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CULTURE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF TAYLOR, RAZ AND RORTY

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For Zahra: My Wife

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on

Culture in the Public Domain and the Challenge of Multiculturalism: A Critical Examination of Taylor, Raz and Rorty

This thesis is concerned with the responses of Taylor, Raz and Rorty, as representatives of various strands of contemporary political thought, to cultural diversity. It is primarily centred around questions of whether cultures and cultural communities have moral claims on the state; and if this is so, how such claims should be met in culturally plural societies. In this regard, these three philosophers' epistemological views and moral philosophies, their accounts of politics, and finally their approaches to the politics of cultural difference are discussed.

Analysing their accounts of moral reasoning reveals the extent to which cultures play a part in the process of moral understanding. This leads to the first argument of this thesis, that cultures to a significant degree structure, and are main sources of, people's moral knowledge. These philosophers have also shown the crucial role of cultures as communities in constituting their members' identity, and in reinforcing the sense of solidarity among them. This makes for the second argument, that cultural communities give rise to some particularistic moral demands, such as survival, respect and the regulation of their members' affairs in some respects.

Taylor and Raz believe that cultures have political implications, in the sense that their claims can legitimately be met through the workings of the state. Responding to the predicament of culturally diverse societies, Rorty defends procedural liberalism, which ignores cultural difference, whereas Taylor and Raz advocate, respectively, the politics of difference and multicultural policies. The thrust of the latter stances point to two principles of "moral sensitivity" and "equality," on which are grounded the two arguments of this thesis. The first principle requires the state, its apparatus and laws to be sensitive to people's cultures, which inform their moral world, particularly if they are in a minority. The second maintains that in so far as particularistic moral demands of cultural communities have found political expression, all cultures existing in a society should be treated equally. Basic human rights and the political requirements of multicultural coexistence are the only limits on the recognition of cultural differences. A politics of cultural diversity, however, *pace* Taylor, cannot be derived from transcendental or philosophically determined necessary conditions of human life. Nor can it be a fully moralised theory indifferent to power and compromise in politics, as Raz has sometime been accused of suggesting.

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INTRODUCTION

Cultural diversity is an undeniable social reality in most societies all over the world. In western countries, this is evident in the population composition that reflects a cultural diversity resulting from forcible occupation of territories and the subordination or incorporation of native ethnic and linguistic communities, the arrival of immigrants, as well as the emergence of sub-cultures within the majority.[1] Although such diversity has been a feature of almost all societies throughout history, it is more defiant today than before. Cultural difference has taken various forms, and has given rise to diverse problems in the public domain of life. Consequently, political philosophy as a conceptual as well as a normative study of politics faces a theoretical challenge. Western political thought and, in particular, liberalism have responded to the issue of cultural diversity in a variety of ways.

Considering rationality, autonomy and equality as its core, liberalism has always been concerned with difference and disagreement. As a matter of fact, liberalism was born of "difference," rising from the ashes of religious wars in Europe. In order to accommodate religious differences, it has devised such concepts as "toleration," and "individual rights." These concepts presuppose "the public-private distinction," and primarily treat people as individuals. Confronting other forms of diversity and disagreement, liberalism has developed the same pattern. This has been the case with class differences which led to the boundaries of the private realm being pushed back by the introduction of social rights, while keeping intact the presupposition of the public-private divide and, more importantly, the treatment of people as individuals. However, this model proved to be not fully responsive to gender and racial differences. The shortcoming became obvious following the emergence, within liberal states, of a new wave of diversity in terms of ethnicity, language, religion (when it goes beyond the familiar version of religious difference between Protestants and Catholics), etc.

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[1] All this, however, happens against the background of economic and cultural globalisation. For some details, see Bhikhu Parekh's characterisation of contemporary multicultural societies in Bhikhu

This new type of difference and disagreement, which has gained momentum in recent decades, is generally called "cultural." It is couched in communal rather than individual terms, and thus questions the individualistic character of the liberal devices for dealing with difference.[2] Moreover, cultures are based on traditions from which they derive intellectual and moral authority, and hence sometimes they challenge the fundamental principles of liberalism. This has given rise to what is sometimes called the challenge of "multiculturalism." The latter opposes the treatment of people as individuals irrespective of their cultural and communal affiliations, and wants to push forward the limits of the public sphere to include the

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Parekh, "Political Theory and The Multicultural Society," *Radical Philosophy*, vol. 95, (May/June 1999), p. 28.

[2] In one sense, this challenge is not new. Many old differences were also put, or could have been put, in communal terms. Perhaps, it is possible to say that the map of the battle or the weaponry is changed. What is more important is to grasp the features of the current confrontation, and to use effective tools, no matter whether they are old or new.

issue of culture. It calls for the recognition of cultural difference in the public domain.

However, liberalism traditionally confines culture to the private realm of life. Whether it is that of the majority or the minority, culture is not seen as an issue for the state to interfere with. Therefore, issues like religious and moral convictions and values, symbols and language, education, etc. are left to individual choice, the civil society and the market, and are supposed not to demand state action. This is, however, not a settled issue. It is, as a matter of fact, part of an already on-going debate between liberals and communitarians. Most communitarians, such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, call for the furtherance of common or collective goods like culture by the state apparatus. Their "politics of identity" is grounded on the view that communities constitute people's identity. Cultures consist of language, practices, and so forth. Hence, the political recognition of culture raises the question as to whether the state can legitimately advance such cultural goals as supporting a particular language, as in the case of the province of Quebec in Canada. Whatever the answer, culturally plural societies require a special response.

Since cultures also include values, the discussion about their status in the public sphere is also related to the debate among liberal philosophers as to whether the state should promote any particular conception of the good life, or stay neutral between such conceptions. Those who are called perfectionists argue that states inevitably do promote certain conceptions of the good, and also that it is desirable to do so, whereas neutralists deny these claims. Accepting either side in this debate would also have consequences in discussing culturally plural societies.

It has been argued that the liberal approach of excluding culture from the public realm is to some extent based on the presumption of "the homogeneity of society."[3] Thus, the refutation of this presumption by the fact of cultural diversity in almost all western societies might undermine the notion of exclusion of cultures from the public sphere. Also, the neutrality of the state towards all cultures has been objected to on the ground that liberals ignore that the dominant culture is well entrenched in various spheres of society. Thus, it is unfair to ask minority cultures to compete with it in a *laissez-faire* situation. Further, liberals overlook the extent to which the dominant culture, its values, symbols and so on, are already represented in state institutions.

Multiculturalism is not merely a political or moral challenge; it has also been regarded as an intellectual challenge questioning the universality of liberal principles. By the end of the colonial era, many non-western cultures and traditions no longer believed in the objectivity and universal applicability of liberal principles. This view has found some sympathisers within the West among postmodern thinkers. Postmodernism is a product of the disenchantment of many western intellectuals and philosophers with universalism and with the Enlightenment project. Scepticism about transcendental and ahistorical value systems has bolstered the postmodern view that what is presented as a universal value is actually contextual. Liberals have responded to such scepticism differently. Some insist on the universality of their doctrine, while some others concede its particularity but still find it worth following.

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[3] Interestingly, whereas in the cases of religion and economic interest it is their heterogeneity that has led to their exclusion from the public sphere in the West, it seems that in the case of culture, the presumption of its homogeneity has facilitated its ascription to the private realm.

The two groups have different answers to the problems of cultural plurality and the legitimacy of imposing liberal principles on non-liberal cultures.

Outline of the Thesis

From what has been said it can be concluded that an examination of various liberal approaches to cultural difference requires analysing the accounts of the role of culture in politics implied by each approach, as well as investigating the moral philosophy behind them. Therefore, this thesis embarks on the task of inquiring into the relevance of culture to morality in the public domain. A crucial question, then, is whether cultures give rise to normative claims that require state action. More precisely, do cultures merit political recognition? Another equally important question, which arises in the context of multicultural societies, is, if cultures can legitimately be subjects of government policies and support, how should states in culturally diverse societies accommodate different or perhaps even incompatible demands of various cultures? Responses to these questions will be discussed by considering the philosophical approaches informing them. Assessing these and some other relevant issues will show whether or not various liberal responses to cultural difference are coherent.

In order to explore liberal approaches to cultural diversity and difference, the works of three prominent liberal philosophers, namely, Charles Taylor, Joseph Raz and Richard Rorty will be explored. These philosophers are chosen because they recognise, in one way or another, the role of cultures and cultural communities in constituting morality, though only the first two thinkers account for the moral significance of culture in politics. The intention has been to represent different, though major, strands in liberal thinking.

We will discuss these philosophers' views on the importance of culture and cultural affiliation in the public arena, and whether they think that culture and its membership engender any demand that requires to be recognised and implemented publicly and by the state. More importantly, we will see how these philosophers deal with the challenge of multiculturalism, if they recognise such a challenge in the first place. That is, if the significance of culture for morality in the public realm is established, what kinds of rights and privileges should be allotted to cultural communities, and particularly to minorities, in a culturally plural society? All this will be done through the exploration of the philosophical background against which concepts of culture and morality and their relation in the public sphere make sense.

Criticising modern epistemology for what is called its disengaged view of knowledge, Taylor holds an account of practical reasoning in which morality, to a large extent, is seen as culturally particular. This grounds his view of cultural incommensurability and the incompatibility of conceptions of the good among various cultures. He speaks of the dialogical feature of human agency that gives culture, particularly through language, a crucial role in constituting people's identity. For him, the dialogical formation of identity and the cultural particularity of moral understanding make a case for the recognition of culture and cultural difference as a moral demand. It is essential for people to make sense of their lives and world. Taylor's politics of difference legitimises pursuing collective goals, such as cultural survival, through government policies, though within the boundaries of "fundamental rights." It also allows some variation in the implementation of the law in order to accommodate cultural differences. Nevertheless, Taylor's attempt to establish the moral demand for recognition as a corollary of the dialogical condition of selfhood is not persuasive. Also, his politics of recognition implies that all aspects of cultural difference have to be acknowledged publicly. Further, his account of multiculturalism is mainly responsive to the demands of geographically concentrated minority cultures, like the Quebecois, rather than dispersed minorities.

The dependence of values on social forms within a culture is a distinctive feature of Raz's moral philosophy that grounds his account of incommensurability and moral pluralism. Cultures are important not only because values are constituted by social forms, but also because through them people can have access to valuable and meaningful options and relationships as well as various patterns of conduct. They also constitute people's identity. For Raz, the vitality of cultures for individual well-being and autonomy establishes multiculturalism. His perfectionist theory of political authority allows him to account for multicultural policies in support of cultural minorities. However, a difficulty with Raz is that he imposes on multiculturalism some limitations, such as the right of exit, which he cannot prove to be requirements of multicultural coexistence or consensually accepted standards, rather than merely particular values of the liberal culture. This is rooted, perhaps, in the tension between universal and cultural elements in his moral philosophy. It can also be argued that there is an individualistic orientation in Raz's multiculturalism that prevents him from attending to the claims of cultural communities on individuals, rather than merely the claims of individuals to cultural rights. Another difficulty with Raz's account of multiculturalism and, in general, with his theory of political authority is the attempt at the total moralisation of politics. He disregards the role of political and democratic interplay between various sources of power, interest and influence within a society.

For Rorty, rationality, morality and even the scope of moral responsibility towards others are defined in terms of solidarity with a particular community and ethnocentrism, rather than in terms of a universal and metaphysically derived set of criteria. Various communities have developed different conceptions of rationality and morality that do not necessarily overlap. Also, the local sense of solidarity and moral responsibility usually overrides the universal sense of identification with humanity at large. It can be argued that since language, language games and values are mainly components of culture, the latter is one of the most significant communities with which Rorty is concerned, though he is not explicit about it. We identify ourselves with our cultural community, and feel strong solidarity with its members. Nevertheless, Rorty does not think that the moral and philosophical significance of communities, particularly cultural communities, should be reflected in politics. His defence of procedural liberalism in inter-cultural relationships privileges the liberal culture over non-liberal ones, while all of them are contingent products of history, and thus on a par. *Pace* Rorty, it is a requirement of taking others "seriously morally as human beings" that their vocabulary and claims should be taken seriously in making moral and political decisions that affect them. Rorty's disregard for the political recognition of cultural difference, perhaps for pragmatic reasons, is inconsistent with the cognitive, moral and emotional significance he attaches to communities including, arguably, cultural communities.

Through examining these philosophers' views, two arguments about the moral significance of cultures can be identified. Firstly, cultures to a large degree form people's moral knowledge, and are their main sources of values. They give their members' lives meaning and direction. Therefore, people should not be judged or treated irrespective of the cultural background of their actions. Secondly, cultures as a form of community constitute people's identity. Cultural communities give rise to particularistic moral demands, such as survival, respect and the regulation of members' affairs in some respects. Taylor and Raz, but not Rorty, believe that the roles played by cultures have, or can have, political implications. They think that the moral claims of cultures can legitimately be met through government policies and actions.

In so far as the significance of culture has political implications, in multicultural societies the above arguments ground two principles. First, the principle of "moral sensitivity" to the effect that the state, its apparatus and laws should be sensitive to people's cultures. This is mainly applicable to minorities, whose values and standards are not secured in the public life of society. Second, the principle of "equality," in the sense that in so far as particularistic moral demands of cultural communities have found political expression, there is no reason to privilege one over another. So, all existing cultures in a society should be treated equally. These two principles are implicit in Taylor and Raz, as well as others like Kymlicka, as grounds of multicultural measures and various aspects of the politics of difference. Only basic human rights and the political requirements of living in a culturally plural society can be legitimate reasons for withholding the recognition of some cultural differences.

Given these limitations, nevertheless, it is not surprising that a procedural politics that ignores cultural differences might suit some culturally diverse societies better, for instance, when there is a danger of increasing hostility among communities, ghettoisation, or the gross violation of basic human rights. Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition, unlike what Taylor sometimes implies, are not the corollaries of necessary conditions of human identity, in the sense that violating them is "pathological," undermines our selfhood, or amounts to doing the impossible. Multiculturalism is a political choice to be made on the basis of its merits in a particular context. The arguments of this thesis provide the politics of difference with philosophical grounds, but do not assert that it is an uncompromising imperative everywhere and all the time, while compromise is the first principle of wisdom in politics.

Chapter Scheme

The first chapter of the thesis provides us with a general perspective on the notions relevant to the significance of culture to morality in the public domain, and their impact on the politics of cultural difference. It begins by defining key terms and concepts, and proceeds to discuss the universalist and culturalist views of morality. Then, the moral demands and rights of communities, including cultural communities, and the shortcomings of liberalism in this regard, as seen by some political philosophers, are delineated. In addition, attention is drawn to the implications of these discussions for an account of multiculturalism.

Each of the three following chapters is devoted to one of the three aforementioned philosophers, beginning with their philosophical viewpoints, in so far as these have some bearing on the issue of the significance of cultures. The middle section in each chapter considers these philosophers' political views, focusing, once again, on their relevance to culture. The final part of each chapter is allocated to their approaches to the issue of cultural diversity in the public sphere and multiculturalism.

In the case of Taylor, whose views are discussed in the second chapter, his criticism of "modern epistemology" and what he brands as "the primacy of the epistemological" as well as his "dialogical theory of the self" are examined first. Then, his liberalism of promoting collective goals, and finally his politics of difference, the idea of cultural survival as well as the presumption of equal worth of all cultures, are probed. The third chapter begins with Raz's "rationalist moral philosophy" coupled with "conventionalism" and leading to "moral pluralism." An examination of his theory of political authority and his perfectionist version of liberalism follows. Raz's account of multiculturalism and its relevant policies and limitations are also discussed. In the fourth chapter, Rorty's "pragmatist account of inquiry," including the refutation of "representationalism" as well as the affirmation of "ethnocentrism" and "antifoundationalism," is assessed. Then, his liberalism of private irony and self-creation and public avoidance of cruelty are explored. Finally, Rorty's view on cultural difference, his rejection of the politics of difference and his defence of regulating inter-communal relations on the basis of procedural justice are examined.

The final chapter, the conclusion, is an attempt to arrive at the outline of an account of the moral significance of cultures, their political implications and their requirements as well as limitations in multicultural societies, on the basis of the common views of the three philosophers or a combination of them. This involves incorporating what is valuable in them, unravelling what is latent in their thought, and working out the direction towards which they point.

CHAPTER ONE

CULTURE, MORALITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

The main concern of the present thesis is to probe the moral need for the political recognition of cultures. In a broader sense, it is an attempt to study the relevance of culture to morality in the public domain, and to investigate its requirements in a culturally plural society. Hence, the crucial question is to what extent and how, if at all, cultures give rise to normative claims which need *public actions*. Responding to this question involves a philosophical study of the relationship between culture and morality, whether in the public or private domain, which in turn requires answering two other questions. Firstly, it has to be considered whether normative statements are *culturally particular* or *neutral*, viz., whether moral principles are trans-cultural or their validity is limited to their culture of origin. Secondly, it is necessary to discuss whether culture as a type of community can be a concern of morality or ethics, alongside other collectivities such as the family, the religious community (in some traditions) and the nation-state.[1] In other words, do people have a particular duty to their cultural communities? The first question is about the sources and foundations of morality, while the second is about its content. Answers to these questions will be the cornerstone of our discussion about those moral claims of cultures that have political implications and their requirements in culturally diverse societies.

In this chapter, after defining the relevant terms and concepts, the above questions and their significance will be elaborated. It will be explained why investigating the relationship between culture and morality in the public domain requires answering the above questions about the universality/cultural particularity of morality and about the moral demands of culture as a collectivity. Various answers given to these questions and their plausibility will also be sketched out. More importantly, we will see how these answers could lead to different conclusions in politics and particularly in the politics of culturally plural societies. This chapter sets a framework for our assessment of Taylor, Raz and Rorty, regarding the issues relevant to the present study. These philosophers have written about a gamut of subjects from the philosophy of mind and epistemology to political, moral and legal philosophy. Hence, it is necessary to focus on the pertinent issues. It is the task of this chapter to provide us with a guiding map that directs us to significant problems.

1. Definitions and Concepts

"Morality," in the sense used in this thesis, covers other-regarding as well as self-regarding normative standards. It is not confined to the rules of action towards, or of relations with, other people, but also includes the standards of excellence or the pursuit of perfection. Furthermore, morality is limited to those normative standards that entail *action*, and does not include aesthetic standards. It is concerned with "oughts." In this thesis, the term "public" is used in the narrow sense of relating to issues associated with, or handled by, the state. Its broader sense that includes the activities and sphere of the civil society is conveyed only when such a sense is emphasised. "Politics" and "the political" are also considered the realm of the state, unless it is specified otherwise.

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[1] Such a moral concern is manifest in claims such as: "family life and particularly some forms of it but not others should be supported," "we should care for the good of society," or "you ought to help

Morality in the public domain is about "oughts" in the public sphere of life. It deals with normative issues at state level, with directives that require *public actions.* Thus, personal and familial, communal and associative moral issues are not its subject matters unless they need public or, more precisely, political recognition and support. Morality in the public sphere consists of the notions of justice, rights and obligations, *inter alia*, in a polity, as well as the normative aspect of public institutions. This definition is close to the way Raz defines "political morality," as consisting of the principles that should guide political actions, and shape political institutions. By political institutions he refers 'primarily to the state and its organs, but also, somewhat more broadly, to all public authorities.' They are, however, different from political organisations or private corporations and trade unions with political influence to the effect that they have general authority over all people in the society including these organisations and corporations. Also, a political action is defined as the action of political institutions or other public authorities.[2]

Morality in the political domain is regarded as a subject matter of political philosophy, particularly where this discipline deals with normative issues. It has been

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believers first."

argued that political philosophy is concerned, firstly, with *conceptual* analysis and concepts such as "state," "revolution," "power," "authority," "right" and "the common good." Secondly, political philosophy answers *normative* questions, for instance those about principles of social justice, rights of individuals and groups, people's obligation to obey the law and the government, and the scope of permissible coercion. Thirdly, political philosophy deals to some extent with *empirical* problems, such as appropriate institutions and mechanisms for implementing principles of justice and for providing effective checks on the sources of power.[3] These three functions of political philosophy are intertwined. Morality in the public domain is a practical knowledge. Hence, a philosophical investigation into such a practice-oriented discipline is primarily concerned with normative issues, while inevitably dealing with conceptual and empirical questions. That is to say, such an investigation takes up conceptual and empirical problems as well as some other philosophical issues insofar as they have a normative significance.

"Culture" is a complex and multi-dimensional term, and is used, in different disciplines, with different meanings, none of which are free from controversy. In this thesis, culture is seen from two perspectives: first as a set of concepts, norms and behavioural patterns, and second, as a community. Regarding the first perspective, a

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[2] Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1988), pp. 3-5.

[3] Hugo Adam Bedau, "Political Philosophy, Problems of," *The Oxford Companion To Philosophy*, Ted Honderich (ed.), (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995), pp. 697-700. For other relevant information about political philosophy see: Edward Sankowski, "Political Philosophy, History of," ibid., pp. 693-697. Also see: Jennifer Speake, Sarah Mitchell, Alan Isaac, *et al* (eds.), "Political Philosophy," *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., (Macmillan: London, 1984), pp. 279-281; David Miller, "Political Theory" and John G. Gunnell "Political Theory and Political Science," *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connolly and Alan Ryan (eds.), (Blackwell: Oxford, 1987), pp. 383-390; and James P. Sterba, "Political Philosophy" and Richard E. Flathman, "Political Theory," *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, Robert Audi and *et al* (ed.), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995), pp. 628-630. For a critical appraisal of the subject-matter and the nature of political philosophy or theory,

combination of two wide and narrow senses of culture is taken as the basis of discussion. Culture is, in a wide sense, the particular way of life of a people.[4] 'In anthropology and sociology, "culture" denotes indifferently all manifestations of social life which are not merely concerned with the reproduction and sustenance of human beings.'[5] Hence, culture comprises "material artifacts" (tools, scientific achievements, works of art, architecture, buildings, etc.), "collective mental and spiritual" artifacts (attitudes, religion, beliefs, language, symbols, values, aesthetic perceptions, etc.) and "distinctive forms of behaviour" (social institutions such as government, family, tribe, profession, rituals and practices, customs, patterns of conduct and rules of etiquette).[6] In a narrow sense, culture indicates a system of values and beliefs, implicit in the wider sense of culture, which gives meaning and purpose to life.[7] This value system covers the full range of human activities and interests,[8] and is usually, but not always, informed by a particular religion.[9]

A crucial problem is how to distinguish cultures from each other. For the purpose of this study, a culture can be distinguished from others by its language, traditions,

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see Bhikhu Parekh, "Theorising Political Theory," *Political Theory*, vol. 27, no. 3, (June 1999), pp. 398-413.

[4] Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 90.

[5] Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, 2nd ed., (Macmillan: London, 1996), p. 122.

[6] Ronald Feltcher, "Culture," *The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, Alan Bullock, Stephen Trombley and Alf Lawrie (eds.), 3rd ed., (Harper Collins: London, 1999), p. 191. Bernard Williams defines culture as a "social world" (Chandran Kukathas, "Explaining Moral Variety," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 11, no. 1, (1994), p. 5, quoting from: Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, (Fontana/Collins: London, 1985), p. 150).

[7] Jaegwon Kim, "Culture," *The Oxford Companion To Philosophy*, Honderich (ed.), p. 172. For more elaboration, see: Philip W. Gwinn and *et al* (ed.), *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., vol. 16, (The University of Chicago: Chicago, 1990), pp. 874-893.

[8] In this regard, there is a similarity between culture and Iris Young's definition of social groups. See Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," *Ethics*, vol. 99, (January 98), pp. 266-7.

[9] Although Kymlicka's terminology of "societal culture" is very useful, I find his emphasis that a tradition has to be institutionally complete in order to be eligible to be called a societal culture unhelpful in studying multicultural societies with dispersed community cultures. See Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996),

shared history, or a comprehensive set of value options that are sometimes encompassed in a distinct religion. These criteria are, however, loose and matters of interpretation.[10] The boundaries of cultures are blurred. The impossibility of delimitation of cultures causes a grave problem, if they are to be regarded as significant in practice and, particularly, in politics. Such an impossibility, nevertheless, does not deny that there are various cultures, and that some differences among groups of people can be called cultural, and may deserve to be taken seriously.

In this dissertation, culture is not viewed from an anthropological or sociological perspective, but from a normative point of view. Therefore, it is considered significant to the extent that it would give normative directives for actions. Culture, in the narrow sense, has direct normative relevance. 'It permits the self-conscious evaluation of human possibilities in the light of a system of values that reflect prevailing ideals about what human life ought to be.'[11] Culture, in its broad meaning, is what people identify themselves with. Such identification could also have normative significance. It requires complying with certain forms of behaviour and practices.

Looking from the second perspective, culture, particularly in the wide sense, is always associated with a community. Apart from the phenomenological account that ways of life and value systems are developed collectively, identification with them is, to some extent, identification with the community that holds them. Following certain

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pp. 18 and 75-80. For a relevant sense of culture, also see Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," p. 271.

[10] Elie Kedourie shows the difficulty of distinguishing languages form each other and, especially, from dialects, if they are considered to be the criteria of nationhood and consequently the eligibility for statehood. See Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 4th ed., (Blackwell: Oxford, 1993), pp. 56-65. Other criteria for separating cultures are, obviously, more loose.

rules and patterns of behaviour demonstrates, in part, a sense of belonging to a particular group of people. Affiliation to a community as such may have some normative consequences. It could give rise to some rights and obligations. Hence, as well as being seen as a way of life and a set of rules distinguished by a value system, religion, language, etc., in this thesis, a culture is regarded as a community holding the former. In the course of our discussion, it will become clearer why it is necessary to attend separately to both aspects of culture, namely, as a set of concepts and norms and as a community, although they constitute a single entity.

It is important to notice that the roots of the philosophical concern with culture and, in particular, language are to be found in the Romantic tradition. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Herder theorised the significance of culture and language, and Fichte gave them political expression. German philosophers were looking for a ground to achieve their wish of the political unification of Germany. A holistic and exclusionist view of culture was to serve this purpose. Fichte developed this account to an extreme that required not only the purification of (German) language, but also the exclusion of other cultural groups.[12] It must be mentioned, however, that making culture a matter of concern for the state and politics does not necessarily mean the glorification and purification of one (that is, our) culture and language at the expense of others. Like many other moral or political ideas, it is prone to extremism, though it is not inevitably so.

As for the term "multiculturalism," it has been used with at least two different meanings in the literature, namely, as a description of a culturally plural society, and as a normative prescription for dealing with such a society. The first meaning

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[11] Kim, "Culture," p.172.

denotes a society consisting of several distinct cultural communities that are self-conscious and want to preserve their identity, and at the same time wish to live together in a single society.[13] It is, however, in the second sense that the term multiculturalism is used in this thesis, viz., as a normative response to the issue of cultural plurality. Multiculturalism is, with this meaning, a doctrine of public recognition of various cultures in a society.

Multiculturalism in the second sense was the idea behind a social and intellectual movement that appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s, primarily in Canada and the United States. At first, it was concerned with education and academic curricula. Later on, the multiculturalism debate began in Europe. Now the challenge of multiculturalism is widespread, and targets almost all public institutions, particularly in western societies. The recognition of cultural communities in a society, however, is not confined to contemporary western societies. Such recognition has many precedents in the East and among Muslim societies, for instance, the Ottoman Empire, and even in the ancient and Medieval West. However, this is not to deny that modern multiculturalism in liberal societies, with which this dissertation is concerned, has its own characteristics. This thesis does not study the aforementioned social movement and its historical background, but the political and moral doctrine behind it, viz., multiculturalism.

2. Role of Culture in the Formation of Morality

In the definition of culture, we have seen that it encompasses a set of standards and a system of moral values. This means that cultures as such are significant for

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[12] See, Kedourie, *Nationalism*, pp. 56-65.

[13] See Bhikhu Parekh, "Managing Multicultural Societies," *The Round Table*, vol. 344, (1997), p. 523.

moral life. However, the question arises as to whether the significance of cultures is merely instrumental, in providing us with access to moral standards, or goes beyond that. Two contrasting answers to this question are conceivable. First, although people can have access to values only by being members of a culture, values themselves are trans-cultural, grounded in human nature or the structure of the universe or the divine will, and are arrived at by rational reflection or revelation. Therefore, the value of cultures is not intrinsic. Second, cultures constitute moral standards, and hence their significance is not merely instrumental. These universalist and culturalist responses attribute different degrees of significance to culture, and consequently come up with diverging views in dealing with culture in the public life of the society.

More importantly, universalist and culturalist approaches lead to different stances regarding the phenomenon of cultural diversity and the political recognition of cultures. As Jurgen Habermas argues, the question of 'whether it is even possible to transcend the context of our own language and culture or whether all standards of rationality remain bound up with specific worldviews and traditions' has implications 'for the concepts of the good and the just with which we operate when we examine the conditions of a "politics of recognition."'[14] It is expected that, unlike the culturalist approach, a fully-fledged universalism does not leave much room for the recognition of culture and cultural difference. Nonetheless, the former has difficulty transcending ethnocentrism and arriving at a definition of recognition acceptable for all. In this section, moral universalism, culturalism and an account combining the two, as well as the implications of these approaches regarding the public recognition of cultures, will be sketched.

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[14] Jurgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," *Multiculturalism and "the Politics of Recognition"*, Amy Gutmann (ed.), 2nd ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 120-121.

2.1. Universalists

Many philosophers believe in objective values and normative statements that are accessible to all those who have rational capacity, no matter to which society and culture and which era of history they belong. In this account, there is a set of *universal* moral directives of which morality in the political sphere is a part. This is so, because human beings have a uniform and unchanging nature and essence, as seen by Plato, the first most eloquent spokesman of universalism. Hence, Platonic philosophers love 'any branch of learning that reveals eternal reality, the realm unaffected by vicissitudes of change and decay.'[15] The common human nature that determines people's humanity is considered morally and ontologically prior to differences among them, and to their particularities. It is on the basis of this universal account of human nature that the good life is defined. We should be 'true to the highest in human nature,' and '[t]he truth is everywhere the same.'[16]

In all aspects of morality, ethics and aesthetics, universalists or essentialists draw upon a universally accessible and monolithic theory which transcends cultural particularities. Otherwise, they argue, we have to subscribe to moral relativism, which 'could sanction the most monstrous violations of human rights,' and render rationally grounded cross-cultural moral criticism impossible.[17] Obviously enough, there is a variety of universalists who believe in universalism to various degrees and in different normative spheres. Bhikhu Parekh discusses how a disregard for the role of culture in shaping people's moral world has given rise to different types of moral monism from Plato to Christian and even modern thinkers such as Locke, Kant, J.S. Mill and Marx.[18]

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[15] Plato, *The Republic*, (Penguin Books: London, 1987), p. 217.

[16] Gutmann quotes Hutchin. Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1992), p. 16.

[17] Alan Gewirth, "Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant To Moral Knowledge?," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 11, no. 1, (1994), p. 29.

Alan Gewirth is a contemporary representative of universalism. He argues that there are some universal moral principles that all cultures must accept, otherwise they subscribe to self-contradiction. "Action," he remarks, 'is the universal and necessary context of all moralities and indeed of all practices.' "Action" and thus "agency" entail some generic and necessary conditions that transcend particular cultures. These conditions are the rights to freedom and to well-being.

> Freedom is the procedural generic feature of action; it consists in controlling one's behavior by one's unforced choice while having the knowledge of relevant circumstances. Well-being is the substantive generic feature of action; it consists in having the general abilities and conditions needed for achieving one's purposes, ranging from life and health to self-esteem and education.[19]

These necessary and universal rights belong to the individual, because in the final analysis the individual, rather than group, is the agent to act.[20] Gewirth goes on to say that the conflict between various interpretations of rights (such as negative or positive rights or rights as "side constraints," etc.) 'can be resolved by fuller analysis of the rational arguments for human rights.'[21] He concludes that cultural differences have no bearing on moral knowledge and, particularly, on what he calls "the Principle of Generic Consistency," that is, the rights to freedom and well-being. All cultures must observe this principle, though their differences within this framework are to be respected.

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[18] See Bhikhu Parekh, "Moral Philosophy and its Anti-pluralist Bias," *Philosophy and Pluralism*, David Archard (ed.), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996), pp 119-127.

[19] Gewirth, "Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant To Moral Knowledge?," p. 27.

[20] Ibid., p. 34.

[21] Ibid., p. 35.

It is plausible to argue that lack of freedom or well-being negates moral agency, and exempts one from moral responsibility. However, *pace* Gewirth, it does not *logically* follow that the affirmation of "agency" capable of "action" requires *rights* to freedom and well-being. Even if the concepts of agency and action entail these rights, they cannot indicate the content and necessary extent of the rights. Indeed, the concept of agency or moral responsibility is compatible with the restriction of freedom and well-being. So punishment, which sometimes restricts freedom dramatically, as in the case of prohibiting murder by the threat of life-long jail, is compatible with the notion of moral agency. That is to say, if nobody can murder because people are denied the freedom to do so, it does not mean that people's agency is negated, or that choice between committing or not committing murder is no longer a moral issue. This is also true about well-being.

Although rights to freedom and well-being are not, contrary to Gewirth's claims, transcendental conditions of moral action and agency, they may have intrinsic value *per se* or as requirements of an already intrinsic moral value. In the latter case, something that intrinsically "ought," or "ought" not, to be done requires freedom and well-being. Thus, the value of freedom and well-being is contingent on the intrinsic value of what they facilitate. This way of putting the issue is far from establishing universal validity of rights to freedom and well-being out of necessary conditions of moral action. Hence, it can be concluded that rights to freedom and well-being, and perhaps many other relevant moral conceptions, cannot be grounded solely on abstract philosophical and ontological premises or merely on conceptual analysis, as people like Gewirth describe. It is difficult to arrive at universal values not affected by particularities of history, society and culture; or if it is possible to do so, they seem to be too thin to enable us to use them trans-culturally. Usually, when there are shared principles that are claimed to be universal, the content and meaning given to them vary from one group of people to another. Fully-fledged universalists have a hard case to prove.

Generally speaking, universalists incline to confine culture to the private sphere. Their philosophical account does not require political promotion of culture, though it may not prohibit state action in support of culture in certain cases. In response to cultural pluralism, they do not have much incentive for recognising diversity. For them, it would be better to neglect cultural differences in the public life, as it is the case with gender, age, religious and other differences. On the other hand, if cultural particularities hinder the realisation of universal principles, such as human rights, they should be suppressed. Assimilation and toleration are seen to be main policies of full-blooded universalists.

2.2. Culturalists

Universal and objective morality, as explicated above, is denied by many philosophers, such as postmodernists and some communitarians. This view can be traced back to the Sophists in ancient Greece who did not see rational arbitration between different moral outlooks as possible. According to Iris Young, differences among some social groups are irreducible in the sense that 'persons from one perspective or history can never completely understand and adopt the point of view of those with other group-based perspectives and histories.'[22] Cultures are seen as self-contained and sole sources of morality and conceptions of the good. They are contexts against which moralities are comprehensible. Even many liberal thinkers now incline towards the cultural particularity of morality. John Rawls in *Political Liberalism* has abandoned the universal tone of his *A Theory of Justice*, and merely addresses Western constitutional democracies.

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[22] Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," p. 258.

Those philosophers who emphasise the importance of cultures draw upon the fact of moral diversity. They argue that many existing moral conflicts in the world are the results of cultural differences. These conflicts cannot be resolved by appeal to universal and objective moral principles, simply because there are no such principles that apply cross-culturally. There are, however, different accounts of how cultural diversity leads to moral diversity.

Alasdair MacIntyre's culturalist account of morality is an influential version in the present time. He gives a particularistic account of morality by saying that moral problems and the way to resolve them vary with historical, social and cultural situations. He points out that there is an intimate connection between language and the belief system. Norms of rationality and truth are implicit in the terms of reference and classification of a language. Hence, there are no "tradition-independent standards of argument."[23] This fact makes comprehension, and translation, of foreign cultures enormously difficult. Although MacIntyre repudiates "radical" incommensurability between rival cultures, he believes that they are essentially incomparable.

Responding to MacIntyre's account of impossibility of cross-cultural translation, Chandran Kukathas draws on similarities between various cultural traditions, such as the common Christian heritage among European cultures. Many cultures share some "fundamental commitments," though they may have "superficial differences." These

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[23] Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Duckworth: London, 1988), p. 403.

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shared fundamental moral ideas make moral dialogue between different cultures possible, and enhance 'the prospects of establishing cross-cultural moral standards.'[24] MacIntyre, however, does not deny that there are some shared standards between competing cultures. Nonetheless, he maintains that these standards are

> insufficient to resolve ... disagreements. It may therefore seem to be the case that we are confronted with the rival and competing claims of a number of traditions to our allegiance in respect of our understanding of practical rationality and justice, among which we can have no good reason to decide in favor of any one rather than of the others.[25]

Kukathas, however, maintains that philosophical conflicts 'should not be seen as insurmountable obstacles to communication between cultures,' and in practice, cultures have been modified and developed models of successful interaction.[26] He thinks that conflicts between abstract philosophical assumptions can be resolved through communication and in the course of time. Although Kukathas does not give any reason for his optimism, and does not come up with a clear philosophical proposal to sort out the moral conflicts between various cultures, it is a fact that different cultures have managed to communicate with each other, and reach some common conclusions, or at least work out their differences. Culturalists are not able to account for these phenomena. They also have difficulty explaining how people sometimes transcend their own culture, criticise it radically, or adopt another one. They underestimate the human capacity for self-creation and self-reflection.

Political recognition of culture seems a natural corollary of the culturalist approach. If morality, and hence morality in the public sphere, is essentially a cultural phenomenon, then regarding culture as a political issue or opting for a cultural politics seems a legitimate position to take. On the other hand, if there is no human nature untainted by cultures, and if there is no universally available code of justice, rights and duties, the recognition of difference is morally necessary. It would be unjustified to impose the moral principles of one (dominant) culture on others. The various cultures existing in a diverse society ought to be recognised, and given equal standing. Nonetheless, because of its inability to explain the exchange and communication between various cultures as well as their compromises and their success in resolving some moral conflicts, the culturalist approach fails to find a *moral* way of dealing with cultural diversity. It has difficulty going beyond pragmatic compromises and *modus vivendi.* This is because it is assumed that there is no universally acceptable definition of moral recognition (of others). Culturalists also face the dilemma of recognising cultural differences, while preventing the disintegration of the society.

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[24] Kukathas, "Explaining Moral Variety," p. 11. Nevertheless, Kukathas remarks that '[d]eep convergence, it might therefore be argued, does not help us to understand substantive disagreements, since the divergence at the intermediate level has not been shown to be affected (much less dissolved) by the recognition of convergence at the deepest level' (Ibid.)

[25] MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, p. 351.

2.3. The Middle Way

There are some philosophers who try to combine culturalist and universalist approaches, and to arrive at a more plausible account. Kukathas argues that Adam Smith suggests a moral theory which accounts for the accessibility of universal moral standards while acknowledging that morality varies in different societies.

According to Smith, human beings' inclination to converse with, to be "in accord with," and to be believed by their fellows leads to continuous exchange between them that is the basis of culture. Morality, on the other hand, originates from the human capacity for sympathy, which is the basis of the emotions of approval and

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[26] Kukathas, "Explaining Moral Variety," pp. 19-20.

disapproval. Sympathy is mutual, and makes people aware that they are also being seen and judged. So, everybody tries to observe him or herself as others see him or her. 'Others, then, are crucial for the development of standards of moral self-evaluation. But more than this, it is the process of self-evaluation by reflecting on the likely judgments of others that leads to the development of common moral standards.'[27] These common standards are seen as independent criteria of what is *in fact* worthy. Nonetheless, 'since they have their origins in the mutual sympathy of particular groups of people, with their own subjective perception of beauty and deformity,' they might vary considerably in various societies.[28] At the same time, morality is open to further reflection and revision. The interaction of various societies and cultures leads to the development of a universal morality.

Hence, Kukathas believes that Smith gives a theory of morality which accounts for moral variety without denying the possibility of achieving universal moral principles. Although the legitimate scope of these universal principles may be limited, perhaps, to the rules of justice, cultural difference is not an insurmountable obstacle to the development of such principles. Kukathas gives two grounds for justifying the possibility of arriving at universal moral standards in Smith's account of morality. One is the theoretical-descriptive account of the emergence of morality in society. He argues that the development of morality transcends the boundaries of one culture. However, he does not offer any philosophical reason why people have to try to see their self-images in the minds of outsiders, and, more importantly, to seek their approval. He himself acknowledges this objection, but maintains that it should not be overstated, because we have

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[27] Ibid., p. 13.

> acquired moral sentiments and developed moral standards which range widely. We have developed the capacity to recognize injustice even when it is perpetrated by "one of our own" to the disadvantage of "strangers" from other families, or towns, or states, or sects.[29]

These remarks, however, can hardly be considered an answer to the above objection. The objection is not that we do not feel sympathy for strangers, but that sometimes we do not seek their moral approval. Hence, achieving a kind of moral convergence in this way may not be the case.

Smith's other ground for the universal tendency of morality is that morality is not merely an "invention," but it is in the nature of people to *be* moral, and to look for "the natural propriety of action."[30] Unfortunately, this ground has not been delineated in more detail by Kukathas. Nevertheless, about his brief comment, it could be said that the mere desire to reach "the natural propriety of action," or to be moral rather than conformist, does not entail transcending cultural particularity. Conceiving one's own moral standards as universal is compatible with their being actually culturally specific, as is the case with most religious or moral doctrines.

The attempt to find a middle ground between universalism and culturalism, or to reconcile the moral requirements of human nature with the embeddedness of moral standards in the actual life of various communities, has also been made by Parekh. While acknowledging the existence of a common human nature, he finds it to be mediated by various cultures in such a way that it cannot be put in ahistorical and trans-cultural terms. He argues that humans are

> cultural beings who, in the course of exercising their shared capacities, satisfying their shared desires, and responding to their common

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[28] Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[29] Ibid., p. 17.
[30] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

> conditions and experiences against the background of their different historical and geographical environment, evolve distinct ways of life or cultures. Different cultures define common humanity in their own different ways, give it a distinct tone and structure, and reconstitute it in novel ways.[31]

Parekh sees human nature and culture, or universality and particularity, as interacting and both equally important in constituting "the distinctive humanity" of each person. However, cultures despite their deep differences 'share enough in common to make dialogue possible,' and are permeable and internally diverse.[32] He also thinks that it is possible to arrive at universal values free from ethnocentric biases through cross-cultural dialogue.[33] In this approach, cultures, due to their role in structuring moral values, are worthwhile, though their worth is not unconditional. They may be subject to criticism, but it is more constructive if such a criticism is based on culturally internal, rather than external, criteria.

Although a combination of the universalist and culturalist approaches seems more persuasive than espousing either of them separately, the difficulty is where to strike a balance between the two. This third approach can justify the political promotion of culture, and affirm the recognition of cultural difference. However, it confronts the complex question of how much diversity is permissible, which it has to answer without sliding into either the universalist or the culturalist approach.

2.4. Multiculturalism and Liberal Conception of Autonomy

All the above approaches, namely universalism, culturalism and the perspective combining the two, can be found among liberals. Therefore, there are various liberal accounts of the significance of culture, depending on the role attributed to it in the formation of morality. Consequently, there are different stances regarding the political recognition of culture and cultural difference among liberals. They vary from the assimilationist theory of John Stuart Mill to Will Kymlicka's theory of multicultural citizenship. However, it should be noted that accepting either the universality or cultural particularity of morality does not necessarily lead to a fixed position regarding cultural diversity. There are many other normative issues to be taken into account. Not all culturalist liberals endorse a politics of recognition and multiculturalism. Michael Walzer, for instance, though acknowledging the cultural particularity of liberalism, prefers a liberalism of neutrality, without a cultural project or any collective goal.[34] On the other hand, not all universalists go for the assimilationist stance towards cultural diversity, as is the case with Kymlicka. One reason for this is the liberal value of autonomy. Hence, even if liberals claim that their principles are universal and applicable to all people irrespective of their cultures, they face the problem of whether enforcing these principles on those who resent them does not amount to disregarding the moral autonomy, equality and dignity of the latter group.[35] Because of the value of autonomy, the relationship between liberalism and multiculturalism is a special and, at the same time, paradoxical one.

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[31] Parekh, "Moral Philosophy and its Anti-pluralist Bias," p. 132.

[32] Bhikhu Parekh, "Political Theory and the Multicultural Society," *Radical Philosophy*, vol. 95, (May/June 1999), p. 31.

[33] Bhikhu Parekh, "Non-ethnocentric Universalism," *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.) (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999), p. 139.

There is an affinity between multiculturalism, as a doctrine demanding political recognition of cultural difference, and the liberal notions of autonomy, consent and obeying oneself. The fact that multiculturalism first appeared, and is still mostly influential, in liberal societies reinforces this suggestion. Kant's principle of autonomy is about people's freedom from externally imposed value and belief systems, and about the rejection of heteronomy. 'Autonomy of the will is the property the will has of being a law to itself.'[36] Rational beings are the authors of the laws (which, however, are universally applicable, viz., categorical imperatives), and at the same time subjects to that law.[37] This is the case, because '[r]ational nature exists as an end in itself.'[38]

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[34] Michael Walzer, "Comment," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* Amy Gutmann (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1992), pp. 102-3.

For Mill, people's dignity and self-respect are tied up with autonomy, since it means that they are not subject to others' will. According to him, '[i]f a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode.'[39] From Rousseau's perspective, it is through "obeying oneself" that alienation can be avoided. The legal and political system of a society must not be alien to its members, otherwise it leads to surrendering their identity. Furthermore, for liberals, 'a social and political order is illegitimate unless it is rooted in the consent of all those who have to live under it; the consent or agreement of these people is a condition of its being morally permissible to enforce that order against them.'[40]

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[35] This question can be put in another way, viz., to what extent is imposing a contested set of moral and political principles in the society legitimate?

[36] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Trans. H.J. Paton, (Routledge: London and New York, 1989), 23rd ed., p. 101

[37] This point has been formulated in other forms by other schools of morality and religions. Perhaps, we can say that it is implied in all of them that morality, in one way or another, (potentially) attracts human beings' acceptance.

[38] Ibid., p. 91.

[39] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, Gertrude Himmelfarb (ed.), (Penguin Books: London, 1985), p. 133.

[40] Jeremy Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 147, (1987), p. 140.

Although liberal notions of autonomy, self-determination and, more importantly, self-authorship of the law address individuals, it is logically plausible to extend them in such a way that they cover groups of people and, particularly, members of various cultures. In other words, if individuals should not be forced to obey others' law, this is also the case with a group of individuals who share the same culture. Hence, an argument for the protection of different cultures 'would be that members of a community are entitled to live according to their own moral code (whether or not it is better than any other).'[41] Moreover, support for cultures is seen as a condition of individual autonomy that is a distinctive feature of liberal political morality. Whereas traditional liberal theorists consider religion and ethnicity as private matters that are not in need of state recognition or interference, 'a new wave of liberal thinking contends that these measures are actually required by individual autonomy.' The latter group has also focused on "group rights."[42]

The point is that advocates of multiculturalism draw on notions that are familiar to liberals. They refer to the government's commitment to public justifiability, the commitment that the use of coercive power over free and equal citizens and the enforcement of the law should be justified in terms of values that they accept. This commitment is one of the pillars of liberalism. Despite the fact that multiculturalism appeals to notions some of which are liberal in their origin, many liberals find it, and particularly its emphasis on group rights, at odds with the principles of individual autonomy and equality. That is why it can be said that the relationship between multiculturalism and liberalism is paradoxical.

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[41] Michael Hartney, "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights," *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Will Kymlicka (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 206.

3. Culture as a Morally Significant Community

We have seen that culture is not only a way of life and a set of values, etc., but is also regarded as a community. A cultural community is a worthwhile community, alongside the family, religious community, society and some other collectivities. People have some obligations towards their own family and society, and some of these obligations such as supporting children or paying tax are either publicly enforced, or considered to be public obligations as such. What is at issue is whether culture as a *community* can have moral relevance in the form of requiring any moral obligation from people, particularly the kind of obligations that demand political support. In this section, first the worth and moral relevance of cultural communities will be discussed, and it will be seen how this could lead to some moral demands. Then, it will be examined whether the moral significance of cultural communities requires political recognition, and what would be the case with culturally diverse societies.

3.1. The Morality of Community

Groups play an important part in shaping human life, and in acquiring and developing those characteristics and capacities that distinguish human species from other beings. As Vernon Van Dyke argues, [t]he development of their [that is, humans'] personalities and talents, their philosophies of life, and perhaps their very existence would depend on the community of which they are a part.'[43] Though subscribing to a weaker view of the value of communities, Andrew Mason finds

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[42] Geoffrey Brahm Levey, "Rethinking Liberal Autonomy In The Light Of Multiculturalism," presented at the Conference on *Multiculturalism, Minorities and Citizenship,* Florence, 18-23 April 1996, p. 1.

[43] Vernon Van Dyke, "Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought," *The Journal of Politics,* vol. 44, (1982), p. 39.

them intrinsically valuable, because their membership is a potential 'ingredient of the good life.'[44]

However, the most important point about culture as a community is that, like other communities, from the nation-state to religious and ethnic community, it is a reference of our sense of belonging. People feel deep attachments to their communities. There is a sense of solidarity among members of a community. Cultural community is a context of identity. Hence, we identify ourselves with whatever is associated with our cultural community. Our language, customs, practices, etc., and in a word our culture, become valuable simply because they belong to our cultural community and to our people. Identity is, to some extent, based on a distinction between "us" and "others," between insiders and outsiders. Things relating to "us" and which are "ours" sometimes acquire a kind of specialness, and occasionally "sacredness," which others lack. Explaining nationalism, Isaiah Berlin pinpoints a feature that could be generalised about all kinds of community. He suggests that nationalism

> ...entails the notion that one of the most compelling reasons, perhaps the most compelling, for holding a particular belief, pursuing a particular policy, serving a particular end, living a particular life, is that these ends, beliefs, policies, lives are ours. This is tantamount to saying that these rules or doctrines or principles should be followed not because they lead to virtue or happiness or justice or liberty, ... or are good or right in

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[44] Andrew Mason, "Personal Autonomy and Identification with a Community," *Liberalism, Citizenship and Autonomy,* David Milligan and William Watts Miller (eds.) (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), p. 176. See also Andrew Mason, "Liberalism and the Value of Community," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* vol. 23, no. 2, (June 1993), pp. 228 and 232. Mason emphasises that, in his definition of community, members must 'be *mutually concerned* and refrain from systematically exploiting each other' (Ibid., p. 217), although he acknowledges that existing communities merely demonstrate various approximations of this ideal.

> themselves, ... rather they are to be followed because these values are those of my group - for the nationalist, of my nation....[45]

To this claim Jeremy Waldron responds that '[i]t seems very odd to regard the fact that this is "our" norm ... as part of the reason, if not the central reason, for having the norm, and following it.' He goes on to say that people regard the norms of their culture as standards representing human wisdom, which explains why they are the best standards to be upheld. People take social norms and practices seriously, not because they are distinctive to their culture, but because they 'think of them as embedded in a structure of reasons and reasoning.'[46] Waldron is right in suggesting that some of our norms deserve respect precisely because we assume that they are rational. Rationality, here, implies universality and capability of attracting the allegiance of all people regardless of whether they belong to our community or not. Most of the rules of justice are of this kind. However, there are some things about *us* and about *our* community that we cherish, though they do not demonstrate the highest degree of justice or excellence. We usually prefer the company of those from our community to that of others. We cherish our language or customs without their being aesthetically the most perfect ones.

Arguably, the significance of communities and, in particular, cultural communities in terms of their role in the formation of people's identity has moral connotations. Also, our preferences for what is *ours* can sometimes be put in normative terms. Emotions and the sense of communal solidarity, creating 'a feeling, or an illusion, of closeness and shared fate,' engender what Yael Tamir calls "the morality of community."[47] Moreover, there is no reason to confine the moral significance of communities and, particularly, the cultural community to the private sphere. Their moral weight can affect the public realm.

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[45] Jeremy Waldron, "Preliminary Thoughts on Citizenship and Identity," *Draft*, pp. 1-2, quoting from: Isaiah Berlin, "Nationalism."
[46] Ibid., p. 2.

Given the moral significance of cultural communities, the question is, whether people have any duty towards them. One way of putting the problem is to ask whether they can be bearers of moral claims or even right-holders. However, it is not necessary for cultures to be the direct beneficiaries of the rights and duties. What is at stake is, do cultures give rise, in one way or another, to moral claims? A more specific form of this question was posed by Parekh, in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair, as to whether it is coherent to argue that cultural communities may be subjects of libel and defamation. As a matter of fact, some sort of notion of ethnic libel has been incorporated in the legal systems of some countries. In Britain, incitement to racial hatred, and in Australia (New South Wales) even 'serious contempt for, or serious ridicule of' persons and groups on the ground of their race are considered criminal acts.[48]

Because of the dominance of the language of "rights" in contemporary moral and political philosophy, it would be better to focus on the question of whether there is such a thing as a right of a cultural community. Since there is a considerable affinity between this question and the broader question of whether there can be collective rights, it is appropriate to start with the latter.

3.2. Can There Be Collective Rights?

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[47] Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 121.

[48] Bhikhu Parekh, "The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy," *Political Studies,* vol. XXXVIII, no. 4, (1990), p. 705.

To begin with the definition of rights, rights are claims made by someone that put somebody else under a duty to act or not to act in a certain way. These rights could be ratified by legal authorities and protected by law. In such a case, they are called legal rights.[49] Otherwise, they are just moral rights, with which only people's sense of morality guarantees compliance. The core of the concept of rights is that someone's certain good or interest is so important that it deserves to be protected by somebody else's duty. As Raz argues, we can speak of a right if an aspect of a single person's well-being is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.[50]

Two points are basically associated with the liberal concept of rights. First, in the case of individual rights, as Dworkin says, '[i]ndividual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them.'[51] Second, '[s]ince moral rights protect important goods and since things have value - morally relevant value - only to the extent that they contribute to the well-being of beings whose life is of ultimate value (i.e. human beings), then only human beings can be the holders of moral rights.'[52] Now the question is whether the second point amounts to denying that collectivities have some kinds of rights. Answering this question requires examining various definitions of collective rights, as follows.

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[49] According to Hofeld, in law, the term "right" is used to refer to four properties or status: 'the correlate of a legal duty ('claim'), the absence of duty ('privilege' or 'liberty'), the capacity to change legal relations ('power'), and protection against a change in one's legal position ('immunity'). Hartney, "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights," p. 211.

[50] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom,* p. 166.

[51] Hartney, "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights", p. 212, summarising Dworkin's arguments in Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously,* (Duchworth: London, 1977), p. 188 ff.

[52] Ibid., pp. 212-3. This model of right that gives the ultimate value to human beings becomes problematic in a multicultural society where some community cultures believe that other beings such as their gods or some other sacred things or animal have rights as well. Such a view is not striking if we note that in liberal societies now animal rights groups fight for similar rights.

Rights of Collectivities

In the most controversial interpretation, collective rights are defined as the rights of collectivities, ranging from the family to interest groups, the nation-state and, finally, humanity as a whole. In this definition, collectivities are supposed to be "right-holders." According to the model of rights delineated above, to establish a right there must be a morally significant interest that subjects some people to a duty. However, we have seen that in the liberal concept of rights, only human beings and their interests are morally relevant. The moral importance of collectivities is contingent on the good of their members. They have a derivative or instrumental value. In this regard, Michael Hartney speaks of "value-individualism," which means:

> only the lives of individual human beings have ultimate value, and collective entities derive their value from their contribution to the lives of individual human beings. The opposite theory we might call '*value-collectivism*': the view that a collective entity can have value independently of its contribution to the well-being of individual human beings. Such a position is counter-intuitive, and the burden of proof rests on anyone who wishes to defend it.[53]

It is plausible to say that we cannot speak of collectivities as entities over and above their members, nor as entities with interests indifferent to those of their members or sometimes in conflict with the interests of most of them. Collectivities do not act as moral agents, because, as Van Dyke argues, 'there is not such a thing as a real 'Group-Person' with human qualities such as a mind or a spirit.'[54] A group is not to be conceived as 'a real person, with ... a will of its own.' At the most, it possesses legal personality, while, according to E. Barker, moral personality and responsibility belong 'solely to the individuals' who constitute it.[55] Thus, there is no such thing as a right of collectivities *per se,* a right that is not related in any way to the rights of their *members.* Consequently, communities and cultural communities, too, cannot be right-holders, and cannot possess rights in this sense.

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[53] Ibid., pp. 206-7.

Rights with Collective Goods as Their Object

Proponents of collective rights can put their argument differently, and maintain that collective rights, unlike individual rights, are those of which individuals cannot the bearers. A right cannot be reserved to individuals, if its object is a collective good. As Hartney argues, this claim takes three different, though overlapping, forms. First, '[i]f there is a right to a good which is a feature which only a group can have, then the right must belong to the group (and not to any individual within it).'[56] Self-government is an example of these goods.[57] It is meaningless to speak of a self-government right unless for a collectivity, and particularly a collectivity of a certain kind. This right is to be exercised only by a collectivity. Second, when the object of a right is a collectively available good and, particularly, a non-excludable one, the relevant right is a collective right. The network of public transport and the good of enjoying a cultured and sophisticated social environment are examples of these goods. Third, rights to participatory goods, which cannot be enjoyed by a single individual, do not belong to a single individual, since they are not "individualizable."[58] Marriage, friendship and games are of this kind.

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[54] Vernon Van Dyke, "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," *The Rights of Minority Cultures,* Will Kymlicka (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 33. It should be mentioned that though Van Dyke does not consider a collectivity as a "Group-Person," it does not prevent him from claiming that collectivities can be right-holders.

[55] Julia Stapleton, "Introduction," *Group Rights,* (Thoemmes Press: Bristol, 1995), p. xxvi, quoting from: E. Barker, Introduction to his translation of O. Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1934), p lxxv.

[56] Hartney, "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights," p. 218. It should be noted that Hartney's delineation of this view of collective rights does not amount to his approval of it.

[57] Hartney adds other examples such as socialisation process and kinship structure, but remarks that this view has implausible consequences. For instance, 'since a fair system of criminal justice is something only a group, and not an individual, can have, it would follow that individuals cannot have any right to a fair system of criminal justice, and that no individual's right would be violated if the system were not fair' (Ibid.). However, the latter part of Hartney's remark is a non sequitur. That is to say, individuals have a right to a fair trial, but not to a fair system of criminal justice, which is conceivable only for a society.

Calling some goods "collective" does not amount to saying that there is no individual interest in them. In all these cases of collective goods while human beings, and not collectivities as entities over and distinct from their members, are beneficiaries, their interest is conceptually intermingled with other human beings' interests. Non-collective goods are enjoyed by human beings as individuals separate from each other, whereas collective goods serve them in relation to each other. Regarding the first form of collective goods, discussed in this section, it is illogical to speak of, for instance, an individual right to self-government, while regarding the second form it is not feasible to exclude others from enjoying some goods, and in the third form, enjoyment is impossible without others' participation.

Defining collective rights as rights with collective goods as their object is plausible. However, the difference between this kind of rights and individual rights is somewhat blurred. Is freedom of speech an individual or a collective right? The difficulty becomes more discernible when we notice that rights, apart from being individual or collective, are only meaningful in relation to other people. Rights do not make sense except in the community, and do not operate except in association with others.

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[58] Denise Réaume, "Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods," *University of Toronto Law Journal* vol. 38, no. 1, (1988), pp. 10 and 27. For more details, see ibid., p. 7-13. Also, seeHartney, "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights," p. 218.

Collective Rights as Membership Rights

Collective rights are sometimes defined as rights to goods to which people are entitled on the basis of their membership of groups. People's rights in publicly-available as well as participatory goods, from one point of view, are the same as other rights that are called individual rights. We have the right to get married, to make friends, to play games, and the right to enjoy a tolerant and friendly society, or to command group-provided facilities, as we have the right to freedom (of expression, movement, etc.), to primary goods for sustenance and to privacy. However, the former group of rights is underpinned by the notion of membership. In entering a marriage contract, a friendship relation, a game or a society, we would have some expectations that we would not have had before. Our membership in a collectivity subjects others, whether members of the collectivity or not, to some duties. Hence, some rights could be reserved to us because of our membership in a collectivity. Non-members cannot claim the enjoyment of collectively-available and participatory goods available in a group as their rights.

"Group rights" are distinct from "individual or human rights," as Tarnopolsky points out, in the sense that individuals are entitled to the former in virtue of their membership in certain kinds of group, but to the latter in virtue of being humans.[59] Individual rights are grounded on people's interest in goods they deserve to have regardless of their membership in any collectivity. These goods give rise to a similar set of rights for everybody, no matter to which collectivity they belong. Ascribing a collective right to a person is contingent on his or her membership in a specific group, whereas this is not the case with individual rights. It can be concluded, therefore, that collectivities, to some extent, determine people's moral status; and entering into, or exiting from, them may change this status.

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[59] Ibid., p. 220. Hartney accepts this distinction as a ground for distinguishing individual rights from collective rights. However, finally, he believes that because of different usage of the term "collective rights" (for instance in the case of Quebec), it is 'hardly conducive to clear thinking' (Ibid., p. 223).

Rights to goods that cannot be conceived of as belonging to individuals (the first category stated in the last section, like the right to self-government) are also of such a kind that their rationale is the existence of some members and the concept of membership in a collectivity. This category of collective rights, since they are not attributable to individuals, is considered by some to be the best manifestations of collective rights. It seems plausible to call all of the rights that are conferred on people in virtue of their membership in one or another collectivity, "membership rights." Hence, those "collective rights" mentioned in the previous section can also be called "membership rights." The two terms are interchangeable.

Membership rights (or collective rights) cover a vast range of rights, from the moral rights of children in the family, to the rights of members of a sport club in relation to each other, the right of members of a trade union or a corporation to participate in the relevant activities, the right of citizenry to live in a particular social and cultural environment, the right of a family to decide its internal affairs without others' intervention and the right of a nation to self-government. To be sure, not every collectivity can claim every kind of right.[60]

It is not clear whether Hartney thinks even this last criterion of distinguishing collective rights (that is, membership) is also not conducive.

[60] For some useful tips about those communities that are entitled to right, see Van Dyke, "Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought," pp. 31-33.

To sum up, although it is implausible to speak of rights of collectivities *per se,* irrespective of the interest or rights of members, there is a category of rights that rest on people's membership in a collectivity, and thus can be called collective rights. In this sense, since the cultural community is a subset of collectivities, it is plausible to speak of cultural community rights. Since cultural communities are morally significant, their membership could be a ground for changing the moral status of individuals, and for ascribing them some collective rights. The latter are rights of people as members of a culture, but not rights of cultures as such. It can be argued that defining collective rights as simply rights of members of particular groupings is conducive to resolving many difficulties of dealing with culturally plural societies, and particularly to overcoming some deficiencies, such as the subordination of women, to which some versions of multiculturalism are susceptible.

Some Features of Collective and Community Rights

The most important characteristic of collective rights is that they are not reducible to individual rights, though they are consistent with and perhaps dependent on them.[61] It is only in virtue of membership that collective rights are conferred on individuals. Van Dyke argues '[w]hen the state imposes taxes, breaks up a monopoly, requires attendance at school, or conscripts a person and sends him into battle, it is not exercising rights taken over from individuals, for they never had such rights. ...they are necessarily and unavoidably the rights of a collective entity.'[62] It is the same with the right to sovereignty. There is no individual right to sovereignty. Such a right belongs to a national community.

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[61] Michael Freeman, "Are there Collective Human rights?," *Political Studies,* vol. XLII, (1995), pp. 38-39.

[62] Van Dyke, "Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought," p. 24.

Particularity, or exclusiveness, is another feature of collective rights. Tarnopolsky remarks that individual rights are one's rights to be treated like other human beings; whereas collective rights, which he calls "group rights," are one's rights to be treated differently.[63] Friendship accords some rights to the relevant friends, while it denies others these rights. Membership in a state reserves some rights to citizens but not to non-citizens.

The third characteristic is differentiated duties. Since collective rights rest on membership, they subject people to different kinds of duties, depending on whether or not they are members of the concerned group. For instance, marriage rights impose some duties (e.g., alimony) on the couple, and some other kinds of duties on others (e.g., refraining from intervention, or giving some kinds of support). However, individual rights impose the same duties on all people, and, perhaps, only pragmatic considerations vary these duties from one person to another. The individual right to life imposes on all people, whether or not they are members of a particular group, one kind of duty, namely, avoiding harm.

Since collective rights are not rights held by collectivities as such, but are simply rights of members, there is no general rule about the priority of collective over individual rights or vice versa. As there could be a conflict between two different types of individual right, there could also be a conflict between an individual and a collective right. If an individual right is outweighed by a collective right, it is not the case that the collectivity *per se* has a right that is prior to individual rights, but that the interest of members of a collectivity requires relinquishing the individual right.[64]

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[63] Hartney, "Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights," p. 220.

[64] Here, Hartney's argument in a different context may be helpful, though it does not distinguish between individual rights and membership rights. He argues that

For instance, in the case of protection of minorities, the collective rights of minority communities sometimes work as a mechanism against the individual rights of outsiders, such as the right to buy land or hunting rights. This is because the exercise of the latter rights 'may enable a majority to destroy the culture, and thereby the opportunity for a good life of a minority. ...Some restriction of the individual rights of insiders may also be justified to prevent actions that would undermine communities which are necessary for autonomous choices.'[65] To be sure, not all individual rights can be overridden. Rights at different levels, namely, individual, community, nation-state, and humanity, limit each other. The outcome of a particular case depends on weighing these rights against each other.[66]

As Kymlicka argues, 'community-specific rights can be ascribed to individuals, or to the community, or even to a province or territory within which the community forms the majority.'[67] Attribution of collective rights to different bodies is sometimes a matter of practicality, as in the case of the right of Canadian francophones to have their children educated in French, 'where numbers warrant.' The exercise of the right

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> If a member wishes to leave the group, it is not a valid reason against his doing so that the group is now smaller than it was before. If there could ever be a valid moral reason against his doing so, it must be because reducing the size of group makes it more difficult for the rest of the members to benefit from the existence of the group. But the reason is therefore one based on the interest of individuals in the continued existence of the group, not on any collective consideration' (Ibid., p. 217).

[65] Freeman, "Are there Collective Human Rights?," p. 35.

[66] Certainly the individual right to life is stronger than the right of the national community to have devotion of their member, whereas the latter seems more forceful than the individual right of access to satellite TV, if there are such rights in the first place.

[67] Will Kymlicka, "Individual and Community Rights," *Group Rights*, Judith Baker (ed.), (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1994), p. 23. He goes on to say that in the context of Canada

> For example, francophones' right to use French in federal courts is accorded to and exercised by individuals. ...The special hunting rights of Aboriginal people, in contrast, are usually ascribed to the community. For example, an Aboriginal band council has the right to determine what hunting will occur. An Aboriginal whose hunting is restricted by her band cannot claim that this is a denial of her special rights, because Aboriginal hunting rights are not accorded to individuals. The right of the Quebecois to preserve and promote their culture, as affirmed in the distinct society clause, is yet another case:

of Muslims or Jews to have religiously prepared meat goes to their religious authority, because it is the most practical way to do it. The method of allocation of collective rights may also depend on the nature of the interest to be protected by the right. For example, the right of self-government needs to be exercised by a nation with clear-cut territorial borders, while the right to preserve a culture has to go to a cultural community with some sort of clear boundary. However, the right of Sikhs not to wear a helmet when driving a motorcycle necessarily goes to individuals. When a right is vested in a group, individuals can take part in its implementation. They also may protest against the result of the exercise of the right by the group; or they 'may leave the group, but the group's decision stands.'[68]

3.3. Political Recognition of the Cultural Community

Given that cultures and, in general, communities constitute people's identity and sense of belonging, some communitarian philosophers advocate a politics of promoting collective goods which protects people's culture and identity. It allows people to experience their life as bound up with the good of those communities with which they identify. In a society, however, there is a variety of communities, some of which do not incorporate all the people, while having a crucial role in forming the identity of their own members. Ignoring one's membership or denying this membership the necessary moral weight would have severe consequences for one's sense of identity. Proponents of "group rights," according to Gewirth, argue that

> the members of many submerged groups are so closely linked together by strong ties of group identity - whether in terms of language, history, religion, tradition, race, class, gender, or other variables - that to deal

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it is exercised by the province of Quebec, whose citizens are predominantly francophones but also include many non-francophones.

[68] Van Dyke, "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," p. 46.

> with them only as individuals apart from this identity would fail to respect an essential part of their personhood.[69]

Hence, in societies comprised of various cultures, recognition of these cultures is crucial for those belonging to them and, at the same time, wanting to participate in the public life of the larger society.

In this context, the right of cultures to survive is vital, because they contribute to the well-being of people by providing them with a system of rules and meaning, a sense of identification, etc. Given the concept of community rights, as defined above, if there could be such a thing as the right of cultures to survive, it is not grounded on the necessity of survival of a culture *per se,* but on the basis that cultures contribute to the good of their members. Thus, if the members of a culture cease to believe that it serves their well-being, there is no point in its survival any more.

The recognition of cultural communities in the form of granting community rights has important implications for plural societies. However, if such rights are conferred on people, minority as well as dominant communities can claim them. Hence, there is no guarantee that minorities will win all their cases. Ironically, the fear that the majority community would try to justify its dominance over, and its suppression of, minorities and individuals by appeal to community rights has led many liberal philosophers to an unqualified rejection of community rights. Nevertheless, most proponents of multiculturalism put their case in terms of "community rights," which they find more useful than the liberal concept of individual rights.

3.4. Liberal Misgiving about Collectivities and Communities

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[69] Gewirth, "Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant To Moral Knowledge?," p. 41.

Liberalism as a moral philosophy is primarily concerned with individuals, and considers them the most fundamental moral units with interest in freedom and some extent of equality. When it comes to political philosophy, liberals try to protect individuals by devising the concept of individual rights. Liberalism is preoccupied with the welfare of, and justice for, individuals. Stressing the value of individual autonomy, liberalism tries to isolate individuals from, and to seal off, the impact of others that may compromise individual self-determination. This could also be based, though not necessarily, on the assumption of metaphysical independence of individuals, or on the individualistic account of rationality as ultimately individual reasoning.[70] MacIntyre points out that the philosophers of the Enlightenment and their successors believe that rationality requires us to

> abstract ourselves from all those particularities of social relationship in terms of which we have been accustomed to understand our responsibilities and interests. Only by doing so ... shall we arrive at a genuinely neutral, impartial, and, in this way universal point of view, freed from the partisanship and the partiality and onesidedness that otherwise affect us.[71]

Liberals underestimate what is called the "quest for community" or, according to Van Dyke, 'primordial collective sentiment and group loyalties.'[72] They ignore the fact that communal attachments constitute people's identity and ends. Van Dyke finds the roots of liberals' neglect of communities in the implausible assumption of liberal philosophy that considers individuals "the only significant units" in the state of nature and also in the subsequent contract. However, he argues that even in an original position, people would be together not only in families, but also in a variety of other collectivities.[73] There is a trend in modern liberal societies, Daniel Bell points out, towards 'a callous individualism that ignores community and social obligations.'[74] The society is reduced to an aggregation of individuals who voluntarily and through a contract have formed it. Membership in a society is mostly assumed to be a matter of choice. Therefore, many non-voluntary collectivities that people find themselves "thrown" into, and that have enormous importance in their "moral world," do not have any liberal explanation.

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[70] About liberal account of rationality, see Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," p. 135.

[71] MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, p. 3.

[72] Van Dyke, "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," p. 49.

Clans and tribal, cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious communities (insofar as they are not chosen), are among those collectivities that are neglected in the liberal moral terminology. It has even been said that liberalism does not give a proper account of the institutions and practices of the nation-state, which is the most well-recognised collectivity in liberal societies. This has led to a split between liberal theory and the practices of liberal states. The moral relations and status to which the nation-state gives rise cannot be explained except by drawing upon the moral significance of communities. Therefore, in order to provide a proper account of them, liberal societies have to smuggle some ideas from collectivist moral doctrines. Tamir gives some examples of what she calls 'a long-standing though much denied, alliance between liberal and national ideas.'[75]

For instance, liberalism's individualistic approach fails to justify our obligation to care for the welfare of others in the society in terms of undertaking the burdens of distributive justice. On the other hand, the universalism of liberal principles of justice flies in the face of the practice of confining the scope of distributive justice to our own society, and also restricting citizenship in the form of giving priority to birthright in granting citizenship. Nor can liberalism account for the demarcation of the state and the desire to keep the society distinct. Liberal arguments such as consent and contract, gratitude or even allegiance to principles of justice and the obligation to support just institutions are not sufficient grounds for the above practices in liberal states. These practices partly rest on an assumption that liberal theory itself cannot provide, namely, communal unity and a feeling of relatedness and solidarity or "the morality of community," as Tamir calls it.[76] Also, the obligation to obey the law is, to some extent, based on identification with the state and a sense of belonging to the society.[77] Liberalism neglects this emotional side to the obligation to obey the law. Only by incorporating collective and, particularly, national, ideas can liberal states justify these practices.[78]

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[73] Van Dyke, "Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought," p. 39.
[74] Daniel Bell, *Communitarianism and its Critics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 7.
[75] Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 117.

More importantly, liberals cannot justify the practice of liberal states of enforcing their authority on dissenters, who do not consent to obeying the state either because of lack of identification with it, or because they do not share its communal values, or even because they do not find it just. Political obligations are assumed because members of the society as a whole impose them on those living in their society. In other words, there is a kind of collective right that sometimes overrides individuals' right to liberty and to live according to the law to which they consent. Perhaps, that is why Michael Freeman argues that '[l]iberal individualism has traditionally failed to recognize its own dependence on the assumption that nation-states have collective rights.'[79]

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[76] Ibid., p. 121. R. D. Grillo argues that the Enlightenment *Gesellschaft* view of the nation as an "association" of like-minded people has coexisted in the West with *Gemeinschft* account of the nation as "a community of blood" (R. D. Grillo, *Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture, and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), p. 15).

[77] There is a debate about which kind of identification is needed in a liberal society. While "liberal-nationalists," such as Tamir, speak of some kinds of pre-political solidarity, for instance national or cultural identity, Mason thinks that for sustaining a liberal society, identifying with its institutions is sufficient. In such a society, for the purpose of co-operation among citizenry and their support for policies, it suffices that 'they share a common fate, a sense of which can often be provided merely by the recognition that they each belong to the same polity' (Andrew Mason, "Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation," Ethics, vol. 109, (January 1999), pp. 277-279).

[78] For a detailed discussion about the inability of liberalism to explain the above practices of the liberal state, see Tamir, "The Hidden Agenda: National Values and Liberal Beliefs," *Liberal Nationalism*, pp. 117-139.

In dealing with groups and associations at levels between the individual and the state, liberal states have a rich tradition of acknowledging some *voluntary* groups such as political parties and charitable or even some kinds of religious groups. This kind of association, however, is regarded as a private aspect of life. In legal practice, too, interest groups are recognised in the form of trade unions and corporations with legal personalities and their own rights and obligations, distinct from those of their stockholders. However, liberals until very recently have not articulated the moral importance of *non-voluntary* communities. According to Van Dyke, '[f]ocusing on concerns at the level of the individual and the state, they [liberals] have no answer to the question of how to provide for those conditions of human well-being that can be promoted effectively only through corporate organizations operating at an intermediate level.'[80]

Both the individualism and the universalism of liberal theory promote blindness to differences among individuals, particularly those differences that are based on group membership. They usually consider linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural differences among individuals to be private issues, not in need of public recognition.[81] However, the communities to which a person belongs and, more importantly, the non-voluntary ones into which one finds oneself "thrown" cannot easily be sidelined to the private realm. Many people ask for the public recognition of their community; and the relative social and economic position of their communities becomes important to them. This is because these communities are central to their members' sense of belonging. They shape people's identity and moral world. This is particularly, but not only, the case with heterogeneous societies. Nathan Glazer maintains that if group membership is seen as permanent and central to individual identity, rather than a purely private and shifting issue of personal preference, then the "group right" approach should be adopted. Moreover, if 'it is unrealistic or unjust to envisage these group identities weakening in time to be replaced by a common citizenship,' then communities should be publicly recognised.[82]

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[79] Freeman, "Are there Collective Human rights?," pp. 39-40.
[80] Van Dyke, "Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought," p. 31.
[81] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 3.

Liberalism and Minority Communities

Liberalism's dislike of recognising non-voluntary communities is thornier in the case of minorities. In traditional liberalism, minorities are treated as aggregations of individuals with equal individual rights. They are bound to obey the majority's decision. Rousseauean republicanism is even harsher, and treats members of the minority as deviants. Both traditions subordinate the minority to the majority, and neither recognises it as a distinct group. That is because, in both approaches, the society is taken to be homogenous. Glazer explains the sociological origins of the liberal approach as follows:

> the language and theory of the protection of human rights developed in a time and place (England in the seventeenth century) when the issue was seen as one of deprivation because of conscience, because of individual

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[82] Nathan Glazer, "Individual Rights against Group Rights," *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Will Kymlicka (ed.), (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), p. 134.

> decision and action, rather than one of deprivation because of race, color, or national origin. England was relatively homogeneous, *except* for religion and political attitudes which largely flowed from religious conviction. These were seen as individual decisions, and protecting diversity was seen as an issue of protecting the diversity that flowed from individual decisions.[83]

In the homogenous societies of the 17th and 18th centuries of Europe, such a formulation of the relation between the majority and the minority, perhaps, was not very unjust. However, if the minority appears to be a *community*, which, as we have seen, possesses some kinds of rights and imposes some kinds of obligation, the case would be different. As Freeman argues,

> Because ethnic groups have common comprehensive cultures and national groups a sense of political distinctiveness, they raise special problems for nation-state political cultures based on the principle of majority rule. The doctrine of equal and universal rights may support the hegemony of the majority culture over subordinated cultures.[84]

Since the majority's way of life, culture and symbols are already entrenched in the society, those in the majority community 'can insist on individualism and the nondiscriminatory treatment of individuals, and can decry any differentiation based on race, language, or religion, knowing that this formula assures their dominance.'[85] As Freeman remarks, such an 'individualistic, egalitarian form of democracy in ethnically plural societies may lead to the violation of the human rights of members of minority collectivities.'[86] The majority has the upper hand in the free market of cultures, whereas in the case of minority communities, neither is their way of life already entrenched, nor do they have the upper hand in the free market of cultures in their society. Hence, they are in need of recognition and special rights to preserve their identity and culture.

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[83] Ibid., p. 126.
[84] Freeman, "Are there Collective Human rights?," p. 26.
[85] Van Dyke, "Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought," p. 40.
[86] Freeman, "Are there Collective Human rights?," p. 32.

Nonetheless, there has been some degree of recognition of linguistic, ethnic and religious communities, especially those that are in a minority position, in the practice of liberal states and international bodies like the United Nations and particularly the League of Nations, as well as in some international declarations. To these communities, some rights have been allocated, such as linguistic rights in Switzerland, Canada and Belgium, or protective rights for indigenous peoples and the reservation of some goods exclusively for them in North America. The difficulty is, however, that these measures cannot be accounted for by liberal individual rights, or by certain versions of these rights.[87] As Van Dyke argues, '[a]n individualistic interpretation of equal protection provides a questionable basis for affirmative action.'[88]

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that cultures can have strong bearings on morality and, in particular, on notions of justice and the relevant rights, duties, obligations, etc. This is based on two considerations. First, cultures constitute the meaning of these moral conceptions. This is a view rejected by universalists, but accepted by culturalists. Universalists are reluctant to recognise cultural differences as morally or politically relevant, though they cannot go beyond some thin abstract principles incapable of cross-cultural application and adjudication. Culturalists advocate the recognition of difference, but are unable to rise above *modus vivendi* in relations between various cultures, because they cannot account for the exchange and conversation between cultures. A third view combining the two, though persuasive, faces a difficulty in delimiting the extent of permissible diversity, since it is puzzled about proportionate extents of roles of cultural and universal elements in constituting morality. Therefore, we need to develop a more refined version of this view.

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[87] Kymlicka argues that '[l]ike Jay Sigler, I believe that providing a liberal defence of minority rights "does not create a mandate for vast change. It merely ratifies and explains changes that have taken place in the absence of theory"' (Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 127). Nevertheless, he points out that '[m]inority rights were an important part of liberal theory and practice in the nineteenth century and between the world wars.' After World War II, however, the heated debate about national minorities gave way to a virtual silence because of 'the fall of the British Empire, the rise of Cold War conflict, and the prominence of American theorists within post-war liberalism.' More importantly, three factors, namely '(1) disillusionment with the minority rights scheme of the League of Nations, (2) the American racial desegregation movement, and (3) the 'ethnic revival' amongst immigrant groups in the United State' led to 'a misplaced antagonism towards the recognition of national rights' (Ibid., pp. 50-57).

[88] Van Dyke, "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," p. 42.

Second, cultures as significant communities in shaping people's identity give rise to some moral claims, rights and obligations. These are, however, claims and rights of *members* of community cultures, rather than those of *cultures* as such. This is so, because we cannot conceive of a cultural community as above and over individuals, and without any relation to the mass of its members. Multiculturalism can establish its call for the public recognition of all cultures existing in a society on these two grounds. Recognition entails respect for, and taking into account, the particularity of different cultures.

Espousing a universalist approach, liberals traditionally do not see moral principles as affected by cultural particularity. For them, however, the value of autonomy puts some restraints on enforcing these principles on those resenting them due to their cultural background. Liberalism also does not consider the moral demands of cultural communities to be in need of public recognition and state support. Nonetheless, in spite of liberals' misgiving about the role of culture and cultural community in morality in the public domain, there have been some recent attempts by contemporary philosophers with a liberal inclination, such as Taylor, Raz and Kymlicka, to incorporate the moral significance of culture into liberalism. They advocate the public recognition of cultural communities and particularly minority cultures. Some others, like Rorty, while accounting for the role of cultures in morality, do not see any implication for it in politics.

In the following chapters, we turn to the works of Taylor, Raz and Rorty. First, their philosophical approaches to epistemology, human agency and morality will be examined in order to find out their views about the universality/cultural particularity of moral principles. Then, we will consider whether they see culture as a worthwhile community imposing moral obligations on people. Finally, we will explore the implications of each philosopher's adoption of one or another perspective for their political views and particularly for their responses to the fact of cultural diversity in society.

CHAPTER TWO

TAYLOR: THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

Charles Taylor's main intellectual concern is what he calls "malaises of modernity," a view shared by many other thinkers, particularly in the contemporary era by communitarians like Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. Taylor, however, is not a root-and-branch critic of modern culture, within which he sees a "diversity of goods" that should be retrieved through "rearticulation."[1] He strongly refutes the widespread moral and intellectual scepticism and subjectivism, and holds modern epistemology responsible for this scepticism and consequent despair.[2] Taylor challenges the ontology behind modern epistemology, which disregards what he calls "transcendental conditions" of human identity and, particularly, the "dialogical" way of its formation.

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[1] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 502 and 520. Also see, Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 23.

[2] Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," *Philosophical Arguments*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997), pp. 34-5.

Taylor's critique of modern epistemology and his rejection of disengaged thinking drive him away from universalism and towards the particularity of rationality. For him, practical reasoning is to a large extent confined to cultural boundaries, resulting in the possibility of the incommensurability of cultures. Cultural barriers, however, can partly be overcome through a "fusion of horizons." Taylor's account of the dialogical character of human agency affirms the role of culture in constituting identity, and makes a case for the recognition of culture and cultural difference as a moral and political demand.

On the political level, the thrust of Taylor's thought is his critique of the rights-based or procedural liberalism of neutrality which he links with modern epistemology. He believes that this version of liberalism is not viable, or is insensitive to the range of social and political possibilities, as identified in his ontological discussions. Taylor also criticises procedural liberalism for its inability to justify the political furtherance of common goods such as culture, language or even political participation. His version of liberalism, on the other hand, does not eschew promoting collective goals of this kind. This liberalism, which is regarded as being hospitable to difference, leads us to his account of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition and difference. In order to accommodate differences in a culturally plural society, the politics of recognition permits some variation in the enforcement of law and rights, from one society to another, as well as the political pursuit of cultural survival. These measures, however, should not lead to violation of the fundamental rights of human beings. Nonetheless, Taylor's attempt to ground his moral and political views on "transcendental conditions" is not persuasive. His politics of recognition is unnecessarily tied up with the issue of worth of cultures, and drives towards turning all aspects of identity into political matters.

In this chapter, Taylor's epistemological view, his account of the self, the political implications of these observations and finally his politics of difference and multiculturalism are discussed respectively. We begin with Taylor's objections to modern epistemology which, he argues, feeds, and is in turn fed by, three malaises, namely, a loss of meaning leading to flattened and narrowed individualistic lives, excessive instrumentalism towards others and other beings, and a loss of freedom and political control.[3] We will see how his embodied account of understanding undermines universalism, exposing the cultural particularity of practical reasoning.

1. Embodied Understanding: A Critique of the Epistemological Tradition

Taylor criticises modern epistemology, or what he generally calls "the epistemological tradition," because of the central place it assigns to the issue of knowledge, or "the primacy of the epistemological."[4] It takes a theory of knowledge, viz., epistemology, as *foundational* for our views in morality, science, philosophy, etc. More importantly, in modern epistemology, 'knowledge is to be seen as correct representation of an independent reality.'[5] In this tradition, even the self is considered in epistemological terms as an entity that is basically capable of representation, and whose sole constitutive feature is self-consciousness. The moral or evaluative concerns of human beings are considered secondary, as subjects to be studied neutrally. Another feature of modern epistemology is that it focuses on the procedure, rather than the content, of an argument. It was Descartes who equipped epistemology with the "reflexive" method of examining ideas through "formal" relations, and in abstraction from what they represent.[6]

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[3] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, p. 10.
[4] Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," p. 34.
[5] Charles Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," *Philosophical Arguments*, pp. 2-3.

The foundational, representational and procedural features of modern epistemology are rooted, one way or another, in the notion of disengaged thinking and the disengaged self. The disengaged picture of the human being, or what Taylor sometimes calls the notion of "neutral" and "punctual" self, asserts that 'the self is defined in abstraction from any constitutive concerns and hence from any identity.'[7] In other words, modern epistemology 'assumes wrongly that we can get to the bottom of what knowledge is, without drawing on our never-fully-articulable understanding of human life and experience.'[8]

In order to refute the picture of the disengaged self, Taylor takes the example of "up-down directionality" of perception as a feature that only makes sense in relation to action. We perceive the world through our capacity for action. Embodiment is an essential feature of our experiences and perceptions, similar to those features that Kant calls "transcendental." As Heidegger shows, Taylor argues, 'the condition of our forming disengaged representations of reality is that we must be already engaged in coping with our world, dealing with the things in it, at grips with them.'[9] Our embodied agency is the locus of actions and desires that cannot be fully understood or controlled. The impossibility of disengagement amounts to the impossibility of having a disinterested understanding of the world which, in turn, undermines foundationalism as well as representationalism. That is because there is no basic representation free from our engagement with the world upon which to build our understanding. 'To situate our understanding in practices is to see it as implicit in our activity, and hence as going well beyond what we manage to frame representation of.'[10]

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[6] Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," pp. 5-6.
[7] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 49.
[8] Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, pp. vii-viii.

Taylor believes that the transcendental condition of being embodied entails that 'the agent must have some insight into the point of his activity.' This is particularly so, if the activity involves a degree of consciousness, because the absence of such a self-awareness would void the point. Hence, Taylor concludes that any account (in sociology, politics, psychoanalysis, etc.) which invokes the agent's self-understanding must take this embodiment into consideration.[11]

Further, the notion of disengaged thinking is accompanied by an atomist view of understanding to the effect that there is no 'locus of thought or feeling other than the minds of individuals.'[12] Modern epistemology takes the human agent as 'the monological subject of representation.' However, Taylor remarks that our understanding is carried through dialogically in the sense that it is an action affected by an integrated and shared agent beyond the individual. Understanding takes place in the context of an individual subject constituted as an integral part of a "we."[13] This point will be explored more in the section on "the self."

What makes Taylor scornful of the disengaged view of the self is primarily its moral corollaries. The disengaged view considers the subject as ideally free and rational and distinct from the natural and social worlds, in the sense that his identity is not defined in terms of these worlds outside him. From this picture flows the moral ideal of the punctual self, 'ideally ready as free and rational to treat these worlds -

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[9] Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," p. 11.
[10] Charles Taylor, "To Follow a Rule," *Philosophical Arguments*, p. 170.
[11] Charles Taylor, "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments," *Philosophical Arguments*, pp. 27-9.

and even some of the features of his own character - instrumentally, as subject to change and recognizing in order the better to secure the welfare of himself and others.'[14]

Nevertheless, Taylor does not deny that there is a moral background for the ideal of disengaged thinking and its associate, instrumental reason. This consists of the moral ideal of autonomy and self-responsible and self-generating thought, as well as "practical benevolence" which is about the relief of suffering and abundance, and is spawned by what Taylor calls "the affirmation of ordinary life." The distorted view of human nature introduced by the disengaged reason should not blind us to the moral thrust behind the disengaged reason and new science.[15]

The Background Understanding

The argument about embodied thinking suggests that there is a background understanding against which we think about the world. This background, Taylor points out, functions as Kantian "transcendental conditions" do. It is the result of our engagement with the world and our previous knowledge and experience. Although we cannot turn this background into an object for examination, we can articulate it, and even challenge or alter parts of it 'but only through our unquestioning reliance on the rest.'[16] This is contrary to the modern intellectual tradition which looks for self-explanatory foundations, and treats all potential issues as though they could become transparent.

Taylor draws upon Wittgenstein who shows that it is not possible to be aware of all issues directly relevant to the application of a rule. This is so, because, in

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[12] Charles Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," *Philosophical Arguments*, p. 130.
[13] Taylor, "To Follow a Rule," pp. 172-3.
[14] Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," p. 7.

understanding social life, 'any explanation leaves some potential issues unresolved, it stands [endlessly] in need of further explanation to back it up.'[17] Thus, understanding always takes place against the background of what is taken for granted, and is the locus of unresolved issues. As Wittgenstein argues, the background explanation is sometimes, or perhaps most of the time, couched in terms of a "custom" or a social practice, which gives sense to the agent's action.[18] However, there is a reciprocal relationship between rules of social practice and action. Actions not only flow from rules, but also shape and reshape them in particular situations; and this is the fact that the epistemological tradition leaves out, Taylor pinpoints.[19]

1.1. Practical Reasoning and Moral Realism

The disengaged, procedural and foundationalist characteristics of modern epistemology entail what Taylor calls the "apodictic" model of practical reasoning. In this model, it is supposed that moral or intellectual disagreements can be resolved by recourse to facts and externally defined criteria that all parties cannot but accept.[20] Modern culture is eager to use the value-free and neutral method of natural sciences in all areas of knowledge. Therefore, modern philosophies try to account for moral sense as visceral reactions, or as human projections onto the neutral world, issues that are ultimately optional and possible to do without, or that can be dealt with descriptively. Norms and values are not considered intrinsic to things.[21] Hence, there is no criterion accepted by all and sufficient to adjudicate on moral disputes.

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[15] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, pp. 103-4.
[16] Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," p. 12.
[17] Taylor, "To Follow a Rule," p. 166.
[18] Ibid., p. 174.
[19] Ibid., p. 178.
[20] Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," pp. 35 and 41.
[21] See, for instance, ibid., p. 38.

Taylor criticises the disengaged method of modern epistemology for its attempt to neutralise our implicit moral commitments and understandings. To do so is to close 'the most important field of moral argument.'[22] We cannot understand any moral argument, if we neutralise our moral intuitions. Since this model of reasoning is impossible to carry out, it leads to despair, scepticism and subjectivism.

Taylor cherishes the "ad hominem" model of practical reasoning which appeals not to externally defined criteria but to implicit premises that all parties in an argument accept or cannot deny. This can be done through comparative studies that may show the relative superiority of one view over another in explaining those implicit premises. For instance, the Galilean approach to physics was able to explain phenomena that the Aristotelian one considered as anomalous. This model also covers 'the commonest form of practical reasoning in our lives, where we propose to our interlocutors transitions mediated by such error-reducing moves, by the identification of contradiction, the dissipation of confusion, or by rescuing from (usually motivated) neglect a consideration whose significance they cannot contest.'[23]

Although Taylor denies that values are merely our projection onto the neutral world, he maintains that 'goods and rights are not properties of the universe considered without any relation to human beings and their lives.'[24] Taylor argues that they are parts of reality, once we do not restrict the latter to what is external to human beings. He rejects the Platonic or naturalist understanding of reality as a property of the universe, without any relevance to human beings.

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[22] ibid., pp. 59-60. Also see Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 8.
[23] Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," p. 53. See also Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 72.
[24] Ibid., p. 56.

From Taylor's point of view, values are real because they are indispensable to explanatory and non-explanatory accounts of my life and that of others, to the effect that they 'make the best sense of our lives.'[25] We accept some goods as real, because we are moved by them. Therefore, in order to understand what is real we should turn to what our best theories tell us is real. These theories are "ontological accounts" that 'articulate the claims implicit in our [moral] reactions,'[26] in our ethical choices, and in our intuitions. Ontologies refer to our view of the world and human life. They account for human beings as creatures of God or pure rational agents or disengaged or self-expressive selves. Our moral reactions should not be neutralised precisely because through them ontological accounts depict our moral world. These accounts can be compared rationally to see which one is "the best account" of our moral lives.

For Taylor, practical reasoning is not confined to *articulating* conceptions of the good underlying one's existing moral intuitions. Through my description of the good, I may convince and move you 'to the point of making it your own.'[27] However, Taylor's ad hominem model of practical reasoning inhibits radical changes in people's perspectives, and faces the charge of defending the status quo. Taylor concedes that

> For all those whose instinct tells them that the true demands of morality require radical change in the way things are, and the way people have been trained to react to them, starting from the interlocutor's standpoint seems a formula for conservatism, for stifling at the start all radical criticism, and foreclosing all the really important ethical issues.[28]

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[25] Ibid., pp. 57 and 59.
[26] Ibid., p. 8.
[27] Ibid., p. 77.
[28] Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," p. 40.

Another difficulty with Taylor's ad hominem reason is that, as is clear from his example of Galilean v. Aristotelian physics, he does not distinguish between natural sciences and normative knowledge. The superiority of the Galilean over the pre-Galilean approach to physics is proved by the former's success in practice and in resolving contradictions and confusions in our thought.[29] *Pace* Taylor, these are shown through recourse to the external reality as a criterion, using an apodictic model of reasoning. The significance of the ad hominem model becomes clearer, only if we make a distinction between natural science and normative understanding. In the latter case, there is no criterion defined outside human understanding to use for adjudicating between different positions. Surprisingly, Taylor criticises Rorty for the same confusion.[30]

1.2. Understanding and Culture

Arguably, Taylor's criticism of modern epistemology undermines a universalist account of rationality. Rejecting a representationalism that idealises understanding without any relationship to human agency and its interests, and arguing for a background understanding evolved from our being at grips with the world, incline towards particularism. Moreover, the ad hominem practical reason that not only does not appeal to externally defined criteria and does not neutralise our moral intuitions, but looks for claims implicit in them, takes Taylor farther from universalism. That is why he finds erroneous the view that we 'ought to be able to convince people who share absolutely none of our basic moral intuitions of the justice of our cause.'[31] It can be suggested that cultural particularity is one constraint on universalism. Taylor's concern with inter-cultural debates and differences shows the extent to which he appreciates the cultural particularity of understanding.

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[29] See ibid., pp. 43-49.

[30] Charles Taylor, "Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition," *Reading Rorty*, Alan R. Malachowski (ed.), (Basil Blackwell: London and New York, 1990), pp. 262, 269-270 and 273.

Inter-Cultural Adjudication

Adjudication between different traditions of morality can be achieved in reason by recourse to common grounds. Taylor's ad hominem practical reason can be utilised through 'working out and developing an insight which is marginally present in all cultures.'[32] In this way, he is confident that it is possible to show the inadequacy of the cosmologies of some cultures or their views of how things are. Hence, in some cases 'our mode of assessment across cultures is not so different from our way of arbitrating within our culture.'[33]

Nonetheless, some inter-cultural differences are too great and the common grounds are too narrow to be arbitrated by the ad hominem model. Taylor concludes that not all practical disputes, particularly those between very different cultures, can be arbitrated in reason. In such cases, what blocks inter-cultural practical reasoning is the possibility of the incommensurability of cultures in terms of their values.[34] Taylor believes in the plurality of ways of development and the incompatibility of ends towards which a culture may progress. For instance, reason as a valuable thing in human life may sap other valuable issues. For him, every culture is merely one of many possible ways of living a human life. Modern epistemology, on the other hand, is not happy with the concept of incommensurability of cultures. It presents 'a picture of cultural difference as not all that intractable, and narrowing in any case with the

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[31] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 71-2.
[32] Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," pp. 55-56.
[33] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, pp. 61-2.
[34] See ibid., p. 62.

march of time.'[35] In the Lockean theory of language, translation of languages from one to another is easy, whereas the Romantic theory, to which Taylor subscribes, finds deep-seated differences among them.

However, the possibility of the incommensurability of cultures does not amount to embracing relativism. Taylor is very keen not to slide into relativism, in which all perspectives are seen as equally arbitrary. Criticising postmodern thinkers, he argues that

> The point of view from which we might constate that all orders are equally arbitrary, in particular that all moral views are equally so, is just not available to us humans. It is a form of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a moral orientation which we take to be right. This is a condition of being a functioning self, not a metaphysical view we can put on or off.[36]

Rather, from cultural differences regarding moral knowledge Taylor draws two conclusions. First, the incommensurability of cultures should not be assumed *a priori*; and until the incommensurability is established, there is no reason not to think of our conceptions of the good as universal. Second, we should give the same status to the conceptions of the good in other cultures that we are trying to understand.[37] This is so because, Taylor argues, morality by its very nature claims to be universal and cross-culturally applicable.[38]

Fusion of Horizons

Even the incommensurability of cultures is not the end of practical reasoning. We can make others' moral behaviour intelligible by enlarging and transforming our standards of evaluation and comparison through a "fusion of horizons," a notion first formulated by Gadamer. Taylor argues that by the "fusion of horizons"

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[35] Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, p. xii.
[36] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 99.
[37] Ibid., p. 62.
[38] See ibid., pp. 67-8.

> We learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture. The "fusion of horizons" operates through our developing new vocabularies of comparison by means of which we articulate these contrasts [between different cultures].[39]

The study of other cultures and peoples cannot be done from an Archimedean point of view. It is only possible by relying on either our home culture understanding or through a comparative study.

> The more we think we have sidelined it [i.e., our own home understanding] or neutralized it, as in the natural-science model, the more it works unconsciously and hence all the more powerfully to ethnocentric effect. In a sense we only liberate the others and "let them be" when we can identify and articulate a contrast between their understanding and ours, thereby ceasing in that respect just to read them through our home understanding, and allowing them to stand apart from it on their own.[40]

The process of fusion of horizons and the enlargement of our vocabulary of evaluation is never complete, and in each stage is limited to the cultures involved. Even if a common human understanding is developed among all cultures and ages, it would be merely "de facto universal." There is no such objective understanding of other, but only an "undistortive" one. 'The aim is fusion of horizons, not escaping horizons. The ultimate [read "final"] result is always tied to someone's point of view.'[41]

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[39] Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* Amy Gutmann (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1992), p. 67.

[40] Charles Taylor, "Comparison, History, Truth," *Philosophical Arguments*, p. 150.

[41] Ibid., p. 151.

However, Taylor sometimes appears to believe in an "ultimate horizon" from which, though 'we are very far away,' 'the relative worth of different cultures might be evident.'[42] Hence, perhaps, he assumes that there is, at least potentially, a "de jure" universal understanding and morality. His theist faith, his occasional reference to the natural order, or to intuitions about claims made on us by non-human entities like God, nature and our ecological surroundings, etc., drive in the direction of universalism. Thus, there is something beyond the self to be explored. Taylor, however, does not delineate in more detail his notion of an "ultimate horizon" or entities that have significance in themselves beyond the human life. This imbues his account of the relation between the universal and the particular with ambiguity.[43]

Reflecting the plurality of ways of living, the fusion of horizons provides us with more options to choose from. It can be said that such a comparative study facilitates what Taylor calls "cultural borrowing," which is an important factor in the modern world. It should be mentioned, however, that this does not necessarily lead to a cultural convergence, because it is not the case that 'what is borrowed will be a carbon copy of the original.'[44]

The attempt to explain and make others intelligible would entail judgements of truth or validity. Understanding, as an attempt to get at the meaning things have for others in our own terms and language, may sometimes portray others' views as flying in the face of reality. Taylor argues that although the intuition of equal value of all cultures nowadays 'seems almost an axiom,' we cannot help ranking discourses as rational/less rational, 'because it defines how we ought to think.' We see that a rational incentive to embark on a comparative cultural study and, more importantly, the spirit of equality are missing in many other cultures. 'Our very valuing of this equality seems to mark a superiority of our culture over some others.'[45] In this sense, we can see the enterprise of enlarging human understanding a rational discourse whereby we learn about our and others' mistakes, and find one account preferable to another.

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[42] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 73.

[43] Another issue that can show the complexity of the relationship between the universal and the particular in Taylor's account is the argument that some sources of the good and moral claims as well as the human predicament in our age can only be explored through "personal resonance." He maintains that this should not slide us into subjectivism (See *Sources of the Self*, p. 512). He, however, offers only a vague account of the notion personal resonance. It is not clear whether such a resonance is universal, culturally circumscribed, or both.

[44] Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, p. xii.

However, the attempt at the fusion of horizons should not be confined to looking for truth or epistemic gains; 'it also has a moral thrust which is independent.' This moral dimension includes making sense of other people's lives, irrespective of the truth claims latent in them. Taylor briefly says that '[w]e see how important it is for human beings to make sense of their world, to find some meaning in the things they experience.'[46] Inter-cultural tolerance in moral and political aspects is another consequence of the fusion of horizons. It does not prohibit us from making "all-things-considered *judgements*" about other cultures, but makes us aware that '[t]here are generally good reasons why we shouldn't *intervene* in the life of another culture or society, even to effect something that would be good if it came about spontaneously.'[47]

To sum up, Taylor's epistemological views show that he finds practical reasoning to a large extent culturally particular, and regards cultural incommensurability as a significant possibility. In the next sections, we will see how he develops this perspective, exploring the role of language and culture in the dialogical process of the formation and recognition of identity.

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[45] Taylor, "Comparison, History, Truth," p. 156.
[46] Ibid., p. 154.
[47] Ibid., p. 163.

2. The Self

Taylor sees every epistemological account in a complex relation of mutual support with an ontology accounting for ultimate factors in explaining social life. Hence, he tries to refute the atomist view of human agency that he discerns to be the ontology behind modern epistemology, giving rise to extreme individualism, instrumentalism and other malaises of modernity. In contrast, he argues for a "dialogical" view of the self that elucidates the significance of the community and culture for human agency. Before discussing the dialogical feature of identity, however, it is necessary to explore what Taylor means by identity, and why what he calls "strong evaluation" is a transcendental condition of selfhood.

Identity is a 'person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being.'[48] It is about commitments and identifications that orient us in life, and give meaning to things around us, suggests Taylor. Using a spatial analogy, he explains that

> To know who I am is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary.[49]

Taylor distinguishes three axes of moral thinking, namely, a sense of respect for obligation to others, an understanding of what makes a full life, and notions concerned with dignity, by virtue of which one thinks of oneself as commanding the respect of others. Taylor's main attempt in the first part of *Sources of the Self* is to show that these axes are not separate from each other.[50] The claim that we have an obligation to respect the life and integrity of others makes sense partly because we find them capable of living a worthwhile life. If we feel an obligation to protect people's right in certain dimensions, such as the right to express and develop their own beliefs and life-plans, this is because we find expressive power rewarding and a sign of dignity.[51]

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[48] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 25.
[49] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 28.

An important issue about all three modes of moral thinking is that they entail "strong evaluation." That is, they all involve 'discrimination of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged.'[52] Our strong evaluations give rise to "frameworks" or "horizons" which define what is valuable, and what should be done.

We cannot do away with frameworks without risking an "identity crisis," or speaking of "pathological" cases.[53] Thus, Taylor's thesis is that 'living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognise as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood.'[54] This phenomenological argument accounts for what Taylor calls "transcendental conditions," outlining the limits of what is conceivable in human life. Therefore, those theories that deny these conditions, and in particular the necessity of "qualitative discriminations" for human life, are self-defeating.

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[50] Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[51] Ibid., p. 25.
[52] Ibid., p. 4.

By giving a broad meaning to the good, Taylor equates strong evaluation with a judgement about what is good. He defines the good as 'whatever is picked out as incomparably higher in a qualitative distinction. It can be some action, or motive, or style of life, which is seen as qualitatively superior.'[55] Sometimes, more precisely Taylor tries to reduce our obligations to others to our belief about what makes a life fulfilling. He states that 'our conception of the human specific potential is an essential part of the background of our ascription of rights.'[56] Hence, he argues that in all axes of practical reasoning, conceptions of the good play a crucial role. Thus, to speak of one's identity is to speak of one's idea of the good. In particular, identity is defined by "hypergoods," the goods that are ranked incomparatively higher than, and are used for judging, other goods. One example of these higher goods is the idea of equality in western democracies.[57] These goods are real, because they are indispensable to our best account of our lives and actions, as mentioned before.

Our strong evaluations are grounded on ontological accounts that, as seen above, tell us how the world is, where the latter includes ideas of the good. Articulating our moral reactions, ontologies account for human nature and predicaments, and thus explain why humans are worthy of respect and rights.

Taylor argues that even those philosophers, such as naturalists, utilitarians, Nietzscheans and postmoderns, who deny any qualitative distinction of some goods or ends as incomparably higher than others, are committed to their own goods and hypergoods. They regard, for instance, the "ordinary life" of work and family, self-

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[53] Ibid., p. 31.
[54] Ibid., p. 27.
[55] Ibid., p. 92.
[56] Charles Taylor, "Atomism," *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 191.
[57] See Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, pp. 63-4.

affirmation, or inclusion and emancipation as higher. For them,'[t]he notion is never that *whatever* we do is acceptable.'[58] The problem, however, is that they cannot account for their moral preferences.

Although Taylor distinguishes two orders of goods in identity, namely, hypergoods and other goods, his definition does not account for the complexity of identity. For instance, identity consists of universal and particular (at different levels of society, individual, etc.) elements, none of which is necessarily prior to another from aesthetic, moral, ethical or political points of view. Such complexity should be taken into account, because different aspects of identity require different ways of handling. As we will see later, Taylor's disregard for this delicacy leads to his uniform treatment of all aspects of identity, irrespective of their specific significance and demands, and makes them political issues indiscriminately. Moreover, his account of identity does not cover a crucial element which is the sense of belonging. Attachment to different kinds of grouping, such as community cultures, is a main ingredient of identity which gives rise to moral claims and duties. Taylor's notion of identity is primarily a package of values and principles. In the next sub-section, we turn to his account of the formation of identity.

2.1. Dialogical Character of Human Agency

In the attempt to refute "atomism," as the ontological back up of modern epistemology, Taylor defines it as the belief that societies consist of nothing other than individuals interacting with each other. 'Take them away and you have nothing left. Their interaction may involve their having certain thoughts, and the contents of these involve roles, offices, etc. But these are ultimately the predicates of the component individuals.'[59] Hence, according to "methodological individualism," social conducts and institutions can be accounted for in terms of individual behaviours and desires. Further, atomists suggest a disengaged identity for individuals whom they consider metaphysically independent of society.[60] In the face of atomism, Taylor argues that

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[58] Ibid., p. 23.

> The community is not simply an aggregation of individuals; nor is there simply a causal interaction between the two. The community is also constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the self-interpretations which define him are drawn from the interchange which the community carries on.[61]

He develops what he calls the "dialogical feature of the self" by saying that we define ourselves or our identity as 'what is significant in my difference from others.'[62] However, Taylor maintains, it is not I who decides what is significant. 'If I did, no issue would be significant.'[63] A claim of significance, in order to be intelligible, needs a special explanation. A horizon or a moral framework providing such an explanation cannot be invented subjectively, because it is about answers to pre-existing questions. He goes on to say that

> One orients oneself in a space which exists independently of one's success or failure in finding one's bearings ... Within this picture, the notion of inventing a qualitative distinction out of whole cloth makes no sense. For one can only *adopt* such distinctions as make sense to one within one's basic orientation.[64]

As we have noticed, Taylor's universe is not silent or flattened, free from meaning, value and horizon of significance. For him, our moral intuitions bear witness to such a morally loaded world. However, conceptions of the good are only accessible to people when they are given expression in a culture. 'The God of Abraham exists for us (that is, belief in him is a possibility) because he has been talked about, primarily in the narrative of the Bible but also in countless other ways from theology to devotional literature.'[65] This leads us to the "fundamentally *dialogical* character" of human agency.[66]

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[59] Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," p. 130.
[60] Charles Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2*, p. 8.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, pp. 35-36.
[63] Ibid., p. 39.
[64] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 30.

In this respect, Taylor argues that 'my discovering my own identity doesn't mean that I work it in isolation, but I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others.'[67] This dialogue happens on two levels: intimate and social. On the intimate level, identity is formed through our contact with significant others, such as parents or teachers. Dialogue is even more important on the broader level of society, where through interaction with others we acquire language, in the broad sense, to define ourselves. Identity takes its shape in the interchange of interlocutors, in "webs of interlocution" which are essential to one's moral sense and self-understanding. One can only be a self among others. Hence, identity requires a reference community, either our intimate historic community or a community of the like-minded that may include past prophets or thinkers. Taylor, therefore, calls this necessity of conversation with others another "transcendental condition" of selfhood to the effect that only in this way we can be sure that what we say makes sense even for ourselves.[68]

What best shows the fundamentally dialogical character of the self is language. Taylor argues that '[t]here is no way we could be inducted into personhood except by being initiated into language.'[69] This is so because thought and all other human phenomena that exist only in a dimension of meaning, like social institutions, practices and roles, are fundamentally dependent on language. Here, Taylor takes a broad view of language which includes all "symbolic-expressive human creations" 'covering not only the words we speak, but also other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including the language of art, of love, and the like.'[70]As seen above, Taylor argues that 'articulation is a necessary condition of adhesion [to some goods]; without it, these goods are not even options.'[71] The crucial point about language is that, as Wittgenstein has shown, there is no private language.[72] It emerges and develops in the speech community, and is in a mutual interaction with the community, its institutions, roles and practices. Language is made by people, while at the same time makes them who they are, and alters their identity and feeling.[73] Taylor subscribes to the Romantic view that finds language a combination of creation and discovery of the human world.[74]

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[65] Ibid., p. 91.
[66] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 32.
[67] Ibid., p. 34.

Identity and Culture

Taylor's discussion of identity and the dialogical way it takes shape reserves a special place for culture. The cultural community is one of the most, if not the most, paramount communities which constitute individuals, and in which the dialogical relationship between the individual and others takes place. Language, in its both broad and narrow senses, is basically a product of the cultural community. Therefore, it is plausible to say that our conceptions of the good and, consequently, "horizons of

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[68] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 38.
[69] Ibid., p. 35. See also Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, p. 32.
[70] Ibid., p. 33.
[71] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 91.
[72] Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," pp. 133.
[73] See Charles Taylor, "The Importance of Herder," *Philosophical Arguments*, p. 97-9.

significance" are cultural phenomena. This is what persuades Hartmut Rosa to say that 'Taylor's philosophical anthropology is... "culturalist" in that every personal identity and social reality is dependent on a particular culture, and there can be no interpretation of either from an "acultural" standpoint.'[75]

Taylor's view on the dialogical feature of the self does not prevent him from acknowledging the role of individuals in giving shape to their own identity. Individuals are not locked in their social conditions. Although we should not overestimate our degree of freedom, it is not zero.[76] The individual can be authentic, and go beyond the scope of his contemporaries' thought in such a way that may be misunderstood by them, but this can be done only in some relation with others' view. Innovation, even in the form of sharp disagreement with one's background, has to be clarified in the common language, and be talked about 'with certain special partner(s), who know me, or with whom I have an affinity.'[77]

For Taylor, authenticity is a moral ideal, but it also requires horizons of significance that are dialogically established. It is void without a dialogical background of significance. There is no personal significance. Authenticity should be self-referential in the *manner* rather than in the *content*.[78] Furthermore, it is an option only if provided by one's social tradition. It is not exempt from the transcendental condition of acquiring a moral framework and identity through conversation with others.[79]

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[74] Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, pp. ix-x.

[75] Hartmut Rosa, "Cultural Relativism and Social Criticism From a Taylorian Perspective," *Constellation*, vol. 3, no. 1, (1996), p. 42.

[76] For an example about modern situation and the possibility of escape, see Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, pp. 73 and 98-9 and 100-101.

[77] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, pp. 36-7.

[78] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, pp. 22, 66 and 82.

[79] See Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, pp. 39-41.

Nevertheless, there is a tension in Taylor's thought between the ideal of authenticity, on the one hand, and his moral realism and the dialogical formation of moral values, on the other. The latter circumscribe the former to a large extent. In this regard, Joel Anderson suggests that Taylor's 'ontological account of non-subjective standards of value' has the implication that 'there will be less and less room for reasonable divergence regarding what it is worthwhile to devote oneself to.'[80]

Difficulties with Taylor's View of the Dialogical Character of Human Agency

An ambiguity in Taylor's view is that, although he primarily accounts for the dialogical character of human life as a "transcendental condition," or an inescapable predicament, sometimes his emphasis is on its being *morally* important rather than its *inescapability*. For instance, he argues that '[t]o shut out demands emanating beyond the self is precisely to suppress the conditions of significance, and hence to court trivialization.'[81] It seems that Taylor implies that the moral significance of dialogical relations follows from the dialogical feature of selfhood, while he cannot establish such a direct relationship. In other words, he cannot prove that the former is a corollary of the latter.

The same problem recurs when Taylor concludes that his argument about identities being shaped through dialogue shows that relationships with others cannot be seen as instrumental. His repudiation of instrumental relations has two strands, though he does not distinguish them. On the one hand, he does not deny the possibility of having instrumental serial and temporary relations, though they cannot be about exploring one's identity, but are 'some modality of enjoyment,' and hence "self-stultifying."[82] On the other hand, he denies that the notion of instrumental relationships has any coherence, which, perhaps, refers to their logical impossibility. 'The notion that one can pursue one's fulfilment in this [instrumental] way seems illusory, in somewhat the same way as the idea that one can choose oneself without recognizing a horizon of significance beyond choice.'[83]

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[80] Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory," *Constellations*, vol. 3, no. 1, (1996), p. 33.

[81] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, p. 40.

Taylor must distinguish between his transcendental and moral arguments. While his discussion of the dialogical feature of human identity establishes the former, the latter does not follow. Another argument is needed to refute instrumental relationships normatively. Taylor is too quick to jump from the inevitability of the dialogical condition of the self to the conclusion of trivialising instrumental relations. Consequently, as we will see later, his moral and political views about communities and cultures cannot be supported by his account of the dialogical formation of identity and the inevitable role of these entities in that process.

2.2. Recognition

The fundamentally dialogical feature of human life gives rise to a need for "recognition," Taylor believes. Hence, there is a close relationship between identity and recognition. He argues that

> The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by *mis*recognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.[84]

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[82] Ibid., p. 53.
[83] Ibid., p. 53.
[84] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 25.

This is in line with the view that human beings are "self-interpreting animals" for whom 'there is not such a thing as what they are, independently of how they understand themselves.'[85]

The origins of the notion of recognition can be found in the writings of Rousseau and, particularly, Hegel. Thus, a quick look at Hegel's account from Taylor's point of view is necessary. Hegel argues that "self-consciousness" longs for "self-certainty."[86] This is so, because there is a tension between what self-consciousness claims to be, his idea of himself, and what he actually is. Self-consciousness 'strives for an external embodiment [particularly another self-consciousness] which expresses him, and is frustrated in this aim when the realities on which he depends in order to be, reflect something alien to him.'[87] 'Self-consciousness proper therefore subsists only by being acknowledged or recognised by another self-consciousness.'[88] This is the starting point of the dialectic of master and slave in Hegel's phenomenology. Once one party because of its "attachment to life" surrenders to the other, the former becomes the slave and the latter the master. While the slave is dependent on the master for his life, the master is dependent on the slave for recognition. However, the slave is not a "self," and he does not count as self-consciousness. Therefore, the master is still unsatisfied. Only mutual recognition that is possible through "the recognition of the universal" would bring satisfaction. It is because of this need for recognition that, according to Hegel, 'in actual fact we ... are either ontologically or factually depending on something other; we are at the mercy of foreign reality.'[89]

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[85] Charles Taylor, "Cognitive Psychology," *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995), p. 191.

[86] Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1975), p. 148.

[87] Ibid., p. 137.

[88] Christopher J. Berry, *Hume, Hegel and Human Nature*, (Nijhoff: The Hague, 1982), p. 199.

[89] Taylor, *Hegel*, p. 149.

While for Hegel recognition is mainly a matter of confirmation to be won through struggle, Taylor makes it a primarily moral concept concerned with dignity, honour and respect for one's identity. Recognition and identity have always been necessary for human beings. In the modern era, however, two changes have brought about a preoccupation with identity and recognition, Taylor points out. The first has been the collapse of the pre-modern hierarchy that was based on unequal distribution of honour. Instead of the old conception of honour, now, in the democratic culture, there is a notion of equal dignity of all human beings. The second has been the individualisation of identity which has come along with the ideal of authenticity, or being true to oneself and to one's own particular way of being. This identity is 'particular to me' and 'I discover [it] in myself.'[90]

The pre-modern socially derived identity enjoyed a built-in recognition, so recognition was not problematic. In the modern world, on the other hand, 'inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn't enjoy ... recognition *a priori*. It has to win it through exchange, and the attempt can fail.'[91] The possibility of failure has turned recognition into a crucial problem that has to be dealt with. Since in the modern era the content of identity is changed, and does not automatically enjoy recognition, it now needs to be recognised.

Problems with Recognition

A difficulty with Taylor's account of recognition is that it cannot be deduced from the dialogical feature of human life. The phenomenological point that human identity is formed through interchange with webs of conversation, and by being introduced to language, does not establish the moral duty of recognition. Recognition has, of course, a dialogical dimension to the effect that our interlocutor, family, society, etc. are morally obliged to recognise us. It stands, however, independent of the transcendental condition that our moral views about good and bad is dialogically constructed.

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[90] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 28.

Taylor sometimes assumes a link between moral and political recognition and the recognition of worth or, at least, of significance. We have seen that recognition is to be given to identity which is 'what is significant in my difference from others.'[92] More importantly, he adds, it is not the individual who decides what is significant. Assuming such a relationship between the acknowledgement of worth and recognition as a moral demand could be a way of backing up the morality and politics of recognition. That is, when there is something worthwhile or significant in one's identity, one can legitimately demand its recognition. In such a case, withholding recognition or "misrecognition" can lead to a "real damage" towards which we are morally responsible. However, unlike what Taylor implies, the relationship between worth and recognition is a non sequitur. The mere worth of an idea does not make everybody duty-bound to recognise it. More premises are needed in order to arrive at the conclusion of a moral duty for recognition from comprehending something significant and worthwhile in others.

In addition, accepting worth or significance as the basis for recognition amounts to restricting it. This is because of the possibility of the incommensurability of cultures, as discussed before. As we have seen, Taylor argues that we cannot convince those who do not share any of our basic moral intuitions about the worth or rightness of our convictions. If this is the case, it is reasonable to expect recognition

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[91] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

only from those who share at least some of our basic intuitions. Others cannot comprehend us and the worth or significance of what forms our identity in order to recognise them. Nor can we recognise the value of their identity. Because the criteria made available to us by our culture do not allow us to recognise incommensurate cultures, our doing so would be no more than an act of condescension. As recognition is not given to, or sought from, radically different cultures, radical criticism within a culture is also in danger of lack of recognition.[93]

Taylor maintains that recognition of the value of different ways of being cannot merely be grounded on difference. Some commonalities or common views are needed. He goes on to say

> To come together on a mutual recognition of difference - that is, of the equal value of different identities - requires that we share more than a belief in this principle; we have to share also some standards of value on which the identities concerned check out as equal.[94]

From this argument Taylor draws the conclusion that commonalities in a society have to be developed and broadened. This can be achieved by a fusion of horizons through which we alter our understanding, and reshape the limits of intelligibility of other people's behaviours for ourselves. The incorporation of the vocabulary of comparison of other cultures into ours would enable us to understand and recognise different and incommensurable cultures.

Although the fusion of horizons could increase the chance of our acknowledging the worth of other cultures, it is still a restricted enterprise. Fusion of horizons is an epistemic process, and there is no guarantee of its success or of its inclusion of all

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[92] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, p. 35-36.

[93] Although Taylor's philosophy allows a range of intra-cultural criticism, its limitations are clear (see Rosa, "Cultural Relativism and Social Criticism From a Taylorian Perspective," pp. 42-46).

possibilities of worth. In such a case, tying recognition as a moral demand to the achievement in the process of fusion of horizons is not only restrictive, but also distortive of the request for recognition. It is distortive, because, as we will see later, the demand for recognition is not grounded on the worth of one's identity or culture. It is primarily a moral demand for respect for human beings and their identities.

A deeper investigation into the concept of recognition as a moral demand reveals that it can take a variety of forms, depending on what is to be recognised and who is expected to recognise it. Taylor neglects this diversity, because, as has already been mentioned, he does not take into consideration the complexity and diversity of the aspects of identity. Identity has different components and layers, each of which requires a particular kind of recognition from particular groups of people. We do not usually look for the recognition of all we have from everybody else. Nor is everybody else duty-bound to recognise all dimensions of our identity. The demand for recognition is related to a claim of membership; thus, it is always addressed to a group to which we feel we belong in some respect. Family as well as local, professional, religious, ethnic and national communities and, finally, humanity as a whole are groups from which we seek the recognition of different aspects of our identity. Some people do not feel the need to be recognised as a member of a certain group, while some others do. For instance, a religious person attaches less importance to her ethnicity, and sometimes the recognition of her ethnicity does not matter to her at all, whereas for a nationalist, the recognition of his ethnicity is a serious identity issue. Furthermore, we do not seek the recognition of some of our personal characteristics, though they are very dear to us, perhaps, not less than those

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[94] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, p. 52.

features of our identity whose recognition we are eager for. Such a diversity in the concept of recognition shows that a uniform model, for instance legalisation, could not assure due recognition of all dimensions of identity.

2.3. Social Goods and Culture

The importance of culture in Taylor's philosophy becomes obvious once again when he challenges the atomist ontology, not for explaining social issues by reference to constituent individuals, as discussed before, but for accounting for social goods in terms of aggregation of individual goods. Taylor argues that atomism buttresses the view embraced by some political and moral doctrines, such as utilitarianism and the rights theory, that all goods are ultimately goods of individuals. Put differently, social goods should be judged on the basis of their goodness for individuals. In this sense, all publicly provided goods are necessarily "decomposable." Hence, social goods are either instrumental, like security, or merely subjective.

However, Taylor believes that there are goods which cannot be reduced to goods of individuals. This is the case when a publicly supplied good is not merely instrumentally valuable, and also when a good is "inherently" social. The latter are those goods of which it is not possible to deprive anybody in the society, not due to technological limitations but because of their nature.[95] Taylor argues that '[s]ome things have value to me and to you, and some things essentially have value to us. That is, their being for us enters into and constitutes their value for us.' They can be called "common goods," and are different from "convergent" goods, which no individual alone can afford or provide. The latter are things like welfare economy, security achieved through the police or the army, the fire department, and the like.[96]

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[95] Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," pp. 137-8.

Taylor's only example of this kind of "irreducibly social goods" is culture, which is the locus of goods such as language, practices, and institutions that shape the background of meaning for our actions. It is not instrumentally good, because the very goodness of our actions depend on it. Further, no member can be excluded from enjoying a culture.

One problem with Taylor's categorisation of social goods is that there is no direct reference to political and social goods like self-determination that can only be attributed to societies rather than individuals. Although the latter is an irreducible common good, it is of special kind that can only be ascribed to a group with certain features such as being geographically concentrated, whereas this is not the case for culture.

The conclusion of this section is that culture as a social good is constitutive of identity and selfhood. The recognition of culture is a moral demand, though Taylor cannot prove it to be a direct corollary of the view about the dialogical way that identity takes shape. It stands independent of the dialogical feature of human life. Recognition as a moral demand is due to human beings. Nevertheless, acknowledging the role of culture in constituting identity gives a new dimension to this moral demand, creating the moral need for the recognition of culture and cultural difference.

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[96] Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," *Philosophical Arguments,* p. 190. Taylor distinguishes another way of being an irreducibly social good which is 'where it is essential to its being a good that its goodness be the object of a common understanding.' Common understanding, as Taylor defines it, is not merely a compound of convergent individual understandings. 'Something is common when it exists not just for me and for you, but for *us,* acknowledged as such.' In this sense, common understandings are "undecomposable" (Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," p. 139). This is the case with relations of friendship and love as well as standing on equal and frank relationships with others in the society.

In the next section, we will turn to political requirements of Taylor's views on understanding and the self. In particular, the place of culture in his account of politics will be explored, and it will be seen whether he finds promoting and maintaining culture to be legitimate political goals or not.

3. Political Implications

Political and moral stands, such as liberalism, are issues of "advocacy" that presuppose some epistemological and ontological accounts, Taylor argues. A particular ontology, however, does not determine a certain policy or moral belief, but can show that its realisation is an impossibility or carries a heavy price.[97] He maintains that his critique of modern epistemology is 'a rejection of moralities based purely on instrumental reason, such as utilitarianism; and also critical distance from those based on a punctual notion of the self, such as the various derivations of Kant.' In politics, according to him, this criticism refutes certain forms of contemporary conservatism as well as radical doctrines of unencumbered freedom.[98]

Regarding political theory, however, Taylor mainly focuses on two competing versions of liberalism, namely, the procedural liberalism of neutrality and equal rights, and a liberalism permitting the promotion of some common goods like culture by political apparatus and recognising differences. He believes that his account of epistemology and ontology not only shows the implausibility of the former, but provides philosophical presumptions of the latter.

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[97] Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," p. 183.

[98] Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," p. 15. More precisely, Taylor believes that '[s]tability, and hence efficiency, couldn't survive ... [the] massive withdrawal of government from the economy, and it is doubtful if freedom either could long survive the competitive jungle that a really wild capitalism would breed, with its uncompensated inequalities and exploitation' (Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, p. 110).

Taylor tries to question the viability of procedural liberalism by attributing to it a naturalistic epistemology and an "atomist" ontology that he undermines, as seen in the previous sections. He assumes that ontological atomism makes it unproblematic 'to conclude to atomism in politics'[99] which he considers as 'one of the most negative' features of modern identity.[100] Taylor identifies atomism with the seventeenth century social contract theory and its successors that advocate the priority of the individual and her rights over the society.[101] He calls the latter doctrines of "the primacy of rights" or procedural liberalism.

In the following sections, we will see that Taylor charges procedural liberalism with non-viability either because it does not accommodate the "transcendental conditions" spelled out in the previous sections about identity and the self, or because it is politically unsustainable. This paves the way for a cultural politics or a politics of recognition.

3.1. Non-Viability of Procedural Liberalism because of Giving Priority to Rights Over Goods

Taylor believes that procedural liberalism involves a rejection of "qualitative distinctions," which he regards as a transcendental condition of selfhood, and consequently is not viable. In this respect, he argues that contemporary moral philosophy 'has tended to focus on what it is right to do rather than what it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good life; and it has no conceptual place left for a notion of the good as the object of our love or allegiance.'[102] He goes on to say that contemporary moral philosophy solely emphasises obligations, while having no room for what is good to do without being obliged. This account gives rise to the view, in political theory, that a liberal society should be centred on the conception of the right rather than on the good. The society does not decide or further any conception of the good, which is left to individuals, but is concerned with 'the principle of maximal and equal facilitation.' For such a society, the procedures of decision-making are crucial.[103] A liberal society, as Rawls and Dworkin remark, is based on a procedural kind of moral commitment and not on a substantive one. That is, it cares to treat people 'fairly and equally,' irrespective of the goals they have chosen.[104]

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[99] Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," p. 135.
[100] Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2*, p. 8.
[101] See Taylor, "Atomism," p.187.

Taylor does not have any problem with a sort of differentiation among moral directives, as advanced by rights theorists. He acknowledges that '[p]erhaps, the most urgent and powerful cluster of demands that we recognize as moral concern the respect for the life, integrity, and well-being, even flourishing, of others.'[105] He happily accepts that there is a category of the moral about obligatory actions that is prior to other parts of moral thinking. He, however, criticises rights philosophies for inability to articulate such a segregation that is ultimately based on a conception of the good. Rephrasing Michael Sandel, Taylor argues that Rawls's two principles of justice are underpinned by a "thick," rather than a "thin," theory of the good. He argues that these theories 'are motivated by the strongest moral ideals, such as freedom, altruism, and universalism. These are among the central moral aspirations of modern culture, the hypergoods which are distinctive to it. And yet what these ideals drive the theorists towards is a denial of all such goods.'[106]

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[102] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 3.
[103] Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," pp. 186-7
[104] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 56.

In the above account, Taylor tries to equate the proceduralist ideal of the priority of rights over conceptions of the good with the denial of "qualitative distinctions."[107] Hence, based on his account of identity and strong evaluation, he implies that such an ideal exceeds the limits of possibility in human life, and consequently is non-viable. He hints that the notion of the primacy of rights is similar to the naturalist view of morality as optional, which cannot account for humans' moral instincts. However, *pace* Taylor, procedural justice does not need to, and actually some of its celebrated versions do not, deny qualitative distinctions as segregation of worthy from unworthy. Taylor himself concedes that procedural moralities enjoy such distinctions based on the notions of equality and universal justice.[108] Moreover, if "good" means anything valuable, rather than merely 'life plans or ways of living so valued,' there is "an extremely important shared good" in the procedural account of polity.[109]

Taylor sometimes levels the charge of non-viability against procedural liberalism by ascribing to it an "atomist" ontology that cannot account for the dialogical character of human agency. The liberalism of rights does not take into consideration the fact that individuals are constituted by their communities. It presupposes the notion of a disengaged subject, and thus a concept of disengaged thinking. That is why rights theories are foundationalist, and attempt to unify all aspects of morality around obligations. They lack sensibility to moral aspirations such as perfectionism,

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[105] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 4.
[106] Ibid., p. 88.
[107] Ibid., p. 79.

heroism and the like.[110] Any moral directive is considered merely a derivation from rights.

In response, it has been said that right-based theories of justice do not need to deny that individuals are constituted by the society. They can accommodate the view that one's identity is dialogically formed in relation with others, and by being introduced to language and culture. Hence, a non-instrumental view of the society in the phenomenological sense is perfectly compatible with the liberalism of rights. Taylor himself acknowledges that procedural liberalism does not entail an "atomist ontology;" it can be grounded on "holism."[111]

Regarding Taylor's stricture that liberalism is foundationalist, Richard Tuck argues that founders of social contract theory (Locke and Hobbes) and especially the inventor of natural rights (Grotius), unlike Kant and utilitarians, have never been reductionist. They did not consider rights as the foundation for other parts of ethics and morality. Grotius discerns rights as "a minimal spot" where all cultures overlap each other. Therefore, they form a common ground for cross-cultural negotiation. From within a culture there need not be a priority for this overlapping meeting ground over the rest of the moral.[112] Taylor accepts that not all theories of natural rights derive other parts of ethic from rights.[113] Finally, he particularly mentions that

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[108] Ibid., p. 64.

[109] Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," p. 194.

[110] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, pp. 89-90.

[111] Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," p. 197.

[112] Richard Tuck, "Rights and Pluralism," *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism*, James Tully (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 160.

[113] Taylor, "Atomism," p. 188, footnote no. 2.

classical founders of right theory and even Rawls are not his targets in his objection to rights theory.[114]

3.2. Procedural Liberalism's Disregard for Collective Goods and Common Bonds

Taylor's more serious charge against procedural liberalism is that it is not viable because it cannot account for fostering the *collective goods* or *common bonds* required for the survival of a society. Here, his discussion about the margins of possibility, or what is attainable, in human life focuses on the political rather than ontological or epistemological aspects.

Taylor argues that societies cannot be without a common bond, and the modern society is no exception. This common bond persuades people to obey the law, observe disciplines and make sacrifices such as paying tax and serving in the armed forces, which are all requirements of every political society. In a free society, these can only be enforced by 'a willing identification with the polis on the part of the citizens, a sense that the political institutions in which they live are an expression of themselves.'[115]

Taylor believes that lack of such a common bond causes political fragmentation and a sense of atomism, and leads to failing to sympathise with others. There will be no desire to hear all voices in society. People will be more interested in partial, local, ethnic, interest-based, etc., grouping than in common projects for the whole society.[116] Symptoms of this fragmentation can be seen in the United States which, as a society united merely in the defence of rights, faces low turn out in elections, suffers from an underdeveloped welfare state, and in which interest groups and single-issue campaigns take the place of the formation of democratic majorities around interrelated programmes.[117] Lack of identification with one's political community, an instrumental view of one's society, political fragmentation and a sense of atomism reinforce each other in a vicious circle. Hence, a free society in order to prevent disintegration needs a sense of attachment and "common enterprise."

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[114] Charles Taylor, "Reply and Re-articulation," *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism*, James Tully (ed.), pp. 246-249.

[115] Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," p. 187.

Nevertheless, patriotism or a sense of common good is not central to liberal politics. Procedural liberalism is mainly concerned with "convergent" goods, and sees society as instrumentally valuable. For it, the individual is the ultimate, and the society and its institutions are merely "collective instruments." Liberalism of rights does not take the principle of belonging or obligation to society or authority as fundamental.[118] It gives, Taylor believes, a distorted description of political

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[116] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, pp. 112-3.

[117] Charles Taylor, "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere," *Philosophical Arguments*, p. 281-4.

[118] Taylor, "Atomism," p. 188. Taylor argues that the society is intrinsically valuable, and thus we have a commitment to it, because obviously individuals are not self-sufficient; and through entering society humans get more than what they get individually. More importantly, 'living in society [or a certain society] is a necessary condition of the development' of 'characteristically human capacities,' such as rationality, morality, autonomy, freedom to form and choose life plans and so on (Ibid., pp. 190-191). Hence, it follows that the obligation to belong to the society is as important as the right to develop the capacities. Put differently, '[w]e could not, for instance, unreservedly assert our right in the face of, or at the expense of, such a society' (Ibid., p. 198).

Taylor goes on to say that not only our intimate relationships with family and friends or even the society but an entire civilisation nurture our capacities. He speaks of the moral, institutional, cultural, material and infrastructural elements contributing to the genesis, development and actualisation of autonomy and freedom in western civilisation. Thus, if somebody believes in individual freedom, he or she ought to be obliged to belong to western civilisation as well. Taylor maintains that 'the commitment we recognise in affirming the worth of freedom is a commitment to this civilisation whatever are the conditions of its survival' (Ibid., p. 207). Whether representative government or anarchy proved to be a necessary condition of the survival of western civilisation, it would attract our obligation.

Apart from the point that Taylor makes too much of our obligation to different communities and institutions, a main objection could be that the above argument does not precisely prove the intrinsic value of the society. Taylor's view that if there are some worthwhile human capacities not only have people right to them, but also we have a 'commitment to further or foster them' (Ibid., p. 194) raises a worry. That is, linking rights and freedoms to worthwhile capacities which we have an obligation to develop can provide a pretext for the restriction of freedoms that are considered short of realising aspirations to common goods as quests for instrumental or subjective goods. In short, procedural liberalism, which due to its atomist ontology cannot account for common goods and bonds, faces the charge of non-viability.[119]

In response to Taylor, it can be argued that procedural liberalism can provide what is needed for the survival of a political society. It can demand some sacrifices, such as obeying the law, paying tax, complying with some sorts of distribution of wealth, serving in the armed forces, resisting invaders, and some kind of public participation like serving on juries, based on its individualistic account of rights. In all these cases, one can appeal to the proceduralist account of the instrumental value of the society rather than the republican or communitarian view of the intrinsic value of the society. The common bond for procedural liberalism can simply be a shared destiny, or a commitment to rights. Further, such a commitment can even be a basis of non-instrumental identification with the society. Acknowledging the above point, in his more recent works, Taylor maintains that 'procedural liberalism can parry the objection of nonviability' in the sense described above.[120]

Taylor sometimes maintains that although there may be some common bonds, viz., a shared view about rights, in procedural liberalism, it centres around concepts

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those capacities. That is why liberals argue that the right to choose one's life-form should be independent of the judgement about one's way of life and the realisation of human capacities. For instance, the right to property should not be dependent on what one has done to one's property but on other moral standards.

[119] Despite his critique of procedural liberalism Taylor does not deny that it is motivated by a philanthropic moral outlook which aimed at the recognition of the value of the ordinary life as well as individual happiness instead of supposedly higher values or great social and political projects (Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," pp. 144-5). The attempt to do without conceptions of the good should be seen as liberation from the stifling and burdensome demands of higher ways of life on human beings which lead to depreciation and suffering or self-delusion. The ideals of autonomy and freedom as well as a desire for transcending parochial theories of the good have also buttressed rights theories (Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, pp. 8 and 85). In the background of these theories, there is preference for conceptions of altruism and benevolence over self-absorption and obsession with the fulfilling life.

[120] Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," p. 194.

such as rights, rule of law and equality rather than collective goods and particularly participation. The latter, according to "the republican thesis," are the essence and safeguard of freedom and patriotism.[121] Taylor, here, means that procedural liberalism does not take into consideration what is necessary for the survival of the *liberal* features of a society. Moreover, Taylor believes that the proceduralist view of liberalism discounts the significance of democratic decision-making and the importance of the public sphere or civil society in this respect.[122]

Against the republican thesis, however, it is argued that viable liberal societies can rely on allegiance on the basis of enlightened self-interest as some of the eighteenth century thinkers believed. Moreover, the modern "revisionist" democratic theory stresses that too much participation of members in a liberal state is not necessary, 'as long as it delivers the goods and makes their lives prosperous and secure.'[123] Taylor finds this answer incompatible with the reality in the societies allegedly based on procedural justice, like the US. He maintains that people's outrage in cases such as Watergate goes beyond 'sources recognised by atomism,' and shows a sense of 'patriotic identification' among people who do not think of 'their society purely instrumentally, as the dispenser of security and prosperity.'[124] However, Taylor's response is hardly convincing, because such outrage need not be based on a sense of identification with the society or patriotism. It may perfectly well have been caused by people's self-interested resentment at the administration's dishonesty or its waste of taxpayers' money. The point is that even safeguarding freedom against would-be despots can be achieved through procedural liberalism.

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[121] See ibid., pp. 201-2.
[122] See Taylor, "Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere," p. 287. For Taylor's detailed account of the concept of civil society, see Charles Taylor, "Invoking Civil Society," *Philosophical Arguments*, pp. 204-224.
[123] Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," p. 195.
[124] Ibid., p. 196.

It can be argued that what rights-based theories of justice cannot account for are measures that go beyond ensuring the survival of the society or its liberal characteristics. These are issues like preserving the distinctness of the society, restricting citizenship or the scope of welfare system to compatriots, or promoting a collective good such as a culture or a language. Taylor maintains that procedural liberalism, due to its instrumentalist and subjectivist view, is inhospitable to views about the intrinsic value of the society, and to collective goods of national, linguistic or cultural kinds.[125] However, he does not notice that in these cases, what is at stake is not the survival of society and liberalism but the survival of particular features of a society that are beyond these. Participatory self-rule, as an intrinsic good and essential component of human dignity, and distributive justice when it goes beyond a measure for preventing the disintegration of the society, are other examples of these particular features. The latter, however, may be not less important than the liberal and democratic characteristics of the society for its members.

What gives credit to the above argument is Taylor's own point that procedural liberalism is only suitable for countries like the US or, perhaps, Britain. The political culture of some other countries like Canada inclines towards more participation. He argues that there is a more or less total "fusion between patriotism and free institutions" in the political culture of the US, whereas, in some other modern democratic societies like Quebec, 'patriotism centers on a national culture, which in many cases has come to incorporate free institutions, but which is also defined in terms of some language or history.' Taylor goes on to say that

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[125] Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," pp. 142-4.

> The procedural model will not fit these societies because they can't declare neutrality between all possible definitions of the good life. A society like Quebec can't but be dedicated to the defense and promotion of French culture and language, even if this involves some restriction on individual freedoms. It can't make cultural-linguistic orientation a matter of indifference.[126]

It is important to distinguish between those collective goods that can be accommodated by procedural liberalism, viz., those needed for the survival of the society or for the prevention of despotism, and those that cannot, that is, collective goals giving the society a particular feature. While the first group are *necessarily* political, the second group are not, though in certain cases they may also legitimately be followed through political institutions, contrary to the liberal dominant view. However, if there are several incompatible collective goals of the latter kind in a society, perhaps due to its culturally plural population, then dealing with them requires a special and complex solution.

3.3. Liberalism of Promoting Collective Goods

Taylor believes that his account of epistemology and ontology grounds another version of liberalism that can accommodate common and collective goals, such as the survival of a particular culture, language, etc. He believes that there is a "natural affinity" between this account 'with its stress on situated freedom and the roots of our identity in community, on the one hand, and the civic humanist tradition [i.e., republicanism], on the other.'[127] Taylor's version of liberalism accepts that a society

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[126] Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," p. 203.
[127] Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," p. 15.

'can be organised around a definition of the good life.'[128] This political doctrine, unlike procedural liberalism, allows promotion of common goods by political means. An example of this kind of doctrine is cultural or linguistic nationalism like that of the Quebecois who find language 'an important enough [common] goal to take priority in some cases over individual goals that would otherwise have been considered as beyond legitimate constraint.'[129] Preserving and strengthening a culture is a justified common good, because, as Taylor argues, language, practices and institutions that shape the background of meaning to our actions are parts of our culture. In this regard, collectivist and nationalist theories have also formulated "collective rights" that sometimes take precedence over individual rights.[130]

A problem with the above account is that Taylor does not provide us with a clear argument demonstrating the "affinity" between his transcendental accounts of understanding or identity and a liberalism of promoting collective goods. His reasoning is mainly confined to stressing that since implementing procedural liberalism amounts to doing the impossible, the liberalism of pursuing collective goals can be the only plausible alternative. However, in the previous sections we have seen that his view of the non-viability of procedural liberalism is untenable. If a liberal society can pursue a collective goal, it is not because of transcendental reasons, but simply because of the moral appeal of such a goal. There is no reason to renounce the political furtherance of the conceptions of the good unconditionally.

On the other hand, Taylor's version of liberalism has been the target of some critiques, for example that it homogenises the society, undermines autonomy, and weakens self-awareness. To begin with, a society that is organised around a view of the good, and pursues collective goals like cultural survival, tends to substitute a dominant interpretation of the common good for various others. In such a case, it suppresses other accounts of the common good, sub-cultures and particular interpretations of the culture. In this regard, Sasja Tempelman argues that Taylor's idea of cultural survival tends toward 'some form of cultural homogeneity' within a particular community.[131]

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[128] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 59.
[129] Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," p. 140.
[130] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

The drive of the Taylorian community towards homogeneity gives rise to another worry to the effect that living in such a community may hinder the process of strong evaluation and consequently awareness of one's identity, which Taylor cherishes. As Richard Weinstock has eloquently shown, the task of strong evaluation is more feasible in a liberal society with a neutral state than in a society pursuing an overarching common good politically. He argues that the attempt to develop the capacity for strong evaluation, that is, second-order reflection on one's desires and evaluative distinction of actions as good, bad, base or noble, might fail in two ways. First, 'when an individual is insufficiently self-aware to realise that she stands within a moral framework, that her practical judgements always presuppose a range of evaluative distinction.'[132] Being unaware of the horizon of value to which her actions refer back, the individual does not try to articulate her framework, and fails to develop her capacity for strong evaluation. The second way of failing might occur 'by being locked into an articulation which is only an imperfect approximation of her good, of the overall conception of the good toward which her more specific pursuits seem to point.'[133]

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[131] Sasja Tempelman, "Constructions of Cultural Identity: Multiculturalism and Exclusion," *Political Studies*, vol. 47, no. 1 (March 1999), p. 22.

[132] Richard Weinstock, "The Political Theory of Strong Evaluation," *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism*, James Tully (ed.), p. 186.

Weinstock believes that in order to prevent both cases of failure, a Rawlsian liberal society with a neutral state rather than a Taylorian communitarian one is needed. This is so, because it is more likely to be aware of one's moral framework in a cultural diversity that can allegedly be provided by a neutral polity than in a homogenised communitarian society of the like-minded. Foucaldian "contact with radical otherness" is necessary to secure the citizenry's self-consciousness; and this would be provided by a society without any notion of the good rather than one with a collective good. Rawlsian primary goods (such as wealth, educational opportunity, freedom of speech, thought and assembly, and freedom from arbitrary arrest) facilitate diversity, and make possible reflection, "rearticulation" and 'revising one's life plan or conception of the good.'[134] Moreover, Taylor's cherished notion of fusion of horizons can flourish better in an impartial liberal society than in a society that seeks cultural survival through state actions. That is because the latter tends to suppress the attempt by marginal or minority cultures to articulate or publicise their own horizons.

A parallel fear, expressed by Habermas and Appiah, *inter alia*, is that the idea of survival may be interpreted as cultural self-preservation in isolation. Such an interpretation weakens any possibility of change in the self-identity of cultures, and, in turn, could end up in a kind of fundamentalism.[135] Nevertheless, it should be said that a Taylorian community may hinder inter-cultural exchange to some extent, but it does not block it. As a matter of fact, Taylor maintains that the dialogical condition is not restricted to human agency as an individual, but extends to cultures and communities; and that is why recognition of cultural communities is a crucial need.

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[133] Ibid., p. 188.

Ibid., pp. 190-191.

[135] See Jurgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* Amy Gutmann (ed.), 2nd ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 131-133, and, K. Anthony Appiah, "Identity, Authenticity,

Also, Taylor's concern with cultural "survival" as a collective good has been attacked by many liberals as a violation of individual autonomy. In this regard, Habermas says 'to guarantee survival would necessarily rob the members [of a cultural community] of the very freedom to say yes or no that is necessary if they are to appropriate and preserve their cultural heritage.'[136] Anthony Appiah, too, argues that 'it seems to me not at all clear that this aim [survival] is one that we can acknowledge while respecting the autonomy of future individuals.'[137] Tempelman finds Taylor's liberalism of seeking cultural survival oppressive, because of its primordialist approach.

> the main pillars of Taylor's theory - that a particular community is crucial for individual identity, that this community is based on a shared culture, that cultural conflict is between 'us' and 'them' - can all be related to primordialist notions of collective identity. This primordialism assumes the unity within and the difference between cultural collectivities without paying attention to the disciplinary practices required to create and maintain them. It tacitly justifies the forms of exclusion that accompany these practices: on the one hand, the suppression of freedom of people to shape their own individual and collective identities in different ways, and, on the other, the marking of outsiders as evidently 'different.'[138]

Nevertheless, regarding the objection about the threat of cultural survival for autonomy, some points are worthy of mention. Firstly, the very notion of identity implies survival. If we accept that culture is constitutive of our identity, we cannot

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Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*, Amy Gutmann (ed.), 2nd ed., p.159.

[136] Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," p. 130.

help desiring its survival. This, of course, does not mean that we can, or have to, impose our culture upon the future generation. Secondly, absolute autonomy is a fantasy. As Taylor has forcefully argued, the dialogical feature of human agency is one of what he calls "transcendental conditions." The processes of socialisation, acquisition of language and education and so on show that children begin with what they have acquired from family and society. Appiah concedes that

> Precisely because the monological view of identity is incorrect, there is no individual nugget waiting in each child to express itself, if only family and society permit its unfettered development. We have to help children make themselves, and have to do so according to our values, because children do not begin with values of their own.[139]

Hence, there is no question that the desire for cultural survival limits autonomy, particularly through the acculturation process. A relevant question, however, is whether it is necessary to involve the state in the realisation of the wish for preservation of culture and the acculturation process. A plausible answer could be that while cultural survival does not inherently need to become a political issue, it could be achieved politically to some extent. Appiah himself is happy to make the process at least partially a matter for state involvement when arguing that 'I would be prepared to defend the view that the state in modern society must be involved in education.... and it does play such a role currently.'[140]

Confronting the above objections, Taylor introduces the concept of "fundamental human rights," which will be discussed in more length in the section on "multiculturalism." There is no doubt that in a society of the type that Taylor

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[137] Appiah, "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction," p. 157.
[138] Tempelman, "Constructions of Cultural Identity: Multiculturalism and Exclusion," p. 23.
[139] Appiah, "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction," p. 158.
[140] Ibid., p. 159.

prescribes, compared to an impartial liberal one, there would be more attempt to homogenise the society, individual autonomy would be more limited, articulated self-awareness would be diminished, and so forth. On the other hand, such a society would follow collective goods that most, if not all, the population find worthwhile. The choice between an impartial state and one promoting a collective good while accepting fundamental rights is not a choice between a non-viable and a viable society, as Taylor sometimes suggests. Nor is it a choice between a moral and an immoral or suppressive option. The two alternatives have their own moral merits that must be the ground for choosing between them, depending on the social context in which they are supposed to operate.

To sum up this section on Taylor's political views, it can be said that his attempt to refute the liberalism of rights, and support a liberalism of promoting collective goods, on transcendental grounds has not been convincing. Adjudication between the two versions of liberalism in a particular social context must be based on their relative moral merits. *Pace* Taylor, procedural liberalism is a sustainable political doctrine; but, as he remarks, it does not accommodate the collective goals that liberal societies at large advance. However, some of these collective goals such as cultural survival do not need to be, and in some societies actually are not, considered political pursuits. In these cases, precisely because the civil society is able to promote these goals, the state is exempted. This means that if the civil society lacks the ability or sufficient resources, the state should do the job. Hence, political doctrines of the Taylorian type are necessary for the latter cases.

4. Multiculturalism

We have seen that in political theory, Taylor concentrates on two competing versions of liberalism, namely, the procedural liberalism of neutrality and rights, and his cherished liberalism of promoting collective goods such as cultural survival. In this section, we will see how these two interpretations of liberalism treat the issue of cultural plurality, and whose treatment is more satisfactory.

Taylor argues that the "cruciality" of recognition resulting from the close link between identity and recognition gives rise to the "politics of recognition."[141] The call for the "politics of equal recognition" in the contemporary era, however, has come to mean two different modes of politics, namely, "the politics of equal dignity" and "the politics of difference." These two are corollaries of the two liberal political stances discussed before.

Procedural liberalism leads to the "politics of equal dignity" which equalises citizenry's rights and entitlements, and requires people to be treated 'in a difference-blind fashion.' This is a consequence of procedural liberalism's neutrality towards conceptions of the good life and, particularly, the collective ones. The philosophical presumption underlying this politics is that human dignity 'is associated less with any particular understanding of the good life ... than with the power to consider and espouse for him or herself some view or other.' In other words, what matters is autonomy.[142] Procedural liberalism refers all differences (those about conceptions of the fulfilling life and personal preferences, or religious, ethnic and cultural ones) to the private sphere of life, and considers them no matter of concern for the state.

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[141] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 25.
[142] Ibid., p. 57.

However, it is argued that this difference-blindness 'negates identity by forcing people into a homogeneous mold that is untrue to them.' Further, it can be said that the very idea of difference-blind liberalism may be 'a kind of pragmatic contradiction, a particularism masquerading as the universal.' In this sense, it represents a hegemonic culture, and hence, is discriminatory.[143] Taylor concludes that procedural liberalism's politics of equal dignity is "inhospitable" to difference, and has a very restrictive view on the acknowledgement of "distinctive cultural identities." This is because, firstly it urges the "uniform application" of rules, and particularly rights, whereas the acknowledgement of difference calls for 'some variations in the kind of law we deem permissible from one cultural context to another.' Secondly, procedural liberalism is 'suspicious of collective goals' such as the survival of a particular culture or community.[144]

However, it can tenably be said that there are some other kinds of liberalism of rights that are more hospitable to diversity than what Taylor conceives. The Grotian natural rights theory, as Tuck describes it, is more responsive to difference, because it considers rights as merely minimal common ground between all cultures. Such a liberalism does not impose moral principles, viz., rights, on different cultures. Moreover, while rights govern inter-cultural relations within a society, it would allow cultures, in their internal affairs, to implement rules more compatible with their own particularities, and also pursue collective goals. Nevertheless, this liberalism does not provide cultural communities with political support for their cultural commitments, activities and goals.

4.1. The Politics of Difference

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[143] Ibid., pp.43-44.

In the matter of recognition, the Taylorian liberalism of promoting collective goods results in the "politics of difference" that demands the recognition of the "unique identity" of individuals or groups and their difference from others. This politics, rather than establishing an identical basket of rights, requires that different individuals and groups be treated differently.[145] Hence, Taylor argues that his version of liberalism is more responsive to difference than procedural liberalism is. This is so, not only because it accommodates collective goods such as communal or cultural survival, but also because it distinguishes between fundamental rights from 'privileges and immunities of uniform treatment' that 'can be revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy.'[146]

Responding to the charge that the politics of difference could be suppressive of individuals and discriminatory, Taylor argues that

> A society with strong collective goals can be liberal, on this view, provided it is also capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common goals, and provided it can offer adequate safeguard for fundamental rights.[147]

The charge of being discriminatory, however, does not seem to be easily deniable. It will be discussed later in this chapter in more detail.

There is, however, an affinity between procedural liberalism's politics of equal dignity and the politics of difference. Both are based on the ground that all humans share 'a universal human potential,' but for the former this universal potential is something like 'to be rational,' as for Kant, while for the latter this potential could be

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[144] Ibid., pp. 60-61.
[145] Ibid., pp. 38-9.
[146] Ibid., p. 59.
[147] Ibid.

something like '[to] form and define one's identity.'[148] This disagreement must be seen alongside a series of disputes that, Taylor argues, run through modern culture 'between what appear to be the demands of reason and disengaged freedom, and equality and universality, on one hand, and the demands of nature, or fulfilment, or expressive integrity, or intimacy, or particularity, on the other.'[149] It can also be argued that the politics of difference grows out of the politics of equal dignity through a new understanding of the human social condition to the effect that due recognition is vital for human beings. Given the role of culture in the formation of identity, it further requires the recognition of culture and cultural difference.

A problem with Taylor's politics of recognising the unique identity of individuals or communities is that it considers all aspects of one's identity to be in need of political recognition. It does not distinguish between those dimensions of identity that one prefers to be private and others. In this regard, Appiah argues that Taylor's politics of recognition raises the worry that the process of recognition leads to the replacement of a negative (collective) script of self-hatred by a positive life-script. He argues that '[t]he politics of recognition requires that one's skin color, one's sexual body, should be acknowledged politically in ways that makes it hard for those who want to treat their skin and their sexual body as personal dimensions of the self.'[150]

This difficulty is rooted in Taylor's uniform treatment of all aspects of identity, as described before. In his definition of identity, Taylor focuses on strong evaluation and ideas of the good life that he finds constitutive of selfhood. Perhaps, it is the vitality of identity in this sense that leads him to regard it as an issue for politics. However, identity is not all about things whose denial is tantamount to disregard for the core of one's selfhood, and thus results in an identity crisis, as Taylor sometimes claims. As said before, identity includes values and principles with a universal range of applicability, as well as local standards and attachments raised by the sense of belonging to various communities. Neither are all dimensions of personhood, whether universal or particular, significant to the same degree; nor do all of them require political recognition. For instance, although a familial way of upbringing is crucial to one's selfhood, there is less demand for its political recognition, compared with the similar demand regarding religious values.

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[148] Ibid. pp. 41-42.
[149] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 101.
[150] Appiah, "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction," p. 163.

4.2. Refuting Recognition of Equal Worth

Although, as said before, Taylor sometimes assumes a link between the politics of recognition and the recognition of worth or significance of other cultures, he refutes the idea of *equal* worth of all cultures. He argues that some proponents of the politics of difference and multiculturalism go beyond the demand for the recognition of the unique identity, and ask for the recognition of equal value of other cultures. They, too, put their argument in the language of the dialogical condition of human agency, and the vitality of recognition. The demand is for recognition of the cultures of minorities or subjugated people by dominant cultures or western colonial powers. From the point of view of the colonised people or minority cultures, it is a problem of self-image. The existing self-images should be changed. This demand is basically focused on education and school and university curricula (particularly in the Humanities departments) in the sense that the "canon" should include authors from other cultures, ethnic groups and sex. So students from different backgrounds or cultures no longer feel that they have been demeaned.

Taylor says that the premise behind the demand for the recognition of equal worth is that, as the logical extension of the politics of universal dignity, equal respect is due to all cultures. He argues, however, that there can only be a presumption that 'all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings.' He accepts that even this presumption is not unproblematic and 'involves something like an act of faith,' and is just 'a starting hypothesis with which we ought to approach the study of any other culture. The validity of the claim has to be demonstrated concretely in the actual study of the culture.'[151] That is to say, what we come up with is not necessarily the approval of the presumption. Therefore, the demand for acknowledging the equality of value at the end of the process of study cannot be put in terms of rights.

Taylor takes his *presumption* of equal worth of all cultures as a point midway between ethnocentrism and the demand for the recognition of equal worth of all cultures. He suggests two grounds for the presumption: first, divine providence, and second, a kind of modesty that acknowledges the limitation of human horizons. Such modesty requires being open to the comparative study of cultures that would result in a fusion of horizons, and alter our present stand.[152] As Taylor sees it, to deprive other cultures of this presumption would be "a supreme arrogance."

However, *pace* Taylor, the claim of multiculturalism is not essentially about the recognition of equal worth. It is about the recognition of *equal standing* of all cultures existing in a society. What is at issue is their status rather than their comparative worth. His emphasis on study for assessing the worth of other cultures may be a symptom of what he himself calls "the primacy of the epistemological" with which he diagnoses modern epistemology. What minority cultures seek is not a kind of *study* to prove or disprove the value, let alone the equal value, of their culture. That is why, as said before, connecting recognition as a moral demand with the acknowledgement of worth and significance is distortive of the demand for recognition. As Susan Wolf notes, the subjugated peoples' request for changing the self-image of their cultures, incorporating their own authors into the "canon," and changing the curricula of the academy (or recognition at large) is based not so much on the *equal worth* of their cultures as on the ground that these cultures and authors are *their own*.[153] If this ground is accepted, as it seems that Taylor accepts it, there will be no need for the untenable and futile discussion of equal worth. What is important is simply that there is a group of people who believe in the worth of their culture which gives meaning to their lives.

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[151] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," pp. 66-67.

A specific question about Taylor's presumption of equal worth is why is it restricted to long-standing and relatively large cultures. In this regard, William Connolly argues that by confining the ascription of the presumption of worth to those cultures that have been around for a considerable period of time, Taylor 'smuggles a teleological ontology into the prose of multiculturalism and deflates the politics of

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[152] Ibid., p. 73.

[153] Susan Wolf, "Comment," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*, Amy Gutmann (ed.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 81 and 85.

pluralisation by which a *new* constituency is formed out of the injuries and identifications imposed upon it.'[154]

Relativist and Neo-Nietzschean Stance

Taylor argues that to assume that all cultures are equally worthy, and to put this assumption in terms of right could only follow from a kind of relativism or subjectivism which denies the possibility of "objective" judgements of values. A radical version of this discourse is put forward by postmodernists who find all judgements of worth arbitrary or imposed by the structure of power. However, this perspective, Taylor argues, cannot account for the moral thrust of the politics of recognition, which is about unjustified judgement of inferiority about the subjugated cultures. He maintains that for "Neo-Nietzscheans,"

> the question is no more of respect, but of taking side, of solidarity. But this is hardly a satisfactory solution, because in taking side they miss the driving force of this kind of politics, which is precisely the search for recognition and respect.[155]

If the issue of the justification of worth of allegedly inferior cultures on the basis of an objective assessment falls away, then the demand for recognition and respect, Taylor remarks, would be tantamount to 'an act of breathtaking condescension.'[156] He says that the beneficiary's demand for *a priori* favourable judgement without a fusion of horizons is like begging for the pretence of respect. It is demeaning, and ultimately reinforces ethnocentrism, because the so-called judgement is made by the original standards of the dominant culture.

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[154] William Connolly, "Pluralism, Multiculturalism and the Nation-State: Rethinking the Connections," *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 1, no. 1, (1996), p. 63.
[155] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 70.
[156] Ibid.

However, Taylor's critique of postmodernist ways of dealing with cultural plurality is not unproblematic. It relies, once more, on the implausible connection between recognition as a moral duty and the acknowledgement of worth. Moreover, Taylor's philosophical critique of postmodern theories is tenable in the sense that they are self-defeatingly relativist and ironically guilty of the charge that they level against their rival positivist-liberal theories, namely, judging from no-where, from a god-like position, and neglecting the basic human conditions. However, this does not automatically mean that postmodern views of pluralism are confused, as Taylor claims. It would be more plausible, if the absurdity of the postmoderns in dealing with the issue of recognition were demonstrated from within postmodernism. It can also be said that philosophical difficulties of postmodern theories do not necessarily discredit their moral views.

One example of postmodern theories of cultural pluralism is put forward by Connolly. Though not mentioning the equality of worth of all cultures, he rejects the privileging of one culture or source of ethics over others. He claims that his "multicultural pluralisation" is the result of being alert to the contingent condition of being, and to 'the incorrigible *fragility* of the ethics and the *contestable* character of every traditional source of ethical restraint and generosity.'[157] What follows from this awareness is 'an ethos of forbearance in political initiatives,' 'an ethos of critical responsiveness.' In a nutshell, '[i]n a world marked by the indispensability and fragility of ethics we find nothing more fundamental than care for the protean diversity of being.'[158] It can be said that postmodern theories breathe more modesty into our understanding of cultural pluralism.

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[157] Connolly, "Pluralism, Multiculturalism and the Nation-State: Rethinking the Connections," p. 59.

4.3. Pursuing Collective Goals

Despite general ambiguities and difficulties with Taylor's politics of recognition, he comes up with two concrete political measures to accommodate differences in multicultural societies. These are, firstly, legitimising some variation in the implementation of the law and the relevant rights and entitlements, and secondly, allowing cultural communities to pursue their collective goals and, in particular, cultural survival. What guarantees justice in society is the observation of fundamental rights. Taylor does not discuss the first measure, so we shall concentrate on his second recommendation.

Taylor's politics of difference permits states to organise the society around a conception of the good life, and to pursue collective goods that are supposed to preserve the national or cultural identities of the societies concerned. The politics of promoting collective goals is applicable in a multicultural society like Canada where different communities are territorially concentrated. Hence, a distinct community like Quebec can legitimately adopt some nationalistic policies to preserve its culture and language. This is in line with Taylor's other suggestion that in order to overcome the fragmentation of the society and people's sense of powerlessness before the state, decentralisation and devolution of power are necessary. He emphasises that 'this is more if the units to which power is devolved already figure as communities in the lives of their members.'[159]

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[158] Ibid., p. 70.
[159] Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity,* p. 119.

However, it is not clear how Taylor is going to apply the politics of advancing collective goals and cultural survival in the context of multicultural societies with dispersed minorities. Obviously, the culture and language of Chinese immigrants in Canada cannot be supported by those methods by which the Quebecois are promoting their own, viz., through imposing some restriction on the use of other languages in Quebec. In fact, Taylor does not show any enthusiasm for defending the cultural rights of non-geographically concentrated minorities. Hence, it may be concluded that Taylor's liberalism is not responsive to the predicaments of dispersed minorities. In this regard, Connolly has claimed that, 'by focusing attention on territorially based minorities ('whole culture') he [Taylor] deflects attention from numerous minority constituencies dispersed across the territories in question.'[160]

Furthermore, given the legitimacy of advancing collective goods in the Taylorian society, the dispersed minorities would be at a disadvantage. The majority's collective goals are pursued by the public money consisting of both the majority and the minority's taxes. The state subsidises the majority's idea of the good life at the expense of others' ideas. Therefore, it can be said that, generally speaking, compared with a society based on a procedural liberalism of neutrality, there would be more suppression or, at least, discouragement of difference in a Taylorian society.

Additionally, we have already seen that a society which promotes an idea of the good life and sometimes opts in favour of cultural survival moves towards homogeneity through suppressing sub-cultures and internal differences. It should be added that scattered minorities are also victims of such a homogenising process. Perhaps, it can be concluded that in the case of multicultural societies with dispersed communities, the Rawlsian version of a liberal society, which does not promote a particular culture, is more hospitable to difference than is a community with a collective goal, such as Taylor suggests.

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[160] Connolly, "Pluralism, Multiculturalism and the Nation-State: Rethinking the Connections," p. 63.

4.4. Question of Fundamental Rights

For Taylor, the only limitations in implementing the collective goods of the majority or that of a geographically concentrated minority are fundamental individual rights. Put differently, any collective pursuit infringing fundamental human rights would be illegitimate. Then, two questions arise. First, is not Taylor's liberalism guilty of the same charge that the so-called procedural liberalism has been accused of, viz., "uniform treatment"? In other words, it seems that Taylor's politics of difference differs from procedural liberalism merely to the extent that it tries to limit rights to what he calls "fundamental rights." There are some elements of rights and goods, in his account, that end up supplying the universality which he denies rights-based theories. Second, how and by which criteria can one distinguish fundamental rights from others which 'can be revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy'?

Taylor himself recognises that the question of what are fundamental rights is a controversial one, especially in a multicultural context. When he says that the liberal distinction of public/private or politics/religion is not acceptable for some cultures, he, perhaps, spells out the same problem. He argues that in controversial cases, the reply that 'this is how we do things here' is "awkward." However, in cases like the Rushdie controversy, where 'issues such as the right to life and to freedom of speech' are at stake, '[t]his reply must be made.'[161] Obviously, this argument is not intellectually of any help in distinguishing fundamental rights, though it points to the right to life and freedom of speech as two examples. It is not at all clear why the right of non-English immigrants in Quebec to be taught in English should be restricted, while Salman Rushdie's right to free speech should not. Perhaps, Taylor thinks that these two instances of restrictions are different in their extent as well as in their content, but he does not provide us with a criterion for distinguishing between the two. More importantly, Taylor does not say how to adjudicate on the conflict between the liberal account of fundamental rights, on the one hand, and the moral beliefs and identity of some other cultural communities that want, for instance, to restrict the freedom of speech, on the other. These cultures and liberalism may simply be incommensurate in the sense that Taylor uses the term.[162]

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[161] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 63.

5. Conclusion

We have seen that Taylor's opposition to what he calls the malaises of modernity has led him to identify and refute the disengaged epistemology and atomist ontology that he sees behind them. His account of the embodied knowledge with its necessary background understanding and ad hominem practical reasoning drives towards the particularity, and arguably cultural particularity, of understanding. Because of the dialogical feature of human agency, culture, particularly through language, plays a crucial role in constituting one's identity which, for Taylor, is about ideas of the good. The political implication of this account is that Taylor endorses a liberalism that allows a society to pursue collective goods, and specifically cultural survival, through government policies.

The view that morality is, to a significant extent, culturally particular results in acknowledging the plurality of ways of development of cultures and the incompatibility of visions of the good they espouse. The incommensurability of cultures does not prevent us from judging other cultures, but has some moral and political implications that call for the toleration of, and respect for, other cultures. Given the cultural particularity of moral knowledge, there is a case for the recognition of culture and cultural difference, because it is important for people to make sense of their lives and world. Hence, we should not intervene in the life of other cultural communities.

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[162] See the section on "Inter-Cultural Adjudication."

Taylor finds procedural liberalism inhospitable to difference partly because it ascribes cultural differences or even collective goals to the private realm of life. In his politics of recognition, on the other hand, all of our differences are to be acknowledged publicly. However, we want some important parts of our identity to remain private. His politics of pursuing collective goals makes cultural survival a political issue while it is not necessarily so. Furthermore, although Taylor's politics of difference, which allows the pursuit of cultural survival through state apparatus, is favourable to geographically concentrated minority cultures, it is not responsive to the demands of dispersed minorities. That is why it is said that Taylor's account of multiculturalism is confined to the problem of Quebec. In this regard, a procedural liberalism built on a "thin theory of the good" could be even more hospitable to, and less discriminative towards, scattered cultural minorities in a society than is a community based on a collective good.

Apart from legitimising the promotion of collective goals, Taylor suggests that implementing some variation in enforcing the law and rights, while at odds with the principles of procedural liberalism, would be crucial in accommodating cultural difference. What determines the limits of pursuing collective goods and variation of the law is the concept of fundamental rights.

A general problem with Taylor's account is that his attempt to arrive at moral and political doctrines from epistemological and ontological views is not convincing. What he calls transcendental conditions of the self are not sufficient grounds for his liberalism of promoting collective goals and the politics of recognition and difference. His charge of non-viability against the liberalism of rights because of disregarding these conditions is not tenable. Also, the recognition of difference as a moral demand is not a corollary of transcendental conditions regarding the dialogical formation of identity. Taylor's appeal to transcendental issues exposes him to his own stricture of universal moralities and, particularly, procedural liberalism, viz., supplying a universalist, ahistorical and trans-cultural view of morality.

Moreover, *pace* Taylor, recognition is not contingent on the claim of worth, let alone equal worth. It is a moral demand for the equal status of various cultures existing in a society. Thus, defining it in terms of value puts it at the mercy of our intellectual achievement, and confines it. Recognition is primarily a moral duty owed to human beings, though created out of a new sensitivity about how human identity and beliefs take shape. The recognition of different identities and cultures is essentially the recognition of what human beings most cherish.

CHAPTER THREE

RAZ: PERFECTIONIST LIBERALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM

The main characteristic of Joseph Raz's political philosophy is his refutation of political neutralism and defence of a perfectionist liberalism that does not eschew promoting some ideals of the good and the moral quality of individual lives through the political structure of a society and public policies. What makes his work stimulating is that he is also one of the few prominent liberal philosophers who have been trying to spell out a liberal response to the fact of increasing cultural plurality in liberal democracies. He has articulated an approach to the rights of minority cultures that goes beyond the traditional liberal attitudes such as assimilation, toleration and extension of civil, political and social rights. It is crucial to see how he reconciles diverging moral demands of liberal perfectionism, on the one hand, and accommodation of cultural diversity, on the other.

Raz grounds his political philosophy on a rationalist and truth-based moral theory that at the same time combines universal and cultural elements. This is, nevertheless, where the tension in his thought begins, and spreads to various parts of his political philosophy. Rejecting the possibility of staying neutral among conceptions of the good in the public realm, Raz advocates a perfectionist politics that cares about the ethical life of the citizenry. His theory of authority provides the ground for such a politics. However, in a society characterised by diversity, a perfectionist politics faces two alternatives, namely, losing its legitimacy or diluting its ethical substance to a considerable degree. Raz's account of multiculturalism is backed up by the recognition of the salience of the culture in determining moral and value options, and thus the vital importance of cultures for individual well-being. Cultures are also regarded as constituting people's identity. Despite repudiation of individualism, Raz's account of culture is individualistic, and hence does not take into consideration claims of cultural communities on individuals, such as a demand to remain distinct. More importantly, his multiculturalism is not free of criteria that are ultimately liberal.

In this chapter, the general features of Raz's moral philosophy, his political perfectionism and finally his account of multiculturalism will be examined.

1. Raz's Moral Philosophy: Combination of Universalism and Contextualism

Raz claims that a moral and political philosophy and a theory of justice must be based on truth, rather than on sceptical grounds, because '[t]here can be no justice without truth.'[1] Hence, he criticises Rawls's reliance on "epistemic abstinence." The latter not only refrains from claiming that his doctrine of justice is true, but also denies that the truth of a doctrine of justice should be a matter of concern for governments adhering to it.[2] For Raz, on the other hand, no political and moral theory can do without what is considered to be true.

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[1] Joseph Raz, "Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence," *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics,* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), p. 55.

[2] Ibid., pp. 46 and 50.

However, it may be asked whether "lack of knowledge" or "uncertainty" cannot be a basis for moral judgement. As a matter of fact, many moral judgements, especially those that emphasise caution and restraint, in one way or another are grounded on the lack of knowledge. This is particularly important in the legal process. Even refraining from judgement sometimes contains a normative point. Nevertheless, the lack of knowledge *alone* does not lead to any moral judgement, and "epistemic abstinence" cannot be the sole ground upon which a theory of justice is built. It has to be accompanied by some truth-claims; and clearly, a lot depends on these truth-claims. It does not seem that Rawls claims to ground his political theory thoroughly on the lack of knowledge of truth, as his "thin theory of the good" proves.

For Raz, however, the truth of moral values is grounded on a delicate balance between timeless or universal and cultural elements. He argues that we human beings have certain innate drives 'to move around, to exercise our bodies, to stimulate our senses, to engage our imagination and our affection, to occupy our mind,' which all cultures try to give a certain shape and channel in specific ways.[3] From his viewpoint, it is the generality of moral principles that make them intelligible and justified. Hence, he regards morality as immutable, and remarks that '[t]he universality of morality is rooted in the nature of moral thought.'[4]

Nevertheless, Raz acknowledges that universal values can be realised in different cultures in a variety of ways which are 'all worthy of respect.'[5] Cultures and local conventions and practices affect the boundaries of normative institutions such as rights.[6] They may even determine the content of a value. In this regard, Raz gives the example of the universal value of comfortable social interactions, the content of which varies from one society to another. Moreover, "comprehensive goals," or pursuits and activities upon which people's well-being is dependent, are socially defined and 'inevitably based on socially existing forms.'[7] In this sense, they are not merely "instantiations" of universal values, but are "distinctive specific goods." Individual behaviours get their meaning and significance from social forms. Raz prefers the term "social form" to "social practice" or "convention" because these are mainly concerned with behaviour, while he means 'social forms to consist of shared beliefs, folklore, high culture, collectively shared metaphors and imagination, and so on.'[8] It seems that what Raz means by culture, at least in one respect, can be understood by his definition of social forms. From his point of view, values and options are only accessible through cultures. In other words, 'individuals would not have been able to acquire and maintain their goals except through continuous familiarity with the social forms.'[9] Raz also sees a kind of interaction between values and social and economic conditions.[10]

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[3] Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 375.
[4] Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism," *Ratio Juris*, vol. 11, no. 3, (3 September 1998), p. 194.
[5] Ibid., pp. 204 and 205.

What makes Raz different from communitarians and conservatives is the universalist element in his moral philosophy. He does not advocate a conventionalist thesis, because he does not believe that 'whatever is practised with social approval is for that reason valuable.'[11] He distinguishes between the social dependence of values and the social dependence of access to them, and also argues that only some abstract values are socially created. For Raz, 'the explanation of the goodness of any good or valuable thing or option has to be relatively independent of the social practices which create that good.'[12] This explanation must point to "good-making properties" of the relevant social practices. These are universal and trans-cultural criteria of value that transcend social approval, and they, rather than social practices, determine the value of a pursuit or an activity. Only by assuming universal standards is it possible to regard some social practices unworthy while they are mistakenly taken as good by their participants. Interestingly, Raz believes that norms of inter-personal relations and personal well-being coincide when social forms informing them are morally sound.[13]

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[6] Joseph Raz, "Free Expression and Personal Identification," *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, p. 133.

[7] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 309.

[8] Ibid., p. 311.

[9] Ibid., p. 310. For instance, Raz argues that personal autonomy is the basic value and way of well-being in western societies in which 'social forms are to a considerable extent based on individual choice.' See Ibid., p. 394, and also Joseph Raz, "Moral Change and Social Relativism," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 11, no. 1, (1994), p. 158.

[10] In the case of the ideal of autonomy, Raz mentions that it is 'particularly suited to the conditions of the industrial age and its aftermath with their fast changing technologies and free movement of labour' (Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 370).

Nonetheless, Raz is cautious about the possibility of intelligibility of all socially existing values on the basis of universal values. That is because

> What we know and what we do not know is partly a matter of accident of our circumstances, and even the best epistemic justification possible cannot rid our beliefs of an element of luck. But epistemic luck is a feature of conditions of knowledge in general. It is not a circumstance special to evaluative beliefs, and it does not negate the possibility of knowledge.[14]

There is no vantage point from which we can know everything, and master every perspective. In other words, the historical contingency of knowledge as well as existing practices limit the scope of what is imaginable and what is feasible for a group of people. There is no inconsistency between holding this view and acknowledging universal moral principles, argues Raz, 'so long as we recognise that these universal principles do not enable us to find about radically new and unfamiliar values or ways of pursuing them.'[15] This view, however, flies in the face of Raz's attempt to deny epistemic abstinence. It leaves room for epistemic deficiency, viz., the possibility that we may not understand some parts of other cultures and value options.

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[11] Ibid., p. 310.

[12] Joseph Raz, "Notes on Value and Objectivity," *Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999), p. 154. See also Raz, "Moral Change and Social Relativism," p. 143.

[13] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 319. It is not clear, however, why Raz believes that the wickedness of social forms must lead to a lack of coincidence between other-regarding concerns and personal well-being.

There is another factor that makes the interaction between universal and contextual elements in Raz's moral philosophy more complex. He remarks that

> This coexistence of universal principles with dependence on contingent historical traditions seems to me to indicate that social forms do more than determine the availability of valuable opinions. They constitute them.[16]

However, the question arises as to precisely what "constituting" means in Raz's terminology. He uses the term "constituting" on several occasions. Explaining the value of autonomy, he says '[w]hat is intrinsically valuable can be, and in the case of autonomy is, valuable as a constituent of a good in itself. Remove other elements of the good in itself and it may turn worthless, or even bad.'[17] So it may be concluded that constituent goods add to and even transform the value of each other in a combination. For instance, regarding the value of autonomy in choosing career, partner, and other relationships and pursuits in western societies, the point of being freely chosen is part of the value of those relationships and activities, and what

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[14] Raz, "Notes on Value and Objectivity," p. 155.

[15] Joseph Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," *Southern California Law Review*, vol. 62, no. 3 and 4, (March-May 1989), p. 1218.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., p. 1229, footnote no. 162.

makes them what they are.[18] Raz's explanation that most intrinsic goods are good in a certain context[19] may also clarify the point to some extent. The role of social forms in constituting value options shows that the social forms go beyond determining the content of a value.

Raz's attempt to combine contextualism or conventionalism, on the one hand, and universalism, on the other, does not appear to be unproblematic. Firstly, he is not clear about what these universal values are. Although he sometimes speaks of self-expression and lack of suppression as universal standards, he does not explain them more clearly, and does not mention how they can be justified as universal. Secondly, although he tries to articulate the interaction between universal and cultural elements in determining valuable relationships and pursuits, still there is an ambiguity in his account. As Donald Regan points out, Raz is not clear on the issue of the foundations of morality, and in his works '[t]here are paragraphs where a certain amount of exegesis is required to dispel the impression that there are conventionalist claims and realist claims in neighbouring sentences.'[20] What gives rise to such a suspicion is, for instance, Raz's view expressed in "Moral Change and Social Relativism." There, refuting "the compartmentalisation of morality" into universal and culturally particular parts, he argues that 'morality cannot be partly universal and partly socially relative, unless the socially relative part is a mere application of the universal part.'[21]

The difficulty is that this ambiguity in the relation between the universal and the cultural overshadows some Raz's other arguments. In political philosophy, and particularly multiculturalism, we have to have a clear comprehension of universal and cultural values in order to warrant adjudication, intervention or otherwise in the case of moral disputes among different cultures and moral traditions. Certainly, if in a dispute what is at stake is a cultural issue, no cultural view is preferable to another. Outsiders, including the state, are not entitled to judge in a situation to which the alleged universal criteria do not apply. Neither do all universally valid and applicable moral beliefs justify interfering with other cultures. An action validated by universal standards should have special importance or urgency, if we are going to justify its impact on the lives of those who do not believe in, or do not have access to, these standards.

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[18] Ibid., p. 1228.
[19] Ibid., p. 1227.

Incommensurability and Moral Pluralism

The constitutive role of local social forms in determining moral options and the insufficiency of universal principles for comprehending unfamiliar values of some societies lead Raz to conclude that these values may be incommensurate. He points out that

> Since the concrete forms in which these [that is, common or universal] values are manifested depend on contingent historical conditions, and cannot be derived from the abstract statement of the value, each form of the general value depends for its meaning on the social practices prevalent, in a way which defies any attempt to commensurate valuations on the basis of the abstract features only.[22]

Raz mainly advances the notion of incommensurability in order to repudiate consequentialism and its claim of comparability of values.[23] If some values,

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[20] Donald H. Regan, "Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom," *Southern California Law Review*, vol. 62, no. 3 and 4, (March-May 1989), p. 1038.

[21] Raz, "Moral Change and Social Relativism," p. 158.

[22] Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," p. 1221.

[23] One of the attempts of Raz's moral philosophy is the rejection of consequentialism. Approval of "action reasons" that engagement in them is intrinsically valuable, regardless of their consequences, rejects "strict consequentialism" which claims the only reason for or against performing an action is

relationships and pursuits, as well as the well-being of different people who have chosen those pursuits as their goals, are simply incomparable, the possibility of 'developing a general system or technology of calculation for practical reasoning' is undermined.[24]

According to Raz, 'A and B are incommensurate if it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value.'[25] In the case of indefinitely divisible value, incommensurability can be established if '*there is (or could be) another option which is better than one but is not better than the other.*'[26] Reason is "indeterminate" in adjudicating between incommensurable options. Although, indeterminacy means "running out of reason" in judging between incommensurate alternatives, Raz is keen that it must not be confused with uncertainty and scepticism. So he emphasises that

> My point is not a skeptical one. There is no denying that some pursuits are more valuable than others. It is also the case that our inability to judge the comparative merit of various pursuits is due to incomplete information. But often it is not. Often there is no information (I mean no true information, as opposed to imagining possible circumstances) which could settle the issue. The alternatives are simply incommensurate.[27]

Lack of information for adjudicating between incommensurate alternatives, and the impossibility of getting such information, must also not be seen as imperfection. It is, Raz maintains, "the ultimate truth," and there is nothing behind it to reason about. He explains that 'the general features of epistemic conditions are correlated

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its consequences. That is why even many consequentialists have abandoned this version of consequentialism. See, for instance, Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 269.

[24] Ibid., p. 358.

[25] Ibid., p. 322.

[26] Ibid., p. 325.

[27] Ibid., p. 342.

with general ontological conclusions. General epistemic indeterminacy reflects the incommensurability of values.'[28]

Nevertheless, despite the incomparability of some options, people do trade off between them in certain circumstances, and make choices that imply a kind of comparison between them. Raz thinks that this phenomenon is explicable by psychological factors or external coercion. Furthermore, incommensurability of alternatives does not preclude choice. Decisions are usually made on the basis of factors such as prevailing circumstances, personal character and more importantly one's will, let alone the value of the option itself. Choosing one among a number of incommensurable options does not entail ranking it above others. One reason for preferring one among incommensurate pursuits is the chance of success, and it is, Raz argues, a moral reason because people's success in their goals partly determines their well-being.

However, Raz's reliance on the chance of success as a reason for choosing can be challenged by questioning the possibility of comparing chances of success in incommensurate options. When two activities are incommensurable, the degree of success in them will probably be incommensurate too. As Regan argues, '[t]he value of success depends on the value of what one succeeds in. If the values of the clarinet and of livestock farming are truly incommensurable, as Raz claims, then so should be the values of success as a clarinettist and of success as a farmer (nor does supposing "greater" success at one, in its own terms, establish a ground for commensuration).'[29] Arguably in the case of incommensurable alternatives, only where there is a big difference in terms of their possibility of success, can such a possibility count as a reason in deciding between them. Although the incommensurability of value options does not undermine the possibility of comparing chances of success altogether, it dramatically restricts its applicability.

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[28] Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," p. 1221.

There exists a distinct type of incommensurability that Raz calls "constitutive incommensurability." In such cases, firstly, if a person has already chosen one among several incommensurate options, he normally refuses to forgo it to obtain others. In other words, he refrains from exchanging what he has already chosen for the others. Secondly, the options involved are of special significance for the person's ability in certain pursuits and relationships; so is refraining from trade-offs between them. Thirdly, "the very thought" of comparison between those options is usually "abhorrent" for the person.

The upshot of the discussion of incommensurability is moral or value pluralism. Moral pluralism is the claim that there are many worthwhile but incompatible forms of life, each having its own distinct merit. To believe in value pluralism is to believe that 'there are several maximal forms of life,' where "maximal life" means a life that cannot be improved 'by acquiring additional virtues, nor by enhancing the degree to which he possesses any virtue, without sacrificing another virtue ... [which is present] or the degree to which it is present in ... [that] life.'[30] Raz calls this "weak" value pluralism, and believes that it can be strengthened by three propositions: first, the rejection of complete ranking of incompatible virtues relative to each individual; second, the rejection of complete ranking of incompatible virtues by impersonal criteria of moral value; third, the belief that those virtues 'exemplify diverse

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[29] Regan, "Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom," pp. 1062-63.
[30] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom,* p. 396.

fundamental concerns.'[31] He argues that these three propositions are supported by the discussions of incommensurability and the dependence of values on social forms.

It should, however, be mentioned that neither value pluralism nor incommensurability is necessarily based on the idea of dependence of values on social forms. Replying to this objection made by Regan, Raz modifies his claim, and argues that the dependence of value on social forms 'indicates, though it does not conclusively prove, the possibility that our ability to compare options depends on the nature of our social practices, which may "run out" leaving us with no grounds for comparison.'[32]

Finally, the incommensurability of value options is not tantamount to the view that there are cultures which are in principle incommensurable. Raz argues that although there may be some concepts specific to one culture and without a parallel in others, it does not mean that those concepts cannot be understood by members of other cultures. This is because there are many concepts, which have "near relatives" in one or the other culture, that bridge "the cultural gap." He believes that there has never been a culture or a culture-specific concept beyond the comprehension of non-members, and thus the idea of cultural islands is absurd.[33] Further, he claims that it does not follow 'from the relativity of justification that there is no way of adjudicating between incompatible thoughts or beliefs.'[34]

Rejection of Moral Individualism

What has been said about the crucial role of culture in constituting one's moral world can also lead us to the repudiation of moral individualism. Although, Raz maintains, a person through autonomous choices and commitments is partially creator of his own moral world, this usually happens within a framework provided by social forms existing in his community. Morality is not an abstract phenomenon, but a contextual one. So, to argue that social forms constitute a person's value options is to consider him as a member of a cultural community and not as an unencumbered individual. According to Raz, this repudiates individualism.[35]

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[31] Ibid., pp. 396-97.
[32] Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply", p. 1220.
[33] Raz, "Notes on Value and Objectivity," p. 158.

However, this point about the communal foundation of morality does not take us far enough in rejecting individualism. Even in this framework we can conceive of an individualistic moral doctrine for which only the welfare or states of individual human beings have intrinsic value. 'A moral theory will be said to be individualistic if it is a humanistic morality which does not recognise any intrinsic value in any collective good.'[36] It is mainly in this respect that Raz is trying to refute individualism.

Raz argues that there are some intrinsic collective goods such as living in a tolerant, educated and respectful society. These general beneficial features of a society are public goods, though their beneficiaries are individuals. Raz defines a good as public in a certain society 'if and only if the distribution of its benefits in that society is not subject to voluntary control by any one other than each potential beneficiary controlling his share of the benefit.'[37] Distinguishing between inherent public goods like enjoying a plural society and contingent public goods such as fresh air, Raz calls the former "collective goods." Raz remarks that collective goods are intrinsically valuable because they are the constituents of what are goods-in-

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[34] Ibid., p. 159.
[35] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 309.
[36] Ibid., p. 198.

themselves.[38] For instance, autonomy as a ultimate value requires the presence of an adequate range of valuable options, which in turn entails the existence of certain social conditions. These conditions are collective goods, and intrinsically valuable, since they constitute the intrinsic value of autonomy.

However, Raz's definition of collective goods does not prevent reducing them to what is good for individuals. Raz does not deny that collective goods, though intrinsically valuable, are neither ultimate goods (that is, they must be explained by reference to other goods which are ultimate), nor good in themselves (that is, it is not that they are good whatever else is the case, but they are good in certain contexts).[39] They are intrinsically good as constituents of some other intrinsic values for individuals. Such a definition of collective goods is, nevertheless, consistent with the ultimate reference to the lives and the welfare of individuals.[40] That is, Raz's collective goods are reducible to individual goods, and reference to the society is necessary merely for explaining the method of their availability.

Raz's definition of collective goods is basically concerned with the distributive aspect of public goods rather than with their nature. It is rather a *test* for distinguishing publicly provided goods from others. Jeremy Waldron remarks that Raz's definition 'concerns the conditions under which a good is supplied; it has nothing whatever to do with the basis of its value.' However, he argues that the truth

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[37] Ibid., p. 198.

[38] Raz argues that there are three categories of intrinsic goods. Firstly, those that are good in themselves, 'the existence of which is valuable irrespective of what else exists.' Secondly, if some things are 'elements of what is good in itself which contribute to its value,' they are constituent goods and intrinsically valuable. Thirdly, ultimate goods. 'The aspects of a good in itself which are of ultimate value are those which explain and justify the judgement that it is good in itself, and which are such that their own value need not to be explained or be justified by reference to (their contribution to) other values' (Ibid., p. 200).

[39] Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," p.1226-27.

[40] See, for instance, Gordon Graham, "Book Review [of *The Morality of Freedom*]," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 149, (1987), p.482.

about genuinely communal goods is that 'they are good for community in a way that is not captured by any account of their value to individuals.'[41] The point about collective goods is that individuals enjoy them as members of a group and not as individuals *per se.* Raz's distribution-oriented definition does not give us enough clues about collective goods. Distinguishing and defining collective goods in terms of their nature, rather than the way of access to them, allow us to think of those goods as having the same standing as some intrinsic individual goods like autonomy.

A more persuasive argument for refuting moral individualism is Raz's repudiation of what he calls the individualist fallacy that means all individual rights 'are justified by concern for the right-holder and his interests.'[42] He argues that rights protected by the criminal law secure public interests besides the interests of the right-holder. Also, democratic rights, such as the right to vote, freedom of expression and association, etc., are based on not only individual interest in these rights, but also on the common good of living in a democratic society. As a matter of fact, it is the latter good that gives "special stringency" to these rights. Moreover, Raz remarks that the rights of office-holders as well as group rights, such as the rights of nations and families, are two categories of rights that illustrate the narrowness of the individualist thesis.[43] For Raz, a collective right meets three conditions:

> First, it exists because an aspect of the interest of human beings justifies holding some person(s) to be subject to a duty. Second, the interests in question are the interests of individuals as members of a group in a public good and the right is a right to that public good because it serves their interest as members of the group. Thirdly, the interest of no single

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[41] Jeremy Waldron, "Autonomy And Perfectionism In Raz's Morality of Freedom," *Southern California Law Review,* vol. 62, no. 3 and 4, (March-May 1989), p. 1125.

[42] Joseph Raz, "Disagreement in Politics," *The American Journal of Jurisprudence,* vol. 43, (1998), p. 75.

[43] Ibid., pp. 75-83. See also Raz, "Free Expression and Personal Identification," pp. 131-54.

member of that group in that public good is sufficient to justify holding another person to be subject to a duty.[44]

2. A Perfectionist Political Philosophy

Raz's rationalist moral theory, which avoids epistemic abstinence, gives rise to what he calls "a sound normative theory of politics" which does not attempt 'to occupy a noncontroversial high ground.'[45] The most important characteristic of Raz's political philosophy is his defence of perfectionism. Perfectionism is the acknowledgement that 'it is the goal of all political action to enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good and to discourage evil or empty ones.'[46] That is, governments should care about the moral quality of their subjects, and take it into consideration in legislating and organising the social life. This is what ancient political philosophy was mainly about. As Aristotle said, 'the legislator must labour to ensure that his citizens become good men.'[47] Hence, for Raz, politics is more than resolving conflicts of interests, and is about providing common goods. To some extent, even 'political conflicts are about the provision of common goods; that is, about mobilizing and coordinating the population to protect and promote interests which are common to all.'[48] Arguably, to the extent that cultures have a role in determining conceptions of the good, Razian perfectionist politics, by pursuing some conceptions of the good, promotes certain cultures. Moreover, since cultures are the way of access to valuable options, they are crucial for a perfectionist political theory that aims to advance those options.

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[44] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 208. It should be mentioned that Raz thinks morality cannot be exhausted by rights. There is more to morality than rights, and here he basically means individual rights. He argues that '[c]oncern for the individual expresses itself in love and friendship; it is reflected in the doctrine of virtue and in much else. But there is no right to have friends or to be loved, and none of the virtues can be understood in terms of rights.' Further, he does not believe that rights are more important than other matters of moral concern. Nevertheless, putting some interests in terms of rights merely shows that these interests should be protected when clashed with some other individual or common interests (Raz, "Disagreement in Politics," pp. 79-86). Furthermore Raz rejects the view that there is a fundamental division between principles concerning others' rights and those concerning personal goals. See *The Morality of Freedom*, chapter 8.

[45] Raz, "Disagreement in Politics," p. 47.

[46] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p.133.

[47] Aristotle, *The Politics*, Ernest. Barker (trans.), (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1958), p. 317.

2.1. Anti-perfectionism

Raz defends the principle of perfectionism by showing the implausibility of "anti-perfectionism." The latter is grounded on the intuitive suspicion that even the right moral ideas, when pursued by the concentrated power of governments or bureaucracies of the best type, are susceptible to distortion, and may backfire. The ideas of the dignity and autonomy of the individual are the basis of this concern. The doctrine of anti-perfectionism, alongside theories of right, responds to this concern by restricting government power and authority in implementing ideals of the good so that it cannot interfere with people's freedom.

Raz distinguishes two related forms of anti-perfectionism, namely, neutrality and the exclusion of ideals. Neutrality is the view that government actions must neither improve nor hinder the chance of individuals' adopting and implementing conceptions of the good. Raz argues that the neutrality between conceptions of the good should concern all matters relevant to the choice among them, viz., it should necessarily be a "comprehensive neutrality," as Rawls' two principles of equal liberty and difference are claimed to be. However, he finds the very idea of neutrality incoherent and thus chimerical, because any hypothetical situation of choice is from the point of view of a particular conception of the good, and any "base line" for judging neutrality is controversial. For instance, non-individualistic or cooperative

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[48] Raz, "Disagreement in Politics," p. 85.

conceptions of the good and even "so-called expensive tastes" are at a disadvantage in a Rawlsian justice.

On the other hand, the exclusion of ideals is intended not to base any political action on the conceptions of the good, whether right or wrong. However, it does not imply a total ban on using moral reason for justifying governmental actions. So it advocates dividing morality into two parts, namely ideals of the good and rights. Raz's point is that this distinction does not justify differentiated treatment of the two parts, especially when we note that both teleological and deontological considerations 'derive from a common moral core.'[49]

Raz concludes that while the intuitive sources of concern about perfectionism are sound, they do not justify anti-perfectionism. A political action cannot be neutral, and should promote the valid ideals of the good, while discouraging the repugnant ones. For him, coercion is not an unjustified means on some occasions, 'it can be genuinely for the good of the coerced and can even be sought by them.'[50] For example, the use of coercion by an ideal liberal state does not count as "insult to the autonomy of individuals," but it aims to ensure autonomy. Some governmental actions are, generally speaking, necessarily coercive. There are also some non-coercive measures, which a perfectionist government can use, and which are not direct assaults on one's autonomy and ability to be part creator of one's moral world. Moreover, perfectionism is not necessarily the imposition of one group's conception of the good on others, because we can conceive of perfectionist actions to pursue what commands unanimous support in the community. Raz also argues that perfectionism is compatible with moral pluralism; that is, one can choose between morally acceptable but incompatible options. Finally, for Raz, '[i]f individuals have moral duties to contribute to other persons and to promote certain ideals, then they are not being treated as means by being made [coercively or non-coercively] to live up to them.'[51]

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[49] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 137. For a full account of Raz's anti-perfectionism, see Ibid., part II.

[50] Ibid., p. 157.

To reinforce perfectionism, Raz remarks that '[s]upporting valuable forms of life is a social rather than an individual matter,'[52] and more importantly, many cherished aspects of our culture have no chance of survival under an anti-perfectionist rule. In this sense, perfectionism provides a theoretical ground for supporting cultures and particularly minority cultures, as we will see in the section on "Multiculturalism." Some people, however, argue that social support for valuable forms of life does not need to take a political and legal form. Waldron, for instance, believes that although Raz shows "the social character" of many liberal ideals, he cannot establish that 'valuable options require recognition through law and formal institutions of society in order to survive.'[53] Regarding Waldron's objection, it can be said that there are many values, albeit appreciated by society, whose survival entails direct government intervention. In this regard, the necessity of supporting "theatre" by state subsidies is but one example. Even accepting Waldron's argument does not rebut Raz's perfectionism, because we can conceive that people willingly give the state the mandate to support some valuable options by the means of law. In this aspect, perfectionism is intimately correlated with Raz's theory of authority which shows that pursuit of moral objectives by legal means is not unrestricted, but depends on

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[51] Ibid., p. 148.
[52] Ibid., p. 162.
[53] Waldron, "Autonomy And Perfectionism In Raz's Morality of Freedom," p. 1138.

'the merit of each case, or class of cases.'[54] It is his theory of authority to which we turn in the next section.

2.2. The Theory of Authority

Authority is a moral concept that justifies acting on somebody else's moral judgement rather than on one's own. Raz begins with a general theory of authority, which covers practical aspects of life, and concludes with a particular kind of it, that is, political authority. For him, it is reasonable to give pre-emptive force to the decisions of another person who usually reasons better than I do, that is, to make him an authority over myself, if this is the way to achieve the goal of performing 'up to the level of the other person.' However, "the condition of autonomy" requires that authority should be conferred in cases where a correct decision, or the likelihood of arriving at a correct decision, is more important than autonomous decision-making, or deciding for oneself.[55]

Regarding the concept of authority, Raz introduces three theses; the normal justification thesis, the dependence thesis and the pre-emption thesis. "The normal justification thesis," which is the foundation of authority, asserts that:

> *the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.*[56]

The dependence thesis says:

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[54] Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," p. 1231.

[55] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 69. For the condition of autonomy, also see Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," p. 1180.

[56] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 53.

> *all authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive.*[57]

The pre-emption thesis claims:

> *the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.*[58]

This pre-emptory feature distinguishes authoritative directives from "requests," and makes them obligatory. In this sense, by turning "oughts" into duties, authorities make a difference.[59] The pre-emptory force of authoritative directives requires that they should not be waived even if mistaken, unless the mistakes are about the limits of their jurisdiction.[60]

The above statements about authority's mistakes may suggest that those under authority should decide whether there is a mistake or not. This point can be extended in order to suggest that regarding the normal justification thesis, as well, it is the person under authority who decides whether the thesis applies to a certain authority in a particular case or not. Nevertheless, the problem is that there is no built-in mechanism in the normal justification thesis to show who is the one who decides whether or not the normal justification thesis applies in a case, or whether or not the dependence thesis has been adhered to. We can see that this problem reveals itself more emphatically in the case of political authority.

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[57] Ibid., p. 47. Raz is keen that the dependence thesis must not lead to the "no difference thesis" which means 'the exercise of authority should make no difference to what its subjects ought to do' (Ibid., p. 48). There are three ways that authorities make a difference; first, when there is no independent reason, authority can make a difference. Second, authorities establish and sustain conventions that are solution to co-ordination problems. Third, they can change situations where people have reason to change, but are unable to do so (such as prisoner dilemma situation). In this regard, authorities also change the reasons that people have had in the previous situation (Ibid., pp. 48-51).

[58] Ibid., p. 47.

[59] Ibid., p. 60.

[60] Ibid., p. 62.

The Authority of Government

Barring anarchism, other political theories admit the necessity of government for human societies. Although many statist theories do not consider the state in moral terms, some political philosophies try to give it moral substance. So for them, the concept of authority, as a moral relation between subjects and the government, is crucial. What makes government authority of a distinctive kind is that, in the exercise of authority, governments use coercion as a legitimate and exclusive means. *These political philosophies* try to justify coercive acts of the state in moral terms, and to find grounds for the right of the government to rule and for the obligation of citizens to obey its command and the law.

Raz denies that even in a reasonably just society there is a general obligation to obey the law.[61] Therefore, what we need is a reason for accepting the authority of the law. The normal justification thesis could provide us with such a reason. 'Only those trusted by the coerced can have the authority to use paternalistic coercion,' to force people to act morally, and to stop them from behaving immorally.[62] The reasons for trusting and accepting the authority of government, Raz argues, are that: the authority is "wiser," 'has a steadier will less likely to be tainted by bias, weakness or impetuosity,' is less likely to be self-defeating, and 'is in a better position to achieve ... what the individual has reason to but is in no position to achieve.' Furthermore, '[d]eciding for oneself what to do causes anxiety, exhaustion, or involves costs in time or resources the avoidance of which by following authority does not have significant drawbacks, and is therefore justified.'[63] Here, the public/private divide is of no significance. So long as there is a moral reason to comply with, whatever the sphere, one can follow authority's judgement rather than one's own.[64]

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[61] Ibid., p. 70.

[62] Joseph Raz, "Liberty and Trust," *Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality: Contemporary Essays*, Robert P. George (ed.), (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996), p. 123.

Although the normal justification thesis is the main argument for justifying the authority of a government, Raz argues that the authority that governments claim for themselves is more extensive than what can be justified by this thesis. "Consent" and "identification with the society" are secondary arguments that extend the authority of the state. However, consent and identification should be accorded to what is just and morally acceptable. They are limited by the normal justification thesis, in the sense that, for instance, they cannot give the government the authority to deprive people of their fundamental human rights.[65] Nevertheless, consent and identification extend the limits of authority, especially in those cases where it is neither more important to decide correctly than to decide for oneself, nor vice versa, but in the vast area between the two extremes.[66]

From Raz's account of the authority of the government it could be concluded that this authority is flexible. The scope of issues regarding which the government has authority over people varies from person to person, because people are different in terms of their knowledge, abilities, character, etc. Some prefer to follow authority in most cases and relieve themselves of the anxiety and strife of judging every case, for which they may even lack the necessary knowledge, whereas others may prefer to decide for themselves in many cases, and have the relevant knowledge. So the normal justification thesis entails the variation of the degree of the legitimacy of state authority over different people. This is even the case with the notion of identifying with the society, which is the expression of an organic relation between an individual and her society, and thus evokes respect for the law. In this regard, Raz points out that 'the attitude of respect for law is not universal.'[67] Furthermore, one can argue that the degree of people's consent to the state can vary from one person to another. Thus, the final result is the variation of the extent regarding which the government has authority over the governed. Obviously enough, this account of authority does not correspond with the ordinary understanding of government authority that depicts it as the same for all. It is a characteristic of modern law that it is impersonal and general.

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[63] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, Ibid., p. 75. Obviously '[i]f it is likely that the government will not judge such matters correctly then it has no authority to judge them at all' (Ibid., p. 412).
[64] For a brief explanation, see ibid., p.72.

Extra-authoritative Power of the State

Governments sometimes use their power outside the scope of their legitimate authority.[68] Apart from issuing authoritative directives, governments influence people's lives in at least two other ways; first by changing the social and physical environment in which people live, and second, by their punitive power. In both cases, government power applies even to those who do not accept its authority, and transcends the boundary of its legitimate authority. That is why Raz differentiates between the authority of the state and the scope of its justified power.[69] From subjects' point of view, the first way of government impact is inevitable and similar to the influence of private agents on their lives. Their compliance with state punitive

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[65] Ibid., pp. 90-94.

[66] Ibid., p. 93, and Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," p. 1183.

[67] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 105.

[68] Raz points out that '[t]here is no way of acting, politically or otherwise, in pursuit of ideals except by relying on the judgement of some people as to which ideals are valid, and imposing it on others who disagree' (Ibid., p. 158). This is, according to him, what authority is about.

power is sometimes grounded on prudential reasons or the concern that 'disobedience will do more harm than good.'[70] There could also be some moral considerations, such as "the duty to support just institutions." Raz explains that '[i]n many situations laws which violate human rights and oppress the population or sections of it cannot be broken without endangering the stability or even the very survival of relatively just institutions.'[71] Nevertheless, the moral duty to support just institutions is not always the case. From the authority's point of view, its enforcement of punitive law is justified because the very rationale of law is 'creating a centre of power which makes it possible to enforce moral duties,' and 'because the population at large is willing to see morality enforced, even in matters in which they are not subject to the authority of the government.'[72] However, this justification is insufficient. Not all claims of one part of a society, even the majority, on the whole society are legitimate.

Hence, the only ground remaining on which the punitive system of the state can be based is the harm principle. In such a case, a shared understanding of the harm principle and its implications in the society is necessary. Otherwise, the punitive influence of government on the lives of those who do not accept its authority cannot be justified. Put differently, there should be a consensus among people as to when and in which cases government can act without having the mandate of some part of the society (presumably, the criminal). Such a shared understanding is also the presupposition of "the duty to support just institutions," which, according to Raz, could be a reason that one accepts the extra-authoritative power of a government.

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[69] Ibid., p. 104.
[70] Ibid., p. 103.
[71] Ibid., p. 102.

That is, there must be a common understanding of *justice* and *just* institutions in the society. This presupposition itself presupposes a homogenous society, holding one and the same moral tradition. Hence, in culturally plural societies, Raz's conception of political authority runs into difficulties, and needs some modification in order to apply to heterogeneous societies.

It can be argued that a reason for the above defect in Raz's theory of political authority is its *individualistic* character. Although, for him, identification with a society or an institution is a subsidiary reason for legitimising its law, this identification appears in the form of a relationship between the individual *per se* and the authority or society. The individual as a *member* of society does not appear in Raz's account of governmental authority or the obligation to obey the law. It should also be mentioned that, as touched on earlier, there is no built-in mechanism in Raz's normal justification thesis regarding who should decide about the applicability of this thesis in the case of the authority of the government.

2.3. A Perfectionist Liberal Polity

In contrast to anti-perfectionist theories of liberalism, Raz suggests a perfectionist version that advocates the usage of political actions for the promotion of what is the distinctive concern of liberalism, namely, the ideal of autonomy. This is the ideal that individual freedom in choosing pursuits is an essential part of personal well-being, that a person should be part creator of his own life. He argues that personal autonomy is not a universal value,[73] but a culturally recognised one. It is also constituted differently in different societies.

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[72] Ibid., p. 103.
[73] Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," p. 1227.

Raz speaks of three conditions of autonomy, which are; first, mental ability and faculties necessary to comprehend, to form intentions, to plan, and to choose. Second, independence which means the lack of coercion and manipulation in the process of decision-making and formation of preferences. Lack of coercion means that, most of the time, one's choice must be dominated neither by the need to protect one's life, nor by the need to protect one's well-being. Coercion is the case when all but one option would involve the sacrifice of one's life or comprehensive goal or constitutive relationship. Hence, the final condition of autonomy is the availability of adequate options; that is, there must be a reasonable variety of options to choose from.[74] Since, for Raz, autonomy requires choice among goods, what makes autonomy possible is moral-pluralism, viz., the availability of incompatible but morally acceptable options each concerning a distinct virtue. In other words, 'valuing autonomy leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism.'[75] Therefore, besides the value of autonomy Raz recognises other substantive values. However, it should be noted that the necessity of an adequate range of morally valuable options does not mean that any particular option should be available.[76]

Raz argues that personal autonomy as one essential ingredient of the good life not only is consistent with perfectionism, but also calls for it to be facilitated, and the conditions for it provided through political means.[77] Generally, autonomy entails three categories of duties from one towards others. The first is to refrain from coercing or manipulating others. The second is to help others to acquire capacities, such as faculties, character traits and bodily health, necessary for conducting an autonomous life. Finally, an autonomy-based morality calls for providing an adequate range of options from which others can choose.[78] While the first duty is a negative one, the last two are positive. Perfectionist policies can be carried out in order to comply with these duties, and to create the aforementioned conditions of autonomy.

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[74] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, pp. 372-8.
[75] Ibid., p.399.
[76] Ibid., p. 410.

However, Raz does not explain why the ideal of autonomy gives rise to some duties, whereas other values in the western society do not. In other words, what is special about autonomy that it should be supported through state apparatus, while this is not the case for other values in western societies?[79]

Raz's perfectionism requires the eradication of immoral options through public policies. This is because autonomy is 'valuable only if exercised in the pursuit of the good.'[80] The intrinsic value of autonomy cannot make good those repugnant or immoral options that are autonomously chosen. Furthermore, the intuitive response is that '[t]he wrongdoing casts a darker shadow on its perpetrator if it is autonomously done by him.'[81] One reservation in this regard, however, is that harmless but

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[77] Ibid., p. 426.

[78] Ibid., pp. 407-8. Raz also justifies these duties on the basis of his interpretation of the harm principle. See ibid., pp. 412-24.

[79] See, for instance, Gerald Dworkin, "Book Review [of *The Morality of Freedom*]," *Ethics*, vol. 98, no. 4, (July 1988), p. 852.

[80] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 381. See also Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, p. 161.

[81] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 380. This has given rise to the objection that there is an inconsistency in Raz. On the one hand, autonomy is considered intrinsically valuable, and, on the other, it is regarded valuable only when the good is chosen. (See, for instance, Regan, "Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom," p. 1084; and also John Martin Fischer, "Book Review [of *The Morality of Freedom*]," *The Philosophical Review*, vol. XCVIII, no. 2, (April 1989), p. 257). Raz's response is that autonomy is intrinsically valuable as a constituent of options which are good in themselves. By removing other elements of the good, 'it may turn worthless or bad' (Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," p. 1229, footnote no. 162).

repugnant options should be discouraged by non-coercive means, viz., they should not be criminalised.[82]

The Scope of State Perfectionism

We have learned how and under which conditions the perfectionist policies of a liberal state must be implemented. Observing "the autonomy condition," three theses of authority, and not violating individual fundamental rights, etc. are among these conditions. Given the intimate correlation between Raz's theory of political authority and his account of perfectionism, we have seen that the distinction between public and private, which for some liberals draws the boundary of the state's intervention, has not much relevance in his political theory. However, the problem is that in a liberal society, and perhaps nowadays in every society, there is a plurality of valuable options to be followed. So, not all people choose the same value options. Then the question arises as to whether the government can impose the burden of some people's ideal of the good on those who have different ideals.

Raz's theory is ambiguous in this regard. On the one hand, he speaks of the extra-authoritative power of the state that somehow allows governments to influence some people's lives when pursuing others' value options.[83] On the other, his theory of authority is flexible from one person to another. Further, in a Razian liberal society whose political system is based on supporting individual autonomy, and necessarily embraces value pluralism, there is no reason why the burden of the majority's wish to pursue one particular ideal of the good (e.g. excellence in art or sport) should be borne by others. Only those ideals of the good that are shared by all people (presumably individual autonomy in the case of the liberal society) can be pursued publicly. So, government actions and public funding are legitimate only in such cases. The conclusion is that Raz's perfectionism should be very limited in scope. That is, state promotion of moral values should be restricted to what is unanimously accepted by members of a society. The limitation of the scope of state perfectionism would be intensified in multicultural societies, since there is less consensus on moral values in these societies.

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[82] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 418. This point has been subject to many objections. It has been argued that all government actions are, in the last resort, coercive. Also, all these actions, coercive or not, change the initial balance of reasons for choosing an option (See Waldron, "Autonomy And Perfectionism In Raz's Morality of Freedom," pp. 1139-52; and also Regan, "Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom," p. 1082). It can be said that Raz overstates the distinction between coercive and non-coercive means in eradicating harmless immoralities. In other words, if we accept perfectionism, and if a government has an authority to discourage harmless immoralities, it can use both coercive and non-coercive means. At least, Raz's moral theory does not, in principle, entail choosing the latter at the expense of the former.

[83] We have, however, seen that neither Raz's individualistic account of authority, nor any other part of his political philosophy, could justify such influence.

Moralising the Political

Tension in Raz's account of perfectionism and political authority leads us to the criticism that his political philosophy is a formula for rationalising or moralising politics completely and stripping the political of its autonomy. Raz's theory of authority indicates that all political issues, in the final analysis, can or should be dealt with discursively. Hence, there is not much room for *deciding* as such. Creative power of politics and its specific logic, autonomous from that of philosophy and morality, are disregarded. It is assumed that regarding political issues a universal rational consensus can be achieved. According to Noël O'Sullivan, Raz takes for granted 'the possibility of a consensual style of politics based on an apolitical concept of reason as providing, in suitably qualified form, a suprapolitical Archimedean point from which to establish an objective, unitary conception of justice by which government may be judged.'[84] As Chantal Mouffe notices, it is a liberal tenet that 'people should not be made to accept institutions and arrangements on grounds that they could reasonably reject. Political discussion needs therefore to be constrained by rules that determine the type of convictions that can be appealed to in argumentation.'[85]

Raz can be criticised at two levels. Firstly, he could be accused of claiming that liberal principles for ruling the society can be arrived at, intellectually and through rational consensus, without excluding any reasonable human being. This is the charge that people like Mouffe and Richard Bellamy make against contemporary liberalism as a whole.[86] It has also been said that liberalism's claim of rational consensus in the case of rights has led to their constitutional entrenchment, and put them out of the reach of politics and the democratic influences. Regarding Raz, O'Sullivan sees in his theory of political authority a neglect of deep-seated diversity that makes arriving at an incontestable rational and moral ideal impossible. Secondly, it can be said that Raz's view of authority and perfectionism is based on the rational consensus at the level of public policies, and neglects conflict and competition within a political unit. More importantly, he disregards the possibility that through democratic processes societies may adopt collective goals which are not desirable to all members to the same extent.

Although Raz speaks of a rational and sound normative theory of politics, he distances himself from the Platonic tradition, and somehow acknowledges the autonomy of the political. For instance, he observes that the application of his theory of politics is a pragmatic issue responsive to economic, social, cultural, and other circumstances. More importantly, he warns against overestimating the power of reason and morality in politics, and against the hope that "applied concrete principles" can be derived from abstract norms by reference to circumstances. Such an overestimation 'encourages the wrong attitudes to politics, ... and a misguided belief in the skills required of politicians. It tends to be disdainful of constraints which are institutional, or political in nature, and which do not appear to be derivable from first principles. It encourages dogmatism and lack of tolerance in the practice of politics.'[87]

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[84] Noël O'Sullivan, "Power, Authority and Legitimacy: A Critique of Postmodern Thought," *Political Theory in Transition*, Noël O'Sullivan (ed.), (Routledge: London and New York, 2000), p. 143.

[85] Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, (Verso: London and New York, 1993), p. 139.

[86] For Bellamy's view, see Richard Bellamy, *Liberalism and Modern Society*, (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1992), pp. 256-61, and also Richard Bellamy, *Rethinking Liberalism*, (Pinter: London and New York, 2000).

Specifically about the first criticism, Raz argues that "rights" are not necessarily outside politics, political conflicts and compromises and political decision-making.[88] Conceptions of rights can be challenged, and entrenching them in the constitution and entrusting courts to protect them are merely matters of division of labour, contingent on the feature of these rights, such as their greater stability, the necessity of their being settled through argument rather than interest group coalitions, and facilitating their accessibility to the disenfranchised.[89] Fundamental political principles of a society are mainly the products of history and culture, and indicate people's sense of belonging to a community rather than a rational consensus.[90] This means that they are disputable, particularly through political processes, in the broad sense, and are subjects of contest and compromise. The second criticism of Raz seems more relevant. His service theory of authority, which is grounded on a better compliance with reasons already applying to those under authority, does not leave much room for democratic interplay of political agents. More importantly, it is a corollary of this theory that goals which are not to the same degree ethically acceptable for all citizens cannot be justifiably pursued by the state. This view is not only at odds with the reality of political life in all liberal societies, but also chimerical.

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[87] Raz, "Disagreement in Politics," p. 49.
[88] Ibid., p. 84.
[89] Ibid., pp. 90-5

At the end of this section on Raz's political philosophy, it can be concluded that, given his moral theory of combining universalism and cultural conventions, every political structure is tied up with a particular culture. A perfectionist politics, in particular, supports or pursues culturally embedded conceptions of the good through public institutions. The difficulty, however, is how such a perfectionist state can promote certain conceptions of the good in a society marked by diversity without undermining its legitimacy. In the next section, we see how Raz addresses the problems of culturally diverse societies and minority cultures.

3. Multiculturalism

Not only Raz's moral theory of reconciling universal and cultural elements, and his politics of promoting goods, but also his response to multiculturalism distinguishes him from most other liberals. His account of multiculturalism is grounded on the role ascribed, in his moral theory, to cultures in shaping moral values, and his perfectionist political philosophy allows him to support cultures by state apparatus. Nevertheless, this account is not free from liberal biases, which restrict the recognition of other cultures. Also, it can be said that Raz's multiculturalism has an individualistic leaning that focuses on the significance of

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[90] Ibid., p. 90.

cultures for individuals, and hence moral demands of individuals in this regard, rather than moral claims of cultural communities on individual members and others.

To begin with, let us see how he defines "multiculturalism." Raz uses the term in two different but related senses, namely, as the description of a reality, that is, a type of society, and second, as a policy appropriate to that kind of society. In the former meaning, multiculturalism is 'the existence within the same political society of a number of sizeable cultural groups wishing and in principle able to maintain their distinct identity.'[91] Perhaps, in this meaning, it would be better to speak of "multicultural societies." In the second sense, multiculturalism is 'a policy of saying yes to this situation.'[92] From the beginning, Raz mentions that his account addresses only those multicultural societies in which different communities are not geographically separated. Therefore, although he chooses to consider a complex type of multicultural society to examine, his account is incomplete, since it does not cover the problems of territorially concentrated cultural communities, which are pressing in cases like Quebec.

Toleration

He observes that liberals so far have introduced three ways of dealing with the phenomenon of multiculturalism. The first way has been "toleration," based on prudential as well as moral grounds. Toleration 'consists in letting minorities conduct themselves as they wish without being criminalized, so long as they do not interfere with the culture of the majority.' The concept of toleration implies that even if minorities are wrong in their conduct, they should be tolerated because of some other considerations, such as public peace, harmony, the harm principle, and the legitimacy of the government.[93] However, toleration has its limitations. The restriction of minorities' access to public spaces and public media, and the necessity of funding the activities of minorities out of their own resources while they contribute to the maintenance of the dominant culture, by paying tax, are limitations of this approach to multiculturalism.[94] It can be added that the sense of guilt imposed on minorities from the majority's point of view, which is implied by the notion of toleration, is another drawback.[95]

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[91] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," pp. 173-4.

Non-Discrimination Rights

The second response of liberals to cultural plurality has been "non-discrimination rights." This approach goes beyond toleration, and is the 'natural extension of the classical liberal conception of constitutional civil and political rights.' Based on this policy, 'a country's public services, its education, and its economic and political arenas are no longer the preserve of the majority, but common to all members as individuals.'[96] All people are entitled to a set of rights, irrespective of their conception of the good that is presumably taken from their culture. However, the non-discrimination rights policy, too, has its own limitation. Raz sees in this policy an "individualistic bias."[97] That is, it treats people as individuals, and not as members of a community. What makes the problem worse is that, as Taylor and

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[92] Ibid., p.158.

[93] Ibid., p.157.

[94] Ibid., p. 157.

[95] Raz argues that one is tolerant only if one inclines or is tempted not to be; and this is so, because intolerant inclination is worthwhile or desirable, and the tolerant person feels antagonism towards, or dislikes, what has been tolerated. See, Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 403.

[96] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 158.

[97] Ibid., p. 159.

many others have said, this policy claims to be neutral, whereas it is not. Right-based theories presuppose the liberal culture, though they pretend to be neutral.[98]

Before turning to the third policy, it should be mentioned that Raz has missed out an earlier liberal policy regarding other cultures and especially minorities in liberal societies, viz., the "assimilationist policy" to which he has shown some sympathy in *The Morality of Freedom.*[99] This approach not only endorses the superiority of liberalism over other moral traditions, but also assumes a missionary duty regarding other cultures. According to Mill's linear understanding of the nature of societies, those "mature" societies of the West in which individuals possess "individuality" and reason and cherish diversity have the right to "absorb," assimilate and dominate inferior Eastern groups that lack individuality and are under despotic customs.[100] The assimilationist approach has been loosened, and it has softened its missionary claims in the twentieth century, but preserved its tone regarding minority cultures *within* western societies.

It can be said that the common core of the aforementioned approaches is that they treat minority cultures *only* according to *liberal principles*. In all of them, liberal standards are used to evaluate the claims of minorities on the dominant liberal society, and to devise the relevant policies, without taking minorities' own moral view into account.[101] For instance, in "toleration" and "non-discriminatory rights," the strict distinction between public and private (as interpreted by liberals) is preserved, and while minorities are left alone in the private realm, liberal principles govern public life. Now, let us see what other conceptual tools liberalism, from Raz's point of view, has at its disposal for dealing with the plurality of moral traditions, and whether they fall prey to the same deficiencies as the previous policies did.

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[98] See Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*, Amy Gutmann (ed.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 43.

[99] See, Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, pp. 423-4. As it is suggested later in this chapter, Raz's thought has gone through a change in this aspect. Hence, in his recent writings, he speaks of multiculturalism, as will be seen.

[100] Bhikhu Parekh, "Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism from Mill to Rawls," *Times Literary Supplement*, (Feb. 25, 1994). p. 11.

3.1. Affirmation of Multiculturalism

Raz argues that "toleration" and "non-discrimination rights" could be the supplements of a third policy, that is, "the affirmation of multiculturalism," or multiculturalism as a policy. It requires the recognition of 'the equal standing of all the stable and viable cultural communities' existing in a multicultural society, and emphasises that the state or political society belongs to all of them.[102] Drawing upon his moral philosophy, Raz bases multiculturalism on two grounds.

> First, the belief that individual freedom and prosperity depend on full and unimpeded membership in a respected and flourishing cultural group.... Second, multiculturalism arises out of a belief in value pluralism, and in particular in the validity of the diverse values embodied in the practices which constitute the diverse and in many ways incompatible values of different societies.[103]

As we have seen, from Raz's point of view, cultures and particularly social forms play an important role in constituting values and value options of people. Meaningful pursuits and relationships on which one's well-being is dependent are socially defined.[104] So, without the cultural community neither would there be any value, nor would well-being be achieved. Consequently, since it is our duty to protect and

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[101] In "assimilationist" and "toleration" policies, other cultures are evaluated on the ground of liberal values, and in the former, other cultures are not even tolerated.

[102] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 159.

[103] Ibid., p. 159.

[104] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 309.

promote people's well-being, however "misguided and worthless" are their beliefs and ways of life,[105] there is a case for a multicultural policy of recognising and supporting various cultures existing in a society.

Raz's second ground for multiculturalism, viz., the plurality of morally valuable but incompatible options, is the repudiation of the possibility of reducing all values to one value. The ultimate and ineradicable plurality of valuable activities is based on the notion of incommensurability. As seen before, we cannot compare incommensurate options, because we run out of reason; and there is no additional information that makes comparison possible. There is a state of indeterminacy; and this is the ultimate truth.[106] Given that social forms constitute value options, incommensurability also applies between cultures. Different cultures give rise to incompatible conceptions of the good. Hence, moral pluralism appears at both inter-cultural and intra-cultural levels.[107]

The plurality and incommensurability of values are reasons why Raz distinguishes between toleration and multiculturalism. The former is to refrain from eliminating errors in another culture, whereas the latter goes beyond that and denies that the other culture is necessarily in error. It considers that the other culture may simply realise universal values in a different way.[108] Hence, Raz's multiculturalism calls for a "moral sensitivity" that 'warns us against the dangers of each one of us understanding the universal in terms of him- or her-self.' This is a moral sensitivity 'which takes more seriously the otherness of the other, a sensibility which stops us from forcing our own ways on the other.'[109]

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[105] Raz, "Liberty and Trust," p. 126.

[106] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 327.

[107] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," pp. 164-5. As mentioned before, the incommensurability of value options should not be seen as incommensurability of cultures and impossibility of conversation between them. Raz argues that '[m]ulticulturalism gives rise to problems of communication and of comprehension. But there is something to communicate and something to comprehend. There is a morality which applies to all the traditions and all the cultures, a morality which bridges the divide between them' (Raz, "Moral Change and Social Relativism," p. 158).

[108] Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 205.

Raz also puts forward another argument for the significance of culture that is related to his point about the cultural determination of values. He argues that

> It is impossible to conduct one's life on the basis of explicit and articulated rules to govern all aspects of one's conduct. The density of our activities, their multiplicity of dimensions and aspects make it impossible to consider and decide deliberately on all of them. A lot has to be done, so to speak, automatically.[110]

These automatic activities are chosen from options that form a 'coherent meaningful whole,' and 'are available only to those who have or can acquire practical knowledge of them, that is, knowledge embodied in social practices and transmitted by habituation.'[111] Besides supplying ways of conduct, cultures facilitate social relations among people within the community.

Cultures are of vital importance for individuals, because they provide them with valuable and meaningful options and opportunities, and also with pre-defined patterns of behaviours. Hence, breaking the relationship between a person and his culture for any reason is disastrous for the person, unless he has already willingly established a substitute relationship with another culture. Some people may say that we are allowed to let minority, and presumably inferior, cultures die, be absorbed, or even be destroyed, if we let their members adopt the dominant culture. Raz answers that the very point of multiculturalism is that 'people's ability to retrain and adapt are

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[109] Ibid., pp. 196-7 and 205.
[110] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 161.
[111] Ibid., p. 162.

[sic] limited.'[112] Moreover, insults and other problems of adaptation are not even "transitional" so as to be limited to the first generation. 'Given the fact that parents are the most formative influence on children, if the problem is one of transition then the transition is stretched out over many generations.'[113] It can be added that those who think that adaptation is a transitional matter think that individuals are beings without memory and history. The descendants of the colonised and the colonial peoples feel not much less ashamed than their antecedents.

Raz argues that the very idea of letting a culture die amounts to downgrading its members. Even in the case of one's attempt to 'shed any trace' of one's culture and to immerse in another, Raz argues that '[w]e tend to find such a course of action undignified. We suspect that those who so behave lack self-respect or self-esteem.' Notwithstanding,

> Members can disown their group and try to assimilate in the majority group - and we should certainly enable them to do so. Or they can strive to change their group. But they cannot responsibly wish for its extinction. Outsiders can, and members can when they see themselves as outsiders. But, particularly horrendous groups excepted, we should not do so precisely because we are outsiders.[114]

What makes the argument about absorbing, assimilating or letting a culture die absurd is another reason for the importance of culture in Raz's writings. That is, cultures constitute the identity of their members. They inform others' perceptions and responses to us, and hence frame our self-identity. They provide people with an 'anchor for self-identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging.'[115]

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[112] Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 200.

[113] Ibid., p. 201.

[114] Joseph Raz, "Reform or Destroy," *Boston Review*, (October/November 1997), p. 39.

[115] Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination," *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, Joseph Raz (ed.), (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), p. 118. See also, ibid., pp. 115-117.

People's sense of dignity is correlated with their identifying themselves as members of a particular culture.

3.2. Multicultural Policies

Multiculturalism as a normative approach in dealing with cultural diversity in a society has several dimensions. Given the importance of cultures to the prosperity of individual human beings, there is a moral demand for respect for cultures.[116] The richness and prosperity of a culture contribute to the fulfilment of its functions, as described above. Raz argues that concern for the dignity and well-being of all human beings calls for 'a political attitude of fostering and encouraging the prosperity, cultural and material, of cultural groups, and respecting their identity.'[117] Public action for the support of cultures should, however, cover only those that are viable. 'There is no point in trying to prop up by public action cultures which have lost their vitality, which have become moribund and whose communities - usually their young members - drift away from them.'[118] This is because Raz does not take the existence of cultures "to be a good in itself,"[119] though his moral theory implies that cultures are of intrinsic value, since they constitute the individual's identity and are the context of meaning for him or her.[120]

Given that cultures constitute people's sense of identification, and given that people identify themselves with a multiplicity of groupings and institutions, these various senses of identification should not be incompatible. They must support each other. We have already seen that a factor for establishing political authority is the sense of identification with the state. Raz remarks that "the heart of the matter" in maintaining a political unity among a group of people is 'free and willing identification with the political society they belong to.' Thus, identification with a political society 'does not replace, but incorporates identification with other groups in that society.' It requires respect for members and consequently for their culture and religion.[121] There should not be a conflict between people's feelings of identification with their culture and with their state.

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[116] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 163, see also Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 197.
[117] Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 197.
[118] Ibid., p. 198.
[119] Raz, "Reform or Destroy," p. 38.
[120] For Raz's definition of intrinsic goods see footnote no. 38 in this chapter.

The society owes members of minority cultures the ability to feel at home in the society.[122] Therefore, 'slighting one's culture, persecuting it, holding it up for ridicule, slighting its value, etc., affect members of that group. Such conducts hurt them and offend their dignity. This is particularly offensive if it has the imprimatur of one's state or of the majority or official culture of one's country.'[123] Hostile and critical portrayals of minority cultures can undermine the public acceptability of those cultures in the society at large.[124]

If fundamental values and necessary aspects of one's way of life are regarded as worthless and prohibited by the government, one can neither trust the government to take one's values and interests into account, nor grant it political authority.[125] Hence, Raz points out that

> To feel part of a society, to be a full citizen of it one must be able to profess one's basic beliefs, and conduct one's life in accordance with them and with one's deepest feeling without fear of criminal sanctions, legal or social discrimination, or social ridicule or persecution.[126]

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[121] Raz, "Multiculturalism," pp. 203-4.
[122] Ibid., p. 199.
[123] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p.163.
[124] Raz, "Freedom of Expression and Personal Identification," pp. 149-50.
[125] Raz, "Liberty and Trust," p. 127.
[126] Ibid., p. 126.

He goes on to say that, so far as is possible, people should not be forced to act against their conscience. To force people to act immorally, as they conceive it, is an offence, and amounts to treating them as second-class citizens. Thus, their fundamental religious or cultural convictions and preferences should be respected by public authorities.[127]

In order to avoid situations in which people are systematically prevented from relying on their own moral values, state policies should be modified in such a way that they accommodate the claims of those who disagree with them. This even includes unreasonable disagreements, in the sense that their "unreasonableness" should not 'limit the way public action should be modified in light of their currency in the country.'[128] This does not mean that Raz subscribes to the doctrine of political neutrality or any other theory of 'radical restraint in the face of disagreement over principles.' He regards the way of dealing with these disagreements as a part of a sound theory of politics. Therefore, the principles on the basis of which dissenting claims of other cultural groups are to be accommodated are not necessarily accepted by all.[129] The point is that only *some* disagreements and *some* mistaken views of others should be taken into account. Moreover, it can be mentioned that since access to values is 'decisive in evaluations which presuppose responsibility,'[130] this type of evaluation of people's actions, life or character should not be done irrespective of their cultural beliefs and practices.

Raz specifically suggests five policies which multiculturalism requires. First, the education of the young, while publicly funded, should proceed within a cultural community. Nevertheless, the young of each culture should also be acquainted with other cultures existing in their society, and should be trained to respect them. Second, different customs and practices of cultural communities should be recognised in the law and by all public institutions and private organisations so far as they serve the public. This should be done within the limits of toleration, to which we turn later. Third, 'the link between poverty, undereducation, and ethnicity' should be broken in order that, for the members of minority cultures, the cultivation of self-respect and the feeling of pride in their culture become a real possibility. Fourth, "autonomous cultural institutions" of each group should be supported and, based on the size of the group, funded through public resources. Fifth, all cultural groups should have their proportional shares in public spaces (e.g. universities, TV, etc.)[131]

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[127] Raz, "Disagreement in Politics," p. 51.
[128] Ibid., p. 47.
[129] Ibid., pp. 43, 47 and 51-2.

As mentioned, the requirements of the two other approaches to cultural diversity, that is, toleration and non-discrimination rights, can be supplements of these policies. So not criminalizing cultural communities' practices and granting equal political, civil and social rights to their members should be added to the above policies which are basically group-oriented. Obviously enough, there are many practical considerations that ought to be taken into account when implementing these policies.

Raz argues that '[w]e should learn to think of our societies as consisting not of a majority and minorities, but of a plurality of cultural groups.'[132] Despite all differences, however, he believes that a kind of common culture, though limited, could, and must, be found in a multicultural society. Cultivation of toleration and respect is one element of this common culture. Interaction of members of all cultures

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[130] Raz, "Notes on Value and Objectivity," pp. 151-2.
[131] For multicultural policies, see Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 174-5.
[132] Ibid., p. 174

in the same economy, and the necessity of possessing the same skills required in the economy, provide the second element of the common culture. Participation in the same political arena and process of decision-making, and the use of the same sources of political power, political language and "political convention of conduct," generate the third component of the common culture.[133] Also, members of a multicultural society must be able to understand and empathise with each other. All this is possible when members of various cultural groups can identify themselves with such a society.

We can easily see that all these elements of common culture are raised by the necessities of multicultural coexistence. Those cultures that, for whatever reason, consent to live in a multicultural society, imply that they are ready to accept the requirements of such coexistence, like avoiding conflict, co-operating, or making some kinds of sacrifice for the society. Raz finds the necessities of living in a multicultural society and the wish to be identified with the overall political society sufficient grounds for empathy with each others' experiences, aspirations and anxieties and for sacrifice (e.g., in the form of redistribution or otherwise).[134] Moreover, it is plausible to say that the authority of the state, and particularly its extra-authoritative power, in a multicultural society are bound to be based on these necessities, plus shared moral beliefs among existing cultures in the society.

3.3. Limits of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism, apart from its claims on the political authority and supposedly majority liberal culture, has also some claims on all existing cultural communities in a society. These claims, according to Raz, should lead to some changes in the attitude of the constituent cultures. This is particularly the case for those attitudes that have been developed in isolation and on the basis of ignorance of other cultures. Multiculturalism calls on existing cultures to be 'aware of different cultures in their society, and learn to appreciate their strengths and respect them,' as well as to tolerate each other.[135] Multiculturalism also, argues Raz, insists on 'a right of exit, that is, the right of each individual to abandon his cultural group.'[136]

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[133] Ibid., p. 173.

While the call for acquaintance with, respect for, and toleration of other cultures is plausible because they are necessities of coexistence of various cultural communities together, the grounds of Raz's call for a right to exit are not clear. Is the right to exit a requirement of living in a multicultural society, or just a liberal value smuggled into multiculturalism? Raz must prove that the right to exit is either a shared norm among various cultures in a society (which is basically a contextual issue and depends on the actual cases), or a requirement of multicultural coexistence *per se*.

On one occasion, Raz suggests that the peaceful coexistence of community cultures requires the right to exit. He argues that

> peaceful coexistence and participation in one political society require becoming acquainted with the customs of all the people and ethnic groups in one's country. This creates opportunities, sometimes it creates the temptation, to drift out of one's native cultural group and into another. Attempts to prevent people from having these opportunities undermine the possibility of mutual peaceful existence.[137]

However, Raz's argument is not convincing, because peace could be sustained in some other ways. Ironically, peace can be sustained by barring any exit, as the

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[134] See Raz, "Multiculturalism," pp. 202-3.
[135] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 166.
[136] Ibid., p. 166. Also see Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 199.
[137] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 172.

historical example of the Ottoman Empire has shown. Supposing a culture bans any exit while liberals allow it, none of these moral approaches (regarding the right of exit) is preferable to the other in a multicultural polity, unless we have some other reasons.

It is possible to trace in Raz's multiculturalism another argument for justifying the right to exit. In his discussion of oppression, Raz argues that most cultures are repressive to a lesser or greater degree. So '[o]pportunities of exit should be encouraged as a safeguard, however imperfect, for members who cannot develop and find adequate avenues for self-expression within their native culture.'[138] However, this argument is also problematic, because, as Raz himself maintains, it is not necessary that a culture provides all valuable options; so long as it provides its members with an adequate range of valuable options it is enough (at least so far as *autonomy* is concerned).[139] Consequently, the right to exit is not easy to be established with reference to individuals' need for self-expression. Moreover, we can sometimes conceive of limiting individuals' right of self-expression because of the good of the cultural community. In the case of freedom of speech and the right of expression, Raz himself remarks that when used for hostile portrayal of a culture, they can have the consequence of undermining its public acceptability. Nevertheless, he thinks that this does not justify censoring critical or antagonistic views about a culture, in so far as these are private acts of condemnation.[140] However, it is

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[138] Ibid.

[139] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, p. 410.

[140] Raz remarks that

> acts of expression have consequences, even as acts of expression, for the life of others. One important interest which all people share is an interest in the character of their environment, cultural and social as well as physical. It is short-sighted to condemn the reaction of the Muslim community to a culture which is critical of their religion as meddling in things which are of no concern to them, since they can avoid reading the

implausible to argue that the individual right to express hostile views against some cultures cannot be limited, even if expressing such views has some critical consequences for members of those cultures.

Of course, as Raz maintains, if a cultural community *structurally* 'frustrates the ability of people, or groups of people, to give expression to an important aspect of their nature within that society,' the case would be different, and the right to exit could be justified.[141] Suppose those aspects of people's nature, the frustration of which justifies the right to exit, can easily be distinguished. In such cases, however, the imposition of "the right to exit" on a culture is grounded on the basis of a universal moral principle which is of such importance that even if the relevant culture does not acknowledge its value, we feel justified in the imposition of the right to exit. In these cases, the justification of the imposition of the right to exit goes beyond common citizenship, whether multicultural or not, and draws upon a crucial value which is thought to be universal. Put differently, if we cannot justify our moral duty to interfere with minority cultures in order to enforce some moral principles, such as the right to exit, by referring to common humanity, common citizenship cannot be a basis for such interference.

This point does not amount to the rejection of any claim based on common citizenship in a multicultural society. After all, the project of multiculturalism is all about such claims. The point is that, in cases of dispute between various cultural and moral traditions in one society, when the dispute cannot be resolved by reference to the shared values or the requirements of multicultural citizenship, the moral view of

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offensive literature.... These facts do undermine the public acceptability of ... Muslim culture (Raz, "Freedom of Expression and Personal Identification," pp. 149-50).

one culture as such should not be preferred by the state, and justify interfering with the other. However, if what is at stake is so salient that it justifies intervention regardless of the values of the other culture, the justification for it is common humanity rather than citizenship in a multicultural society. In other words, in such cases we are as justified to condemn, to intervene and to impose some moral views on other cultures in our society, as we are to do so regarding other societies in the world. For instance, the moral justification for imposing some universal moral principles on enslaving cultures in our multicultural society is the same as the moral justification for imposing those principles on a culture in a remote part of the world. Obviously, if the violating community culture is part of our state, practically we are in a better position to intervene, yet the moral reason is the same, regardless of whether the disputant cultures live in one society or not. In a nutshell, minority cultures within a society are somewhat similar to foreign countries in terms of justifying intervention.

In less extreme cases of oppression, it is not sufficient to ask other cultures to observe the right to exit simply because it is regarded as universal (for instance, by the liberal culture). Nor do all universal claims allow interference with the affairs of others who do not believe in them. Universal moral values are always claims of a particular moral tradition; and in a multicultural society only those normative claims are applicable that either are requirements of peaceful coexistence in a multicultural society, or are based on overlapping consensus among existing cultures in the society. Only those universal moral principles, such as prohibiting slavery, which we

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[141] Generally speaking, Raz argues that 'all cultural communities should be denied the right to repress their own members' (Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 199). However, he does not make it clear what he means by repression.

consider so important that they trump other moral considerations can form the basis for interfering with other cultures, even though the latter do not accept them.

Nevertheless, Raz argues that while liberal multiculturalism 'respects a variety of cultures, it refuses to take them at their own estimation. It has its own reasons for respecting cultures, ... it does so while imposing liberal protection of individual freedom on those cultures.'[142] Although it is plausible not to take (other) cultures at their own estimation when justifying the project of multiculturalism *from within one's moral tradition*, the imposition of what is valuable only for one culture on others in a multicultural society is untenable. Though Raz's notion of autonomy is not the exact equivalent of the right to exit, his reasoning in the defence of the right to exit makes Regan's critique of him plausible. Regan accuses Raz of establishing autonomy as 'a constituent of well-being in a society like ours,' while treating it as if 'the unconditional value of autonomy' has been established.[143] In the same vein, Susan Mendus and Richard Bellamy find Raz's model of a perfectionist liberal society 'curiously intolerant and illiberal,' since it allows tolerance only between autonomous lives. This model is, in particular, regarded as untenable for multicultural societies.[144] To sum up, though the right to exit is intuitively appealing, Raz's arguments are not sufficient to establish it.

Raz vaguely expresses another limitation imposed by his theory of multiculturalism, that is, 'liberal multiculturalism will also require all groups to allow their members access to adequate opportunities for self-expression and participation in the economic life of the country, and the cultivation of the attitudes and skills required for effective participation in the political culture of the community.'[145] To be sure, the whole project of multiculturalism is about minorities' access to public, including political and economic, spheres of a society. However, the terms and conditions of this access (by the members of different cultures) and whether its extent is adequate or not, should not be determined by the majority liberal culture. Apart from minority cultures' own standards, overlapping consensus of existing cultures and the requirements of multicultural citizenship should be the criteria for deciding in this regard. Unfortunately, the brevity and vagueness of Raz's discussion in this respect makes his point difficult to assess.

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[142] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 167-8.
[143] Regan, "Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom," p. 1077.
[144] Bellamy, *Liberalism and Modern Society*, pp. 247-8, and Bellamy, *Rethinking Liberalism*, p. xi.

3.4. Assessing Other Cultures

Raz's affirmation of multiculturalism persuades us to look at his assessment of other cultures. To begin with, Raz's assumption in *The Morality of Freedom* is that cultures that do not support autonomy are "inferior." So he calls for 'taking action to assimilate the minority group, at the cost of letting its culture die or at least be considerably changed by absorption.'[146] For Raz, the only reasons for toleration and a decrease in the pace of assimilation are practical ones.

However, Bhikhu Parekh, who has seen the dark shadow of the Millian missionary legacy on the assimilationist views of Raz in *The Morality of Freedom,*[147] suggests that Raz's attitude has altered in his "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective." Raz no longer believes in inherent inferiority of other cultures that do not support autonomy. He argues that

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[145] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 175, and Raz, "Multiculturalism," p. 199.
[146] Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, pp. 423-4.
[147] Parekh, "Superior People," p. 12.

> I believe that very often judgements about inferiority of other cultures are based on bigotry and ignorance, and that in truth many cultures simply cannot be compared in those terms. Each of them is valuable. Each of them can be improved in a way consistent with its own spirit and out of its resources. But none of them can be judged superior to the others.[148]

Interestingly, Raz's later view about other cultures is more in line with his moral philosophy, incommensurability of value options and the role of cultures in constituting values. As we have seen, while Raz maintains that autonomy is an intrinsic value, and bases his political morality on it, he acknowledges that autonomy is not a "universal value." In other words, well-being is not fundamentally contingent on autonomy, or lack of personal autonomy is not tantamount to lack of good life. He adds

> I think that there were, and there can be, non-repressive societies, and ones which enable people to spend their lives in worthwhile pursuits, even though their pursuits and the options open to them are not subject to individual choice. ... I do not see that the absence of choice diminishes the value of human relations or the display of excellence in technical skills, physical ability, spirit and enterprise, leadership, scholarship, creativity, or imaginativeness, which can all be encompassed in such lives.
>
> Of course, to succeed in such lives one's socialisation has to succeed, and one must engage in the various pursuits wholeheartedly. But it is a mistake to think that what is chosen is more likely to attract our dedication or involvement than what is not.[149]

Therefore, it is not the case that an autonomous life is necessarily better than other forms of life. This conclusion is also congruent with his acceptance of other values beside freedom and value pluralism.

4. Conclusion

The dependence of values on social forms and its corollary, namely, the vitality of the cultural community for individual well-being are the most distinctive features of Raz's moral philosophy that distinguish him from many other liberal philosophers, and bring him close to communitarians. His account of incommensurability and moral pluralism and the rejection of moral individualism are related to the former thesis. However, as we have seen, Raz's attempt to incorporate contextualism and universalism in a single theory tends to lean towards one side, mainly universalism.

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[148] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 168.

We have also seen that Raz's account of political authority has some drawbacks that make it incompatible with the reality of governmental authority. For instance, it may lead to a view about the flexibility of the scope of state authority from one person to another, while the authority of the modern state is general and obligatory for all citizens. Raz's normal justification thesis and two other supplementary grounds of political authority, viz., consent and a sense of belonging, make for an individualistic relationship between the authority and citizenry. However, as he argues, government power often transcends its legitimate authority, and affects the lives of those who do not accept its authority. This is usually done through the punitive power of governments, as well as their manipulation of the social and physical environment. Raz's individualistic theory of authority cannot properly take this extra-authoritative power of governments into account. Moreover, government extra-authoritative power is not justified unless there exists a common understanding of morality and justice among the citizenry (regardless of whether they accept the authority of government or not). A multicultural society is, however, characterised by the absence of this shared understanding. Only a collectivist account of political authority can justify the extra-authoritative power of the state in a culturally plural society.

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[149] Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," pp. 1227-8.

Raz's account of political authority even qualifies perfectionism, because perfectionist policies of a government are supposed to be based only on reasons that are shared by all citizens. Those value options that only *some* persons or groups choose (and which are incommensurate and perhaps incompatible with those of others) are not legitimate reasons for a government to rely upon. Restriction of perfectionist policies of a political authority is more severe in a multicultural society. This is because the value options of existing community cultures in a multicultural society could be, as Raz argues, incommensurable or probably incompatible. Raz's theory of authority requires that, in a multicultural society, the government be confined to relying on a *thin* theory of the good. The thinness of this theory of the good depends on the extent of overlap between moral beliefs of existing cultures in a society. Also, Raz's theory of authority is an attempt at total moralising and rationalising of politics, and disregards the role of political interplay between various factors and forces within the society.

Raz's account of multiculturalism as a moral approach is primarily grounded on the view that values are constituted by social forms in a culture. Moreover, people can have access to valuable and meaningful options and relationships as well as various patterns of conduct through their cultures. The latter also constitute people's identity. The salience of cultures, in these aspects, shows that individuals' well-being and autonomy are dependent on membership in cultures. Additionally, value pluralism and the incommensurability of value options reinforce the case for multiculturalism. Raz's perfectionist political philosophy allows him to account for multicultural policies in support of cultural minorities.

A difficulty with Raz's multiculturalism is that he puts some limitations on the inclusion of cultures that are merely grounded on the values of one culture, viz., liberalism. For instance, he remarks that "the right to exit" must be recognised by minority cultures. He does not, however, show that the right of exit is a requirement of living in a multicultural society or a consensually accepted standard. Also, his account does not indicate that the allegedly universal right of exit is of such importance that we should not hesitate to ask other cultures to comply with it. His justification of the right to exit is based solely on liberal principles. The problem of imposing some of unjustified limitations on multiculturalism is rooted in the ambiguity in the relationship between universal and cultural values in Raz's moral theory.

It is plausible or, perhaps as Raz argues, necessary for everybody to believe in universal values, and to consider morality not simply a function of social practices, because morality is inherently intelligible. However, there is no reason to impose the values that we think to be universal on those who do not believe in them, merely because they live in our society. The point here is not about the moral value of some practices but about the *legitimacy* of compelling others to comply with them. If multiculturalism is not about the majority and the minority but about the plurality of cultural communities in a society, there is no reason to force our values down the throats of the others. Principles and the structure of a multicultural polity must be based either on overlapping consensus among existing community cultures (that is, what is common between them) or on the requirements of multicultural coexistence. What has been said does not amount to the rejection of any kind of exclusion in a culturally diverse society, but to a reminder that the principle of exclusion is not to be favoured by one moral tradition alone.

Another deficiency in Raz's account of multiculturalism is that he looks at the significance of culture from the individual's rather than the community's perspective.

He sees culture as the context of value options, and even recognises the individual demand for identification with his or her cultural community. However, he does not pay attention to the claims of culture as a community on the individual members as well as on others. Although concepts of collective rights do appear in Raz's moral and political philosophy, they do not play a significant role in his multiculturalism.[150] In this regard, he ignores an important aspect of multiculturalism, which is the desire to preserve the distinctness of the community culture and to achieve some kind of self-government for such a community. One reason for this could be that Raz is not concerned with those multicultural societies in which community cultures are territorially concentrated. However, the desire for distinctness is not confined to geographically separated cultures.

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[150] The concept of collective right may also justify the extra-authoritative power of the government when it cannot be justified either by appeal to common moral principles among cultures existing in a society or by universal principles. The necessities of coexistence in a multicultural society could be considered as giving rise to some relevant collective rights of the state in such a society.

CHAPTER FOUR

RORTY: ETHNOCENTRISM AND PROCEDURAL LIBERALISM

Richard Rorty is an American representative of postmodern thought, who recognises the sceptical trend in contemporary western philosophy. He argues that abstract notions such as "absolute truth," "humanity as such," "rational being," etc., when subjected to "conceptual analysis" and close scrutiny about their nature, raise a "sense of artificiality."[1] Such 'a taste for "deconstruction,"' however, is not to be taken, as it is by many people, as 'a good sign of lack of moral responsibility.'[2] In particular, Rorty is concerned with the liberal culture of human rights and tolerance, and tries to vindicate it without appealing to traditional western philosophy and its conceptions. His "postmodernist bourgeois liberalism" project is an attempt to reformulate liberalism in such a way that it can accommodate the philosophical claims of postmodernism in an age of uncertainty and diversity. He thinks that the "pragmatism" of the Deweyan tradition is the way to do so. Instead of relying on transcendental features of human thought, as people like Kant conceive them, what we need is a sense of community based on 'a "merely" ethical foundation' and 'shared hope.'[3] The moral purpose behind postmodern liberalism is to make people more tolerant and more pragmatic, he argues.

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[1] Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,* (Cambridge university Press: Cambridge, 1989), pp. 195-6.

"Solidarity" is a key concept in Rorty's philosophical and moral views. Rationality is no more than solidarity with the community with which we identify. Our sense of moral responsibility is also confined to what we consider to be our moral community. There are many communities that attract our sense of solidarity; and moral dilemmas are products of clashes between them, he believes. The cultural community is the community to which we owe our language, and which gives our definition of "true"[4] as well as most of our values and practices. Hence, the latter community is expected to have a crucial part in Rorty's account. In other words, it can be argued that the cultural community is one of the most eligible candidates to play the role that he allocates to the communities that provide us with a sense of solidarity. Nevertheless, he is not very specific about "culture," and uses the term to convey various meanings.

On the other hand, Rorty's political views, which are encompassed in a proceduralist liberalism of avoiding cruelty and humiliation and facilitating self-creation, do not have a place for communal and cultural solidarities. He finds the

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[2] Ibid., p. 89. Rorty denies that philosophical anti-absolutism of Nietzsche, Heidegger and French postmodernist means "the freedom to torture," the end of morality and the beginning of power and permissiveness.

[3] Richard Rorty, "Solidarity Or Objectivity?," *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991), p. 33.

politics of difference unpatriotic, and although he appreciates the need for the diversity of cultures, he does not recognise an obligation to preserve all cultures. In his pragmatism, cultural differences would be better to be subject to neglect in a liberal polity. Hence, it can be argued that there is an inconsistency between his "ethnocentric" morality and philosophy, and his proceduralist political justice. This is, in turn, perhaps, rooted in a tension between elements of pragmatism and solidarity in his thought.

In this chapter, in order to work out the place of culture and cultural difference in Rorty's thought, I will examine, first, his philosophical outlook, and then his account of liberalism. Finally, I will discuss whether he has dealt with the issues of culture and cultural difference accordingly in his political approach. To begin with, the philosophical views that Rorty upholds will be considered.

1. Philosophical Argument: Pragmatism

Rorty calls his philosophical approach "pragmatism." This approach owes as much to the American tradition of pragmatism and people like Peirce, Dewey and James[5] as to Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, and more importantly to Rorty's own peculiar thinking. Rorty's pragmatism can be divided into three parts, namely, "antirepresentationalism," his "solidarity"-based account of inquiry and "antifoundationalism."

1.1. Antirepresentationalism

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[4] Rorty, "Introduction", *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 3.

[5] For an overview of pragmatism, as a tradition from Peirce, James and Dewey to Putnam, Habermas and Rorty, see Matthew Festenstein, *Pragmatism And Political Theory*, (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1997), pp. 5-7.

Rorty's philosophical view is centred around what he calls the "antirepresentationalist" view of inquiry which denies that 'the notion of "representation," or that of "fact of the matter" has any useful role in philosophy.'[6] Representationalism, on the other hand, is an attempt to explicate "rationality" and "objectivity" in terms of accurate representation of reality. Representationalists look for ahistorical truth transcending our interests and cultural context.[7] For them, inquiry is to correspond to the nature of truth and goodness and the nature of man and the universe. Metaphysical representationalists, such as Kant, sometimes identify a given "conceptual framework" or *a priori* fundamental concepts as necessary for experience and, thus, for cognition.

Rorty argues that "correspondence" theory of truth is not "explanatory useful." He distinguishes between successful prediction or control and correspondence with reality. He questions the representationalist claim that some theories work or sciences succeed because they correspond with reality or accurately represent truth. His argument is that there is no test for assessing the accurate representation of an "antecedently determinate" reality, independent from the test of predictivity.[8] Hence, Rorty concludes that the pragmatist 'drops the notion of truth as correspondence with reality altogether, and says that modern science does not enable us to cope because it corresponds, it just plain enables us to cope.'[9]

Representationalism is based on the distinction between reality and appearance, or things-in-themselves and things-in-relation-to-the-human-mind. However, Rorty argues, such a distinction is difficult to maintain, because it is impossible to distinguish between "the world's" contribution to cognition from the agent's. Our knowledge of things cannot be free of human interpretations. Things-in-themselves, insofar as they are not conceptualised, cannot be isolated and distinguished; and when they are conceptualised, they are tailored to the needs of a *particular* group of people, and to the needs of 'a *particular* convention of representation.'[10]

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[6] Rorty, "Introduction," *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, p. 2.

[7] See, for instance, Richard Rorty, *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature*, (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1980), pp. 8-9.

Reality, Language and Truth

Rorty rejects the idea that truth is "out there," and that all we must do is try to find it. However, this is not to deny that "the world is out there." The latter claim is that the world is not the product of human fantasy, and that there are causes, other than human intellectual faculties, involved in engendering most of what happen in the world. Although the world is out there, its descriptions expressed in sentences are not; and these descriptions, rather than the world itself, are subjects of truth or falsity. Hence, '[t]o say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human language, that human languages are human creations.'[11]

For Rorty, in the absence of reality and truth, language goes all the way down. Concepts are only available through language. Language is "ubiquitous." Rorty maintains that

> there is no way to think about either the world or our purposes except by using our language. One can use language to criticize and enlarge itself, as one can exercise one's body to develop and strengthen and enlarge it,

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[8] Rorty, "Introduction," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, pp. 4-5.

[9] Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, (The Harvester Press: Brighton, 1982), p. xvii.

[10] Richard Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 36.

[11] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 5.

> but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in relation to something else to which it applies, or for which it is a means to an end.[12]

The important point is that the world does not provide us with a language to speak. Language is a creation of human beings, viz., '*languages* are made rather than found'.[13] Nevertheless, it must be noted that the adoption of a language is not subject to choice, either an arbitrary or criteria-based choice, for there are no such criteria. Foucault follows this to an extreme by saying that "we should not imagine that the world presents us with a legible face ... [we] must conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things."[14] Further, Rorty thinks that a recognition of the contingency of language leads to a recognition of the contingency of conscience.

In order to ground his claims, Rorty draws upon Davidson's view of language. The traditional treatment of language considers it as a medium between the world and the self, a medium that either represents the reality out there, or expresses the core self within human beings. Davidson breaks with these realist and Romantic views of language, and, alongside Wittgenstein, proposes a "tool model of language." However, language is not a tool for doing something that has already been conceived. On the contrary, '[i]t is a tool for doing something which could not have been envisaged prior to the development of a particular set of descriptions, those which it itself helps to provide ... something that never had been dreamed of before.'[15] Language is not an entity with a fixed task.

In this account, the intellectual history and the history of language and science has no *telos*; it is just the history of contingently evolving useful metaphors.

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[12] Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. xix.
[13] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 7.
[14] Richard Rorty, "Method, Social Science, Social Hope," *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 205.
[15] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 13.

Scientific revolutions are '"metaphoric redescriptions" of nature rather than insights into the intrinsic nature of nature.'[16] What "strong scientists", poets and philosophers do is dissolving, rather than solving, inherited problems. Therefore, 'substituting dialectic for demonstration as the method of philosophy, or getting rid of the correspondence theory of truth, is not a discovery about the nature of a pre-existent entity called "philosophy" or "truth." It is changing the way we talk, and thereby changing what we want to do and what we think we are.'[17]

Rorty's antirepresentationalism has been subject to many criticisms. His attempt to do away with reality slides into scepticism, and exposes him to the charge of being non-realist. Timothy Cleveland argues that Rorty's view 'seems to waver between a trivial claim about truth and a claim indistinguishable from linguistic idealism.'[18] Critics like Taylor point out that some of our propositions are 'true in virtue of the way things are, or the nature of reality.'[19] Rorty is inconsistent in his antirepresentationalism. He sometimes reserves a role for correspondence, for instance, when stating that reality 'contains the causes of our being justified in holding a belief.'[20] It seems that he sometimes mixes up the concept of "Truth" (with a capital "T") with "truth" (with a small "t"). Then, when the absolute account of

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[16] Ibid., p. 16.

[17] Ibid., p. 20.

[18] Timothy Cleveland, "The Irony of Contingency and Solidarity," *Philosophy*, vol. 70, no. 272, (April 1995), p. 239. For more details, see ibid., pp. 219-227.

[19] Charles Taylor, "Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition," *Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" (and beyond)*, Alan R. Malachowski (ed.), (Basil Blackwell: London and New York), p. 269.

[20] See Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 21, also Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 163, and Richard Rorty, "The World Well Lost," *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 14. For some criticism, see Taylor, "Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition," p. 267, Ronal Beiner, "Richard Rorty's Liberalism," *Critical Review*, vol. 7, no. 1, (1993), p. 18, and Norman Geras, *Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind: The Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard Rorty*, (Verso: London and New York, 1995), p. 134-6.

"Truth" from an Archimedean vantage point collapses, he concludes the implausibility of "truth," whereas the latter does not follow the former.

Setting aside criticisms, Rorty's antirepresentationalism, by discrediting an account of knowledge as things-in-themselves and introducing elements of human mind and situation, particularly language, paves the way for a cultural interpretation of reasoning. In the next section, we will see what role cultural communities can play in Rorty's view of understanding.

1.2. A Solidarity-Based Account of Inquiry

Repudiating representationalism, Rorty insists on doing without a concept of truth altogether, and argues that 'the pragmatist does not have a theory of truth.'[21] Nevertheless, this does not amount to denying that some statements are true or false, or to saying that all statements are equally acceptable. He cannot avoid distinguishing warranted from unwarranted propositions. Truth is, according to Rorty, 'just the reification of an approbative adjective, an adjective whose use is mastered once we grasp, as Putnam puts it, that "a statement is true of a situation just in case it would be correct to use the words of which the statement consist in that way in describing the situation." Correct by whose standards? *Ours.* Who else's? The *Nazis'?*'[22] In this section, we will see that Rorty ends up reducing truth to justification. He subscribes to an account of inquiry based on "solidarity," and coloured by his peculiar "pragmatism." Although Rorty is not particularly concerned with cultures, it will be argued that identification with a cultural community is a crucial bond of solidarity that shapes people's reasoning.

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[21] Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?," p. 24. For some relevant points, see Rorty, "Is Truth A Goal Of Inquiry?," p. 21, and Rorty, "Introduction," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 11, quoting from Davidson: "The Structure and Content of Truth," *Journal of Philosophy*, 87 (June 1990), p. 309.

[22] Richard Rorty, "Hilary Putnam and The Relativist Menace," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, pp. 53-54.

The Test of Success, and the Coherence Theory of Knowledge

In Rorty's account of inquiry, since there is no test for the accuracy of representation *independent* from the test of success, what we are left with is to see whether a proposition is successful in practice or not. Success does not merely mean "control" and "prediction," which are prime concerns of natural sciences, but not those of the humanities, sociology and literary critics.[23] It means coping with reality, either the environment or (other) people's behaviour. Therefore, Rorty views rationality or knowledge as "increasingly complex adaptive behaviours," with the purpose of satisfying human needs and happiness.[24] A key notion in Rorty's account of inquiry is "convenience." Propositions (e.g., there are "mountains"), concepts and, particularly, "categorical distinctions" invoked by philosophers are 'useful only so long as they facilitate conversation about what we should do next.'[25] This shows that in the pragmatist tradition, "true" like "good" is a normative notion, and is 'the name of whatever proves to be good in the way of belief.'[26]

Rorty's emphasis on success, coping with reality or convenience must be interpreted on the basis of the "coherence" theory of knowledge, in the sense that one's beliefs must form a coherent whole. A true statement is one that is in harmony with other scientific, moral and intellectual beliefs and experiences as well as desires a person has, satisfying all his contemporary norms and standards.[27] It can be said that the coherence theory takes most of our beliefs and interests for granted.

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[23] Richard Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers,* vol. 1, p. 40.

[24] See, Rorty, "Is Truth A Goal Of Inquiry?", p. 20. For some relevant points also see ibid., p. 32, Rorty, "Introduction," *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers,* vol. 1, p. 1, and Richard Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers,* vol. 3, p. 83, Rorty, "The World Well Lost," p. 16, and Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism,* p. xli.

[25] Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Response to Jean-Francois Lyotard," *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers,* vol. 1, p. 211.

[26] Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism,* p. xxv.

Ethnocentrism: Justification to the Community with which We Identify

Given the coherence theory, for Rorty, the term "true," if used, would mean no more than "justified." The only criterion of truth is justification. In order to arrive at truth we cannot bypass justification.[28] Hence, considering "truth" as distinct from "justified" does not make any difference to practice, and we would be better to do without it.

Pursuing justification, the Rortyan pragmatist does not buttress his conviction by "objective truth," but by its overlap with that of others. Further, he 'romanticizes the pursuit of intersubjective, unforced agreement among larger and larger groups of interlocutors.'[29] What distinguishes warranted from unwarranted assertions is their enjoying wider consensus; and this is grounded not on epistemological or metaphysical reasons, but on an ethical one.[30] The distinction between rational and irrational is no more than a distinction between force and persuasion. Hence, "justification," too, is essentially a normative notion. It is about feeling solidarity, about the moral need to justify our beliefs and desires to ourselves and to our fellow agents, not a need to search for truth or things-in-themselves.[31]

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[27] For instance, see Rorty, "Hilary Putnam and The Relativist Menace," pp. 60-61. See also Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," *On Human Rights: The Amnesty Lectures 1993*, Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 117, and Richard Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, p. 193.

[28] Rorty, "Introduction," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 2, also Rorty, "Solidarity Or Objectivity?," p. 24.

[29] Rorty, "Is Truth A Goal Of Inquiry?," p. 41.

[30] Rorty, "Solidarity Or Objectivity?," p. 24.

[31] Rorty, "Is Truth A Goal Of Inquiry?," p. 26.

If it is not non-human reality, but audience and fellow-inquirers that impose conversational constraints and rules of inquiry on us, then who are these people? To whom we should justify ourselves? Antirepresentationalists' reply is: the members of the community with which we identify;[32] and this is "ethnocentrism." It is the view, according to Rorty, that 'there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society - *ours* - uses in one or another area of inquiry.'[33] Rorty's pragmatist does not think of "rationality" as being based on "method" which indicates the *a priori* criteria of success in an inquiry. It rather means "reasonableness" and "sanity."[34] Rorty argues that

> On a Quinean view, rational behavior is just adaptive behavior of a sort which roughly parallels the behavior, in similar circumstances, of the other members of some relevant community. Irrationality, in both physics and ethics, is a matter of behavior that leads one to abandon, or be stripped of, membership in some such community.'[35]

In this account, morality, unlike prudence, is the appeal to that part of our desires and beliefs that are shared by other members of our community.

Ethnocentrism is the idea that loyalty to one's community is a sufficient reason to adhere to some beliefs rather than others. It is to privilege one's own culture. 'To be ethnocentric is to divide the human race into the people to whom one must justify one's beliefs and the others. The first group - one's *ethnos* - comprises those who share enough of one's beliefs to make fruitful conversation possible.'[36] We cannot justify our beliefs in different aspects of culture and science to somebody whose views do not overlap with ours to a sufficient extent.

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[32] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 177.
[33] Rorty, "Solidarity Or Objectivity?," p. 23.
[34] Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 37.
[35] Richard Rorty, "Postmodernist bourgeois liberalism," *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, p. 199.
[36] Rorty, "Solidarity Or Objectivity?," p. 30.

Hence, when a liberal, like Rorty himself, confronts "enemies of liberalism," such as Nietzsche and Loyola, he cannot help calling them "crazy." The problem with these people is not that their views are "unintelligible," or that they have a wrong theory of the nature of human being. 'They are crazy because the limits of sanity are set by what *we* take seriously. This, in turn, is determined by our upbringing, our historical situation.' All this means that 'there is no way to see them as fellow citizens of our constitutional democracy, people whose life plans might, given ingenuity and good will, be fitted in with those of other citizens.'[37]

Ethnocentrism implies that rules of justification are relative to audience. Rorty argues that '[a]nything, indeed, can count as a representation of anything, if there is enough antecedent agreement that it will count as such. More generally, representationality, and thus cognitivity, is something we can create, if not exactly at will, at least by agreement.'[38] That is to say, all criteria of rationality (considered to be different from "bad subjectivity" or "politicisation") and even rules of logic are *created* by people, and are sociological or socially-constructed.[39] Logicians and philosophers merely tell us which procedures and standards people we identify with use in their inquiries, rather than what is the objective way to do so.[40]

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[37] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," pp. 187-188.

[38] Rorty, "Is Truth A Goal Of Inquiry?," p. 33.

[39] For instance, see Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," pp. 70-71.

[40] Ibid., p. 71. Rorty goes as far as suggesting that disciplines to be divided on the bases of communities of reference rather than "subject-matters," 'chunks of the world' (Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 45).

In this account, morality and moral choices are closely connected to "convention and anecdote,"[41] literature, arts and other branches of the humanities in the society. Rorty argues that '[o]ur acculturation is what makes certain options live, or momentous, or forced, while leaving others dead, or trivial, or optional.'[42] Cultures, in turn, are contingent on historical and socio-economic situations. For instance, "the culture of human rights" thrived in the post-Enlightenment Europe that enjoys leisure, literacy and comfort, against the background of religious wars and the Holocaust.[43] Hence, Rorty agrees with Oakeshott that morality is 'the voice of ourselves as members of community,'[44] and approves of the communitarian claim that the community is constitutive of the self, a claim that is not incompatible with liberal beliefs.[45]

The contingency of our rational and moral criteria does not make them less significant or less worthy of following. Rorty concludes that 'if the demands of a morality are the demands of a [historically contingent] language, ... then, to "stand unflinchingly for one's moral convictions" is a matter of identifying oneself with such a contingency.'[46] As a matter of fact, we feel more commitment to our convictions when we see them as particular and distinctive characteristics of our community in contrast with others. Nevertheless, we identify ourselves to different extents with different communities, some of which overlap and some of which are conflicting. The latter case leads to conflicting rules of inquiry or moral responsibility and then to moral dilemmas.

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[41] Rorty, "Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism," p. 201.
[42] Rorty, "Introduction," *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers,* vol. 1, p. 13.
[43] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," pp. 125-7.
[44] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,* p. 59.
[45] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 179.
[46] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,* p. 60.

However, Rorty's account of inquiry must not be confused with relativism or subjectivism. He finds relativism self-refuting, and maintains that ethnocentrism does not mean that all communities and convictions are equally good. On the contrary, it implies that some beliefs are preferable, but this has to be worked out from the contingent position in which we are and by using the standards of the community with which we identify. Not surprisingly, it usually turns out that *our* views are the most cogent ones. Hence, Rorty points out that 'I quite agree that ours [i.e., our human rights culture] is morally superior [to other cultures], but I do not think this superiority counts in favor of the existence of a universal human nature.'[47] In this regard, Matthew Festenstein's remarks could be relevant, as he puts a non-relativistic position in the following way:

> [T]he fact that we do not endorse the political culture of Georgia plantation owners of the last century, or the outer fringes of contemporary Afrikaner political culture (if that is how we appraise them), should not lead us to assume that these groups themselves possess reasons to agree with us; but neither should this fact lead us to think that we are unjustified in our appraisal.[48]

Thus, for Rorty, ethnocentrism does not mean lack of rational arbitrament. It merely means that 'there is no way to beat totalitarians in argument by appealing to shared common premises.'[49]

However, an important difficulty with Rorty's ethnocentric account of morality and knowledge, whose source of reference is "we," is demarcating the limits of these "we" with which we identify. The concept of "we" and "our community" is so fluid that it is sometimes difficult to arrive at unequivocal and uncontroversial views. It can cover social units slightly bigger than a family to civilisational blocks. On various occasions, Rorty implies that units as different as fellow scientists and scholars in various disciplines, barracks, monasteries, business corporations, religious communities, nation-states, and western or liberal societies, are communities and cultures to which his account of inquiry and rationality refers.[50] More importantly, there is no guarantee that there will be a consensus about rationality and morality, which is crucial for this kind of theory, at any of these levels.

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[47] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, And Sentimentality," p. 116. See also Rorty, "Postmodernist bourgeois liberalism," p. 202.

[48] Festenstein, *Pragmatism And Political Theory*, p. 122.

We have seen that Rorty uses the term "justified" in a sense void of any commitment to represent the reality. Our sole commitment is considered to be loyalty to our community. Challenging Putnam's view about non-sociological ways of justification and about warranted assertions *independent* of what the majority says, Rorty maintains that 'I view warrant as a sociological matter, to be ascertained by observing the reception of ... [a person's] statement by his peers.'[51] However, the objection may be raised that although he may be right in insisting on the sociological character of inquiry, one's commitment in cognitive behaviour is to avoid propositions that are incompatible with reality. Here, reality does not need to have any transcendental meaning, irrespective of humans' interests and values, but is about facts out there which cannot be avoided. In this sense, truth also means nothing more than the rejection of false views which do not pay off.

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[49] Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 42.

[50] See, for instance, Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism", p. 83, Rorty, "Method, Social Science, Social Hope", pp. 194-195, Richard Rorty, "Rationality and Cultural Difference," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 188, Richard Rorty, "On ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, p. 208.

[51] Rorty, "Hilary Putnam and The Relativist Menace," p. 50.

The difficulty with Rorty's non-realism becomes clear when he accepts that 'many (praiseworthy and blameworthy) social movements and intellectual revolutions get started by people making *un*warranted assertions, assertions that begin to get warranted only as (in Putnam's words) "our norms and standards of warranted assertibility ... evolve."'[52] The unease between this claim and Rorty's non-realist account of inquiry is due to the fact that there is more to true statements than justifiability and warrantedness. Statements require sociological justification to be accepted as true, but, more importantly, they need *epistemical* justification with regard to reality out there, in the first place. As said before, it seems that Rorty himself sometimes restores "the fact of the matter." For instance, he argues that '"method" and "rationality" are names for a suitable balance between respect for the opinions of one's fellows and respect for the stubbornness of sensation.'[53]

Pragmatism: Not Commonsensical or Intuitionist

Despite being ethnocentric, Rorty sometimes argues that his pragmatism is not commonsensical or intuition-based in the sense that it does not appeal to "widely shared beliefs."[54] Rorty goes as far as describing intuition as an irrational notion.[55] Pragmatists, however, admit that because of our intellectual tradition we have some intuitions such as "truth is more than assertibility" or "there is more to pain than brain-states." However, we would be better to abandon them. For pragmatists, the '*only* argument for thinking that these intuitions and vocabularies should be eradicated is that the intellectual tradition to which they belong has not paid off, is more trouble than it is worth, has become an incubus.'[56] This is also the case, because preserving all "deep" intuitions of all intellectual traditions would be self-defeating. Hence, there should be an attempt to change the common sense, the intuitions, and the self-image of the community, in so far they are not useful in problem-solving.

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[52] Ibid., p. 50.
[53] Rorty, "Method, Social Science, Social Hope," pp. 194-195.
[54] Rorty, "Is Truth A Goal Of Inquiry?," p. 41.
[55] See, Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," p. 171.

Pragmatic changes, perhaps, can be brought about by appeal to the criterion of "us at our best." [57] Rorty's epistemology, which is based on the justification to an audience, is not radical, and he would argue that this is an epistemic inevitability. Nevertheless, Rorty sometimes tries to compensate for the conservative character of his ethnocentrism by supplementing it with the notion of "better versions of ourselves." They are those we recognise 'as people who have come to hold beliefs that are different from ours by a process that we, by *our present* notions of the difference between rational persuasion and force, count as rational persuasion.'[58] Hence, the criteria of justification depend not only on who we are, but also on who we want to be. The criterion of "us, at our best" could be considered as a way to settle controversial cases on which Rorty's consensus-based account of inquiry is unable to adjudicate.

Although Rorty's pragmatism is a mandate for changing those parts of our self-image that have not paid off, through appealing to "better versions of ourselves," the question is how we can realise that some conventions have not paid off and have to be changed. Rorty's antirepresentationalism has deprived him of one of the most important incentives for change, namely, "reality." His suggestion for 'playing vocabularies and cultures off against each other'[59] is also of limited help, because ultimately "we" determine the limits of "sanity." Such a suggestion may merely help us find better means of realising our ends. The only other way out of our prevalent views that Rorty is left with is through finding out inconsistency among them and 'playing off parts of our minds against other parts.'[60] In short, Rorty has limited incentives and resources for change.

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[56] Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. xxxvii.

[57] For instance, see Rorty, "Introduction," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, pp. 5 and 7.

The notion of "us at our best" is an attempt to reconcile pragmatic and ethnocentric elements in Rorty's account of understanding. Without recourse to reality there would not be much critical bite to pragmatism, and with recourse to reality it is not clear how coherent his antirepresentational ethnocentrism would be. There is a tension between the pragmatic and ethnocentric components in Rorty's thought. The ethnocentric element of inquiry requires solidarity with one's community, whereas the pragmatic dimension focuses on efficient problem-solving, coping with reality and convenience. The two do not drive in the same direction.

Despite all these difficulties, Rorty's ethnocentrism can be understood as an acknowledgement of the limitation of human understanding. 'We will always be held captive by some picture or other, for this is merely to say we shall never escape from language or from metaphor.'[61] We have to start from the contingent point where we are, to work out other or new beliefs by our own light. We can change some of our beliefs and desires, but only by relying on the rest, and taking them for granted.

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[58] Rorty, "Hilary Putnam and The Relativist Menace," p. 54.
[59] Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. xxxvii.
[60] Rorty, "Introduction," *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, p. 14.
[61] Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," p. 80.

1.2.1 No Human Nature: The Contingent Self

Rorty argues that 'since no proposition is "made" true by anything and since no sentence is a representation of anything, all candidates for truth are on a par in respect to their relation to an independent reality.'[62] This view discredits traditional distinctions between subject matters and various disciplines. The upshot of blurring these distinctions is the denial of any epistemological, metaphysical or methodological difference between facts and values, morality and science, or truth in normative and in descriptive senses. That is to say, there is no difference between "quarks" and "human rights," in terms of their "ontological status."[63]

Therefore, the proposition that "there is no truth out there" applies not only to statements about the external world, but also to those about the self. According to Rorty, it was Freud who, for the first time, "de-universalized" the self 'by tracking conscience home to its origin in the contingencies of our upbringing.'[64] He denied the existence of a central faculty called reason, or a universal moral sense. The border between pure rationality and acculturation has also been blurred by anthropologists. Hence, contemporary intellectuals have given up "the picture of ahistorical natural centre" which is common to all human beings qua human and central to their humanity. Human beings do not possess an "extra added ingredient," mostly called rationality, that distinguishes them from brutes, and sets the goal and essence of the humanity. Gadamer and Heidegger's account of human beings as

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[62] Richard Rorty, "Charles Taylor on Truth," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 92, footnote no. 16.

[63] Rorty, "Introduction," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 8. See also Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," pp. 163-4.

[64] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 30.

"historical all the way through" shows that there is no trans-historical metaphysical "we."[65] Consequently, Rorty maintains that there is no such thing as human nature.

Such an account is somehow related to an awareness of "extraordinary malleability" of human beings. The latter are flexible, alterable and self-shaping.[66] Once we give up metaphysical attempts to find human nature, argues Rorty, we can consider the self as a historically contingent web without a specific focal point. He goes on to say that the self

> is a network that is constantly reweaving itself in the usual Quinean manner - that is to say, not by reference to general criteria (e.g., "rules of meaning" or "moral principles") but in the hit-or-miss way in which cells readjust themselves to meet the pressures of the environment.[67]

Although Rorty denies that there is something called human nature, and tries to "de-universalise" the self, in his various writings he mentions some characteristics that are shared between all human beings. Susceptibility to cruelty and particularly to humiliation, using language, creating metaphor, and the ability to redescribe are among these characteristics.[68] Some of these features precisely distinguish human beings from brutes. Such universal claims seem to be at odds with Rorty's philosophical approach, which is based on contingency, and is critical of traditional western philosophy for its search for the nature of human beings. Hence, one may ask whether Rorty himself has not fallen prey to what he believes causes "embarrassment" for the universalist, who claims that the term "human nature"

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[65] Rorty, "Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 176, and Rorty, "Rationality and Cultural Difference," p. 186.

[66] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, And Sentimentality," p. 115.

[67] Rorty, "Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism," p. 199.

[68] See, for instance, Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity,* p. 91. Moreover, Rorty postulates a need, "to come to terms with the blind impress" and "to make a self" for oneself (by "redescribing that impress") in general terms, and describes it as *everyone's* need (Ibid., p. 43).

'names an unchanging essence, an ahistorical natural kind with a permanent set of intrinsic features.'[69]

Rorty sometimes tries to accommodate this criticism by saying that he does not repudiate sociological and "general facts" taken to be true about human beings, though these facts are considered to be free from moral connotation, and not to be metaphysical. He maintains that the notion of "human nature" that he rejects is the one

> in the traditional sense in which Sartre denied that there was such a thing, rather than in the rather unusual one that Rawls gives it. Rawls distinguishes between a "conception of the person" and a "theory of human nature," where the former is a "moral ideal" and the latter is provided by, roughly, common sense plus the social sciences. To have a theory of human nature is to have "general facts that we take to be true, or true enough, given the state of public knowledge in our society," facts that "limit the feasibility of the ideals of person and society embedded in that framework."[70]

However, it is obvious that general features like susceptibility to cruelty and humiliation are not free of moral implications such as "cruelty is the worst thing we do." Actually, Rorty's eagerness for an ever-expanding sense of human solidarity is implicitly grounded on the significance of human "similarities with respect to pain and humiliation" despite "traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like)."[71]

Finally, it may be said that Rorty merely means that there is no human nature in metaphysical terms, in the sense of an *a priori* telos for human beings with moral and theoretical corollaries. This is not to deny that there are some general facts, though empirical and ethnocentric rather than philosophical and transcendental, about human beings. It is only in the latter sense that Rorty can coherently claim to have abandoned the concept of the self. However, such a teleological account of human nature is not the concern of most contemporary philosophers who use that concept, and thus, according to Geras, is not "interesting."[72] To sum up, Rorty mixes up different meanings of the human nature, and, as Geras remarks, 'by a kind of continual shifting of ground, so that in now one, now another meaning, a human nature is denied by Rorty, even while in one or other of the meanings not currently being denied a human nature is also implicitly affirmed by him.'[73]

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[69] Richard Rorty "Feminism and Pragmatism," *Radical Philosophy*, vol. 59, (Autumn 1991), p. 5.

[70] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 182, footnote no. 17. Quotations are from: Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 88, [1980], p. 534.

[71] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, p. 192.

1.2.2 Cultures and Language Games

One's views and judgements in different areas of life are encapsulated in "language games" or "final vocabularies." Rorty apparently uses these terms interchangeably to convey one's basic epistemic, scientific, moral and aesthetic theories and concepts such as truth, rightness and beauty. We have seen, however, that his antirepresentationalism and ethnocentrism reduce all truth claims, in both ethical and scientific areas, to the justification to, and the feeling of solidarity with, *our* community.

Arguably, cultures are the most obvious candidates for playing the epistemic role that Rorty attributes to communities, because we owe our language, criteria of inquiry and moral options to our culture. While he is not explicit about such obviousness, such an impression can be supported tacitly by his various arguments. Rorty maintains that, in ethnocentrism, the word "true" is an expression of commendation in all cultures. The identity of the point conveyed by the term does not, however, amount to denying that there are different procedures and different references, in various cultures, in order to warrant the truth of a claim.[74] Endorsing Tarski's "discovery" that 'we have no understanding of truth that is distinct from our understanding of translation,' Rorty concludes that 'there is no possibility of giving a definition of "true" that works for all ... languages.'[75]

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[72] Geras, *Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind*, p. 65.

[73] Ibid., pp. 48-9. For a delineated discussion about Rorty's repudiation of human nature, see Geras, "That Most Complex Being," Ibid., pp. 47-70.

"Language games," as Rorty describes them, go beyond "languages" in their ordinary or linguistic meaning, as a composition of words, grammatical rules, etc. The former are closely tied with the culture when he regards it very widely as 'a set of shared habits of action, those that enable members of a single human community to get along with one another and with the surrounding environment as well as they do.'[76]

Given Rorty's ethnocentric account of rationality, lack of trans-cultural criteria and the denial of human nature, he recommends dropping "the distinction between rational judgement and cultural bias" or between "natural" and "cultural." He argues that such distinctions, which are meant to serve to mark off the centre of the self from its periphery, should be replaced by "self-consciously ethnocentric" terms which demonstrate our affiliation to a particular group, such as: 'being a Christian, or an American, or a Marxist, or a philosopher, or an anthropologist, or a postmodernist bourgeois liberal.'[77]

Consequently, we are confronted with 'alternative language games - the vocabulary of the ancient Athenian politics versus Jefferson's, the jargon of Newton versus that of Aristotle, the idiom of Blake versus that of Dryden' as merely incompatible and not reflections of truth or external reality.[78] There is no vantage point from which to adjudicate impartially between these languages and language games. Also, in morality, it is not the case that there is a single set of values and beliefs appropriate for all societies and historical periods.[79] Hence, the question arises as to whether there is a possibility of dialogue between alternative language games and cultures. Are they self-contained units? Are borders between cultures barriers that cannot be crossed, or is conversation between them achievable?

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[74] Rorty, "Solidarity Or Objectivity?," p. 23.
[75] Rorty, "Introduction," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 3.
[76] Rorty, "Rationality and Cultural Difference," p. 188.

Absurdity of Existence of Alternative Conceptual Frameworks, or of Untranslatable Languages

For Rorty, the incompatibility of language games does not mean that there exist *alternative* "conceptual frameworks," Kantian *a priori* concepts necessary for understanding. The concept of "alternative conceptual frameworks" entails that there could be entirely different conceptual schemes which might replace and thus dissolve 'our entire belief structure ... leaving not a wrack behind.' It is the Hegelian historicist account of thought, morality and society that asserts the possibility of existing alternative Kantian conceptual frameworks. Rorty summarises the discussion about alternative conceptual frameworks or alternative worlds as follows:

> (1) the skeptic suggests that our own beliefs (about, e.g., other minds, tables and chairs, or how to translate French) have viable alternatives which unfortunately can never be known to hold but which justify the suspension of judgement; (2) the anti-skeptic replies that the very meaning of the terms used shows that the alternatives suggested are not merely dubious but in principle unverifiable, and thus not reasonable alternatives at all; (3) the skeptic rejoins that verificationism confuses the *ordo essendi* with *ordo cognoscendi* and that it may well be that some

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[77] Rorty, "On ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," p. 208.
[78] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, p. 5.
[79] Rorty, "Priority Of Democracy To Philosophy," p. 190.

> alternative is true even though we shall never know that it is; (4) the anti-skeptic replies that the matter is not worth debating until the skeptic spells out the suggested alternative in full detail, and insinuates that this cannot be done; (5) the controversy degenerates into a dispute about assuming the burden of proof, with the skeptic claiming that it is not up to him to build up a coherent story around his suggested alternative but rather up to the anti-skeptic to show a priori that this cannot be done.[80]

Rorty's argument is that the very idea of alternative worlds denies the possibility of showing evidence that such alternatives exist.

Rorty also denies that the languages of ancient Greece or Medieval Europe count as alternatives to that of contemporary Europe, firstly, because we "rationally" justify changes that distinguish the latter from the former; secondly, there are many shared beliefs among all of them. Hence, drawing upon Davidson and Stroud, Rorty concludes that '[s]ince most of our beliefs (though not any particular one) simply *must* be true - for what could count as evidence that the vast majority of them were not? - the specter of alternative conceptual frameworks shrinks to the possibility that there might be a number of equally good ways to modify our present set of beliefs in the interest of greater predictive power, charm, or what have you.'[81]

Similarly, Rorty denies that there could be untranslatable languages. Believing that, like humanity, language has no nature but history, he argues that there is no commensurating language into which the languages of various communities can be translated. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are unlearnable languages. He finds the latter view incoherent, drawing on similar reasons for the implausibility of "alternative conceptual frameworks." Rorty sees the idea of incommensurability of languages as based on the fact-language distinction, and on the view that languages embody incompatible systems of linguistic rules. He concludes that there is no *a*

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[80] Rorty, "The World Well Lost," p. 7.

priori philosophical reason to disprove or, even *pace* universalists, to prove that conversation and agreement between different languages and cultures is possible.[82] Encountered with 'repeated [failures in] attempts systematically to correlate these sounds with the organisms' environment and behavior,' we cannot distinguish whether these are *merely* sounds or assertion in an "untranslatable language." For Rorty, all this simply shows 'how complete our egocentric predicament is.'[83] Instead of the futile attempt to distinguish whether organisms with which we are concerned merely make sounds or speak an untranslatable language, we would be better to try to find the best way of coping with them, using ethnocentric methods.

Rorty thinks that incompatibilities between languages and language games can ultimately be reduced to the lack, or insufficiency, of overlap between them.[84] He argues that

> when we say that Aristotle and Galileo, or the Greeks and the Cashinahua ... did not "speak the same language," we should not mean that they carried around different Kantian categories, or different "semantic rules," with which to organize their experiences. Rather, we should mean merely that they held such disparate beliefs that there would have been no simple, easy, quick way for either to convince the other to engage in a common project.[85]

When there is no sufficient overlap between two cultures or persons' beliefs, their attempts at the exchange of views fail, as is the case about Rorty's conversation with Nietzsche and Loyola. However, this does not mean that these people lack rational

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[81] Ibid., p. 12.

[82] Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Response to Jean-Francois Lyotard," pp. 215-7.

[83] Rorty, "The World Well Lost," pp. 6-7.

[84] For instance, see Rorty, "Priority Of Democracy To Philosophy," p. 190. Rorty remarks that the view that human beings are centreless networks of beliefs and desires and that their vocabularies and opinions are determined by historical circumstance allows for the possibility that there may not be enough overlap between two such networks to make possible agreement about political topics, or even profitable discussion of such topics.

[85] Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Response to Jean-Francois Lyotard," p. 218.

faculties, or are not capable of reasoning and following the rules of logic.[86] In short, the possibility of insufficient overlap between different cultures is different from the claim of the "unintelligibility" of one culture from the point of view of another. While Rorty has no problem with the former, he does not affirm the latter.

Lack of a metanarrative, a single universal language to which all other languages are translatable, on the one hand, and the incompatibility of languages and language games, on the other, are not tantamount to the outright impossibility of conversation between different languages and cultures. This is mainly because there is some degree of overlap between them; and there is an enormous number of platitudes upon which they can agree.[87] At least in recent centuries in western liberal societies, according to Rorty, there has been an attempt at a more inclusive conception of human history that incorporates new and other experiences. In the absence of the final authority of rationality, intellectual or 'philosophical progress occurs to the extent that we find a way of integrating the worldviews and the moral intuitions we inherited from our ancestors with new scientific theories or new sociopolitical institutions and theories or other novelties.'[88]

1.2.3 Role of Communities in Confining the Scope of Feeling Moral Responsibility

Solidarity not only determines the content of our moral obligation substantively, but more importantly, Rorty points out, sets the limits of our "moral community," that is, the society towards whose members we hold ourselves morally responsible. In other words, the basic explanatory notion in *feeling* moral obligation to somebody is "ethnocentrism", viz., he or she is "one of us." The point is that 'our sense of solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed are thought of as "one of us," where "us" means something smaller and more local than the human race.'[89] Rorty argues that people usually appeal to local and concrete rather than to universal and abstract solidarities. He denies that the largest group with which we identify 'is "humanity" or "all rational beings" - no one, I have been claiming, *can* make *that* identification.'[90]

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[86] See Rorty, "Priority Of Democracy To Philosophy," p. 191, and also ibid., footnote no. 42.
[87] Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Response to Jean-Francois Lyotard," p. 215.
[88] Rorty, "Introduction," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 5.

Repudiating universal arguments, Rorty not only doubts the efficiency of the Kantian point that the faculty of deliberation is sufficient for membership in the moral community, but also claims that the utilitarian argument that 'all pleasures and pains felt by members of our biological species are equally relevant to moral deliberation,' may not be convincing for some people.[91] What counts is membership in "*our* moral community." In other words, one's moral community does not go beyond the (local) community with which one identifies. It must be noted that, in this sense, the role of solidarity to community is not so much cognitive as impulsive, viz., it gives rise to the feeling of sympathy towards others rather than to convictions or moral beliefs.

Here again, culture when considered as a *cultural community* is one of the obvious candidates towards whose members we feel moral responsibility. That is, the cultural community is one of our most significant moral communities. Hence, we owe cultural communities our sense of morality in cognitive terms as well as in terms of its scope. Rorty, nonetheless, does not expressly mention such a role for cultures.

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[89] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 191.
[90] Ibid., p. 198.
[91] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," pp. 125-6.

Expanding the Sense of Solidarity through Imagination and Sensational Stories

Despite his emphasis on the significance of the local sense of solidarity, for Rorty, as we will see, moral progress is no more than expanding our moral community. It is to see more and more "featherless bipeds" as members of that community. The more efficient way to expand the reference of "people like us" is, however, "sentimental education," either through "imagination" or "manipulation of feelings," rather than "inquiry." The expansion of the sense of solidarity is to be achieved, Rorty argues, by 'the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers. It is not discovered by reflection but created. It is created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people.'[92] In this regard, solidarity consists in self-doubt, a doubt about one's "sensitivity to the pain and humiliation of others."[93]

Rorty believes that fellow-feeling aroused by hearing "sad and sentimental stories," rather than an increase in moral knowledge, has led to the emergence of the human rights culture in the West.[94] Hence, sentimental abilities such as sympathy or capacity for friendship cannot be regarded as less significant for humans than the faculty of knowing. Because of these sad and sentimental stories, now cruelties that have happened to foreigners bring forth as strong a response as when they happen to our people. They have induced 'us, the rich, safe, powerful, people, to tolerate, and even to cherish, powerless people - people whose appearance or habits or beliefs at first seemed an insult to our moral identity, our sense of the limits of permissible human variation.'[95] Sentimental education, according to Rorty, can be achieved by realising that similarities between others and us prevail over our differences. However, '[t]he relevant similarities are not a matter of sharing a deep true self which instantiates true humanity, but are such little, superficial, similarities as cherishing our parents and our children - similarities that do not interestingly distinguish us from many nonhuman animals.'[96]

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[92] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. xvi

[93] Ibid., p. 198.

[94] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," pp. 118-9.

"Connoisseurs of diversity" rather than "agents of universality," such as philosophers and theologians, for Rorty, are those who expand the reference of "us," and open the door of liberal justice to people on whom it has been closed. Anthropologists, ethnographers, historians, novelists, and muckraking journalists persuade us to know more about the implications and meanings of cruelty in different contexts. They

> insist that there are people out there whom society has failed to notice. They make these candidates for admission visible by showing how to explain their odd behavior in terms of a coherent, if unfamiliar, set of beliefs and desires - as opposed to explaining this behavior with terms like stupidity, madness, baseness or sin.[97]

Sentimental education, however, works only when there are favourable conditions such as security and wealth, when people 'can relax long enough to listen.'[98]

Rorty's view about local sense of solidarity has been criticised, firstly by some counterfactual statements. Based on the relevant literature, Geras says that the rescuers of Jews during World War II, contrary to Rorty's claims, have explained their deeds in universal, rather than local, terms.[99] Besides, it has also been asked what prevents us from expanding the feeling of solidarity beyond our locality to others and finally to the human kind. Why is the notion of 'obligations imposed by the recognition of membership in the same species'[100] not convincing? It cannot be because of the sheer size of the human community, or lack of concrete relations within it. Many other communities which Rorty regards as references of solidarity, such as the American community, unlike family and some other local communities, are quite big, and do not entail a concrete and face-to-face relationship among their members.[101]

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[95] Ibid., pp. 133-4.
[96] Ibid., p. 129.
[97] Rorty, "On ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," p. 206.
[98] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," p. 128.

The refutation of the possibility of identification with "humanity" also flies in the face of Rorty's liberal desire for an ever expanding sense of solidarity. Pointing to the theme of "dehumanization," Geras mentions that '[n]othing shows more tellingly the power, and the widespread recognition of the power, of arguments from a common humanity than the extensive use through human history of linguistic and other practices of dehumanization.'[102]

While Rorty acknowledges the existence of "similarities" among humans, such as using language or, more importantly, susceptibility "to pain and humiliation," which allows extensive solidarity despite "differences,"[103] it is not clear why he downgrades the role of these universal features in *feeling* solidarity with others. Furthermore, "the human rights culture," or human solidarity, may be

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[99] See Geras, "Richard Rorty and the Righteous Among the Nations," *Solidarity in the Conversation of the Humankind*, pp. 7-46.
[100] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," p. 133.
[101] See Geras, *Solidarity in the Conversation of the Humankind*, pp. 78-79.
[102] Ibid., p. 96.
[103] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, p. 192.

"ungroundable"[104] in the sense that it is not based on a universal metaphysical human feature (as will be delineated in the section on "antifoundationalism"), but it would be, *pace* Rorty, meaningless without conceiving common features of human beings, distinguishing them from other species.[105] Recognising commonalities accounts for the maxim of "avoiding cruelty."[106] In short, it is only a presumption of universality that makes sensational stories about the suffering of people comprehensible.

What persuades Rorty to go for sentimental education through sad and sensational stories rather than inquiry into universal features could be the fear of exclusion on the basis of metanarratives, as postmoderns argue. Nevertheless, Rorty's sensational stories could be as subject to exclusionist attempts and even distortion as universal theories are. As Bruce Robbins argues, '[w]e know how evasive they are, how susceptible to multiple and contradictory interpretations. We also know how often stories have functioned to "make strange" rather than to produce recognition of sameness.'[107] As a matter of fact, throughout history, demagogues' manipulation of sentiments through alleged sad stories has been no less harmful than alleged rational arguments for dehumanisation. Not all novels and films and reports are meant to expand the sense of solidarity. Many are aimed at increasing hatred and fragmentation.[108]

Stressing the significance of the sense of *human* solidarity does not amount to denying the importance, and in some cases the privilege, of local and concrete solidarities which give rise to the sense of family and national, religious or cultural communities. It is simply to say, as Joan Williams argues, that '[a] defining characteristic of ourselves is our commitment to the ideal of identifying with all humanity at least to the extent of refusing to kill or torture people by means of positive actions.'[109] To sum up, universal and local, including cultural, senses of solidarity operate side by side, and, depending on the context, one or another may overshadow the other. Hence, there is no metaphysical reason to privilege one over the other.

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[104] See Rorty, "Method, Social Science, Social Hope," p. 208.

[105] For instance, see Geras, *Solidarity in the Conversation of the Humankind,* pp. 100-101.

[106] For instance, see Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 91.

[107] Bruce Robbins, "Sad Stories in the International Public Sphere: Richard Rorty on Culture and Human Rights," *Public culture*, vol. 9, no. 2, (1997), p. 227. See also Bhikhu Parekh, "Non-ethnocentric Universalism," *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.) (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999), p. 141.

1.3. Antifoundationalism

The third component of Rorty's pragmatism is "antifoundationalism." To begin with, "foundationalism" is the view that moral and political concepts and ideas can be based on fixed and permanently valid philosophical grounds. That is, there are independently true premises about the nature of man or the universe that justify our moral intuitions.[110]

Rorty argues that although social practices could have some empirical presuppositions,[111] they have no philosophical one. The latter are some beliefs such as "the truth of a sentence consists in its correspondence to reality," or "ethical judgements are claims to knowledge rather than mere expressions of feeling." These

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[108] For instance, many Iranians have complained that the film "Not Without My Daughter" depicted them in an offensive and distortive way.

[109] Joan C. Williams, "Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of The Gaze," *Wisconsin Law Review*, vol. 131, (1992), p. 141.

[110] Rorty, " Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," pp. 117-8.

[111] Regarding the empirical presuppositions of social practices, Rorty gives the example of "current practice of financing health care," which presupposes the belief that 'surgeons do not perform operations merely to make money for themselves or their hospitals, but do so only if there is a good chance the operation will benefit the patient,' or that 'many diseases are caused by bacteria and viruses, and that a few can be cured by acupuncture.' See, Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," p. 64.

also include theories of human nature and the self. Such beliefs are, Rorty thinks, merely optional or rhetorical, and not closely connected to the practices.

Rorty argues that 'the Socratic virtues - willingness to talk, to listen to other people, to weigh the consequences of our action upon other people - are *simply* moral virtues. They cannot be inculcated nor fortified by theoretical research into essence.'[112] Practices and virtues like academic freedom, honesty, trustfulness and care can be defended by their resulting in "successful accommodation among individuals,"[113] by "sociopolitical justifications." For instance, Rorty believes that to defend universities it is not necessary to go beyond the good they do in supporting the institutions of liberal democracies.[114]

There is no need for "philosophical foundations," *partly* because they could not pass close scrutiny without becoming problematic. They usually turn out to be merely circular or even irrational, in the sense that they are not neutral and free from bias. For instance, Davidson suggests that "rational self-criticism," by which freedom from "bias" and "prejudice" is to be achieved, is at the bottom merely "irrational;" and Rorty argues that there is no escape from circularity in defence of liberal democracy or any other moral and political theory. He goes on to say that if the attempts of Plato, Aquinas, Kant, etc. to achieve knowledge about human nature or truth have not been of use in realising our utopias, this could show that there is no such knowledge in the first place.[115] Rorty sometimes finds philosophical arguments

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[112] Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," p. 172.
[113] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 184.
[114] Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," p. 69.
[115] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," p. 118.

"sterile debates," and even "stumbling-blocks" to effective political organisation, when we think of our public responsibilities in their terms.[116]

However, Rorty argues, it is important not to consider the lack of close connection between philosophical or epistemological presumptions and our moral or ethical practices 'as a philosophical truth about the necessary, ahistorical relation of philosophy and the rest of culture. It is simply a sociological truth about the lack of interest that most people, intellectuals as well as nonintellectuals, currently have in philosophy.'[117] That is, people in the "rich North Atlantic democratic societies" can usually get along with the practices, whatever their philosophical presuppositions are, or even without them.[118]

Maintaining antifoundationalism, Rorty does not *ground* liberalism on philosophical foundations as the representation of the universal truth, or even on what a community regards as philosophical truth. Rather, liberalism and its institutions are taken for granted. Kantian principles are useful (merely) for *summarising* hopes and moral intuitions of postmodern bourgeois liberal societies, but not for justifying them.[119] Criticising communitarians like Taylor, Rorty argues that 'the philosopher of liberal democracy may wish to develop a theory of the human self that comports with the institutions he or she admires. But such a philosopher is not thereby justifying these institutions by reference to more fundamental premises, but the reverse: He or she is putting politics first and tailoring a philosophy to suit.'[120] Hence, Rorty interprets Rawls as not *justifying* the priority of justice over conceptions of the good but *taking it for granted* and filling out its consequences.

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[116] Richard Rorty, "A Cultural Left," *Achieving Our Country*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998), pp. 92-7.
[117] Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," p. 75.
[118] Ibid., pp. 64-66.
[119] Rorty, "Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism," p. 198.
[120] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 178.

Rorty wants to invert the traditional philosophical order of grounding institutions and beliefs on metaphysical truth about the world and the self as a foundation. So, it is not the case that a "philosophical tribunal" decides about our democratic politics and policies, but philosophy must be '*in the service* of democratic politics.'[121] This is the way of liberating "our civilisation," Rorty interprets Dewey and James.[122] Hence, 'if it ever comes down to a choice between the practices and traditions that make up academic freedom and antirepresentationalist theories of truth and knowledge, we should go for academic freedom.'[123]

Is Antifoundationalism Consistent with Antirepresentationalism and A Solidarity-Based account of Inquiry?

If nowadays nobody cares about philosophical presumptions of their moral and political views, then what is the point of Rorty's solidarity-based account of inquiry and antirepresentationalism? Are these two components of Rorty's pragmatism not redundant, philosophical views that do not make any difference to practice? It seems that there is an inconsistency between antifoundationalism and the two other constituents of his pragmatism. Lutz puts the argument as follows: 'if inquiries into the self yielded either no knowledge at all or else knowledge with no political implications, such inquiries would not threaten [any moral doctrine including] liberalism. But Rorty fears that studying the self will undermine our faith in liberal democracy and urges us to throw away the facts about the self.'[124]

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[121] Ibid., p. 196.
[122] Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," p. 161.
[123] Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," pp. 79-80.

Rorty's answer to the above questions is that although embracing antirepresentationalism and a solidarity-oriented account of knowledge does not matter in the short run, it may well make a difference in the long run. This is particularly so because the pragmatic theory of truth is, in Dewey's term, 'true in the pragmatic sense of truth: it works, it clears up difficulties, remove obscurities, puts individuals into more experimental, less dogmatic, and less arbitrary sceptical relation to life.'[125] More specifically, pragmatism is better, Rorty argues, 'not just because it will free philosophers from perpetual oscillation between skepticism and dogmatism, but because it will take away a few more excuses for fanatism and intolerance.'[126] Hence, pragmatism, better than other theories, coheres with liberal democratic practices.[127] This is similar to Rorty's other argument that we should drop the objective-subjective distinction 'in favour of the thought that we might be better than we presently are - in the sense of being better scientific theorists, or citizens, for [sic. or] friends.'[128] Hence, he finds the view that philosophical principles are abbreviations, rather than foundations, of liberal democratic practices, an indication of moral and intellectual progress, since it allows us to see various other beliefs as good summaries of these practices.

Nevertheless, Rorty maintains that

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[124] Mark J. Lutz, "Socratic Virtue in Post-modernity: The Importance of Philosophy for Liberalism," *American Journal of Political Science,* vol. 41, no. 4, (October 1997), p. 1143.

[125] Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism", p. 78, quoting from: John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty,* in *The Later Works of John Dewey,* vol. 4, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 9. Also see Rorty, "Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 193.

[126] Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," p. 83.

[127] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,* p. 197.

[128] Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 41.

> There is no way in which the issue between the pragmatist and his opponent can be tightened up and resolved according to criteria agreed to by both sides. *This is one of those issues which puts everything up for grabs at once.*[129]

Since "the fact of the matter" is not available to Rorty, and presumably to anybody else, such an adjudication ultimately has to be done circularly, either by appealing to pragmatism itself or otherwise.[130] Such an account of the relationship between liberalism and pragmatism prompts us to ask about Rorty's view on philosophy, to which we turn in the next section. Before that, however, it should be emphasised that antifoundationalism is consistent with antirepresentationalism and the solidarity-based account of inquiry. Further, it is only a short step from saying that there is no truth-in-itself, but solidarity with the community, to stating that our moral and political views do not need any philosophical ground. Antifoundationalism is also consistent with, or even could be regarded as a corollary of, Rorty's adherence to the coherence theory of knowledge.

Philosophy and Its Relation with the Rest of Culture

Rorty contrasts two senses of philosophy with each other. In the narrow sense, which he sometimes distinguishes by using a capital "P", it means 'following Plato's and Kant's lead, asking questions about the nature of certain normative notions (e.g., "truth," "rationality," "goodness") in the hope of better obeying such norms. The idea is to believe more truths or do more good or be more rational by knowing more about Truth or Goodness or Rationality.' In contrast, "philosophy" (with a small "p"), in the wide sense, simply means what Sellars calls "an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term."[131] He adds that '[u]ncapitalized, "truth" and "goodness" name properties of sentences, or of actions and situations. Capitalized, they are the names of objects - goals or standards which can be loved with all one's heart and soul and mind, objects of ultimate concern.'[132] Rorty adheres to the wide meaning of philosophy which is visionary, rather than to its strict sense as a discipline seeking the nature of things and producing objective truths.

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[129] Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. xliii.

[130] According to Rorty, '[a] circular justification of our practices, a justification which makes one feature of our culture look good by still citing another, or comparing our culture invidiously with

As touched upon before, Rorty thinks that

> the most philosophy can hope to do is summarize our culturally influenced intuitions about the right thing to do in various situations. The summary is effected by formulating a generalization from which these intuitions can be deduced, with the help of noncontroversial lemmas. The generalization is not supposed to ground our intuitions, but to summarize them.[133]

Drawing upon Hegel, who defines philosophy as "holding your time in your thought," Rorty argues that philosophy is a portrayal historical characteristics with which one identifies and the end towards which they point.[134] Hence, philosophical standards are contingent on a particular culture and language and a particular group of people with whom we converse, having no, or minimal, role in choosing them. All this parallels Festenstein's argument that the pragmatist tradition tries to elucidate 'the principles taken to be implicit within a particular form of life rather than a set of *a priori* and universal principles.'[135] Consequently, it is thought that there is no

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others by reference to our own standards, is the only sort of justification we are going to get' (Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, p. 57).

[131] Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. xiv.

[132] Ibid..

[133] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, And Sentimentality," p. 117.

[134] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 55.

[135] Festenstein, *Pragmatism And Political Theory*, p. 7.

neutral or "real touchstone" for comparing vocabularies used in different cultural or sociological contexts.[136] Furthermore, "circularity" in reasoning is inevitable.

Socio-political and economic conditions also influence our account of inquiry and philosophy. For instance, philosophers' focus on effecting change rather than on stable ahistorical criteria has been due to the prevalence of literacy, comfort and affluence among the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Europeans and Americans.[137]

In this account, philosophy has some pragmatic benefits. It increases 'the predictability, and thus the power and efficiency, of our institutions. It also heightens the sense of shared moral identity which brings us together in a moral community.'[138] Abandoning eternity, philosophy should "look to the future," and be an attempt to make life easier. Hence, philosophical progress consists in becoming more "imaginative," and enlarging "linguistic and argumentative repertoire."[139] In this sense, the aim of Rorty's philosophy is to "edify," viz., to help 'readers, or society as a whole, to break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes.'[140] 'Beyond this traditional humanist task,' Rorty argues, 'we [philosophers] can do only what lawyers do - provide an argument for whatever our client has decided to do, make the chosen cause appear the better.'[141]

Rorty's antifoundationalism, particularly in defending liberalism, which restricts political theorising to political culture without appealing to any philosophical presupposition or a theory of the self, has attracted some objections. It has been argued that philosophy, with its claims about the nature of the human being and society, is a valuable tool for recognising and criticising deficiencies and inequalities in liberal practices. Rorty's attempt to separate philosophy from politics deprives us of this valuable tool. It has been said that, as Lutz puts it, 'despite the failures of foundational Philosophy, we can still use various forms of non-foundational philosophy to criticise, reform, and justify contemporary democracy.'[142] Nevertheless, Rorty's philosophy seems capable of accommodating Lutz's "non-foundational forms of philosophy." Rorty appreciates new imaginative theories that reveal or resolve some problems in the current situation. These new theories may be free from some disadvantages of the old ones, and bring about some changes in current (liberal) moral practices, but are not considered as the latter's grounds. Rorty, once again, looks at them pragmatically.[143]

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[136] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 53.
[137] Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," p. 121.
[138] Ibid., p. 117.
[139] Richard Rorty, "Philosophy in America Today," *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 222.
[140] Rorty, *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature*, p. 12.
[141] Rorty, "Philosophy in America Today," p. 222.

Apart from its difficulties, Rorty's antifoundationalism is an attempt to distance moral convictions from, and also to privilege them over, various rational arguments given in their support. In a nutshell, for him, practical reasoning is concerned more with what is taken to be right than with its philosophical justification.

2. Liberalism

Having seen Rorty's philosophical views and, more importantly, his anti-foundationalism in defending political practices, we now turn to his account of liberalism to see how his philosophy coheres with this account.

If there is no truth, moral order or human nature to draw upon, and if there is merely "justification to a particular community," the liberal theory has to construct a coherent conception of political justice around basic intuitions and beliefs in liberal democratic societies. Moreover, such a conception is, as Rawls argues, necessarily confined to "settled" ideas, such as toleration and denunciation of slavery.[144] Perhaps, one of these ideas is Rorty's belief in "a firm distinction between the private and the public."[145]

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[142] Lutz, "Socratic Virtue in Post-modernity," p. 1144. For a similar point, see Beiner, "Richard Rorty's Liberalism," p. 20.

2.1. Private Irony and Self-creation, and Public Avoidance of Cruelty

According to Rorty, liberals in the private sphere are concerned with self-creation; they are "ironist." Ideally, someone who is aware of the contingencies surrounding her, becomes an ironist. Subscribing to Rorty's pragmatic theory of truth, the ironist is someone who fulfils three conditions:

> (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself.[146]

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[143] See Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," p. 80.

[144] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 180, quoting from: Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* 14, (1985), p. 230.

[145] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,* p. 83. A difficulty with Rorty's definition of liberalism as "domination-free communication," avoidance of cruelty, etc. is that he ambivalently gives it a consensual ground in order to satisfy the requirements of his solidarity-based account of morality. Although, on occasion, he admits that other accounts of liberalism attract more advocacy in western democracies than his does, he treats the liberal tradition as monolithic. As Festenstein argues, Rorty 'tends to ignore competition among brands of liberalism, as if distinctions among liberals exist only at the level of foundation ('Kantian' and 'ethnocentric' liberals) while practical opinions converge. Liberals argue over such questions as whether or not individual rights include social and civil rights, and the reducibility of conceptions of social justice to the self-interested sentiments of market actors, and so on, in articulating what they take a liberal society to be.' A consequence of this imaginary consensus is that, Festenstein states,

> By describing political argument as either a struggle between incommensurable discourses or a placid series of 'reminders' of underlying consensus, his (Rorty's) schema ignores the extent to which political arrangements may require justification, from the point of view of the liberal values that he avows, for those with more orderly, anarchic or egalitarian visions to the political community - who hardly need to be intractable fanatics (Nietzsche or Loyola) beyond the conversational pale, but may be his fellow citizens (Festenstein, Ibid., p. 128).

[146] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,* p. 73.

Facing up to the contingency of the self, the Rortyan ironist tries to *make* the truth and the final vocabulary rather than to *find* them. This is what we see as 'the conscious need of the strong poet to *demonstrate* that he is not a copy or replica as merely a special form of an unconscious need everyone has: the need to come to terms with the blind impress which chance has given him, to make a self for himself by redescribing that impress in terms which are, if only marginally, his own.'[147] As Freud observes, it is only through clinging onto some of one's "crucial idiosyncratic contingencies" that one can create a worthwhile self for oneself. This is because all of us, "language-users," share "a faculty for creating metaphors."[148] Therefore, the ironist strives to redescribe herself and the contingencies of language, the self, and culture to make the best self for herself that she can.[149] Redescription and self-creation are the watchwords of the ironist.

Regarding self-creation, Nietzsche is the source of inspiration for Rorty. Nietzsche's main concern is creativity and self-overcoming. Nietzschean philosophers celebrate 'sensuality, appearance, change, longing, suffering, mortality, and conflict, philosophers of the future will become ever stronger than and more distant from the herd - and thus less vulnerable to the eviscerating morality of pity.'[150]

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[147] Ibid., p. 43.

[148] Ibid. pp. 33-6. Rorty maintains, however, that there is nothing in Freud's theory that *entails* such a self-creation, though the theory can *explain* it.

[149] Ibid., p. 80.

[150] Lutz, "Socratic Virtue in Post-Modernity," p. 1132. Although Rorty praises Romantic and Nietzschean "strong poet" and self-creation, he thinks that 'there can be no fully Nietzschean lives, lives which are pure action rather than reaction - no lives which are not largely parasitical on an un-redescribed past and dependent on the charity of as yet unborn generation.' See Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 42.

On the other hand, what is crucial for the liberal ironist in the public realm is to avoid cruelty. This is because, liberals believe, 'cruelty is the worst thing we do.'[151] Human beings are also susceptible to a particular kind of cruelty which is "humiliation." Hence, for Rorty, solidarity is based on a sense of a common danger.[152] As Lutz remarks, '[i]n the tradition of Hobbes and Locke, ... ironist liberals will be drawn to political society ... because they flee a common evil.'[153]

The liberal ironist's public realm and her sense of solidarity are, however, not confined to avoiding cruelty and humiliation. Rorty believes that the liberal society should also provide everybody with the opportunity for self-creation, and hence with the requirements of making a self for him/herself, such as democratic freedoms and rights, relative social equality, wealth and peace.[154] In this regard, liberalism in the public realm safeguards individual private pursuits. Richard A. Posner remarks that

> The basic political task, therefore, in Rorty's view, is to create a social framework that, by the cultivation of tolerance and the legal protection of diversity and debate, encourage geniuses, like Copernicus and Bentham, Christ and Marx, Nietzsche and ...who are able through the deployment of powerful metaphors ... and other redescriptions to shatter our dogmas (through perhaps erecting new ones in their place), enrich our sense of possibility, add to our repertoire of techniques for controlling the physical and social environment, broaden our sympathies.[155]

Nevertheless, Rorty claims that there is no relationship between the liberal ironist's desire for self-creation and her attempt to avoid cruelty. While metaphysicians, whether liberal or not, strive to find a single final vocabulary for both the public and the private domains, Rorty thinks that his liberal ironist has different vocabularies for dealing with the two realms. The two cannot be brought together theoretically. Moreover, unlike the liberal metaphysician, the liberal ironist does not try to make the public rhetoric of liberalism "central to the final vocabulary of the individual liberal."[156] That is to say, there is no "*automatic* priority" for our moral responsibilities in the public realm over private affections and attempts such as self-creation.[157]

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[151] Ibid., p. 197.
[152] Ibid., p. 91.
[153] Lutz, "Socratic Virtue in Post-Modernity," p. 1137

Maintaining the "firm distinction between the private and the public," Rorty points out that continuing redescription and irony is reserved for the private life, without giving rise to a public action. Such a distinction is necessary in order to avoid others' "actual and possible suffering" and humiliation. This is because '[t]he redescribing ironist, by threatening one's final vocabulary, and thus one's ability to make sense of oneself in one's own terms rather than hers, suggests that one's self and one's world are futile, obsolete, *powerless*. Redescription often humiliates.'[158] Humiliation, in turn, wounds one's self-image. Heroes of self-creation and irony like Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida, when regarded 'as *public* philosophers are at best useless and at worst dangerous,' though they play an important role 'in accommodating the ironist's *private* sense of identity to her liberal hopes.'[159]

Nietzsche is "crazy," when the matter comes to politics, because his favourite philosopher is "by nature a commander and legislator" who seeks to change how others live and think. Unlike Rorty, Nietzsche thinks that creativity is the work of an aristocratic society 'that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or

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[154] See Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 84, and p. 197.
[155] Richard A. Posner, "Richard Rorty's Politics," *Critical Review*, vol. 7, no. 1, (1993), p. 38.
[156] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 92.
[157] Ibid., p. 194.
[158] Ibid., p. 90.
[159] Ibid., p. 68.

another.' This is so, because only through experiencing command and rank in relation to others, can one experience it within oneself. Cherishing what is common rather than what elevates a few above others, liberal democratic societies inhibits 'longing, internal tensions, and inner discipline needed to create new values.'[160] *Pace* Nietzsche, Rorty, believes that the ideal of self-creation does not necessarily lead to an anti-liberal politics. On the contrary, he thinks that a liberal politics is more consistent with the Nietzschean creativity.

However, it has been objected that Rorty's "firm distinction between the private and the public" and use of different vocabularies when dealing with the two realms give rise to what is sometimes called "ego-splitting," or "cultural schizophrenia."[161] The question is whether the liberal politics of avoiding cruelty (even through redescription when affecting others) is compatible with the private poetic culture of continuous redescription and absolute irony in which every commitment can be dissolved.[162] Rorty's distinction, Nancy Frazer argues, leads to the private variety of 'extreme egotism and individualism,' and the public homogeneity and communitarianism.[163] At a deeper level, it can be suggested that ultimately there is a tension between the image of liberal ironist and ethnocentrism. How can a liberal be an ironist, and always try to be innovator by redescribing herself, while she is ethnocentrist? On the other hand, it is suggested that there is an inconsistency between accepting an ethnocentrist and ironist philosophy and being a serious political liberal. This philosophy does not offer enough reason to prefer liberalism to non-liberal doctrines or even Fascism. '[T]he serious liberal concerned with human solidarity and freedom cannot accept a contingent, in the sense of arbitrary or unjustifiably biased, distinction between persuasion and force. Liberalism limits concessions to contingency.'[164]

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[160] Lutz, "Socratic Virtue in Post-Modernity," pp. 1132-33.

[161] Beiner, "Richard Rorty's Liberalism," p. 19.

[162] The question is sometimes put as following, 'if novelty [and "making it new"] is the supreme standard, enemies of liberalism, provided that their versions of illiberalism are sufficiently novel, would count as exemplars of Rorty's new intellectual culture' (Ibid., p. 30, footnote no. 25).

[163] Nancy Frazer, "Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty between Romanticism and Technocracy," *Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" (and beyond)*, Alan R. Malachowski (ed.), (Basil Blackwell: London and New York, 1990), p. 313.

Rorty's different vocabularies for the public and the private spheres not only raise the question of why ironism and aestheticism should stop short of going beyond the private realm, but also subject him to the charge of defending the status quo.[165] That is, he excludes liberal politics from the domain of redescription. The notion of the public-private dichotomy also seems to be exempt from revision. However, Rorty contradicts himself by advocating a conception of moral progress which requires continuous *redescription* so that we can see how more and more others, whom we do not regard as part of "us," feel pain and humiliation, and we can find about the hitherto unknown ways of cruelty.[166] It should be added that Rorty's account may not be radical, but it does not prohibit critics from going beyond issues of rights and equality to actual moral and social problems in the liberal society, such as "divorce rates," "drug use," "political apathy," etc.[167] Showing concern for leftist social democratic policies, in *Achieving Our Country*, Rorty slams the academic and cultural left for neglecting economic inequality in the US, and other real "problems of men."[168]

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[164] Cleveland, "The Irony of Contingency and Solidarity," p. 240.

[165] Lutz puts the charge of conservatism as follows: 'despite Rorty's alluring promise that an ironic society will be more poetic, passionate, and diverse, he quietly assures us that it will be as pervasively pragmatic, cautious, and monotonous a society as traditional liberalism.' Lutz, "Socratic Virtues in Post-modernity," p. 1139. For a similar criticism, see Joan Williams, "Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of The Gaze," p. 134.

[166] For instance, see Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," p. 128.

[167] This is a response to charged made by Beiner. For more detail about his view, see Beiner, "Richard Rorty's Liberalism," p. 21. Nonetheless, Beiner acknowledges Rorty's commitment to "a left-liberal or social-democratic agenda," despite lack of "much critical bite" to his social theory. See Ibid., pp. 29-30, footnote no. 18.

Moreover, in spite of Rorty's claim about the firm distinction between the public and the private realms, there is some conflation between the two in his account. As stated, social organisations in Rorty's liberal utopia should give everybody a chance at self-creation through public provision of the required rights, freedoms, peace, wealth, etc. There is even more overlap between the two spheres. Humiliation is abhorrent in the public life, mainly because it wounds one's self-image, affects one's final vocabulary, and then cripples one's ability to redescribe, and to make a self for oneself.[169] If this is so, then we can say that the public life is, in one way or another, reducible to "self-creation" or the private life. Thus, Rorty's claim that his liberal ironist uses various vocabularies for different sides of life is untenable. That is to say, the liberal ironist, *pace* Rorty, has a "metavocabulary," and "subordinates" the public life to the private life. The intermingling of the private and the public domains is evident in Rorty's claim that a liberal ideal society 'has no purpose except to make life easier for poets and revolutionaries while seeing to it that they make life harder for others only by words, and not deeds.'[170]

Along the same line, it can also be argued that Rorty's account of the political is poor, in the sense that it is confined to avoiding cruelty and providing requirements of self-creation. Hence, he is not concerned with important issues in political philosophy such as legitimacy, authority, the concept of law and justice. This gives rise to what Williams describes as 'Rorty's advocacy of a world carved up into a small public and a large private sphere.'[171] More importantly, such a limited account of politics does not seem to have a place for communal, and particularly cultural, solidarities, other than solidarity with the liberal society. Furthermore, Rorty's account of the public life does not give any incentive for political participation.

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[168] See Rorty, "A Cultural Left," *Achieving Our Country*, pp. 75-107.

[169] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 90.

[170] Ibid., pp. 60-61. This also shows a strong elitist element in Rorty's thought. Though concerned with all people's ability to be creative, he ends up admitting that '[a]utonomy is not something which all human beings have within them and which society can release by ceasing to repress them.

2.2. Ethnocentric Liberalism

An important point is that the liberal ironist does not ask why cruelty should be avoided, just as she does not ask why redescription is recommended. There is no non-circular way of answering these questions. To answer these questions is an impossible task that metaphysicians have assumed for philosophy. Redescribing oneself as well as avoiding cruelty are parts of the liberal ironist's final vocabulary. They are taken for granted. The only available explanation is the pragmatic sense of solidarity and ethnocentrism. As seen before, ethnocentrism also demarcates the boundaries of the community towards whose members one feels moral obligation. Here again, one cannot rise above the contingencies of ethnocentrism. The sense of solidarity is local. The liberal, like others, feels solidarity and moral responsibility towards those who are "one of us."

A Non-Ethnocentric Ethnocentrism

Having discussed the ethnocentric explanation of liberal ethics of creativity and moral commitment to avoid cruelty, two points are worthy of mention: firstly, the liberal conviction of the duty to expand the sense of solidarity and the scope of

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It is something which certain particular human beings hope to attain by self-creation, and which a few actually do' (Ibid., p. 65).

[171] Williams, "Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of The Gaze," p. 155.

intersubjective agreement, and, secondly, the belief in the value of free encounter *per se.* Both points have epistemic and moral significance.

To begin with, although '*[w]e* have to start from where *we* are,' from ethnocentrism, it is a liberal wish to expand the sense of "we," a historical and contingent wish that liberals happen to have. 'What takes the curse off this ethnocentrism is ... that it is the ethnocentrism of a "we"("we liberals") which is dedicated to enlarging itself, to creating an ever larger and more variegated *ethnos.*'[172] Hence, Rorty's liberal ethnocentrism calls for being less ethnocentric, and his abandonment of foundationalist philosophy is a way to do so.[173] In this regard, Rorty argues that 'we [bourgeois] liberals are exemplifying the attitude we claim to despise. We would rather die than be ethnocentric, but ethnocentrism is precisely the conviction that one would rather die than share certain beliefs.'[174] Rortyan liberals defend, 'on the basis of solidarity alone, a society which has traditionally asked to be based on something more than mere solidarity,' viz., on the dignity and inalienable rights of all men.[175]

This is, to be sure, moral progress in the sense of 'becoming like ourselves at our best (people who are not racist, not aggressive, not intolerant, ...),'[176] conforming 'more closely to the way we wealthy, secure, educated inhabitants of the First World think people should treat one another.'[177] Such liberal moral progress, Rorty argues, should be conceived of as

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[172] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 198.
[173] Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p.43.
[174] Rorty, "On ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," p. 203.
[175] Rorty, "Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism," p. 198.
[176] Rorty, "Introduction," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, p. 5.
[177] Ibid. p. 7.

> an increase in our ability to see more and more differences among people as morally irrelevant. This ability - to see the difference between people's religions, nations, genders, races, economic status, and so on as irrelevant to the possibility of cooperating with them for mutual benefit and as irrelevant to the need to alleviate their suffering - has increased considerably since the Enlightenment. ... Our Western liberal picture of a global democratic utopia is that of a planet on which all members of the species are concerned about the fates of all the other members.[178]

That is, perhaps, one reason why Rorty's liberal politics does not have a place for local communal and cultural solidarities. It regards these solidarities as morally irrelevant and matters of benign neglect.

The desire to extend the reference of "us" is not only a desire for feeling moral responsibility towards as many people as we can, but also a desire to expand the scope of our community of inquiry, viz., to achieve as much intersubjective agreement as possible.[179]

All this, however, does not mean that there is no limit to the expansion of the sense of "we." It is not the case that illiberal or undemocratic arguments should necessarily be taken seriously. That is why Nietzsche or Loyola is considered "crazy."

Regarding the second point, Rortyan liberals believe that it is through listening to various points of view and opening the discussion to as many people as possible that they arrive at what is best to approve,[180] as Habermas believes in decision-making through a process of "domination-free communication."[181] This is, however, not because open encounter leads to truth, but merely for the sake of toleration and free discussion *per se.*[182] Furthermore, Rorty's pragmatist does not think that in the future there will necessarily be a point of convergence in the process of inquiry, precisely because she denies that truth is "out there," waiting for us.[183] Therefore,

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[178] Ibid., pp. 11-12.
[179] See Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 38, and also Rorty, "Solidarity Or Objectivity?," p. 23.
[180] Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 39.
[181] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 66.

> A liberal society is one which is content to call 'true' whatever the upshot of such encounters turns out to be. That is why a liberal society is badly served by an attempt to supply it with 'philosophical foundations.' For the attempt to supply such foundations presupposes a natural order of topics and arguments which is prior to, and overrides the results of, encounters between old and new vocabularies.[184]

The liberal account of inquiry is primarily about the moral duty of continuing conversation as "its *own* end."[185] Thus in this sense, the term rational, rather than signifying objectivity or transcendence, denotes some moral virtues, such as toleration, dialogue, avoidance of using force, persuasion and intersubjective agreement. These are virtues, Rorty argues, that members of a liberal society need, in order to preserve the liberal democratic and pluralist features of their community.[186]

2.3. Suitability of the Conception of Essenceless Self for Liberalism

Although liberal democracy does not need a theory of the self, Rorty argues, if 'one *wants* a model of the human self,' perhaps 'for the purpose of systematizing our intuitions about the priority of liberty,' 'then this picture of a centreless web will fill the need.'[187] He goes on to say that '[t]o see one's language, one's conscience, one's morality, and one's highest hopes as contingent products, as literalization of what once were accidentally produced metaphors, is to adopt a self-identity which suits one for citizenship in such an ideally liberal state.'[188] This account of the self "serves" liberal ideals of avoiding cruelty and extending the sense of solidarity very well. Particularly, the vocabulary of contingency, which is more consistent with self-creation than with objectivity or transcendental truth and rationality, coheres with the ironist culture of liberal democracies.

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[182] See Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy To Philosophy," pp. 191-2.

[183] Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 38.

[184] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity,* p 52.

[185] Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," p. 172.

[186] Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 37. Also see, Rorty, "Introduction", *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers,* vol. 1, p. 13.

[187] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 192, also see ibid., p. 185, footnote no. 24.

3. Moral and Political Implications of Culture and Cultural Difference

In the section on Rorty's philosophical viewpoints, we have seen that solidarity with communities plays two crucial roles that can be called cognitive and impulsive. First, it determines what is considered to be rational and, in particular, moral. There is no truth as the representation of things-in-themselves and distinct from human life. True statements are no more than what is justified for the community with which we identify. Rorty's antifoundationalism is a further step to reinforce the separation between ethical convictions and their alleged abstract philosophical grounds. Moral views are taken for granted in a community, and philosophy is no more than their abbreviation. Second, solidarity sets the boundaries of people's moral community, to whose members they feel moral responsibility. Then, it has been our conclusion that a cultural community, given the importance of language, upbringing, etc., is one of the most salient communities to provide people with the kind of solidarity with which Rorty is concerned.

However, as touched upon in discussing Rorty's liberalism, his account of politics, which is restricted to avoiding cruelty and providing the chance of self-creation for everybody, does not seem to be concerned with cultural solidarities. This is, perhaps, because although liberalism is not less than any other moral and political doctrine ethnocentric, paradoxically it is an ethnocentrism which obliges its advocates to be less ethnocentric, and to be more inclusive of "featherless bipeds." In this section, we will see in more detail how Rorty deals with the issues of culture and cultural difference in moral and political terms. Hence, the question is, have the cognitive and impulsive roles of cultural communities, particularly in culturally diverse societies, any moral and political significance?

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[188] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 61.

3.1. All Language Games and Cultures on a Par

If there is no truth out there, and all we have are different descriptions that are mainly based on our language and sense of solidarity, then all descriptions and all languages are on a par. None is more true than, and thus has any privilege over, another. For Rorty, a pragmatic culture is one in which 'neither the priests nor the physicists nor the poets nor the Party were thought of as more "rational," or more "scientific" or "deeper" than one another.'[189] The same, one may say, is the case with different cultures. The point is that there is no rational way, in the sense of an Archimedean point of view, to adjudicate between competing sets of practices, values, and beliefs.[190] Although we adjudicate between different claims, our judgements are inevitably circular and ethnocentric. Relying on different solidarities, of which cultural solidarities are the most significant ones, various language games are merely incompatible, though of equal standing.

3.2. Castigating Politics of Difference

Rorty is critical of the concentration of what he calls "the cultural left" on "politics of difference" or "of identity" or "of recognition" at the expense of "the problems of men," sufferings and inequalities.[191] He argues that '[t]his Left wants to preserve otherness rather than ignore it.' He finds this strategy "disuniting America," and argues that 'insofar as this pride [in being different, black, etc.] prevents someone from also taking pride in being an American citizen, from thinking of his or her country as capable of reform, from being able to join with straights or whites in reformist initiatives, it is a political disaster.'[192] Hence, Rorty castigates the academic left for being "unpatriotic," due to its insistence on a politics of difference and "cultural politics."[193] As Robbins argues, 'for Rorty, too little attachment to the nation produces the same undesirable effects as too great an attachment to culture.'[194]

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[189] Rorty , "Introduction," *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. xxxviii.
[190] Festenstein, *Pragmatism And Political Theory*, p. 5.

He also criticises the politics of difference when it is seen as denying other cultures human rights and democracy. He disdains what he, borrowing from Levi-Strauss, calls "UNESCO cosmopolitanism," and says that

> The most contemptible form of such cosmopolitanism is the sort that explains that human rights are all very well for Eurocentric cultures, but that an efficient secret police, with subservient judges, professors and journalists at its disposal, in addition to prison guards and torturers, is better suited to the needs of other cultures. ... The alternative to this spurious and self-deceptive kind of cosmopolitanism is one with a clear image of a specific kind of cosmopolitan future: the image of a planet-wide democracy.[195]

For Rorty, the politics of difference, in the sense of UNESCO cosmopolitanism, amounts to refuting the superiority of the (western) ideal of liberal democracy and thus its world-wide applicability. Hence, he suggests that we

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[191] Rorty, "A Cultural Left," *Achieving Our Country*, pp. 75-107.

[192] Ibid. p. 100.

[193] Richard Rorty, "The Unpatriotic Academy," *New York Times*, (Feb. 13, 1994), E15.

[194] Robbins, "Sad Stories in the International Public Sphere," p. 213.

[195] Richard Rorty, "Philosophy and the Future," *Rorty and Pragmatism*, Herman Saatkamp, (Vanderbilt University Press: Nashville, 1995), p. 203.

> *think about cultural diversity on a world scale in the way our ancestors in the seventeenth and eighteenth century thought about religious diversity* on an Atlantic scale: as something to be simply *ignored* for purposes of designing political institutions.[196]

3.3. No Commitment to the Preservation of All Cultures

Rorty's view of neglecting cultural differences for the purpose of designing political institutions means lack of any political or moral commitment to preserve various cultures existing in a society.

Given the account of solidarity, he acknowledges the importance of preserving the community with which one identifies. Rorty argues that '[t]his community would serve no higher end than its own preservation and self-improvement, the preservation and enhancement of civilization.'[197] He even interprets the appeal to objectivity and ahistorical truth, which for Nietzsche are various sorts of "metaphysical comfort," as rooted in 'the hope that something resembling *us* will inherit the earth,'[198] and in the fear of death of our society.

Such an argument, however, does not give rise to a duty to preserve all communities or cultures, contrary to the assertions of some advocates of the politics of difference. Rorty argues that the idea of preserving all cultures is based on the assumption that they are all realisations of rationality, when rationality means "an extra added ingredient" distinguishing humans from animals, and not implying any pragmatic meaning.[199] Pragmatism's rejection of the latter account of rationality leaves the former idea unsupported. On the other hand, leftist intellectuals, *inter alia*, regard a culture as a "work of art" and, thus, as valid and worthy of preservation as any other. 'It is an attempt to re-create the Kantian distinction between value and dignity by thinking of every human culture, if not of every individual, as having incommensurable worth.'[200] Rorty is also critical of this account, and concludes that 'there seems no particular reason to hope for immortality for any contemporary set of cultural differences, as opposed to hoping that it may eventually be supplanted by a new and more interesting set.'[201]

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[196] Rorty, "On ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," p. 209.
[197] Rorty, "Science As Solidarity," p. 45.
[198] Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity," p. 32.
[199] Rorty, "Rationality and Cultural Difference," p. 189.

The Need for Diversity of Cultures

Although Rorty sees no need for the preservation of all cultures, he stresses the importance of cultural diversity to overcome the fear that ethnocentrism may turn human communities into "semantic monads, nearly windowless." Echoing John Stuart Mill, he sees splits within a culture as the only hope of transcending it. These splits caused by external influence and disruptions or internal tensions 'supply toeholds for new initiatives ... [and] make people listen to unfamiliar ideas in the hope of finding means of overcoming those tensions.'[202]

Endorsing the Deweyan suggestion of supporting democratic values through art, Rorty observes that the culture of toleration can be promoted by novels and biographies or autobiographies, etc. written by people who have experienced tension between cultures in their own personal lives. Hence, for him, cultural difference and particularly preservation of other cultures are significant in so far as they have some pragmatic use, viz., promoting the culture of tolerance and freedom. Nevertheless, he claims that there is sufficient cultural diversity in western societies, so the extirpated culture of 'Ur and Harappa are no more to be regretted than are the eohippus, the mammoth, and the saber-toothed tiger.'[203] This indicates that, for Rorty, there is no need for the government interference in order to provide or preserve cultural diversity. Finally, he argues that

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[200] Ibid., p. 190.
[201] Ibid., p. 194.
[202] Rorty, "Introduction," *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 13-14.

> The real work of building a multicultural global utopia, I suspect, will be done by people who, in the course of the next few centuries, unravel each culture into a multiplicity of fine component threads and then weave these threads together with equally fine threads drawn from other cultures - thus promoting the sort of variety-in-unity characteristic of ... [culture of freedom and tolerance]. The resulting tapestry will, with luck, be something we can now barely imagine - a culture that will find the cultures of contemporary America and contemporary India as suitable for benign neglect as we find those of Harappa or of Carthage.[204]

3.4. "Kuwaiti Bazaar": Private Clubs and Procedural Justice

Rorty argues that the liberal ideal of procedural justice is precisely designed to deal with cultural diversity. It accommodates such a diversity, because it does not presuppose, and thus does not require or sanction any particular philosophical approach to the human nature and the meaning of life. In other words, 'one does not have to accept much *else* from Western culture to find the Western liberal ideal of procedural justice attractive.'[205]

Rorty sometime pictures his ideal plural liberal society as a "Kuwaiti bazaar," a term he borrows from Clifford Geertz. He goes on to say that '[w]e can urge the construction of a world order whose model is a bazaar surrounded by lots of exclusive private clubs.'[206] In this bazaar, however, many people do not see any way of espousing the convictions of many of those with whom they do business, convictions that they find utterly unacceptable. Hence, in such a bazaar there could be a *civil society* of the bourgeois democratic sort, but not a *community* in the strong sense. Nonetheless, the exclusivity of private clubs is crucial for Rorty's ideal world because, as Levi-Strauss mentions, 'such exclusivity is a necessary and proper condition of selfhood.' These exclusive and ethnocentric selves cooperate with each other by accepting procedural justice.

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[203] Rorty, "Rationality and Cultural Difference," p. 194.

[204] Ibid., p. 201. In the original text, Rorty distinguishes the meaning of culture used in these sentences from its other meanings used in various parts of his article by adding subscripts. However, those subscripts are omitted in the quotation here because the relevant senses are clear; keeping those subscripts would have needed clarifying different meanings.

[205] Rorty, "On ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," p. 209.

Rorty concludes that '[t]he ultimate political synthesis of love and justice may thus turn out to be an intricately-textured collage of private narcissism and public pragmatism.' Although the basic reason behind a Rawlsian procedural justice is pragmatism, Rorty maintains that a commitment to such a politics is 'a moral commitment when made by members of some clubs (e.g. ours) but a matter of expediency when made by members of others.'[207] This, however, gives rise to the question as to why non-liberal cultures have to accept procedural liberalism as a matter of expediency, while for liberals it is an integrated part of their culture. Rorty's response is quite clear: we are not duty-bound to treat others in their own terms.

3.5. Taking Other Human Beings, though not Necessarily Their Moral Vocabulary, Seriously

In ethnocentrism, *we* determine the limits of sanity, and on this basis not only assess others' claims, but also conduct our treatment of others. We deal with others in our own terms, Rorty maintains. Such a reservation, however, seriously qualifies his account of conversation with, and inclusion of, other cultures and language games. He argues that

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[206] Ibid.

> We have to insist that not every argument needs to be met in the terms in which it is presented. Accommodation and tolerance must stop short of a willingness to work within any vocabulary that one's interlocutor wishes to use, to take seriously any topic that he puts forward for discussion. To take this view is of one piece with dropping the idea that a single moral vocabulary and a single set of moral beliefs are appropriate for every human community everywhere, and to grant that historical developments may lead us to simply *drop* questions and the vocabulary in which those questions are posed.[208]

Given antirepresentationalism, generally speaking, Rorty is not interested in others' account epistemically, unless it stretches imagination and opens up new pragmatic ways of viewing the world.

Rorty, however, acknowledges that everybody's account of his own behaviour is morally, rather than epistemically, "privileged." Therefore, '[w]e have a duty to listen to his own account, not because he has privileged access to his own motives but because he is a human being like ourselves.'[209] He argues that the

> substitution of objectivity-as-intersubjectivity for objectivity-as-accurate-representation is the key pragmatic move, the one that lets pragmatists feel they can have moral seriousness without "realist" seriousness. For moral seriousness is a matter of taking other human beings seriously, and not taking anything else with equal seriousness. It turns out, pragmatists say, that we can take each other very seriously indeed without taking the intrinsic nature of reality seriously at all.[210]

However, for Rorty, even our moral obligation to others does not oblige us to respond to their moral needs in their own terminology. 'Moral commitment, after all, does not require taking seriously all the matters that are, for moral reasons, taken seriously by one's fellow citizens. It may require just the opposite. It may require

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[207] Ibid., p. 210.
[208] Rorty, "Priority Of Democracy To Philosophy," p. 190.
[209] Rorty, "Method, Social Science, Social Hope," p. 202.
[210] Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," p. 83.

trying to josh them out of the habit of taking those topics so seriously.'[211] The reason for joshing them is, perhaps, mainly pragmatic. Sometimes, breaking cultural narrowness and achieving moral progress will be possible only in this way.

Nevertheless, Rorty's view in treating others by liberal standards in the public domain is incoherent. The refusal to take seriously what others take seriously is inconsistent with taking *those people* "morally" seriously. This is because human beings are, as Rorty himself remarks, no more than webs of beliefs and desires. Disregarding those constituents of the web that are its characteristics cannot be considered as taking their holders morally seriously. Such a refusal may work in discussions as well as in moral assessments, but as an overall political strategy would be untenable. If we are to take other people seriously, we cannot, *pace* Rorty, ethnocentrically deny the seriousness of their claims or the terms in which they have been couched. Seen from another angle, the refusal to take others' vocabulary seriously sounds like the Nazis' view that, to use Rorty's own words, "We have no concern for legitimizing ourselves in the eyes of others."[212]

We have seen that, for Rorty, the most salient imperative in relation to others is the avoidance of cruelty and humiliation. The refusal to take others' claims and vocabulary seriously, however, implies that it is the liberal pragmatist who defines what cruelty and humiliation mean. Such a claim would be untenable, because cruelty and humiliation are emotional and thus agent-dependent concepts. Hence, it is meaningless to care about somebody's feelings while drawing only on our own emotional judgements. For instance, concerning moral ideals such as pragmatism and toleration, the liberal pragmatist substitutes "light-mindedness" for deep inquiries into, or questions about the nature of, the self. He does not bother whether such questions or inquiries have moral significance for some people. However, the question is, what will be the response of the pragmatist if those issues are indispensable to these people's sense of identity and moral dignity?

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[211] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 194.

[212] Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Response to Jean-Francois Lyotard," p. 214. Rorty argues that, unlike the Nazi, the ethnocentrist liberal says "We admit that we cannot justify our beliefs or our actions to all human beings as they are at present, but we hope to create a community of free human beings who will freely share many of our beliefs and hopes." Rorty goes on to say 'There is a difference between the Nazi who says "We are good because we are the particular group we are" and the reformist liberal who says "We are good because, by persuasion rather than force, we shall eventually convince everybody else that we are" (Ibid.)

Refusing to take into consideration our interlocutors' vocabulary and working only within our own final vocabulary are thornier when they constitute a separate community, and particularly a cultural community. Given the significant roles of such communities in Rorty's theory, there will be no justification for disregarding the cognitive and moral terminology of other cultural communities with which we share our public realm. In disputes between different cultural solidarities, the criteria for adjudication should not be those of one of them. David Little, commenting on Rorty's "Solidarity or Objectivity," argues that 'Rorty appears to permit criticism and pressure against those societies [the ones we do not like] *if we happen to want to* criticize and pressure them in pursuit of some interest or belief we may (at the time) have, and for whatever ethnocentric reasons we may happen to hold those interests or beliefs.'[213]

Rorty's ideal of a pluralistic liberal society, as a "Kuwaiti bazaar," consisting of private clubs that co-operate according to a procedural justice is a significant step towards recognising cultural differences. However, it is a qualified attempt, since, as seen before, while for liberals commitment to such a liberal procedural justice is "moral," for others it is a matter of "expediency." This is obviously not an equal treatment of other cultures, because the political morality dominant in Rorty's ideal society is a part of the liberal culture, whereas it is not so for other cultures existing in the society. Equal treatment of all cultures requires devising a system of justice based on the overlapping values and desires of all relevant cultures. As Rorty himself argues, 'there is no supercultural observation platform to which we might repair. The only common ground on which we can get together is that defined by the overlap between their communal beliefs and desires and our own.'[214]

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[213] Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," p. 187, footnote no. 33, quoting from: David Little, "Natural Rights and Human Rights: The International Imperative," *National Rights and*

Rorty does not look at the issue of cultural difference from the minority cultures' viewpoint. Thus, he denies the duty to preserve cultures. Although the duty to preserve a culture could be subject to the existence of a significant body of members wishing for its survival, it could not be subject to its pragmatic usage, such as providing diversity, for the majority.

One reason for this may be that Rorty, like many other liberals, presumes a homogeneous society, free from conflicting senses of solidarity or community. As Frazer argues, 'Rorty assumes that there are no deep social cleavages capable of generating conflicting solidarities and opposing 'we's' ... Social engineering can replace political struggle.'[215] Such a presumption, alongside the criterion of "enjoying *wider* consensus" for distinguishing warranted from unwarranted assertions, sometimes works to the disadvantage of minority cultures. This is so because the dominant culture is in a better position to enter into a free debate, and publicise its

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Natural Law: The Legacy of George Mason, Robert P. Davidow (ed.) [Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University Press, 1986], pp. 67-122.

[214] Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Response to Jean-Francois Lyotard," p. 212.

beliefs and needs than minority cultures are. The latter may not be able to express their views and needs eloquently, or the dominant culture may not appreciate their needs and values.

Recognising the crucial roles of communities and cultural communities in morality and knowledge, Rorty is in a position to articulate the political implications of such recognition. However, he stops short of that. Denying universal standards, he deals with other cultures on the basis of a declared ethnocentric liberalism rather than on common grounds between them, which is necessary if all cultures and language-games are on a par. Perhaps that is why Michael Billing argues that Rorty's ethnocentrism is no more than "the nationalism of the *Pax Americana*" which 'draws its moral force to lead the nations from its own proclaimed reasonableness. The global ambitions are to be presented as the voice of tolerance ('our' tolerance), even doubt ('our' doubt, 'our' modesty). All the while, 'we' are to keep a sense of 'ourselves.' And a sense of 'others': the mad and the bad, who cling to dangerous absolutes, opposing 'our' pragmatic, non-ideological politics.'[216]

4. Conclusion

We have seen that for Rorty, solidarity with the community accounts for the meaning of rationality and the definition of morality as well as for the scope of moral responsibility towards others. Arguably, culture is one of the significant communities, if not the most significant community, with which Rorty is concerned, though he is not explicit about it. We owe to it our language and basically our language games, values and beliefs. Our sense of solidarity is one of the strongest in

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[215] Frazer, "Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty between Romanticism and Technocracy," p. 313.

relation with members of our cultural community. However, Rorty does not translate the moral and philosophical significance of communities and particularly cultural communities, as he himself articulates, into politics.

Rorty's model of civil society in which private clubs regulate their public affairs on the basis of procedural liberalism does not treat non-liberal cultures on an equal footing. Ethnocentrism may be plausible in assessing others' claims and particularly in the private realm. It is tenable not to take others' vocabulary and claims seriously in inquiry. There is no choice but to be cognitively ethnocentric. However, it is a requirement of taking others "seriously morally as human beings" that their *vocabulary and claims* should be taken seriously in making moral and political decisions that affect them. If there are different cultural solidarities in a society, all 'products of time and chance' and exhibiting "sheer contingency,"[217] there is no reason to privilege the vocabulary and moral claims of one over those of others in the public. They all are on a par in the public domain. Hence, some version of the politics of difference and a public based on common grounds among all existing cultures in a society are moral requirements of living in a multicultural society.

Rorty's model of a Kuwaiti bazaar accepts differences in the private realm. His liberalism has no difficulty leaving different cultures alone, but is not ready to recognise their difference publicly. It merely tolerates others. Rorty seems to think that benign neglect is the pragmatic way to deal with cultural diversity in order to increase toleration, etc. Nevertheless, as said before, such a stance is inconsistent with the roles he allocates to communities and, arguably, cultural communities. This,

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[216] Michael Billing, "Nationalism and Richard Rorty: The Text as a Flag for the Pax Americana," *New Left Review*, no. 202, (1993), pp. 82-83.

[217] Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 22.

once again, shows the tension between the pragmatic and ethnocentric elements in his thought. While the ethnocentric dimension of inquiry requires solidarity with one's community, the pragmatic dimension stresses success and coping with reality. The two drive in different directions.[218] In short, Rorty's politics does not catch up with the implications of his account of solidarity and its cognitive, moral and emotional significance. One reason for this could be that he does not try to articulate a comprehensive view of politics in the first place.

Rorty's philosophy, despite its difficulties and inconsistencies, emphasises two important points. Firstly, it stresses the implausibility of a metaphysically derived universal set of criteria and values appropriate for every community everywhere. Different communities and cultures have developed various conceptions of rationality and morality that do not necessarily overlap with each other. Secondly, it indicates the significance of a local sense of solidarity and moral responsibility that, in some respects, may even override the universal sense of identification with the humanity as a whole. The cultural community is one of the most salient groupings with which we identify, and acts as our moral community, giving rise to a local sense of responsibility.

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[218] In this regard, Rorty's remark that he has learned that it is a mistake to try to hold 'reality and justice in a single vision' may be relevant. See Richard Rorty, "Trotsky and Wild Orchids," *Common Knowledge*, vol. 13, (1993), pp. 147-8. Rorty's difficulty, however, is not very different from the predicament of other liberals on the issue of diversity, as he himself describes:

> Liberals who are both connoisseurs of diversity and Enlightenment rationalists cannot get out of this bind. Their rationalism commits them to making sense of the distinction between rational judgement and cultural bias. Their liberalism forces them to call any *doubt* about human equality a result of such irrational bias. Yet their connoisseurship forces them to realize that most of the globe's inhabitants simply do not believe in human equality, that such a belief is a Western eccentricity. Since they think it would be shockingly ethnocentric to say "So what? We Western liberals *do* believe in it, and so much the better for us." they are stuck (Rorty, "On ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz," p. 207).

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Increasing cultural diversity in western societies has prompted a gamut of questions on all aspects of political thought, which have received a variety of responses in contemporary works of political philosophy. In this thesis, the writings of Taylor, Raz and Rorty, specifically, have been examined. In order to analyse their approaches towards cultural diversity, we discussed whether they think cultures and cultural communities, in general, give rise to any moral obligation that needs to be dealt with politically, viz., through the workings of the state. We then considered the implications of their answers for multicultural societies.

Taylor, Raz and Rorty give various accounts of the importance of culture. A critical survey of these accounts indicates that there are two arguments regarding the significance of culture, namely, that culture is a source of moral values for people, and that as a type of community (the cultural community) it gives rise to some moral demands. In so far as the significance of culture has political implications, the two arguments ground two principles of "moral sensitivity" towards, and "equal" treatments of, people's cultures, as Taylor and Raz's views point in this direction. The scope of tolerance and recognition is only limited by cultural communities' obligation to observe basic human rights as well as by the political necessities of living together.

1. Significance of Culture

1.1. Culture as a Source of Moral Understanding

The first argument about the significance of cultures is to the effect that they play an important role in the formation of our moral understanding. This is a point that Taylor, Rorty and Raz recognise to different extents. Taylor finds knowledge and, in particular, practical reasoning, engaged with the world and relying on a pre-established background understanding. Consequently, he sees moral ideals and commitments, which in his view constitute one's identity, as formed dialogically and in the community, particularly through language in the cultural community. For Taylor, the power of justification is confined to those who share some basic intuitions. When the common ground between two cultures is very narrow, their disputes cannot be arbitrated in reason, and they are simply incommensurable. The cultural particularity of practical reasoning, however, does not result in relativism. Taylor's assumption of the ultimate horizon, his view on the claims on us of non-human entities, as well as the universal worth of values such as equality and respect for all, drive towards universalism. A difficulty with Taylor is that the border between the universal and the culturally particular is blurred. We know that some aspects of our moral knowledge are universal while some others are cultural, but it is not clear how they relate to each other.

Raz, too, recognises that values and meaningful "comprehensive goals" are based on cultures or, as he prefers to put it, on socially existing forms. Maintaining universal principles, he argues that social forms constitute value options in a way that 'defies any attempt to commensurate valuations' merely on the basis of abstract universal values.[1] These principles may not enable us to find out about radically new and unfamiliar values or ways of life. The incommensurability of value options, however, does not amount to the incommensurability of cultures and the unintelligibility of one for the members of another. Nevertheless, Raz's account is also ambiguous about the relationship between cultural and universal factors in determining values.

In Rorty's pragmatism, inquiry, either normative or scientific, far from being a representation of truth, is a reflection of solidarity with the community with which we identify, and thus is particular. He argues that there is no metaphysically derived universal set of criteria and values appropriate for all communities. Different communities have different conceptions of rationality and morality that do not necessarily overlap. Our moral knowledge is inevitably ethnocentric, and moral options become available to us through the process of acculturation. One can maintain that this particularity is cultural, though Rorty himself eschews using this adjective. However, Rorty's fully-fledged anti-representationalism leads to contradiction and inconsistency. While rejecting the concept of truth and correspondence with reality, he cannot help coming back to the view that some of our statements can be warranted if they correspond to the reality.

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[1] Joseph Raz, "Facing Up: A Reply," *Southern California Law Review*, vol. 62, no. 3 and 4, (March-May 1989), p. 1221.

Although the writings of Taylor, Raz and Rorty offer different accounts of the relationship between the universal and the culturally particular, of the role of truth and reality in moral convictions, and of the commensurability or incommensurability of cultures, they all reserve an indisputable role for cultures in constituting morality. People's moral understanding is inevitably culturally embedded. This does not require falling into relativism, but only maintaining that, as Parekh argues, '[t]here is an inevitable dialectical interplay between the relatively thin universal values and the thick moral structures that characterise different societies.'[2]

Moreover, Rorty, Raz and Taylor agree that people mainly acquire their values from their cultures. The latter view is also shared by Kymlicka, who argues that cultures provide people with 'meaningful options encompassing the range of human activities.'[3] Values and norms may be divinely provided or grounded on pure reasoning, or they may merely be social constructions developed contingently in certain social and material circumstances. Nevertheless, irrespective of their origin, moral values are accessible to most people when incorporated into a culture. In a nutshell, culture is a source, perhaps even the main source, of morality.

Concern for Culture and Cultural Difference: A Moral Sensitivity

To consider cultures as sources of moral knowledge is to acknowledge that our appraisal of people's moral behaviour and our expectations of them irrespective of the cultural background that informs their moral world cannot be justified and fair. This is particularly so, if the appraisal and expectation entail holding people morally or legally responsible, and subjecting them to punishment or encouragement.

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[2] Bhikhu Parekh, "Non-ethnocentric Universalism," *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.) (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999), p. 158.

Cultures provide people with, and form, the moral knowledge that is regarded as valid by their members and, thus, is the basis of their evaluations and actions. Hence, we should be sensitive towards what people see as the cultural background against which they decide and choose among different value options. For many moral doctrines, not least liberalism, the authority of what is considered a principle is to some extent contingent on the fact that people agree on it. Universal principles, as we have seen in the first chapter, are assumed to be arrived at freely. This puts some limitations on the legitimacy of imposing law and morality on dissenters. For Raz, incommensurability of ways of life endorsed by different cultures calls for a "moral sensibility" which requires taking difference seriously, and avoiding imposition of our own values on others.

It is noteworthy that most people regard their moral values as objective in the sense that all humans can have access to them, regardless of their cultural affiliation, and thus put them in universal terms. Morality, to some extent, is constituted by the *claim* of universality.[4] In other words, the claim to universality is latent in the nature of many moral convictions, as Taylor and Raz maintain. It is not surprising that cultures are mostly associated with religions or humanist traditions with universal messages. Even Rorty's ethnocentrism does not prevent him from acknowledging the universalistic tone of moral knowledge.[5]

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[3] Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996), p. 101. Also, see P. 83.

[4] The *claim* of universality is obviously different from the issue of whether a principle is actually universally accessible and culturally neutral, or culturally particular to the effect that it is acceptable only for certain culture(s) in which it has been developed. Although many people may not accept one's moral view, it does not mean that one oneself has to deny the claim of universal validity of one's beliefs. Ordinary people are not interested in the phenomenology of moral views or their anthropological roots. They are usually concerned with whether they are regarded as objective and universally valid or not.

[5] Two senses of universality need to be distinguished, namely, universal accessibility and universal applicability. The former is about the possibility of universal justification or, roughly speaking,

The moral sensitivity towards cultures informing agents' behaviour has an interpersonal and civil dimension, in the sense that it should be observed by people in various aspects of civil society, which has nothing to do with the state. In their treatment of culturally different persons, people should try to understand and take into account the relevant cultural context. However, the present thesis is confined to the implications of sensitivity towards cultures so far as the state is concerned. This is because the state cannot occupy a morally higher ground, and claim cultural neutrality.

Given that cultures are sources of morality, moral directives concerning the workings of the state or justice in the public sphere, as sub-sets of moral understanding, are inevitably to some extent derived from cultures.[6] This also implies that the entire legal system in a society is, in one way or another, informed by its culture. This is particularly the case with the perfectionist state whose working is not limited to executing intrinsically political functions, or to fulfilling moral demands that, due to their nature, only states are capable of meeting. For perfectionists like Raz, moral values can be pursued by state apparatus, in so far as it is the most effective way that people can comply with those values. There is no fixed

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objectivity, while the latter concerns the scope of applicability of a principle. These two do not go always together. Thinkers who maintain the cultural embeddedness of morality, denying its universal accessibility, do not necessarily repudiate its universal applicability. On the other hand, acknowledging objectivity and universal accessibility does not amount to denying that some moral claims, such as agent-dependent norms, have a limited range addressing a certain person or group of people. Cultures' particularistic claims, some of which are of paramount importance for the politics of recognition, will be discussed in later sections of this chapter.

[6] No comprehensive culture can disregard politics. Some cultures give a thick and explicit set of rules for public life and political institutions, whereas some others give a thin account of such rules, or leave politics to politicians. Among religions, for instance, Islam is regarded as a highly political religion, while Buddhism is not.

boundary between the moral and the political.[7] Hence, culture plays an important role in shaping the public life of the society, whether perfectionist or not.

Insofar as a culture informs people's moral understanding and the public life of their society, there is harmony between the two. This usually occurs in a homogeneous society. In culturally plural societies, however, there could be a discrepancy between the morality dominant in the public life and some people's moral values. The main difficulty, in heterogeneous societies, is that members of subordinated cultures are sometimes expected to abide by rules and values, in the public realm, which are alien to them. They are also judged in the public life by principles that are not available or acceptable to them. The consequence is either their alienation from the public realm or "ego-split," both heavily costly. In order to mitigate such consequences, the political apparatus in a society ought to be sensitive to the issues of culture and cultural difference. This means that people's basic cultural beliefs should be respected and accommodated. In other words, as far as possible, as Raz singles out, people should not be compelled to act in a manner contrary to their conscience, or be systematically prevented from acting on their values.

Concern for Cultures Out of Concern for Human Beings

It is important to argue that sensitivity towards, and concern for, culture does not arise simply from holding culture as a main source of morality. The latter fact must be complemented with a normative proposition in order to result in a moral concern for culture. Arguably, the concern for culture is based on the moral concern for human beings, or as Rorty puts it, 'taking other human beings seriously, and not taking anything else with equal seriousness.'[8] If there were already no concern for human welfare, there could be no concern for cultures. This ground for respecting cultures is also mentioned by some other philosophers. As seen before, from Raz's viewpoint, the demand for respect and prosperity for a culture is a "moral claim" that 'rests entirely on their vital importance to the prosperity of individual human beings.'[9] Habermas refers to the same point when arguing that 'from a normative point of view, the integrity of the individual legal person cannot be guaranteed without protecting the intersubjectively shared experiences and life contexts in which the person has been socialized and has formed his or her identity.'[10] In his discussion of fusion of horizons, Taylor touches on a similar point when finding people's ability of making sense of their life an essential human purpose. However, he does not mention this notion in his recognition argument.

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[7] Raz points out that whenever "the normal justification thesis" applies, there is a case for the authority of the state, unless voluntarism is the rationale of a moral option, viz., it is its point to be chosen autonomously.

A difficulty with Taylor is that he tries to ground the moral demand for recognition merely on transcendental conditions of human life, viz., the dialogical feature of selfhood. For him, since one becomes a functioning self, capable of strong evaluation, dialogically and in interaction with others, recognition becomes crucial. Since one's selfhood is constituted by one's culture, the latter should be recognised. However, as we have seen in the chapter on Taylor, there is a gap between the dialogical feature of selfhood as a transcendental condition, and "recognition" as a moral duty. Such a gap has to be filled with an already existing normative statement, such as concern for human prosperity. The role of cultures in constituting identity can only be supplementary to establishing the demand for the recognition of cultures. Some liberals, non-foundationalists like Rawls or antifoundationalists like Rorty, are quick to argue that they do not start from transcendental conditions, but from the moral consensus within the liberal society. Taylor, however, does not appeal to this sort of argument, nor does he provide us with the relevant premises to fill the gap. He, untenably, jumps from the alleged transcendental account to a moral conviction.

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[8] Richard Rorty, "John Searle On Realism and Relativism," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998), p. 83.

[9] Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), p. 163.

The necessity of such an already existing and substantive normative statement, viz., the care for human welfare or the like, in order to arrive at moral concern for cultures, shows that the latter cannot be premised merely on the neutrality between different moral traditions or on a view that finds them all equally arbitrary.

It is important to emphasise that the moral duty to recognise cultures, whether the mainstream or minority ones, rises out of the care for human beings in order to untie such a moral demand from the question of worth, let alone equal worth, of cultures. As Habermas argues, '[t]he right to equal respect, which everyone can demand in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed as well as elsewhere, has nothing to do with the presumed excellence of his or her culture of origin, that is, with generally valued accomplishments.'[11] Further, to grant cultures recognition solely on the basis of their worth distorts the demand for recognition which is based not on the worth of these cultures, but on their vitality in giving sense to their members' lives. Recognition is a moral or political demand, not a demand for the acknowledgement of worth. Evaluative and aesthetic assessments are precious intellectual activities, but

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[10] Jurgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* Amy Gutmann (ed.), 2nd ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 129.

they are not the basis of recognition as a moral and political "ought." Although, as we will see later, these assessments may delimit the scope of recognition, the latter is primarily grounded on the concern for human well-being.

Moreover, we do not have to appeal to the value of diversity and pluralism in order to recognise other cultures. Pluralism is, at the most, no more than a subsidiary proposition. The value of moral diversity offers dominant cultures merely a self-regarding reason for respecting others. Other cultures may provide the majority with valuable resources, more options to choose from, and a self-critical viewpoint. As Kymlicka argues, however, the value of cultural diversity does not seem to be weighty enough to entail a right for other cultures to be recognised by the majority.[12] Nonetheless, it is moderately important, since, as Parekh argues, it convinces the majority that it does not simply bear 'the moral burden of tolerance as an earnest of generosity' towards minorities. This makes the relationship between communities more healthy.[13]

Doing away with the issue of worth, although the sensitivity towards cultures out of concern for human beings widens the scope of recognition, it paradoxically restricts the latter in another way. Such recognition will be counter-productive, if it does not promote human welfare. Slavery, human sacrifice and racism are not justified, in spite of being sanctioned in some cultures. Moral sensitivity towards other cultures is not tantamount to acknowledging the rightness of their practices, as a practice is not valuable simply because it commands social approval, according to

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[11] Ibid., p. 129.
[12] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, pp. 121-123.
[13] Bhikhu Parekh, "Britain and the Social Logic of Pluralism," Bhikhu Parekh (ed.), *Britain: A Plural Society*, (Commission for Racial Equality: London 1989), p. 67.

Raz.[14] That is why, for him, a political theory of multiculturalism should not be neutral in the strict sense. Moreover, he maintains that cultures are not to be taken at their own estimation. In this regard, also Rorty remarks that '[a]ccommodation and tolerance must stop short of a *willingness to work within any vocabulary that one's interlocutor wishes to use, to take seriously any topic that he puts forward for discussion.*'[15]

One should, however, be cautious about these views of Raz and Rorty. Unwillingness to work within the vocabulary of one's interlocutors and to take their cultures at their own estimation is what has justified the neglect of culture and cultural difference by liberals and others. The entire project of multiculturalism will be at stake, unless the above points are interpreted as saying: even if members of such cultures cannot be convinced that horrible actions like slavery or racism are wrong, there is no reason to legitimise slavery and racism for those cultures in the society. Only in such severe cases, it does not matter whether the conceptual tools allegedly necessary for rejecting these practices are available in a culture or not. A recent example that has given rise to some discussions in western societies is female circumcision when it leads to genital mutilation.[16] However, those moral conventions of other cultures that are extremely abhorrent are much fewer than those which are not. Thus, there is plenty of room for legitimate moral sensitivity towards values and practices of other cultures. For instance, polygamy is not in such a sharp contrast with liberal values that requires its outright ban, casting off any sensitivity towards it. We will discuss these cases later in this chapter. Nevertheless, the decision about which practices are abhorrent and which are not is *inevitably ethnocentric*, as Rorty defines it.

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[14] See Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1988), p.310.
[15] Richard Rorty, "Priority Of Democracy To Philosophy," *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical papers*, vol. 1, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991),p. 190.

At the risk of repetition, it can be said that the *care for culture and cultural difference is contingent on a moral concern for human agency*. It is the human being to whom we owe moral recognition. However, identifying cultures as sources of morality and acknowledging their vitality for people's life and sense of meaningfulness, as Taylor and Raz single out, give rise to a new moral sensitivity, that is, care for, and recognition of, culture and cultural difference. Although there are many other considerations to be taken into account in order to establish the politics of recognition and multiculturalism, concern for cultures out of care for human beings is the cornerstone of such a politics.

1.2. Cultural Community as a Bearer of Moral Claims

Apart from maintaining moral standards with universal applicability, cultures raise particularistic norms. In the latter case, the culture does not work as a source of people's value structure reflecting universal principles, but as a type of community parallel to some other collectivities such as family, religious community, nation-state and so forth. This is the second argument of this thesis about the significance of culture in the sense that culture *qua* cultural community gives rise to some moral obligations. The aforementioned collectivities subject people to some moral duties, for instance, members to obey particular regulations and non-members to respect those regulations and to avoid interfering with the former's affairs. They also require special treatment of their members by each other. Hence, it is plausible to assume that cultural communities do the same. Cultural communities raise various moral

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[16] See Bhikhu Parekh, "Equality, Fairness and Limits of Diversity," *Innovation*, vol. 7, no. 3, (1994),

claims that differ from one culture to another. Nonetheless, generally speaking, these demands can be classified into at least four categories, namely, survival, respect, regulation of members' affairs in some aspects, and reservation of some rights and prerogatives for their own members.

Taylor, Rorty and Raz's philosophies account for many particularistic moral demands of cultural communities. However, they do not provide a comprehensive articulation of these demands that can be subsumed under the second argument for the moral significance of culture. We have seen that, for Taylor, cultural survival is high on the agenda. This is because culture is the background of meaning to our actions. It can be argued that the very fact that cultures inform people's sense of belonging and identity entails a demand for survival. For Raz, people's dignity and self-respect require respect for, and prosperity of, their culture.[17] It is important for people to see their cultural community commanding respect in the larger society and enjoying a relatively satisfactory position in the political, cultural, social and economic life of their societies.

Rorty observes that self-preservation and self-improvement are communities' higher ends. He takes a big step in recognising the particularistic demands of communities, and arguably cultural communities, by stating that people's sense of moral responsibility and solidarity is confined to those whom they consider to be members of their community. Communal solidarity is, at least sometimes, stronger than human solidarity. The difficulty with Rorty is that he implies that the feeling of moral responsibility towards members of one's community is in conflict with the

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p. 289.

same feeling towards all human beings. For him, the sense of solidarity is local, but it ought to be expanded to the humanity at large through sensational education. Rorty is wrong in assuming that the expansion of the sense of solidarity towards more and more people is to be done at the expense of giving up the local sense. Nobody should forsake his particular love of, and his parental duties towards, his child for the universal love of, and general duties to, human beings as a whole, nor vice versa.

If cultural communities give rise to a particular sense of responsibility among their own members, then it is plausible to say that they require special treatment of their members by each other. This, however, does not mean that the rights of non-members are to be ignored, or that they are to be treated without dignity, but that cultural communities reserve some particular and extra rights for their members. More importantly, it is a main function of cultures to provide their members with patterns of behaviour in order to regulate their life in one or another dimension, as Raz points out.

The function of communities and cultural communities, in particular, in giving rise to moral claims, does not mean that they are bodies independent of, and over and above, their members, though they are not merely aggregations of individuals. Such moral claims are ultimately and necessarily derivative of the interests of people, nevertheless, the interests of people as members of a particular community rather than as individuals irrespective of their communal attachments. The moral claims of communities are contingent on the purposes and requirements of communities as well as the role they play in the life of their members. The main ground for the moral

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[17] Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination," *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, Joseph Raz (ed.), (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), p. 119.

claims of communities, or "the morality of community" as Tamir singles out, is that they constitute people's identity, and inform their sense of belonging, as Taylor, Raz and Rorty noted. It is noteworthy, however, that formal membership alone is a sufficient basis for subjecting people to some sorts of communal duties, or conferring some kinds of collective-based rights on them.

Political Implications of Cultural Communities' Moral Claims

This thesis has been concerned with those moral claims of cultural communities that have a political bearing. We have seen, in the previous chapters, that moral claims of some other kinds of communities can be translated into politics. Some of the measures of the nation-state, for instance, are only justifiable in terms of the moral demands of the nation-state for survival, or in terms of treating members and non-members differently and preserving some prerogatives only for members. These measures include restricting the scope of redistributive justice to citizens, confining the right to citizenship, and imposing the obligation to obey the law on those who eschew giving their consent to it.

In the case of cultural communities, in order to establish a relationship between culture and morality in the public domain, it has to be shown that moral claims of culture require state support. Obviously, some moral claims of cultural communities do not involve state action; such action may even void the point of some moral claims. For instance, state support in a very explicit manner would not be an appropriate way to achieve the survival of cultural customs and habits. Similarly, genuine respect can only be achieved through the striving by members of a cultural community rather than through enforcement by government. Also, some cultural patterns of behaviour, say, rules of etiquette, are not in need of public support. Moreover, the state should not persuade members of a cultural community to care for each other more than they do for others. Although these points show that some of the community's moral demands should not be pursued publicly, it cannot be ruled out that some others, which may not even be political issues *per se*, can legitimately be pursued by the state.

Among our selected group of philosophers, Rorty, despite the recognition of communities' demand for survival and self-improvement, does not see any role for these demands in liberal politics. This may be due to his pragmatist and proceduralist interpretation of liberalism. Consequently, he cannot account for the fact that all liberal states, in one way or another, are engaged in supporting culture. Establishing state-owned radio and TV channels, subsidising cultural activities such as fine arts, theatre, orchestra, opera, etc., promoting national language,[18] family life, social network of care, teaching cultural values at schools and so on are examples of this support. For instance, the French government is eager to protect the French language and culture against the wave of English language and American culture, particularly through the Cinema industry.

In the above cases, the aim is mainly the survival of a culture or a particular aspect of it, which otherwise could be weakened. The state may also be involved in the above activities in order to help present a respectable picture of the society's culture in the international arena and among other cultures. Further, some cultural rituals can keep their attraction among members as a result of state aid. More importantly, some decisions of the state inevitably have cultural connotations. A society has to have (an) official language(s), public holidays, state symbols, an anthem and so forth, which are inescapably cultural phenomena. In these respects, as Kymlicka points out, '[t]he state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others.' Hence, it is partial.[19]

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[18] For an argument regarding the necessity of government support for art, language and (high) culture, see Ronald Dworkin, "Can a Liberal State Support Art?," *A Matter of Principle*, (Harvard University Press: London, 1985), pp. 221-33. Maintaining that 'art qualifies for state support', Dworkin remarks that when what he calls "cultural structure" is in danger of decay or debasement, people must protect it. 'We inherited a cultural structure, and we have some duty, out of simple justice, to leave that structure at least as rich as we found it' (Ibid., p. 233).

Raz recognises that many cherished aspects of our culture cannot survive except through perfectionist policies. In these cases, the state takes the responsibility of meeting the moral claims of cultures for survival and respect, because this is the most effective way to do that. For instance, private bodies do not have enough incentive to support the civic ethos, whose strength is supposed to be in the interest of the society at large. State effectiveness may be due to the communal nature of relevant activities. State support is usually justified under the label of the interest of national culture. However, maintaining the right of exit, Raz does not seem to favour state enforcement of intra-cultural demand for observing cultural standards, such as using a particular language.

Taylor is keen to justify the policy of those states, such as Quebec, which try to protect a national culture and language through the workings of the government. In such cases, a national community's demand for survival, respect among other national cultures, and some cultural standards of behaviour are supported publicly. Such a policy can legitimately be adopted, if other moral and political considerations are taken into account.

To sum up, although moral demands of cultural communities for survival, respect, enforcement of cultural patterns of behaviour, etc. are not necessarily in need of state support, in some circumstances they may be so. In the latter cases, in the context of culturally plural societies, we will confront parallel moral claims of various cultures, which should be dealt with justly.

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[19] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, pp. 108 and also 108-115.

Equal Treatment of Moral Demands of Various Cultural Communities

The just treatment of cultural communities as bearers of moral claims, in a multicultural society, can be illuminated in a contrast with the just treatment of cultures as sources of morality. As we have seen, culture when considered as a source of moral principles provides people with standards for action and decision-making. These principles are mostly assumed to be universal and applicable in the public life of every society. The claim to universal validity constitutes the belief in some moral principles, such as justice. Hence, we should be sensitive to other people's cultural contexts, because they provide the evaluative background to their moral behaviour. Even if we do not find a group of people's normative views valid, this does not undermine their demand for moral sensitivity from us. Here, there is no question of equality of worth of cultures, and consequently no question of equality of respect out of equality of worth. Other cultures are respected merely because they inform the lives of many other people.

On the other hand, when culture as a community raises some moral claims, the latter do not have universal scope. They are not necessary requirements of justice, and may not be intrinsically political. They are particular, and focus on the interest of one or some communities, rather than all people. A cultural community's demand for survival and respect is basically the survival of, or respect for, its own tradition. It wants its own language, ritual and patterns of conduct to be followed, particularly by its own members. In these cases, there is no reason to privilege one culture over another. That is, all cultures existing in a society are basically on a par. Hence, in so far as their moral demands for survival, respect, the enforcement of their behavioural patterns, and the reservation of some rights for their member, involve state action, they should be treated in an equal manner.

Habermas argues that politics unavoidably deals with questions of "what is good for us" rather than "for everyone," or with what he calls "ethical-political decisions." The legal order in every society is inevitably permeated by this kind of ethics, and thus cannot be neutral regarding these issues. Although the state's neutrality among all culturally particular concepts of the good is not possible, according to Habermas, a democratic constitutional state should not privilege 'one [culturally particular] form of life at the expense of others within the nation.'[20] The state should not take sides with respect to differences rising from particularities of its constituent cultural communities. Hence, if a state supports a culture or enforces its particular moral demands, equality entails supporting other cultures existing in a society or enforcing their particular moral demands, so far as possible. While Catholic, Protestant and Jewish schools in Britain enjoy public funds, there is no reason to deny such funds to Orthodox, Muslim or Hindu schools. Similarly, there is no reason for the anti-blasphemy law in Britain to be restricted to Christians.[21]

2. Multicultural Measures

So far, we have seen that the two arguments that cultures are sources of morality, and that as cultural communities they raise some moral demands, have some political implications. That is, cultures give rise to moral directives for the state in ways articulated in the two arguments. These arguments in the context of multicultural societies result in two principles. First, "the moral sensitivity principle," viz., since people get their moral standards from their culture, there should be a moral sensitivity towards the latter, in the sense that judging and treating people in the public life should not be done irrespective of the moral standards that their cultures have made available to them. Second, "the equality principle," that is, in so far as the moral demands of a culture as a particular community have found political expression in a society, other cultures existing in that society should be provided with equal opportunities.[22]

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[20] Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," pp. 122-128.

[21] Bhikhu Parekh, "Equality in a Multicultural Society," *Equality*, Jane Franklin (ed.), (Institute for Public Policy Research: London, 1997), pp. 148-9. As another case in this regard, there is no reason to prohibit marriage between first cousins as allowed among Muslims, and between uncle and niece as permitted among Jews, merely because Christianity does not endorse them. The equal right of different religious communities to take oath on their own sacred books, however, is accepted in many societies.

These two principles give rise to the following measures that are regarded as requirements of justice in a multicultural society. As we will see, some of these measures may seem to contradict each other, such as seeking a consensual or procedural conception of morality in the public sphere of the society, on the one hand, and supporting minority cultures and allowing them to regulate their internal affairs, on the other. However, these diverging policies basically show that there are various and complex ways of dealing with the issue of cultural diversity depending on particular contexts. They also indicate that deciding among these ways is a political issue to be based on the merits and attributes of each case.

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[22] Kymlicka's "equality argument" refers to the same point. Nevertheless, his argument is somewhat mixed with what, in this thesis, is called "the moral sensitivity principle," because it goes beyond the equality of government policies toward cultures, and encompasses equality in the market place (Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, pp. 108-115). I think the attempts to rectify inequalities in the market-place can only be justified by appeal to the moral sensitivity principle.
Kymlicka identifies another ground for multicultural rights, viz., historical agreements between the host country and immigrants, like the Amish, as well as those between an incorporated national culture, say indigenous people or Quebecois, and the incorporating state, like the US or Canada (Ibid., pp. 116-120). However, it should be noted that for political philosophy, these treaties are significant so far as they are manifestations of demands of communities as bearers of moral claims, such as survival, distinctness, self-determination and so on.

2.1. A Consensual, Thin or Formal Conception of Morality in the Public Domain

In culturally plural societies, a straightforward way of responding to the moral concern for cultures is to regulate politics and inter-community relations on the basis of overlapping consensus among all existing cultures, rather than on moral principles accepted only by the dominant one. This is an obvious implication of the principle of sensitivity to people's culture as the evaluative background to their moral behaviour. In this way, there would be an affinity between people's culturally inspired moral views and the morality dominant in the public domain of their society, and hence the incongruity between the two sets of moral values would be mitigated. The basic values embedded in the political structure of a society should be acceptable to all its component cultures, so far as feasible. In other words, the grounds for the prevalent concept of justice in a multicultural society, as Rainer Forst argues, 'have to be "not reasonable to reject" by the different cultural (ethnic or national) groups involved.'[23]

One way of achieving such a consensus in multicultural societies is that morality in the political sphere should not be substantive; and when it is inevitably so, it should not be ethically thick. It should eschew prescribing, or even encouraging, a particular way of life, and mainly focus on the procedures of legislation and the exercise of power. As Parekh argues, in a culturally diverse society, '[a] well-considered theory of political obligation, as of legitimacy and authority, will necessarily have to be thin and formal, leaving sufficient moral spaces to be filled in differently by different moral traditions.'[24] The constitution should include the fundamental rights limited to 'matters essential to all forms of good life and on which a broad cross-cultural consensus can be obtained.'[25] This is close, in a sense, to "the model of civil association" whose advocates argue that 'the only viable basis for legitimacy in contemporary western states is the construction of a public realm on the basis of purely formal or procedural considerations. Only in this way, they maintain, is it possible to develop a non-coercive mode of integration in conditions marked by diversity.'[26]

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[23] Rainer Forst, "Foundations of a Theory of Multicultural Justice," *Constellations*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1997), p. 63. Forst suggests that the "right to justification" qualifies as the basis for multicultural justice. The right means that for every claim others make on some people, and especially for every form of force to which the latter are subjected, they must be given adequate reasons justifying these claims and norms on which the force rests. He adds that the right does not specify a conception of

Among our three philosophers, Rorty is a proceduralist who thinks that the liberal ideal of procedural justice is the best way of dealing with cultural diversity. However, the difficulty with Rorty is that he sees this way as a liberal solution rather than as a consensus among various cultures. Although his antifoundational postmodernist liberalism does not recommend a "philosophical outlook about human nature and the meaning of human life," its Rawlsian procedural justice is 'a moral commitment when made by members of some clubs (e.g. ours) but a matter of expediency when made by members of others.'[27] Such a view is not compatible with the equality principle.

Although a formal and ethically thin theory of justice is a classic way of achieving a consensual politics, it is not the only way. It is plausible to conceive of a

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good life, is the minimal basis of any acceptable view of justice, and thus "not reasonable to reject" by any culture (Ibid., p. 65).

[24] Bhikhu Parekh, "Theorising Political Theory," *Political Theory*, vol. 27, no. 3, (June 1999), p. 410.

[25] Bhikhu Parekh, "Common Citizenship in A Multicultural Society," *The Round Table*, vol. 351, (1999), p. 452.

[26] Noël O'Sullivan, "Power, Authority and Legitimacy: A Critique of Postmodern Thought," *Political Theory in Transition*, Noël O'Sullivan (ed.), (Routledge: London and New York, 2000), p. 146. It should be noted that the model of civil association differs from other models of formal and procedural government in denying any pre-political grounds for politics. See ibid.

[27] Richard Rorty, "On ethnocentrism: A reply to Clifford Geertz," *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, p. 210.

Razian perfectionist state based on the unanimous consent of its constituent cultures. The scope of such perfectionism depends on the extent of overlap among the cultures. Thus, only those ideals of the good that are shared by all people can be promoted publicly.

A conception of justice, however thin and formal, cannot be neutral, and it is not desirable that it should be so. Inescapably, it would reflect the contingent consensus achieved in a particular multicultural society. At the most, it could include those cultures living together in the society, and be impartial towards them.

Nonetheless, a fully consensual, thin or formal political morality is not feasible. It is also insufficient, and thus arguably unfair in some types of multicultural societies. It needs to be supplemented by other measures that form what is sometimes labelled as the politics of difference. These measures make for what in Iris Young's terminology is called "differentiated citizenship," and in Kymlicka's, "group-differentiated rights." These rights and prerogatives are conferred on people on the basis of their membership in cultural communities, give rise to differentiated duties, and can be vested in various bodies from individuals to the territorial institutions, as described in the first chapter.

However, some political thinkers, such as John Gray, see governments as "ill-fitted" to act in support of cultural traditions. They think that a limited government based on the model of civil association can protect not only individual liberty, but also cultural diversity, while not institutionalising 'traditions or ways of life in state-subsidized ghettoes.'[28] Gray sees multicultural policies as leading to cultural apartheid, and being paternalistic, since they imply that minority cultures cannot maintain themselves without state support. However, he does not show why multicultural measures necessarily bring about those consequences about which he is worried. From inappropriate policies it does not follow so much that multiculturalism should be abandoned as that the policies should be improved or replaced. There are some alternative multicultural measures, such as flexibility in implementing the law, that do not lead to ghettoisation.

Gray also implies that since what is at stake in cultural protection is not something that puts the survival of the society at risk, it should not be an issue for politics. This is in turn based on the *complete* autonomy of politics from other spheres of life. It is plausible to conceive of politics and its normative rules as to some extent independent of other realms, but there is no reason to dissociate them thoroughly from the latter. There is no reason to confine politics to protecting the survival of the society. It is a fact of the modern state that it interferes with many aspects of human life, and there need be no unease about it, insofar as such interference is justified and beneficial. Gray's conservatism of the limited state would be tenable only if it were proved that the disadvantages of state intervention outweigh its advantages, as it is the case with many, though not all, issues. Hence, it can be argued that wise actions of states in support of various cultures coexisting in a society should not be opposed.

Perhaps, a fundamental reason for Gray's approach is that state intervention distorts free competition of cultures.[29] However, it is wrong to conceive of people's attachment to their cultures merely in terms of competition, since, as said before,

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[28] John Gray, "The Politics of Cultural Diversity," *Post-liberalism: Studies in Political Thought,* (Routledge: London and New York, 1993), p. 266.
[29] See, for instance, ibid., p. 268.

cultures inform our sense of belonging. Furthermore, the view about the sufficiency of the model of civil association in dealing with diversity presupposes that a state adopting this model would be impartial towards existing cultures within a society. This is, however, to disregard the fact that all states are inevitably to some extent culturally partial. Thus, some compensatory mechanisms for those at a disadvantage are necessary, as Taylor, Raz, Kymlicka and others believe.

Among the philosophers concerned in this thesis, we have seen that Raz and Taylor, to different extents, accept the politics of difference which takes into account the cultural differences existing within a multicultural society. Raz's multicultural policies and Taylor's politics of recognition are responses to cultural differences. On the other hand, Rorty is not sympathetic to the "politics of difference" or "recognition." This, however, seems to be at odds with his thesis about solidarity with the community, which accounts not only for our moral knowledge but also for the scope of our sense of moral responsibility. Rorty sees the particularity and ethnocentrism of reasoning, the demand of communities for self-preservation, and their role in reinforcing the feeling of moral responsibility among members, but he does not find these issues politically relevant. As suggested in the chapter on Rorty, this may be due to the tension between notions of solidarity with the community and pragmatism in his account of knowledge. In the following, some aspects of the politics of difference and Taylor and Raz's view about them will be elaborated.

2.2. Flexibility of the Law

When political requirements do not allow us to go for a consensual, let alone thin and formal, conception of morality in the public domain, there should be some variations in enforcing the law and political authority on people whose culture is at odds with the dominant morality. As seen before, the need for such a variation is endorsed by Taylor. A sharp example of the need for flexibility could be the case of pacifist cultural or religious communities, say Quakers, which prevent their members from supporting warfare in any form. Such a demand has direct political implications, and its recognition in some way by the state is morally important. Otherwise, members of pacifist cultures would be denied observance of one of their substantial beliefs.

Some cases of flexibility have already been accepted in some states. For instance, Sikhs are exempted from a British law requiring motor-cyclists to wear a crash helmet instead of the traditional turban, or from the law prohibiting carrying daggers in public places, thus allowing them to carry a covered small dagger (*kirpan*) which is a mandatory symbol of their religion.[30] Here, some religious practices clash with laws which *per se* are not culturally particular but as requirements of safety and security are just and universally valid. However, "the moral sensitivity principle" provides us with a reason for the flexibility of the law. Put differently, when a just law clashes with the practices of a group of people, there should be some understanding of, and sensitivity towards, the culture inspiring their value system. Parekh recommends such a flexibility in the law regarding the education of Gypsy children to the effect that, while the children's right to some level of education is respected, and they acquire basic values and skills needed to function in the society at large, the Gypsy way of life is not uprooted.[31] Iris Young also recognises this need when arguing that due to 'group differences in capacities, socialization, values and cognitive and cultural styles' some groups deserve "special rights."[32]

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[30] Cases mentioned in this section are taken from Parekh, "Equality, Fairness and Limits of Diversity," pp. 289-308.

[31] Ibid., p. 297.

There is a second category where a law informed by a particular culture or religion conflicts with particular injunctions of other cultures. This is the case with government decisions on public holidays, uniform dresses in public institutions like hospitals, schools and the armed forces, official language(s), etc., which are unavoidably culturally particular. In such cases, if absolute equality is impossible, viz., if it is impractical to allow other cultures fully to practise their own custom, perhaps for reasons of public discipline and harmony, some flexibility towards other cultures is necessary in order to comply with "the equality principle." This is the view expressed by Lord Scarman in the case of Ahmad, a Muslim teacher who wanted time off to attend Friday prayer. Ahmad's demand should have been met without imposing economic sacrifice on him, simply because, unlike those of Jews and Christians, Muslims' day of prayer is not assigned a holiday in Britain.[33]

Some demands of minority cultures are in conflict with a law that, though culturally particular and not a requirement of politics, is claimed to represent the identity of the society. This is the case with the *hijab* controversy in France in which the demand of three Muslim girls to be allowed to attend school wearing head scarves was initially rejected, because it was considered as conflicting with the secular identity of the country. Again, here, the principle of equality requires flexibility in implementation of the law, granting the girls freedom to wear religious clothing. It also grounds other cases such as Sikhs' demand for a modification in their wearing of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police uniform or in wearing of school uniforms so that they can keep their turban, and Asian women's request for some adjustments in their wearing of hospital or other kinds of uniforms to make them culturally acceptable to them. Kymlicka recognises these equality-based demands, and classifies them as "polyethnic rights."[34]

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[32] Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," *Ethics*, vol. 99, (January 98), pp. 269 and 271.
[33] Parekh, "Equality in a Multicultural Society," p. 124.

The flexibility and the consequent exemptions or adjustments suggested do not amount to inequality. On the contrary, they are requirements of a culturally contextualised, or culturally sensitive, view of equality, as Parekh mentions. Equality does not equate with uniformity. From time to time, it requires difference.[35]

2.3. Supporting Minority Cultures in the Battle for Survival and Respect

Although cultural survival and respect are not necessarily political tasks, as said before, states may be involved in them. Taylor basically reformulates liberalism in order to put such tasks on the agenda. In such a case, the equality principle entails equal governmental support for the survival of, and respect for, all cultures existing in a society.[36] Even if states basically stick to the non-interventionist doctrine, or eschew supporting cultures in a certain way, the moral necessity of state assistance for cultures does not fade away completely. This is the case when a culture is in danger of extinction or grievous humiliation, and consequently its members are threatened with the loss of, and disdain for, their identity and the background culture that provides them with a sense of life and meaningful options. The moral sensitivity principle enjoins affirmative actions, in the form of state subsidies or some other financial incentives for cultural events, to be taken for supporting endangered cultures. The system of education is the most important institution in the survival of a culture, and therefore should be the locus of legal recognition of, and state support for, cultural communities. Raz's multicultural policies including support for autonomous cultural institutions, education within the cultural community and publicly funded access to public spaces (such as TV) can mainly be justified in this way.

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[34] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, pp. 30-31, 109 and 114-115.

[35] Parekh, "Equality in a Multicultural Society," pp. 142 and 151.

[36] In the case of Britain, Parekh argues that '[i]f the fairly secure British identity needs Government protection - as is evident from the Education Reform Act - the insecure ethnic identity needs it even more' (Parekh, "Britain and the Social Logic of Pluralism," p. 71).

In this regard, Habermas sees "reverse discrimination" as a plausible action in support of the long-suppressed and disavowed indigenous or some other minority cultures.[37] These affirmative actions that are mainly temporary are 'designed to raise the disadvantaged and the weak [communities] to a point where they are able to compete as equals and take full advantage of the available opportunities.'[38] It is noteworthy that state support cannot guarantee cultural survival or respect. It merely provides members with the opportunity and facilities to retain and regenerate the strength and profile of their cultures.[39]

2.4. Regulating Members' Affairs in some Respects

As mentioned before, it is one of the functions of cultures to regulate their members' affairs in some dimensions of life. They provide people with patterns of behaviour with various moral weight. To eschew observing some of them may even lead to excommunication, while violating others prompts punishment, and in some cases can be ignored. The more severe the consequence of breaching a cultural norm, the more it is assumed to be an integrated part of the cultural identity of members.

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[37] Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," p. 129.
[38] Parekh, "Britain and the Social Logic of Pluralism," p. 72.
[39] Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," pp. 130-132

Not all cultural standards of moral conduct have a public aspect, and, more importantly, they are not necessarily in need of state support. In some cases, nevertheless, state recognition of such patterns of behaviour is tenable. It may even be a requirement of better compliance with justice, since some of those patterns are, from the point of view of the relevant cultures, crucial. Mason sees some degree of legal and political self-determination as necessary for a cultural community, if its members wish to 'express and protect their identity in spheres that are particularly important to it.'[40] Allowing minority cultures to regulate some aspects of their members' life is grounded on both the moral sensitivity and equality principles. Parekh argues that

> Every political community needs to provide autonomous spaces in which its different communities can feel secure and both affirm and negotiate their respective identities in their uncoerced interactions with each other. This may take many forms such as freedom to regulate their internal affairs themselves and to set up appropriate cultural and educational institutions, with state support and subsidy when appropriate. If a community is territorially concentrated, its autonomy might also require that it should enjoy rights and powers not required by communities with different needs.[41]

As the above passage shows, the extent of the political recognition of the authority of cultures is contingent not only on the nature of demands of the relevant cultures, but also on whether or not they are territorially based. A good example of giving scattered minority cultures some politically sanctioned authority over their members is the recognition of their personal law. Some countries like India and Iran, while enforcing a uniform criminal code for the whole society, allow religious communities to have their own personal law.

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[40] Andrew Mason, "Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation," *Ethics*, vol. 109, (January 1999), p. 283.

Geographical concentration of minorities makes giving more such rights to cultural communities feasible. Territorially based minority cultures can have some kinds of internal autonomy. The scope of autonomy would be determined by the extent and the content of cultural difference. Recognising pursuit of collective goals in states like Quebec, Taylor maintains the legitimacy of providing minorities with the autonomy to regulate some of their internal affairs. However, the difficulty is that he recognises such a right only for territorially concentrated minorities; and as said before, scattered minorities are at a disadvantage in his theory. Hence, it has been argued that his multiculturalism is confined to the problems of Quebec. Also, Kymlicka argues that a cultural minority that forms a distinct nation and whose homeland is incorporated in a larger political unit can have "self-government rights." The devolution of political power would give extensive jurisdiction to the minority culture over issues crucial for it, such as control over education, language, culture or even immigration policy, as in the case of Quebec.[42]

The state can recognise the allocation of some prerogatives to members of a cultural community, as it is the case with Indian rights to the land and fishing in reservations in North America. Nevertheless, these exclusive rights should be scrutinised very carefully in order to avoid any possibility of apartheid and prejudice.[43]

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[41] Bhikhu Parekh, "Managing Multicultural Societies," *The Round Table*, vol. 344, (1997), p. 526.

[42] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, pp. 27-30.

[43] Kymlicka mentions another category of multicultural rights, namely "special representation right" (Ibid., pp. 131-151). Iris Young, too, speaks of "groups representation" as a requirement of differentiated citizenship (Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of *Universal Citizenship*," pp. 258-67). It seems to me that this right should not come alongside multicultural measures. This is because it is sometimes regarded as derivative of the aforementioned categories in this thesis to the effect that it is a mechanism for securing or safeguarding those rights, as Kymlicka implies when describing the interaction between this right and the self-government right (Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 143). In this sense, special representation must come alongside other safeguarding decision-making procedures such as veto system, giving a voice to

3. The Extent of Permissible Differences and Diversity

If the two arguments about the political significance of cultures due to informing people's value options and giving rise to moral demands as communities, as well as the two principles of moral sensitivity and equality stand, there is little ground for withholding toleration of different cultural practices or their recognition when applicable.[44] Nevertheless, as said before, it is not the case that all cultural patterns of behaviour are acceptable in a multicultural society simply because they are sanctioned by one of the component cultures. Similarly, the survival of a culture as well as the flexibility of the law due to requirements of a particular culture are not without limitation. There are at least two kinds of constraints on political recognition and toleration of culturally-induced values. Firstly, cultural norms and conducts should not breach basic human rights, or fundamental human rights as Taylor calls them. These rights are entailed by human welfare, which itself is the main reason for recognising cultures. Secondly, living in a polity, particularly a multicultural one, has its own political requirements which have to be observed.

3.1. Basic Human Rights

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communities when a policy proposal particularly affects them, etc. Some other times, the rationale for special representation right is mainly considered to be political participation rather than the recognition of difference; and cultural communities are merely considered as units facilitating such participation.

[44] It is sometimes suggested that cultural distinctness is a reason to treat cultural communities not much differently from treatment of foreign countries. For instance, Kymlicka argues that '[m]any of the reasons why we should be reluctant to impose liberalism on other countries are also reasons to be sceptical of imposing liberalism on national minorities within a country'(Ibid., p. 167). This quotation shows that he restricts the applicability of this point mainly to the territorially concentrated national minorities incorporated in a larger society, rather than immigrants and dispersed minorities. This is because the former are institutionally complete, and also claim to be distinct political communities. However, if Kymlicka's main argument stands, his reasons for its restriction to geographically-based minorities are not persuasive, since what matters is primarily cultural distinctness. The difference between territorially concentrated and scattered minorities is merely that there are more practical, rather than moral, hindrances in recognising and tolerating practices of the latter minorities.

People, whatever their communal affiliations, are humans entitled to the basic rights of human beings. Rights to life and to basic goods as well as freedom of conscience, prevention of torture, slavery, mass expulsion, racism and arbitrary detention, or *habeas corpus*[45], can be mentioned in this regard. The state should use various techniques at its disposal, including coercion, legal enactment, financial encouragement, negotiation and so on, to enforce these rights on cultures that deprive their own members or others of their basic rights.[46]

A serious problem with basic human rights is that there is no consensus about them. L. S. Lustgarten argues that the only exceptions to a policy of cultural pluralism should be practices which result in 'severe physical abuse or worse,' such as suttee or female circumcision.[47] Some others identify a broader range of basic human rights to be observed by all cultures.

Taylor defines fundamental rights *formally* by distinguishing them from other individual rights which he describes as 'privileges and immunities of uniform treatment' that 'can be revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy.'[48] For instance, if the democratic principle entails the consent of the governed subject to periodic review, it does not require only a particular set of procedures and institutions for securing the consent, as some native Indian leaders in Canada pointed out.[49] This point can be complemented by saying that basic human rights are those that cannot even be overridden by collective rights.[50] The latter consideration obviously suggests that recognising some demands of cultural communities may legitimately put some restrictions on non-basic individual rights.

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[45] Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* Amy Gutmann (ed.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 61.

[46] Kymlicka believes that compliance of national minorities with basic human rights, or as he claims liberal principles, should not be pursued by coercive interference, mainly due to pragmatic reasons. Force is only warranted 'in the case of gross and systematic violation of human rights, such as slavery or genocide or mass torture and expulsions.' He does not see much difference between foreign states and national autonomous minorities in terms of grounds for intervention. For more details, see Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, pp. 167-170.

[47] L. S. Lustgarten, "Liberty in A Culturally Plural Society," *Of Liberty*, A. Phillips. Griffiths (ed.), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983), p. 101.

[48] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 59.

As Parekh argues, '[c]ommunity implies shared values and a common way of life, and is incompatible with the more or less unrestrained rights of its members to do as they please.'[51] Hence, some limitations on the rights of individuals in the interest of the community can be justified. Freedom of speech and expression or freedom of movement and travel may, if they lead to the disintegration of significant communities in people's lives, legitimately be confined. Restricting the right to property, land or otherwise, for the sake of the community, could also be tenable. Mason remarks that there is no reason to give priority to individual autonomy when it threatens to undermine a valuable community in the lives of people.[52] As a matter of fact, liberal society itself imposes these limitations on individual rights without offering a plausible explanation. It restricts immigration, and enforces the redistribution of the wealth. If these actions are legitimate in the name of the society, some sorts of them could also be legitimate in the name of the community.

It may be said that some individual rights such as freedoms of expression, movement, property, etc. are distinguished from the basic human rights of not being subject to physical harm, the right to basic goods and freedom of conscience, to the effect that any legislation restricting the latter, but not the former, is considered unjust. Non-fundamental rights can be limited, interpreted and applied according to the cultural requirements of a community. As Raz argues, the law can encourage certain types of speech, and restrict some others. Nevertheless the state or community cannot legitimately close all, or perhaps most, avenues of realising these rights.

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[49] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, pp. 39-40.

[50] Lustgarten, "Liberty in A Culturally Plural Society," pp. 91 and 101. It is also argued that tolerance may be inappropriate 'where those to whom it might be extended would themselves deny it to others. To afford tolerance in such circumstances would be a self-defeating exercise, if it put at risk the continued existence of a liberal society' (Sebastian Poulter, *Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998), p. 32). However, I do not find this view persuasive.

[51] Bhikhu Parekh, "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy," *Political Studies*, Special Issue, *Prospects for Democracy*, vol. XL, (1992), p. 171.

[52] Andrew Mason, "Liberalism and the Value of Community," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 23, no. 2, (June 1993), pp. 238-239.

One of the rights central to liberalism is the right of exit. So long as individuals remain members of a community, and particularly if they are attached to it, they are subject to the moral claims of their community, but they are basically free to leave the community. Denying the right of exit or dissent is seen as denying individuals' dignity and the right of leading the life of their own choice, which best serves their welfare. According to Habermas, 'in the last analysis the protection of forms of life and traditions in which identities are formed is supposed to serve the recognition of their members; it does not represent a kind of preservation of species by administrative means.'[53]

Raz sees the right of exit a part of the project of multiculturalism, which makes the coexistence of various cultures possible, and provides an opportunity for members 'who cannot develop and find adequate avenues for self-expression within their native culture.'[54] As Forst puts it eloquently, people belong to their cultures, but are not owned by them.[55] Moreover, Kymlicka argues that liberals cannot accept any "internal restriction" upon the basic civil and political liberties of members by their cultural community. This is, he believes, because the *raison d'être* of care for minority cultures is to enable their members to choose.[56]

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[53] Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," p. 130.
[54] Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," p. 172.
[55] Forst, "Foundations of a Theory of Multicultural Justice," p. 67.

Despite various liberal arguments, it is not clear why the right of exit must be seen as a basic human right, rather than as one of the rights that can be limited, yet not abandoned. *Pace* Raz, this right is not a necessity of coexistence of different cultural communities, and hence a requirement of multiculturalism. Nor does the restriction of this right irredeemably damage individual well-being, in so far as not all avenues of self-expression are closed. Unconditional insistence on the right to exit amounts to smuggling a particularly liberal value into multiculturalism. It can be argued, therefore, that although the right of exit is cardinal, and should ultimately be sanctioned for human welfare, there could be some limitations which might hinder, but not block, it. Put differently, it is not untenable to make exit costly, though possible. The hindrance could be justifiable based on the interest of the body of members in preserving the integrity of their community.

In the case of those immigrant groups that arrived in the host country being allowed by historical agreements to maintain certain internal restrictions, like the Amish and the Hutterites, Kymlicka sees their claim for restriction of their members to have some weight.[57] We have already noted that, from the point of view of political philosophy, historical treaties are significant, in so far as, and because, they are manifestations of moral claims of cultural communities to survival, autonomy, etc. Therefore, it would be plausible to argue that a similar claim of other cultural communities could also have some weight. In a nutshell, setting aside basic human rights, individual rights such as the right to exit or to free expression should be balanced against the interest of the community as a whole.

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[56] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, pp. 153 and 165.
[57] Ibid., p. 170.

3.2. Political Considerations

The second type of restriction on state recognition of cultural practices and values can be called political. Justice in the broader level of the society is a moral requirement of which the recognition of cultural difference is but one element. A politics of difference should not lead to inequality among constituent communities,[58] or the dominance of the minority over the majority, as it was the case with the former South African regime of apartheid. Not every difference deserves to be sustained.

Moreover, morality in the public realm goes beyond the principles of justice. There are some other political norms such as solidarity and harmony within the society, mutual trust and co-operation among various sections of the society. Multicultural policies of recognition should be balanced against these political norms and requirements. Political considerations can be divided into three sub-categories, namely, those related to the well-being of the society as a whole, those associated with the interests of the majority, and those pertinent to the interest of the minority itself.

The requirements of the well-being of the society at large, such as the need for peace, security, safety, health, harmony, discipline and avoidance of fragmentation and anarchy, sometimes outweigh the demand for the recognition of the relevant value of a particular culture. In a multicultural society, particularly, there are some more political requirements to be taken into account, such as the unity of the society, peaceful inclusion of subjugated groups and accommodation of a variety of cultural communities. Sebastian Poulter argues that '[t]here are clear dangers to the social cohesion of the country as a whole if too great a stress is placed on ethnic differences and if individuals from the various groups identify themselves so strongly with their own distinctive communities.'[59] Hence, political philosophers stress common citizenship as a necessity of maintaining a multicultural society. It binds citizens, irrespective of their cultural affiliations, together on the basis of a common public realm and a common public language.[60] Moreover, the institutional accommodation of cultural diversity must be practicable.[61] It is also the case that the demand for the recognition of difference should not put an unbearable or unreasonable burden on the society at large.[62] In a nutshell, multicultural coexistence gives rise to some necessities that are to be taken into consideration in any account of multiculturalism.

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[58] Ibid., p. 194.

The majority's interest is another political consideration to be taken into account, and respected. This is both pragmatic, in order not to provoke the majority's resentment, and just, because the welfare of the majority of people is at stake. After all, number matters. A relevant demand of the majority that should be given enough weight in recognising minority cultures is, Parekh points out, the preservation of the specific cultural structure and the historical identity of the society and its political system.[63]

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[59] Poulter, *Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience*, p. 26.

[60] See Parekh, "Managing Multicultural Societies," p. 527. In Australia, National Agenda specifies the broad boundaries of operating multicultural policies as follows:

> The key premise is that all Australians should have an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia's interests. Everyone also has to accept the basic structure of Australian society, namely the constitution and the rule of law, tolerance and equality, Parliamentary democracy, the freedoms of speech and religion, sexual equality, and the status of English as the official language of the country. In return for the right to express their own culture and beliefs, everyone is under a reciprocal responsibility to respect the rights of others to do likewise and express their own views and values. (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of Multicultural Affairs, *National Agenda for A Multicultural Australia*, (Canberra, 1989), p. vii, cited from Poulter, *Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience*, p. 384.)

[61] Lustgarten, "Liberty in A Culturally Plural Society," p. 101.

[62] For instance in the case of Sikhs who prefer to wear their traditional turban rather than crash helmet, Parekh argues

> So far as the minimum requirement is concerned, it places the burden of injury on those causing it. The burden of additional injury is borne by the victims who, for cultural reasons, choose to meet the minimum requirement in their own different ways. Such an arrangement respects differences without violating the principle of equality and accommodates individual choice without placing unequal financial and other burdens on the rest of their fellow citizens (Parekh, "Equality in a Multicultural Society," p. 129).

Looking from the minority's viewpoint, it must not be ignored that a politics of difference may consolidate the power base of some elite groups within a minority community at the expense of the rest. This elite could be a traditional leadership or politicians or those who have the monopoly of access to the media, even intellectuals, separated from the minority's main body, and looking for their own interests. It must be proven that members of a minority culture, at large, wish to preserve the distinctness and integrity of their culture, and to be treated differently in some respects.[64] Further, it should be noted that not all aspects of identity and not all differences need political recognition. Politics is a bad instrument for supporting moral views that are to be chosen thoroughly *autonomously*, as Raz argues. Some differences in moral attitudes and conventions should also be left to the civil society to deal with. Political recognition of difference may sometimes backfire, and worsen the situation of minorities. It may also lead to ghettoisation. The publicity that follows politicisation may reinforce stereotypes. The politics of difference is a delicate business.

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[63] Ibid., pp. 125 and 146. Beyond this, Parekh remarks that what he calls "operative public values" are the criteria for delimiting the range of permissible cultural diversity. In every society, these form a distinct 'body of values which are enshrined in its constitutional and political institutions and structure the conduct of its collective affairs.' Although they may not be shared by every single member, the society as a whole is committed to them. Cultural minorities have an obligation to respect and uphold these values which are historically developed (Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy," *Defining and Measuring Democracy,* David Beetham, (SAGE: London, 1994), pp. 215-217). Although minorities' obligation to preserve the identity of the state in general is plausible, the view that they have an obligation to preserve each and all enshrined values of the society does not seem persuasive. Some of these values may have to be changed in order to accommodate cultural differences.

[64] Some literature suggests that such a wish is eroding among minorities, for example in the US. See, for instance, Irving Kristol, "Faith à la carte: Religion and Politics in an Era of Good Feeling," TLS, (May 26, 2000), p. 14. It is, however, a matter of controversy whether this is the case or not.

The Element of the Political

Recognising the importance of political considerations in an account of multiculturalism shows that it should not be seen as an attempt for the total moralisation of politics in culturally diverse societies. Within it, there is an ineradicable political factor which is the result of power struggle and trade-off between various sources of power, such as economic and intellectual ones. The political element is also influenced by the media, established institutions, history and more importantly the sheer size of different segments of the society. There is no rationally compelling moral formula for all circumstances and cases of cultural diversity. We have already seen that multiculturalism is to a large extent a contextual policy; and this is the reason for putting diverging multicultural measures alongside each other. Multiculturalism is not a view from "nowhere," an Archimedean vantage point, but is open to challenges that more often have political forms, as Raz argues. It is inevitably based on some kind of compromise that is never immutable.

However, it is the aim of multiculturalism to limit the effect of some political factors. It is not supposed to be a mere reflection of a power struggle. It is an attempt to blunt the sharp edges of power by incorporating moral factors. These moral considerations, which themselves are ultimately susceptible to the balance between sources of power, exclude some parameters of power from the public domain as illegitimate. Hence, the democratic interplay of powers and the majoritarian rule are accepted in some aspects, but ruled out in some others. Multiculturalism should not be seen as the end of democracy, coalition, interest groups, voluntary association, etc. It should not be regarded as doing away with lobbying and pursuing particular interests of certain segments of the society through politics. It only delimits the legitimate boundaries of democratic game. Multiculturalism will undermine itself, if under the label of defending minorities it does not allow a majority, formed around a culture, a policy, a taste or whatever else, to achieve its legitimate gaols. Multiculturalism should not be seen as a Platonic project of rationalising and moralising politics in culturally diverse societies.

In short, the element of the political appears in multiculturalism in two senses. Firstly, it is not an unchallengeable philosophical view dissociated from the balance of power in a society. Secondly, it is compatible with the interplay of political factors within certain limits.

4. Liberalism and the Issue of Culture

This thesis has brought to the forefront what Bruce Robbins calls 'an element of hidden normativity, or cryptonormativism, that was already there in culture.'[65] An important question throughout our discussion of Taylor, Raz and Rorty has been whether liberalism as a political doctrine can take account of the moral significance of culture and its political implications as described above.

Taylor criticises mainstream liberalism for disregarding not only the normative element of culture, but culture in its entirety. In particular, contemporary liberalism faces two charges. Firstly, it is accused of not taking into consideration the cultural embeddedness of individuals. It strips people of their communal and cultural affiliations, and considers them as unencumbered individuals. The extent to which people's moral view and identity is constituted by their cultures, as articulated in our two arguments about the roles of culture, is not appreciated by liberals. Put differently, liberalism is associated with a disengaged account of reason, looking from nowhere in order to establish principles of justice. In this way, it does not even see its own cultural presumptions and particularity. Secondly, liberalism pushes culture to the private realm of life. It avoids the public recognition of moral demands of culture and cultural difference, as described in our discussion about the political implications of moral claims of cultures as well as the debate about multicultural measures. Thus, liberalism is seen as guilty of disregarding people's identity which is constituted by their membership in cultural communities.

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[65] Bruce Robbins, "Sad Stories in the International Public Sphere: Richard Rorty on Culture and Human Rights," *Public culture*, vol. 9, no. 2, (1997), p. 230.

Regarding the first charge, we have seen that the liberal rights theory is not necessarily premised on disengaged reason, or on atomism as understanding individuals metaphysically independent of the society. Some versions of this doctrine are compatible with the view that the individual is constituted by the society or culture, and with the embodied view of human understanding. The liberal primacy of rights can be considered a product of particular social circumstances in the West. This is the view shared by Rawls, Rorty and Walzer, *inter alia*, though expressed in different ways. It seems that Taylor, too, concedes this point in his later writings.[66]

More importantly, the primacy of rights as a characteristic of liberalism does not require presumption of a vantage point from which a disengaged subject can think and judge purely rationally. Unlike what Taylor conceives and criticises, rights do not need to be assumed as foundations for other parts of ethics, or there is no necessary (even epistemological) discrimination between the rights and the rest of the moral as there is in the Kantian ethics or Habermasian discourse ethics.

The primacy of rights, understood in this way, is not primacy in value, but a political primacy in the sense that the rights are the first to be implemented in organising a political society. Such a political primacy of rights can have two grounds. It may be based on the Hobbesian view of politics as a way of avoiding conflict. It can also draw upon the Grotian account of natural rights as common denominators of all cultures.[67] Constituent individuals or communities each can have their own ranking of moral and ethical issues, and apply it when the matter does not go beyond their own realm. Within a certain culture there may be no primacy for rights; that is, they are not necessarily prior to other parts of ethics. Therefore, being looked at from within a culture, rights do not necessarily trump other moral directives. However, rights have primacy in interpersonal or inter-cultural relations in the society. There is a Rawlsian "overlapping consensus"[68] at work. As Taylor himself argues

> we all seem to share an intuition that these human immunities are of unique importance, although we articulate this in very different terms, and draw the boundaries of these immunities differently. Let's see if we can come to some agreement on these boundaries, each from our horizons.[69]

The political primacy of rights is crucial in accommodating cultural plurality, because they are supposedly common denominators between different cultures. Liberalism of rights, which avoids promotion of a particular concept of the good,

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[66] See, for instance, Charles Taylor, "Irreducibly Social Goods," *Philosophical Arguments*, (Harvard University Press: Massachusetts,1997), p. 145.

[67] See Richard Tuck, "Rights and Pluralism," *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism*, James Tully (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 159-170.

[68] John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, (Columbia University Press: New York, 1993), Lecture IV.

[69] Charles Taylor, "Reply and re-articulation", *Philosophy In An Age Of Pluralism*, James Tully (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1994), p. 248. He delineates this view in more detail in Charles Taylor, "Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights," *The East Asian*

could satisfy a requirement of multiculturalism by establishing the political system on the basis of a consensually agreed set of rights. According to Tuck, the primacy of rights as described above would be faithful to 'the phenomenon of moral variety which arguably lay behind the first and most influential right theories.'[70]

The second charge against liberalism of rights is more serious. The liberal doctrine relegates culture to the private realm of life. Hence, it not only does not recognise cultural differences politically, but also does not justify advancing the mainstream culture through the working of the state. Further, as seen before, most liberals do not regard the moral claims of collectivities and communities as having political implications. Liberalism cannot account for the public promotion of any collective good or communal measure whose rationale is not merely the survival of the liberal society, and which can only be justified on the ground of the morality of community. However, all liberal states, in one way or another, are involved in such measures. Welfare-oriented policies for members and different restrictions on non-members, as well as the encouragement of a particular culture through state subsidies for arts and promotion of the culture of care, family life and language can be mentioned in this regard. There is a discrepancy between theory and practice in liberalism.

Consequently, liberalism also lacks a proper theoretical device for supporting, rather than merely tolerating, cultural and communal differences. Evading endorsement of multicultural measures, it does not sanction compliance of members with cultural patterns of behaviour and moral claims. Moreover, conventional

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Challenge For Human Rights, Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 124-44.

[70] Tuck, "Right and pluralism," p. 160.

liberalism asks for the universal application of rights and the law. Equality before the law is one of the basic requirements of liberalism. It cannot justify flexibility in the implementation of rights and law in dealing with culturally different communities.

Although liberalism, in its dominant version, does not recognise the need to support culture or cultural differences politically, Taylor and Raz, *inter alia*, indicate that it can be complemented with such a thesis without contradicting its principles. Taylor provides us with a version of liberalism that goes beyond Rawls and Rorty's proceduralism, and allows the public promotion of collective goals such as cultural survival. This version, as Walzer points out, 'allows for a state committed to the survival and flourishing of a particular nation, culture, religion, or of a (limited) set of nations, cultures, and religions.'[71] Kymlicka represents a version supporting minority cultures. Raz's account of liberalism maintains both the mainstream liberal and minority cultures.

Also, it can be argued that a sort of variation in implementing law can be accommodated by liberalism, as Taylor, Parekh and Kymlicka believe. Such a flexibility is not only consistent with the equality principle, but is an interpretation of equality that takes into consideration particular needs of equally worthwhile human beings. In this interpretation, equality must not be confused with uniformity. Culturally flexible enforcement of law is an important policy in accommodating dispersed minority cultures.

A liberal polity can regulate the relations between communities on a consensual or procedural basis, while basically leaving them alone in their internal affairs. This is what Rorty's Kuwaiti bazaar gives ground to, but stops short of acknowledging, whereas Taylor, Kymlicka and Parekh subscribe to it.

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[71] Michael Walzer, "Comment," *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition,"* Amy Gutmann (ed.), (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1992), p. 99.

5. Final Remarks

A polity that promotes collective goals or pursues cultural survival, recognises the norms of minority cultures, and authorises them to regulate some of their members' conducts, can be just and even liberal as long as it protects basic human rights. It is hospitable to difference, because it gives political primacy only to fundamental rights rather than to what Taylor calls 'the broad range of immunities and presumptions of uniform treatment that have sprung up in modern cultures of judicial review.'[72] However, its hospitality is confined to organised minority cultures. Unorganised minorities as well as sub-cultures are at a disadvantage in such a polity. Moreover, while allowing the mainstream community or minorities to follow goals that the majority of their members cherish, it is, compared to procedural liberalism, somewhat restrictive of individual autonomy.

Procedural liberalism and the political doctrine of permitting pursuit of cultural goals and recognising difference have their own particular moral merits. In order to comply with the requirements of justice, the choice between them should be made contextually as well as consensually. This choice would inevitably be made in a politically charged environment.

Following Poulter, we can end this thesis by echoing Saint Augustine's remarks: '[i]n necessities, unity; in doubtful things, liberty; in all things, charity.'[73] When it is necessary to apply a unified set of rules, perhaps due to practical reasons or the nonnegotiable principles of justice or overlapping consensus among cultures existing in a society, no variation should, or need, be allowed. When it is realised that the rules in question are culturally particular, and there is no practical justification for applying an identical set of rules, variation according to cultural particularities should be permitted. And in all cases, the spirit of charity should be observed in treating culturally different people.[74]

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[72] Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 61.
[73] Poulter, *Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience*, p. 391.

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[74] This suggestion is inspired by Poulter's recommendations for English law in dealing with minority cultures. See, Poulter, *Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience*, p. 391.

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