 6 went beyond the need to abide by past documents and iterated a new set of EC-based conditions for peace. In this document the Nine asserted for the first time that '...in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians...'(EPC, 56 See Appendix 4.2) The second track was the establishment of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD). The Dialogue would be a variety of meetings at differing diplomatic levels between Arab and West European representatives on matters relating to economic, technical and cultural co-operation. As was, the EAD was not intended to, because of its non-political framework, '...affect the current efforts [by the EPC] to work out a peace settlement in the Middle East...'(EPC,1982;68) Genscher also announced that consultations between the EC and Israel would begin.(Ibid.)

The American reaction to the EAD was negative. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were anxious to express their hostility to this action, taken without prior consultation with the United States. The Secretary of State, in a six point memo to the President of the Council of Ministers, remarked that '...the United States will not accept this procedure in the long run without its having a great effect on our relationship...'(Kissinger, 1982;930) The President was equally adamant.(Ibid.,932) Nevertheless, the EAD was not able to begin its first meeting of the General Committee until 1976. Substantive matters relating to the EAD were stalled because, like those of the Geneva Conference of 1973, issues arose relating to the attendance of Palestinian representatives. Originally the EAD was to be a forum for the various EC member states, the EC Commission and Arab states interested in attending. A non-state actor such as the PLO and its representatives would therefore be excluded, again. As such, the Arab states objected to the meeting of the highest level committee of the Dialogue until this issue was resolved. Compared to the exclusionary tactics and strategy of the United States, the EC found a method that allowed Palestinian representation. Under the so-called 'Dublin formula' the two groupings would be arranged in blocs, rather than by states. Subsequently, there would be a European group alongside an Arab one. Having declared that these blocs were not to be restricted to state officials, Palestinians acting on behalf of the PLO would be able to attend. The first General Committee could then be held. This will be examined in greater detail in the 'Assessment' section of the chapter.

Last, but not least, is the divergence between Western Europe and the United States over the need to cooperate and over the role of the Soviet Union in out-of- NATO-area conflicts. Official statements from UK and French governments, coupled with House of

Commons debates, were such that the need for strong ties with the United States was recognized, but not at any price. The UK stated that it not '...regard the presence of Russian observers in the Middle East as a cause for alarm...'(Times, Oct. 29, 1973;6) The French President, Pompidou, was quoted three days later as saying that '...experience shows that tête-à-têtes between the two super powers can lead as easily to confrontation as to détente...'(FT, Nov. 1, 1973;22) A meeting between Chancellor Brandt and senior officials from the Department of State covered issues related to NATO solidarity, the Middle East and the need for improved communication between the allies, in and outside of the NATO sphere, in light of the bitterness emerging from lack of knowledge of the world-wide alert.

In the UK House of Commons, a similar line of reasoning - anxiety over a breakdown in communications but not at any price or cost - was also heard. Mr. Callaghan asserted his advocacy of NATO but that he could not '...conclude any other than that the United States behaved with brusqueness and insensitivity in her action in setting a state of alert in being...'(UK HoC, Oct. 31, 1973;198) He went on to add that '...in the case of the recent alert there was no question of attack on a NATO country...[therefore the US] must recall that she occupies these bases with our consent. This is not a a matter of diplomatic courtesy...'(Ibid.) Mr. Walters noted that it is '...in the best interests of Britain, Europe and the United States that there should be a powerful Western influence in the Middle East...'(Ibid., 208) However, not at any price. He proceeded to condemn the US for its 'one-side and ill-advised' support for Israel, based on domestic rather than national interest and foreign policy concerns. As such, '...is it any wonder that the European Governments should have turned away from American leadership in the Middle East...[and] is it not the height of absurdity for Washington to lecture its NATO allies for failing to follow the United States' lead?...'(Ibid.)

This second period of post-war policies is therefore marked by continuing and diverging trends. They are continuing in that both actors remained wedded to the policies of the pre-war era, and diverging in the sense that one set were exclusionary of the Palestinians, while the other, that of the EC member states, appears to be inclusionary. The hallmark of this brief assessment is that, whereas the US attempted to and was successful in postponing the issue of these people, the EC under the 'Dublin formula' sought to do nothing but the opposite.

C. Active Engagement (1976-1978)

The third phase of EC-US relations concerning the Middle East is one of apparent convergence, but, when placed under greater scrutiny, replete with differences.[4] Convergence appeared to be on the horizon after the election of Jimmy Carter to the

Presidency of the United States. This is so for a number of related reasons. Chiefly, Carter stressed that for the past eight years US foreign policy had revolved around the Soviet Union to the exclusion of all other issues and concerns of the United States. This narrow definition of vital interests obscured, for Carter, issues of great importance. These included the elevation of the priorization of human rights and North-South issues, to name but two.(See Brzezinski, 1983) His was a term in office that was to be highlighted by the utilization of power for the sake of American principles.

To this extent, the matter of the Palestinians fell well within the confines of those issues to be prioritized by the US government. This prioritizations was noted in a number of speeches by Carter, prior to and after taking office, and in one of his major diplomatic appointments. In March of 1977, at an election press conference, Carter spoke of the need for '...a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many years...'(Ibid., 91) By May of the same year, the centrality of the Palestinian issue to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was highlighted in a further press conference. Carter, at that juncture, is quoted as saying that '...there can be no reasonable hope for a settlement of the Middle Eastern question...without a homeland for the Palestinians...'(Ibid., 83) This stance was reiterated on a number of other occasions after the presidential election. [5]

Senior diplomatic appointments of President Carter also reflected his prioritizations of human rights and North-South issues, rather than those of an East-West nature. For the United Nations Andrew Young, a leading figure in the US civil rights movement of the 1960s, was selected. Known for his somewhat non-traditional views on international relations, Young may have been the type of person to stretch to the limits the boundaries of the international policies of the President. It was Young who met secretively with high ranking members of the PLO and by doing so broke the limits of these boundaries when the meetings were made public by Israeli officials. Embarrassed by these actions, the President was forced to accept the resignation of his ambassador. But this occurrence does not detract from the fact that Young's beliefs were known in advance of his selection; views that were obviously compatible with those of Carter or else he would not have been selected for the task at hand - the establishment of closer relations with Palestinian representatives as a possible prelude to a peace process that would include the major Arab states as well as this oft ignored grouping.

Last of these 'pro-Arab' stances assumed by President Carter is the declaration agreed to by Carter and Brezhnev at the US- Soviet summit of October 1, 1977. At the end of this meeting the two leaders agreed that

> the vital interests of the people of this area...urgently dictate the necessity of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This settlement should be

> comprehensive, incorporating all parties concerned and all questions...
>
> all specific questions of the settlement should be resolved...including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people...
>
> the only right and effective way of achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference...with participants in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict, including those of the Palestinian people...(NYT, Oct.2, 1977;16)

With respect to the European Community, these three years were notable for its active engagement on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue. From a major speech by the UK Ambassador to the UN, Ivor Richards, to a series of draft resolutions outlining a position of advocacy on behalf of the Palestinians, the following years were to see a new impetus behind EC policy in the Middle East. One example of such advocacy is the debates on a Report of the UN General Assembly regarding the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. The British delegation to the Security Council expressed a number of reservations with respect to this report, but did confirm that the three steps listed in the report that must be taken into account to establish a just, lasting and comprehensive peace are those that the United Kingdom adheres to. These steps include the withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied after 1967; respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of every State in the area under discussion, and the '...recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to the expression of their national identity...'(UN, June 25, 1976;2) Also, this was the first occasion were an EC member state announced that it would support the adjustment of UN SC Resolution 242 to make it acceptable to the Palestinian people, thus paving the way to a lasting and comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. The genesis of this was that the United Kingdom, France and Italy, on behalf of the European Community, abstained on a draft Security Council resolution because it had not taken account of UN SC Resolutions 242 and 338.(Ibid.)[6] Thus, the UK Ambassador noted the reason for this exclusion and the omission from Resolution 242 of the recognition of the Palestinians as people rather than refugees. Consequently, the Ambassador stated that '...for this reason my Government has stated our view that resolution 242 (1967) must be supplemented, but not supplanted, so as to take account of the political rights of the Palestinian people and to enable them to express their national identity...'(Ibid.) This call for such an amendment would be reissued in the latter half of 1978, and rejected by the Carter Administration. By late May the convening of the first General Committee of the EAD was held. After its discussions the communiqué issued stated that the Nine '...recognized that a solution to the question of Palestine based

on the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is a crucial factor in the achievement of a just and lasting peace...'(EPC, 89) Another draft resolution in the Security Council based upon this position soon followed in late June.

June and November of 1977 were the next two illustrations of a rejuvenated EC policy in the Middle East. As in the past, the first saw the 'legitimate rights' of the Palestinians, and the need for a homeland for these 'people', reaffirmed. To this end the statement called for the recognition of Israel to exist within secure borders. To wit, Israel must be ready to '...recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people...'(EPC, 108 See Appendix 4.3) Novel in this statement is that only the recognition of the right to existence was called for, and not the acceptance of UN SC Resolutions 242 and 338. Also, the EC did not stipulate the PLO and/or the Palestinians, but the 'Arab side', an ambiguous reference that could be self-defined. The November statement reiterated the need to act on the basis of the principles laid down in June as well as the fact that '...it is urgent that genuine peace at last be achieved for all the peoples in the area, including the Palestinian people...'(EPC, 121)[7]

This last statement, coupled with those of President Carter, illustrates the degree of convergence between the American and West European positions on the Middle East. The perceived movement of the former is noted because of the opposition to this stance by the major Jewish organizations in the United States. Late, in October 1977, Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State, met with leaders of American Jewry who expressed their resentment of US policy. To this end, the chair of the Jewish group asserted that it '...expressed its concern, its frustration, its anger...[because] we perceive certain policies on the part of this Administration which in our judgement do not achieve those high and noble purposes [of a just and lasting peace] but in fact pervert them...'(NYT, Oct. 27, 1977;1 and 4)

D. Allies Apart, Accords and Declarations (1978-1980)

The onset of 1978 marked the beginning of an American impetus for peace in the Middle East. Aside from other pressing issues, President Carter's background aligned him closely with this area of the world, and the desire to achieve a lasting peace between its inhabitants. So came Carter's press conference in the first week of the new year. This conference was used as the launchpad for a new American initiative that eventually brought about the Camp David Peace Accords between Israel, Egypt and the United States. At this conference, Carter said that three necessary steps must be taken for peace to occur in the Middle East. The first two are the normalization of relations between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied territories. The third is that '...there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem is that Israel must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the

Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future...'(NYT, Jan. 5, 1978;A5) As such, there is a direct link, after much negotiating between the various parties, with the peace agreement on September 17 of the same year.

The Camp David Accord document is notable with respect to this case study for the three stage process that envisioned the establishment of self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The preamble to this staged process notes that

> Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages...
>
> [the third stage of this process is that]...Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and other Palestinians as mutually agreed...[Myths and Facts, 1988;296-298]

As was the case with the June 1977 declaration of the European Community and its omissions, so it was with the Camp David Accords. Consistent with past US policy, the framework of Palestinian participation in any of these processes is the recognition of the right of Israel to live within secure boundaries under UN SC Resolution 242 and UN Resolution 338.(Ibid., 296) Of course, this in itself was a change in that Resolution 338 was not mentioned. However, UN SC Resolution 242 was left unchanged in its wording, inclusive of the status of the Palestinian people as 'refugees'. This alone would preclude any change in the latter's policy, and the evolution of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

The second notable aspect of this staged process is the manner in which the Palestinians would became associated with the Accords. Agreement on the movement from one stage to another had to come between Egypt, Jordan and Israel, and also on the participation of the Palestinians. As such, Israel was again granted an effective veto on the future participation of actors. While the tone of Carter's policies may have changed, the substance had not. Lastly, and like Nixon and Kissinger before him, Carter's emphasis with respect to the future status of the West Bank was placed within a Jordanian context. Interestingly enough, Jordan rejected the Camp David process and was not a signatory to the document. Yet this country was explicitly included in its final provisions, whereas the Palestinians and their representatives were not.

The inclusion or exclusion of the Palestinians and in particular the PLO is the issue on which this last era of divergence turns on. The initial response to Camp David on the part of the European Community was both positive and negative. While welcoming any moves that may be prelude a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the

member states also hoped that a framework would come into being to make it possible for all parties concerned to participate in the process.(EPC, 129) While not directly referring to the Palestinians, the EAD statement following the next meeting of the General Committee did. This communiqué read that the EC agrees that the '...Palestinian question is central to the conflict in the area and that a peaceful, comprehensive and just settlement of the conflict, including obviously a solution of the Palestinian problem...'(EC Bull.-12/78;19)

The next year was an even more furious time for European Community actions on the subject of the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the centrality of the Palestinian issue to the conclusion of the dispute. Speeches in the UK House of Commons and Lords, by West German, Belgium, Italian and French Foreign Ministers, as well as fact finding missions to the region by the EC Presidency, were intended to lead to another major statement on this issue. The Venice Declaration of July 1980 would be that statement, but first the context shall be ascertained. By March of 1979 the EC was again commenting on Camp David, albeit in a more negative manner and with stronger language on the issue of the Palestinians. Only a comprehensive framework that included all of the parties could lead to lasting peace in the Middle East, and as such, the Camp David Accords were found to be wanting. As such a precondition for the success of such a framework was set. This was that a homeland for the Palestinians must be part of the final agreement. Nothing less would be acceptable. The document read that '...such a settlement must...translate into fact the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland...'(EPC, 163)

In the months of March, April and May of 1979 a concerted British effort to focus on this issue of the Palestinians and their need for a homeland was pressed by the Lord Privy Seal, Foreign Secretary Owen and Prime Minister Callaghan in the House of Commons. Owen, responding to questions concerning the Camp David Accords, stated that British and EC policy was that '...We believe that there must be a Palestinian homeland if there is to be a comprehensive peace settlement...'(HoC, Mar. 21, 1979;1473) Callaghan reiterated this comment when he spoke six days later. At that time the Prime Minister said that while he welcomed the Camp David Accords and praised all three of the leaders involved, Britain and the EC '...regard as essential that we should move on from here to a comprehensive peace settlement that will engage the other Arab States and give the Arabs in Palestine - the Palestinians - the opportunity of a secure future for themselves, as well as securing peace for Israel...'(HoC, Mar. 21,1979;258)[8] Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany was quoted as advocating a homeland and the self-determination of the Palestinians, and the Belgian Foreign Minister said that the PLO should be from this point forward with the EC '...the channel through which the Palestinian people express their will...'(quoted in Ifestos, 453) The September address by the EC Presidency to the UN General Assembly reiterated, in a most important forum,

these points. The Irish Foreign Minister, O'Kennedy, said that '...it is essential that there be respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people...who are entitled...to exercise their right to their own future as a people...'(EPC, 171-175)

The final prelude to the Venice Declaration was the attempt of the European Community, via its two Security Council member states, to draft an amendment or supplementary document to the existing Resolution 242 so as to confer actual status on the Palestinians. This was conceived as a means by which the PLO could, on behalf of its constituency, recognize the existence of Israel and accept Resolution 242 as it stood, without grave domestic political consequences. Lord Carrington explained the proposal by saying that the area of negligence with respect to the Palestinians as refugees or a people, is '...an area to which Resolution 242 may be supplemented; not...replace, amended or distorted, but supplemented to meet this point...'(MEI, Sep. 28, 1979;14-15) Between the United Kingdom and France there was the appearance of every intention on the part of these two states to do exactly what Carrington spoke of - admitting to the Security Council a resolution that would add to Resolution 242.[9] The Carter Administration was openly concerned with the prospects of what appeared to be an amendment, rather than a supplement to, Resolution 242. In June of 1980 President Carter remarked at a press conference that '...we are monitoring very closely what is being done by others, notably the European Community, to make sure that they don't do anything that would interfere with or subvert the progress of the Camp David procedure...'(WCPD, June 23, 1980;1114) The President went on to state unequivocally that the US would '...protect the UN Security Council Resolution 242 with a veto if necessary...'(Ibid.)

The Venice Declaration itself, with respect to this case study, has two relevant sections. The first reiterates previous stances of the European Community and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. This also states two points related to the move to supplement Resolution 242. The first is that '...a just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees...'(EC Bull 6-1980;10-11 See Appendix 4.4) Associated with this is that '...the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations...'(Ibid.) Thus the link between a new status for the Palestinians and the PLO as a full participant in the peace process was made, albeit outside of the framework of the United Nations and thus the grasp of the United States. The second area of the Declaration, important for later discussion is that which covers the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The Dialogue had previously been confined to technical issues, to avoid intricate discussions over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East in general. However, this section explicitly mentions the need to hold a meeting at a 'political' level, evidently for the first time. As such, the EAD was envisioned as one possible forum in which a comprehensive peace may be solved. Simultaneously, the Nine worked towards another broadening of the EAD relationship by stating that this forum may be able to

'...contribute to the development towards the development of co-operation and mutual understanding between Europe and the Arab world...'(Ibid.) The semantic relevance of this latter passage will be examined in greater detail later, and within its own context. Nevertheless, it is important to point out at this juncture the broadening of the EAD beyond the original intentions of the European Community, in both 1972 and 1974.

The reaction to Venice was mixed. P. Ifestos notes the disappointment of the moderate Arab states and the leadership of the PLO because of the minimalist language of the document. A neutral assessment was made by the US Secretary of State. Cyrus Vance, when asked for the US response to the Declaration, commented that '...I do not see anything on its face which directly challenges the Camp David process or seeks to divert the effort of the parties...'(quoted in Ifestos, 467) Curiously enough, this statement was sandwiched in between various additional statements from leading EC statespeople, notably UK Prime Minister Thatcher. The latter said that the intention of the EC member states, with respect to agreement to, and publication of Venice, was to '...do something positive, but which is complementary to US efforts. We want to do this in partnership with the US...'(WSJ, Jun. 16, 1980;14) However, Members of the European Parliament were notable in their interest with respect to Venice. Ripa de Meana said that '...we applaud the fact that the problem of the Palestinian people has been acknowledged, an acknowledgement that goes beyond the old and unacceptable definition of the Palestinians as 'Palestinian refugees'...(EC OJC, Jun. 18, 1980;126) And finally, MEP Castellina, in a debate over the Venice Declaration, remarked that '...at last we are distancing ourselves from the position of the United States...'(Ibid.)

IV:Commonalities and Divergencies

The response from President Nixon to West European/European Community policies during the October 1973 War, as well as that of President Carter to the EC attempt at a reformation of UNSC Resolution 242, illustrate that at various junctures during the Arab-Israeli conflict divergences between the allies occurred. The lack of interest shown by the member states of the EC towards the Camp David Accords is another illustration of this divergence in policy. Explicit attempts to exclude Palestinian representation within the Arab-Israeli peace process, by the United States, compared with the inclusionary tactics of the European Community, represent a fourth area of divergence between the allies. Many more are apparent in the more detailed analysis conducted later in this chapter. The point to make at this stage is that all of the actors involved in this conflict, for the sake of this chapter, indicate that the Western allies were of differing opinions with respect to a variety of issues concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.[10] This is well documented in analyses carried out by Stephen Artner and Panayotis Ifestos, to name two such scholars.[11] Consequently, the presence of, at a base level, divergence between the

allies is not in question at this juncture. Neither are the types and areas of divergence. These will appear later. What is in question at this stage is a 'first cut' into the question of why these divergencies appeared in the first place, continued through the entire period examined; from 1973 through to 1980 with agreement over the Camp David Accords and Venice Declaration.

V:Understanding the Divergencies

A number of questions were posed at the outset of this case study. These questions asked whether or not there was a 'European' position with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict; whether or not this position was difference from that of the Unites States; and, if differences were present, could these differences be explained by a Realist perspective of International Relations.

In the third chapter of this thesis that dealt with a number of overall reasons for divergencies between Western Europe and the United States, a number of reasons forwarded as those that constitute a 'conventional wisdom' in the works cited. These included the shift in power, status and roles between Western Europe and the United States; the differing threat perceptions of the Soviet Union; the economic resurgence of the European Community member states and the relative decline of the United States since the late 1960s; the presence of nuclear weaponry and the onset of nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States; the evolution of détente; and the factors of geography and history. Present in all of the literature reviewed, this wisdom defines the Realist position from the 1960s through to the 1990s. With these factors in mind the task now is to highlight those academics who appear to operate from a Realist perspective on the specific issue of European Community-United States differences with respect to the Middle East. After these academics have been assessed in some detail, an analysis of their positions will question the validity of this particular 'conventional wisdom'. The case to prove here will be whether or not this 'conventional wisdom' can stand this validation test, and, in doing so, 'claim to know' why EC-US differences occur over Middle Eastern and Arab-Israeli issues.

The essential work on European Political Co-operation and the Middle East is that by Ifestos. While many other academics have written extensively on this topic, the Ifestos book is commonly referred to because of its detail with respect to EPC and the Arab-Israel. Consequently, this study will look to Ifestos for his reasons for differences in the Middle Eastern positions of the United States and the European Community. Of the many possible permutations available, Ifestos concludes that there are seven factors that can be discerned as reasons why differences in policies between the allies exist. In order these factors are:

1) heavy energy dependence on the Middle East and the need to develop a foreign (energy) policy towards the producer states;

2) financial and commercial factors relating to the recycling of petrodollars, investments and the need to secure a stable export outlet;

3) the transformation of the post-war balance-of- power system and the relative decline of US power, compelled the Europeans to seek to promote their own interests world-wide;

4) the inability of the US to guarantee a continuous supply of energy resources to Europe from the Middle East;

5) the relative growth in importance of the Middle East and again, the need for Europe to promote its interests in this region;

6) the continuous demands of the Arab states for a European policy with regard to the Palestinian issue;

7) factors relating to European integration and the desire to project the EC as an international actor.
(Ifestos, 383-384)

These seven factors can be further categorized into more general ones, in order to lend them greater coherence. Factors listed as the first, second, fourth and sixth are all related to questions of energy, trade and Western Europe's dependency on both. The third, fifth and seventh factors reflect shifts in the international system, and the Community's want to react to these trends in a positive and progressive manner, especially with regard to the process of internal integration towards a full political union. With reference to the 'conventional wisdom' on transatlantic relations, it could be said that both sets of factors listed fall within the broad framework of a Realist approach to allied divergences.

But Ifestos is not alone in highlighting these two sets of factors as those responsible for transatlantic tensions. Stephen Artner agrees that in the calculation of European interests and motives in the Middle East, the energy dependency of the EC member states along with the development of closer commercial ties between the Community and the Arab world, must be considered as important.(Artner, 1980;420-21) Alongside the economic factors, Artner also points briefly to long standing historical ties between Western Europe and the Arab world as another motive for the policies of the former, besides the physical proximity of the Middle East.(Ibid., 420 and 430) Lastly, and also in agreement with the factors set down by Ifestos, Artner notes that the '...geopolitical position of the West as a whole would be gravely endangered by Soviet expansion beyond Afghanistan toward the oil-rich area of the Persian Gulf...'(Ibid., 420) Consequently, the United States and the European Community have an interest in securing a lasting peace to

the problems between Israel and its Arab neighbors. However, the proximity of the latter to that region makes this potential occurrence of more direct interest than for the United States.

To this last motivation the comments of David Allen and Michael Smith can also be added. In a co-authored article, the academics agree that the lack of ability of the United States to 'control' Israel, on a range of issues, has made the West Europeans more concerned than they have previously been.(Allen, 1983;127) Adam Garfinkle also speaks of the 'double dependency' of the West Europeans when related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Aside from the economic dependency on the Arab states, Garfinkle cites the need for the EC states to avoid displeasing the United States. This is so for, while shifts in power between the allies has occurred, the only actor that has a realistic chance of forging a real peace between Israel and the Arab world is still the United States. The author comments that '...while the EC periodically pretends otherwise...most Europeans know that their own diplomatic forays into the Middle East are mere holding actions until the day when the Americans might convince, cajole or connive the local parties to put their affairs in better order...'(Garfinkle, 1981;635)

With a 'conventional wisdom' established as to why the European Community diverges from the United States over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East in general, this section shifts from description to analysis and validation. In turn, the two sets of factors outlined by Ifestos and emphasized by Artner, Garfinkle and Allen and Smith will be analyzed to assess their validity. Is the claim of oil dependency justified, and do the West Europeans perceive the Middle East to be part of the larger East-West confrontation? Can a Realist approach based upon these factors adequately explain allied differences, or do the relevant academics and practitioners also highlight other possible motivations that go beyond the realm of Realist thought? With these questions in mind, this analysis turns to the first set of factors enunciated by Ifestos and the academics noted above.

Oil. The Arab states have a tremendous amount of this finite but precious resource, the United States has some; and most of the Europeans have almost none. Consistently the critics of the European approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict have sought refuge in the belief that the Europeans have, for the sake of a stable source of energy embodied in oil, developed a diplomatic stance that opposes that of the United States and looked at unfavorably by the Israelis, for the sake of Arab appeasement. These critics suggest favor is curried with the Arab states, citing oil as the basis on which the policies the EC have developed through EPC and the Euro-Arab Dialogue. There is much to be said for this line of reasoning given the basic statistics in both oil needs and existing trade between the Europeans, Americans and Arab states, and the realities of the oil embargo during the Yom Kippur War.

Between 1970 and 1973, *before* the October War, the Arab states, on average, exported forty-three percent of its goods to the Community, compared to ten percent to the United States. Of this trade, roughly the same percentage was in mineral products, consisting of petroleum products and crude oil. The telling figure related to these statistics is that, as a percentage of total mineral consumption, the EC's figure was close to sixty percent, compared to ten of the United States. Thus, while mineral products were roughly the same percentage of US and EC imports from the OPEC states, in total, the Community produces, internally, many less petroleum products, namely crude oil, than the United States and is, at the end of the day, much more dependent upon OPEC as a strategic trading partner. As such, the OECD posited that if the oil embargo was not selective to Western Europe, and production fell by twenty percent of then current capacity, the Europeans would lose somewhere between twelve and fifteen percent of its energy supply, while the Americans would risk losing, at the maximum, three percent.(OECD, 1973) Therefore the key economic sectors of the former would be hurt much more than those of the latter, a daunting prospect for the leader of any western industrialized state.(See Appendix 4.5)

Further emphasis is placed on the 'oil weapon' and the charge of European pandering to Arab interests through the 1973 embargo itself. The OPEC nations unilaterally decided to cut their cumulative oil production by five percent, and a further five percent each month the war lasted. However, this was a policy tempered by selectiveness on the part of OPEC. By November 18 the respective Arab oil ministers had met and decided that the Europeans, based upon their stance on the conflict, would be 'rewarded', as Kissinger once stated, and have further reductions of their oil imports cancelled. The oil embargo was selective because all of the Community was granted this favor save for The Netherlands, the European country who stood most firmly with the United States throughout the war.(Kissinger, 1982;879) This assault on the policies of the allies, especially those of the Europeans, was made more explicit during an interview with Sheik Yamani of Saudi Arabia in Copenhagen on November 22. It was then he threatened the Europeans saying that '...your [Europe's] whole economy will definitely collapse all of a sudden [if you follow the policies of the United States]...'(Ibid., 880) Further preferential treatment would come, but it would also carry a price tag - the adoption of policies in opposition to those of the United States and favorable to the Arab cause.

This dependency of Europeans on Arab energy resources closely aligned itself, for the most part, with broader issues of trade and commerce. The Community was in 1973, and remains today, far more dependent on foreign trade, this primarily consisting of oil, than the United States.(Economist, Aug.24, 1991;52-53 and Appendix 4.5) The Community's relationship, in this respect, to the Middle East and specifically Arab states, is no less different to the situation which the Community finds itself in with regard to oil

resources. Consequently, the EC has a great 'regional' interest in maintaining good relations with its trading partners, specifically those of the Arab League and OPEC. The relationship, or in the case of the United States, lack thereof, is underscored greatly by the trading figures presented in Appendix 4.5. Illustrated in those charts, the dependency of the Community from 1970-1985, on general world trade, trade with OPEC, and specific mineral trade, is 'proof' that European policies in the Middle East, from 1973 onward, were nothing except signs of '...European readiness to curry favor with the Arabs...'(Volker;1976;172)

This sentiment is strengthened by statements from two West European governmental-related sources. The first is from a former European official who worked in the Middle East. This diplomat commented that because of the West European dependency on oil reserves and energy products from the Middle East '...European interests are closely bound up with the stability in the Middle East and a degree of understanding with the Arab world...'(Tomkys; 1987;431) The second such statement comes from the French President, Pompidou. With respect to Kissinger's attempts to create a 'consumers' cartel in reaction to that of OPEC/OAPEC, the President said to Kissinger that

> I could not concur, however, in establishing a consortium of consumers that would seek to impose a solution on the producers. You [the US] rely on the Arabs for about a tenth of your consumption. We [France] are entirely dependent upon them [the Arab states]. We can't afford the luxury of three or four years of worry and misery waiting for the Arabs to understand the problem. I won't be able to accept, no matter what conditions are established, a situation which requires us to forgo Arab oil, for even a year...(Kissinger, 1982;897)

This intimate economic and commercial relationship is strengthened when one closely examines a number of the EPC's communiqués that take note of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or have come about in regard to the EAD. The agreed agenda of the latter included issues such as '...trade, finance, industrial development, social and cultural exchanges and scientific co-operation [because] security in Europe is linked to the security in the Mediterranean area and that of the Arab region..."(EPC, 1982;88) The conclusion of a number of economic, commercial and trade agreements between the Community and the Mahgreb and Mashraq unions, another forum for Arab states, underpins this notion that a certain portion of security and stability in Europe, is inextricably linked to the overall stability of the Near East. In more narrow terms, however, this means that good relations must be created and kept between the Europeans and the Arab states. Because the US does not have the resource predicament of Western Europe, it is able to follow a more 'unbiased' position concerning the region and view the situation in more 'global' terms, taking account of the overarching US-Soviet relationship at all times.

The second set of factors listed above pertain to the shifts in power between the United States and the European Community and the perceived need for the latter to assert its 'presence' in world politics. The French Foreign Minister, Jobert, remarked that the superpower condominium during and immediately following the Yom Kippur War made Europe a 'victim'. Europe was not an independent actor during the war but '..,pawn than an instrument or an asset in the arbitration of the great powers. It can and should learn a basic lesson from this. Many people expect Europe not merely to react but to actually be born at last...'(Kissinger, 1982;719) Alec Douglas-Home, Jobert's counterpart in the United Kingdom, echoed this sentiment and commented that the '...pressure of events on both sides of the Atlantic and in Japan obliges us all to quicken the pace [of political co-operation]...'(Ibid., 732) Minimally, the Arab-Israeli conflict was one of the two issues selected by the leaders of the European Community where it was perceived that Europe's voice in world affairs was 'absent'. Comments by the Italian Prime Minister, Mariano Rumor, during EC summit at The Hague summit in 1969, could be viewed as the beginning of this active belief. At that time in The Hague, Rumor stated that he believed that '...Europe as such, is absent from the world dialogue...'(Ifestos, 1987;150)

What remains now is an examination of the above 'conventional wisdom'. The question that should be posed at this point is whether or not this 'wisdom' can still be held to be valid in the face of a critique. However, one half of the factors set out above are unobjectionable. The leadership of the European Community was of the belief that the voice of Western Europe was not being heard during events that directly impinged on their political and economic security. But this acceptance of the second set of motivations does not discount the possibility that the first set of factors may be inadequate for an explanation of the divergencies between the United States and the European Community. For this further analysis is required.

VI:Assessment

The contention put forward by Ifestos, Artner, Allen and Smith and Garfinkle with respect to the first set of factors, is that the oil dependency of Western European upon Arab oil supplies and trade relations is such that it forces the former to act differently with respect to policies on the Arab-Israeli conflict. As such, one finds comments that Western European positions are attempts to do no more than 'curry favor' with the Arabs in return for a secure supply of oil. However, figures derived from statistical compilations by the United Nations point to different conclusion. Western Europe does import more oil from AOPEC states than the United States, however, the differences between the United States and the European Community member states are not as divergent as the critics have concluded earlier. These former findings are illustrated in Appendix 4.5. Whereas the United

States exports roughly one quarter of its total trade to the AOPEC states, the European Community's trade accounts for thirty-three percent of its total export. Of these figures mineral resources accounted for eighty-eight percent of American trade and a comparable ninety-two percent for the European Community. In a more selective table comparing the United States to a Europe comprised of France, West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the figures again lack widespread discrepancies between the allies. By the year of the Yom Kippur War these five European states imported slightly over twelve percent of their energy resources, while the figure for the United States was eleven and a half percent. At the time of the Venice Declaration the figures were twenty-two and thirty-two percent, respectively.

Added to these charts, tables and figures is the knowledge that the first collective European Political Co-operation document on the Arab-Israeli situation was not agreed to in 1973 but in 1971; two years earlier. This document did suffer from a lack of agreement with respect to its publication because of requests from West Germany, Italy and The Netherlands, but this request did not detract from the perception of this communiqué as pro-Arab in orientation. Stephen Artner confirms this by commenting that the much more heralded November 1973 declaration was '...little more than a reaffirmation of the basic elements of previous United Nations and EEC declarations...'(Artner, 431) For the author, the 1971 document is defined as one of these 'previous declarations'. David Allen and Michael Smith echo this remark for they go further back in the history of Euro-Arab relations, attempting to make a case for the existence of a European policy prior to the Yom Kippur War. The co-authors state that the Venice Declaration can be viewed as a direct reaction to the Camp David Accords. The Declaration can also be viewed as a policy that can be '...traced back as far as Suez in the case of Britain and France and to the Middle East War of 1967 for the rest of Western Europe...'(Allen, 125) The assertion of these views by a number of highly regarded academics working in the area of Euro-Arab politics assists in the attempt of this thesis to discredit the 'conventional wisdom'.

A second possible avenue by which the 'conventional wisdom' may be undermined is to advance the notion that the timing of the various EPC declarations and communiqués was determined by political rather than economic factors. Roger Tomkys, a British diplomat who served in the Middle East, states that the '...timing and content of successive declarations have been shaped by lasting concerns for peace and judgements about the need to keep up the momentum of negotiations...'(Tomkys, 1987;431) The author goes on to assert that, in particular, the Venice Declaration of 1980 was made partially because of Lord Carrington's '...determination that Europe simply could not afford to let peace efforts stall...'(Ibid., 432) Tomkys does not make the identical argument for the declarations of 1973 and 1977, but when reviewing the trade figures and patterns, one may conclude that these communiqués were also not because of the sole need of the EC member states to

'curry favor' with AOPEC states. In these years the EC imported slightly less than twenty percent of its needs, but the United States imported close to thirty percent. Trade figures with AOPEC states alone were, for the EC and the United States, ninety-five and ninety-six percent, respectively. With so little difference, the case for the 'conventional wisdom' as the only credible reason why Western Europe adopted the positions that it did, appears to be less valid over time.

This assessment points to a direction away from the Realist conventional wisdom asserted by Ifestos. However, this assessment is an initial one at best. A much lengthier and detailed analysis of the verbatim statements, documents and communiqués is required to lend this assessment a great degree of depth. This further re-examination, assessment and analysis will revolve around three key areas, including the timing of these documents; the language utilized in these documents; and finally, the relevance of the actions of some of the member states of the European Community.

A. Timing

Timing may be said to be the key to a number of questions relating to this case study. One of the central issues of EC-US divergencies over the Arab- Israeli conflict is that the stance of the European Community is understandable. Because of its lack of energy resources the OAPEC states were able to 'blackmail' the EC into developing a pro-Arab policy. The various EC/EPC communiqués during and immediately after the October 1973 war lend credibility to the notion of Western Europe attempting to curry favor with the Arab world. However, the key to fully understanding the relationship between the EC and the Arab world lies not in the statements of 1973, but those between 1969 and 1972, as already mentioned. This is because as far back as The Hague summit of 1969, the leaders of the EC understood the importance of three issues. The first was for the Community to be able to 'speak with one voice' with respect to international politics. The second and third were that there were issues of 'great importance' that required such a voice, issues including the Middle East and the CSCE process.

With respect to the pro-Arab nature of the EC/EPC declaration, the first initiatives following from this decision in The Hague of importance appeared in May of 1971, with the production of an EPC report and the communiqué dated May 13, 1971. Both are perceived by scholars in this area of research as indicative of a new pro-Arab stance on the part of the member states. Even Ifestos, who contributes much to the notion of a 'conventional wisdom' attributable to the Realist paradigm, makes note of this declaration and report and its significance.(Ifestos, 421) He does so by mentioning that The Netherlands and West Germany, two generally pro-Israel states, vetoed the publication of this statement at that time. This rejection is indicative of the 'tilt' of the document, as noted

not by outside actors, but by EC member states. The third aspect of this 'timing' is that of the November 1972 'Necessary progress in community energy policy' report, described above. While this report did indicate the energy problem that could be faced in the future because of EC member states on AOPEC energy resources, the report stipulated that this problem should be dealt with in a bilateral manner with the Arab OPEC states, due consideration paid to a range of mutually beneficial issues. Also, the Euro-Arab Dialogue that grew out of this report, like that of a number of EC-third party bilateral groupings, is noted for being a relationship between unequals that is more equal that it need be. As such, David Allen states that the EC should receive some credit for its '...pre-crisis anticipation of the eventual need for a new relationship with the Arab world...'(Allen, 1982;69)

Thirdly, debates within the European Parliament on the Middle East adhere to this line of activism at the levels of the Commission, Council of Ministers and the intergovernmental EPC forum. Of all of the speeches, that of Mr. de la Malene is of most interest. He states that because the European Community is an entity in its own right, unburdened by the past history of West European-Middle East relations, it should be given a '...clean sheet, and this should enable it to play a special role in this dispute...'(EC OJC Mar 15, 1973;106) He also states in the same speech that

> because Europe is less directly involved in this conflict [East-West/America-Russia] than they are, it has a better chance of finding a way out of the impasse, or at least can offer an alternative solution to an agreement between the two major powers...(Ibid.)

The fourth element of this consideration of 'timing' is the divergence between the United States and Western Europe in the UN Security Council in June 1973, four months *prior* to the outbreak of the October War and the onset of the oil embargo by AOPEC member states. As related above, a draft resolution based upon the work of the EC Presidency and supported by Britain and France was vetoed by the United States. The reason for this veto, as noted in the speeches documented above, was the biased nature of the resolution and its potential harm to UN SC Resolution 242. This move forward, coupled with EC policies after the October 1973 war, illustrate a continuity with, rather than a break from, the past.

The last element of this notion of 'timing' relates to the Venice Declaration. If one adheres to the thesis of Ifestos and his 'conventional wisdom', then one must attribute most of the factors influencing Western Europe's policies with respect to the Middle East to concerns over the purchasing of a stable flow of energy resources from OAPEC states. The Venice Declaration, which followed the second oil crisis of 1979, appears to complement this thesis. However, it is interesting to illustrate that even Ifestos notes the

disappointment within the ranks of the PLO after this statement. The lack of an explicit call for Palestinian statehood engendered a negative reaction from officials from the PLO and other moderate Arab states such as Egypt. As such, Venice does not depart from the substance of earlier declarations agreed to and publicized by the EC. The point to be ascertained is that, had the member states attempted to 'curry' even more favor with OAPEC states and the PLO, the call for a Palestinian state and a draft UN SC resolution calling for the amendment of UN SC Resolution 242 would have been made. However, neither were, yet the EC was still perceived as being a third source of diplomacy for the Arab world.(Ifestos, 467) While Ifestos claims that this declaration was the endpoint of the evolution of EPC policymaking in this area of the world, when comparing it to other statements from the late 1970s nothing new has been brought to light. Again, the 'timing' of statements, combined with what was or was not found within these documents, sheds considerable light on the lack of credibility that can be found within the 'conventional wisdom'.

Lastly, this re-examination gives new strength and credibility to one of Stephen Artner's key assertions concerning an explanation of EC-US divergencies over the Middle East. Artner argues that the declarations of 1973 - often perceived as the first inklings of a pro-Arab tilt by the European Community - are no more than '...a reaffirmation of the basic elements of *previous* United Nations and EEC declarations...'(Artner, 431 emphasis added) This evidence to the assertions of Artner, among others, adds to the proof that Realism is unable to 'claim to know', in a comprehensive manner, why the United States and the member states of the European Community differ over policy towards the Middle East, and in specific the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is because the timing of official policy on behalf of the EC is consistent not just from the onset of the October War of 1973, but the first half of 1971 with the Schuman Document, the energy paper that suggested a multi-dimensional dialogue between the Community and the Arab world, and the communiqué of May of that same year. Of course some of these policies had the energy relationship between Western Europe and AOPEC states in mind, however, this relationship alone may not be able to explain fully the rationale for such a comprehensive dialogue.

The possible inability for interest and energy-based factors to explain these activities between 1971 and 1973, prior to October of the latter, is twofold. Firstly, it was not until 1973 that the Arab OPEC states wielded any power in the field of oil production in relation to the Western world. Prior to this occasion, these states were dominated by the large multinational oil companies operating in their states, as well as the states represented by these firms. Secondly, until 1973 the flow of oil and other energy resources from the Middle East to Western Europe remained uninterrupted. Consequently, there was no reason for the latter to 'curry favor' with the states of the former. With oil at around three

dollars per barrel, and multinationals such as Royal Dutch Shell in control of their resources, conscious policies favoring AOPEC states rather than Israel would appear to be unnecessary.[12] But they were seen as necessary by some leading members of the EC. As such, one must ask why this was so, given that the interest-based factors of Ifestos fail to ring true. At this juncture, all one may say is that more than just these factors, factors relating to the conditions imposed by the state of the international system and the Rrealist synthesis that adheres to these conditions, are at work. These factors may be domestic, idea-based and/or ideological, but it may be enough at this moment to say that whatever they are, they give rise to the vulnerability of the Realist argument, and the need for an additional and/or alternative theoretical model to explain parts of the US-EC relationship that traditional schools of thought cannot.

B. Language

Differences between the language utilized by EC member states in various instances compared with that of the United States can be viewed from three perspectives - regional, global and 'civilizing factors'. The first relates to the language utilized by the actors with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and specifically the issue of the Palestinian people. The second pertains to the East-West situation and the relationship between this global dilemma and the Middle East. The third and final factor relates to aspects of various documents that illustrate a relationship founded on issues besides those of an economic, security and trade-related nature. All three, in turn, will now be examined in detail.

B.1 Palestinians as People

Regionally, the United States during the Nixon-Ford Administrations refused to accept the status of the Palestinian people or include them as participants in peace negotiations. This is illustrated by the absence of the Palestinian issue in US-Soviet summits, as well as the formal agenda for the Geneva Conference of 1973. The guarantee from the United States to Israel to accept a veto on additional participants to such conferences was also another manner by which the United States was able to exclude Palestinian representation, without having to accept any blame for this exclusion.

The Carter Administration attempted to reverse this strategy by moving on the issue of the Palestinians. The President, on several occasions and as noted above, spoke of these people, their desire for a homeland and the centrality of their cause to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, one must carefully examine the language of these statements. From Carter's campaign speech through to his interview on television the central concern of his was that of the Palestinian *refugees*. This is the language first applied to the UN SC

Resolution 242 that speaks of the need to achieve a just settlement to the 'refugee problem'. This is also the language that is noted by almost every scholar working on the Arab-Israeli conflict as that which has prevented the Palestinians and the PLO from accepting this and UN SC Resolution 338.[13] The latter does not speak of the Palestinian issue at all, but rather a cease-fire agreement after the October 1973 war. However, it is an acceptance of the right of Israel to exist within secure boundaries; the condition laid down by the United States that the PLO has always had to accept if it was to gain recognition. This condition is explicitly stated in the 1975 promissory note between the United States and Israel. Coupled with this visualization of the Palestinians as refugees, rather than anything else, was the rhetoric utilized by President Carter with respect to the settlement of this problem. Rather than speaking of a definitive vision of what the Middle East might appear to resemble after a comprehensive peace process, his language was couched in terms of the need for 'some solution', almost implying that *any* solution would be useful, as long as there was a solution.

But this language is not the language of the European Community and its member states, regardless of the forum utilized to illustrate their concern for the Palestinian people. Throughout 1976 and 1977 the EC utilized the term 'people' and spoke of the need for a 'homeland'. One can return to the EC declarations of the early 1970s and recognize that it was they who first spoke in definitive terms of 'rights' for Palestinians rather than simply the recognition that these people had suffered for 'many, many years'. While the Venice Declaration did not meet the expectations of the PLO with an explicit call for a Palestinian state, it still reiterated points that have been expressed since the early 1970s; points that semantically are different than those made by the United States, even at the height of pro-Arab sentiment - the Carter Presidency.

The same is true of the word 'Arab'. It is consistent in US policy to deal directly with Arab states, be it in the context of Geneva Peace Conferences or summits such as the Camp David Accords. This is acute in the negotiations prior to the former, when Kissinger and Carter rejected to include Palestinian representatives. In both occasions, the matter of the Palestinians would be dealt with by the leaders of countries such as Egypt and Jordan rather than the Palestinians themselves. By comparison the European Community dealt with the same people within the context of the 'Arab' bloc. This occurred not only within the prism of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, but also the main declarations and communiqués of the EC on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

B.2 Soviet Influence

Time and again in Henry Kissinger's memoirs one other issue is central to the United States. This was the role that was played by the Soviet Union in the Middle East in general, and peace negotiations in specific. Just as it was the policy of the US to exclude the Palestinians and the PLO, so it was for the Soviet Union. The drawing away of Anwar Sadat from Soviet influence, and the intent to exclude the USSR from directly engaging in the process through 'back channels', is evident throughout.(Kissinger, 1982) The government went so far as to implicitly recognize the Soviet Union as a threat to the peace process and the security of Israel twice. The first was during the October 1973 war and the second after the 1975 guarantees to Israel. As to the former, Kissinger notes in his memoirs that one of his priorities at the outset of the war was to induce Soviet caution through a linkage between Soviet actions in the Middle East and the process of détente.(Kissinger, 1982;468) Later on, the Secretary asserted that an Arab victory with Soviet armaments would be a '...geopolitical disaster for the United States...'(Ibid., 493 and 508-09) Assistant Secretary of State Hartman said on another occasion that enhanced Soviet influence in the Middle East would '...have fundamentally altered the East-West political and military balance, with incalculable results...'(as quoted in Cromwell, 1992;95)

President Nixon agreed to a higher state of *world-wide* military readiness on the basis of presumed Soviet actions in the Middle East. The thought of placing US armed forces on the ground in Israel, in case of similar action by the USSR, was also considered.(Ibid.) In response to the West European reaction to not assist in the military airlift to Israel, and criticism of the world-wide alert, the President asserts that he does not

> believe we can draw such a fine lines when the USSR was and is so deeply involved, and when the crisis threatened to spread to the whole gamut of East-West relations. It seems to me that the Alliance cannot operate on a double standard in which US relations with the USSR are separated from the policies that our Allies conduct toward the Soviet Union...(Kissinger, 1982;715- 716)

The second instance of American geopolitical concerns is implicitly evident in the September 1975 guarantees to Israel. Aside from the policy of exclusion with respect to the Palestinians, and the various arms sales agreed to by the two countries, another guarantee was added. This last guarantee was that the United States would consult with Israel over military and political strategy in the advent of a threat from any world power. Given that in 1975 there was only one other country in the world capable of a 'global reach', it is

evident that the United States was again elevating the Middle East to an issue of East-West concern.(Ifestos, 610-11)

Jimmy Carter came to power intent on lessening the grip on US policy the Soviet Union had exerted during the previous eight years. His prioritizations of North-South issues instead of those of an East-West nature reflected this intention. Consequently, when dealing with the Soviet Union Carter and his foreign policy experts decided to include rather than exclude the Soviet leadership; to create a partnership of co-operation rather than one of conflict and hostility.(Brzensinski, 1983) Nevertheless, in the realm of the Middle East, the legacy of President Carter is notable for the absence of the Soviet Union, rather than its presence. The Camp David Accord signatories are the United States, Israel and Egypt, thus reflecting two similar trends - the continued exclusion of direct Palestinian representation and the Soviet Union.

The last strand of this thought is constituted from a number of speeches in the US House of Representatives and Senate that reflect a desire to link US-European and US-Soviet relations. Congressmen Tunney notes that the degree of co-operation between the USSR and the United States with respect to the October 1973 war, was illustrative of the seriousness with which the former treats the process of détente. Edward Kennedy states that all of NATO should concern itself with the presence and activism of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Consequently, the impression is given that if the USSR is not treated by the Allies in a similar fashion, Western Europe is acting disloyally to the United States. As such, a link between alliance politics, US-Soviet détente and the Middle East is strengthened by non-Administration politicians.

Nothing anywhere near this assertive concerning the East-West relationship appears in any official statements, communiqués or documents published by the European Community at the time of the October 1973 War. In fact, the period of late October and early November 1973 were highlighted by West European leaders doing exactly the opposite of President Nixon. Responding to calls for greater Allied convergence on the Middle East, these leaders iterated their belief that the Middle East could and should be isolated from East-West issues, to minimize conflict in the former, and retain a relationship gained through much diplomacy in the latter.(Cromwell, 87) Examples of this are noted earlier, in that the UK Government did not perceive the fifty Soviet military observers as a direct threat to the stability of the Middle East. Also, the French President was somewhat philosophical about the relationship between the superpowers; it could be one of conflict or condominium and that this wavering should not be taken to heart every time the two fall in, or out, with each other.

B.3 Civilizing Factors

Although without much to compare with from the perspective of the United States, there are a number of linkages between the Arab world and the European Community that are stressed in declarations, communiqués and statements throughout this seven year period. As noted above, the communiqué from the first EAD meeting stated that geographical, security-based and economic interests bind these two continents together. However, in addition, the document also states that the 'interchange between both civilizations' contributes to these ties between the two parties.(EPC, 88) In further EAD statements the political and social, cultural and technical aspects of the relationship were mentioned.[14]

The concerted activity and statements by EC member states through the mechanisms of EPC, prior to and within the Venice Declaration, are also indicative of this broader concept of Euro-Arab relations. Firstly, one of the ministers for the UK Foreign Office, Douglas Hurd, espoused the need to understand better the Islamic religion so as to better understand the Arab world. He first recognizes the contributions made by Islam to Europe and asserts that '...there is no inherent conflict between Muslim and Western traditions and Islam is not opposed to closer ties between the West and the Muslin world...'(Hurd, Feb. 18, 1980;15) Nevertheless, misunderstandings that cause conflict have developed over time between the Western and Muslim worlds. Consequently, it is appropriate and useful for the West to '...try harder...to understand Islam and avoid approached it armed only with our preconceptions...[and] the West can come to terms with Islam and work out a new relationship based not on cultural patronage but on mutual respect...'(Ibid.) The Venice Declaration makes two points clear on this issue. The first is that the Nine '...consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East *oblige* them to play a special role...'(Ifestos, 613) Secondly, and with specific reference to the EAD, the declaration states that a meeting at a political level, rather than one dealing with issues relating to science, culture or economics, should be convened. A meeting at this level and on this issue may be able to allow the Nine to '...contribute towards the development of co-operation and mutual understanding between Europe and the Arab world...'(Ibid., 614) Nowhere within any of the major documents between the United States and the Arab world does the former speak in these terms. The comparable document to Venice is the Camp David Accords. Within the preamble section of text it does recognize the Middle East as the 'cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions', but nothing with respect to US-Arab relations. Even within agreements between Israel and the United States, such as the 1975 guarantees, only strategic and military concerns are mentioned.

All of the above noted differences in the language utilized by the member states of the European Community and the United States throughout the 1973-1980 period beg one simple question: what does any of this illustrate with respect to the Allies' perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the utility of the Realist tradition? Firstly, the tendency of the EC to utilize language that dealt directly with the Palestinians as a people, as well as placing them within an 'Arab' bloc, illustrates two points. The first is that the former recognized the presence, potential influence and importance of the latter with respect to the Middle East situation. The second is that regardless of the latter's lack of statehood, recognition was granted in statements, communiqués, declarations and meetings between the leadership of EC member states and the EC Commission on one hand, and the Palestinians on the other. The United States, however, refused to deal directly with the Palestinian leadership because of the refusal of the latter to accept UN SC resolutions 242 and 338. While possibly justifiable, this policy was aimed at maintaining a certain status on the Palestinians; Resolution 242 spoke of them as 'refugees' rather than 'people'. As almost non-entities, as a group of undefined people without a state, they lacked the formal ability to articulate certain rights such as recognition, not to mention a homeland of some sorts or statehood. The only time these aspirations were dealt with by the United States, was in a state-to-state manner with countries such as Egypt and Jordan. In 1975 as well as 1978, the US Administration perceived the Palestinian issue to be one that should be solved within the confines of a Jordanian settlement, rather than on its own merits.

The globalization of regional issues such as the Middle East, by the United States, reflects the objective superpower status of the latter compared to the regionalism of the member states of the European Community. The geographical proximity of the latter to the Soviet Union is another interest-based factor that Panayiotis Ifestos, the author of European Political Cooperation, contends is at the heart of alliance divergencies in the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is much to be said concerning the point that the West European states may not wish to assess direct blame upon the USSR, given the realities of the European political theater in the mid to late 1970s. As such, it would appear to be rational for these countries to refrain from diplomatically attacking the Soviet Union, while these West European states may desire the latter, they could only do the former.

The absence of Soviet-centric policies on the part of the European Community exist for many reasons. Most will be more relevant to the specific issue of the imposition of martial law that will be dealt with in the following chapter. As such, only one reference will be cited at present. This is from a recent work by William Cromwell.(Cromwell, 1992) Cromwell cites indigenous concerns and domestic ideological forces as additional reasons for allied divergences over the status and culpability of the Soviet Union.(Ibid., 185-189 and 239-248) Cromwell states that the EC is '...less preoccupied than Washington by an East-West view of regional conflicts...[and] tended to focus more on

their indigenous causes and to propose solutions that would encourage insulating such disputes from the East-West confrontation...'(Ibid., 187)

As to the presence or absence of 'civilizing factors' in the statements of the European Community, its member states, and the United States, a number of possible answers spring to mind. One may be that perhaps this difference reflects no more than the 'conventional wisdom' of Ifestos; the United States is more concerned with actions than words and military/geostrategic concerns than trade relations simply because of its global status and concern over Soviet intervention in the area in question. Perhaps these differences are, inversely, because the EC member states are unable to act or lend support in the area of politico-military relations, and therefore devote their energies to areas of less political sensitivity. Or, perhaps one might add that this link between Europe and the Arab world is honestly thought of as important, for reasons that include trade, energy resources and investment, but also broader issues that do not directly impinge on political-economic questions. In the end, that one may never truly know.

Taken together what do these questions, raised in order, say about the divergencies between the allies over the Middle East and the prospects for Neorealism's inability to 'claim to know' why these divergencies occur? As the last case study on the plight of the Kurdish people of Northern Iraq illustrates, one notices the creation of a simplistic boundary between 'order' and 'justice'. The United States deals with Arab states, and only Arab states, because the Palestinians refuse to accept Resolution 242. The latter refuse because by doing so they agree with the United States in that they are non-actors - refugees with no exact homeland or state - not a people with exact aspirations. As such, a further refusal on the part of the United States is illicited. Even during the tenure of President Carter, the conditions contained with Resolution 242 did not change, and were objected to when brought up by the United Kingdom and France in the Security Council. This 'state-bias' reflects the desire of the United States, possibly because of its superpower status, to maintain order and stability in the international system by denoting the principal actors of the international system as states, and only states. To grant the Palestinians status could possibly undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of not only Israel, but also Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In turn, this could affect the status of a number of other countries allied to the United States in other areas of the world. Turkey, Iran and Iraq all come to mind.

But the member states of the EC, as well as the EC Commission and Presidency, do not appear to view the situation in the same light. Possibly this is because of the supranational nature of the EC and the relationship between the EC and its member states. The EC is not a 'state' in a traditional sense, but a hybrid of several definitions. The member states have willingly consented to the creation and evolution of this supranational institution, along with the transfer of a degree of sovereignty from one level of government

to another level of political authority. Consequently, there may not be as much of a perceived need for the EC and its member states to recognize only those entities that adhere to the classical 'state' definition. If this is so then the existence of the European Community itself would be in some doubt. Disagreements as to the direction of the EC occur, but the very existence of the institution do not.

Lastly, the 'civilizing factors' mentioned in the various communiqués prove difficult in themselves, for the very reason mentioned above; one never knows if these words are simply rhetoric, or related to an actual belief that there is a common bond between the two worlds that should be encouraged alongside questions of commerce, industry, oil and energy. But as Stephen Artner relates, whether or not they were meant to be taken seriously, they have been agreed to and are found in the text of a number of important and well known documents. As such, the EC can be held to these statements; they cannot be forgotten.

The 'claim to know' of the Realist paradigm is based upon being able to explain issues and relationships because of factors present at the level of the international system that are objective, scientific and interest-based. Within the context of the utilization of language, the facts do not adequately fit the theory as presented. Gaps first asserted by a number of scholars, in this instance Stephen Artner and Roger Tomkys, appear to have a certain degree of validity. As such, one may postulate even now, prior to the completion of an analysis of all of the issues at hand, that the Realist school of thought cannot 'claim to know' why the allies diverge. If it could, then this gap within the evidence would simply not exist, and questions would not remain.

C. Beyond France

Initially the West German and Dutch governments refused to allow the publication of the May 1971 statement on the Middle East. Most observers conclude that they did so because of the pro-Arab nature of the document, and the domestic and international repercussions of being publicly aligned with such a position. Also, the French governments of the early and mid-1970s are presumed to be at the forefront of pro-Arab policies amongst the member states of the European Community. This is noted time and again by Kissinger, as mentioned above on various occasions, none not least the Washington Energy Conference and the establishment of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. In the face of an embargo, The Netherlands was the only country that decided to reject the initial position of the European Community with respect to the October 1973 Arab- Israeli war while the rest of the Nine 'curried favor' with the AOPEC states.

From 1973 through to the publication of the Venice Declaration, the policies of all of the major governments of the EC altered towards a more pro-Arab position. Scholars

such as David Allen, in his work European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, illustrate that all of the member states moved towards similar positions and policies with respect to this area of the world.(Allen, 1984) To this end, Allen concludes that one can easily detect the 'Europeanization' of the foreign policy of the member states as regards fact-finding missions; the Euro-Arab Dialogue; and the Multinational Force in the Sinai that acted as a non-United Nations peacekeeping mission.(Ibid., 241)[15] Nevertheless, Allen does not disregard statements and communiqués for they are as much a part of international diplomacy as any other aspect of this process. However, the author does contend that this harmonization is more because of external rather than internal factors, as seen by the similarity in position of non-EC West European/Scandinavian states. The pro-Arab position of France, Britain, Italy and Ireland is still tempered by that of The Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark and Belgium.(Ibid., 242)

One may posit that the above analysis tends toward a recognition of the 'conventional wisdom' of Ifestos, that EC policy is interest-based, with energy considerations as the main priority. However, to distinguish between the EC and US tends to obscure the events of the mid to late 1970s, as well as the timing of declarations, not to mention the consistent 'regional' approach to the Middle East that is indicated by broader West European policies towards the Soviet Union.[16] This period was replete with consistent, coherent and common policy initiatives from not only France and Britain, but also West Germany and Belgium.(IHT, Oct. 31, 1979;1) Two examples of this new approach were the use of the term 'homeland' by West Germany officials and implicit recognition of the PLO as the representative voice for the Palestinian people by Belgium.(Ifestos, 453) For an explanation of such moves one can point to the second oil shocks after the fall of the Shah of Iran and the need for a stable supply of energy resources for West Germany and other West European countries, vital to maintain a healthy industrial base. However, if this need for oil was so acute, West Germany and other less pro-Arab EC states may have concluded that a more pro-Arab policy was necessary, regardless of the international repercussions of such a move. But such was not the case. The text of the Venice Declaration does not, as has been mentioned a number of times before, take on board a position in line with that of some of the moderate Arab states nor the PLO. Consequently, one may be able to view the progressively pro-Arab stance of West Germany and Belgium, to name two of the states mentioned by David Allen, as something more than simply responding to the demands of the Arab world. The documents, in this instance, speak for themselves on the ability of the Realist project to explain and 'claim to know' why EC and US divergencies over the Arab-Israeli conflict exist. However, and like other sections of this analysis, one is unable, without a margin for error, to ascertain which other unit and sub-unit factors may exist that provide for this criticism of Realism. Suffice to say that it is at this juncture of the analysis that one may perceive the need to begin to examine

alternative theoretical approaches to attain a more comprehensive understanding of these allied differences in this issue-area.

VII:Conclusion

But what does this critique of the literature specific to the Arab-Israeli situation illustrate to the reader with respect to the EC-US relationship, and the validity of the 'claim to knowledge' of Political Realism that was proposed in the first chapter? The dominant explanation for transatlantic divergences concerning the Middle East, as noted throughout this case study, relates to notions of national interest, conceptions of resource-based power, and the determining effect that the international environment (the environment that all actors must operate from) has upon relations between these various actors. In specific, the global interests and position of the Unite States and the lack of oil resources of Western Europe forced the latter to 'curry favor' with Arab states on the matter of the Arab-Israel dispute and not the former. The interests of the former come to a different conclusion, stemming in part from the perceived East-West dimension of this same Middle East situation.

To this end key documents, eye witness accounts, fact and figures, the timing of a variety of events such as the Venice Declaration in 1980 and the policies undertaken by a number of actors, particularly France and the European Community, illustrate that the explanatory power of this conventional wisdom is not as credible as it might appear to be at first glance. Research conducted by diplomats such as Roger Tomkys and academics like Stephen Artner push one towards a disbelief in the unassailable validity of the Realist-based theorization of allied disagreements in the Middle East. Also, the very presence and activism of the European Community - the devolution of certain responsibilities by the member-states to a supranational and sovereign body such as the EC appears to be contradictory to some of the core assumptions of Political Realism, again as espoused in the first chapter. This said, the conventional literature of this case study that can and should be situated within the Realist project becomes somewhat invalid from the outset, because one of its basic premises is contrary to the realities of the case study.

This exposure of the limitations and the weaknesses of the conventional wisdom of this case study, therefore, reflect those that where noted in the first chapter; a dependency on the international environment, the primacy of the State, the exclusion of levels of analysis other than that above traditional actors, and the possible ignoring or rejection of 'agency'. Also, this exposure strikes at the heart of the arrogance of Morgenthau. He spoke of the ability of Political Realism to pass certain tests with respect to the ability of this tradition to explain empirical facts and figures and the bringing into order and meaning '...a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible...'(Morgenthau, 1958;3) Political Realism, because of the critique found

within this chapter, has failed to comprehensively meet and pass this test; it has failed in its ability to explain and understand, and to 'claim to know' why transatlantic allies diverge with respect to the Arab-Israeli situation between 1973 and 1980.

But where does this failure of the 'claim to knowledge' of Political Realism leave the reader, and this thesis? It was not the task of this project to assemble a new theoretical position that would be able to comprehensively explain the relations between the EC and US. The task was, as set out in the introduction, to illustrate the possible weaknesses and limitations of Political Realism with respect to the security dimension of this relationship, and then point to possible areas of future research where more comprehensive answers may be found. Minimally, however, the activism of the European Community and a belief that 'civilizing factors' such as beliefs, values and 'ideas' were present in the calculation of nation-state and regional interests with respect to the Arab-Israeli situation, all already noted above, may give one an initial insight into a future research agenda. Minimally, this agenda may be one that requires the notions relating to the divisibility of sovereignty; the acceptance of the influence of non-state actors in world politics; the inclusion of 'agency' in the discussion of interest; and rejection of the belief that one can comprehend international relations by conducting research at only one level of analysis, regardless of which level that may be. In themselves these conditions do not direct one to one specific and already developed tradition, or one that is in its infancy. However, these initial conclusions do assist in one's thinking with respect to the question of 'where do we go from here', and at this juncture of this thesis that may be all that should be asked from it; more case studies, analyses and conclusions await prior to the formulation of a number of concrete conclusions.

---

[1]For more detail of the Jarring mission sponsored by the United Nations that acted as the basis for future EC declarations see United Nations Document S/10929 of May 18, 1973.

[2]See Congressional Record, V.119, Part 25, p.33152-53; p.33158- 59; V.119, Part 26, p.33689-90.

[3]Senator Brooke reiterated the sentiments of Senator Kennedy and referred to a leading article in The Economist entitled 'The Day of the Ostriches'.(Economist, Nov. 3, 1973;13-14) In this article the magazine commented that '...for a moment last week Europe went neutral...the demonstration showed Europe trying to shut its eyes to what was at issue, and then running around in frightened circles because the probem would not go away. It managed to combine the behaviour of the ostrich and the hen...'(Ibid.)

[4]These actual divergencies will be examined below in the 'Assessment' section of this chapter.

[5] See Brzezinski, p.105, for further evidence of this belief in the centrality of the Palestinian issue, as well as the October 1, 1977 summit communique on the Middle East between the US and Soviet Union.

[6] Abstentions on the part of Britain and France in the Security Council on pro-Arab related draft resolutions had also taken place in November 1975 and January 1976. Similar

reasons to those above by Ivor Richards were expressed on those occasions. What makes this occurrence notable is the mention by Richards of the need to supplement UN SC Resolution 242 so as to allow the inclusion of the Palestinians, rather than maintaining their exclusion from Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

[7] See also a speech by Prime Minister Callaghan on October 27, 1977 listed in Survey of Current Affairs, V.7, No.11, p.422.

[8] See also comments made by the Lord Privy Seal in the House of Commons on May 18, 1979, V.967 and Lord Carrington in the House of Lords, May 22, 1979, p.240, V.400.

[9] For evidence of this activity see: Carrington, Financial Times, February 13, 1980, p.6; Hurd, Middle East International, February 15, 1980, p.15; Giscard D'estaing, Le Monde, March 9-10, 1980, p.1; Artner, S., 'The Middle East: A Chance for Europe', p.437.

[10] See Kissinger's comment that '...the so-called European-Arab Dialogue, the European alternative to our [US] Middle East diplomacy, whose rationale could only be disassociation from the United States...'(Kissinger, 1982;898) See also comments by Israeli and Egyptian officials, as well as King Hussein of Jordan, in Ifestos' work, p.462 and 466.

[11] See Ifestos' comment that the EC member states '...achieved a convergence of views on a highly complex problem in the background of conflicting demands by the actors concerned...'(Ifestos, 566) Artner comments that '...a basic consensus on the outline of a...Community policy towards the Middle East has been achieved...'(Artner, 438) Also see M. Smith and D. Allen (1990).

[12] For a detailed description of the relationship between multinational oil companies and their home and host countries, see Daniel Yergin, The Prize:Epic Conquest for Oil, Money and Power, New York:Simon and Schuster, 1993.

[13] See the already cited works of S. Artner, P. Ifestos and D. Allen for this reference.

[14] See EPC documents p.102 and EC Bull. 12-1978 p.19 1.4.2

[15] The MFO was established in 1982 as a direct result of the Camp David Accords.

[16] Please see the next chapter on EC-US reactions to the imposition of martial law in Poland in late 1981 and early 1982, as well as the simultaneous completion of the Siberian Pipeline Project between Western Europe and the USSR for a discussion of EC-US perceptions of the nature of the Soviet threat.

Appendix 4.1

UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338

Text of Security Council Resolution 242, Nov. 22, 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security.

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Text of Security Council Resolution 338, Oct. 22, 1973

The Security Council,

1. *Calls upon* all parties at present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy.

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Source: P. Ifestos, European Political Cooperation, p.610

Appendix 4.2

European Political Cooperation Declaration
November 1973

EPC – Middle East: The declaration of November 1973 (Bull.-EC, 10–1973, point 2502, p.105–6)

Declaration by the Nine on the Situation in the Middle East

2502. The gravity of events in the Middle East has led the Governments of the EEC Member States to discuss the situation in the light of political cooperation. Member States' Foreign Ministers issued the following Communiqué on 13 October 1973:

'The nine Governments of the European Community, greatly concerned over the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East appeal to those concerned to stop the fighting. The cease-fire which would spare the people suffering from the war from further tragic ordeals, must at the same time open the way to real negotiations on an appropriate basis so that the conflict may be settled in compliance with all the provisions of Resolution 242 adopted on 22 November 1967 by the Security Council.'

The political consultations went on during the following weeks in the light of developments in the Middle East situation.

On 6 November the Foreign Ministers, on the basis of a draft finalized by the Political Committee, adopted the text of the following declaration:

'The Nine Governments of the European Community have continued their exchange of views on the situation in the Middle East. While emphasizing that the views set out below are only a first contribution on their part to the search for a comprehensive solution to the problem, they have agreed on the following:

(1) They strongly urge that the forces of both sides in the Middle East conflict should return immediately to the positions they occupied on 22 October in accordance with Resolutions 339 and 340 of the Security Council. They believe that a return to these positions will facilitate a solution to other pressing problems concerning prisoners-of-war and the Egyptian Third Army.
(2) They have the firm hope that, following the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution No 338 of 22 October, negotiations will at last begin for the restoration in the Middle East of a just and lasting peace through the application of Security Council Resolution No 242 in all of its parts. They declare themselves ready to do all in their power to contribute to that peace. They believe that those negotiations must take place in the framework of the United Nations. They recall that the Charter has entrusted to the Security Council the principal responsibility for international peace and security. The Council and the Secretary General have a special role to play in the making and keeping of peace through the application of Council Resolutions Nos. 242 and 338.
(3) They consider that a peace agreement should be based particularly on the following points:

(i) the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
(ii) the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967;
(iii) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

Source: Bull-EC, 10-1973, point 2502, p.105-106

Appendix 4.3

European Political Cooperation Declaration
June 1977

EPC – Middle East: The declaration of June 1977 (Bull.-EC, 6--1977, point 2.2.3., p.62)

Middle East

The European Council, which met in London on 29 and 30 June adopted the following statement on the Middle East:

Statement on the Middle East

1. At the present critical stage in the Middle East, the Nine welcome all efforts now being made to bring to an end the tragic conflict there. They emphasize the crucial interest which they see in early and successful negotiations towards a just and lasting peace. They call on all the parties concerned to agree urgently to participate in such negotiations in a constructive and realistic spirit; at this juncture in particular all parties should refrain from statements or policies which could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace.
2. The Nine set out on many occasions in the past, for example, in their statements of 6 November 1973, 28 September 1976 and 7 December 1976, their view that a peace settlement should be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on:

(i) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
(ii) The need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967;
(iii) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
(iv) Recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

It remains their firm view that all these aspects must be taken as a whole.
3. The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned. In the context of an overall settlement, Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people: equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the States of the region can be assured; but it must be based on commitments to peace exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing truly peaceful relations.
4. The Nine believe that the peace negotiations must be resumed urgently, with the aim of agreeing and implementing a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the conflict. They remain ready to contribute to the extent the parties wish in finding a settlement and in putting it into effect. They are also ready to consider participating in guarantees in the framework of the United Nations.

Source: Bull-EC, 06-1977, point 2.2.3, p.62

Appendix 4.4

European Political Cooperation Declaration
June 1980

Middle East

The European Council, which met in London on 29 and 30 June adopted the following statement on the Middle East:

Statement on the Middle East

1. At the present critical stage in the Middle East, the Nine welcome all efforts now being made to bring to an end the tragic conflict there. They emphasize the crucial interest which they see in early and successful negotiations towards a just and lasting peace. They call on all the parties concerned to agree urgently to participate in such negotiations in a constructive and realistic spirit; at this juncture in particular all parties should refrain from statements or policies which could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace.

2. The Nine set out on many occasions in the past, for example, in their statements of 6 November 1973, 28 September 1976 and 7 December 1976, their view that a peace settlement should be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on:

(i) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
(ii) The need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967;
(iii) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
(iv) Recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

It remains their firm view that all these aspects must be taken as a whole.

3. The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned. In the context of an overall settlement, Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people: equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the States of the region can be assured; but it must be based on commitments to peace exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing truly peaceful relations.

4. The Nine believe that the peace negotiations must be resumed urgently, with the aim of agreeing and implementing a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the conflict. They remain ready to contribute to the extent the parties wish in finding a settlement and in putting it into effect. They are also ready to consider participating in guarantees in the framework of the United Nations.

Source: Bull-EC, 06-1980, point 1.1.6-1.1.8, p.10-11

Appendix 4.5

General Energy and Trade Statistics

Table I

Total Exports, percentage of OPEC trade with EC and US

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	43	10
	1973	40	12
	1977	31	20
	1980	30	10
	1985	26	10
Average		34	12

Table II

Total Exports to OPEC, as a percentage of total EC and US trade

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	20	10
	1973	24	18
	1977	34	36
	1980	45	40
	1985	44	20
Average		33	25

Table III

Mineral Exports, as a percentage of total OPEC raw mineral trade with EC and US

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	43	09
	1973	41	12
	1977	30	20
	1980	30	19
	1985	26	09
Average		28	14

Table IV

Mineral Exports, as a percentage of total OPEC trade with EC and US

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	38	07
	1973	36	11
	1977	28	19
	1980	28	18
	1985	24	09
Average		31	13

Table V

Mineral Imports, as a percentage of total EC and US trade with OPEC

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	87	77
	1973	92	87
	1977	95	96
	1980	95	97
	1985	93	85
Average		92	88

Table VI

Mineral Imports, as a percentage of total EC and US trade

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	06	03
	1973	07	06
	1977	11	24
	1980	13	26
Average		09	15

Table VII

Net Mineral Imports, as a percentage of total fuel consumption of EC and US

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	62	09
	1973	64	17
	1977	57	25
	1980	56	17
	1985	43	11
Average		56	16

Table VIII

Total Production, minerals, with individual crude oil figures listed, in lillion tonnes

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	499/ 13	566/533
	1973	578/ 11	649/515
	1977	554/ 48	733/453
	1980	534/ 90	662/482
	1985	420/145	608/500
Average		517/ 61	644/497

Note:Minerals. defined by the UN Yearbook of Trade Statistics, are limited to petroleum products and crude oil

Table IX

Total Exports, as a percentage of world trade, of the EC and US

		EC	US
OPEC	1970	36	14
	1973	36	12
	1977	34	11
	1980	33	11
Average		35	12

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1982 and 1988.
For 1982 Yearbook, see pp. 1118-1123, 1158-1162;
For 1988 Yearbook, see pp. 1074-1081, 1084-1085, 1096-1099.

Table X

Net Imports of Eneregy Related Products, 1971-1980

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Franc	13.7	13.1	12.3	22.8	22.7	22.3	21.3	19.3	21.3	26.4
Germ.	9.8	8.9	10.9	18.0	16.7	17.0	16.1	15.9	19.2	22.1
Italy	16.7	14.9	14.0	26.5	26.8	25.7	25.5	24.0	23.9	27.7
NL	12.8	13.0	13.1	17.9	17.6	19.3	18.2	15.4	19.7	23.5
UK	12.6	11.0	10.8	19.9	17.8	18.0	14.2	11.6	11.8	13.4
US	8.0	8.5	11.6	24.7	27.0	27.6	29.1	24.4	29.1	32.7
EUR.	13.1	12.2	12.2	21.0	20.3	20.5	19.1	17.2	19.2	22.6

Source: UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 1977 and 1988.
For 1977 see pp.354, 383, 488, 628, 895, 914;
For 1988 see pp.361, 399, 522, 712, 1033, 1048.

Chapter Five: Allies, Enemies and Embargoes: The Polish Crisis of 1981/82

I: Introduction

Before launching into the second case study, a study concerned with the actions, reactions and policies of the European Community and the United States to the imposition of Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Pipeline Project between various EC member states and the Soviet Union, a number of criteria regarding this event have to be established from the outset. Firstly, one must explain why this case study has been selected rather than any other. As was true for the first study and will be so for the third, the selection of the second study is, to a certain extent, idiosyncratic. Depending on one's research interests and one's depth of knowledge on a variety of issues and events, one selects those studies with which one is more familiar. Nevertheless, there are other less idiosyncratic reasons for the singling out of the Polish issues. The first of these can best be understood in the context of the objectives of the 1969 European Community summit in The Hague. At this gathering the nine member states agreed that 'Europe' should strive to 'speak with one voice' on issues deemed to be of 'importance'. Of the many international events at that time only two were selected, one being the Arab-Israeli crisis which has been examined in the preceding chapter. The second topic chosen by the member states was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, one could extrapolate from the CSCE process a concern on the part of the member states regarding East-West relations in general and a desire to control their own destinies independent of US-Soviet negotiations. Because of this importance placed upon East-West relations, the priorization of the Polish crises over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may appear to be appropriate, for the former is directly related to the overall theme of this thesis.

A second reason may be found in the work of Susan Strange, and her development of four structural bases of power. The first of Strange's structural bases of power is Security, and defined as one that '...lies with the person or group able to exercise control over...other people's security from violence...'(Strange, 1987;565) Strange concentrates her work on the material capabilities of an actor in the determination of that actor's ability to dominate or control other actors. However, one may be able to make the point that the ability to avoid being held 'hostage' to one's military and ideological rival is a national security concern for that actor, and that actor's allies. As such, the 'security' of Western Europe may be considered to have been 'at stake' in late 1981 and early 1982, the imposition of Martial Law in Poland and the completion of the Siberian Pipeline Project, considered.

The reasons behind the selection of this event clearly established, questions must be posed to create a framework of reference for this study, as was done in the first case study, and so too for the one that follows this second selection. These questions are:

> 1) Can a coherent EC policy be discerned where EC institutions were present alongside those of the member states?
>
> 2) If an EC policy was found to exist, was this policy different from that of the United States with respect to the imposition of martial law in Poland and the construction of the Siberian Pipeline?
>
> 3) Can a conventional wisdom, based around the Realist project, comprehensively explain allied differences over policy in Eastern Europe?

As was true of the first three theoretical chapters and the proceeding and preceding case studies, a fully developed alternative or additional perspective on EC-US relations will not necessarily be offered at the conclusion of this chapter. Instead, alternative and additional options will be explored in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

II:The Context

The signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement (SALT I) in 1972 between President Nixon and Premier Brezhnev was intended to begin a period of détente between the superpowers. However, what followed was another period of intense competition between the two rival states and their allies. From the continuing war in South East Asia to the pursuit of allies in Africa and the Middle East, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was immense. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was another event that was perceived as a challenge to the containment policies of the United States and a potential threat to a secure supply of Persian Gulf oil for the western world. What would be next? The leadership of the United States believed that the SALT I agreement would stem the tide of Soviet actions. However, the Soviet leadership viewed the agreement as recognition by the United States of the USSR as its equal, capable of acting in all areas of the world like the United States before it. The latter had 'oversold' the agreement and was now forced to contain Soviet incursions into previously unchallenged areas of the world; areas directly impinging on the security of the United States and Western Europe. With the election of Ronald Reagan to the American presidency, on a platform of 'America First', a new ideological perspective was brought to bear on the superpower relationship. As Fred Halliday asserts, the second cold war had been born in the latter half of 1979, and the early days of 1980.(Halliday, 1983;11) Another crisis perceived as a 'test' for the Reagan Presidency might precipitate a more than

casual reaction. The first of these crises came in the form of the imposition of martial law in Poland in the latter part of 1981. The second was the matter of the Trans-Siberian Pipeline. The pipeline project was a joint venture between a number of West European governments and firms and the Soviet state. The pipeline would wind over a distance of five thousand miles from the Jamal peninsula in Siberia to a network of Soviet gas pipelines that would then redirect a portion of the gas to various West European states.(Keesings, 31458 see Appendix 5.1 for map) This was the latest in a series of similar large scale projects that involved West European companies, governments of various levels of authority and Soviet authorities. Within this context the framework was established for what would become another chapter in tensions between the leadership of the United States on one hand, and the European Community on the other.

However, it took the strikes in Poland in the summer of 1980 that began to bring to the forefront of the international arena the Trans-Siberian Pipeline, as well as the controversy between the allies with respect to the pipeline. From July 3, 1980 to its end on August 31, numerous strikes, protests and demonstrations were organized throughout Poland in all of the major industrial centers, bringing the Polish economy to a standstill. On August 31, 1980 the government and the trade unions agreed to a negotiated settlement that included the transformation of the Polish economy, and society.(Ruane, 1982;27) But the relationship between the trade unions and the government was not strong, and suffered when President Gierek resigned because of ill health shortly after the negotiations had been completed. There was a lack of confidence in the new leadership and fears that the agreements would not be honored. This was illustrated by the outbreak of small strikes across Poland. Compromises and agreements were negotiated, but proved ineffectual. The government was pressed to control the strikers and soon was unable to do so. By late 1981 the government stated that harsh punishments would be delivered if strikes and other industrial actions continued. The trade unions would be broken if labor unrest continued. (Ibid., 253)

On November 25, 1981 cadets staged a sit-in at the Fire Brigade College in Warsaw. Government forces stormed the building and arrested the demonstrators for a brief period of time. It was revealed that one of these demonstrators was a prominent member of the trade union Solidarity.(Ibid., 268) Shortly thereafter President Jaruzelski delivered a live speech on national television and radio. The President stated that all Solidarity attempts to ban the Communist Party from factories would be punishable by law, and contacts between the two groups were suspended.(Ibid., 270) Strikes, demonstrations and protests, however, continued unabated, even while the trade union's two day conference in Gdansk was taking place at the same time. One outcome of this conference was the call for a general strike, held on December 17, 1981. In response to

this proclamation the government issued a statement. One section of this document read as follows:

> in such a situation [which Poland now finds itself in] bringing masses of people out on to the streets is tantamount to putting a match to a powderkeg...the demonstrations are being arranged under slogans hostile to people's power and to socialism which has for thirty-six years been the system for regulating the life of the Polish people and will remain so...all acts against people's power will be counteracted by the organs of public order...(Ibid., 274)

After issuing this statement the Polish government imposed martial law on the citizens of the country. A complete media blackout was ordered and Poland had become segregated from the rest of the world. Government troops and police officers were stationed in the main cities, controlled important buildings and offices, and confiscated documents vital to the work of the trade unions.

III:Reactions, Actions, and Allied Policies

A. Early Days (Late December 1981 - Early January 1982)

The fact that Secretary of State Haig was in Brussels at a meeting with his NATO counterparts allowed him to have access to up-to-date information concerning events in Poland. To this end, Haig delivered the first US response to the imposition of martial law that stated that '...the political experiment in Poland should be allowed to proceed unimpeded...[and] the United States reiterates that the people of Poland should be allowed to find a solution to their current difficulties through a process of negotiation and compromise among the parties involved...'(Haig, 1984;250) A ban on Polish exports to the United States, along with an end to governmental foreign aid and the beginning of humanitarian aid to the strikers were, Haig mentioned, all options to be considered by President Reagan in the near future.(Ibid.)

The first declaration of President Reagan, on December 17, 1981, stated that '...it would be naive to think this could happen without the full knowledge and the support of the Soviet Union...'(WSJ, Dec. 18, 1981;2) This stance was expanded and strengthened on December 24 when the United Stated Government contemplated, for the first time, the placement of sanctions on Poland and the USSR. The President said that '...the Soviet Union, through its threats and pressures, deserves a major share of blame for the developments in Poland...'(WSJ, Dec. 24, 1981;3) Reagan also made clear that this political crisis would have business and commercial repercussions. He stated that '...if the outrages in Poland do not cease, we cannot and will not conduct 'business as usual' with

the perpetrators and those who aid and abet them...'(WSJ., Dec. 24, 1981;3) If to only reiterate these points of December 24, the opening line of the third American statement, made public on December 29, was that '...the Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression of Poland...'(WSJ, Dec. 29, 1981;5) President Reagan also announced a number of sanctions directed against Poland and the USSR, including the dealying, banning or suspension of a number of negotiations concerning maritime, agricultural and scientific exchange agreements, the banning of Soviet and Polish national airlines from landing in the US, a delay in nuclear arms talks, and the one that was of most concern to Western Europe, the ending of the issuance of licenses for the export to the USSR of electrronic equipment, compuetrs, broadly defined high-tech material and oil and gas-related equipment such as pipe-layers.(Keesings, April 30, 1982;31456 See Appendix 5.2) By the end of this first period of events inside Poland, the Under-secretary of State, Eagleburger, said that '...the possibilities for a real cooling off of the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union is there...'(FT, Jan. 4, 1982;2)

Similar sentiments towards the Soviet Union were also voiced in the US Congress, be it the Senate or the House of Representatives. On January 6, 1982, Eugene Atkinson commented in the Senate that '...we must insist...that the Soviet Union remain physically removed from the Polish situation...[the US] must be firm on behalf of a policy of nonviolence and non-intervention by the Soviet Union in Poland's affairs...'(CR, Jan. 6, 1982;E6024) Later in the month another senator, Clairborne Pell, addressed the same issue, albeit with some degree of divergence from the policy of the Administration. Mr. Pell agreed with President Reagan's stance on Poland. Pell stated that he '...fully share the Administration's concern and outrage over the tragic repression that is taking place in Poland...'(CR, Jan. 25, 1982;S11) However, the senator disagreed with the linkage made between Poland and arms control talks. The senator remarked that he '...disagreed...that discussing a time and place for resuming START negotiations should be considered 'business as usual'...it is the height of folly for the Administration to link the START negotiations to Soviet misbehavior, whether in Poland or anywhere else...'(Ibid.) Nonetheless, Clairborne Pell did agree that the United States '...can, and should...stress our disapproval of Soviet repression of the freedom-parched people of Eastern Europe and, particularly, Poland...'(Ibid.) This latter statement was agreed to by Mr. Murkowski, who in early February remarked that '...the Soviets cannot escape the fact that they have once again usurped Polish freedom...'(CR, Feb. 10, 1982;1547) These three politicians all agreed with the President as to where blame should be directed, only differing on the finer points of how to deal with the Soviet Union from that position.

From December 14, 1981 to January 3, 1982 the initial reactions of the political leadership of the United States and the European Community are highlighted by their noticeable divergencies with respect to knowledge and perception of the role played by the

Soviet Union in the imposition of martial law. The first statement from the ten member states, on December 15, did not even mention the Soviet Union. The declaration mentioned the concern of the EC states, and that these states '...look to Poland to solve these problems herself without the use of force...'(EPC, 1982;297) The second European Community reaction to the events in Poland, and the stance taken by the United States, was that no sanctions were imposed on either Poland or the Soviet Union and that it was not prudent to direct blame towards one country or another. The member states were keen to maintain some sort of relations with Eastern Europe, to negotiate an end to the crisis in Poland and preserve the benefits of the emergence of European détente in the 1970s. Consequently, West European states made the point that while they condemned the actions of the Polish and Soviet governments, it was necessary for the sake of ending the crisis and East-West relations in the aftermath that they would '...support anything short of a complete rupture of relations...some lines have to be kept open...'(WSJ., Dec. 29, 1981;5) This remark only reiterated the content of an official communication between the United Kingdom as the holder of the EC Presidency from January 1, 1982 and the Polish government on December 23.(UK, 1981) Finally, and again to note the difference in stance between themselves and the United States, the EC member states said that they did not share the US viewpoint that '...the Soviet Union is to be considered the prime author of the imposition of martial law...'(WSJ, Dec. 31, 1981;5)

Notwithstanding this public stance taken by the EC and its member states, unofficial reaction to the imposition of martial law was converging with the American perspective. Debates within the European Parliament and national parliaments, particularly the British House of Commons, are representative of these conflicting positions. In the former, a number of parliamentarians from various member states vocally supported directing blame towards the Soviet Union. Mr. Habsburg of the European People's Party (EPP) commented that '...what is happening in Poland is not a matter of internal politics but of aggression from outside. Poland's betrayer...is a Soviet lackey...'(OJC, Dec. 17, 1981;242) Mr. Macciocchi of the Radical Party Group agreed indirectly with this reasoning saying that, in response to the official statements of the Ten, that '...it is totally wrong to maintain that Poland will sort things out for herself...'(Ibid., 249) While not mentioning the Soviet Union, the implication was obvious.

The same tone was utilized by a number of parliamentarians in the House of Commons in a similar debate on the Polish situation. Raymond Whitney asserted that sanctions against the Soviet Union must be implemented as soon as possible. While an end to grain shipments should not occur, it '...must be made clear to the Soviet Union that the West is ready and determined to take such action...'(UK HoC, Dec. 22, 1981;949) Julian Amery went even further and contemplated the future prospects of détente between the East, primarily the USSR, and the West. Amery concluded that a linkage of sorts between

arms negotiations and the Polish crisis should occur. He stated that '...if President Brezhnev cares at all about the arms talks, he should be a little careful about what he does in Poland...'(Ibid., 941) Amery suggested that British policy on Poland should parallel the United States', not diverge from it. He noted, at the end of his speech, that '...it is of paramount importance that Britain and the United States should work together and should be seen to be doing so...'(Ibid.) These statements come in light of the policy of non-intervention stressed by the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. The latter's comments in the first days of the crisis were that '...the problems of Poland are for the Poles to solve and we hope they will do by a process of compromise and negotiation...'(Guardian, Dec. 18, 1981;5)

B. Clashes and Compromises (Mid January - March 1982)

The second period of the initial phase in the imposition of martial law is from January 4, 1982 to March 12, 1982. The third official declaration of the EC member states, along with an explanatory press conference, began to bridge the gap between the rhetoric of the United States and the European Community. In their statement the Ten '...note with concern and disapproval the serious external pressure and the campaign directed by the USSR and other Eastern European countries against the efforts for renewal in Poland...'(EPC, 1982;303 See Appendix 5.3) The President of the Council of Ministers, Leo Tindemans, asserted that '...without the influence of the Soviet Union, it wouldn't be possible to have events like what we have now in Poland...'(WSJ., Jan. 5, 1982;2) By the end of March this stance had, like that of President Reagan, begun to harden. In a European Council statement, the Heads of State and Government said that the '...situation in Poland continued to place a strain on East-West relations, and thus to affect the relations of the Ten with Poland and the USSR bore a clear responsibility in this situation...'(EPC, March 29/30, 1982;313)

However, in spite of this rhetorical convergence, the EC and the United states remained at odds over actual trade policy with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Concerns differed with respect to the Siberian Pipeline Project and the question of sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union. In the week of January 26 a number of EC member states announced natural gas agreements and contracts with the Soviet Union. France agreed to buy eight billion cubic metres of natural gas from the USSR for a period of twenty-five years, with Cruesot-Loire signing an eight hundred million dollar contract to construct sections of the pipeline.(Keesings, 1982;31459) The Netherlands, having spoken of buying four to five billion cubic metres of gas, agreed to the purchase of two billion metres of natural gas and the Belgian government approved of the purchase of somewhere between three and five billion metres. The latter also stipulated that Soviet gas

supplies would never exceed twenty-five percent of total domestic energy requirements. For a wider European perspective, non-European Community member states such as Spain, Portugal and Austria concluded or began negotiations with the USSR over similar purchase agreements. The only EC member state to delay the conclusion of an agreement was Italy. It was intending to sign an agreement for eight and a half billion cubic metres, but delayed in the wake of events in Poland. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached shortly after martial law was ended.(Ibid.)

As to the second matter of sanctions, it was not until late February that the EC committed itself to sanctions similar to those imposed by President Reagan in late December. Sanctions were placed upon luxury items and consumer and heavy goods. These restrictions inhibited goods such as cars, alcohol, electric motors, furs and wood panelling from being imported into the Community from Eastern Europe; chrome and other non-ferrous metals were not, and they accounted for one quarter of total trade.(Europe, Feb. 23, 1982;5) This lack of action stands together with another late March 1982 statement of the European Council. This spoke of the need to maintain contact between East and West at any level. The Ten stated that the establishment of economic and commercial ties '...have played [a role] in the stabilisation and development of East-West relations as a whole and which they wish to see continue on the basis of a genuine mutual interest...'(EPC, 1982;314)[1] This is in marked contrast to comments attributed to a US trade official previous to the CoCom meeting of late January. On this occasion, when the matter of increased trade restrictions on sensitive export items to Eastern Europe and the USSR were to be discussed, this official asserted that the US government desired a mechanism and organization that could be perceived as a '...system with more teeth...'(WSJ, Jan. 19, 1982;8)

The link between the American and West European position, seemingly at odds with each other, was made by the West German government. In early January 1982, Chancellor Schmidt travelled to Washington DC to speak with President Reagan on the matter of Poland. The conclusion of this summit meeting was a strongly worded statement on the situation. Both leaders and their respective governments, in this declaration, '...agreed on their analysis of the situation...[and] noted the responsibility of the Soviet Union for developments in Poland...'(Economist, Jan. 9, 1982;35) With West Germany the European state most likely to suffer economic losses because of the US pipeline embargo, a stalling of détente and arms control negotiations, the position taken by Schmidt reflects a final bridging of the divergence between Western Europe and the United States with respect to the role of the USSR in Poland. Further declarations agreed to at a NATO Council meeting in the middle of January are similarly illustrative of consultations between the allies, and convergence, at least on a declaratory level, between the allies. This link was only declaratory and symbolic because the list of already imposed

sanctions published by NATO was mainly one of sanctions imposed by the United States unilaterally, and not in concert with its West European/NATO allies.(Economist, Jan. 30, 1982;49 See Appendix 5.4) Secondly, the point in the communiqué that called for action was also weak, and therefore more symbolic than anything else. This and one other point stated that '...each ally will, in accordance with its own situation and legislation, identify appropriate national possibilities for action...'(Keesings, Apr. 30, 1982;31456) The only concerted action agreed to was that the allies would '...resolve not to undermine the effect of each other's measures...'(Ibid., See Appendix 5.5 for text) Nevertheless, while opinion on the assessment of and pursuance of blame converged, the steps implemented to assert this same reaction were continually different in this second phase of the crisis. In the first phase the United States imposed punitive sanctions on both Poland and the Soviet Union, including the suspension of a number of lower level agreements; the end to a variety of contacts between the USSR and Poland with the United States; and a moratorium on the transfer of oil and 'gas equipment. The latter were intended to directly affect the construction of the Siberian Pipeline. These sanctions on pipeline equipment were later expanded to include US contracts with West European firms and implemented retroactively. In the middle of January, the US pushed for more restrictive guidelines for CoCom to observe with respect to the transfer of possible defense technology to Eastern Europe.(WJS, Jan. 19, 1982;8) To this end a US official said, before the CoCom meetings were to begin, that the allies have to '...be more deliberate when we trade with the Russians, and look at their military needs and requirements...'(Ibid.) The result, however, was less than desired. The final, brief communiqué stated that the allies had agreed to review the guidelines of CoCom and adapt them to '...the evolution of the world situation, notably in the field of strategic technologies...'(IHT, Jan. 22, 1982;1)

Diverging from this strong rhetoric was Chancellor Schmidt and his top officials. After the Bonn-Washington meeting Schmidt concluded that sanctions were not as effective as they had been thought and that a continuous attempt to influence future relations in Eastern Europe may be more useful in the long term. Consequently, the German leader questioned whether '...one is doing oneself a favour in the long run if one voluntarily limits such possibilities of influence...'(Guardian, Jan. 4, 1982;5) Similar hesitation with respect to the imposition of strict sanctions was echoed by Prime Minister Thatcher one week later. In a House of Common debate Thatcher remarked that while the USSR should shoulder much of the blame associated with the imposition of martial law, some future action against the USSR to illustrate this culpability may be forthcoming.(FT., Jan. 11, 1982;1) Nevertheless, no actual sanctions were clarified or imposed at that time by the British or any West European government.

Lastly, the actions of a number of West European governments illustrated different positions between Europe and the US over the Siberian Pipeline Project. Despite the

decision of the US to not conduct 'business as usual' with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the imposition of sanctions, many West European governments, publicly owned corporations and private companies continued to lobby for a series of contracts with the Soviet Union, with respect to the pipeline project. Notable amongst these contracts were those by France and Spain on the reception of gas and French companies accepting significant construction contracts from the USSR.(Keesings, 1982;31459) While sanctions on the importation of luxury items, as mentioned previously, were announced by the European Community a few days later, the actions of these governments and firms testify to the disrespect accorded to the United States during the first months of martial law.

C. Summer Months and Beyond (April - November 1982)

As has been noted in the full description of the events of April to November 1982, the positions of the United States and EC member states did not change during this time period. Instead, they appeared to hardened. At the end of July the talk was of the European Community, on behalf of the member states, filing a lawsuit against the US Government for its imposition of sanctions deemed retrospective as well as extra-territorial. This followed the June 18 announcement of President Reagan that sanctions imposed upon US companies were to be extended to companies owned and/or controlled by US firms, as well as to foreign companies utilizing US technology under contract. However, West European states and firms had been advised, as reported in The Economist, that signed contracts must be honored and that because they were signed prior to Reagan's announcement, were valid anyway.(Economist, July 31, 1982;36)

By the middle of August the EC wrote to the Department of Commerce stating that sanctions imposed in June by President Reagan were invalid under international law. The law under which the president acted, the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, allows the president a wide latitude in designing, shaping and then implementing policy in this area. One section of the EAA stipulates that the US President can stop or limit the export of '...any goods, technology, or other information subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States...'(Economist, Aug. 14, 1982;59) The civil penalty for the breaking of this Act could be the withdrawal of the right to export or buy US goods and technology. As such, the US Government may apply the civil section of the EAA rather than the criminal. The Economist described in some detail the position of West European states and firms with respect to international law, in a context of informal civil proceedings officiated over by the US Government. In early to middle September, government and company officials decided to resist US sanctions. Officials from West Germany, Italy, France and the United

Kingdom, at a meeting in Britain, agreed to withstand US pressure to impose stronger sanctions on the Soviet Union.(UK, 1982) Creusot-Loire announced that it would, in conjunction with Dresser France, oppose US sanctions in legal proceedings to take place in the United States.(Economist, Sep. 18, 1982;65) While reporting all the actions taken, The Economist did not mention that, regardless of the outcome or whether or not this matter even went to a court proceeding, the fact that the EC Commission was asked to begin to address the issue of extra-territoriality demonstrates the fragility of the transatlantic relationship during the latter stages of the Polish crisis. At a time when one might presume that allies should be wanting to be converging in their policies, the opposite was occurring.

By November of 1982 the imposition of marital law had begun to end, with the freeing of Solidarity leader Lech Walesa from imprisonment. Almost simultaneously, the US President announced the cessation of sanctions and an agreement over the need to re-examine and strengthen rules pertaining to CoCom proceedings was reached between the allies. As reported above, the EC Commission stated that the agreement between the allies '...constitutes a major step towards stabilization of relations between the Community and the United States...'(Europe, Nov. 15, 1982;3) Nevertheless, Greece and France rejected the accord. The latter responded by saying that France took note of the actions of President Reagan but was not 'a party to the agreement'. Nevertheless, the remaining member states and the EC Commission joined with Canada, Japan and the United States in the ratification of an export control document stipulating what could be exported to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.(WSJ, Nov. 15, 1982;2) The agreement calls for a moratorium on the purchase of natural gas from the USSR after a review of possible energy sources for Western Europe was conducted; the inclusion of grain exports in a review of East-West trade; the expansion of the list of non-tradable items from those of purely military value to high technology goods with broad national security implications; and the establishment of a common credit and finance policy to minimize the risk of Eastern debt and reduce export credits allowed to the Soviet Union.(Ibid.) While this was an in-principle agreement in November, US officials were optimistic that the document would be completed and formally agreed to in the near future.(Ibid.) Apparently, the French position aside, a convergence of rhetoric and policy had at last occurred between the policies of Western Europe and the United States on East-West trade, and the specific issue of Poland.

IV:Divergencies

The response of the member states of the European Community to the reactions and actions of the United States over the course of events inside Poland is notable for, by and

large, this response by at odds with the position of the United States. From the assessment of responsibility to the imposition of sanctions and the stoppage of humanitarian foods, EC member states differed with the US in a variety of fora, including NATO; Group of Seven; and CoCom. The inclusion of the Siberian Pipeline project, along with the extra-territorial and retroactive nature of certain sanctions bound to effect West European governments and companies, was another occasion where the allies diverged. The negative attitude taken by many of the West European leaders towards President Reagan's policies are additional points illustrating divergence. Consequently, the presence of divergencies and differences between the allies is not in question. The fact that the member states asked the EC Commission to prepare for a judicial hearing against the United States because of the extra-territorial nature of imposed sanctions lends even more weight to this assertion. What is in question at this stage is a 'first cut' into the question of why these divergencies appeared in the first place.

V:Understanding the Divergencies

That a difference of opinion between Western European and the United States occurred appears to be obvious. The allies argued for almost one year over two issues: the dependency of Western Europe on Soviet energy supplies and the degree of Soviet involvement in the imposition of martial law in Poland. The Europeans denied that the first scenario would occur, while they refused to publicly acknowledge the second, even if they knew the Soviet Union was culpable. What remains now is to surmise what the 'conventional wisdom' is concerning the occurrence of these differences; whether this 'wisdom' is accurate enough to leave no doubts as to its claim to know; and if there are doubts with this Realist approach what alternative positions may be brought forth. The last of these tasks will, as was true in the previous case studies, be useful only as a pointer to alternative theoretical positions, rather than a definitive statement.

Given a review of the academic literature, one 'conventional wisdom' built around the reasons given above can be discerned. In an article printed on January 30, 1982 journalists for The Economist wrote that '...it would be nice to say that the Europeans' different views spring mainly from legitimate arguments over the effectiveness of any sanctions in Russia...but they really stem from the difference in the relative importance of their trade with Russia...'(Economist, Jan. 30, 1982;49) In a survey of East-West trade in May 1982 by the same newsmagazine, additional space was given to the facts behind this assertion. The magazine notes that West Germany, Britain and France are trading nations. In 1980 exports from all three of these countries account for between twenty-one to twenty-eight percent of their Gross National Product. Consequently, all are dependent, to a greater or lesser extent, on good relations with other states and actors.(Economist, May 22,

1982;64) Also, each of these countries have other reasons for maintaining their trading relationships. The geographical position of West Germany is one factor while the status of London as one of the world's financial centers in another. The individualistic nature of French foreign policy and the large amount of British capital in foreign investments are other factors that may be added to those already stated. For these reasons the authors of the survey state that it is no surprise that countries such as West Germany '...keep a low profile in East-West relations...[and] have a penchant for the carrot rather than the stick...'(Ibid.) With respect to specific trade figures between Western Europe and the East, and those of the United States with the latter, a similar argument is put forward. Stephen Woolcock contends that the data assembled lends credibility to the 'dependency' charge laid by American officials and columnists. Consistently, the percentage of overall American trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has ranged from sixth tenths of a percent to slightly over three percent in 1976 and 1979, respectively. In 1980 American imports to Comecom states accounted for slightly less than two percent of its total yearly exports.(Woolcock, 1982;52 See Appendix 5.6) In comparison, West Germany, Italy, Britain and France have export and import trade figure that are consistently higher over an identical period of time. By 1980, West German, Italian, French and British exports accounted for almost five, three and a half, four and a half and slightly more than two percent of their total world trade. Import figures for all these countries were roughly similar.(Ibid.)

A comparison between energy trade figures of the four West European countries and the United States with Comecon states is equally persuasive. Illustrated in Appendix 5.6, European Community member states, compared to the United States, have consistently imported more of their energy supplies from the Soviet Union. From 1970 to 1985, inclusive of figures from 1980 and 1982, mineral imports from the Soviet Union to EC member states accounted for an average of sixty-five percent of total EC-Soviet trade. By comparison, the figure for the United States over the identical period of time was seven percent. The agreements related to the Siberian pipeline project would increase the percentage of gas supplied by the Soviet Union to West Germany and Italy to a figure of thirty-five percent. Overall these three states would be dependent upon the USSR for six percent of their total energy needs.(Stern, 1982;24) And all of these negotiations were conducted because West European countries wanted to lessen their dependence on Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf oil after the oil embargoes of 1973 and 1979. There was a generally held desire to move away from oil-based energy resources to those of a natural gas element. Given existing West European supplies and third party contracts, to increase the region's percentage of natural gas dependency to fifteen percent of total energy supplies Soviet natural gas would be critical. The newsmagazine's exact words were that this target '...could not be met without Russian gas...'(Economist, July 10, 1982;64) In total

the contracts negotiated between the Soviet Union and eight West European states (five European Community member states) amounted to thirty-nine and a half billion cubic metres of natural gas, the length of the contracts varying between countries.(Economist, July 31, 1982;36 See Appendix 5.6) The only European Community state not involved in the buying of natural gas, but still assisting in the construction of the pipeline, was the United Kingdom.

Why the Europeans took such a neutral position with respect to Soviet involvement in the imposition of martial law can also be explained by the amount of contracts awarded to firms in four of these nine West European countries, and the jobs thus provided. Appendix 5.7 also depicts the amount that companies in each state involved in the construction of the pipeline would receive. These sums ranged from 180 million US dollars for John Brown PLC in Britain to 1.2 billion US dollars for a group of firms such as Mannesmann in West Germany. Italian companies were to receive close to 900 million US dollars for their work, while Creusot-Loire and other French companies were set to share 664 million US dollars in contracts. The total figure is calculated at 3.6 billion US dollars. The Economist estimated that in West Germany alone, these and other Comecom-related contracts account for the employment of between 100,000 and 300,000 people (Economist, Feb. 27, 1982;23); a figure representing one percent of the total West Germany workforce. The newsmagazine admits that this figure may not appear considerable, but for firms such as Mannesmann, who base their steel-making capacity on potential East European orders, a trade embargo could prove a 'financial disaster'.(Ibid.) Added to the potential of such a disaster for a number of West Germany's high technology manufacturing firms, a trade embargo would inflict political damages on the Schmidt government. This was argued for '...what counts is the dependence of key political constituencies...on that trade [to Eastern Europe]...(Ibid.)

Taking this comment to a logical conclusion are Angela Stent and Phil Williams. The former, Angela Stent, is an academic who has spent a considerable amount of time researching and writing on East-West energy relations. She points to two areas of disagreement amongst the allies. The first is that whereas there is general agreement on the nature of Soviet domestic society, there is disagreement on how to '...interpret Soviet foreign policy behaviour and, more important, how the west should respond to Soviet actions...'(Stent, 1984;453) While the Europeans view détente in more regional and limited terms, the Reagan Administration came to power with a jaundiced view of US-Soviet agreements, critical of Soviet expansionism in the Third World. Stent rationalizes this difference as one partially based on the former's geographic proximity to the Soviet Union. Having witnessed the affects of World War Two on the USSR and understandable of its insecurities, West European leaders are '...more favourably disposed than the United States towards seeking a dialogue with the Russians...'(Ibid., 454)

The second area of disagreement between the allies concerns their concept of security. While one's definition of security is largely driven by military considerations, the West European concept is also inclusive of economic factors.(Ibid.) Both parties agree that rules prohibiting the sale of military-sensitive high technology are important, but do not agree on what type of equipment should be included in this definition. For example, a truck could be considered a solely economic transfer but does has the potential to be utilized for military purposes. Based on this broad view of what 'militarily-sensitive' material might include, almost anything could be prohibited from being exported to the Soviet Union or any other Eastern bloc country. Stent argues that this lack of agreement is a problem for the allies. What makes this problem into a potential crisis is the trade dependency of Western Europe on Eastern Europe. Consequently, there is an '...inevitable transatlantic disputes when America seeks to restrict the flow of European industrial goods to the east, while continuing to encourage its own agricultural exports...'(Ibid.)

To this growing Realist 'wisdom' is added the voice and opinions of Phil Williams, an author cited in the chapter on overall transatlantic trends. In his article "Europe, America and the Soviet threat", Williams states that one source of the divergence between the allies is '...seriously divergent perceptions of and policies towards the Soviet Union...'(Williams, 1982;372) While conscious of the lack of monolithism in either position the author does contend that the foundations of similar allied disputes over arms control, European defence spending and other security related issues can be traced to '...competing conceptions of Soviet capabilities and intentions...'(Ibid., 373) But in themselves these statements are not unlike those of other academics who will be cited below. What makes Williams different are his conclusions why these divergencies are present.

Williams suggests a number of reasons. One such reason stems from the status and role of the United States in world politics. Because of the perceived global role of the US, American politicians have a different sensitivity to Soviet foreign and military policies to the Europeans. The attainment of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union has made this sensitivity more acute than ever and, in this author's opinion, difficult to accept.(Ibid., 377) This has made the United States' leadership take a different attitude towards Soviet incursions into the Third World. While the Europeans tend to stress the importance of local forces, American leaders view their resistance to these advances as an overall '...litmus test of Moscow's sincerity and one of the keys to the future of détente...'(Ibid.) Another reason that 'fits' with this wisdom described in Williams' article is the varied historical experiences of Western Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union.(Ibid.) As advanced by Stent, West European leaders are able to 'empathize' with Soviet leaders because of their shared experiences during World War Two. Having been party to the destruction of its society as was the Soviet Union, Stent argues that Western Europe

tempers its position in relation to the Soviet Union. Like those reasons cited previously, historical considerations are systemic in that these considerations are immutable and operate on, not through, the state or states in question. As such, they are 'realist' in orientation and relate to those 'wisdoms' set out in the third chapter of this thesis.

The result of the above inquiry into why the European Community and the United States differed in their responses to the Polish crises is the emergence of a 'conventional wisdom'. It is one that is founded upon West European dependency on energy supplies; trade concerns; employment opportunities; and major manufacturing companies sensitive to even minor fluctuations in their market. In its spirit, this set of factors, like those of the preceding chapter on the Middle East, appear to match that wisdom elucidated in the third chapter. In that chapter, the wisdom as to why general transatlantic tensions occurred was extracted from a vast literature ranging from the 1960s through to the early 1990s. This earlier 'wisdom' included such factors as the shift in power, status and roles between Western Europe and the United States; the differing threat perceptions of the Soviet Union; the economic resurgence of the European Community member states and the relative decline of the United States since the late 1960s; the presence of nuclear weaponry and the onset of nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States; the evolution of détente; and factors of geography and history. Just as this wisdom can be associated with a Realist perspective on International Relations, so too can the wisdom elucidated above. Outstanding now is the question of whether this 'wisdom' can stand a test of validation.

VI:Assessment

The first critique of this wisdom is an attack on the dependency theory laid out above. Anthony Blinken, in his book Ally versus Ally, contends that the energy policies of West European states, combined with past policies of the Soviet Union, dispel the blackmail arguments of the US Administration. One policy of West Germany, the most vulnerable of the EC states to Soviet blackmail, is a move to double switching. Double switching is a process where companies and households are able to switch from gas to oil, and then from oil to coal if necessary. This process would defeat the abilities of the Soviet Union to blackmail West Germany through a stoppage in the supply of natural gas.(Blinken, 1987;50-51) Also, West Germany has linked its incoming Soviet-based pipeline to the central power stations of the country. This move also allows West Germany to shift the form of its energy utilization from gas back to oil. The third supply-related movement by West Germany, France and Italy is a policy to maintain a thirty-five day storage allowance. This was done in case of a shortage of external supply from any source. Again, the ability to compromise these states is further relieved.(Ibid., 52) The author

contends that because of these moves, a shortage would '...not unduly harm the West's defense capacity in a conflict lasting one month or less...[or] even during a longer confrontation...'(Ibid., 54)[2]

The possibility of the Soviet leadership pursuing a policy of coercion through a stoppage of natural gas is not thought of as a likely scenario by Anthony Blinken. When given the opportunity to influence the actions and policies of West European governments in the past, the Soviet leadership has declined to do so. During the Yom Kippur War and the AOPEC oil embargo of Western Europe, the Soviet Union did not offer her support. Also, when the Kremlin issued statements in support of the miners' strike in Britain in 1984, no actual support was given.(Ibid., 53) American officials have pointed out to West European diplomats that the Soviet Union has denied oil supplies to numerous countries. Albania, after its alignment with China, Yugoslavia after its attempted disassociation with the USSR, and Israel after the Suez crisis of 1956, all suffered shortages in Soviet oil supplies. However, Blinken points out that Soviet action was taken *after* an action had occurred, and not before in order to influence a decision. Finally, Blinken criticizes the American position because their '...criticizing the pipeline for being a potential tool of escalation makes little sense if other such tools are available. These scenarios are farfetched...'(Ibid., 55)

Beverley Crawford does contend, contrary to Blinken, that the Soviet Union did attempt to exert influence on a number of these states because of their energy relationship with the former. In 1956 after the Suez invasion of Egypt by Israel, the election of an anti-Soviet government in Finland in 1958, 1960 with China and 1968 after Ghana seized two Soviet trawlers the latter had suspended, reduced or threatened to invoke an action of some kind with respect to the delivery of energy supplies to these countries listed.(Crawford, 1993;165) However, compared to US officials who attempted to draw parallels between these incidents and that of Western Europe in 1981, Crawford asserts that there were three conditions that were present in these previous cases that were not in 1981.[3]

These three conditions include the ability of the Soviet Union to dominate the world supply of the resources, the attractiveness of the USSR as a supplier of energy and the unique dependence created through the necessity of delivery through a pipeline. For all of these conditions the Soviet Union appears to have some leverage given that it was the most stable of suppliers of natural gas compared to Libya and Iran, had the largest known quantity of natural gas reserves in the world and the necessity of a pipeline created the related need for long term guaranteed contracts. However, Crawford notes that all of these countries mentioned above were weak politically, dependent on Soviet trade and therefore unable to resist Soviet pressure. With respect to Western Europe, the USSR was dependent on western countries for trade, aid and hard currency and unable to influence strong states such as West Germany, Italy and France because of this *mutual* dependence. For the

author this situation '...created conditions under which a cutoff of energy to manipulate political relations was deterred...'(Ibid., 169) Therefore, while arguing that the USSR did attempt to influence other states because of energy relations, Crawford is compelled because of the evidence to reiterate the findings of Blinken above and Stern below.

Lastly, and as important as the above refutations, are the actual figures cited above. Jonathan Stern reported in his article "Specters and Pipe Dreams" that France, Italy and West German will become dependent upon the Soviet Union for thirty-five percent of their natural gas supplies and six percent of their total energy needs.(Stern, 1982;24) But he, too, makes the point that the dependency theory of American officials is exaggerated and too hypothetical to judge in terms of relevancy or potential. Aside from the double switching of the West German government, there are other reasons as to why any shortage, blockage or denial of gas supplies is unlikely to occur, or will prove ineffective. One reason is that the West German gas pipeline runs through East Germany and also West Berlin. West Berlin is jointly administered by the four allies and a gas embargo would bring the USSR into direct conflict with the United States. This alone may make an embargo unlikely. Second and third reasons relate to the need of the Soviet Union to acquire Western parts for any expansion of the pipeline as well as the former's need for hard currency. Both are delivered to the USSR by Western Europe because of the pipeline, and both would be jeopardised if an embargo was attempted.(Ibid., 26) While this is very similar to the arguments of American officials, there is one difference. The Soviet Union does not need the Siberian pipeline to run through parts of Western Europe. The Soviet Union does not require the massive turbines provided by General Electric and John Brown PLC. With respect to hard currency, the Soviet Union also cannot be hurt with what it does not have to begin with. Only after the pipeline is constructed and in operation, and hard currency is exchanged, does Western Europe have any real leverage over the policies of the Soviet Union. As Stern asserts, the '...economic and political leverage cuts both ways in the West European-Soviet gas trade...'(Ibid., 27) Added to this, the French argue that while West European dependency on Soviet energy supplies would total six percent of total West European energy supplies, this figure does not illustrate the whole story of the Euro-Soviet relationship. Stephen Woolcock contends that this dependency total would be no more than it has been in the past. Because oil supplies from the Soviet Union would drop and be replaced by natural gas shipments, the overall percentage would remain fairly constant at six percent.(Woolcock, 1982;57) The presence or absence of the Siberian pipeline would not alter existing realities.

Because of this lack of change in the overall percentage of energy supplies delivered to Western Europe, many academics researching this area of East-West relations maintain that the pipeline project was only an excuse for the United States to 'punish' Western Europe. Linda Miller, in her article "Energy and alliance politics", asserts this

point. She states that the pipeline controversy was a convenient avenue through which the US leadership was able to dramatize fundamental differences concerning allied relations with the Soviet Union.(Miller, 1983;480) By using the pipeline issue in this manner the United States '...politicized the matter in a way that sharpened differences between the US and its allies...'(Ibid.) Why? Miller claims that the pipeline issues illustrated two points. The first was that sanctions are ineffective if implemented unilaterally and without prior allied consultations. The second was that American and West European politicians have differing definitions of energy security. The former has a definition based upon '...narrower military priorities and European views based on broader economic determinants...'(Ibid.), but does not take this point further. Unfortunately, the same criticism is true of Stephen Woolcock's assessment of the situation. In his article in The World Today Woolcock states that it should be recognized by American officials that the '...Europeans' differing perceptions are due to their assessment of the political situation and not their increased trade dependence...'(Woolcock, 1982;59)

A logical conclusion to Miller and Woolcock's assessment is provided by the same Phil Williams cited above as a 'realist'. Interestingly, Williams not only highlights historical and systemic/power-based reasons for allied tensions and divergencies over Poland, but also those of a cultural and ideological nature. The author posits that American policy-makers approach the Soviet Union with an 'inherent bad faith' model.(Williams, 1982;376) This model is a result of not only strategic concerns but also '...ideological or cultural factors and reinforced by domestic political considerations...'(Ibid.) This model is present in American society because of a deep-seated antipathy towards Communism, not present in Western Europe. This antipathy, Williams states, is '...deeply embedded in American society in a way that finds few parallels in Western Europe...'(Ibid.) Examples given to the reader include the presence of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and a more inclusive definition of instability. This definition treats domestic, political, social and economic instability as important as external threats. State intervention and state social welfare programs such as 'socialized' medical systems are examples of this West European definition. In the United States the PCI is opposed by McCarthyism and the New Right of the Reagan Administration, and a definition of instability would not be '...particularly sympathetic to allies who regard the internal fabric of society as the key to security in the 1980s and 1990s...'(Ibid., 379) [4]

This 'model' of bad faith is found not only amongst diplomats, international officials and the Presidency, but also people involved in the defence sector of the economy and the armed forces, the latter two groups dependent, to a certain extent, on the presence of a threat in order to justify large defence budgets and new weapons systems. Because of strong relationships between defence industrialists, American politicians and the military (the military-industrial complex spoken about by President Eisenhower), some policies

appear to have been driven by inflated perceptions of the Soviet Union resulting from intense lobbying by interested parties.(Ibid., 378) In all political cultures, domestic realities and intellectual traditions, coupled with those factors cited above have '...done much to shape the conflicting prescriptions for dealing with the Soviet Union...'(Ibid., 379)[5]

What strengthens this counter-argument to the Realist position is the body of evidence that illustrates divergent policies prior to December 12-13, 1981. Angela Stent, Reinhard Rode, Stephen Woolcock and Michael Mastanduno have all written books, monographs, papers and articles detailing consistent American and West European approaches towards East-West trade, the utilization of sanctions to effect change and reactions to each other's policies. Briefly stated is Woolcock's description of three phases of this debate over East-West trade, including American dominance in the 1940s and 1950s of the transatlantic relationship, and the East-West bridge building exercises of the 1960s of Western Europe.(Woolcock, 1982A;4) The latter part of the 1970s was marred by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the crystallization of the policy debate between the allies. In this instance '...Western views of the role of trade in East- West relations were in some areas clearly divergent...'(Ibid., 5) The trade dependency of Western Europe upon East European trade was put forward by American officials as reasons why the former's reaction to the invasion was less than that of the United States. Curiously, Soviet oil supplies to Western Europe were not an issue at that juncture, only overall trade patterns.

Reinhard Rode takes a broad yet detailed sweep of British, Italian, French, West German, European Community and American policies regarding East-West trade, from essentially the immediate post-war period. All of the EC member states and companies have negotiated sizeable natural gas supplies and construction contracts with the Soviet Union. Rode does not ignore the fact that these contracts have always had economic, trade and employment benefits to them.(Rode, 1985;130, 146 and 161) However, given the continuity and consistency in the overall East-West policies of the four main West European/European Community states, the author goes beyond the obvious dependency theories attached to these economic benefits. The author contends that co-operation between East and Western Europe was enhanced to assist in the '...liberalization of the East European regimes and the existing bloc structures...'(Ibid., 128) Seymour Weiss, writing in the Wall Street Journal, thought along similar lines of reasoning when he stated in a column in early January 1982 that

> for the Europeans, and the West Germans in particular, détente has always been much more than just the 'relaxation of tension' and the stabilization of the military milieu. Détente in Europe was to fashion the framework that might allow the Soviets to loosen their stranglehold on the eastern half of the

continent...détente was a down-payment on a better all-European future...(WSJ, Dec.30, 1981;5)

These postulations and opinions are validated by Chancellor Schmidt in a speech quoted in work by Angela Stent. In this statement, Schmidt echoed the sentiments of his predecessor, Willy Brandt, when the former said that '...East-West trade is an important instrument for ensuring peace...we [the West] must still strengthen the effect of this interaction...'(quoted in Stent, 1981;179) And this position on the part of West German and leading West European politicians contrasts with that of the United States over an identical period of time. From the Export Control Act of 1949, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951 and the EAA that was amended and liberalized in 1972, 1974 and 1977, the United States has continually pursued a policy of punishment with respect to the Soviet Union and its allies. The amended version of the EAA in 1977 stated that products that represented '...a significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States...'(Ibid., 215) This wording was designed to make the blockage of exports to the Soviet Union and its allies the exception rather than the rule. A further amending of the Act was attempted in 1979. However, Rode is of the opinion that the wording of the proposed amendment did not appear to shift the principles or legal aspects of the EAA in such a manner that would be perceived as being as liberal as the policies of Western Europe.(Ibid., 121)

In practical terms the most notable event that tested Western resolve over the subject of East-West trade prior to the Polish crises of 1981 and 1982 was a similar pipeline project negotiated in the early 1960s. Detailed by Angela Stent the project in question was the Friendship Pipeline. This would service the natural gas needs of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia but required the manufacturing technology of a number of West European firms to complete the project. In response to the involvement of Western firms - West European and American - the US Administration prohibited the relevant equipment and parts from being shipped to the Soviet Union. However, British officials refused to agree with this policy during a CoCom meeting. Consequently, a recommendation was issued via the mechanisms of NATO instead. This occurred because CoCom required unanimity whereas NATO rules stipulated that only a majority was necessary for policy to be adopted. A relatively weak declaration was issued that stated that '...member countries, on their own responsibility, should to the extent possible 1) stop deliveries of large diameter pipe (over 19 inches) to the Soviet bloc under existing contracts; and 2) prevent new contracts for such deliveries...'(Stent, 1981, 102) The pipeline was completed one year behind schedule, but completed nonetheless. The total percentage of Italian and West German energy needs supplied via the Friendship Pipeline amounted to two percent.(Ibid., 98)

But differences between the United States and its western allies over the latter's trade relations with the Soviet Union and East European states existed, as was also the case in 1982 with the Siberian pipeline project and American and West European stances concerning high technology lists and other issues related to East-West trade. For these reasons, Rode concludes that the East-West trade dispute '...has really existed since 1949...[and] given the continued differences between the current underlying philosophies, there is no early end to the dispute in sight...'(Ibid., 221) The authors of the book note the presence or absence of Marxist thought in the domestic political societies of Western Europe and the US. Rode also concludes that the former's adoption of an integrationist approach to European issues has 'spilled over' to those concerned with East-West subjects. Spill-over is a process where economic activities eventually affect political ones, thus spurring movement in both areas. Given the manner in which West German leaders and their colleagues in the rest of the European Community have attempted to utilize their trade relations with Eastern Europe, an integrationist-style is in operation.(Ibid., 201-210)

Assertions concerning the role of ideas and ideologies in the manifestation of transatlantic disagreements have been made by a number of academics. Of these the most damning critiques comes from the writings of Phil Williams. Consequently, it is the work of this academic that will serve as the basis for this last section of this case study.[4] Williams argues that the objections to EC actions on the part of the United States were based not only on objective factors such as trade and energy dependency, but also ideological and idea-based criteria. With respect to these assertions, there are two interesting points that should be articulated. The first is that none of these scholars are wholly dismissive of the Realist conventional wisdom as a possible explanation for US-EC disagreement. Nevertheless, all of these scholars conclude that there are, within this argument, a number of gaps that are unanswerable solely from this perspective. US politicians utilized Realist conventional wisdom to build an argument that is credible, but it is not comprehensive enough to hide the fact that their political environment, and the discourse that penetrates that environment, was overtly at play in the establishment of these disagreements. It is this recognition of an overt role for idea based factors that is the novel part of the approach utilized by Williams and the others. The second point to illustrate from the assertions made by these scholars is that none appear to make them from material outside of that utilized by the arguments positioned in opposition to the Realist argument highlighted and reviewed earlier in this chapter. No new information is given to the reader and therefore their assertions with respect to the overtness of ideas and ideologies remains stagnant, and, in the final assessment, unsustainable.

In order to sustain and possibly expand on this assertion made by Williams, Woolcock, Miller and Stent it will be useful to recategorize the initial reactions, actions, and comments of US and EC politicians and officials into three sections. These three

sections will, in turn, will tackle issues related to the language utilized by the allies during the crisis; their differing policy initiatives; and the status of the United Kingdom throughout. The curious position of this country may lend even more insight into the accuracy of the assumptions of Phil Williams.

A. Language

A.1 Condemnation

As noted above, the first declaration of President Reagan was one that directed the entire blame for the imposition of martial law in Poland towards the Soviet Union. On December 29 the president decided to reiterated this belief by noting that a 'heavy and direct responsibility' must be borne by the USSR. Again, one may note the utilization of the word 'direct'. It may have been conceivable that the Soviet Union was indirectly assisting the plans to imposition martial law, but not to the US Government. President Reagan went out of his way, one might conclude, to lay full accountability for the events unfolding in Poland at the feet of the Soviet leadership.

By the middle of January, the United States began to press its West European allies to support their desire for more stringent CoCom rules pertaining to East-West trade. However, US officials associated with the CoCom negotiations appear to define East-West trade as trade with the Soviet Union, and only the Soviet Union. One such official was quoted as saying as such, when he commented that the allies have to be '...more deliberate with the Russians...' Nowhere within this text was any other East European country mentioned. In late December 1981 the president said, in one of his televised addresses concerning the situation in Poland, that business as usual with those associated with these events would not be tolerated by the government. On this occasion Reagan only spoke of 'perpetrators and those who aid and abet them' rather than the Soviet Union, but the point had already been made. This was simply an opportunity to lash out in as many ways as possible.

However, the language of the European Community and its member states in the first two weeks of the imposition of martial law is different from that used by the United States. Rather than, as was the case with President Reagan, lashing out at the Soviet Union, a more neutral position was taken by those making the decisions for the European Community. A benign approach to the events in Poland was assumed at first, followed by a rejection of the accusations directed towards the Soviet Union at the end of December. The EC member states refused to accept the American position that the Soviet Union was the 'prime author' of the imposition of martial law.(WSJ, Dec. 31, 1981;5) It was left to

Members of the European Parliament, and other national legislatures, to deride and accuse the Soviet Union for the imposition of martial law.

After two weeks the EC member states began to shift their tone of their of language toward that of the United States, but with some reservation. The official European Political Cooperation statement noted with 'concern and disapproval' the actions of the Soviet Union in stemming the 'renewal' of Poland in the wake of the imposition of martial law. This was a condemnation, but only of sorts. The EC President, in the press conference that followed the official statement, was more critical of the Soviet Union. Emulating the words of President Reagan in late December, Tindemans rejected the notion that the USSR was not involved in the planning and implementation of martial law. At the European Council meeting in late March 1982, it was decided that the USSR, and not the Polish government, '...bore a clear responsibility...' for the events taking place in Poland.(EPC, March 29/30, 1982;313)

The last official statement on behalf of the member states of the European Community, in spite of its convergence with the statements already issued by the United States and spoken by President Reagan, nevertheless begs a simple question. If the Soviet Union did bear a 'clear responsibility' for the imposition of martial law, and these actions could not have occurred without the knowledge, support and agreement of the USSR, then why did it take almost three full months for the EC to state this position when it took the United States no time at all? Surely if the United States could ascertain this degree of responsibility after learning of occurrences inside Poland, then so too could any West European government. But such was not the case in the months between December 1981 and March 1982. Why and how this affects the 'claim to know' position of Neorealism, shall be explored shortly.

A.2 East-West Relations

Events in Poland unfolded so as to encompass the whole of the East-West relationship. After deciding that the Soviet Union bore a clear responsibility for Polish actions, President Reagan and his advisors decided to create a link between this affair and overall East-West superpower relations. The first appearance of the desire to establish this link came on January 4, 1982 . It was at this juncture that Lawrence Eagleburger said a 'cooling off' of the entire US-Soviet relationship may occur because of the role of the USSR in the Polish crisis. Consequently, the United States desired re-examination of allied agreements dealing with East-West issues. Other high level US officials reiterated this sentiment. Mr. Stoessel from the State Department said that talks between the US and USSR on nuclear issues would continue, but that the US '...cannot dissociate this type of contact from other aspects of Soviet behaviour...'(WSJ, Dec. 28, 1981;2) At the end of

January a spokesperson speaking on behalf of Secretary of State Haig reiterated these sentiments. The spokesperson said that continuing repression in Poland '...obviously constitutes a major setback to the prospects for constructive East-West relations...[and] has a serious effect upon the prospects for moving forward in arms control...'(IHT, Jan. 25, 1982;1) Also, the United States appeared to want to associate events in Poland with the possibility of not attending the Madrid meeting of the CSCE. In the second week of February Secretary Haig said that violations of human rights in Poland on the part of the USSR do '...threaten the very basis of this conference...'(IHT, Feb. 10, 1982;1)[6]

Because of the ability of President Reagan to involve the Siberian Pipeline Project, those agreements re-examined were of a trade, financial and commercial nature. As such, US officials began to press their West European counterparts, along with the Japanese, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders for a strengthening of mechanisms and policies that would prevent the export of western high tech material to the Soviet Union. CoCom, as the western forum in which East-West trade-related matters were discussed, became a subject of inquiry for the United States. Subsequently, US officials were found commenting on the need to either strengthen the rules of CoCom and restrict further the type and quantity of goods exported to the Soviet Union, or, if this was impossible given existing CoCom rules, create a new organization that had '...more teeth...' and would do the job more effectively.(WSJ, Jan. 19, 1982;8) The end result of this stance was that the allies agreed in November of 1982 to a tightening of CoCom rules, as well as the expansion of the remit of CoCom to encompass the reviewing of financial, commercial and monetary relations between East and West, alongside its traditional role of reviewing and restricting trade in goods and high tech material.[7]

By comparison, the member states of the European Community tried on many occasions to make the point that in spite of the imposition of martial law in Poland, the development of relations between East and West established in the 1970s should not be made a victim of this event. The mechanisms put into place since that time should be utilized to solve the Polish crisis, not ignored, disrupted or disconnected because of it. Through notes from the UK Presidency to Poland, and statements in the press, the EC member states argued that '...some lines [of communication] have to be kept open...'(WSJ, Dec. 29, 1981;5) At the European Council meeting of late March, when the EC finally directed blame towards the Soviet Union, the Council also mentioned that a strain had been placed upon East-West relations. As such, a link between Poland and general relations had been made, but not in the same vein as that made by the United States in late December 1981. While the US appeared to be stating new policy, the Council was stating what was obvious to everyone; nothing more, nothing less.

Differences between the EC and the United States also appeared with respect to the Madrid CSCE conference. In response to the Haig statement, Leo Tindemans, on behalf

of the EC member states, stated that there was support for the CSCE process but that '...new agreements at Madrid would lack credibility...'(IHT, Feb. 10, 1982;2) This comment was made in light of West European concerns that the United States would call for an abrupt end to the conference because of the refusal of the USSR to discuss events taking place in Poland.[8] A second European Council demarche in March increased the divergence over this issue between itself and the United States. After having stated the obvious, the European Council sought to reiterate its desire to maintain communication with Eastern Europe. Political, economic, financial and commercial relations between East and West had developed since the onset of détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and East-West relations between East and Western Europe, has stabilized the continent with a view to greater cooperation in the future. The Council spoke of its desire to see this type of cooperation on a variety of levels and issues '...continue on the basis of a genuine mutual interest...'(EPC, 1982;314) The key word to ascertain from this statement is 'continue', contrasting with the negative terminology of the United States. [9] An end to divergence in East-West linkage is marked by a statement by Chancellor Schmidt echoing the opposite of Lawrence Eagleburger's 'cooling off' pronouncement. In a speech in the West German Parliament Schmidt said that talks between the US and EC member states would proceed despite continous disagreement over Poland. However, he asserted that whatever the outcome of these talks, '...what should not happen, and what will not happen...so far as we are concerned, is that a trade war break out with the Soviet Union, which itself could usher in a new period of cold war...'(FT, June 25, 1982;18)

Unlike the first assessment of language, a convergence between the United States and its West European allies did not occur until the middle of November, after the imposition of martial law had been lifted and notable detainees such as Lech Walesa had been freed from prison. Newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal note that while the United States gained a number of concessions from its EC allies, so too had the West Europeans. While a moratorium on natural gas sales from the Soviet Union had been agreed to, this was after a further two agreements, recognizing that a review of potentially new sources of energy for Western Europe could be found, and that grain sales from the United States to the USSR would be included in a general review of East-West trade relations. As such, questions concerning the timing or the tardiness of the EC response come to mind. Further, 'why' did this divergence occur in the first place, and what may be the link between these two analyses of language.

A.3 Allied Talk, Allies Asunder

The third and last aspect of language utilized in the wake of the Polish crisis, as with that of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is the presence of strong public criticisms of Western Europe by US officials. The initial West European response to events in Poland was that EC member states would not follow the example set by the United States. This sentiment was found in West Germany, France and the United Kingdom.(Keesings, 1982;31457 and WSJ, Dec. 29, 1981;5) British officials commented that the '...Polish crisis has the potential of becoming the most divisive issue the alliance has ever faced...'(WSJ, Dec. 29, 1981;1) US officials concurred with this statement. One expression of agreement was that '...there is a potential danger for great misunderstanding or serious disagreement to develop between the allies on this point...'(FT, Dec. 29, 1981;1) Secretary of State Haig confirmed this position by saying that an allied split over Poland would be the '...worst possible outcome...'(FT, Dec. 31, 1981;1) Secretary Haig said that it was Moscow's main objective to create this rift.(Ibid.) However, it was found by the Financial Times that his speech outlining sanctions on the Soviet Union was objected to by the EC member states. Nonetheless, Reagan did not temper his remarks and titled his speech 'Poland - the Soviet Responsibility and the American Response'.(Keesings, 1982;31456)

After this episode, US officials were quoted in the press as saying that '...the approach [with the allies] now isn't to lay on great pressure...one of the lessons of Afghanistan is you don't make friends if you try to force them into actions...'(WSJ, Dec. 31, 1981;2) However, this conciliatory tone towards Western Europe did not carry over into the early part of 1982. Firstly Secretary Haig made an interesting link between his condemnation of the USSR and his anger over West European refusal to blame the Soviet Union for the events in Poland. Haig said that

> for well over a year, the alliance has stated that there would be serious consequences if the Soviet Union intervened to reverse an entirely peaceful dialogue in Poland...[and] Soviet responsibility for present events is clear, a western failure to act would not only assist the repression of the Polish people but also diminish the confidence about our reactions to future events in Poland and elsewhere...
>
> [as well] the West is often accused of being merely a collection of consumer societies. Are we so sated or intimidated that we fear to defend the values that make life worth living?...(IHT, Jan. 13, 1982;1)

Prior to the CoCom meetings US officials were quoted as saying that their allies did not fully comprehend the far-reaching consequences of flexible restrictions on the

exportation of commercial goods to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. One official stated that the US '...wants to educate and persuade Europeans about where we go from here [with respect to stronger restrictions on trade]...'(WSJ, Jan. 19, 1982;8) Mooted by President Reagan and Secretary Haig, a proposal to reduce the number of US armed forces stationed in Western Europe was introduced on the floor of the US Senate by Senator Ted Stevens in late February.(Keesings, 1982;31459)

By the first week of March, the West German Foreign Minister, Genscher, was informed that the United States would not raise the matter of the Siberian pipeline again because of anti-West European sentiment engendered by the announced and implemented US position.(Ibid.) But the damage had apparently been done. At a government-sponsored seminar on East-West security issues, in June 1982, one West European official commented was that '...there's something wrong here...dropping any consideration of the merits of the pipeline, whether it creates dependencies, whether it helps the Russians, the strangest thing is how the Americans don't see they'll lose twice: on the most crass level, they won't stop the pipeline, and they look very incompetent in sacrificing the capital they have built up recently [in Western Europe]...'(NYT, June 28, 1982)

What is immediately noticeable in the Polish crisis is its similarity to the Arab-Israeli conflict examined in the previous chapter; differences in language were also present. Also, differences in language relating to the position, policies and actions of the Soviet Union were noted and examined. In addition, there was an expansion of this rhetoric from a regional to global dimension, not to mention anti-European sentiment from the Administration and the Senate making its way into the public domain. This also occurred in the Polish crisis. Even when the EC member states condemned the Soviet Union, it was three months late and they never desired to expand on the ramification of events to encompass the broader East-West relationship. And lastly, the United States appeared to go out of its way to offend West European leaders over their response to the imposition of martial law and the actions taken by the US.

As was the case with the Middle East, one can look to 'conventional wisdoms' to ascertain an answer. The question is can this answer be comprehensive enough to 'claim to know', as the Realist project so desired? The 'wisdom' is quite well known. Western Europe sought to limit its assessment of blame towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for self-interested and political, security, trade and energy-based considerations. The proximity of the Soviet Union, coupled with the need of Western Europe to attain a stable supply of energy resources and the direct impact of sanctions and a loss of trade and contracts from the Soviet Union and its satellite states would be devastating for the economies of all of the major industrialized countries of the European Community. This is not true for the United States, and as such has greater freedom to ascribe blame to the Soviet Union; link Poland to overall East-West relations; and proceed with policies such as

those devised within the context of CoCom. Also, the status of the United States as the only Western country able to counter the Soviet Union on a global scale, as determined by its capabilities, may deem necessary linkage between regional and global acts. A statement by Secretary of State Haig on December 27, 1981, relates closely to this assumption. Haig stated that because the United States '...remains the leader of the Western world...[it] therefore in most respects be the pacesetter [in reacting to the Polish crisis...'(Keesings, 1982;31454)

But does all of this ring true to form, or can one identify gaps within this logic that convey the possibility of an alternative perspective? Firstly, and as was true of the study on the Arab-Israeli conflict, a domestic perspective is taken by Western Europe. When Lord Carrington, on behalf of the EC, professed that only Polish people can decide their fate, he was attempting to state what the EC member states saw as the self-evident if painful truth; no matter what the West would like to do, martial law is going to end at the behest of the Polish and Soviet governments. Western interference may only serve to exacerbate the matter. The notion that the United States, as a global power, can affect any situation may be one reason why the US took such an active stand.[10] No one can adequately defend the position that sanctions on the landing rights of Aeroflot, for example, were the cause of the end of martial law. Analyses of the material needs of the USSR to ensure construction of the Siberian pipeline were such that the sanctions placed upon West European and US firms would have only delayed completion. These sanctions would not have ended the building of the pipeline.(Keesings, 1982;31459) As well, the sanctions, if carried out over a longer duration, would have made the Soviet Union independent of Western technology for they would have needed to not only build their own, smaller turbines, but eventually construct a plant able to produce turbines the size of those built by General Electric in the United States. Sanctions may have been, if carried to their logical conclusion, damaging, but for the United States rather than the Soviet Union. Lastly, the inability to fully or even adequately understand the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union in any instance makes explanation of Soviet actions tenuous at best. A second reason why gaps may appear in the ability of Realist approaches to explain US-EC divergencies concerns the emphasis placed upon commercial ties as means of establishing and maintaining contacts between states. Time and again Chancellor Schmidt spoke of these contacts that assisted in the formation of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik in the late 1960s, the strengthening of these same ties throughout the decade of the 1970s, and the ability of these ties to maintain these relations even during crises such as Poland and Afghanistan. So too did a number of the other leaders of EC member states, most notably Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom.[11]

But in itself this is not terribly important as Realist considerations can be ascertained. However, there are a number of points of interest. As mentioned earlier, the

study by Rode illustrates that this pattern of positive compared to negative sanctions is historic when examining US-Eastern Europe and EC-Eastern Europe relations. Secondly, the United States attempted to utilize the same type of negotiating tactic with the EC as it had done with Eastern Europe since the late 1940s. In this instance, this tactic failed to produce the desired results, as seen by the natural gas and pipeline delivery contracts signed by France, Spain and a number of EC-based companies following the imposition of retroactive and extra-territorial sanctions. Interestingly, it has usually failed with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, too. Lastly, the sentiments of the US Administration directed towards Western Europe illustrate again this notion of the United States as the leader of the Western world, and the need for others to follow her positions, policies and statements. If this does not occur, for whatever reason, anger is expressed. The irony of these comments from the likes of Secretary Haig is that he blames the Soviet Union for creating a rift between the allies, and not the policies of the United States. This is slightly ironic not because he was of this belief, but because the timing of events such as Reagan's speech on December 29 was that it was done with full knowledge of West European reactions; and then US officials concern themselves with being too heavy handed towards their allies and the possibility of a rift between them over the matter of Poland.

All of the above point to two related conclusions to this first assessment. The first is that, as posited by Phil Williams and the body of research that he represents, the Realist conventional wisdom is not only subject to criticism on account of its position, but its inability to comprehensively explain why the European Community and the United States differed to the extent they did over the imposition of martial law in Poland. The second conclusion is that the desire of the West European member states to continue their relations with Eastern Europe, and to utilize commercial contacts to furnish political realities, illustrates a further two points. Firstly, the Realist wisdom appears to be an inappropriate model to utilize in explaining this development. Secondly, while ideas, ideological content and values may not explain the maintenance of these contacts (however this is unproven at this juncture), it may be fair to say that unit and sub-unit factors can; factors that the academic leaders of the Realist tradition reject as being useful in the calculation of interests within the international system. The need to seek out additional and alternative theoretical models is already perceived as necessary, and two subsequent 'assessments' sections remain.

B. Policy Initiatives

Not surprisingly, the policies adopted by the United States and the EC member states coincide, in the main, with the rhetorical stances mentioned above. As stated in President Reagan's first address on the Polish crisis, he would make sure that the

relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union would not be 'business as usual' if martial law did not end soon. This was on December 18, 1981. By December 24 the United States had drawn up and announced a set of sanctions designed to affect Poland. These included the banning of Polish aircraft from landing rights in the United States (primarily New York); the ending of the renewal of credits to Poland from the US Export-Import Bank; and the withdrawal of Polish fishing rights in US waters.

These initial moves were followed on a number of fronts. The first was an attempt to utilize NATO meetings as another forum in which sanctions would be agreed to and applied. The second was a meeting between President Reagan and Chancellor Schmidt in Washington. Reagan pressed his West German counterpart to assist in pushing the EC member states to place a number of sanctions on the Soviet Union and Poland. The third was the mid-January meeting of CoCom. There, as mentioned above, US officials were instructed to propose a series of measures that would further restrict the export of military and commercial equipment to Eastern Europe and, in particular, the Soviet Union. Fourth and finally, the United States expanded its range of sanctions at the end of December.

The NATO meetings proved, at first, inconclusive. The original statement of NATO in late December noted its 'great concern' for the events unfolding in Poland, but no decisions regarding sanctions took place. By January 11 another NATO ministerial meeting was held, with a more comprehensive statement being issued. As reported above this statement directed blame towards the Soviet Union but went no further than that. It was agreed that '...each ally will, in accordance with its own situation and legislation, identify appropriate national possibilities for action...'(Keesings, 1982;31460) The restriction of Polish and Soviet diplomats and a reduction in exchange agreements were listed as those areas where agreement may be found. By January 30 all of the NATO allies except for Greece agreed that there would be no more subsidized food shipments to Poland, talks concerning the rescheduling of Poland's foreign debt would be delayed until after the end of martial law, and government guaranteed bank credits for Poland would also cease.(Economist, Jan. 30, 1982;49)

Secondly, Chancellor Schmidt met with President Reagan and agreed on a number of points concerning the situation in Poland. As mentioned previously, this meeting began the link between existing US policies and the strengthening of EC statements. Both leaders stated that the Soviet Union was responsible for the actions of the Polish government, but disagreed over the proper use of economic sanctions. At one end of the spectrum Schmidt said that '...in the economic field there isn't so much pressure the West could bring to bear...' whereas, at the other, Reagan called for '...forceful measures to induce both Polish and Soviet authorities...'(WSJ, Jan. 6, 1982;3) The attempts by US officials to call for tougher CoCom guidelines that would further restrict trade from the West to the East also fell on deaf ears. Most of the EC member states involved in these talks rejected the need to

expand the list of goods subject to review, as well as the need to include commercial goods within the definition of military hardware. It was not until November 1982 that an agreement of sorts, was reached between the allies. And at that juncture the agreement was more of an agreement to review rather than create policies.

Finally, the United States implemented a series of Soviet-directed measures on December 29, 1981. These included a ban on Aeroflot landing rights in the United States; the ending of a variety of low level agreements and exchanges between the two countries, and the suspension of the export of oil and natural gas equipment from US companies to the USSR. As an addendum, pipe-layers were included. To this end it has already been reported that the United Stated expanded, in 1982, this last restriction to include US owned and operated companies world-wide, as well as companies utilizing US material under license.

At odds with these policies were the member states of the European Community. Notably absent from their list of sanctions were any items mentioned by President Reagan. The only agreement between the allies existed over financial relations between the West and Poland, and the restriction of the movement of Polish and Soviet diplomats. Also, no attempt was made to utilize NATO and CoCom forums to assert their position, per se, as was the case with the United States. Bellicose rhetoric towards the Soviet Union and the United States was not prevalent. The EC member states refused to link its condemnation of Soviet and Polish actions to economic sanctions, mainly for the reasons stated by Chancellor Schmidt and given credence to by US officials, specifically with respect to the ability of the West to disrupt the completion of the Siberian Pipeline. Those sanctions eventually imposed by the EC included a ban on luxury items and non-energy based resources.

Again, as a concluding assessment to this section, the question of why this divergence between the allies occurred must be posited. The conventional wisdom behind these divergencies is that Western Europe had too much to lose from the imposition of sanctions such as those preferred by the United States. While a number of US companies had contracts with West European firms and the Soviet government with respect to the pipeline project, the value of these contracts and the man-hours of potential employment were not comparable. As such, the US government may have perceived itself to be in a privileged position, and thus more flexible in the approach it could take in response to the Polish crisis. Western Europe did not have such flexibility. Economic, commercial, diplomatic and financial considerations appear, for commentators and US officials alike, as the sole reason behind West European intransigence.

But is this the case, or must one understand the value of commercial and financial relations with respect to détente, as well as the influence that Western Europe can have in Eastern Europe? Schmidt, prior to and during his meeting with Reagan, was of the belief

that the West had very little scope in its ability to influence events in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union maintained a sphere of influence in this area of the continent and would pay whatever price it must to maintain that sphere. The autarkic nature of command economies, by and large, is a hallmark of the desire to maintain an independent position in the wake of potential crises. The imposition of martial law, coupled with the reactions of the United States, may be one such crisis.

Secondly, and as mentioned as the third of the three reasons why the language of the allies was noticeably different throughout the crisis, West European politicians perceived détente and the maintenance of this relationship to be broader than that of the United States. The emergence of détente for the latter was the conclusion of the SALT I and Basic Agreements documents of the early 1970s. However, scholars such as Alexander George conclude that the United States saw these agreements as a means by which the USSR would be constrained globally. The reverse believed by the Soviet leadership.[12] Nevertheless, for Western Europe détente was a two part process that would lead to a stabilization of relations between East and West, and a gradual normalization of these relations. The policies of Willy Brandt in the 1960s and 1970s are indicative of the commercial, business and social nature of détente that would infuse the political, military and security aspects of this 'agreement'. The conclusion of friendship treaties and the construction of a pipeline with assistance from West European states and firms is illustrative of the use of economic levels in a positive rather than negative manner. The opposite is true for the United States.(See Stent, 1982 and Rode, 1985)

Does this divergence over conceptions of the constituent elements of détente relate to the explanatory abilities of Realist thought and its related 'conventional wisdom'? One may conclude that these diverging policies reflect a combination of interest-based and non-interest-based factors. The expansion of the definition of 'security', and how it can and should be achieved - through military as well as political and business-related measures - may reflect differences in unit and sub-unit factors such as ideas, ideological perspectives and beliefs concerning what is and is not important, not obvious at the level of the international structure. If so, then the ability of Neorealism to explain comprehensively US-EC divergencies with respect to the imposition of martial law in Poland in late 1981 and early 1982 is in doubt. Additional and/or alternative theoretical models may be in order. This is not to say that it should be a forgone conclusion that ideas, ideological beliefs and certain values pertaining to the way the world should work are necessarily correct, or the only unit and sub-unit factors at work in this instance. However, the differences over the way in which economic, commercial and business related issues are utilized and manipulated lend credence to the belief that a gap exists within the Realist project; and given the criticisms of US reactions to West European policies and the historical pattern of these

divergencies, the notion that idea-based factors are at work appear credible enough to warrant further investigation.

C. The Strange Case of the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, out of all the member states of the European Community, provides an interesting insight into why divergencies between the allies occurred. To restate, the conventional wisdom on differences between the United States and the European Community is based on the latter's dependency on trade, energy resources and employment relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s the Siberian pipeline project was the illustration of this dependency, and the reason Western Europe was reluctant to directly blame and impose sanctions on the Soviet Union. To a certain extent, these criticisms ring true. Countries such as France, Spain and West Germany have extensive business dealings with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The situation of the United Kingdom with respect to this criticism, however, is different. As indicated in the appendices relating to which countries were most involved in the pipeline project, the one country omitted is the United Kingdom. Because of the existence of North Sea oil, Britain received none of the natural gas supplied by the pipeline project. Also, only one company in the United Kingdom had contracts with the project. John Brown PLC had agreed to a contract to supply turbines with a monetary value of 180 Million US Dollars. This figure pales in comparison to those contracts with French, West German and Italian firms, the combined total of which exceeded 2.7 billion US dollars. Therefore if there was one country that had as much flexibility in the assessment of responsibility and the imposition of sanctions as the United States, it was the United Kingdom.

But such was not the case. In fact, Prime Minister Thatcher can be seen as being more ardent in her rejection of the US position than many of her West European/EC counterparts. This unilateral position can be seen on two occasions. The first was the note sent to the Polish government by the United Kingdom on December 23, 1981. This note called for the maintenance of communications between East and West in the wake of the imposition of martial law.(UK, Dec., 23, 1981) The Prime Minister did not reiterate the position of the EC after the latter had agreed to assess blame in the direction of the Soviet Union. In the House of Commons Thatched said that '...there will be some action to indicate we believe that Russia not only knew exactly what was going on, but played a part in it...'(FT., Jan. 11, 1982;1) Tindemans, in his press conference, went so far as to indicate that, like the position of the United States, the EC was of the belief that the imposition of martial law was imposed upon the Polish government by the Soviet leadership. By stating that the USSR played 'a part' the Prime Minister may not have been convinced that the

United States or the European Community were correct in their assessments of the situation, and who was responsible for what. This statement agrees with those issues by Lord Carrington, from the outset of the crisis, on behalf of the government. Time and again the Foreign Secretary said that '...the problems of Poland should be solved peacefully by the Polish people, in the spirit of compromise, without outside interference, so that the process of reform and renewal can continue...'(SCA, Mar. 12-13, 1982;67)

Of course, the context of this stance should be noted. Throughout her career as Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher was regarded as the 'Iron Lady' with respect to her outward hatred of all things Soviet. This makes her reluctance to condemn even more curious. However, the other context that the Prime Minister should be placed in is one of a reluctant European. Scholarly work testifies to the distaste felt by Mrs. Thatcher with respect to the federalist project within the European Community. This distaste was illustrated in her infamous Bruges speech where she spoke of the need to roll back the frontiers of the state at all levels, including the European 'superstate'. But it was this same Thatcher that on most occasions found a significant degree of convergence with her West European counterparts, especially with their request for the EC Commission to prepare the necessary documents for a court challenge over the applicability of the US Export Administration Act to foreign-based firms. The Economist remarked in an article concerning these legal manoeuvres that what was noticeable was not that French, Italian and West German companies and officials were continuing to resist US pressure and pushing forward with a legal challenge, but that the United Kingdom was as well.(Economist, Sep. 18, 1982;65) As such, the third context for the Prime Minister lends even more doubt to the Realist conventional wisdom. This context is that of the 'special relationship' that existed between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan. Originally Thatcher had asked for an exemption for John Brown PLC from the EAA and US sanctions, and the UK leader had attempted to temper the anti-American sentiment of the European Council meeting of June 28-29. However, when realizing that the 'special relationship' would not work to her advantage, Prime Minister Thatcher began to utilize the mechanisms of the European Community, and her language can be seen to have become even more divergent from that of the United States.(Katzman, 1988;37)

This stance taken by the United Kingdom, in the face of overlapping contexts and the lack of an economic need to do so, frustrates the conventional wisdom and points to that gap within the Realist project that Phil Williams speaks of. The question therefore is why was this so. Julie Katzman notes that the EC negotiator on the issue of extra-territoriality was Sir Roy Denman, a long time UK Foreign Office diplomat. As such, the Prime Minister may have felt more at ease with EC mechanisms because of the person in charge of the proceedings.(Ibid., 37) However, this is only one point out of many that cannot be explained by the conventional wisdom. However, both of these arguments fail to

impress. Consistently Thatcher was not the sort of politician who sought 'European' credentials, except in her understanding of what a 'European' meant. Also, the 'shadow of the future' (Axelrod, 1984) should prevail at all times, not just during crisis situations because the Ten member states are continually locked in negotiating sessions where continuos give and take is required.

Possibly, in the end, one should retreat to historical explanations; that the United Kingdom has a history of utilizing economic incentives in a positive rather than negative fashion places it within a context, rather than that of the United States.[13] Also, while there is an Anglo-Saxon link between the United Kingdom and United States, an unconscious and latent 'Europeanization' of British thinking with respect to matters concerning the concept of security, has occurred because of the intensity of relations and contacts established between Britain and the other members of the European Community. As posited by the likes of Karl Deutsch, integration of countries can occur on a variety of levels, one of these levels being that of socialization - the creation of a 'community'.(Deutsch, 1973) Consequently, two factors found at the level of the international system and attributable to Neorealism and its 'conventional wisdom' with respect to transatlantic differences, are firstly, unit and sub-unit levels of analysis and secondly, ideas, ideologies, values and belief system. Essentially, one may be moving into the realm of 'how and why people think the way they do' rather than 'how the international system determines the course of world events. The gap, especially with the case of the United Kingdom, is present; the credibility of Neorealism found lacking; and the move to alternative and/or additional theoretical constructs that appeal to unit and sub-unit factors essential.

VIII:Conclusion

The work of Williams, Stent, Miller and Woolcock illustrate a gap exists between the explanatory power of the conventional wisdom specific to this case study and the realities of the situation. As was true of the previous case study, the dominant literature associated with this case study of allied divergence posits that resources and geostrategic considerations were at the root of EC- US troubles. The degree of trade with Eastern Europe and the USSR in the critical area of energy, coupled with the proximity of the Soviet Union and the possibility of military action by the latter in a part of its empire spilling over or having direct consequences in Western Europe were the specifics of this argument, whereas the opposite was true for the United States. Consequently, the latter was able to pursue a more vigorous anti-Soviet policy, whereas the member-states of the European Community were not. In brief, this is the summarization of the traditional understanding of allied relations during the Polish Martial Law crisis.

However, the critique of this position by authors already mentioned exposes gaps within this logic. The specific role of the United Kingdom in this affair, combined with a differing perspective of the trade figures between Western Europe and the Soviet Union and the way in which the former manages its resources and trade relations, historically and in the present, all give rise to a belief that the conventional literature is not able to explain and understand the empirical data. Statements by officials and politicians from Western Europe and the United States add to this belief.

But like that of the previous case study the question of how do these conclusions assist in the overall project of this thesis is once again relevant. The acceptance of a resource and narrowly-defined interest based conception of international relations, as well as one that is greatly determined by geostrategic and geographical considerations (objective factors that cannot be changed by any actor), is a thesis that is similar to the initial propositions and assumptions of the tradition of Political Realism that is to be found in the first chapter. As such, there a definite link can be made between the conventional literature and explanation found in this case study and the core assumptions of Political Realism. Bluntly, there is a fit. But another fit is also found; the one between the weaknesses of the conventional wisdom found in this chapter, those found in the previous chapter, and those of Political Realism in the first. An adherence to 'structural' and objective factors; of power-based calculations of interest; of a single level analysis of a situation such as the imposition of Martial Law in Poland; and rejection of 'agency' and sub-unit factors of analysis, not to mention non-state actors, are not only the hallmarks of the propositions of Political Realism in general, but the conventional literature of this case study.

The above conclusions and linkages between various propositions and conventional wisdoms is such that one again the self-imposed test required by Hans Morgenthau in Politics among Nations exposes the inability of Political Realism to 'claim to know' why the United States and European Community differ with respect to this case study. This is so not only because of the above, but also due to the activism of a non-state actor such as the EC in this affair, and the acceptance of this author to test the propositions of Political Realism in the realm of security relations, of issues that relate to the supposed dominant concerns of states and statesmen, war and peace, so to speak, as well as the acceptance of Williams' claim that a 'bad faith model' which is present at the level of 'agency' is partially responsible for differing reactions to this crisis.

Given that Political Realism fails an empirical and logical test in the case of allied reactions to the crisis in Poland in 1981 and 1982, what comes next? A similar answer to that of the previous case study can also be given, in that what comes next must be a continued search for a theory that is more comprehensive than that of Political Realism with respect to the explanation of allied security relations. To this end this alternative

tradition must include notions relating to the relevance of non-state actors, agency, unit and sub-unit levels of analysis alongside those of an international nature, and a more comprehensive concept of sovereignty that allows for a division of this concept, rather than a static belief in the primacy and sacrosancteness of the individisibility of the nation-state and all that it encompasses. Which tradition, theory or school of thought this may be is not at present known, nor will be discussed. One case study remains to be explicated and analyzed, and only then, when one reaches the concluding section of the thesis, shall a more comprehensive answer to the 'where do we go next' be given to the reader.

---

[1]See also an article detailing the opinion of Chancellor Schmidt on the maintenance of relations between East and Western Europe during the crisis in The Guardian, January 4, 1982, p.5.

[2]For a more recent espousal of West European contingency plans and their effect upon the US position see B. Crawford, Economic Vulnerability in International Relations:East-West Trade, Investment, and Finance, New York:Columbia University Press, 1993, p.174-177. Crawford contends that '...in sum, Western Europe's vulnerabilities of resource dependence in this case were low before the pipeline crisis and were reduced even further thereafter...(p.178)

[3]Crawford cites a statement by Richard Perle, the National Security Advisor for President Reagan who said that '...we have to anticipate that in a crisis, the Soviets might interrupt the flow of gas to achieve political purposes. They have done so before...'(p. 159)

[4] See also William Cromwell's The United States and the European Pillar, pp.185-189 and 246 for a similar perspective on West European and American differences with respect to the role of ideological and indigenous forces and the East-West relationship on the understanding of certain regional crises.

[5] See also the work done by Linda Miller, Stephen Woolcock and Angela Stent as reviewed in earlier sections of this chapter. The author is of the belief that Williams' work is able to encompass the arguments of the others as well as his own.

[6] Secretary Haig went on to add that '...we [the US] cannot pretend to build up the structure of peace and security here in Madrid while the foundation for that structure is being undermined in Poland...'(IHT, Feb. 10, 1982;1)

[7] Noted in all of the major works done of the imposition of martial law, such as Anthony Blinken's Ally versus Ally, is the large degree of debt that was owed to West European and US-based lending institutions at the time of the martial law decrees by not only Poland, but every East European state.

[8] The International Herald Tribue, after airing these sentiments by West European officials, quotes Secretary Haig saying that '...we're here because of our continuing support for the Helsinki process...' and that ending the conference was not an American intention.(IHT, Feb. 10, 1982;2) However, concern on the part of West European officials illustrates that lack of trust and communication between the allies during the midst of the Polish crisis because of diverging views over the role of the Soviet Union and actions that should be implemented by one, the other, or both.

[9]As cited above, Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Thatcher spoke in the same vain in the early and middle parts of January 1982. For the former see The Guardian, January 4, 1982, p.5 and the latter, the Financial Times, January 11, 1982, p.1.

[10] Chancellor Schmidt is quoted as saying exactly this point. In an interview the West German leader said that '...almost 40 years ago, the Powers decided in a meeting in Yalta to practically divide up Europe into spheres of influence...so the possibilities of influencing developments in Eastern Europe are limited and that is true of the present situation in Poland...'(Guardian, January 4, 1982;5)

[11] A detailed assessment of the position and policies of the United Kingdom in itself will be conducted later in this section of the case study.

[12] For a detailed analysis of the conflicting perceptions held by the United States and Soviet Union on the matter of the 1972 Basic Agreement and SALT I accords, see A. George, Managing US- Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, Boulder:Westview Press, 1983.

[13] See the assessment made above by R. Rode and E. Barker, The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-1950, Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1983, for another historical examination of this consistent positive utilization of trade with respect to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Appendix 5.1

Proposed Route, Trans-Siberian Pipeline



Source: Economist, July 10, 1982, p.63

Appendix 5.2

Speech by President Reagan
December 29, 1981

Announcement of United States Sanctions against Soviet Union

President Reagan issued on Dec. 29, 1981, a statement entitled *Poland—the Soviet Responsbility and the American Response*, in which he announced for the first time US sanctions against the Soviet Union in connexion with the Polish crisis. The statement was worded as follows:

"The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. For many months the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such a crackdown. They brought major pressures to bear through now-public letters to the Polish leadership, military manoeuvres and other forms of intimidation. They now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued.

"Last week I announced that I had sent a letter to President Brezhnev urging him to permit the restoration of basic human rights in Poland, as provided for in the Helsinki Final Act. I also informed him that, if the repression continued, the United States would have no choice but to take further concrete political and economic measures affecting our relationship.

"The repression in Poland continues, and President Brezhnev has responded in a manner which makes it clear the Soviet Union does not understand the seriousness of our concern, and its obligations under both the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter. I have therefore decided to take the following immediate measures with regard to the Soviet Union:

"(1) All [services of] Aeroflot [the Soviet civil airline] . . . to the United States will be suspended.

"(2) The Soviet purchasing commission is being closed.

"(3) The issuance or renewal of licences for the export to the USSR of electronic equipment, computers and other high-technology materials is being suspended.

"(4) Negotiations on a new long-term grains agreement are being postponed.

"(5) Negotiations on a new US-Soviet maritime agreement are being suspended, and a new regime of port-access controls will be put into effect for all Soviet ships when the current agreement expires on Dec. 31.

"(6) Licences will be required for export to the Soviet Union for an expanded list of oil and gas equipment. Issuance of such licences will be suspended. This includes pipe-layers.

"(7) US-Soviet exchange agreements coming up for renewal in the near future, including the agreements on energy and science and technology, will not be renewed. There will be a complete review of all other US-Soviet exchange agreements.

"The United States wants a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union. We intend to maintain a high-level dialogue. But we are prepared to proceed in whatever direction the Soviet Union decides upon—towards greater mutual restraint and co-operation, or further down a harsh and less rewarding path. We will watch events in Poland closely in the coming days and weeks. Further steps may be necessary and I will be prepared to take them. American decisions will be determined by Soviet actions.

"Secretary Haig has been in communication with our friends and allies about the measures we are taking and explained why we believe such steps are essential at this time.

"Once again I call upon the Soviet Union to recognize the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people for a process of national reconciliation, renewal and reform."

Source: Keesings, April 30, 1982, p.31456

Appendix 5.3

European Political Cooperation Declaration
January 4, 1982

The final communiqué issued after the Jan. 4 meeting of European Community Foreign Ministers was as follows:

"(1) The Ten utterly disapprove of the development of the situation in Poland.

"(2) They have noted the declarations of the Polish leadership of its intention to maintain national independence and to re-establish in the near future liberty and the process of reform, as well as resuming the dialogue with the various elements of the Polish nation. Unhappily the Ten must note today that, contrary to these declarations, what has taken place has not been dialogue but repression, bringing in its train violations of the most elementary human and citizens' rights, contrary to the Helsinki Final Act, the United Nations Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"(3) The Ten therefore appeal urgently to the Polish authorities to end as soon as possible the state of martial law, to release those arrested and to restore a general dialogue with the Church and Solidarity.

"(4) The significance of these grave events extends beyond Poland itself. The inability of the system in Eastern Europe to accept the modifications necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people is such as to endanger public confidence in the possibility of co-operative links with the East, and thus seriously to affect international relations. In this context the Ten note with concern and disapproval the serious external pressure and the campaign directed by the USSR and other Eastern European countries against the efforts for renewal in Poland.

"(5) This already grave situation would be further aggravated if it led to an open intervention by the Warsaw Pact. For this reason the Ten wish to issue a solemn warning against any such intervention.

"(6) The Ten are totally in sympathy with the Polish people and are willing to continue the direct humanitarian aid to them.

"(7) The Ten have taken note of the economic measures taken by the United States Government with regard to the USSR. The Ten will undertake in this context close and positive consultations with the United States Government and with the governments of other Western states in order to define what decisions will best serve their common objectives, and to avoid any step which could compromise their respective actions.

"(8) Developments in Poland constitute a grave violation of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. The Ten, therefore, consider that the Madrid conference should discuss them as soon as possible at ministerial level. The Ten will make approaches to the neutral and non-aligned states to propose an early resumption of the Madrid meeting. [For the debate on Poland in Madrid on Feb. 9 and thereafter, see below.]

"(9) The Ten will work in the United Nations and its specialized agencies for a denunciation of violations of human rights and acts of violence.

"(10) Other measures will be considered as the situation in Poland develops, in particular measures concerning credit and economic assistance to Poland, and measures concerning the Community's commercial policy with regard to the USSR. In addition, the Ten will examine the question of further food aid to Poland.

"(11) The Ten have called on the Polish authorities, both nationally and through the presidency, to lift the abnormal and unaccept-

Source: Keesings, April 30, 1982, p. 31456

Appendix 5.4

NATO Sanctions List
January 11, 1982

Country	Sanction
United States	Delay in start of long range nuclear weapons negotiations. Embargo on material for Siberian gas piepline. Closure of Soviet purchasing mission in New York. Suspension of licenses for export of high-tech material to USSR. Postponement of long term grain agreement talks. Suspension of maratime agreement talks; stiffer controls on Soviet ships. Suspension of exchange visits and co-operative scientific research projects. Suspension of landing rights for Aeroflot. Reduction of landing rights for Lot (Polish airline). Suspension of Polish fishing rights in US waters.
Most of NATO	End of government-gauranteed bank credits to Poland, except for food. Delay of Polish debt repayment talks. End to subsidized food shipments to Poland. Public condemnation of USSR and Poland at CSCE meeting in Helsinki.

Note: Greece agreed to only the last of the sanctions in the NATO catgeory.

Source: Economist. January 30, 1982, p.49

Appendix 5.5

NATO Declaration
January 11, 1982

"(1) The Allied governments condemn the imposition of martial law in Poland and denounce the massive violation of human rights and the suppression of fundamental civil liberties in contravention of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Final Act of Helsinki.

"(2) The process of renewal and reform which began in Poland in August 1980 was watched with sympathy and hope by all who believe in freedom and self-determination; it resulted from a genuine effort by the overwhelming majority of the Polish people to achieve a more open society in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki.

"(3) The imposition of martial law, the use of force against Polish workers, with the thousands of internments, the harsh prison sentences and the deaths that followed, have deprived the Polish people of their rights and freedoms, in particular in the field of trade unions. These acts threaten to destroy the basis for reconciliation and compromise which are necessary to progress and stability in Poland. They are in clear violation of Polish commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the principle relating to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Developments in Poland demonstrate once again the rigidity of the Warsaw Pact regimes with respect to those changes necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of their peoples*. This endangers public confidence in co-operation between East and West and seriously affects international relations.

"(4) The Allies deplore the sustained campaign mounted by the Soviet Union against efforts by the Polish people for national renewal and reform, and its active support for the subsequent systematic suppression of those efforts in Poland. These acts cannot be reconciled with the Soviet Union's international undertakings, and in particular with the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki, especially those dealing with sovereignty, non-intervention, threat of force, and self-determination. The Soviet Union has no right to determine the political and social development of Poland.

"(5) The Allies call upon the Polish leadership to live up to its declared intention to re-establish civil liberties and the process of reform. They urge the Polish authorities to end the state of martial law, to release those arrested, and to restore immediately a dialogue with the Church and Solidarity. Only with reconciliation and genuine negotiation can the basic rights of the Polish people and workers be protected, and the economic and social progress of the country be secured. Poland could then expect to enjoy fully the benefits of stability in Europe and of constructive political and economic relations with the West.

"(6) The Allies call upon the Soviet Union to respect Poland's fundamental right to solve its own problems free from foreign interference and to respect the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people for national renewal and reform. Soviet pressure, direct or indirect, aimed at frustrating that desire, must cease. The Allies also warn that if an outside armed intervention were to take place it would have the most profound consequences for international relations.

"(7) In their communique of Dec. 11, 1981 [see pages 31430-31], NATO ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work for a climate of confidence and mutual restraint in East-West relations; what has since happened in Poland has great significance for the development of security and co-operation in Europe. The persistence of repression in Poland is eroding the political foundation for progress on the full agenda of issues which divide East and West.

"(8) The Allies remain committed to the policies of effective deterrence and the pursuit of arms control and in particular have welcomed the initiatives contained in President Reagan's Nov. 18 speech [on proposals for arms limitation or reduction in Europe—see page 31431]. The Soviet Union will bear full responsibility if its actions with regard to Poland and its failure to live up to existing international obligations damage the arms control process. A return to the process of real reforms and dialogue in Poland would help create the atmosphere of mutual confidence and restraint required for progress in negotiations in the field of arms control and limitations, including the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces [INF—ibid.] due to resume on Jan. 12.

"(9) In view of the grave developments in Poland, which constitute a serious violation of the Helsinki Final Act, the Allies agreed that the Madrid conference should deal with the situation as soon as possible at the level of Foreign Ministers.

"(10) The Allies will also intensify their efforts to bring to the attention of world public opinion and international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies such as the International Labour Organization, the violation of human rights and acts of violence in Poland.

"(11) Each ally will, in accordance with its own situation and legislation, identify appropriate national possibilities for action in the following fields: (i) further restrictions on the movements of Soviet and Polish diplomats, and other restrictions on Soviet and Polish diplomatic missions and organizations; (ii) reduction of scientific and technical activities or non-renewal of exchange agreements.

"Meanwhile the Allies emphasize: their determination to do what lies in their power to ensure that the truth about events in Poland continues to reach the Polish people despite the obstacles created by the authorities in Warsaw and Moscow in direct contravention of their obligations under the Helsinki Final Act; their resolve that the quality of their relations with the military regime in Poland should reflect the abnormal nature of the present situation and their refusal to accept it as permanent; their willingness to contribute, with other governments, to the solution of the problem of Polish citizens now abroad and unable or unwilling to return to their own country."

"(12) The Allies recognize the importance of economic measures to persuade the Polish authorities and the Soviet Union of the seriousness of Western concern over developments in Poland, and stress the significance of the measures already announced by President Reagan."

"(13) Regarding economic relations with Poland, the Allies: noted that future commercial credits for goods other than foods will be placed in abeyance; noted that the question of holding negotiations about the payments due in 1982 on Poland's official debts should, for the time being, be held in suspense; affirmed their willingness to continue and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish people for distribution and monitoring by non-governmental organizations to ensure that it reaches the people for whom it is intended; noted that those Allies which sell food to Poland will seek the clearest possible Polish commitments with regard to the use of the food."

"(14) In the current situation in Poland, economic relations with Poland and the Soviet Union are bound to be affected. Soviet actions towards Poland make it necessary for the Allies to examine the course of future economic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union. Recognizing that each of the Allies will act in accordance with its own situation and laws, they will examine measures which could involve arrangements regarding imports from the Soviet Union, maritime agreements, air services agreements, the size of Soviet commercial representation and the conditions surrounding export credits."

"(15) The Allies will maintain close consultations on the implementation of their resolve not to undermine the effect of each other's measures.

"(16) In addition to agreeing to consult on steps to be taken in the near future, the Allies will also reflect on longer-term East-West economic relations, particularly energy, agricultural commodities and other goods, and the export of technology, in light of the changed situation and of the need to protect their competitive position in the field of military and technological capabilities."*

* The Greek delegation reserved its position (i) on the sentence in Paragraph (3) beginning: "Developments in Poland", and (ii) on Paragraphs (11), (12), (13), (14) and (16).

Source: Keesings, April 30, 1982, p.31457

Appendix 5.6

General Energy and Trade Statistics

Table I

Total Imports, as a percentage of EC and US trade, from Eastern Europe/Soviet Union

		EC	US
E.E/USSR	1970	2.0/1.0	0.4/0.2
	1975	2.0/1/5	0.4/0.2
	1980	2.0/2/0	0.4/0.1
	1982	2.0/3.0	0.3/0.1
	1985	2.0/2.0	0.4/0.1
Average		2.0/2.0	0.4/0.1

Table II

Total Exports, as a percentage of EC and US trade, to Eastern Europe/Soviet Union

		EC	US
E.E/USSR	1970	3.0/1.0	1.0/0.3
	1975	5.0/2.0	2.5/1.5
	1980	3.0/1.5	2.0/1.0
	1982	3.0/1.5	2.0/1.0
Average		3.5/1.5	2.0/1.0

Table III

Total Mineral Imports, as a percentage of total EC and US imports, from USSR

		EC	US
USSR	1970	0.3	0.0
	1975	1.0	neg.
	1980	2.0	neg.
	1982	2.0	0.0
	1985	2.0	neg.
Average		1.5	neg.

Table IV

Total Mineral Imports, as a percentage of total EC and US imports from the USSR

		EC	US
USSR	1970	26.0	0.0
	1975	57.0	25.0
	1980	75.0	8.5
	1982	84.0	0.0
	1985	82.0	2.0
Average		65.0	7.0

Note: The term - neg. - represents a figure that was below 0.,05 and, when rounded, would not rise to 0.05, as a minimum statistical figure.

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations, New York, 1982, 1984 and 1988.
From 1982 Yearbook see pp. 1106-1113, 1118-1123
From 1984 Yearbook see pp. 1046-1047
From 1988 Yearbook see pp. 1074-1077, 1084-1085.

Appendix 5.7

Proposed Trans-Siberian West European Contracts



Source: Economist, July 31, 1982, p.30

Chapter Six:Safe Havens, Enclaves and Alliance Politics:The Kurds of Iraq

I:Introduction

Before launching into the last case, examining the reactions, actions and policies of the European Community and the United States to the Kurdish crisis of 1991, criteria pertaining to the selection of this event have to be elaborated. These criteria establish the operational framework for this case study. Firstly, it is important to understand why this incident has been chosen in preference to any one of numerous other possibilities, namely the Balkans crisis since 1992. The selection of any case study will be idiosyncratic to a certain extent, depending on one's research interests and depth of knowledge on a variety of issues prior to selection; one is more likely to select those case studies which one is more familiar. Nevertheless, there are other reasons for the singling out of the Kurdish crisis.

The selection of the Kurdish crisis, rather than the war in the Balkans, is partially information driven. At the time of writing of this dissertation, the Balkans war is still in progress. The policies of the US and EC are constantly evolving and changing. Secondly, while there is a tremendous amount of secondary literature on the policies of the allies concerning the Balkans, primary material remains difficult to obtain; even more so than for the Kurdish crisis. Also, some of this literature, given the dynamics involved in an ongoing event, is in itself changing and being re-assessed in light of current developments. The situation in the Balkans remains too fluid, in the estimation of this author, for research to be conducted over a span of a three year doctoral program. Therefore, when faced with the decision to select a 'current' case study, preference was given to one where primary material was slightly easier to obtain, and the event in question had been recently concluded, rather than one that remains active.

However, the Kurdish crisis was selected for more than just those reasons mentioned above. Another significant reason as to why this case study was selected was that there had been a significant degree of importance attached to the Persian Gulf War of 1991 by the politicians involved in amassing the coalition forces for Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This may have been so because the creation of these two operations, and the war itself, was the first major military engagement since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the freeing of Central and Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the end to the Cold War. The war also marked the use of the mechanisms of the United Nations, through the Security Council, not seen since the onset of the Cold War. Repeatedly, and because of these factors, US President George Bush stated that the triumph of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf signalled the beginning of a 'new world

order'; a world determined by that deemed 'right' and democratic. One might surmise that the policies adopted by the US and EC during and after the Gulf War would assist in the shaping of this 'new world order'; serving as examples to the rest of the world of appropriate inter-state conduct. In this respect the Kurdish safe haven project of 1991 was the first major policy to be initiated by the coalition allies in the wake of this call for a 'new world order'. The conflicts and convergences over policy to assist the Kurdish refugees of Northern Iraq in 1991 may, therefore, lend one insight into relations between the coalition allies, namely the United States and the European Community, into the coming century. For these reasons, and those already mentioned, this last case study will examine the reactions, actions and policies of the allies towards the Kurdish refugees following the coalition victory in the Persian Gulf in 1991.

The reasons behind the selection of this case study clearly established, questions must be posed to create a framework of reference for the study, as was done in the preceeding case studies. These questions are:

> 1) Can a coherent EC policy towards the Kurds be discerned where EC institutions were present alongside those of the member states?
>
> 2) If an EC policy can be found to exist, was this policy different from that of the United States, and in what areas?
>
> 3) Can a 'conventional wisdom', based around the core assumptions of the Realist project, be found to adequately explain allied divergencies with respect to policy towards the Kurds?

As was true of the theoretical chapters and the case studies that followed, the development of an alternative theoretical model that may be able to comprehensively explain EC-US differences will not necessarily be offered at the conclusion of this case study. Instead, alternative theoretical options to the Realist project, if warranted, will be explored in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

II:The Context

On August 2, 1990 Iraqi armed forces, under the guidance of Saddam Hussein, crossed the Iraq-Kuwait border and seized Kuwait. The rationale behind the action of the Iraqi government rested on the assertion that the northern part of Kuwait was rightfully part of Iraq; the Iraqi government was only reclaiming its territory. American governmental sources claim that by the third day of this invasion, 120,000 Iraqi troops with over eight hundred tanks had been stationed inside the border of Kuwait. American officials believed that Saddam Hussein was intent on threatening Saudi Arabia soon after.(Bush, Sep. 11, 1990;1) President George Bush of the United States, in a speech to a

joint session of Congress, said to his audience that it was because of this apparent threat that he '...decided to check that aggression...'(Ibid.) Along with forces from twenty other states American forces formed a coalition that assembled in the Persian Gulf.

Operation Desert Shield, as it was codenamed by the United States, was intended to shield Saudi Arabia and other key Gulf states from Iraqi aggression. However, President Bush, Vice President Quayle and Secretary of State James Baker began to enunciate a number of other primary objectives for this mission. Firstly, the president said that the United States and its coalition allies must '...defend civilized values around the world and maintain our economic strength at home...'(Ibid.) The first four objectives defined by the American leader were:

> 1) Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately, and without condition.
>
> 2) Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored.
>
> 3) The security and stability of the Persian Gulf must be restored.
>
> 4) American citizens abroad must be protected.
> (Ibid.)

President Bush then stated that a fifth objective had also emerged, defined in part by the historic circumstances of the Gulf conflict. In November of 1989 the Berlin Wall collapsed, along with the divisions between East and West in Europe, and the United States and the Soviet Union. As time progressed, the prospects for peace in the whole of Europe increased and the threat of nuclear war diminished. Given this setting, the fifth objective - a new world order - emerged from the thoughts of the American president. Bush commented that what could emerge was '...a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony...'(Ibid., 2) Added to this statement the president also asserted that this new world order would be one where '...nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respects the rights of the weak...'(Ibid.)

After four months of Operation Desert Shield the coalition allies, through United Nations Security Council resolutions, delivered an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein was told that he had until January 15, 1991 to abide by the resolutions already agreed to by the member states of the Security Council. The Iraqi government refused and Operation Desert Shield was converted into an offensive mission, codenamed Operation Desert Storm. In less than one hundred hours from the onset of military operations, coalition forces from twenty-eight countries and six continents - ranging from France to

Fiji - defeated the Iraqi armed forces. President Bush, after the success of this operation against the Iraqi armed forces, delivered his annual State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress on March 6, 1991. The President stated that the success of the coalition was a '...victory for the rule of law and for what is right...'(Bush, March 6, 1991;161) From this victory four challenges spring forth, the first of which was the need to create security arrangements in the Persian Gulf. The participation of American forces in joint military exercises, seeking to avoid the permanent stationing of US forces in the Persian Gulf, constituted one element of that security. A second challenge was to control the proliferation of weapon systems while the third was to foster opportunities for peace in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The fourth and last challenge was that of stimulating economic development in the Persian Gulf region. The president asserted that '...by meeting these four challenges we can build a framework for peace...'(Ibid., 162)

However, while the goals of Operation Desert Storm were attained, the Iraqi armed forces were not rendered ineffective. Attacks on the Kurdish population of Northern Iraq with helicopter gunships, tanks and heavy artillery were reported in British newspapers to have occurred in the early days of April. The Independent stated that Kurdish refugees were beginning to flee their towns for mountains in the more northerly sections of Iraq.(Independent, Apr. 3, 1991;12) United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar was quoted as being 'gravely concerned' at these movements. However, this comment was criticized as being weak by unnamed diplomats and human rights experts.(Ibid.)

This is the context of European Community and American policies for the remainder of this case study. However, unlike the two previous case studies, the American position towards the Kurdish refugees will be described after that of the EC. The reasons for this methodology will become obvious as the crisis is described and analyzed.

III:Actions, Reactions and Allied Policies

A. Initial Reactions (April - May 1991)

European Community positions began to form in early April, the first move being made by the French government. In a memo sent by the Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, France called for the convening of an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to '...discuss the serious situation resulting from the abuses being committed against the Iraqi population in several parts of Iraq, and particularly in the Kurdish-inhabited areas. By virtue of its repercussions in the region, this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security...'(UN, Apr. 4, 1991) Roland Dumas, the French Foreign

Minister, stated that '...justice can evolve...when new crimes are committed, why should the rule of law not acquire the resources to respond?...'(Independent, Apr. 5, 1991;10) On April 8 the European Community announced the delivery of its first humanitarian aid package to non- governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Northern Iraq, amounting to five million ECUs to be utilized for medical and food aid, as well as shelter equipment.(EC, Apr. 8, 1991)

By April 9 the idea of taking concrete action to assist the Kurdish population of Northern Iraq took on a new life when UK Prime Minister John Major proposed the creation of enclaves to help the Kurds return to their villages. Major proposed to create, under the auspices of the United Nations, an '...enclave under UN protection that would provide shelter and housing to Kurds until it is safe for them to return to their homes...(Globe and Mail, Apr. 9, 1991;1) He added later on that this program could be a long term commitment.(Guard., Apr. 9, 1991;1) Douglas Hurd noted in the House of Commons that the long-term aim of the EC was for the establishment of autonomous rule for the Kurds in northern Iraq.. He stated that '...the Kurds should enjoy autonomy and a respect for their way of life. That is our view and must be the long-term aim...'(UK HoC, Apr. 18, 1991;33) However, the Prime Minister also mentioned that he was not intent on '...seeking to divide the country [Iraq]...[but] as long as the Iraqi government is going to persecute its minorities, the enclave will be necessary...'(Independent, Apr. 9, 1991;1) It was reported in the media that the German Foreign Minister Genscher and EC Commission President Jacques Delors insisted that a return to normal relations with Iraq would require a degree of autonomy for the Kurds in Northern Iraq.(Ibid.) As well, the European Community and its member states agreed to donate one hundred and eighty-five million dollars in humanitarian aid to this project.(IHT, Apr 9, 1991;1 See Appendix 6.1 for aid projects and Appendix 6.2 for map of safe haven area) No official EC statement was issued in light of comments already made.

The positions presented to and adopted by the Heads of State of the European Community were reflected in statements made by Members of the European Parliament. Following debate in the EP, a number of politicians argued that the Kurds required an autonomous region and that the UN should adopt new methods and rules to accommodate crises such as that witnessed in Northern Iraq. Bertens of the Liberal Democrats asserted that the '...United Nations should not stop at national borders when within those borders such flagrant violations as genocide are taking place...[and] if it is necessary to amend the United Nations Charter to achieve this end, then we [the EC] should put such amendments in hand...'(EC OJC Apr. 18, 1991;228) With respect to Kurdish autonomy, a number of MEPs agreed that the attainment of this goal should be one of the primary objectives of the European Community. Puerta Gutierrez of the GUE said that a stable solution for the

Kurdish area should be one which '...includes the right to autonomy and its own identity...'(Ibid., 230)[1]

In response to the Major and EC enclave proposal, a variety of US officials from the Secretary of State to the White House spokesperson, offered little enthusiasm. Initially, James Baker stated that the United States '...cannot police what goes on in Iraq and we cannot be the arbiters of who shall govern Iraq...'(Guard., Apr. 9, 1991;9) US officials were quoted as saying that '...we haven't even reached a judgement yet on whether or not it's [the safe havens idea] a good idea overall...'(FT., Apr. 9, 1991;1) Finally, the White House spokesperson said that President Bush had a problem with the proposal in that '...nobody wants to try and establish another country within Iraq. Nobody wants a demarcation that says this is a permanent area or new country. But in principle, and in concept, everybody agrees. The meaning is the same...'(NYT, Apr. 12, 1991;A6) Nothing regarding autonomy for the Kurds was mentioned by any US official.

The New York Times reported, on April 17, that the United States had come to an agreement with its European Community member state allies over the creation of a series of camps along the Turkish-Iraqi border and rest stops inside Iraq.(NYT, Apr. 17, 1991;A12) These camps, originally conceived of by France, would be able to care for up to one hundred thousand refugees.(Ibid.) President Bush stated that he had '...directed the US military to begin immediately to establish several encampments in northern Iraq, where relief supplies for these refugees will be made in large quantities...'(Bush, Apr. 22, 1991;273) President Bush stipulated the conditions that would be attached to this expanded US relief effort, specifically that this effort '...is not intended as a permanent solution to the plight of the Kurds...'(Ibid.) The basic policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Iraq would remain. The United States, was '...not going to intervene militarily in Iraq's internal affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire...'(Ibid.) Nevertheless, the President ended his statement by stressing that the United States '...must do everything in our power to save innocent life. This is the American tradition, and we will continue to live up to that tradition...'(Ibid.) The United Stated also released figures indicating the level of its financial commitment to the Kurds of Northern Iraq. Twenty-eight million dollars had been donated in food aid, and another twenty-five million of 'in-kind' military costs had been underwritten by the Department of Defense.(US, Apr. 15, 1991;4 See Appendix 6.3) However, it is worthwhile noting that this figure is from January 1991 onwards, and only from the time that the enclave proposal was agreed to by the allies.

Finally, figures provided by the United Nations indicate the commitment of the Allies to the enclave project. The countries involved in providing armed forces in Northern Iraq to protect the camps and rest stops included, as of the end of April, Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Turkey, Canada and the United States. Germany

provided support from the Turkish side of the border because of constitutional constraints. The level of support indicates that the West European commitment amounted to 11% of the total, with 1,176 troops, whereas the US contingent constituted 70% of the force with 10,333 troops. The three largest contingents, in order, were the United States, Turkey and Britain.(US Command, July 1994 See Appendix 6.4) By the end of May the European contingent included armed forces from those countries listed above, and, additionally, as well as Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal. The combined strength of this contingent was 8,997 troops, comprising 42% of the total, whereas the United States contributing 11,936 troops, which amounted to 52% of the total.(Ibid.)

B. Getting Out (June - July 1991)

President Bush, in a number of speeches during and immediately after the end of the Persian Gulf War, spoke of the creation of a new world order. Many of his more important remarks have already been highlighted elsewhere in this case study. Nevertheless, these speeches and comments are those that one can continuously point towards when attempting to build an understanding of Bush's reactions and actions to other issues related to the Persian Gulf War. With that in mind, two points systematically appear in the President's speeches: the relevance of the principles of territorial integrity and the sovereignty of nation states. Consequently, President Bush rejected any ideas and potential policy options that would have enmeshed the United States in an Iraqi civil war by way of assistance to the Kurds in the North, or the Shiite Arabs in the South. This message was succinctly forwarded by James Baker in early February, where he argued that the goal of the United States is '...the liberation of Kuwait. It is not the destruction of Iraq. It is not changes in the borders of Iraq...'(Baker, Feb. 6, 1991;81) Nevertheless, President Bush was also quoted as saying that with the establishment of this new world order states would incur a new set of duties and obligations, including the recognition of shared responsibilities for freedom and justice, as well as the forging of a world where '...the strong respects the rights of the weak...'(Bush, Sep. 11, 1990;1)

As such, the President may have placed himself between two pillars of principle that may not, in the practical world, be particularly compatible, and the events of June and July 1991 represent the consequences of this dilemma, President Bush had, however, defined the boundaries in which US armed forces would operate in Northern Iraq before he reached this dilemma. In late April the President said that US troops '...are going to stay there [in the area] as long as it takes to make sure these refugees are taken care...'(Guard., Apr. 27, 1991;6) US officials comment that the term 'in the area' was never meant to indicate only Northern Iraq, but Northern Iraq and areas on the Turkish side of the border such as Silopi and Incirlik.(US, Sep. 1994) This said, Bush also mentioned at the end of

this press conference that these troops will stay there for as long as it takes to complete the operation of bringing the Kurds down from the mountains and into safe areas and then to their towns, but '...not a minute longer...'(Ibid.)

Whereas the President thought that OPC may be completed in the near future, UK Foreign Office ministers stated in the House of Commons that only part of the objectives of Provide Comfort have been attained. Douglas Hogg, in this debate on June 25, 1991, commented that allied forces would not be withdrawn from Northern Iraq because of the Iraq' army's harassment of the Kurds. The five hundred strong UN security force intended to replace the allied forces would not be capable, equipped or mandated to secure these refugees. As such, the allies would be remaining in the area until such a time when they would not be required to do so. No time limit or deadline was imposed.(UK HoC, June 25, 1991;445-46) Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, has already voiced these concerns one week earlier when he said that '...we don't want to end in a way that will merely recreate the same problem...'(Independent, June 18, 1991;1)

But what was the American reaction to these comments and statements of 'facts on the ground'? The US reaction can be judged in two ways. Most obviously, one can point to US words and actions in the latter half of June 1991. A spokesperson from the Pentagon, his remarks clearly different from those made by UK officials, said that '...we've succeeded in creating a climate in which [the refugees] have gone back home. Now, we're winding up that operation. We're turning it over completely to the international organizations...'(Independent, June 18, 1991;16) The withdrawal of US armed forces from Northern Iraq was going ahead as planned, and on schedule.(Ibid.)

What makes these actions notable is that within days of this comment from the Pentagon, a reversal in US policy occurred. British officials assert that, as was the case in early April when Prime Minister Major initially proposed the enclave project, the US needed to be persuaded to remain in Northern Iraq. UK and French officials told their colleagues from the United States that '...you can't go. Our presence would not have any credibility without you...'(Independent, June 20, 1991;1) Officials from these two countries confirm that American diplomats were wavering between a policy of withdrawal and of maintenance of their position in Northern Iraq; a position that may have been forced upon them because of the various, possibly conflictary statements issues by President Bush, Vice President Quayle and Secretary of State Baker relating to their not wanting to become involved in a Vietnam-styled civil war. Therefore, on June 22, a US military official stated that a new operation would replace OPC, Operation Provide Comfort II (OPCII), beginning with the stationing of close to three thousand troops in the area surrounding Northern Iraq. The conditions for this force would be twofold. The first, which appears to be open-ended in nature, would be that OPCII '...will end when...security conditions are all right for withdrawal, when the Kurds feel secure, we will pull out...'(Independent, June 22,

1991;11) The second condition was the conclusion of an agreement between the Kurdish rebel leaders and the Iraqi government, handing to the former certain rights of autonomy.(Independent, June 20, 1991;1)

Even more curious at this point is that by the end of the first week of July the US general in charge of the entire operation, John Shalikashvili, stated that '...allied troops will pull out regardless of differences between Kurds and Baghdad over autonomy plans...'(Independent, July 5, 1991;13) But the EC decided to remain, the Community opting to fund and support the stationing of the five hundred security guards that would replace allied forces in Northern Iraq.(SCA, July 1991;265-66) Under the guidelines of UN Security Council Resolution 688 the UK Foreign Office believed that a four-point policy should be enacted.(See Appendix 6.5 for UNSC Resolution 688) This stated that an active presence in Northern Iraq of five hundred security guards was necessary to illustrate '...the determination of the international community that Security Council resolution 688 will continue to be observed...'(Ibid.) This relates to sections in this resolution that demanded Iraq allow humanitarian aid to the Kurds. The third operative clause of the resolution states that the Security Council '...*Insists* that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and make available all necessary facilities for their operations...'(UK, Jul. 24, 1991; xl) Sanctions should be maintained, renewed repression should not be tolerated and a multinational force with air power should be assembled in Northern Iraq. Until that time, however,

> the forces which remain in the region will continue to act as a deterrent to any Iraqi behaviour which might threaten peace and security. They will be prepared, if circumstances so demand, to respond swiftly: to go back in, if necessary, to protect the safety of the refugees...and to take any other action as may be required...'(Ibid.)

On July 13, and in contradiction to statements from General Shalikashvili, Operation Provide Comfort II was established. The United States, Turkey, France, UK, Italy, and The Netherlands contributed air power, logistics and a command structure, as well as slightly more than six thousand ground forces. The US provided roughly sixty-five percent of the troops, with the UK, Italian, French and Dutch contingents consisting of almost 15 percent. The Turkish government provided close to twenty percent, with its fixed contribution of 1,160 armed forces.(US Command, July 1994) these ground and air forces remained in the region of Northern Iraq until July 31, 1991 with the US providing the first three elements, and the West Europeans the forces on the ground.(Independent, July 13, 1991;14)

Finally, the establishment of OPCII marked another about-face for the United States in the region surrounding Northern Iraq, bearing in mind the consistent policies of

Western Europe, driven by the work of the United Kingdom and France and supported by the remainder of the EC member states with armed forces and the financing of aid projects from April 9, 1991. It is a fact that the remaining forces were primarily stationed in Turkey and therefore President Bush was true to his words that US forces would not remain in Northern Iraq, but considering the cautiousness of the president from the outset, the very decision to stay 'in the area' at all denotes a change in US policy. Why the US Administration required such ambiguous langauage with respect to the placement of troops, in the face of an unprecedented movement of refugees, is addressed in the assessment of allied policy.

C. The Aftermath (August 1991 - Present (July 1993))

In July of 1991 the leaders of the Group of Seven - France, Germany, Britain, Japan, Canada, United States and Italy - gathered for a summit on the state of the world economy. However, these summits have often dealt with political issues that require immediate attention at the highest levels. The final political declaration of the summit, stated that these leaders '...note that the urgent and overwhelming nature of the humanitarian problem in Iraq caused by violent oppression by the government required exceptional action by the international community...'(FT., July 17, 1991;4) The seven leaders went on to persuade the '...United Nations and its affiliated agencies to be ready to consider similar action in the future if the circumstances require it...'(Ibid.) Several months later, the Third Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons, was tabled. The report called for the creation of a special UN Commissioner for disaster relief co-ordination as well as a 'good government' clause with respect to international aid. The human rights record of a third country would be subject to consideration when a country asks for financial and other assistance from the United Kingdom. But the United Kingdom was not the only major West European country involved in OPC now developing disaster and humanitarian relief mechanisms to avoid another situation similar to Northern Iraq. The German and French governments were developing their humanitarian assistance offices within their respective Foreign Ministries.

With the French Government this process began when President Mitterrand brought Bernard Kouchner into his cabinet to assume this portfolio. The interesting point is that Kouchner had already established two non-governmental organizations, bodies that usually reject the rules of international law, the respect accorded to territorial integrity and nation state sovereignty, Medecins sans Frontieres being one such example. The humanitarian role of the French Foreign Ministry began to evolve rapidly in light of Kouchner's presence, and has continued without it. One example of this continuation is the

co-operation of high level French officials in a university project directed towards understanding the international legal implications of the safe haven project.(ECHO, 1994) Of course, given the remarks of Roland Dumas prior to the actions of John Major and France in the UN Security Council, this involvement appears to be consistent, regardless of the presence or absence of Kouchner.

The same activism infected the German government. While there was a humanitarian office within the Foreign Ministry prior to the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and Operation Provide Comfort, the importance given to this office has been enhanced in the light of the plight of the Kurds and the response of the EC to this situation. The appointment of Ambassador Eiff as the charge d'affaires of the German Division of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) has been a signal to those working in this division of the enhanced importance of their work. Officials in the DHA admit that their budget has not increased, but its role has. The DHA is now being asked to deal with more projects than ever before, because of its work and successes in Northern Iraq.(Germany, DHA Interviews;1994) With respect to the actual work of the Division, officials make the point that groups that attempt to politically or ideologically promote an independent Kurdistan, and other such activities, are refused funding, but because of the 'special nature' of the Kurdish situation, has prompted the government to fund non-governmental organizations such as the German counterpart to Medecins sans Frontieres, as well as a number of UN-related organizations.(Germany, DHA Interviews;1994)

Most important of all of these moves towards a greater ability to deal with future humanitarian needs in various areas of the world has been the establishment of an EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO). While not the sole reason for its creation, the safe haven project of 1991 and the overall and long-term plight of the Kurds was one of the principal contributing factors. The Kurds, along with the disintegration of the USSR and the continuing famine in Africa, required a '...significant mobilization of human and material resources...'(ECHO, Interviews;1994) While the EC was already the largest donor of foreign and humanitarian aid in the world, the events of the early 1990s prompted the EC Commission to centralize these functions into one department with its own remit, budget and personnel. The Kurdish operations have assisted in defining the way in which ECHO approaches disaster situations and whether or not it will become involved. Personnel at ECHO comment that the plight of the Kurds was one where 'something had to be done' and that the rules of '...international law were not held in high esteem...'(ECHO, Interviews;1994) While the question of legality, and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq were discussed inside the EC Commission, the plight of the Kurds overwhelmed those warning against involvement. Consequently, and a point that will be developed further in the last section of this case study, ECHO has associations with seventy-three non-governmental organizations, including Pharmaciens sans Frontieres and

Medecins du Monde, as well as OXFAM and several UN-related agencies.(ECHO, June 6, 1993 See Appendix 6.6) Of the projects developed by ECHO and these groups some have been short term in orientation, but numerous others have long term implications. Also, some of these groups working with and being funded by ECHO have as their goals the long term reconstruction and rehabilitation of Kurdistan, and the protection of the human rights and civil liberties of the Kurds of Northern Iraq.(ECHO, Nov. 11, 1993 See Appendix 6.7) Finally, and making the existence of the EC Humanitarian Office particularly interesting, there is an institutional link between it, the European Commission, and the Member States of the EC. Funded by the Commission, ECHO was created to be and remains independent of the member states. Consequently, ECHO activities are not subject to member state approval. As well, ECHO personnel state that the Twelve have not objected to the creation of the office, nor its work.(Ibid.) Since the creation of ECHO its relief missions have expanded to include parts of the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and 1993, as well as a host of developing and less developed countries. Only once have the member states rejected an increase in the budget of ECHO.(ECHO, Interviews; 1994 and See Appendix 6.8)

In comparison, the US Office for Developmental Assistance (OFDA) was not, in a significant manner, involved in the safe haven operation in Northern Iraq. The Department of Defense (DoD) was asked to control the American aspect of the program and, as a result, very little money has been given to the relief operation by way of humanitarian assistance. Most of the DoD's contributions have come by way of 'in-kind' payments and the supplying of security forces whose task is to protect the predominantly West European humanitarian aid workers.(ECHO, 1993) These 'in-kind' funds totalled, as of the end of July 1991, close to two hundred thousand dollars US.(US, NSIAD-91-160;21) By way of another comparison with the role of the European Community and its leading member states, the vast majority of funds that have been dispersed from OFDA have been directed to the UN Disaster Relief Organization; UN High Commission for Refugees; the International Committee of the Red Cross; and the International Organization for Migration. The key link between all of these agencies is that they are mostly UN-related. As such, they must act in accordance with the rules of the Charter of the United Nations, including paying of respect to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states of the UN. Consequently, and unlike groups such as Medecins du Monde, these groups must abide by the decisions of these states and can only be active in an area of a country such as Northern Iraq if granted permission by the Iraqi government. Therefore, the programs of these agencies must not be perceived as antagonistic to the state or they will not receive the necessary approval. Many of the organizations working with ECHO and the EC member states are, if not hostile, indifferent to this relationship between UN member states and international aid agencies. They deliver assistance where

they perceive it to be required, even if the government is the persecutor of the people in need of assistance.

As to events in Northern Iraq and the surrounding area, a Military Coordination Center (MCC) remains with a staff of up to fifty personnel. From a number of coalition forces, the responsibility of these people is to act as a liaison and defuse incidents between the Kurds and the Iraqi government.(US Command, Sept. 1994) While not there to protect the Kurds or humanitarian aid workers, the contingent is still multinational, representing the commitment of not only the United States to this project, but the West Europeans as well. Again, this illustrates that while the US has the *single* largest number of troops in Northern Iraq, they are not the *only* such forces protecting the Kurds, and therefore not the *only* troops at risk with respect to attacks from the Iraqi army.

IV:Convergence and Divergence

The United States was cautious with respect to the EC plans for the creation of safe havens/enclaves. The US later differed with the European Community over the timing of the withdrawal of armed forces from Kurdistan and then again concerning the need to remain in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi government. Finally, the United States and the EC differed and have continued to differ over the long-term implications of the safe haven project in Northern Iraq and the need to assist in the reconstruction of Kurdistan. Nonetheless, in these three issue-areas where divergences appear to have been present between allies, consensus occurred in each. As to the initial phase of Operation Provide Comfort, the misgivings and doubts of the United States gave way to agreement over the title of the encampments to be created, the objective of this operation, and the size of the area that would be under de facto coalition control. With respect to the first, agreement between the US and Western Europe came in stages. By the end of April the coalition of armed forces had stationed ten thousand troops in Northern Iraq, the majority being American, with the intention of creating havens so that the Kurds could come down from the mountains with the hope of returning to their villages and homes in the near future.(Guardian, Apr. 19, 1991;11) Agreement on the size of the safe haven area was also reached by the Allies. Encampments, closely following a French suggestion, where a series of camps and smaller 'stops' along and inside the Turkey-Iraq border would be built. Each 'camp' was prepared to host up to one hundred thousand refugees, with the stops providing shelter for much smaller numbers. President Bush decided to have US ground forces remain in Northern Iraq under the auspices of Operation Provide Comfort. Originally for an interim period until United Nations forces could take over, these US troops, combined with those from Britain, France and Turkey, would act to deter Iraqi attacks and thus protect the Kurds. However, this force was not intended to be,

nor was after its creation, a large combat-ready force.(US Command, Interviews; April 1994) Consequently, convergences between the United States and its EC allies have occurred, albeit prompted by the actions of EC member states, and especially Germany, Britain and France. But while this last statement does well to summarize the relationship between the allies from April 1991 onwards, the question in mind is why did divergencies between these allies occur in the first place? Furthermore, if convergencies occurred, why did the leadership of the Kurdish rebellion in Northern Iraq note that they perceived differences between the allies, appealing to the EC rather than the United States because of that reason.(Independent, Apr. 17, 1991;1) To this end a 'first cut', like that in the proceeding two case studies, will take place to provide an initial assessment of the strength and credibility of the Realist conventional wisdom with respect to transatlantic relations in general, and specifically this case study.

V:Understanding the Divergencies

Officials from the United States Government cite a number of possible reasons why differences existed between the US and the European Community with respect to the relief effort for the Kurdish people. In brief, these reasons concern the stability of the Persian Gulf basin; the juridical implications of the term 'enclave'; the status of Iraq as a unitary state; the degree of public support for the protection of the Kurdish people; and the legacy of the Vietnam War.

The first of these reasons relates to the strategic and political importance of Iraq in the Persian Gulf. Iraq has traditionally been a counter-force to the Muslim-led government in Iran, and, possibly because of that, western governments have tended to support Iraq publicly and privately. During the eight year war between Iran and Iraq many western states supplied arms to the latter to balance the former. The antipathy of Iran to the United States since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 has enhanced this desire of western states to support the regime of Saddam Hussein. The breakup of Iraq into two or three components would have threatened stability in the Persian Gulf, and the ability of Iraq to constrain the fundamentalism of Iran and the southern section of Iraq. The editorial board of the New York Times concurred in this assessment of transatlantic differences. The editors wrote that, in their estimation, '...Washington may better serve its interests by letting the Iraqis resolve their own differences and trying to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity by keeping outsiders out...(NYT, April 2, 1991;A18) Their counterparts at The Independent were of a like opinion. Their editorial stressed that differences remained between the Allies because '...the majority of the Bush inner circle...concluded that US assistance to the rebels could be contrary to US regional interests...'(Independent, April 7, 1991; 21) Because of these regional concerns American officials admit that they must plan for what is practical rather

than what is desired. In the case of the Kurds what is practical means that the United States is '...not always on the side of revolutionaries..[and] are caught between our principles and our practical matters...'(US, Interviews;1992) For these officials being caught between principles and practicalities means that '...more often than not the latter wins out over the former...'(Ibid.)

A second reason offered why the United States Administration appeared indifferent to the plight of the Kurdish people may have also been because of the practicalities of Operation Provide Comfort. Firstly, US officials are of the opinion that an 'enclave' implies the stationing of troops in the area concerned for an indefinite period of time.(US, Interviews; 1992) On the other hand 'safe havens' imply safe areas that are temporary in nature, confined to northern Iraq and do not require the placement of a significant number of armed forces in the designated area. President Bush consistently objected to endorsing policies that would require the former rather than the latter type of security area. British diplomats validate this claim by stating that if the United States had a different policy from the European Community, then it was because the Bush Administration was '...reluctant to putting people on the ground...'(UK, Interviews;1992)

The absence of the term 'enclave' was noted by reporters for The Independent on April 12, 1991, three days after the British/European Community relief plan was proposed. Reporters for the newspaper claim that American officials '...refused to describe a border strip of northern Iraq occupied by Turkish troops as an enclave...'(Independent, Apr. 12, 1991;1) The reporters continued by also claiming that the '...preferred terminology in Washington is "sanctuary"...or "safe haven". Both are held to lack judicial overtones of "enclave"...'(Ibid.) Echoing these comments was Marlin Fitzwater and his comments of the same day that were reported in the New York Times. At that time the White House spokesperson said, with respect to 'enclaves' or 'safe havens' that '...the meaning is the same, which is that we need an area, call it what you will, of safety...'(NYT, Apr. 12, 1991;A6) This begs the question that if 'enclaves' and 'safe havens' meant the same, then why did Fitzwater refuse to call this area of safety for the Kurdish refugees the former rather than something nearer to the latter?

One other reason behind this possible refusal to call these safe areas 'enclaves' relates to the possible dismemberment of Iraq. A number of leading political commentators lend credibility to this concern. Edward Mortimer of the Financial Times states in one of his columns that if the enclave would expand to include large towns the area would become '...to all intents and purposes a Kurdish state under UN protection...'(Mortimer, Apr. 10, 1991;19) He adds that when a similar policy was approved of and conducted, Bangladesh was created and admitted to the United Nations as an independent state. Without saying it, the same could occur in Northern Iraq. In Newsweek the position forwarded against a large military intervention in support of the

Kurds was similar. The authors concluded that '...a victory by Kurdish and Shiite [in the south] insurgents would tear Iraq apart, destabilizing the whole Persian Gulf region...'(Newsweek, April 15, 1991; 17) When asked of the long-term implications of a 'safe haven' policy Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, former Secretaries of State to Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter, agreed that almost no matter what may occur, haven policies more than imply intervention in the internal affairs of another country. Vance commented that '...it's going to be hard to ask them [the Kurds] to go back. And that gets us into politics...'(NYT, Apr. 18, 1991;A16) However, Richard Boucher of the Department of State, when asked whether enclaves contradicted the principle of territorial integrity, said that he saw '...no contradiction between supporting the territorial integrity of Iraq and having an external body control some of its territory...'(Independent, Apr. 10, 1991;10) Officially, Mr. Boucher said that he was unaware of the question of the legality of the enclaves having been raised at the Department of State.(Ibid.)

Nevertheless, the breakup of Iraq was something that President Bush and the leaders of other states of the coalition were not seeking. Returning again to the press conference held by Marlin Fitzwater, he noted that one concern held by President Bush was that the '...problem was that nobody wants to establish another country within Iraq. Nobody wants a demarcation that says this is a permanent area or new country...'(NYT, Apr. 12, 1991;A6) The dismemberment of Iraq would have created a period of instability in the Persian Gulf, and this was not what President Bush or his allies had sought throughout the war. One of the main objectives of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was to '...seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world...'(Bush, Nov. 30, 1990;295) Vice President Quayle repeated this goal in December 1990 and it was again restated by President Bush on April 13, 1991. At Maxwell Air Force Base Bush stated that '...the quest for the new world order is, in part, a challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay...'(Bush, Apr. 13, 1991;1) This may be contrary to an earlier speech of his when Bush said that the world he seeks is one where, in the words of Winston Churchill, the '...principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong...'(Bush, Mar. 11, 1991;162) This confusion between principle and practicalities was alluded to earlier by a number of US officials in designing US foreign policy. Reporters from the New York Times echoed this dichotomy between the principles agreed to in the charter of the United Nations - territorial integrity and the sovereignty of existing states - and what was referred to as '...America's longstanding commitment to human rights and self-determination...'(NYT, Apr. 4, 1991;A10)

A further reasoning behind a cautious US approach to the enclave proposal of the European Community is the lack of public consensus with respect to military intervention in Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. The April 15, 1991 edition of Newsweek cites a nation-wide poll that illustrates that the overwhelming majority of the US public

was not in favor of continued military involvement in the affairs of Iraq and its citizens. While some twenty-seven percent were in favor, the remaining seventy-three percent were either against or undecided.(Newsweek, April 15, 1991;18) The undecided represent a section of this public that was neither for nor against intervention, but reflected an ambiguity towards this intervention that demanded a cautious approach rather than an activist one. Consequently, President Bush could cite this low level of domestic support for his lack of desire to become involved in the affairs of the Kurdish refugees, and possibly the internal affairs of Iraq.

This low level of public support may have several explanations. The American public may have been wary of continued involvement in Iraq in the aftermath of Desert Storm and the Persian Gulf War. Another reason may have been that, while there may have been a national interest in maintaining a secure supply of oil from the Persian Gulf and the need to protect against a country like Iraq from having a monopoly on this supply of oil, the plight of the refugees was not in the national interest of the country, and therefore not something that the United States should become involved in. A third reason may be that there is a legacy from Vietnam that continues to influence American public opinion and decision-making with respect to foreign adventures that are not overtly perceived to be in the national interest of the United States. President Bush gave credence to the potential of this influence when he said that '...the United States is not going to intervene militarily in Iraq's internal affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire...nor will we become an occupying power...'(Bush, Apr. 16, 1991;273) This reference to Vietnam suggests a scenario where US ground troops become involved in a long term operation, without a clear purpose or time scale for withdrawal and in an area of the world distant from the perceived national interest of the US. Michael Klare suggests the same when he notes that this legacy alludes to a '...disinclination to engage in further military interventions in internal Third World conflicts...'(Klare, 1981;1) Past presidents of the United States have attempted to reduce the apparent influence of this legacy through a limitation on foreign interventions or by way of active involvement, perhaps the best example being President Reagan from 1980 through to 1988. The latter's engagements were, in the words of Klare, a conscious attempt to go 'beyond' the Vietnam legacy, to defeat and erase it from conscious of the US public and political leadership.

There is no doubt that these reasons were considered when debating whether or not the United States should become involved in the enclave project, and if so, to what extent and through what means. One can point to a number of instances where West European politicians and officials have made statements or pursued certain policies that make the caution of President Bush understandable, if not justifiable. These occasions do not but add to the conventional wisdom why the United States reacted differently than the EC member states to the plight of the Kurds throughout the lifespan of the safe haven project.

However, this additional support for the conventional understanding of EC-US relations should not detract from the possibility of an alternative reading of this same affair. The question whether there can be an alternative or additional reading of transatlantic differences over the plight of the Kurds is one that must be addressed at this stage in the case study. Simply put, are there any gaps to be found in the 'conventional wisdom' that will illustrate a vulnerability in the overall Realist project, as outlined in the first three theoretical chapters of the thesis?

A number of gaps in the reasons put forward by US officials for a cautious American approach *can* be discerned through the statements of West European officials. With respect to the notions of stability for the Persian Gulf and the need for a unitary Iraqi state, there appears to be no difference in the goals of the British and American political leaderships. At the time of the announcement of the proposal, John Major stated that he and his EC colleagues do not '...accept that this [proposal] would be a partition. We are not seeking to divide the country...'(Independent, Apr. 9, 1991;1) Similarly, Douglas Hurd asserted that the enclave project does not mean the '...redrawing of boundaries...[because] these boundaries should be respected for the common good...'(quoted in Mayall, 1991;425) Foreign Office officials involved in the implementation of the enclave project cite the size of the area under consideration as evidence of the lack of interest on the part of the EC member states of turning this project into a forerunner of an independent Kurdish state.(UK ODA, Interviews;1992 See Appendix 6.2) Even as recent as the early months of 1994 British Foreign Office officials still working with Kurdish refugee organizations put to rest this notion of a desire on the part of the European Community for an independent state.(UK FCO, Interviews;1994)

The definition applied to the term 'enclave' by West European officials reflects their limited intentions. The British Ambassador to the United Nations stated in the Security Council that the concerns of his country were humanitarian rather than political or juridical. David Hannay said that '...we are not proposing a safe haven as a juridical...or political concept, but as a humanitarian one...'(quoted in Morris, 1991;37) As such, there was no thought as to the long-term implications of the proposal, and people in the United Kingdom charged with implementing the policy agreed with Hannay. They note that the initiative was '...never meant as a political gesture to suggest to the Kurds that they were on their way to a greater Kurdistan...'(UK ODA, Interviews;1992) Consequently, not only were the EC allies of Britain told of the limited goals of the enclave proposal, but so too were leaders of the Kurdish rebellion such as Talabani. Nobody, apparently, was under the illusion that the creation of enclaves was the first step towards a greater Kurdish state; nobody, except possibly the US Administration.

The legacy of Vietnam does not directly impinge on Western Europe. Britain and France, as the two most actively engaged EC member states with respect to the Kurdish

refugees, have longstanding traditions with respect to overseas adventures and involvement. This can be noted from the continued activism of the French Foreign Legion in Northern Africa. However, with respect to the United States, two gaps appear where the legacy of Vietnam is used to rationalize US foreign and international policy. Germany, because of the legacy of two world wars and the hegemonic aspirations of the Nazi regime, constitutionally prohibits herself from involvement in foreign engagements unless under the umbrella of NATO. Nevertheless, and apparent from statements made by ECHO officials and data supplied by the US Command in Germany that served as the logistical center for Provide Comfort, Germany supplied, at a peak, over two hundred ground troops to the allied effort.(See Appendix 6.3) While this contribution was only one percent of the total number of ground troops stationed in and around Northern Iraq, the fact that Germany contributed troops at all, in the face of constitutional constraints and historical influences, contrasts with the official cautiousness of the United States, where no such legal limitations existed.

The second 'gap' coming from the application of the Vietnam legacy to the Kurdish case is the assumption that US ground forces would be more exposed to Iraqi military attacks and more susceptible to involvement in the internal affairs of Iraq than the West European troops also stationed in Northern Iraq. The data supplied by the US Command does illustrate that the US force in Northern Iraq was the single largest contingent in the coalition.(Appendix 6.3) However, US forces were not the *only* forces present in Northern Iraq and thus not the *only* forces open to attack. Also, because West European forces maintained a presence in Northern Iraq past the summer months of 1991, they too would have been susceptible to becoming involved in the internal affairs of Iraq if a civil war erupted between the government and Kurdish rebel groups. Consequently, the utilization of the legacy of Vietnam, while understandable, cannot be said to be comprehensive enough to justify the cautiousness of the United States.

This assumption concerning the US military presence in Northern Iraq does, to a certain extent, go hand in hand with those concerning stability in the Persian Gulf basin. President Bush's desire for stability and to maintain the integrity of Iraq as a unitary state is posited in such a manner that one could assume that the opposite goals were desired by Britain and France, as well as Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Luxembourg. While the United States has more global interests than any one of these West European countries, it does not mean that EC member states have no interest in international stability, a secure supply of oil that is not monopolized by one state like that of Iraq, and the maintenance of borders and boundaries that some were party to in their creation. For example, it was because of Britain that some of the states in the Middle East and Africa have the boundaries that demark their states. Many of these boundaries were, at that time, artificially drawn and unrepresentative of modern political realities. However, if asked

whether Britain and France would desire the redrawing of these boundaries because of their 'artificialness', the answer would be a resounding negative. Is this desire for stability any different from that of the United States? Can the United States claim a much greater interest in stability than its allies, or are the justifications of President Bush more than slightly vulnerable to criticism and further analysis?

In this light the status of Turkey may mark another divergence between the allies with respect to the issue of sovereignty and regional stability. US Command officials make much of the long-standing historical cold-war relationship between the United States and Turkey, and the personal one between President Ozal and George Bush.(Guardian, Jan. 23, 1991;20) Firstly, one may note that President Bush became more interested in the plight of the Kurds when the movement of these people began to impinge upon the Turkish border, and was perceived to be the onset of a second Kurdish refugee crisis for Ozal in the past two years. Indicative of this notion is that after a telephone conversation between Ozal and Bush in the first week of April 1991, Secretary of State Baker made a special trip, on April 8, to the Turkey-Iraq border region in order to personally assess Ozal's claims concerning the Kurds of Iraq.(Kirisci, 1994;13 and see evidence gathered within this paper for further reference) Thus it appears apparent that for the United States the *Kurdish* problem was really a *Turkish* problem, and not one in itself.(US Command, Sept. 1994) In the end President Bush was persuaded by the allies to become more involved in the situation, which he did, but was is notable is the reason *why* he became involved in the first place. This is so because one can then grasp why President Bush was reluctant to become more involved in what was becoming more and more a Kurdish problem, rather than a Turkish one; a problem he had no great interest in from the beginning. On the other hand, the lack of a close relationship between the European Community and Turkey, as seen by the reluctance of the former to grant the latter full membership, may have 'freed up' the EC so that it could relate to the movement of Kurdish refugees on that level alone.(Guardian, June 21, 1991;25) The leadership of Western Europe may not have needed any more persuasion than the fact that the Kurds needed assistance, and no more. This divergence highlights even more the primary factors behind the decisions of the United States and Western Europe with respect to the Kurds, and the concepts and issues at play from the onset of the Kurdish (Turkish?) crisis such as the stability of the Persian Gulf region and the integrity of states such as Turkey.(Freedman, 1993;422 and Guardian, March 12, 1991;10)

However, and as briefly mentioned above, there are junctures during the early stages of the enclave proposal that may have made the cautiousness of President Bush understandable. In April 1991 the French government forwarded a letter to the President of the UN Secretary General calling for discussion on the plight of the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq. This was subsequently followed by a statement by the French Foreign

Minister, Roland Dumas. Dumas said that '...when new crimes are committed, why should the rule of law not acquire the resources to respond?...'(Independent, Apr. 5, 1991;10) After the announcement of the enclave proposal, John Major recognized that this project could be a long-term commitment.(Guardian, Apr. 9, 1991;1) Two days after this statement, Douglas Hurd of Britain was quoted as saying that Britain '...cannot accept that the international community is powerless to relieve mass suffering simply because of rules designed by the international community to make the world safe...'(Times, Apr. 11, 1991;1) All of these initial remarks could give rise to the notion that the goals of the European Community were confused, and that the US required more time to better understand the exact proposal of John Major, how this was to be implemented in Northern Iraq, the military commitment necessary to make the proposal viable, and the time frame of the project. Cautiousness, in this light, can be understood as being prudent rather than obstructionist.

Also, the public opinion in the member states of the European Community was considerably different from that in the United States. Instead of a public not interested in further military activism in the Persian Gulf as the case was in the US, a cross-EC poll conducted by Gallup Europe illustrates that of the forty-six percent of the public that knew of the enclave project, seventy-nine percent was in favor. In every country more than half of those who knew of the project were in favor, with opinion in The Netherlands and Portugal reaching ninety-two percent.(ECHO, May 30, 1991) This difference in opinion may have been another factor in the decision to initiate the enclave project, and maintain it throughout the summer months. The cautiousness of the United States mentioned above can again be explained as being prudent and domestically aware rather than obstructionist. However, British officials working in the area of the Middle East contend that there was '...not an enormous difference...between the United Kingdom and United States in position...'(UK FCO, Interviews;1992) If this is true, then public opinion data and the influence of the legacy of the Vietnam war should not be considered as factors in the decisions of President Bush and other US officials. This begs the question that, if there was no significant divergence between the allies, or some of the reasons for any divergence can be invalidated or deemed as insubstantial, why was the leadership of the United States so cautious at every stage of Operation Provide Comfort between April and July 1991, compared with its allies in Western Europe?

To answer this question may look, firstly, at the remarks of a number of noted political scientists and columnists concerning US policy. Many of these people voiced their displeasure with the policies of the United States in Northern Iraq.[2] Only a few prominent sources agreed with President Bush.[3] Of the former, a few stand out in their pointed, vehement, yet still academic, criticism of the Bush Administration and serve as an additonal first cut to why the US was cautious in agreeing to the Kurdish rescue plan in

comparison to the member states of the European Community. These political scientists and columnists include Michael Mandelbaum of John Hopkins University, Pierre Lellouche, a distinguished professor of foreign affairs in France, and columnist Charles Krauthammer, whose work can be found in the Washington Post. The former states that '...we are back to the old Bush of Tiananmen Square...of putting expediency before principle...of what amounts to moral callousness...'(Independent, Apr. 17, 1991;21) Lellouche comments that the new world order of President Bush is '...no more than the plastering over of the old order expressed in the UN Charter; the sanctity of borders and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. It is in the name of 'interference' that the Kurds are being slaughtered...'(Lellouche, Apr. 22, 1991;13)

Third and last are those comments of Charles Krauthammer. On April 5 the columnist paralleled the Iraqi attack on the Kurdish people to that of the Soviet army's non-interference in the Nazi destruction of Warsaw in 1944. Krauthammer then states that a President has '...no right to call a foreign leader Hitler...and then stand by while he massacres his people by the thousands...'(Krauthammer, Apr. 5, 1991;A19) This occurred, ostensibly, because President Bush had '...returned to his Tianenman mode: conduct of foreign policy as the coldest *Realpolitik*...'(Ibid.) Finally, the columnist asserts that because of this acquiescence in the face of barbarism many people and states may think again in being associated with the power of the United States. Krauthammer contends that the indifference of the US was '...so characteristic of a traditional hegemon, might give them [other people] second thoughts...[because] when their interests and ours diverge, even if their cause is just, we might let them go the way of the Kurds...'(Ibid.) Even after the start of Provide Comfort and the participation of US armed forces in Northern Iraq, Krauthammer was still critical of American policy. In an article entitled 'Which New World Order?', the author insists that President Bush's elucidation of a new world order was one that was constituted from peaceful settlements, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all people. However, for Krauthammer, what was notable in this assessment was 'what was left out'.(Krauthammer, Apr. 17, 1991;A25) The author notes that '...missing are the values that American presidents have traditionally used to justify American intervention abroad...'(Ibid.) However, it is noted that President Bush '...did invoke justice, but last and least. His principal passion is something quite different...[which is] a way to keep order...'(Ibid.) Krauthammer notes that beyond this orderly new world there is a second world that speaks of justice and rights, but it is one that Bush is uncomfortable with. However, the columnist asserts that this orderly world will not do for two reasons. Firstly, is that it '...cannot command domestic support...', secondly, it is '...too weak and passive an idea to deal with the crises of the post-Cold War world...'(Ibid.) A final plea for new rules for a new world is made, with the recognition that, when needed, President Bush invokes a

vision of the world that is not just about power, but justice as well. Unfortunately, and as stated in the opening section of this editorial, justice maintains a secondary status behind that of power.(Ibid.)

But what of the above? These criticisms of US foreign policy in Northern Iraq, coupled with the apparent vulnerability of the oft-stated reasons for the caution of President Bush, beg several questions with respect to the applicability of the Realist conventional wisdom. Was this cautiousness because of the need for the United States to station armed forces in Northern Iraq as well as the possibility that these safe havens may become an embryonic Kurdish state, heralding the dismemberment of Iraq? Did the prospect of becoming enmeshed in a 'Vietnam-style' civil war deter the United States from being more active in the formulation of allied policy in Northern Iraq? All of these factors played a role in the calculation of American interests. To this end there is no doubt. But this calculation of interests therefore assumes that EC member states desired outcomes such as a Kurdish state, the dismemberment of Iraq, and a limited role in the protection of the Kurds, and regarded stability and order in the Persian Gulf as unimportant. The statements of West European officials from countries not heavily involved in the operation of Provide Comfort do not reflect this assumption. Consequently, these reasons for caution on the part of the United States, coupled with the Realist conventional wisdom that apparently assists in one's understanding of why allied differences over policy occurred, appear to be vulnerable to a certain degree of criticism. But the criticism of Mandelbaum, Lellouche and Krauthammer is superficial at best. It serves only as a starting point for further analysis of the statements, communiqués and implemented policies of the allies throughout the Kurdish crisis between April and July of 1991, the long-term implications and reactions of these allies accounted for. It is this assessment, based partially on criticism of US policy, that must be dealt with at this juncture.

With respect to divergences noted above, three instances during Operation Provide Comfort can be identified as those that highlight these contradictions. The first occurred during the initial phase of the Operation, after the announcement of the proposal by John Major; the second, in July of 1991 when the United States was prepared to leave the coalition force in Northern Iraq; and lastly, the aftermath of the Operation and the various long-term governmental and EC-related policies invented because of the plight of the Kurdish peoples. All three will be examined below and may be able to illustrate, through analysis of verbatim statements from politicians and officials involved in the decision-making process, that the conventional Realist wisdom is incapable of delivering a comprehensive understanding of EC-US differences with respect to the Kurds. Whereas the political columnists and scientists have only hinted at these differences and the causes behind them, a more detailed analysis may expose the role of values, ideas and ideological considerations in these decisions, rather than having such considerations ignored, assumed

or taken for granted by the Realist position. The three areas to be explored will concern conceptions of sovereignty; short-term allied agreements; and allied policies concerning humanitarian disaster relief in the wake of the Kurdish operations.

A. Conceptions of Sovereignty

Much of the conventional understanding of the cautious American approach to the Major/European Community proposal for enclaves revolves around their legal implication, and the differences between enclaves and the creation of safe havens or sanctuaries. US officials remark that no matter what the allies could have agreed to with respect to Northern Iraq, the majority of the armed forces used to secure the area under question would have been American. The utilization of US forces would have met a tremendous degree of opposition in the United States for a number of reasons. Concern arose over the implications of these camps for the integrity and sovereign status of Iraq. The potential of civil war between the Kurds, Shiites and the Iraqi Government would have been greater if the supposed juridical concept of the enclaves had been enforced by the allies. Such involvement might prompt not only the fragmentation of Iraq, but the destabilization of the whole Persian Gulf region. Secondly, due regard must be given to socio-political concerns: the 'Vietnam syndrome' and corresponding lack of resolve on the part of the American public; public concern at the lack of clear objectives, and agreed time limitations; and concerns over the importance of the issue to the national interest of the United States. Previously cited polls illustrate the concerns of the US public. Only half agreed with the notion of protecting the Kurds, and less agreed that US ground forces should be employed in this task.

However, if these reasons were comprehensive enough to explain the divergences between the United States and the European Community with respect to the proposal of John Major, why did criticism of the policy continue in the manner it did, as was illustrated in the first sections of this chapter? To explain this political scientists, columnists and former senior government officials implicitly give credence to the notion that the Bush Administration hid behind these rationales to avoid stating more deeply held convictions held by its leadership. However, the assertions of this group, most forcefully displayed by Charles Krauthammer, Pierre Lellouche and Michael Mandelbaum, is left at the level of the implicit rather than the explicit. It is hoped that a further examination of some of the verbatim statements of the political leadership of the European Community and the United States will provide a more comprehensive understanding of these values marking EC-US relations, and divergences.

What makes the opening remarks of President Bush notable, is not only their extreme caution and negative reaction to the enclave proposal, but the ad nauseam

assertion that only the United States did not want to promote the fragmentation of Iraq through the creation of a Kurdish state. One can point to a number of instances in the early part of April when the French and British governments did speak of the need to bend international laws to aid the Kurdish peoples. These include the draft letter to the Security Council on the part of the former and statements made by the latter in the media.[4] However, within the context of the entire debate concerning safe havens, enclaves and sanctuaries these comments appear to be the exception rather than the rule. Other comments from foreign policy leaders in Britain, the proposing country, appear to place the enclave concept squarely within the confines of international law and agreed UN Security Council resolutions such as Resolution 688. John Major, Douglas Hurd, Douglas Hogg and David Hannay can all be found to be resisting suggestions that the enclave policy would result in the fragmentation of Iraq, the creation of an independent Kurdistan and the destabilization of the Persian Gulf basin[5], comments from some political columnists aside.[6] In retrospect, the position of these officials can also be discerned from that of personnel working in and with the Foreign Office, as well as in the House of Commons Third Report, which noted the primary objectives of John Major's enclave proposal.(UK, Jul. 24, 1991)

What makes this first divergence even more curious is the timing of the West European and American statements. Most of the remarks on the part of US officials, including those of President Bush, came between April 10 and 16, 1991, whereas the statements of British officials were made between April 9 and 10, 1991. As such, the US President had considerable time to discuss his concerns with his counterparts in Britain, France and Germany, prior to finalizing his position. A number of media sources note that these discussions did occur, yet the reason why the United States had been slow in agreeing to the refugee assistance plan was that '...this is a difficult logistical problem...'(Guardian, Apr. 17, 1991;1) What one may be able to conclude is that a divergence greater than that over the concerns for the armed forces and juridical interpretations of the language used occurred between the United States and its EC allies. Divergencies were explained because of some of the ingredients of what constitutes a 'conventional wisdom', but not all of them, the answer why this may be so can be found within the debate held in the European Parliament on April 18, 1991. Mr. Dry of the Socialist Party Group stated that the Kurds have the right to autonomy within a federal state. This option, worked out by way of an international conference, should not be considered unrealistic because '...there are several federal states among the Twelve. That kind of solution is neither unrealistic, nor utopian, nor threatening...'(EC OJC, Apr. 18, 1991;238) Aside from the federal nature of some of the member states of the EC, the Community itself, in its formation and continued evolution as a supranational organization, is another illustration of a level of authority to which all of the Twelve have

agreed to. Indeed, there are aspects of the EC that explicitly transfer sovereignty from the nation state to the supranational level. The deepening of the competencies of the EC Commission and European Parliament, as well as the legislative and juridical authority of the Court of Justice, underline the fact that 'sovereignty' in the West European context no longer holds the same definition as it classically ascribed to the nation state. The sacrosanctness of Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty compared to the willingness of EC member states to defy international legal customs, in small or large measure, may be indicative of the conceptual differences that are held in Western Europe and the United States.

One may thus conclude that while international developments, such as the consequences of World War Two, assisted in pushing West European states together with respect to the formation of the ECSC and the EC, none were 'forced' to transfer as much sovereignty to these institutions as they did. This divergence over what may and may not be defined as 'sovereign' coincides with the earlier discussion concerning the nature of the international system and the principles that one state or a group may accord primacy to in their relations with third party actors. Caroline Thomas denotes sovereignty as one of the '...basic pillars of order in the [international] system...'(Thomas, 1985;3) One's understanding of sovereignty, and how much priority this term should be accorded in global affairs, may lend one many insights into whether social justice or 'stability' is more important. The fact that senior politicians from Security Council states such as France and Britain, supported by other large EC states such as Germany, began to open up the definition of what is or is not sovereign, and what is and is not acceptable action in the face of already established international laws, says something quite explicit on the stance of these leaders in the debate on the nature of the international system and notions of order, stability and justice. That the president of the United States framed his 'new world order' speeches almost wholly within a context of stability and order, as with that speech delivered at Maxwell Air Force Base, rather than one of justice, indicates something else in the position of the leadership of the United States in relation to that of the member states of the European Community.

In conclusion it may have been, as one EC official confessed, that Prime Minister Major was attempting to gain domestic political advantage and President Mitterrand was forced into his position because of the interests of his spouse.(ECHO, Interviews; 1994) Nevertheless, the leaders of two of the most powerful states in the international system not only proposed the enclave plan, but pursued it with vigor throughout and in the face of obvious hostility on the part of the leadership of the United States. Finally, the political reasons behind the evolution of Operation Provide Comfort have not precluded the West European states and the EC from developing and enhancing their own mechanisms for humanitarian and disaster relief. Such developments suggest that while domestic

considerations may have driven initial proposals, these states believed that the Kurdish situation was not only important in itself, but had long term implications for international law, and possibly prompting changes in this law to meet the demands of an increasingly complex world. These developments will be examined in the third part of this section of the chapter.

B. Short Term Agreement

The description of events given above illustrates two differing paths towards the same endpoint. The member states of the European Community proposed and agreed to a common position in early April of 1991. From that point onward a consistent approach was in order, with respect to humanitarian assistance, aid projects and military commitments. As to the latter, there was no time when EC member states refused to belong to a UN or Allied operation in Northern Iraq. Whether it was Operation Provide Comfort, OPCII or the stationing of UN guards in Kurdistan, the member states were fully supportive of such measures, contributing funds, logistical assistance, air support and ground forces. The same, however, could not be said of the United States, per se. While the US, over time, did supply these operations with logistic support and the other above mentioned types of assistance, the history of US involvement in Northern Iraq with respect to military commitments is still one of inconsistency. From a position of initial cautiousness to an acceptance of a reworked enclave plan through to vacillation on the longevity of Provide Comfort and the necessity of OPCII, the United States appeared to forever require other states to push it towards a decision. The contradictory statements of Pentagon spokespeople and military commanders on the one hand, and General Shalikashvili on the other, are illustrations of this vacillation. The comment by President Bush that '...history will show...these things manage to take care of themselves...'(Guardian, Apr. 27, 1991;6) is an indication of the political wavering that inspired military vacillation.

This hands-off approach to the situation in Northern Iraq was further highlighted when, as mentioned above, British and other West European officials were forced, on two occasions, to persuade US officials to co-operate in OPC by contributing armed forces. The first of these was in the middle of April 1991 and the second in late June of the same year. The possibility of a long-term commitment, and the complications that could evolve such involvement must have been of concern to President Bush. His many speeches prior to, during and immediately after the Persian Gulf war indicate that he was adverse to having US forces give any direct or indirect aid to a Kurdish rebellion that might destabilize Iraq. What makes this position notable is, again, the timing. It was only on April 16 that the United States made a full commitment to the stationing of ground forces in Northern Iraq

for the purpose of protecting the Kurds. This was ten days after the announcement of the enclave proposal by John Major. The second cautionary statement from President Bush was on April 27. One week previous Douglas Hurd had stipulated that none of the EC member states involved in OPC intended on being in Northern Iraq for an indefinite period of time. The Foreign Secretary did not state when the withdrawal of forces would take place, but from Hurd's statements in the House of Commons, it appears that such a withdrawal would occur some time in the summer months. Nevertheless, President Bush felt it necessary to reiterate his position of April 16 concerning the short term nature of Provide Comfort: '...this new effort...despite its scale and scope, is not intended as a permanent solution...to the contrary, it is an interim measure...'(Bush, Apr. 16, 1991;273)

Was this reiteration a genuine response to domestic concerns relating to the 'Vietnam syndrome' and polling indicating that the President did not have the full support of public opinion, or something more? Again, Realist assumptions concerning the world and the power of short-term interests can, in part, explain this divergency between the United States and the member states of the EC. Nevertheless, the timing of the Bush speeches, combined with his desire to maintain stability, order and rule of law in the Persian Gulf appear to also explain, in part, this divergency. Thus, the link between these two allied disagreements and notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, order, and justice can be established; a long-term commitment to the Kurdish peoples implies and commits states to the reconstruction of Northern Iraq. As one British Foreign Office official commented, this type of reconstruction '...gets one into the politics of Iraq...the internal problems of the country...'(UK ODA, Interviews;1992) Therefore the reconstruction of Northern Iraq may also imply an even greater disruption of the integrity of Iraq, with a civil war one possible outcome of the involvement of outside forces. Given the rhetoric of President Bush with respect to not having US ground forces embroiled in domestic situations, it was possibly deemed necessary to publicly dispel any fears of this occurring.

However, what is notable in the US position is that coalition forces did not withdraw from Northern Iraq and the surrounding area in the summer months of 1991. In fact, ECHO officials confirm that allied forces, albeit in much smaller numbers than those stationed in Kurdistan in April and May of 1991, by way of the MCC, are still being maintained in the latter part of 1994.(ECHO, Interviews;1994) In fact, these same ECHO officials concede that it was the United States that pushed for a continuation of OPC rather than the leadership of Western Europe. This said, there is a strict division of labor and resources between the allies; the United States has maintained the single largest military presence and the provision of 'in kind' payments for Provide Comfort, while EC member states have continued to sponsor humanitarian aid work and supply material used in the various encampments and ongoing reconstruction projects. The only record of US government-mandated assistance to the Kurds is through Public Law 102-368, whereby

forty million US dollars was granted. However, the law stipulated that this aid could be used for emergency relief through the creation of emergency (i.e. non-permanent) medical and food facilities prior to the onset of the winter.(US Command, Internal Document, Sept. 1994) Consequently, the United States can be seen as not contradicting its continued role in Northern Iraq. Having very little to do with the actual reconstruction and redevelopment of Kurdish villages and towns in Northern Iraq, the US may be able to escape the claim that it, alongside the member states of the EC, has acted in a manner that has breaches what Thomas has called the 'basic pillars' of international law - the sovereignty of Iraq as well as the international legal system that upholds this state-based system. On the other hand, ECHO officials remark that international law has played a very small role in the calculation of what officials should and should not do with respect to aiding the Kurds. Additionally, the EC member states agree with this stance of the EC Humanitarian Office. This assertion is based upon two foundations. The first is that none of the member states have attempted to dissuade the EC Commission from operating in Northern Iraq, while secondly, all of the member states continue to utilize their own forces in Kurdistan. More on the long-term aspects of this involvement will follow later in this chapter.

The conclusion to this section is similar to that pertaining to the first divergency. There are many reasons why the United States acted in the manner it did over a long-term period with respect to its commitment to the Kurdish refugees of Northern Iraq. Some of these reasons can be found within the 'conventional wisdom' of Realist thought. However, the timing of many of the statements of President Bush and the link between these notions of stability and order, and justice and social responsibility towards weaker members of the world, illustrate two beliefs. Firstly, the gap in the conventional wisdom requires further explanations from perspectives other than Realism. Secondly, and more importantly, the link between the rhetoric and statements of President Bush, Prime Minister Major, Hurd, Hannay and other West European politicians, and notions of sovereignty, relates back to values, beliefs, world perspectives, and theoretical constructs that these politicians hold as parameters on acceptable behavior on the part of their governments. Lastly, it is at this juncture one may posit that unit and sub-unit level factors are at work in the determination of policy with respect to the Kurds of Northern Iraq. These factors, domestic, idea- based and/or ideological, lend credence to the existence of a gap between what actually occurred in Northern Iraq and the ability of the Realist perspective on International Relations to provide an adequate explanation.

C. Beyond the Kurds

The third link between sovereignty, territorial integrity and order on one hand, and justice on the other, comes by way of the various policy proposals that have been enacted by the EC member states and the United States. As noted above, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the EC Commission have all implemented a number of measures in the wake of the Kurdish safe haven project. The most immediate of these was the Anglo-German initiative at the Group of Seven summit of July 1991. Heads of State and Government Prime Minster Major and Chancellor Kohl argued for, and gained, the consent of the other leaders for the inclusion of, within the political communiqué, the need for the United Nations to be prepared for future crises and movements of people like that of the Kurdish refugees.(FT., Jul. 17, 1991;4)

The United Kingdom, in a series of reports to the House of Commons, expressed the desire for the United Nations to move towards a more pre-emptive role with respect to the avoidance of humanitarian crises. In a report prepared in the middle of June 1991 its review of the mechanisms for this role lists three salient points. Firstly, the international community has begun to look to '...the UN system to perform complex and challenging tasks beyond its remit or experience...'(UK, June 1991) Secondly, some of these tasks have already been called for by the United Kingdom. The Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, made the assertion, cited previously in this chapter, that the clear need for a humanitarian effort is a new factor in international politics and a justification for intervention by a third party in the affairs of a sovereign state, including the deployment of an army to secure the territory where the human rights violations are occurring and deliver the required assistance; all without the permission of the state whose borders and sovereignty is being breached. Lastly, the report denotes three possible situations where intervention may be justified, as well as the need for a clear set of international rules concerning humanitarian intervention so as to establish a framework from which to operate in the future.(Ibid.)

Another House of Commons report, published in July 1991 and also previously mentioned in this chapter, pushes even further with respect to the abrogation of the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation state. The report assesses the implication of revising Article 2.7 of the UN Charter. This article prevents states from interfering in the internal affairs of another state. The report asserts that the UN Security Council Resolution enacted with respect to the implementation of the safe haven project, UNSC Resolution 688, is a document that '...is the most important precedent in the long term for the UN's role in the internal affairs of a State...'(UK, July 1991;xxvi) Lastly, but possibly the most important of all House of Commons views on this subject, is the October 1991 report. As stated above, on a number of occasions the United Kingdom, alongside

Germany, called for the creation of a UN disaster relief co-ordinator. Also, noted by officials from the UK Foreign Office and its counterpart in Germany, is the linking of humanitarian aid to a third country and the notion of 'good government'. Respect for human rights, increasing the effectiveness of aid packages and the enhancement of internal developments are the three pillars of this concept.(UK, Oct. 1991;par.25)

The enhanced profile of the humanitarian aid divisions in Germany, France, as well as the French UN Security Council draft proposals in early April, may be viewed in the same light as developments in the United Kingdom. The appointment of Bernard Kouchner, through to the continued involvement of French ministers and officials in university-based research into humanitarian intervention, indicates a pattern of involvement similar to Britain. The same is true of the Division of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) section of the German Foreign Ministry. Not only has this section of the government been assigned a larger number of projects, it has also attained a greater degree of status through the appointment of a former Ambassador as the person in charge of the unit. Like ECHO, the DHA is associated with NGOs such as the German component of Medecins sans Frontieres. Officials in the unit assert that they do not fund organizations that have an overt political and/or ideological agenda and check the credentials of every organization that applies for funds, but that the Kurdish situation was a special situation, but not necessarily the last such situation that the unit would become involved in.(Germany DHA, Interviews, 1994)

Lastly, but certainly not least, is the role of the EC Humanitarian Office. As mentioned above, ECHO was in part created because of the plight of the Kurdish refugees. The need for greater co-ordination within the EC Commission was evident because two Directorate Generals were in charge of Community policy in this area. However, in itself the establishment of ECHO is not a tremendous achievement. What is interesting to note, coinciding with the possible divergence between stability, order, sovereignty and justice, is the attitude taken by ECHO officials towards international legal statutes, the implications of their actions with respect to international law, and the lack of desire among EC member states to curb the powers and tasks of ECHO. The lack of respect apparently accorded international law and the notions of territorial integrity and sovereignty allow ECHO officials a degree of flexibility in two main respects. The first concerns which non-governmental organizations ECHO associates with and funds. The second concerns the types of projects ECHO is willing to fund and assist. As to the former, NGOs such as Medecins du Monde (an offshoot of Medecins sans Frontieres, and also created by Bernard Kouchner), that do not respect the wishes of host countries, are very much involved in ECHO projects. This indicates a lack of respect accorded to traditional notions of sovereignty within ECHO. The latter is that, with respect to the Kurdish situation, ECHO is continuing to fund projects that will aid in the redevelopment and reconstruction of

parts of Northern Iraq.[7] As noted by a UK official, such developmental projects broach the line between external and internal issues and involves one in the politics of the host country. Having said this, in the case of Iraq, ECHO does not concern itself with the desires of the host country; another instance of ECHO flaunting the 'sacrosanct' principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The power of this argument is strengthened even further when one couples these actions with the words of Douglas Hurd, Roland Dumas and Genscher of Germany. All three of these Foreign Secretaries have alluded to or directly mentioned the need for the international community, through the mechanisms of the United Nations, to assess the laws already in place with respect to their ability to meet the demands of future humanitarian disasters. The divergence between the United States and its West European allies is emphasized by this coupling of EC words and deeds. Nowhere within the speeches of American politicians and officials, save for the one occasion already mentioned, did any of these people speak clearly and forcefully about matters such as disaster relief assistance; the reassessment of international law and the mechanisms of the UN; and the possible need to re-evaluate the sacrosanctness of the principles of territorial integrity and nation state sovereignty.

This linkage between sovereignty, territorial integrity and order on one hand, and justice on the other, does not, after careful examination of US policy, appear correct - for three main reasons. Firstly, while there was a long-term commitment to the Kurds of Northern Iraq, the commitment is 'in kind', of a limited value dollar and military-based nature. Consequently, there is no actual or practical relationship between US involvement in Northern Iraq and the reconstruction of the latter with roads, schools, instructors, hospitals and all of the other necessities of a 'normal' society such as desired by the Kurds, even given the assistance provided by Public Law 102-368, for this support is for emergency and *not* longer term reasons. The only link is that these projects could not continue without the military protection provided by the United States, assuming that the latter was the only country providing armed forces. As noted previously, the US has the single largest contingent still maintained in Northern Iraq and the surrounding area, but not the only one. West European troops, alongside West European aid workers, are also present in Northern Iraq.

A second and related reason is that there has been no movement by the US prior to, during, or after Operation Provide Comfort in terms of new methods to alleviate future persecution and population migrations. In early April of 1991 it was France who put forward a draft resolution calling for the need to act with respect to the plight of the Kurds. By the middle of this same month it was the British Prime Minister who proposed the creation of enclaves in Kurdistan, and the French who designed the model for these enclaves. By June and July of 1991 it was the leadership of Britain, France and Germany

who persuaded the United States to remain in Northern Iraq because, in their assessment, the task of protecting the Kurds had not yet been completed. Later on in July, it was Britain and Germany proposing the idea of a disaster relief co-ordinator for the United Nations and the EC through ECHO and the member states, that were enlarging their assistance for disaster relief through the creation and expansion of already existing humanitarian offices; the insistence that an improvement in human rights became a condition for receiving foreign aid; and the establishment of links between these offices and non-governmental agencies unconcerned with sovereignty, territorial integrity and 'order' as priority concepts in international politics.

Nowhere amongst all of these developments can the United States be found. From its caution at the outset of the EC sponsored enclave plan, to its desire to withdraw from Kurdistan in the middle of July 1991 and the lack of initiative with respect to new techniques, relationships and directions with respect to humanitarian assistance and intervention, the United States has neither followed nor led its West European allies. In truth, it has not even appeared interested.(OFDA, Interviews;1994) This may illustrate, given that there is a discernible pattern since April 1991, a reluctance on the part of the United States to bend or break the rules of the international system that it helped to create. As mentioned earlier in the case study, President Bush, Vice President Quayle and Secretary of State Baker continually stressed the need to create or fashion a 'new world order' that has as its constituent elements the rule of law, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and lastly, a concept of human rights, justice and the protection of the weak. However, as has also been noted previously, the last three often come last in the definition of this 'new world order' and may be perceived as the least important.

The position of the United States in the world as the only superpower with perceived global interests, is such that the maintenance of an ultra-stable international system should be important to its leadership. To begin to undermine the sanctity of borders in the Persian Gulf basin may lead to the same in other areas of the world where the United States has vital national interests. One possible example of this may be in other parts of the Middle East with the territorial integrity of Turkey and Israel. The perceived need to maintain the 'status quo' may be a factor in this desire for systemic stability. The international system, with its ranking of states by political, economic and military capabilities, may dictate the flexibility that the United States and its leadership has in being creative and radical compared with relatively lesser powers such as France, Britain and Germany. The Realist perspective, dominant in this kind of analysis, would appear to be able to explain why a litany of divergences existed and continue to exist between the US and its West European allies over Northern Iraq, the plight of the Kurdish people, and the question of 'what comes next' in terms of international humanitarian assistance.

However, one can illustrate a number of 'gaps' within this explanation. The most significant gap of all is the omission of the perceived interests of countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Repeatedly, the leadership of these countries, notably the former, stated that there was no interest in the creation of an independent Kurdish state, of the undermining of the sanctity of the borders of Iraq, or the destruction of the Iraqi government. One can notice this because the EC member states agreed with the United States' desire to have safe havens on a limited scaled in Northern Iraq, rather than enclaves that might have been perceived by the Kurds as the prelude to a new state. Nonetheless, these states did not discontinue their efforts to aid the Kurds through a variety of mechanisms, nor did they not utilize opportunities such as the Group of Seven meeting to press for matters like a UN disaster relief co-ordinator for similar humanitarian circumstances. The refusal to redraw boundaries did not dissuade the French and British governments from extending their armed force commitments past July of 1991, whereas it did the United States.

The second 'gap' is the failure to acknowledge the interest of Britain, France and Germany in a stable international system. None of these states come to mind as being 'revolutionary' in their pursuit of domestic and foreign policies, nor do they not have certain interests throughout the globe. Of course, none of them has the scope of interests of the United States, but all maintain a special interest in areas of the globe where they had colonies or historical links. This desire for a stable international system begs one question why these states took on this collective role they did from April to July 1991, if they ask of the international system the same as the United States? The answer is unclear at this point. However, one may conclude that the ability of the Realist project to 'explain' and 'claim to know' why certain states act they way they do is vulnerable to criticism. The answer that the international system is such that certain states *must* act in a certain, almost predetermined manner, does not appear able to maintain as much validity in this instance as its proponents may wish; additional or alternative theoretical perspectives may therefore be in order. It may be enough to say at this point that the priorization given to issues such as human rights, civil liberties, humanitarian assistance and justice over 'order', as well as the negation of certain aspects of the Realist project such as the role of the international system and the need for a system-based approach to international politics, incite one to conclude that unit and sub-unit factors, normally omitted from the Realist thesis, need to be included within an analysis of transatlantic studies, or, at the very least, taken into consideration as influences upon state behavior.

VII:Conclusions

The timing of the actions and reactions of the United States and European Community, the reliance of both on a variety of words and phrases that have specific, yet differing meanings, the domestic aspect to the cautiousness of President Bush, and the glaring gaps in future policy direction between the Allies are the main points of contention that have been highlighted in this case study. Alongside of these points of contention have come a conventional wisdom based upon a number of particular convictions, including the sacrosancteness of the notions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and the global interests of the United States compared to regional ones of the European Community. To this end a link between these core assumptions and the initial propositions of Political Realism that are found in the first chapter of the thesis can be made, as has been true in the previous two case studies. This link can be made because the initial propositions mentioned adhere to the primacy of state actors, the determinism of the international environment and related objective factors, and awareness, but rejection of, moral considerations in the formulation of foreign policy and international relations. Clearly said by Morgenthau and reiterated with illustrations from Carr and Kissinger, the primary motivating force of states and statesmen should be power, defined as the national interest. The achievement of this goal, most likely through the balancing of forces and understanding of objective conditions, is the responsibility of rulers, leaders and princes; deviance from this task would be a negation of their duties to themselves, their states, and citizens.

But based upon eye witness accounts, facts, figures, documents and verbatim speeches of many of the primary actors in the Western response to the plight of the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, the conventional wisdom of why the United States and its West European allies clashed appears to be weakened, injured, and hurt in its ability to 'claim to know' why these disagreements took place. Is it certain that the conventional wisdom concerning these transatlantic strains is not completely in error, but enough doubt has been cast upon it to return it damaged, especially in the wake of the 'claim to knowledge' that is explicit and implicit in the writings of the founders of this wisdom's school of thought. Morgenthau asked that Political Realism should be put to a test in order to assess its 'claim to know'. Such a test was conducted, and the specific utilization of Political Realism was found to be wanting in a number of areas with respect to this case study, which have already been noted and analyzed above.

But so what? The Political Realist project has been found wanting. This was true of the two previous case studies as well, so how does this information concerning this case study add to one's knowledge with respect to a more comprehensive understanding of EC-

US relations, and the theoretical perspective that should be utilized to better understand this security relationship? It is the belief of this author that this study highlights, even more than the previous two, two factors that must be assimilated within a tradition for this more comprehensive understanding of EC-US security relations can be delivered. These two factors are the importance and relevance of non-state actors in the realm of international politics and the necessity of accounting for 'agency', defined as goals, beliefs, values, morals and self-directed goals.

This above conclusion concerning 'agency' stems from the massive involvement of the European Community as an institution in the affairs of the Kurds and in the policies implemented in the wake of Operation Provide Comfort, and the belief that whereas the United States reacted to a problem of 'stability' and alliance in the Persian Gulf, the European Community reacted to those as well as one that involved a humanitarian tragedy that required a response by the wealthier nations and actors of the world. It might well have been that the French reaction to the plight of the Kurds was because of the individual interests of the spouse of President Mitterrand, but this motivation in itself pushes one to a necessary inclusion of 'agency', even at the basest of levels of analysis. The domestic considerations of President Bush are also such that one must develop a theory of International Relations that also takes into account the state at the unit and/or sub-unit level of analysis, and not only one operative at the level of the international environment.

These two considerations should push one towards certain possible alternative theoretical traditions rather than others in the search for a theory that is able to explain European Community- United States differences in the realm of security issues. To say at this point which theory, tradition, perspective or school of thought this should be will wait until the next, and concluding, section of this thesis, where the question of what may be the specifics of a future research agenda might include will be discussed at some length. It is enough at this juncture simply to state that there are some obvious limitations to not only the conventional wisdom with respect to the analysis of this case study, but Political Realism in general, as noted in the first chapter, but illustrated in greater detail and depth over the course of this and the two previous case studies on EC-US security relations.

---

[1] See also speeches by Dury, Roth and Jackson with respect to Kurdish autonomy and amendments to the UN Charter.(EC OJC, Apr. 18, 1991;228-240)

[2] See articles by B. Amiel, 'Idealism abandoned by a shrinking Bush', Sunday Times, April 7, 1991, p.4; A.M. Rosenthal, 'The Fear of Mortality' and 'Why the Betrayal?', New York Times, April 2, 1991, p.A20 and April 16, 1991, p.A24; P. Jenkins, 'Major puts UN on the spot' and 'Pricking the US conscience', Independent, April 10, 1991, p.21 and April 17, 1991, p.21; E. Mortimer, 'Safe haven is not enough', Financial Times, April 10, 1991, p.19; Newsweek, 'The Case for Action', April 15, 1991, p.16.

[3] See Economist, 'The hammer of the Kurds' and 'Want another war?', April 6, 1991, p.10 and April 13, 1991, p.10; Newsweek, 'The Case against Action', April 15, 1991, p.17; New York Times, 'How Can the US Standly Idly By?', April 2, 1991, p.A18.

[4] See Hurd's comments on the negation of the boundary between internal and external concerns in Financial Times, April 11, 1991, p.4 and Roland Dumas in The Independent, April 5, 1991, p.18.

[5] For the comments of John Major see The Independent, April 9, 1991, p.1; for Douglas Hurd see Financial Times, April 11, 1991, p.4; and David Hannay is quoted as saying that Britain was '...not proposing a safe haven as a juridical concept or a political concept, but a humanitarian concept...'(Morris, 1991;37)

[6] See Mortimer, E., 'Safe haven is not enough', Financial Times, April 10, 1991, p.19.

[7] Appendix 6.6 is a partial list of the 73 NGOs that have partnership agreements with ECHO as of June 24, 1993 and a summary of the principles of one of these organizations, Frances-Libertes. This summary indicates the long rather than short-term goals of these organizations that may impinge on the sovereignty of the state in question.

Appendix 6.1

European Community Sponsored Aid Projects
in Northern Iraq

Date	Country	Amt. (M ECU)	Type of Aid
April 08	EC-NGOs	3.7	Food
April 09	EC	150.0	Medical
April 16	EC	10.0	Medical
	France	6.0	Medical
	Holland	2.7	Medical
	Denmark	2.5	Medical
April 17	EC-Belgium	100.0	Camp Equip.
April 27	EC-France	2.2	Food
	EC-Holland	1.8	Medical
May 03	EC-UK	2.9	Sanitation
			Health
			Disaster

Aid by sector as a percentage (%)

Local Infrastructure	34.00
Medical Aid	5.33
Food Aid	37.23
Water/Sanitation	3.44
Energy	13.05
Mine Disposal	6.96
Total	100.0

Source: EC Humanitarian Office, Press Release, June 24, 1993

Appendix 6.2

Map of Allied Safe Haven Protection Zone
Northern Iraq



Source: US Department of State, April 22, 1991, p.277

Appendix 6.3

United States Contributions to Kurdish Relief Effort

Recipient	Amount ($US)
International Comm. of the Red Cross	10,250,000
League for Red Cross	255,000
UN Disaster Relief Organization	2,695,228
UN High Commission for Refugees	500,000
Government of Jordan	275,000
Save the Children	94,473
CARE	150,000
UNDRO	117,052
US Office of Foreign Disaster Relief	749,772
Total	15,386,525

Source: US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1994

Appendix 6.4

Armed Forces Committment in Northern Iraq, by Country
from April 16, 1991 - July 31, 1991
as a total and percentage of total committmeNT

Country	APR 16	APR 26	MAY 06	MAY 16	MAY 26	MAY 29
Austral.	0	0	0	0	74	24
Belgium	0	0	0	0	107	107
Canada	0	120	91	72	43	23
France	143	354	933	2006	2124	2107
German	0	198	221	196	133	41
Italy	0	74	89	1045	1167	1158
Lux.	0	0	0	0	38	38
NL	0	364	1018	1014	1010	1010
Portug.	0	0	19	0	0	0
Spain	0	3	389	603	593	593
Turkey	160	1160	1160	1160	1160	1160
UK	96	773	3529	4037	3943	3943
US	3386	7287	10302	11700	11710	11210
EC	239	1176	6198	8901	9115	8997
Total	4785	10333	17732	21833	22107	21464

Country	JUN 01	JUN 14	JUN 28	JUL 15	JUL 31	PEAK	PEAK AS % TOT
Austral.	74	74	0	0	0	74	0.3
Belgium	149	134	12	0	0	150	0.7
Canada	12	4	0	0	0	120	0.5
France	2132	2106	1155	807	351	2141	9.3
German	57	0	0	0	0	221	1.0
Italy	1165	1038	757	608	176	1183	5.2
Lux.	38	38	0	0	0	43	0.1
NL	1010	623	222	139	131	1020	4.4
Portug.	2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	19	neg
Spain	590	568	528	2	0	602	2.6
Turkey	1160	1160	1160	1160	1160	1160	5.0
UK	3959	3118	1257	1000	189	4192	18.0
US	11028	7949	5914	5671	4011	11936	52.2
EC	9186	7603	3961	2556	847	9571	41.8
Total	21376	16812	11005	9387	6311	22843	100.0

Source: US European Command, Germany, July 1994

Appendix 6.5

UN Security Council Resolution 688

Adopted by the Security Council on
April 5, 1991

The Security Council,

Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations,

Gravely Concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved,

Taking note of the letters sent by the representatives of Turkey and France to the United Nations dates 2 April 1991 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22435 and S/22442),

Taking note also of the letters sent by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations dated 3 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22436 and S/22447),

Reaffirming the committment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and all States in the area,

Bearing in mind the Secretary-General's report of 20 March 1991 (S/22366),

1. *Condemns* the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region;

2. *Demands* that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same content that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;

3. *Insists* that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from the repression in all of its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities;

5. *Requests further* the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population;

6. *Appeals* to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relef efforts;

7. *Demands* that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends;

8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Appendix 6.6

Selected List of Non-Governmental Organizations with Partnership Agreements with EC Humanitarian Office

Organization	Country
Assoc. di Cooperazione allo Sviluppo	Italy
Aide Medicale Internationale	France
CARE International	Belgium
Dutch Consortium	The Netherlands
France Libertes	France
Handicap International	Belgium
Iraqi Humanitarian Relief	Great Britain
Kurdish Rehabilitation	Iraq
Kurdish Life Aid	Great Britain
Medecins du Monde	France
Medico International	Denmark
OXFAM	Great Britain
Pharmaciens sans Frontieres	France
Save the Children	Iraq/Great Britain
CARE	Belgium

Note:A total of 11.5M ECU has been given by ECHO to these organization as of June 24, 1993.

Source: ECHO Press Release, June 24, 1993

Appendix 6.7

France Libertes - Aims and Objectives

1) The education and protection of children: building of schools, orphanages, reception centres for street children, training of teachers and instructors, supply of teaching materials,

2) Health: building of health centres and hospitals, supply of medical equipment and medicines, training of health workers,

3) Training and employment: aid to reinsert the disadvantaged into economic life,

4) Economic development: water supplies, rehabilitation of villages, food aid.

5) Fundamental rights and freedoms: support for the persecuted, defence of civil liberties.

ECHO, as of November 24, 1993, has given France-Libertes 710,000ECU for a series of aid projects related to these above goals.

Source: EC Humanitarian Office, Brussels, June 24, 1993

Appendix 6.8

Current EC Humanitarian Office
Financial Aid, 1992-93

LOME IV	1992 DECISIONS (in ECU)	1993 DECISIONS (in ECU)
AFRICA		1,000,000
ANGOLA	7,500,000	6,000,000
BENIN		1,000,000
BURKINA FASO		500,000
BURUNDI		4,000,000
CENTRAL AFRICA (Chad Refugees)		200,000
DJIBOUTI		515,000
ETHIOPIA	3,600,000	350,000
FIDJI		1,000,000
GHANA		500,000
GUINEE BISSAU		300,000
GUINEA		1,000,000
HAITI	1,000,000	2,000,000
KENYA	7,150,000	2,400,000
LIBERIA	1,000,000	8,990,000
MALAWI	400,000	
MAURITANIA	1,000,000	
MOZAMBIQUE	2,000,000	3,000,000
NAMIBIE		180,000
RWANDA	2,700,000	9,000,000
SENEGAL		1,000,000
SIERRA LEONE		1,850,000
SUDAN	4,000,000	9,300,000
TANZANIA		2,000,000
TOGO		500,000
UGANDA		1,000,000
Wallis & Futuna(New Caledonia)	325,000	
WESTERN SAMOA	300,000	
ZAIRE		6,500,000
ZIMBABWE	700,000	
AFRICA Burundi Refugees		18,300,000
Totals :	31,675,000	82,385,000

LOME III	1992 DECISIONS (in ECU)	1993 DECISIONS (in ECU)
SOMALIE	40,000,000	7,796,000
Totals :	40,000,000	7,796,000

BUDGET	1992 DECISIONS (in ECU)	1993 DECISIONS (in ECU)
AFGHANISTAN	2,000,000	2,750,000
ALBANIA	2,000,000	456,000
ALGERIA		1,225,000
ANGOLA		1,000,000
LATIN AMERICA	500,000	
BANGLADESH	2,000,000	
BOLIVIA		445,000
BRAZIL		470,000
CAMBODIA		1,785,000
CHILE		500,000
COLOMBIA		470,000
CUBA	250,000	7,805,000
EGYPT	500,000	
EL SALVADOR	200,000	
ECUADOR		350,000
EX-USSR	3,550,000	51,295,000
EX-YOUGOSLAVIA	277,067,297	395,080,195
GUATEMALA		250,000
INDONESIA	250,000	
HONDURAS		595,000
INDIA		920,000
IRAK	5,000,000	21,500,000
IRAN		230,000
LIBAN		1,800,000
MONGOLIA		1,820,000
NEPAL		1,800,000
NICARAGUA	500,000	700,000
PAKISTAN	250,000	430,000
PALESTINE/ISRAEL	50,000	10,400,000
PARAGUAY	250,000	
PERU		510,000
PHILIPPINES	500,000	
ROUMANIA		350,000
RWANDA		2,000,000
SOMALIA		4,500,000
SRI LANKA		150,000
SUDAN		1,100,000
TURKEY	500,000	
URUGUAY-ARGENTINA	400,000	
VENEZUELA		150,000
VIETNAM		110,000
YEMEN	600,000	75,000
ZAIRE		1,300,000
ZIMBABWE		12,000
General Studies		500,000
Totals :	296,367,297	514,833,195

Grand total 1992 :	368,042,297	ECU
Grand total 1993 :	605,014,195	ECU

Source: 'At a Glance', ECHO, 1993

Conclusion:Where to with European Community-United States Security Studies?

I: Introduction

Three chapters on the theoretical underpinnings of the transatlantic relations between the United States and the European Community, along with three case studies that detail specific instances of divergence between these actors indicate a number of hypotheses concerning the Realist-oriented conventional wisdom concerning EC-US relations. These hypotheses question the ability of the Realist to explain Allied divergences. These same truths suggest the possible directions one may lean towards with respect to being able to comprehensively understand the case studies presented in this thesis, as well providing an original vantage point for observations within the realm of security studies. Nevertheless, the question that remains is how should one examine transatlantic relations through the 1990s and into the next century?

II:Questions

The first point of departure at this juncture is to return to the questions posed in the introduction to the thesis with a view to developing answers to them, based upon the empirical work in the three case studies:

> 1) The role of Agency as a variable to consider in the formulation of foreign policies and the conduct of international relations;
>
> 2) The ability of Realism to adequately incorporate the role of Agency within its theoretical framework, and with particular reference to the transatlantic relationship;
>
> 3) The validity of the existing and dominant (realist in orientation) literature concerning the transatlantic relationship, given the inability of this literature to adequately incorporate Agency within its explanation of European Community-United States divergences.

As to the first question posed, the opening chapter of the thesis laid out the core assumptions of the Realist project, including the belief in the ability of the structure of the international system to 'shape and shove' primary actors. The circumstances in which these actors find themselves assume a dominant role in the calculation of the interests of these same actors. Because of this assumption, factors to be found at the unit and sub-unit level of analysis, be they bureaucratic or domestic politics, ideas, or belief systems, are considered relatively insignificant in the shaping of international political decisions and

events. This belief is based upon the propositions of a number of the major scholars of Realism, found in the first chapter of the thesis.

However, in all of the case studies undertaken in this thesis, the analysis of divergences and disagreements between the United States and European Community betray this assumption concerning the level(s) of analysis one chooses to priorize and the ability of Agents to assume a position of importance in the calculation of decisions. In each instance, this betrayal is revealed through the case studies in two aspects. The first aspect was the initial critique of what appeared to be a 'conventional' understanding of allied disagreements, whereas the second was a more detailed assessment of this critique. For example, in the case study on the imposition of martial law in Poland and the dispute between the allies concerning the Trans-Siberian Pipeline, the work of Anthony Blinken, Angela Stent and, briefly, Beverley Crawford, illustrate that the concerns voiced by the US Government and the conventional literature to why the European Community reacted differently than the US towards the Soviet Union were slightly misleading. Their critiques were supported by the work conducted by Linda Miller, Stephen Woolcock and Phil Williams. Williams, notably, spoke of an 'inherent bad faith model' present in the body politic of the United States that is absent throughout Western Europe. However, these authors went no further in this analysis and did not devote much time to a specific review of the dispute itself. Much of their work was at a general rather than specific level of analysis.

Consequently, a second 'cut' with respect to the specific details of the dispute between the allies was undertaken. A number of areas of the dispute were mentioned as indicative of not only the inability of the Realist project to comprehensively explain the transatlantic divergence over the Polish crisis, but also the possible presence of unit and sub-unit factors - Agents one may say - in this dispute between the allies. The conclusion from this, as was true with the other case studies, was that it is not assumed that 'Agency', through an analysis of unit and sub-unit levels, needs to be considered with respect to decisions that affect relations between actors. However, the ability to injure the Realist conventional wisdom and acceptance of the possible presence of unit and sub-unit levels factors casts doubts upon this wisdom and highlights the need for a comprehensive multi-level analysis. In summation, it is possible to conclude that Agency should neither be ignored nor rejected as a potential factor. This is not to say that it should be dominant or given priority over the international system, but that more research into the effect of Agency on international politics, and specifically transatlantic relations, should be conducted.

The first chapter of the thesis not only listed the main propositions of Political realism, but also the limitations and weaknesses of this same paradigm. The second and third chapters were the first two opportunities to test these propositions, and explore these

weaknesses with respect to the creation and evolution of European Political Co-operation, and the literature concerning transatlantic relations from the 1960s through to the early 1990s. In both instances the tests revealed that Political Realism was lacking in its ability to comprehensively explain EC-US relations. In the former institutional and non-state actor developments in EPC exposed weaknesses in Realist thought through the latter's inability to grasp the presence of significant non-state actors and situations where states are unable to control their own environment. The literature review of the third chapter, nevertheless, illustrated contradictions that must be dealt with during this thesis. These contradictions were that even though Realism was found lacking in its ability to explain EC-US security relations, there was no apparent successor theory to replace it, and that Realism remains the dominant theoretical paradigm for scholars researching in the area of transatlantic relations. Because the former appears at odds with the latter in their conclusions, the resultant is that a task of this thesis is to challenge this transatlantic literature and, under greater and more detailed scrutiny, ask whether or not this situation needs clarification and/or rectification. If so, then alternative or additional theoretical models will be solicited with a view to either adding to or replacing Realism as the dominant paradigm of this field of inquiry.

With respect to the case studies that analyzed allied reactions to the plight of the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq, it was evident that the conventional wisdom concerning allied disagreements - the comparative military capabilities and global role of the United States and the European Community and its member states - is inadequate in delivering a comprehensive answer. This inadequacy is all too evident in the second section of the critique of this conventional wisdom: the review of developments in disaster and humanitarian relief assistance programs in the EC and the United States. Beyond those programs already functioning in Germany, France and the United Kingdom, the creation and evolution of the EC Humanitarian Office is indicative, to some extent, of the limitations of Realism that were highlighted in the first chapter of the thesis. The non-nation-state basis of ECHO and its related communitarian status make it difficult to comprehend from a Realist perspective that holds as the primary actor in world politics the State, with other actors being secondary in their status, importance and significance to developments in international relations.

Perhaps the most inclusive of the three questions posed at the outset of this thesis concerns the ability of the literature as a whole to adequately explain transatlantic relations. No better example of whether or not this task can be accomplished may be the case study of allied disagreements concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conventional wisdom throughout the literature on the European dimension to the Arab-Israeli conflict is that the EC and its member states 'curried favor' with Arab states so as to be excused from their oil embargo. This is most clearly espoused by Ifestos. Because of the nature of this

specific wisdom, the relationship between this wisdom and that of the dominant general transatlantic literature found in the third chapter of the thesis could be described as quite compatible; a compatibility compounded by the fact that West European politicians and officials assert that the energy based relationship, prior to and after the October War of 1973, was decisive in the conduct of affairs between the two groupings. Nevertheless, the dominant literature and wisdom is punctured by two interesting critiques based upon specific issue areas that are taken up in detail in the latter half of the case study. These critiques utilize primary statistics as well as the arguments of former EC officials and the secondary literature to illustrate that even in this instance, where the conventional wisdom might appear at first invincible, the Realist project is unable to adequately explain transatlantic disputes and once again the 'agency-structure' and 'level-of-analysis' debates are joined. However, the presence of inadequacies and limitations within this conventional wisdom does not, as is true in all of the case studies, immediately imply that 'Agency', as well as a level of analysis different from that of the systemic, have important roles to play. Instead, the presence of agents and other levels may mean that the Realist project needs greater refinement to be able to cope with its limitations. But the second critique within this case study, a critique that highlights the possibility of unit and sub-unit levels of analysis being able to assist in the explanation of EC-US divergences, points not only to Realist inadequacies, but the place that 'Agency' may occupy within the conventional wisdom concerning not only this specific case study, but European Community-United States security studies, in general.

III:The Way Forward

The above section illustrates that the original set of questions posed at the outset of this thesis can be returned to in such a manner one may be asked where does one proceed, given the answers to these questions. The case studies confirm that the Realist project is inadequate with respect to a comprehensive explanation of transatlantic disagreements between the United States and European Community. The Achilles heel of this project - its inability to accommodate neither factors present at the unit and sub-unit levels of analysis nor 'Agency' - is noticeable in all three case studies, as well as the chapter charting the creation and evolution of EC foreign policy mechanisms.

To these notable weaknesses in the ability of Political Realism to comprehensively explain EC-US security relations in the case studies analyzed, the question at hand for Justin Rosenberg is '...what alternative terms should the issue be posed...'(Rosenberg, 1994;45) His response is that given the vulnerability of the Realist position, what may be required is an understanding of the international system that '...needs to be...theorized...as a level, or dimension, of a broader, more inclusive social order...'(Ibid.) To this end the

author proposes a number of directions, each to be taken up in greater detail below. The first is that the characterization of the state system cannot be '...contained at the level of the international...'(Ibid.) Immediately, concerns related to 'levels-of-analysis', a limitation already noted in the first chapter of the thesis, appear on the horizon as one path to follow. A second concern by Rosenberg is that what may be necessary at this juncture is an enhanced critique of the state that would be able to encompass the state-system as a whole, while a third may be an attempt to demystify contemporary international institutions and the dominant understanding of these same institutions.(Ibid.) Issues relating to 'agency' and the search for alternative theoretical traditions with respect to Rosenberg's project and that of this thesis are other areas of possible research that too have been noted previously, be it in the first chapter on Political Realism or the literature reviews conducted in the second and third chapters, respectively.[1] Because of these notations, these second and third concerns will also be examined in some detail below.

A. Alternative Theoretical Traditions

In this area of the move from the status quo of Political Realism to different theoretical traditions four choices come to the fore. These include Consociationalism; the self-styled logic of Roy Ginsberg; current developments in Political Realism and Neorealism; and the Gramscian Marxist tradition of Robert Cox. However, out of all these theories, this author posits that the tradition with the most potential to explain, comprehensively, transatlantic security relations is that of the Gramscian Marxism of Robert Cox.

A.1 Consociationalism and Self-Styled Logics

With specific references to the 'self-styled' logic, its strength is also its weakness. The strength of this logic is that it seeks to combine a number of elements from Political Realism, Complex Interdependence and Integration Theory in order to explain European Community foreign policy actions, broadly defined. By combining these elements, the logic seeks to overcome the limitations of not only Political Realism, but also those of the other paradigms it incorporates. However, because this logic could be seen as nothing more than an amalgamation of various assumptions, drawn from various paradigms, with no 'center, it could be criticized for its ambiguity, and for its attempt to be everything to everybody. Secondly, and with respect to its incorporation of aspects of Political Realism, Complex Interdependence and Integration Theory, it remains wedded to certain core assumptions, such as the State as the primary actor in international relations; those assumptions that have been exposed in this thesis as factors limiting the ability of Political

Realism to explain, comprehensively, EC-US security relations. Consequently, instead of moving forward in its ability to explain this relationship, the 'self-styled' logic remains stagnant.

The same is true of Consociationalism to the extent that it too has limitations that exclude it from selection for more detailed analysis. Consociationalism may be very useful in explaining the creation and evolution of European Political Co-operation, but not transatlantic security divergencies. This paradigm, because of its cleavage-based approach to domestic politics, may be useful in explaining the factors that pull and push EPC towards greater cohesion and communitarianism. However, whether or not this same paradigm would be able to tackle those issues present at the level of international politics, or present a case for the linkage of domestic and international issues, is dubious. Simply put, while this paradigm may have a theory of the State, does it have a theory of international relations? To move from one tradition that excludes the former to one that excludes the latter would be to recreate the problem, albeit at a different level of analysis. Like Ginsberg's logic, this author would not select this paradigm for a future research agenda concerned with the development of a richer understanding of EC-US security relations.

A.2 More on Realism

With respect to the broad tradition of Political Realism, developments from the late 1970s through to the early 1990s may inspire some optimism as to the ability of this paradigm to re-invent itself. Since Waltz's Theory of International Politics a number of works have been published that may represent steps forward in the comprehensiveness of this tradition. The two that come to mind are Barry Buzan's books People, States and Fear and The Logic of Anarchy and work in the area of regime theorization. With respect to the former's People, States and Fear. Buzan contends that security must be analyzed not only from an international perspective, but also from national, regional and individual perspectives also. However, in his attempt to broaden the levels of analysis of Structural Realism, Buzan remains wedded to a number of Realist-oriented core assumptions that condition his thinking throughout his work. These includes the priorization of the international level of analysis, the notion that power is relative, and that in order to obtain such power military-strategic forces will be employed.(Buzan, 1991;21-23)

In The Logic of Anarchy Buzan claims that he has attempted a 'great leap forward' theoretically from Ken Waltz, introducing a mechanism by which one can link differing levels of analysis. Thus his work should be considered as a new development within current debates concerning International Relations theory.(Buzan, 1993;244) However, Buzan states at the conclusion of his work that while his is an attempt to move forward

from Waltz, simultaneously this work '...does not wreck the fences around Waltz's tidy universe...but it leaves intact the powerful theoretical apparatus of structural realism...'(Ibid., 244-245) Thus again, Buzan is wedded, implicitly on this occasion, to a certain number of core assumptions of Neorealism, and by association, Political Realism; assumptions that have already been exposed as limiting the ability of this paradigm to explain, comprehensively, EC-US security relations.

The same is true of the literature concerned with regime theorization. Scholars working in this area of structural realism, most notably Robert Keohane, remain explicitly realist in their analyses of international relations, and thus wedded to the core assumptions of Political Realism. In the beginning of his article, Keohane states that '...argument developed here is deliberately limited to the systemic level of analysis...'(Keohane, 1982;327) He adds that in this systemic approach the '...actors' characteristics are given by assumption, rather than treated as variables; changes in outcomes are explained not on the basis of variations in these actor characteristics, but on the basis of change in the attributes of the system...'(Ibid.) It is because of the continuing limitations of the Political Realist/Neorealist/Structural Realist tradition that this author is suspicious of the ability of this work, and the Political Realist paradigm, to transform itself in such a way that it will be able to include those factors delineated above.

A.3 Gramscian Marxism

Is there an alternative paradigm that incorporates some of the notions found in traditional paradigms such as Political Realism, while incorporating the political economic factors of Complex Interdependence, has a theory of the State as a unitary actor in international relations and domestically, and includes in its analysis 'agents' that are present at the unit and sub-unit levels of analysis? Robert Cox's Gramscian Marxist analysis appears to this author as the most promising of them all, for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the Gramscian approach of Cox is the only paradigm that operates from a critical, and thus non-traditional perspective. This is to the benefit of the paradigm for it is, unlike that of the 'self-styled' logic, and Buzan and Krasner's work, not wedded to any of the core assumptions of Political Realism. As such, it is a paradigm that does not begin with a set of established limitations. Secondly, the nature of this paradigm allows it to be extremely critical of existing traditions and its related literature. This perspective is useful because theorists within this framework may not feel the need, as may be so for those theorists working within the traditional literature, to assert the correctness of the literature and its theoretical framework. Thirdly, the critical and normative nature of Gramscian Marxism is such that it is explicit in its lack of objectivity, even while it implicitly claims to be able to explain international relations. Morgenthau's 'claim to know' how is such that

it is likely to contain an implicit, and therefore limiting, normative bias. By being explicit, Cox is less open to criticism in his own claim to knowledge.

Fourth, and most importantly, Gramscian Marxism's ability to remain outside of the traditional theoretical literature but simultaneously incorporate aspects of this literature into its own theoretical framework, including material capabilities. What also distinguishes this paradigm from others is its ability to combine material capabilities, a primarily realist-oriented factor, the institutional aspect of Complex Interdependence, and Agency in the form of 'ideas'. For Robert Cox, the combination of these three forces represents a theoretical 'fit' unique to the Gramscian Marxist project.(Cox, 1986;217-221) Coupled with this fit, and particular to this form of Marxism, is Cox's disregard for traditional class-based analyses that reject the concept of the State, prefering the core assumption that the unitary state is a prominent, albeit not singular, actor in international politics.(Ibid., 205)

In light of this framework for analysis, two criticisms come to mind with specific reference to this thesis. The first is that Robert Cox's approach, because it is rooted in a Marxist analysis of politics, is determinant and politico-economic in orientation, thus unable to assist in the explanation of security issues and relations. To this Cox contends that through the utilization of this approach one is able to move from '...identifying the structural characteristics of world orders as configurations of material capabilities, ideas and institutions to explaining their origins, growth and demise in terms of the interrelationships of the three levels of structures [which is of social forces, forms of state and world orders]...'(Ibid., 226) Given this rebuttal, and Cox's move away from a class-based and economically-determinant Marxian analysis of politics, there would appear to be tremendous potential in the utilization of this paradigm for study in the specific area of transatlantic security relations.

The second criticism, like that facing Consociationalism and Ginsberg's 'self-styled' logic, is that within the specific literature concerning EC-US security relations there is a paucity of material written from this theoretical framework. As such, to say that Gramscian Marxism is in a better position to either assist Political Realism, or act independently, in building a more comprehensive analysis of EC-US security relations is to promulgate a series of assumptions rather than realities. This is correct to only a certain extent. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a number of scholars were located on the margins of the traditional literature, these being Nicholas Wahl, Michael Smith, Michael Vlahos and William Cromwell. Of these, Vlahos is the author of choice, because of explicit reference to 'agency' as being a crucial factor in the analysis of EC-US relations, and because of his sub-structural level of analysis approach to International Relations.

Thus there is some research being conducted from a framework that could be located within the Gramscian Marxist paradigm. Additionally, Stephen Gill's Atlantic

Relations:Beyond the Reagan Era is another work that speaks of the need to be theoretically critical and Gramscian in perspective with respect to transatlantic relations. However, this book is primarily concerned with political-economic issues and not those of a security nature. Nonetheless, the research of Vlahos and Gill point to a couple of works that can be associated with Robert Cox's paradigm, presenting us with a starting point from which one can advance, unlike the near total absence of specific EC-US scholarly work utilizing the 'self-styled' logic of Ginsberg or the Consociationalism of Wolfgang Wessels.

To summarize, this author selects Robert Cox's Gramscian Marxism as the theoretical framework that has the most potential to assist in the establishment of a comprehensive analysis of EC-US security relations because of this framework's ability to incorporate a number of vital assumptions. These include a unitary and prominent state as an actor in International Relations; the incorporation of material capabilities and institutional processes within a non-traditional paradigm; the inclusion of 'ideas', and, in general, 'agency' as a factor to be analyzed in the explanation of international relations; and the acknowledgement of the significance of levels of analysis alongside a structural understanding of international relations. It is because of these assumptions and postulations that it is suggested that Gramscian Marxism, above and beyond the 'self-styled' logic of Ginsberg, Wessel's Consociationalism and recent developments in Neorealist thought, should be selected as that framework which will contribute to a richer understanding of European Community-United States security relations.

IV:Final Conclusions

The elucidation of a new theory of International Relations that will be able to contribute a richer understanding of European Community-United States security relations was not the primary object of this thesis. The primary object was to illustrate the vulnerability of the 'claim to know' of traditional theoretical paradigms within International Relations, an analysis of three case studies exposing the limitations of the mainstream conventional literature and its theoretical framework. However, to uncover significant limitations in the existing conventional wisdom, without pointing to a number of paradigms that may assist that wisdom in building a more comprehensive analysis of EC-US security tensions, would be to invite criticism by way of the question 'so what?' As such, this concluding chapter has not only reiterated this author's main objectives as regards the conventional wisdom, and noted instances in the cases studies where these objectives have been developed in greater detail, but also pointed to a number of paradigms that may be useful in future analyses of transatlantic security relations. Additionally, this chapter has selected, for a variety of reasons, one of these paradigms,

Gramscian Marxism, that illustrates the greatest promise for the construction of a future research agenda.

Hopefully, this thesis has done what it set out to accomplish - a critique of the Realist approach to EC-US relations through the exposure of limitations in the conventional wisdom concerning transatlantic tensions, as well as providing an answer to the 'where does one go from here' question by stressing a theoretical paradigm that is explicit in its attempt to open up the study of International Relations to factors not within the traditional purview of Political Realism. It is this explicit 'opening up' of the theoretical box and the hope of linking this project to general debates within International Relations, that stands as the contribution of this thesis to the study and discipline of International Relations: an attempt to contribute to a richer understanding of theories explaining European Community-United States security relations during and after the end of the Cold War.

---

[1]Rosenberg, in a recent article entitled The International Imagination:IR Theory and 'Classic Social Analysis' in Millennium, V.23, No.1, also concludes that an alternative to Realist thought could be found in the work of C. Wright Mills' The Sociological Imagination, which was published in 1959. Debate concerning this proposition ensued, with reponses, both for and against, by Mervyn Frost, David Campell, Fred Halliday, Mark Neufeld and Steve Smith, found in Millennium V.23 No.1 and V.23 No.2 under the title of 'Discussion:The International Imagination'. However, because this discussion relates more to develpments in IR theory in general *rather* than theory as it relates to EC-US relations and the study of EC foreign policy in specific, it is a discussion that will not be 'picked up on' in this thesis.

Bibliography

Primary Sources - Government Documents

European Community

Bulletin of the European Community

06-1971 06-1980
10-1973 11-1989
12-1978 12-1989

EC Humanitarian Office, "Humanitarian aid from the European Community"

--------, "At a glance", 1994

--------, Interviews, 1994

--------, Press Releases, Jun. 24, 1993
Oct. 13, 1993
Nov. 11, 1993
Nov. 24, 1993
Dec. 13, 1993

"Necessary progress in community energy policy", Oct. 1972

Official Journal of the European Community

March 1973
June 1980
July 1981
November 1981
December 1981
December 1989
April 1991

Press Releases

April 08, 1991
April 16, 1991
April 17, 1991
April 27, 1991
May 03, 1991

"Single European Act", Brussels, 1987

United Kingdom

"Aid to Iraqi Refugees", Jun. 19, 1991

"The Middle East After the Gulf War", Third Report, Foreign Affairs Committee, Volume I, Jul. 24, 1991

"The Middle East after the Gulf War:Observations by the Government", Foreign Affairs Committee, Oct. 1991

House of Commons

Oct. 1973	V.863
March 1979	V.964-967
June 1991	V.193
July 1991	V.194
April 1991	V.189
March 1991	V.188

House of Lords

May 1979 V.400

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Interviews, 1992

'Note to Poland', Dec. 23, 1981

Overseas Development Administration (ODA), Interviews, 1992 and 1994

Survey of Current Affairs (SCA)

August 1976	December 1981
November 1977	V.7, No.11
April 1979	V.9, No.04
January 1982	V.12, No.01
April 1991	V.21. No.04
July 1991	V.21, No.07

United States of America

Baker, J., "Opportunities to Build a New World Order", Feb. 6, 1991

------, "Iraqi refugees:The need for international assistance", Apr. 7, 1991

Bush, G., "Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base College", Apr. 13, 1991

------, "The Gulf: A World United Against Agression", Nov. 30, 1990

------, "US Expands Kurdish Relief Efforts", Apr. 16, 1991

------, "Towards a New World Order", Sept. 11, 1990

------, "The World After the Persian Gulf War", March 6, 1991

------, "The Gulf: In Defense of Moral Principle", Dec. 18, 1990

------, 'America's Objectives in the Persian Gulf", Nov. 29, 1990

US Command, Southern European Headquarters, Interviews, April 1994

----------, Operation Provide Comfort Armed Force Committments, April - July, 1991, July 1994

Congressional Record

October 1973	V.119, No.25-26
November 1973	V.119, No.27-28
September 1978	V.124, No.22
January 1982	V.127, No.189
January 1982	V.128, No.01
February 1982	V.128

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Interviews, 1994

United States, "Crisis of refugees and diplaced persons of Iraq", Apr. 15, 1991

-------, "Iraqi non-compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions", Jul. 18, 1991

-------, "Persian Gulf Relief Effort", GAO/NSIAD-91-160, 1991

-------, US Embassy in United Kingdom, Interviews, 1992

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, V.16, No.25 Jun. 23, 1980

Wireless File (US Press Release), Eur-504, Jun. 15, 1980

Other

Germany, Division of Humanitarian Affairs, Interviews, 1994

OECD Report, 1973, Paris:Organization for Economic Co-ordination and Development

United Nations, Report of the Secretary General under Security Security Resolution 331 (1973), Document S/10929, May 18, 1973

-------, Security Council Official Records, Jun. 1976

-------, "Letter from France to Security Council", Apr. 4, 1991

Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, New York:United Nations, 1977, 1982 and 1988

-------, Interviews, 1994

Personal Interviews

David Hope, United Kingdom

Nancy Johnson, United States

Shawn Messick, United States

Anna Wexburn, United Kingdom

Commander Ron Morris, UN Command

Richard Lewartoski, European Community

John Hawkes, United Kingdom

Klaus Spreicher, Germany

Secondary Sources - Books and Articles

Allen, D., "Western Europe in the Atlantic System of the 1980s" in Gill, S.(ed.), Atlantic Relations:Beyond the Reagan Era, New York:Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989

-----, "Europe, the United States and the Middle East", Journal of Common Market Studies, V.22, No.2, Dec. 1983

-----, European Political Cooperation, London:Butterworth Scientific, 1982

-----, Pijpers, A. (eds.), European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984

-------, Smith, M., "From the 'Year of Europe' to A Year of Carter: Continuing Patterns and Problems in Euro-American Relations" in Journal of Common Market Studies, V.17, No.1, Sept. 1978

-----, "Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Area", Review of International Studies, V.16, 1990

-----, "Western Europe in Reagan's World" in Rummel, R.(ed.), The Evolution of a New International Actor, Colorado:Westview Press, 1990

Allen, R., "The Atlantic Alliance at a Crossroads", Strategic Survey, V.9, No.4, Fall 1981

Allison, G., Halperin, M., "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications" in Tanter, R., Ullman, R.(eds.), Theory and Policy in International Relations, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1972

Amiel, B., "Idealism abandoned by a shrinking Bush", Sunday Times, Apr. 7, 1991, p.4

Alker, H., "The Dialectics of World Order:Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire", International Studies Quarterly, V.28, No.2, 1984

Arrighi, G., "A Crisis of Hegemony" in Amin (ed.) Dynamics of Global Crisis, New York:Monthly Review Press, 1982

Art, R., "Fixing Atlantic Bridges" , Foreign Policy, V.46, Spring 1982

Artner, S., "The Middle East:A Chance for Europe?", International Affairs, V.56, No.2, Summer 1980

Ashley, R.K., "Dialogue: Towards a Critical Theory of International Politics", Alternatives, V. XIII, No.1, January 1988

-------, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space:Towards a Critical Theory of International Relations", Alternatives, V.12, No.4

-------, "The Poverty of Neorealism", in Keohane, R.(ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York:Columbia University Press, 1986

Axelrod, R., The Evolution of Cooperation, New York:Basic Books, 1984

Bailey, R., The European Community in the World, London:Hutchinson of London, 1973

Baldwin, D., "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis", International Organization, V.34, No.4, Autumn 1980

Banks, M., "The Inter-Paradigm Debate" in M. Light(ed.) International Relations, London:Pinter Publishers, 1985

Barker, E., The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-1950, Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1983

Beaufre, A., et al..(eds.), Strategy for the West, New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1973

Blinken, Anthony, Ally versus Ally:America, Europe and the Siberian Pipeline Crisis, New York: Praeger, 1987

Bluhm, W., "Causal Theory in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*", Political Studies, February 1962

Birrenbach, K., The Failure of the Atlantic Community, London:Frederick A. Praeger, 1963

-------, The Future of the Atlantic Community, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963

Brandon, H.(ed.), In Search of a New World Order, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1992

Brzezinski, Z., Power and Principle, New York:Farrar,Straus, Giroux, 1983

Buchan, A., "Europe and the Atlantic Alliance:Two Strategies or One?", Journal of Common Market Studies, V.1, No.3, 1962

Buchan, D., Colchester, N., Europe Relaunched, London:Hutchinson Business Books, 1990

Bull, H., Anarchical Society, London:Macmillan, 1977

-----, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy", Social Research, Winter 1981

-----, "European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO" in Foreign Affairs, V.61, Spring 1983

Bulmer, S., "Analysing European Political Cooperation:The Case of the Two-tier analysis" in M. Holland (ed.) The Future of European Political Cooperation, London:MacMillan, 1991

Buzan, B., "Economic structure and international security: the limits of the liberal case" in International Organization, V.38, No.4, Autumn 1984

-----, People, States and Fear, London:Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991

-----, European Security Order Recast, New York:Pinter Publishers, 1990

-----, The Logic of Anarchy:Neorealism to Structural Realism, New York:Columbia University Press, 1993

Cafruny, A., "A Gramscian Concept of Declining Hegemony" in Rapkin, D.(ed.) World Leadership and Hegemony, London: Lynene Reinner Publishers, 1990

Calleo, D., The Atlantic Fantasy:The US, NATO and Europe, London: John Hopkins Press, 1970

-----, America and the World Political Economy, London: Indiana University Press, 1973

-----, "The European Coalition in a Fragmenting World", Foreign Affairs, V.54, No.1, 1975

-----, "The Atlantic Alliance: A View from America" in Von Geusau (ed.) Allies in a Turbulent World, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982

-----, Beyond American Hegemony, Oxford:The Alden Press, 1987

Camps, M., "Sources of Strain in Transatlantic Relations" in International Affairs, V.48, No.4, Oct. 1972

Caporaso, J., Dolan, M., "The External Relations of the European Community", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, V.440, November 1978

Carr, E.H., The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939, London:Papermac, 1939

Chace, J., "The Concert of Europe", Foreign Affairs, V.52, No.1, October 1973

-----, "Europe: Is There a Price to be Paid" in E. Ravenal and J. Chace (eds.), Atlantis Lost, New York:New York University Press, 1976

Christison, K., "The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz", Journal of Palestinian Studies, V.18, No.2, Winter 1989

Cleveland, H., The Atlantic Ideal and Its European Rivals, London:McGraw Hill, 1966

------, NATO:The Transatlantic Bargain, London: Harper & Row, 1970

Cohen, B., "The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck" in Hanreider, W., (ed.) The United States and Western Europe, Cambridge, Mass:Winthrop Publishing, 1974

Cohen, E., "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance" in Foreign Affairs, V.61, No.2, Winter 1982/83

Coffey, P., The EC and the United States, London:Pinter Publishers, 1993

Cottrell, A., Dougherty, J., The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance, New York:Frederick A. Praeger, 1964

Cox, Robert, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", in Millennium, V.12, No.2, 1983

---, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" in Keohane, R.(ed.) Neorealism and its Crittics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986

Crawford, B., Economic Vulnerability in International Relations: East-West Trade, Investment and Finance, New York:Columbia University Press 1993

Cromwell, W., The United States and the European Pillar, London: Macmillan, 1992

Dankert, P., "Europe Together, America Apart" in Foreign Policy, V.53, Winter 1983/84

DePorte, A.W., "The Uses of Perspective" in Tucker and Wrigley (eds.) The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1983

Der Derian, J., Shapiro, M., International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, Lexington, Mass.:Lexington Books, 1989

de Ruyt, J., European Political Cooperation, Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council of the United, 1989

Dessler, D., "What's at stake in the agent-structure debate?", International Organization, V.43, No.3, 1989

Deutsch, K., "Attaining and Maintaining Integration", in M. Hodges(ed.) European Integration, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972

Diebold Jr., W., "Economics and Politics: The Western Alliance in the 1970's" in Hanreider, W. (ed.) The United States and Western Europe, Cambridge, Mass.:Winthrop Publishers, 1974

Doyle, M., "Thucydidean Realism", Review of International Studies, V.16, 1990

Duchene, F., "The European Community and its Global Responsibilities", in Kaiser and Schwarz (eds.) America and Western Europe. Lexington, Mass.:D.C. Books, 1977

Dworkin, R., Nuclear Deterrence:Ethics and Strategy, London: University of Chicago Press, 1985

-----, European Detente, London: Frances Pinter, 1986

Erdman-Keefer, V., "The Corn War:A Euro-American Trade Dispute" in Rummel, R., The Evolution of of an International Actor:Western Europe's New Assertiveness, Boulder:Westview Press, 1990

Everts, P., The European Community in the World, Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1972

Featherstone, R., "The EC and the US:Managing Interdependence" in Lodge, J.(ed.) The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, London:Pinter Publishers, 1993

Federal Republic of Germany, European Political Cooperation, 1982

Feld, W., West Germany and the European Community, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981

------, The European Community in World Affairs:Economic Power and Political Influence, Oxford:Westview Press, 1983

Freedman, L., "The Atlantic Crisis" in International Affairs, V.58, No.3, Summer 1982

--------, The Troubled Alliance, London:Heinemann Educational Books, 1983

--------, "A clear cut case for action", The Independent, Apr. 12, 1991, p.21

-------, The Gulf Conflict 1990-91. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1993

Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of Containment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982

Galtung, J., Europe: A Superpower in the Making, London:George Allen & Unwin,1973

------, "The European Community: A Superpower in the Making?" in Transarmament and the Cold War: Essays in Peace Research, Copenhagen:Christian Ejlers, 1988

------, Europe in the Making, London:Crane Russak, 1989

Garfinkle, A., "America and Europe in the Middle East", Orbis, V.25, No.3, Fall 1981

Garratt, J., "Euro-American Energy Diplomacy in the Middle East 1970-80", in Spiegel, S. (ed.) The Middle East and the Western Alliance, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982

Garthoff, R., Detente and Confrontation, Wasington D.C.:The Brookings Institute, 1985

George, A., Managing US-Soviet Rivalry:Problems of Crisis Prevention, Boulder:Westview Press, 1983

Gill, S., "American Hegemony: Its Limits and Prospects in the Reagan Era, in Millennium, V.15, No.3, 1986

-----, "Hegemony, consensus and trilateralism", Review of International Studies, V.12, 1986

-----,(ed.), Atlantic Relations:Beyond the Reagan Era, New York:Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989

-----, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990

-----, "America, Europe and the Emerging World Order", York University Center for International and Strategic Studies, Paper #6, March 1991

----- (ed.), Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993

-----, "Reflection on Global Order and Socio-Historical Time", unpublished paper

-----, Law, D., The Global Political Economy, Baltimore:John Hopkins University, 1989

Ginsberg, R.,(ed.) European Political Cooperation in the 1980s, Lonodn:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988

------, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community, Boulder, Colorado:Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1989

-----, "EC-US Relations", in Lodge, J.(ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, New York:St. Martin's Press 1989

------, "EC-US Political/Institutional Relations" in Hurwitz, L.(ed.), The State of the European Community, Boulder:Lynne Reinner, 1991

------, "Trends in the Literature on European Community Foreign Policy", paper presented at ECSA Conference, Washington DC, May 1993

------, Featherstone, K., The United States and European Community in the 1990s, London:St. Martin's Press, 1993

Gordon, C., The Atlantic Alliance; A Bibliography, London: Frances Pinter, 1978

Hahn, W., Pfaltzgraff, R., Atlantic Community in Crisis, Oxford:Pergamon Press, 1979

Haig, A., Caveat, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984

Halliday, F., The Making of the Second Cold War, London:Verso, 1983

Hanreider, W., The United States and Western Europe, Cambridge, Mass.:Winthrop Publishing, 1974

Hassner, P., "Europe in the Age of Negotiations", The Washington Papers, California:Sage Publishers, No.8, 1973

------, "Recurrent Stresses, Resilient Structures" in Tucker and Wrigley (eds.) The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics, New York:Praeger Publishers, 1983

Henig, S., The External Relations of the European Community, London:Chatham House, 1971

Herz, J., "Political Realism and Human Interests", International Studies Quaterly, V.25, No.2, June 1981

Hill, C.,(ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation, London:George Allen & Unwin, 1983

-----, "European Foreign Policy:Power Bloc, Civilian Model - or Flop?" in Rummel, R.(ed.), The Evolution of a New International Actor, Colorado:Westview Press, 1990

-----, "'The Capability-Expectation Gap', or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", Journal of Common Market Studies, V.31, No.1, 1993

Hillenbrand, M., "The Future of the European Community as a Problem in American-European Relations" in Kaiser and Schwarz (eds.) America and Western Europe, Lexington, Mass.:D.C. Books, 1977

Hix, S., "The Study of the European Community:The Challenge to Comparative Politics", West European Politics, V.17, No.1, 1994

Hobbes, T., Leviathan, Penguin Books, London, 1651

Hoffman, M., "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", Millennium, V.16, No. 2, Summer 1987

--------, "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory", Millennium, V.17, No. 1, 1988

Hoffmann, S., "An American Social Science", Daedalus, V.106, No.3, 1977

--------, "The Western Alliance:Drift or Harmony?", International Secuirty, V.6, No.2, 1981

Holland, M.(ed.) The Future of European Political Cooperation, London:Macmillan, 1991

Hunter, R., "What Crisis?" in Washington Quarterly, V.5, No.3, Summer 1982

Ifestos, P., European Political Cooperation, Aldershot:Gower Publishing Company, 1987

Jenkins, P.,"Major puts the UN on the spot", The Independent, Apr. 10, 1991, p.21

------, "Pricking the US conscience", The Independent, Apr. 17, 1991, p.21

Joffe, J.,"European-American Relations:The Enduring Crisis" in Foreign Affairs, V.59, No.4, Spring 1981

-----, "Europe and America:The Politics of Resentment" in Foreign Affairs, V.61, No.3

-----, The Limited Partnetship, Cambridge:Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987

Kaiser, K., Schwarz, H., America and Western Europe, Lexington, Mass.:D.C. Books, 1977

Katzman, J., "The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Row", Millennium, V.17, No.2, Summer 1988

Keesings Contemporary Archives, London: Keesings Publications, 1970, 1975, 1982.

Kelleher, C., "A New Security Order:The United States and the European Community in the 1990s", ECSA Occasional Paper, June 1993

Keohane, R., Nye, J., Power and Interdependence, Toronto:Little, Brown and Co., 1977

Keohane, R.(ed.), "The demand for International Regimes", International Organization, V.36, No.2, 1982

-------, Neorealism and Its Critics, New York:Columbia University, 1986

-------, "Power and Interdependence Revisited" in International Organization, V.41, No.4, 1987

Kirisci, K., "Provide Comfort and Turkey", Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, Series 3, No.3, 1994,

Kissinger, H., A World Restored, Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957

--------, The Troubled Alliance, London:McGraw Hill Book Company, 1965

--------, The White House Years, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979

--------, Years of Upheaval, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982

Klare, M., Beyond the Vietnam Syndrome, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC, 1981

Knudsen, B.,"Europe and America:Foreign Policy in the 1980's", Paris:Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1984

Kolodziej, E., "Europe: The Partial Partner" in International Security, V.5, No.3, Winter 1980-81

Krasner, S.,(ed.), "Structural causes and regime consequences:regimes as intervening variables", International Organization, V.36, No.2, 1982, p.185-205

------, "Regimes and the limits of realism:regimes as autonomous variables", International Organization, V.36, No,2, 1982, p.497-510

Krauthammer, C., "Tiananmen II", Washington Post, Apr. 5, 1991, p.A19

----------, "Which New World Order", Washington Post, May 17, 1991, p.A25

Laursen, F., "The EC in the World Context", Futures, V.23, No.7, Sept. 1991

Legum, C.(ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey V.2 1977-78, London:Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979

Lellouche, P., "Does NATO have a Future: A European View", in Wahington Quarterly, V.5, No.3, Summer 1982

---------, "A Stillborn 'New Order'", Newsweek, Apr. 22, 1991, p.13

Light, M.(ed), International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, London:Pinter Publishers, 1985

Liska, G., Europe Ascendant, Baltimore, Md.:John Hopkins Press, 964

Lodge, J.(ed.), European Union:The European Community in Search of A Future, London:Macmillan, 1986

Luard, E., "A European Foreign Policy?", International Affairs, V.62, No.4, 1986

Macdonald, H., "The Western Alliance and the Polish crisis", The World Today, V.38, February 1982

Machiavelli, N., The Prince, New York:W.W. Norton & Co., 1970

Mayall, J., "Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the 'NWO'", International Affairs, V.76, No.3, 1991

Mayne, R.(ed.), The New Atlantic Challenge, London:Charles Knight and Company, 1975

Menon, A., "The International Relations of Western Europe", Oxford International Review, V.5, No.1, 1993

Millennium, 'Discussion:The International Imagination', V.23, No.2, Summer 1994; See articles by David Campbell, Mark Neufeld, Fred Halliday and Steve Smith, and by Mervyn Frost in V.23, No.1, Spring 1994

Miller, L., "Energy and alliance politics:lessons of a decade", World Today, V.39, December 1983

Moisi, D., "Europe and the Middle East", in Spiegel, S. (ed.) The Middle East and the Western Alliance, London:George Allen & Unwin, 1982

Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations, New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1966

----------, "The Problem of the National Interest" in Politics in the Twentieth Century, Volume One, Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1958

----------, "The Intellectual and the Moral Dilemma" in Politics in the Twentieth Century, Volume One, Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1958

----------, "The Moral Dilemma of Political Action" in Politics in the Twentieth Century, Volume One, Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1958

Morris, J., The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in International Relations, University of Hull, 1991

Mortimer, E., "Safe haven' is not enough", Financial Times, Apr. 10, 1991, p.19

Munk, Frank, Atlantic Dilemma, New York:Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964

Neff, D., "Settlements and Guarantees:The US threatens linkages", Middle East International, Sept. 27, 1991

Neufeld, Mark, "Reflexivity and International Relations Theory", Toronto: York University Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1990

Neville-Jones, P., "The Genscher/Colombo Proposals on European Union", Common Market Law Review, V.20, 1983

Nuttal, S., European Political Cooperation, Oxford:Claredon Press, 1992

Nye, J., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", World Politics, V.40, No.2, 1988

Palmer, J., Europe Without America, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1987

Pfaff, W., "Redefining World Power", Foreign Affairs, V.70, No. 1, 1991

Pierre, A., "America Faces Western Europe in the 1980s" in Ravenal and Chace., (eds.) Atlantis Lost, New York:New York University Press, 1976

Pijper, A., "European Political Cooperation and the Realist Paradigm", in Holland, M., The Future of European Political Cooperation, London:Macmillan, 1991

Pinder, J., "Economic Union and the Draft Treaty" in Lodge,(ed.), European Union, London:MacMillan, 1986

Pinto, D., "The Great European Sea Change", Daedalus, Fall 1991

Prag, D., "International Relations" in Lodge,(ed.), European Union, London:MacMillan, 1986

Quandt, W., Decade of Decisions, Berkeley:University of California Press, 1977

------, "The Western Alliance in the Middle East", in Spiegel, S. (ed.) The Middle East and the Western Alliance, 1982, George Allen & Unwin, 1982

------, "The Middle East in 1990" in "America and the World 1990/91", in Foreign Affairs, V.70, No.1, 1990/91

Ravenal, E., Chace, J., (eds.), Atlantis Lost, New York: New York University Press, 1976

Rengger, N., "Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman", Millennium, V.17, No. 1, 1988

Rode, R., Jacobsen, H.,(eds.) Economic Warfare or Detente, London:Westview Press, 1985

Rosenberg, J., "What's the matter with realism?", Review of International Studies, V.16, 1990

----------, The Empire of Civil Society, London:Verso, 1994

----------, "The International Imagination:IR Theory and 'Classic Social Analaysis", Millennium, V.23, No.1, Spring 1994

Rosenau, P., "Once Again into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities", Millennium, V.19, No.1, Spring 1990

Rosenthal, A.M., "Why the Betrayal?", New York Times, Apr. 2, 1991, p.A19

--------, "The Fear of Morality", Apr. 16, 1991, p.A23

Ruane, K., The Polish Challenge, London:British Broadcasting Corporation, 1982

Ruggie, J.G., "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity", in Keohane, R.(ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986

Rummel, R.(ed.), The Evolution of an International Actor:Western Europe's New Assertiveness, Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1990

------, (ed.), Toward Political Union:Integration and Security in Western Europe, Oxford:Westview Press, 1992

Russett, B., "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" in International Organization, V.39, No.2, Spring 1985

Schaetzel, R., The Unhinged Alliance, London:Harper & Row, 1975

Schlesinger, J., "An American Assessment:Hands Across the Sea Less Firmly Clasped", in H. Brandon (ed.) In Search of a New World Order, Washington DC:Brookings Institute, 1992

Schwok, R., EC-US Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992

Serfaty, Simon, The Fading Partnership: America and Europe after 30 Years, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979

Singer, D., "The Levels of Analysis problem in International Relations", in K. Knorr (ed.) The International System: Theoretical Essays, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1961

-----, "International Conflict", World Politics, No. 3, Apr. 1960

Sloan, S., NATO's Future, London:MacMillan Press, 1986

-----, "A New Transatlantic Bargain?" in Rummel, R.(ed.) The Evolution of a new International Actor:Western Europe's New Assertiveness, Boulder:Lynne Reinner, 1990

Smith, M., Western Europe and the United States: The Uncertain Alliance, London:George Allen & Unwin, 1984

Smith, M., Hollis, M., Explaining and Understanding in International Relations, Oxford:Claredon Press, 1991

------, "Beware of gurus:structure and action in international relations", Review of International Studies, V.17, 1991

-----, Woolcock, S., The United States and the European Community in a transformed world, London:Chatham House, 1992

Smith, S., International Relations: British and American Perspectives, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985

-----, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations", Millennium, V.16, No.2, 1986

Snyder, R., et al, Foreign Policy Decision Making, New York:Free Press, 1962

Spiegel, S., (ed.), The Middle East and the Western Alliance, London:George Allen & Unwin, 1982

------,The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985

Steel, R., The End of Alliance, London:Andre Deutsch, 1962

Stein, A., "Coordination and collaboration:regimes in an anarchic world", International Organization, V.36, No.2, 1982

Stein, J.G., "Alice in Wonderland:The North Atlantic Alliance and the Arab-Israeli Dispute" in Spiegel, S. (ed.) The Middle East and the Western Alliance, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982

Stent, A., From Embargo to Ostpolitik, London: Cambridge University Press, 1981

-----, "East-West trade and technology transfer:the west's search for consensus", World Today, V.40, November 1984

Stern, J., "Specters and Pipe Dreams", Foreign Policy, No.48, Fall 1982

Strange, S., "The persistent myth of lost hegemony", International Organization, V.41, No.4, 1987

Taylor, P., "The European Community as an Actor in International Society", Journal of European Integration, V.6, No.1, Fall 1982

------, Groom, J.(eds.), Functionalism, London:London University Press, 1975

Thomas, C., New States, Sovereignty and Intervention, Aldershot: Gower, 1985

Thucydides, c.400 B.C./1951, History of the Peloponnesian War, John H. Finley, Jr., trans. New York:Modern Library

Tillman, S., The United States in the Middle East, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982

Tomkys, R., "European Political Cooperation and the Middle East", International Affairs, V.63, No.3, 1987

Treverton, G., Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe, Cornell University Press, New York, 1985

Tucker, R., Wrigley, L.(eds.), The Atlantic Allliance and Its Critics, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1983

Twitchett, K., Cosgrove., S., The New International Actors, London:Macmillan, 1970

van Eekelen, W., "European and Arab Dialogue:Motives and Obstacles", Euro-Arab Dialogue Lectures, The Hague:Lutfia Rabbani Foundation, 1985

Vasquez, J., The Power of Power Politics, New Jersey:Rutgers University Press, 1983

Vernon, R., "Rogue Elephant in the Forest", Foreign Affairs, V.51, No.3, 1973

------, Cleese, A.(eds.), The European Community after 1992: A New Role in World Politics?, Baden-Baden:Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991

Vlahos, M., "Culture and Foreign Policy" in Foreign Policy, V.82, Spring 1991

Vincent, J., Wilson, P., "Beyond Non-Intervention", unpublished paper

---------, "The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought", Millennium, Summer 1981

Volker, E., Euro-Arab Cooperation, Amsterdam:A.W. Sijthoff, 1976

Von Geusau, F., Allies in a Turbulent World, Lexington:Lexington Books, 1982

Wahl, N., "The Autonomy of 'Domestic Structures' in European-American Relations" in Chace and Ravenal (eds.) Atlantis Lost, New York: New York University Press, 1976

Wallerstein, I., "Friends as Foes" in Foreign Policy, V.40, Fall 1980

Walt, S., Origin of Alliances, New York:Cornell University Press, 1987

Waltz, K., Man, State and War, New York:Columbia University Press, 1959

-----, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979

-----, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*:A Response to my critics", in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and and its Critics, New York:Columbia University Press, 1986

-----, "Realist Thought and Neorealit Theory", Journal of International Affairs, V.44, No.1, 1990

Webb, C., "Theoretical Problems and Perspectives" in Wallace, W.(ed.) Policymaking in the European Community, Toronto:John Wiley and Sons, 1983

Weil, G., A Foreign Policy for Europe, Bruges:College of Europe, 1970

Weiss, S., "A Critical Phase in Transatlantic Relations", Strategic Survey, V.9, No.2, Spring 1981

Wendt, A., "The agent-structure problem in international relations theory", International Organization, V.41, No.3, 1987

------, "Bridging the theory/meta-theory gap in international relations", Review of International Studies, V.17, 1991

-----, "Anarchy is what states make of it", International Organization, V.46, No.2, 1992

Wheeler, N.J., "Hedley Bull's Pessimism and the Future of International Society", unpublished paper

Williams, G., The Permanent Alliance, Leyden:A.W. Sijthoff, 1977

Williams, P., "Europe, America and the Soviet threat", World Today, V.38, October 1982

--------, "The United States' commitment to Western Europe:strategic and political disintegration", International Affairs, V.59, No.2, 1983

-------- (ed.), Europe and the United States:US security policy toward Europe in the 1990s, Bonn:Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1992

--------, "Atlantis Lost, Paradise regained?:The United States and Western Europe after the Cold War", International Affairs, V.69, No. 1, January 1993

Woolcock, S., "East-West trade:US policy and European interests", The World Today, V.38, February 1982

--------, Western Policies on East-West trade, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982A

--------, "East-West trade after Williamsburg: an issue shelved but not solved", World Today, V.39, July-August 1983

-------, "The Uruguay Round: Issues for the European Community and the United States", London: Chatham House, 1990

Yannapolous, G., Europe and America, 1992, London:Manchester University Press, 1991

Yergin, D., The Prize:Conquest for Oil, Money and Power, New York:Simon and Schuster, 1993

Z., "The Year of Europe", Foreign Affairs, January 1974

Newspapers and Magazines

Daily Telegraph, "Bush will not be drawn into a civil war", Apr. 12, 1991, p.1

Economist

"The day of the ostriches", Nov. 3, 1973, p.13-14

"Resolved to be irresolute", Jan. 9, 1982, p.29

"To hell with Europe", Jan. 9, 1982, p.35

"We may do such things...", Jan. 16, 1982, p.29-30

"Allies:Divided we stand", Jan. 30, 1982, p.49 and 53

"Levers or lifelines?", Feb. 27, 1982, p.23-24

"East-West Trade", May 22, 1982, p.59 and 64

"When political masters fall out, whom does business obey?", Jul. 10, 1982, p.63

"Pipedreams", Jul. 10, 1982, p.64

"That pipeline: Are restrospective sanctions legal?", Jul. 31, 1982, p.36

"Over to the lawyers", Aug.14, 1982, p.59

"Pipelines asunder", Sep. 4, 1982, p.13

"No compromise in the pipeline", Sep. 18, 1982, p.65

"The hammer of the Kurds", Apr. 6, 1991, p.9

"Want another war?", Apr. 13, 1991, p.16

"That slippery slope", Apr. 13, 1991, p.67

Europe

"EEC-Poland: Council Approves Principle of Trade Sanctions on Soviet Union", Feb. 23, 1982, p.5

"The Ten do not wish to dramatize the divergences", Jan. 4, 1982, p.3-4

"Europe for Poland", Jun. 6, 1982, p.1

"Pipeline and...prestige", Nov.15, 1981, p.3

Foreign Bureau of Information Services

Oct. 26, 1989
Jun. 28, 1990

Financial Times

"US attacks allies", Oct. 27, 1973, p.1

"Kissinger criticizes Europe over Middle East policy", Oct. 30, 1973, p.1

"Pompidou proposes European Summit to increase unity", Nov. 1, 1973, p.22

"Further cuts to hit EEC", Nov. 6, 1973, p.8

"Britain aims at PLO in new Mideast peace", Feb. 13, 1980, p.6

"Western rift over Poland", Dec. 29, 1981, p.1

"West Germans traed warily over sanctions", Dec. 29, 1981, p.2

"Western Europe cool to US sanctions against Soviet Union", Dec. 31, 1981, p.1

"Europe tries hard to close ranks with US", Jan. 6, 1982, p.2

"Crisis may lead to new cold war", Jan. 4, 1982, p.2

"Europe ready to edge closer to US position on Poland", Jan. 11, 1981, p.1

"Trade sanctions widen gulf in transatlantic strategy", Jun. 25, 1982, p.2

"Bonn opposes trade ware", Jun. 25, 1981, p.18

"US backs off Kurdish safe haven plan", Apr. 9, 1991, p.1

"Major presses his case for Kurdish safe haven", Apr. 11, 1991, p.4

"Hurd warns Iraq to respect Kurdish safe haven", Apr. 20, 1991, p.4

"Political Declaration", Jul. 17, 1991, p.4

The Globe and Mail, "EC proposes UN enclave to protect Kurds", Apr. 9, 1991, p.1

The Guardian

"EEC may toughen line on Warsaw", Dec. 18, 1981, p.5
"Schmidt kills US hopes on sanctions", Jan. 4, 1982, p.5

"Allies' view of US pipeline ploy", Jun. 28, 1982

"Watch the Turk", Jan. 23, 1991, p.20

"Turkey gives blessing to Kurdish autonomy in Iraq", March 12, 1991, p.10

"Aid workers shield Kurds", Apr. 1, 1991, p.1

"Iraq told force may be used to set up enclave", Apr. 9, 1991, p.1

"West uses UN charter to justify aid but deny military support to Kurds", Apr. 9, 1991, p.9

"Bush dilemma gives EC lead role in crisis", Apr. 10, 1991, p.7

"US threatens force over Kurds", Apr. 11, 1991, p.1

"Allied troops to shield Kurds", Apr. 17, 1991, p.1

"Major nudged US to send troops", Apr. 18, 1991, p.8

"Britain sends up to 5000 troops to Iraq", Apr. 19, 1991, p.11

"Camps open as Bush gaurantees Kurds' safety", Apr. 27, 1991, p.6

"Not Invited to the Feast", June 21, 191, p.25

The Independent

"French bid to aid Kurds is thwarted", Apr. 3, 1991, p.12

"Paris calls for new UN laws to help Kurds", Apr. 5, 1991, p.10

"Blood stains the new world order", Apr. 7, 1991, p.1

"Descent from moral crusade to Greek tragedy", Apr. 7, 1991, p.21

"Major urges enclave for Kurds", Apr. 9, 1991, p.1

"US cautious over plan for Kurds' haven", Apr. 10, 1991, p.1

"US sees 'merit' in enclave proposal", Apr. 10, 1991, p.10

"Major's enclave plan for Kurds runs into trouble", Apr. 10, 1991, p.1

"Bush drowns 'enclave' in semantic sea", Apr. 12, 1991, p.1

"Human Rights are the Yardstick", Apr. 13, 1991, p.14

"Major's haven plan in tatters", Jun. 17, 1991, p.1

"Europeans agree not to desert Kurds", Jun. 18, 1991, p.1

"US says pull-out from Iraq goes on", Jun. 18, 1991, p.16

"UK backs force to protect Kurds", Jun. 20, 1991, p.1

"Allies troops may stay on in Northern Iraq", Jun. 21, 1991, p.1

"US suspends withdrawal from Northern Iraq", Jun. 22, 1991, p.1

"Allies agree on deterrent force", Jun. 22, 1991, p.11

"Turket sees role in allied force", Jul. 5, 1991, p.13

"US applies double squeeze on Iraq", Jul. 13, 1991, p.14

International Herald Tribune,

"PLO makes diplomatic gains in Europe", Oct. 31, 1979, p.1

"Haig calls the Polish crisis a test of West's credibility",
Jan. 13, 1982, p.1

"US and allies set tighter controls on sales to Russia",
Jan. 22, 1982, p.1

"US links arms talks, Soviet role in Poland", Jan. 25, 1982, p.1

"Western allies warns Russia, Poland on pact", Feb. 10, 1982, p.1-2

"U.S. and the Kurds: A Perfect Dilemma", Apr. 5, 1991, p.1

"EC backs enclave for Kurds in Iraq", Apr. 9, 1991, p.1

Le Monde, 'Giscard calls for bringing PLO into Mideast
peace negotiations', Mar. 9-10, 1980, p.1

Middle East International

Sep. 28, 1979
Feb. 15, 1980
Jul. 18, 1980

Myths and Facts, Washington DC:Near East Report, 1988

Newsweek, "The Case for Action/The Case Against",
Apr. 15, 1991, pp. 16-17

--------, "Where Was George This Times?", Apr. 15, 1991, p.18

--------, "A New World Order?", March 11, 1991, pp.36-38

New York Times

"Text of the Soviet-American statement on the Mideast",
Oct. 2, 1977, p.16

"Vance Briefs US Jews on Mideast", Oct. 27, 1977, p.1 and 4

"Text of statement by Sadat and Carter following meeting at Aswan",
Jan. 5, 1978, p.A5

"Allies' View of US Pipeline Policy:A Stunning Act that is
Self-Defeating", Jun. 28, 1982

"State of the Union", Jan. 30, 1991, p.A12

"Bush's Address on End of the Gulf War", March 7, 1991, p.A12

"How Can the U.S. Stand Idly By?", Apr. 2, 1991, p.A18

"Inaction on Kurds Is Akward for U.S.", Apr. 4, 1991, p.A10

"U.N. Votes Terms For An End To War", Apr. 4, 1991, p.A10

"U.S. and Europe Agree on Safe Havens for Kurds", Apr. 12, 1991, p.A6

"Bush News Conference: Relief Camps for Kurds in Iraq", Apr. 17, 1991, p.A12

"Bush says U.S., British and French will build refugee havens for Kurds", Apr. 17, 1991, p.A12

"Relief Plan for the Kurds:A Risky Undertaking", Apr. 18, 1991, p.A18

"How Bush Overcame Reluctance and Embraced Kurdish Relief", Apr. 18, 1991, p.A18

The Times

"Best Middle East peace hopes for 20 years", Oct. 27, 1973, p.8

"Washington criticism of allies fails to worry Foreign Office", Oct. 29, 1973, p.6

"Brandt moves to heal the breach with US", Oct. 31, 1973, p.8

"Bush agrees in principle with Kurd havens plan", Apr. 11, 1991, p.1

"Major calls on leaders to back a disaster relief supremo", Jul. 16, 1991, p.9

Sunday Times, "Bush plans Iraqi rebel 'safe zones'", Apr. 7, 1991, p.1

Wall Street Journal

"Common market favors a role for PLO in reaching any Middle East settlement", Jun. 16, 1980, p.14

"Reagan blames crisis in Poland on Soviet Union", Dec. 18, 1981, p.2

"Reagan orders economic sanctions against Poland", Dec. 24, 1981, p.3

"US may move soon on threat against Soviets", Dec. 28, 1981, p.2

"Bonn-Washington tie is strained by discord over views on Poland", Dec. 29, 1981, p.1 and 5

"Poland will require a reappraisal of detente", Dec. 30, 1981, p.5

"Bonn takes issue with US curbs on Soviet trade", Dec. 31, 1981, p.2

"Poland and the crisis of the Alliance", Jan. 4, 1982, p.4

"EC won't damp US sanctions against Soviets", Jan. 5, 1982, p.2

"Schmidt supports US in blaming Soviet for Polish crisis but balks on sanctions", Jan. 6, 1982, p.3-4

"NATO blames Moscow for Polish crisis, indicating Europe may join in sanctions", Jan. 12, 1982, p.2

"US to press industrial countries to curb high-technology sales to East bloc", Jan. 19, 1982, p.8

"US trade pact with allies is seen as small step to harder line on East", Nov. 15, 1982, p.2

"Western Europe's Use of Economic Sanctions", Nov.16, 1982, p.6

Washington Post

"Kurds contend US encouraged rebellion via Voice of Free Iraq", Apr. 9, 1991, p.A17

"In Iraq, Hungary Redux", Apr. 5, 1991, p.A2