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The Origin and Development of the Sudanese Private Capitalist Class:

A Socio-Political Analysis

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the hitherto neglected subject of the role of the Sudanese capitalist class in development. It explores the origin, development and political role of this class, with particular emphasis on its wealthier members. The period covered is 1898-1975. The research is based on interviews with 100 Sudanese businessmen, selected for their prominence in the economic life of the country today. Published and unpublished documentary sources were used to analyse the setting and devise the criteria by which subjects were selected for interview.

The principal findings are as follows. A business class, engaged mainly in trade, existed before British colonialism. The colonial period enhanced its development through increased export-opportunities for traditional commodities and improved transport facilities. The British first encouraged immigrant businessmen and later implanted religious leaders as agricultural capitalists. Industrial investment was blocked so as to clear the market for British manufactures. After Independence, with the encouragement of the state and neo-colonial finance, an industrial capitalist class emerged, the industrialists coming mainly from the ranks of established businessmen.

The Sudanese business class is socially and culturally cohesive despite the diversity of its origins. Politics have been from the outset a more important determinant of business success than 'entrepreneurship'. Regional, tribal, and extended family ties are utilised to further capital accumulation, and the education of future generations of businessmen is carefully husbanded. Sudanese businessmen and their families enjoy a distinct and highly privileged life-style.

The Sudanese bourgeoisie was allied politically with colonialism even at the height of the anti-colonial struggle. In the post-colonial period,

its political parties opposed all radical social change, made alliances with imperialism and supported repression. In view of their political affiliations, the businessmen studied cannot be considered members of a 'national bourgeoisie'.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

It is banal but nonetheless true to say that the overriding concern of the Third World countries is development. The post-Second World War period saw African countries achieving political independence one after another. The national governments which followed proclaimed ardently their desire to shed the fetters of 'backwardness' and to 'develop' their national economies. The Sudan was no exception. After political independence in 1956, the views propounded by successive governments had the common theme of emphasizing the central role of private investment and of local businessmen in the process of 'development'.

Before examining the validity of this contention, it is necessary to briefly define the concept of development itself, this being a controversial concept particularly with regard to the Third World.

It seems that development is often confused with economic growth measured in terms of annual increase of per-capita income or national product, regardless of its distribution, the level of development of the social forces, the relations of production, the ownership of the means of production and the degree of participation of the people in effecting that growth. A wider understanding of the development process is shown in the following definition:

"Real *development* involves a structural transformation of the economy, society, policy and culture ... that permits the self generating and self perpetuating use and development of the people's potential."¹ It is within this context that the views on the role of the local bourgeoisie in development acquire significance. This study is concerned with Sudanese local bourgeoisie and in particular with the wealthier section of this class. It

1. J. D. Cockroft, A. G. Frank and D. L. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy, Anchor Books, New York, 1972, p.xvi.

seeks to illuminate three main areas: (1) the origins of the local bourgeoisie; (2) the factors that contributed to its development and the nature of this development; and (3) the role this bourgeoisie played in the politics of the country. The study covers the period from the inception of the British colonialism in 1898 up to the contemporary period (1975).

Origins

As has recently been pointed out by Paul Kennedy, African businessmen have received very little attention in the literature, whether from writers who work within a basically marxist framework or from those who do not.¹ From a marxist viewpoint, much more has been written about the dependent nature of the African bourgeoisie than about the very way this bourgeoisie originated or how it subsequently developed. Comprehensive studies like Lenin's on the development of capitalism in Russia² or Maurice Dobb's on the development of capitalism in Europe³ hardly exist for the case of Africa. None of the studies that have been concerned with the development of the bourgeoisie in Africa have traced the origin of this class comprehensively in each country separately.

The Sudan fits squarely within the general picture of neglect. One of the few works that mentions the Sudan in the course of a general discussion of Africa is that of Samir Amin.⁴ Although Amin is not specifically concerned with the development of the bourgeoisie in Africa, the topic arises as part of his generalized theory of peripheral social formations. In his recent study, Samir Amin divides these social formations into three main categories: the American, Arab, Asian and African formations. The general features of

1. Paul Kennedy, 'Indigenous Capitalism in Ghana', Review of African Political Economy, No.8, 1977, p.21.
2. V. I. Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967.
3. Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, Routledge, Revised Edition, London, 1967. * (see next page)
4. Samir Amin, Unequal Development, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1977.

peripheral formations are summarized in four points: "(1) the predominance of agrarian capitalism in the national sector; (2) the creation of local, mainly merchant, bourgeoisie in the wake of dominant foreign capital; (3) a tendency toward a peculiar bureaucratic development, specific to the contemporary periphery; and (4) the incomplete, specific character of the phenomena of proletarianization."¹

Among the African countries referred to by Samir Amin is the Sudan. Amin traces the pre-mercantilist period back to the era of the Sultanate, when long distance trade was practised with Egypt and the East. According to him, the Sudan was integrated in the capitalist market during the Turko-Egyptian colonial period, when Sudanese nomads participated in trade by acting as middlemen for Turkish, Syrian and European merchants. They then moved to agriculture on lands given to them by the Turko-Egyptian system. These agricultural undertakings were largely commercial. At this stage, although new farming methods were introduced, the relations of production were still based on the use of serfs and slaves. Wage labour was not known. Samir Amin's reference to the Sudan in this study only goes up to the end of Mahdist rule (1898) and does not cover the subsequent periods.²

Classes of local agricultural capitalists are known to have developed in most of the peripheral countries after colonialism either reinforced or

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- * Apart from the literature discussed in the text see the following
- F. H. Cardoso, 'The Industrial Elite in Latin America', in Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today, Henry Bernstein, (ed), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1973.
- G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, 'Class Formation and Economic Development in Tropical Africa', in Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today, Henry Bernstein, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1973.
- S. M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin America, OUP, New York, 1967.
- Frank Brandenburg, 'A Contribution to the Theory of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: The Case of Mexico', Inter-American Economic Affairs, 16, Winter 1962, pp.2-23.
- Alexander Gerschenkron, 'Social Attitudes, Entrepreneurship and Economic Development' in his book, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1962.

1. Ibid, p.333.

2. Ibid.

implanted groups of landlords to produce for the export market. In Iraq, for example, the British created a local agricultural capitalist class. In his study of Egyptian class formation, Mahmoud Hussain asserts that the Egyptian bourgeoisie started in agriculture.¹ The prominent families of this class were of Turkish origin most of whom re-invested in trade and industry in urban areas in partnership with foreign or Egyptianized capital. Hussain agrees that the production relations maintained by this class were transitional between feudalism and capitalism. But specialization in cotton production for the world capitalist market led to the elimination of all but a few of these feudal forms, especially after the Second World War.² In contrast, the bourgeoisie in Syria started trade in the urban areas and then moved to agriculture in the countryside.³

In spite of the seemingly different configurations in the various Third World countries, differences brought about by the varied aims of the colonizing powers and the different levels of development of the social formations themselves, a general pattern does emerge. Most of the local bourgeoisies seem to have started in trade. This is compatible with the early history of long distance trade in these countries, especially in Africa. This is revealed for the Sudan in the writings of O'Fahey and Spaulding,⁴ MacMichael⁵ and Bishai⁶; for the Gold Coast in the book by David Kimble⁷; and for Africa generally in the work of Irving Markovitz⁸ and Jan Vansina.⁹

1. Mahmoud Hussain, Class Conflict in Egypt 1945-1970, Monthly Review Press, London and New York, 1973.
2. Ibid, pp.17-18.
3. Amin, op.cit.
4. R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, Methuen, London, 1974.
5. Harold MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Faber and Faber, London, 1934.
6. A. Amin Bishai, Export Performance and Economic Development in Sudan, 1900-1967, Ithaca Press, London, 1976.
7. David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963.
8. Irving Markovitz, Power and Class in Africa, Prentice-Hall International, Englewood Cliffs, 1977.
9. Jan Vansina, 'Inner Africa' in The Horizon History of Africa, A. M. Josephy (ed.), America Heritage, New York, 1971.

Together with the early history of long-distance trade, the needs of colonial expansion in subsequent periods played a central role in the development of the Third World bourgeoisies. The necessity of comprehending this specific feature of the origins of these classes has been emphasized by

E. A. Brett:

"Capitalism had evolved organically in the area of origin, but it was injected into the colonial world from outside and, where necessary, imposed upon unwilling populations there at the point of a gun. The process of organic evolution ... produced an indigenous capitalist class which was securely rooted in the social structure and culture and which, whatever its limits, had necessarily to rely upon internal sources of support to legitimate and defend its claims to social predominance. The dominance of this class in European society was subjected to intense opposition both from the old feudal order and from the emergent working class, but its claims to represent at least one significant tendency within the national culture could never be entirely rejected. But external dominance in the Third World meant that the commanding heights of the new economy and administration were occupied by expatriate groups from the beginning; expatriate groups, moreover, with access to resources derived from their metropolitan base which were far in excess of anything which the indigenous groups could hope to acquire in the short run. The crucial question for the long-term development of the society as a whole therefore relates to the effect of their dominance upon the emergence of indigenous social formations ..."¹

The findings of this thesis confirm for the Sudan Brett's assertion that the hegemony of colonialism affected the bourgeoisie from its very origins.

Subsequent Development

The debate about the factors affecting business success and the development of business classes is a relatively old one. It originates in the way early writers defined the term entrepreneur. The *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, for example, lists under 'entrepreneurship' writings that date back to the eighteenth century.² The earliest contributions were

1. E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, Heinemann, London, 1973, p.284.
2. Thomas Cochran, 'Entrepreneurship', in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, David L. Sills (ed.), Macmillan, New York, 1968, vol.5, p.88.

mainly from Europe, particularly France. Thinkers such as Richard Cantillon, Francois Quesnay, Nicholas Baudeau and A.R.J. Turgot used the term entrepreneur to refer to anyone engaged in economic activity that involved uncertainty, risk-taking and/or innovation. By 1800, some French economists differentiated between entrepreneurs, using criteria largely based on the characteristic of the various sectors of the economy. The term was applied variously to contractors, agriculturalists, industrialists, etc. The classic definition, which is said to have survived until the twentieth century, is the one provided by Jean-Baptiste Say. In his work 'Catechism of Political Economy', Say considered the entrepreneur as the agent who "unites all means of production and who finds in the value of products ... the re-establishment of capital he employs, and the value of the wages, the interest, and the rent which he pays, as well as profits belonging to himself."¹

According to these writers' definitions, it appears that a significant factor in business success and development lies in the possession of the essential characteristic of risk-taking and innovation. Business success, according to Say, does involve some personal attributes, such as perseverance, judgement and knowledge of the world and of business, but he does not discuss the entrepreneur in terms of risk-taking or innovation. Like the British classicists from Smith to Marshall, he was unable to make entrepreneurship a significant factor in his general economic theory, in contrast to the French school. In fact the English equivalent to the French term was undertaken as projector, which Daniel Defoe in 'An Essay upon Projects' equated with fraud or swindler.

Thomas Cochran, the author of the essay on 'Entrepreneurship' in the *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* summarizes the attitude of the English classical economists from Smith to Marshall in terms of the

1. Ibid.

difficulty they faced in incorporating an unmeasurable factor like entrepreneurship into their economic analyses. These economists used a highly aggregative system of relations of theoretically measurable quantities and therefore rewards for risk-taking or uncertainty was a negation of any proper theoretical explanation. Cochran concludes that : "The basic problem of finding an operative role for entrepreneurship in economic theory remained unsolved; and economic theorists, in general, are well aware of the incongruity of a non-measurable human element in a theoretical structure based on unquantifiable assumptions, moved in other directions."¹ Later refinements were introduced by Schumpeter and others, who characterized the entrepreneur only as one whose responses were creative or innovative. In short, the essence of success was attributed in a greater or lesser degree to a supposedly definable but unquantifiable entrepreneurial function of making strategically important or innovative decisions that involve elements of risk or vision.

It was Alfred Marshall, from among the nineteenth-century economists, who first perceived the fact that entrepreneurs could only function if they were capitalist owners themselves. Rewards that accrued to them were considered a return on capital investment rather than a compensation for entrepreneurial skills.

Other nineteenth-century contributors on the question such as Weber and Sombart added another dimension to the theory of entrepreneurial success. Sombart viewed the essence of capitalism to be represented in the 'spirit' that inspired the modern epoch. For him:

"at some time in the distant past the capitalist spirit must have been in existence - in embryo if you like - before any capitalist undertaking could become a reality."²

1. Ibid, p.89.
2. W. Sombart, 'Quintessence of Capitalism', quoted in Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975, p.5.

Max Weber saw the source of this spirit in the religious ethic of Calvinism. According to him, the wordly ascet^{ic}ism of the Puritan middle class was a major factor in the rise of modern industrial capitalism.

Norman Long reports a number of studies that follow Weber's lead, such as Pieris' study among the sikhs which suggested that, like puritanism, sikhism had a direct effect on the development of the industrial class of the Punjab region. Kennedy's study of the Parsis of India also suggested that elements of zoroastrianism had a favourable influence on entrepreneurship. Nevaskar's comparison of the Jains of India and the Quakers of America arrived at similar conclusions.¹

Long justifiably criticizes the Weberian school on the grounds that, whilst their hypotheses may be applicable in specific contexts, we cannot assume that they indicate necessary pre-conditions in all situations. He goes on to cite Gershenkron who asserted that (a) the same function could be performed by other institutions, such as banks, the state, etc., and (b) what may constitute a 'developmental' value system differs from one society to another. What may be a facilitating factor in one society may be detrimental or irrelevant elsewhere. The Third World in particular has not been affected by the puritanism of Western Europe. The examples cited by Long include Bellah's study of Japan, where religious values did not correlate positively with the growth of private capitalism but rather with the reinforcement of state-planned change and bureaucracy. The universal validity of the protestant ethic-induced development of capitalism is again questioned in a study carried out in Indonesia by Geertz. This study regards political motivations as the main stimulating force behind economic innovation to a degree that blurs the distinguishing demarkation lines between the political elites and entrepreneurs.²

1. Norman Long, An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development, Tavistock, London, 1977, pp.60-63.

2. Ibid, pp.66-68.

The fundamental problem with the Weberian and neo-Weberian approach is aptly raised by Long. It shares with other modernization approaches the assumption of a universal final outcome for all societies. Although Long does not discount completely some relationship between religious asceticism and entrepreneurship, he emphasizes the necessity of taking other factors which could affect or stimulate economic endeavour into account. A further shortcoming is the apparent discounting of an important dimension related to the degree of flexibility and adaptability of any belief system when confronted with changing circumstances.¹

Most important of all, Long's concluding remarks sum up the complexities of social and economic realities in which certain members of a society are apparently placed in strategic positions which permit them, and not others, to mobilize resources and utilize economic opportunities. He lists numerous factors such as family structure, land tenure systems and patterns of social stratification as pertinent to the subject. In short: "The fundamental errors involved in this type of approach remain those of positioning [sic] a linear, Western-biassed model of development and of abstracting specific factors from a complex socio-historical process and assuming them to be crucial."²

Maurice Dobb carries the criticism further by questioning the entire relationship between capitalism as an economic form and the capitalist spirit as a product of this form. He poses the question as follows:

"... if capitalism as an economic form is the creation of the capitalist spirit, the genesis of the latter must first of all be accounted for before the origin of capitalism can be explained. If the capitalist spirit is itself a historical product, what caused its appearance on the historical stage?"³

1. Ibid, pp.68-69.

2. Ibid, p.70.

3. Dobb, op.cit., p.9.

Dobb adds that answers propounded to date have failed to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon.

The theories that have attempted to explain the genesis of capitalism as an outcome of Judaism (Sombart) or Protestantism (Weber) would seem to have reversed the real causality, since religion is an outcome of the social order rather than vice-versa. This understanding is no longer confined to Marx, though he was perhaps the first to develop it. According to Dobb, for Marx:

"... the essence of capitalism is neither in a spirit of enterprise nor in the use of money to finance a series of exchange transactions with the object of gain, but in a particular mode of production. By a mode of production he did not refer merely to the state of technique ... but to the way in which the means of production were owned and to the social relations between men which resulted from their connections with the process of production."¹

For Marx, what has been called an entrepreneur is simply a capitalist since, as an owner of the means of production and buyer of the labour power of others, he is the conscious representative of capital in its endeavour to accumulate. This being an important concept, it is best to quote Marx's own words at some length:

"As the conscious representative of this movement, [circulation of capital], the possessor of money becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which the money starts and to which it returns. The expansion of value which is the objective basis or main-spring of the circulation ... becomes his subjective aim, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of even more and more wealth in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist, that is, as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will. Use - values must therefore never be looked upon as the real aim of the capitalist; neither must the profit on any single transaction. The restless never-ending process of profit-making alone is what he aims at ... this passionate chase after exchange-value, is common to the capitalist and the miser; but while the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational miser. The never-ending augmentation of exchange-value, which the miser strives after, by seeking to save his money from circulation, is attained by the more acute capitalist, by constantly throwing it afresh into circulation."²

1. Dobb, op.cit., p.7.

2. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume (1), Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1974, p.151.

For Marx the capitalist is a rational owner of wealth whose main characteristic is a boundless and conscious desire for profit-making. It is this very feature that distinguishes between a successful capitalist and an unsuccessful, or 'mad', one. The conscious and successful capitalist is the one with the ability to understand and conform to the rules of capitalism. It is within such a comprehensive framework that entrepreneurship has to be explained. Without a persistent struggle to keep in step with the needs of the never-ending process of profit-making, capitalists can be led astray from the necessary consciousness to remain capitalists with the eventual result that they are expelled from the arena altogether.

It is not personal attributes or entrepreneurial skills that determine the success or otherwise of individual capitalists in the Marxist view. It is rather the degree of adaptability they show to the changing demands of success. This quality is not innate but is acquired through the capitalists' consciousness which singles out from the specific context factors that are conducive to their development and to which they have to conform at the peril of their demise as capitalists.

For Marx's comprehensive analysis, individual capitalist fortunes are only important in as much as they involve members of a class that exploits social labour for its own benefit. Whether they are adventuresome, courageous and innovative or not is not, in itself, relevant to his analysis. Their significance is derived from the necessity of mapping a strategy to end exploitation. Capital accumulation, in Marx's view, does not reflect any unusual capabilities in individuals. It is rather a result of a long historical process that places members of this particular class in the position of owners of the means of production and buyers of labour power. Marx's main distinction, then, lies in the degree to which a capitalist consciousness is exhibited.

Within this same framework it is necessary to delve into the reason why, even among conscious capitalists, some succeed more than others. Although capitalism everywhere has an inherent feature or built-in mechanism for destroying some capitalists so that others may grow bigger, in the Third World additional factors seem to operate. Factors related to the expansion of colonialism and neo-colonialism have produced varying responses from local capitalists according to the specific situation at hand. Further empirical studies within a comprehensive theoretical framework will be needed, however, if any meaningful generalizations are to be arrived at.

The rules of the game for capital accumulation vary with the place, time and the circumstances. The local capitalist classes which were injected into the Third World had to accept the conditions of the colonizing capital which, as in the case of the Sudan, even picked the individuals who were to become members of this class according to its political needs at the time. In neo-colonial Africa different methods had to be used by world capitalism: states had to be kept within the orbit of the world capitalist system -- local capitalist classes had to be strengthened in firm collaboration with international capital, whose demands created the necessary conditions for further accumulation of capital. It is not without reason, then, that local businessmen's success in the Sudan varied directly with the degree of their dependence on foreign capital.

Political Role

The origin and development of the Third World bourgeoisie is different from that of the European bourgeoisie. So too is its political role. In attempting to study the local capitalist class in a country like the Sudan, it is important to be aware of the crucial distinction between the classic form of capitalism that developed in Western Europe and the forms of capi-

talism that developed in the Third World. In Europe, while exploiting the proletariat, the European bourgeoisie usually played the historical revolutionary role of massively and rapidly advancing the development of the forces of production. Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto:

"The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam and navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing the whole continent for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?"¹

In the case of the Sudan, like most Third World countries, it is suggested that such a role was hampered by the impact of colonialism and neo-colonialism which determined the nature of its bourgeoisie.

The nature and political role of the Third World bourgeoisies has received attention since the turn of the century, though almost exclusively among marxists. The bourgeoisie of the Third World was viewed by some as consisting entirely of dependent, *comprador* elements, which could play no role in bringing about revolutionary change. Others distinguished between a progressive bourgeoisie and a *comprador* bourgeoisie. The former was considered part of the revolutionary forces in the first stages of the transition to socialism.²

The political history of contemporary Africa contains many examples of the negative role that local bourgeoisies can play in the face of any attempt to introduce radical social change. The experience of Ghana and Guinea suggests the importance of a proper analysis of the links between national bourgeoisies and neo-colonial capitalism.

1. Karl Marx and F. Engels, 'The Communist Manifesto' in Selected Works Volume 1, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, pp.38-39.
2. This discussion is surveyed at length in Chapter 8.

In Guinea in 1962, Sékou Touré had to appeal to 'revolutionary firmness' against the trading bourgeoisie. The warning was clearly necessary because when the government introduced a new tax a number of traders went on strike. Sékou Touré had then to make it clear that those capitalists were not simply an economic obstacle to Guinea's advance but were in fact natural allies of imperialism and neo-colonialism.¹

In Ghana during the period prior to the coup against Nkrumah, there was a considerable sharpening of the struggle between the people and the trading and bureaucratic capitalist elements who wished to be the main beneficiaries of Independence and drag the country further along capitalist lines. The failure of Nkrumah's regime was in part the product of an underestimation of the counter-revolutionary role such elements can play in collaboration with neo-colonialism. In his famous Dawn Broadcast of 8th April 1961, Nkrumah castigated the bourgeois elements who were utilizing their state positions to enrich themselves at the expense of national development and the people's interests.²

The Case of the Sudan

The importance of the different fractions of the bourgeoisie with regard to the role they play in hampering development and permitting neo-colonial capital-penetration varies from one Third World country to another. In his study of the Malian bureaucracy, for example, Claude Meillassoux states:

"... so having been the instrument of the colonial power and having then turned against it to become the mouthpiece of the exploited Malian peasantry, the bureaucracy was gaining, (with its access to power) some of the characteristics of a social class: control of repression involving a resort to various devices to maintain dominance."³

1. Jack Woddis, 'Is there an African National Bourgeoisie?', African Social Studies, selected by C. W. Gutkind and Peter Waterman, Heinemann, London, 1977, p.276.
2. Ibid.
3. Claude Meillassoux, 'A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali',

/continued ...

Following Meillassoux's analysis, Diana Wong asserts: "In Benin a national bourgeoisie is virtually non-existent, the national subsistence mode of production did not allow any considerable accumulation of wealth in the hands of rich landowners or merchants."¹

In the Sudan, in contrast to Benin, a local capitalist class does exist and the economic and political objectives of colonialism contributed to its development. Moreover, the pre-capitalist mode of production allowed for the development of an important merchant class in the Sudan through a chain of brokers and merchants linking the direct producers with the export companies. The Sudanese capitalist class has controlled the state apparatus throughout the post-Independence period and was able to absorb the bureaucracy to serve the capitalist pattern of development.

The events of July 1971 in the Sudan, when the local bourgeoisie conspired with the imperialist bourgeoisie directly to bring down the regime, pushed to the forefront the necessity for a comprehensive study of this class. The policies subsequently embodied in the new Labour and Investment Laws of 1972 and 1973 emphasized the need even further.

In spite of the growing economic and political influence of the Sudanese local business class no study has addressed itself to the question. In fact it is not just the bourgeois class that has been neglected, because every aspect of class formation in the Sudan is in great need of comprehensive analysis. No study has as yet been published on the subject. The Sudan, though one of the least studied among African countries, is not alone in its plight. The editorial of a special issue of the *Review of African Political Economy* devoted to the theme of 'Classes in Africa' conceded that:

contd. ...

quoted in Diana Wong, Corruption and the Bureaucratic State, paper presented to Seminar on Subsistence and Reproduction, Bielefeld University, Germany, May 1977, p.17-18.

1. Diana Wong, op.cit., pp.17-18.

"... the analysis of class relations in Africa remains under-developed. Governments and politicians, bureaucrats and academics have officially declared African societies to be classless. Class analysis has been deemed by them inappropriate. More than that, it has been seen as divisive. ... there were neither exploiters nor exploited classes, nor any fundamental cleavages in society other than those artificially created by alien and subversive groups ... Under the cover of offering an authentic African solution, the ideology of African socialism was used to put the study of Marxist method beyond bounds. Conventional social science teaching supported this. Economists denied the political implications of what they were doing. Political scientists identified conflicts and cleavages among parties, factions and individuals, but kept them separate from any analysis of the class relations. Sociologists emasculated the concept of class by assimilating it to the study of stratification. Populations were surveyed and ranked according to their access to opportunities and rewards, and interviewed about the ways in which they judged one another's status. Classes became classifying categories, separated from the relations of production and exploitation which constituted them. In all these cases it was declared that empirical evidence and the resources of science had shown that if class was important elsewhere, it was not, at least as yet, important in Africa."¹

This passage has been quoted at length because what it offers as a generalization for Africa is specifically applicable to the Sudan. Political parties, bureaucrats and academics too generally subscribed to the notion of a classless Sudan. They depicted marxist analysis not only as alien and divisive but also as opposed to the principles of Islam.

After the October 'revolution' of 1964, however, these same circles had to face a new and massive wave of popular support for socialist ideas. In an attempt to contain that sentiment and the major political force behind it, the Communist Party, they themselves declared their own brands of socialism such as 'Islamic Socialism',² 'Sudanese Socialism',³ and lately 'May Socialism' in opposition to the Marxist notion of socialism.⁴

1. Review of African Political Economy, No.3, 1975, p.1-2.
2. The Constitutions of the Umma Party and other minor parties such as The Islamic Charter Front, the Islamic Republican Party and others.
3. Student political groups in Khartoum University, the 'Socialist Front' and the 'Democratic Socialist Congress'.
4. An interesting departure of the Sudanese brand of petty bourgeois socialism, which is perhaps more related to African rather than to Arab models, is that it did not categorically deny the existence of classes. All that was rejected in Marxism was the necessity of the class struggle. It was claimed that, although classes might exist, their antagonisms need not be resolved through a class struggle.

Unfortunately these depictions have rarely taken the form of writing. The persistence of the oral tradition, even at the level of academic debate, is partly responsible. The only published works that address themselves to the study of the Sudan from a class perspective are the publications of the Communist Party,¹ MERIP Report entitled *Colonialism and Class Struggle in the Sudan*² and a forthcoming work by T. C. Niblock entitled *Class and Exploitation in the Sudan*. This being the case, it is not unexpected to find that the business class in the Sudan has received no attention. Even the publications of the Communist Party include neither a comprehensive study of class formation in the country as a whole nor a specific study of the Sudanese bourgeoisie. What they do incorporate is numerous references to both, in contexts related to everyday political questions. The MERIP Report analyses the modern history of the Sudan from a class point of view but does so briefly and without focussing specifically on the bourgeoisie.

The only systematic study which might be considered relevant to this research is F. Barth's 'Economic Spheres in Darfur'.³ In this work, Barth describes the patterns of alternative choices open to members of a particular community. He analyses the 'spheres of exchange' and the alternatives open to members of the community in the direction of the commercialization of the local economy. He considers the individual who succeeded in effecting an advantageous break-through in spite of the apparent constraints arising from the socio-cultural setting as an entrepreneur.

Two features of Barth's study limit its relevance to the subject of this research. Firstly, it is concerned with entrepreneurship as an individual asset freed from factors other than the ability of the individual

1. See Chapter 8.

2. MERIP Report, No.46, Colonialism and Class Struggle in the Sudan, London, 1976.

3. Frederick Barth, 'Economic Spheres in Darfur', in Raymond Firth ed., Themes in Economic Anthropology, Tavistock Publications, London, 1967. See also the discussion in Long, op.cit., pp.110-114.

concerned to break through constraints at the micro level (the community). Secondly, the study is limited to one community, in one province of the Sudan, at a particular point of history. Such micro analysis views the entrepreneur as an individual in a community rather than as a member of a class within the total socio-economic context of the whole country. This study is concerned with the entrepreneur's individual history in as much as he is a member of a class. The problem of the limitations of the available literature therefore still remains.

Assumptions and Methodology

The essence of economic activity, in all societies and at all times, is the utilization of nature's resources for the benefit of man. Specific historical developments, resulting in the allocation of opportunities for, and benefits of, this utilization in a specific manner. This appropriation of social and economic benefits and its distribution among people are the result of a determinate type of relations that permit some to appropriate a larger share of those benefits through their ownership of the means of production. It is as part of such a process that the business entrepreneurs of the Sudan are conceptualized in this study. They are viewed as a class by virtue of their control over the means of production, which consequently gives them access to a larger share of the social product and enables them to enforce their hegemony over the political, cultural and social life of the country. Classes in this study are defined as:

"Groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupied in the historically determined system of social production; by their relation to the means of production; by their role in the social organization of labour and consequently by the diversion of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another, owing to the different places they occupy in the definite system of social economy."¹

1. V. I. Lenin, 'A Great Beginning', Selected Works, Vol.3, International Publishers, New York, 1967, p.213-14.

The business or capitalist class is defined as the group of people who own means of production and hire wage labour in the process of making profits and accumulating further capital.

For development to take place in the sense we shall use here the participation of the bulk of the people in the economic, political and cultural life of the country has to be elicited. This can only occur if their access to the social product is enhanced and equalized. This in its turn necessarily involves specific and deliberate action to bring about such changes in the existing order.

Because we are bound to adopt a position on such issues, this study does not claim to be impartial or value-free. For related reasons, it rejects the equilibrium approach proposed by Almond,¹ Easton,² Parsons³ and their followers - themselves hardly value free - which legitimates the prevailing order and advocates 'adaptation' rather than radical social change. The acceptance of such an approach necessarily involves the acceptance of the prevailing order and the reduction of the people opposed to it to mere 'critics'. The myth of value-free social research has now been effectively dispelled. Individuals and groups derive their evaluative assumptions from their particular understanding of what they consider to be in the public interest or what they identify as a subject worthy of opinion. Brett has put this simply and effectively by asserting that, if we recognize that

"Adam Smith spoke for the bourgeoisie, Marx for the proletariat ... then there is no point in rejecting particular models simply because they have a normative component; their value will depend upon their content, the social interest with which they tend to identify, their ability to explain observed phenomena, and the implication of their use for the course of future social action."⁴

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1. G. Almond and J. S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, 1961.
 2. D. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1965 and Systems' Analysis of Political Life, Wiley, New York, 1965.
 3. T. Parsons, 'A Functional Theory of Change', in A. and E. Etzioni, Social Change, Basic Books, New York, 1964.
 4. Brett, op.cit., p.9.

At the same time the view is taken here that it is erroneous to believe that revolutionary concepts can be transported from the West - or indeed anywhere - and applied mechanically to Third World situations. Since radical transformations can only emanate from the particular society in question, they require specific analyses of the problems within this social order. Thus, while using the marxist model as a tool of analysis in studying the wealthiest layer of Sudanese capitalists, I subscribe to the caution expressed by the editors of the *Review of African Political Economy*:

"All too often, Marxist analysis, in attempting to correct ... [various bourgeois] tendencies, mechanically transposed to African Societies schemes of class relations characteristic of Western capitalism, and its development from European feudalism. These Marxists tended to proceed by assertion, from some inexorable historical precedent, rather than through the analysis of African Society and their relations to the rest of the world ... Marxist analysis requires examination and analysis of the material conditions which determine the possibilities for and obstacles to revolutionary action by the exploited classes. It demands a political analysis, in terms of class struggle, of the steps necessary to fashion the conditions under which a class, in alliance with other classes, can transform its own situation and end its exploitation."¹

This thesis is an empirical examination of one section of the Sudanese business class in the period between 1898 and 1975. The study is based on interviews with the richest hundred businessmen of the country and traces the origin of their wealth through three generations. Nevertheless it makes no claims in its conclusions to be a basis for generalizations about the *whole* of the bourgeoisie of the Sudan. For such generalizations to be possible it would be necessary, first and above all, to carry out a comprehensive study of class formation in the Sudan to provide a framework. Secondly, it would be necessary to study all the various layers of the capitalist class. Thirdly, an in-depth analysis of the nature of development of the state in the Sudan would need to be carried out. Moreover, a detailed and analytical study of

1. Review of African Political Economy, No.3, 1975, p.2.

the political economy of the country needs to be done despite the crippling deficiencies in the available statistical data as an essential task without which we will be 'ploughing the sea' as the Arab saying goes.

This study does not address itself to the formulation of a strategy regarding the 'national' or *comprador* bourgeoisies. It is simply an attempt to document certain important aspects relating to the leading Sudanese capitalists for the formulation of such a strategy it is vitally necessary to undertake numerous empirical studies in addition to this study. No strategy could be designed without such empirical knowledge, no matter how deep were the theoretical grounding of the concerned people.

The aim of the study is to trace the social origins of one hundred leading Sudanese businessmen, to isolate the factors that determined their success and to examine the existing social, political and material resources that are used to enhance their capital accumulation. In addition, the thesis examines the degree of coherence of the Sudanese bourgeoisie, i.e. its homogeneity or heterogeneity, and the political role it played in the modern history of the country. For such an investigation, no single social science discipline could be sufficient. The study aims at a multi-dimensional analysis of a class. Hence a multi-disciplinary approach, taking in the total socio-economic system of the country, was considered necessary. The risk of displeasing defenders of strict disciplinary boundaries seemed to be worth taking.

Several difficulties were encountered in carrying out the research. Some arose from the fact that research of this sort was being carried out for the first time and in a largely hostile atmosphere. Secondly, the few available studies that might have been of help proved inadequate for various reasons connected with the prolonged history of anti- or non-marxist literature in the Sudan. Thirdly, the statistical data required were found to be

scarce and sometimes inaccurate, with different values being given by different sources for the same statistic. Even where accurate the data frequently proved inadequate because of the tabulation system used, which obscured important aspects. Fourthly, the macro/micro nature of the research, which necessitated the treatment of the subject through various disciplines and within the social system of the country in its totality, meant a great deal of effort in terms of acquaintance with the relevant literature in addition to the physical effort needed to obtain detailed information on the subject. Fifthly, the long span of the historical period studied, which was believed to be important if a relatively complete picture of the development of the class was to be had, created various problems, mostly related to the lack of relevant documentation. Finally, the interviewees were some of the busiest people in the country and persuading them to give up time for long interviews was not an easy task. Moreover, they often had to be cajoled into parting with information which they believed might hamper their development. In fact in one case even this failed to elicit the required answers.

The thesis falls into two main parts. The first three chapters provide a preliminary discussion based chiefly on secondary and official data. The succeeding five chapters analyse the main empirical findings and their implications. Chapter One is a description of the economy of the Sudan in a political economy perspective. Its main focus is an argument about the predominance of the capitalist mode of production over the non-capitalist mode in contemporary Sudan. It discusses the penetration of capitalism in the country and its implications, including the various disparities that characterize Sudanese society.

Chapters Two and Three trace the development of private capitalism in the Sudan. The development of the indigenous Sudanese and immigrant capita-

lists is traced as far as possible for the period under study. The research covers the major sectors of the economy as well as the areas, crops and products that contributed to the growth and development of private capitalism. The question of whether a capitalist class exists in the Sudan and the dependent nature of this class constitutes the main underlying theme of the chapter.

Chapter Four explains the criteria used in the selection of the leading Sudanese capitalists studied. The criteria, based on the most important fields of capital accumulation in the country, took account of the historical period of the study (1898-1975). The chapter describes in detail selection of the subjects and their distribution both sectorally and regionally. It also outlines the methods used for the analysis and the way the interviews were carried out.

Chapter Five documents the life histories of the cases studied as related by themselves. Chapter Six begins the discussion of some of the more significant patterns to emerge from the empirical data with regard to capitalist activities. Topics covered include (1) the impact of tribal, kinship and extended-family formations on capital accumulation; and (2) the regional implications of capital transference.

Chapter Seven discusses the educational patterns revealed by the cases studied. It traces the significance attributed to education by the different generations of capitalists, and those family members seen as potential heirs. The specializations chosen and the countries where this education is obtained are specified and compared to the provision of education in the country as a whole. This chapter also discusses the capitalists' consumption patterns, including nutrition, health, housing and other amenities. The chapter emphasizes the distinctiveness of the life-style of these capitalists relative to that of the Sudanese population at large.

Chapter Eight begins with a more extensive review of literature on the political role of Third World bourgeoisies than it seemed appropriate to include in this Introduction. The viewpoints considered are mostly marxist, since this school of thought seems to be the most concerned with the question. The remainder of the chapter argues that, contrary to the bulk of the written political history of the Sudan, this history is amenable to class analysis. The political role of the Sudanese capitalist class is documented for the whole of the period under study. It is suggested that, in contrast to what occurred in some African and Third World countries, there were no fractions of the Sudanese bourgeoisie which played a progressive role during the colonial period. Moreover, that attitude persisted even during the climax of the national liberation movement. The chapter also examines the position of the Sudanese Communist Party with regard to the role this class can be expected to play in radical social change. The reason for this critical examination of the position of the Communist Party is that this party is the only influential left wing organization in the country.


The Conclusions sum up the findings of the thesis with regard to the origin, development and political role of the Sudanese business class.

CHAPTER ONE

Some Aspects Of The Political Economy Of The Sudan

SUDAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
|  Sakel cotton |  Groundnuts and sesame |  Ginning factories |
|  American irrigated cotton |  Dura and dukhn |  Oil mills |
|  American rain cotton |  Gum |  Railways |



This chapter introduces some major aspects of the political economy of the Sudan. It starts with a description of the geography, people and natural resources of the country. A short account is then given of the population, the labour force, land tenure patterns and transport.

The chapter criticizes the classification of production in terms of a modern/traditional dichotomy. It is suggested that such dichotomy is inadequate for analysing the modes of production in the country. The economy is then analysed in terms of two modes of production: the capitalist mode of production and the non-capitalist one. The main theme of the discussion is the progressive integration of the non-capitalist mode of production into the capitalist market.

In the discussion of the penetration of the capitalist mode of production, a variety of aspects are covered. These include the nature of both capitalist and non-capitalist production, the role and nature of the State and the impact of foreign capital. The consequences of capitalist penetration for the creation of numerous disparities between urban and rural areas, and between regions are also discussed.

It is argued that the penetration of capitalism in the country can only be usefully analysed if the economy is approached as a totality. Such an approach leads to the conclusion that the penetration of capitalism in the Sudan and the determinant role it has played since the colonial period paved the way for the ascendance of the capitalist mode of production and the progressive dissolution of the non-capitalist mode.

The Country

The Sudan, with an area of almost one million square miles (2.5 million square km.), is the largest country in Africa. It lies between latitudes

3°N and 23°N and longitudes 21°E and 39°E. The country forms an immense basin, sloping gently down towards the North, with highlands on the other three sides. The Red Sea Hills and the Ethiopian highlands lie on the eastern side, the Jebel Merra range on the western side and the Imatong range in the far South.

The Nile, which is the dominant feature of the country, runs through it for two and a half thousand miles. The main Nile starts in Lake Victoria, enters the Sudan through rocky gorges and then flows through the large swampy areas of the Sudd region where it is joined by the Subat and Bahr Elghazal rivers to make the White Nile. This flows northwards till it reaches Khartoum, the capital city, where it is joined by the Blue Nile, its largest tributary which originates in Ethiopian Highlands.¹

Broadly speaking, the soils of the Sudan are sandy in the northern part of the country, clayey in the central part and lateritic in the southern part. The country north of Khartoum is desert or semi-desert land with rainfall ranging from virtually none in the extreme north to less than eight inches in Khartoum. In this area agriculture is only possible with irrigation along the banks of the Nile.

The broad central zone, covering an area of about half the country south of a line roughly joining Geneina and Kassala, is fed by rainfall ranging between eight inches in the northern part of the belt to about thirty inches in the southern part. The most important rainfed agricultural areas, including mechanized farming and animal production, lie in this region. This zone, in turn, can be divided into three distinct regions: Kordofan and Darfur in the West with relatively less rainfall, where shifting cultivation is practised; the central part of the zone, where the unreliability

1. Ali Mohd. Alhassan, "Structure of the Sudan Economy", In Ali Mohd Alhassan, An Introduction to the Sudan Economy. Khartoum University Press, Khartoum, 1977.

and the short season of rainfall necessitate irrigation, e.g. in the Gezira; and the clay plains in the East where the rainfall is relatively abundant.

The Southern region extends over one sixth of the total area of the country. Its rainfall varies from a little over thirty inches (800 mm) to as much as sixty inches, making it suitable for the cultivation of practically all types of tropical crops, including tea and coffee.

Unrelieved by altitude or, for the most part, by ocean breezes, Sudan's climate is very hot. Every part of the country experiences maximum temperatures of over 100°F during several months of the year and many parts experience these temperatures at all times of the year. On the other hand, the north is sometimes hampered by Haboobs, an overpowering dust storm. Thus the Sudan has a tropical continental climate, except for a narrow fringe along the Red Sea coast which enjoys a maritime climate.¹

The People

There exists a broad distinction, which is slowly being modified by various socio-economic changes, between the northern and southern parts of the Sudan. The north, with certain important exceptions, is Arabic in speech and its peoples are largely arabized in culture and outlook. Its indigenous inhabitants are generally moslems. A minority of Arabic speaking christians is composed of the descendants of immigrants from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, etc. who mainly arrived after the Turko-Egyptian conquest in 1820.

The arabization of northern Sudan resulted from the penetration of Arabs who had already emigrated from Arabia to Upper Egypt. With certain exceptions, those northern Sudanese who claim Arab descent belong to one or other of two extensive, if somewhat artificial divisions. The islamized Nubians, mainly sedentaries of the main Nile of lower Nubia, include the Barabra, Sukkut and Mahas, who still speak the Nubian language. South of them are a series of

1. See Ibid.

tribes, inhabiting the older upper Nubia, who belong to the Jaali Group.

These tribes claim as a common ancestor an Arab named Ibrahim Jaal.¹

The name Jaaliyin (singular Jaali) is especially applied to one tribe of this group, dwelling between the Athara Confluence and the Sabaluqa Gorge. The Jaaliyin in this restricted sense formed, from the sixteenth century until the Turko-Egyptian conquest, a tribal kingdom, dominated by a royal clan known as Saadab. North of them the region of Berber is the homeland of the Mirfab, another tribe of the Jaali Group, who also used to form a tribal kingdom. Further north still are other tribal members of the same group, the Rubatab and Manasir, inhabiting the banks of the Nile down to and beyond the great bend at Abu Hamad.²

The area of the Nile between the Fourth Cataract and al-Dabba is the homeland of the Shayqiyya, which does not claim Jaali origin. Many observers have noted what history confirms, the difference between their character and that of their neighbours. In the eighteenth century the predatory, equestrian aristocracy of the Shayqiyya dominated Nubia. In 1821 they alone of the riverain tribes resisted the Turko-Egyptian invasion. Their subsequent services to the new regime as a quasi-feudal irregular cavalry led to the establishment of Shayqiyya colonies around the junction of the Niles and elsewhere.³

The most northerly tribes of the Jaali group lie downstream of the Shayqiyya, between al-Dabba and the country of the Barabra. Their homeland is the historical region of Dongola. These tribes are known collectively as Danaqla. Among these there is far more consciousness of their origin than among the tribes of the southern Jaali Group, and a Nubian language

1. P. M. Holt, Modern History of the Sudan, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1961, p.6.

2. Ibid, p.7.

3. Ibid.

continues to be spoken.¹

Various ruling groups, basically neither Nubian nor Arab, have claimed a Jaali ancestry. The royal family of Taqali, a small moslem state in the pagan Nuba mountain in West Sudan, derives its origin from the marriage of a Jaali holy man with an indigenous princess. A similar story is told of the origin of the Nabtab, the dominant clan of the Beja Banu Amir. The royal Kayra clan of the Fur claimed Abbasi ancestry, as did the neighbouring rulers of Wadaa. The rise of the Shayqiyya in the eighteenth century produced an emigration of Danaqla to Darfur, which seems to have led to the development of trade between that state and Egypt. In the nineteenth century Jaali Jallaba (petty traders) were active in Southern Kordofan and Darfur, on the Southern fringe of Arab territory, while Danaqla and other members of the Jaali groups played a prominent part in the opening up of the White Nile and Bahr-al-Ghazal. Al-Zubayr Basha Rahma, the merchant-prince of the Western Bahr-al-Ghazal in the reign of Khedive Ismail, prided himself on his Abassi (Arab) descent.²

The term Juhayna is a comprehensive term for all tribes claiming Arab descent but not asserting a Jaali-Abbasi origin. Arabs of the Juhayna of Arabia, who had immigrated to upper Egypt played a leading part in breaking through into Nubia in the fourteenth century and there had been a tendency for elements of various (and even non-Arab) origins to link themselves with this successful tribe. In Rufaa, found on the Blue Nile, some memory of a distinct origin is still preserved. Their ancestors lived in geographical proximity to the ancestral Juhayna (Hejaz and Upper Egypt). This has probably led to their inclusion in the Juhayna group.³

Among the numerous tribes of the Juhayna group are the Shukriya, camel

1. See Ibid.

2. Ibid, p.8.

3. Ibid.

and sheep owning nomads. These rose to importance during the eighteenth century as the power of the Fung Sultanate declined, under the leadership of Abu Sin Family. Ahmed Abu Sin lived on good terms with the Turko-Egyptian regime, was given the rank of bey, and for ten years was governor of Khartoum. Their territory included the grain producing rainlands of Gadarif, where a grain market was developed. This market was originally called Suq Abu Sinn. It has now taken over the anglicized name of the region Gadarif.¹

Kababish is another important nomadic tribe. These inhabit the sheep and camel rearing area of the semi desert in north Kordofan. They are a synthetic tribe, formed of diverse elements by a common way of life which is reflected in their name (from Arabic Kabsh, 'a ram').²

An important sub-group of tribes claiming origin from the Juhayna is the Baqqara of southern Kordofan and Darfur. The Baqqara belt of Sudan and Chad extends from the White Nile in the East to Lake Chad in the West following a line more or less south of the old Sutanates of Sinnar, Dar Fur, Waday, Bagirmi and Barnu. The belt, centred on the tenth parallel north, consists of broadly similar climate, soil and vegetation features and is suited to nomadic cattle keeping. The area is inhabited by many Arab and non-Arab tribes, pastoral and agricultural, but the Baqqara are characteristic of it and most numerous. Baqqara is the Arabic name for cattlemen, and the term applies especially to those Arab tribes which had a life of nomadism dictated by the needs of their cattle.³

Between the Baqqara in the South and the Arab camelmen of the North were enclaves of non-Arab sedentaries. From one of these, the Fur, protected by the mountainous basin of Jebbel Marra, developed the moslem Sultanate

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., pp.9-10. See also Talal Asad, The Kabbabish Arabs: power, authority and consent in a Nomadic Tribe, Hurst, London, 1970.

3. Ian Cunnison, 'Aspects of Social Anthropological Research in the Sudan', in Yusuf Fadl Hassan, (ed.) Sudan in Africa, Khartoum University Press, Khartoum, 1971, p.186.

of Darfur. Among the non-Arab tribes to the south of the Baqqara were the Rizayqat of southern Darfur and the Taaisha, who were the fighters of Almahdi and the kinsmen of his Khalife Abdullah Altaaishi.

The Beja are Hamentic-speaking tribes inhabiting the Red Sea Hills and part of the plains sloping down to the main Nile. These are camel nomads, although there has been a degree of sedentarization, specially in connection with the development of modern agriculture in the Gash and Toker deltas. Like the riverain Nubians the Beja became moslems and have undergone various degrees of arabization.

The principal tribes of the South are the Dinka, the Shilluk and the Azande but there exists numerous smaller tribes which, some say, run into hundreds. The Dinka are the largest and occupy an extensive territory. Some of the Dinka dwell on the eastern bank of the White Nile, and others - the majority - in the grassy flood plains of Bahr-al-Ghazal where they herd their cattle. The Shilluk occupy a comparatively small area on the western bank of the White Nile. The Azande are divided by the boundary between the Congo and the Sudan.

Although the question of tribal affiliation has so far been accepted, on the whole further studies are needed to trace the extent of the diffusion among these tribes as a result of continuous socio-economic changes.

I. Cunnison has already challenged the purely genealogical approach to the analysis of the tribal question. In his study of the Baqqara tribes of western Sudan, he emphasized the importance of the economic mode of life in the definition of the tribes.¹ Others like Mafeje have emphasized the relation of tribalism to class formation. Mafeje suggests that tribalism should not be seen as a static concept and should be conceptualized as an ideology associated with class changes. In his work on tribalism in South Africa,

1. Ibid.

Mafeje asserts that tribalism was created as a result of colonialism. Even the term itself did not exist in pre-colonial South African society.

Unlike South Africa, in the Sudan tribes as described above existed before colonialism but were subjected, as Mafeje goes on to discuss, to the socio-economic changes or, in other words, to changes in the class formation.¹

Natural Resources of the Sudan

To borrow Geoffrey Kay's words: 'The essence of material production consists of the actions men take upon nature in their effort to humanize it, its aim is to transform natural objects of little or no use in their original form into a condition where they can satisfy human needs. The more men understand, or progress in understanding, the laws of nature the more they are capable of exercising control over it.'²

In the Sudan natural potentials for material production are rich but most of these resources are not utilized yet, some are far below full utilization and perhaps none are fully utilized.

Land Resources

Of the Sudan's 1 million square miles, 48.5% is desert or semi-desert, 41.3% woodlands and savannah and 10% swamps and mountain vegetation.³

The total land area of the Sudan is just over 250 million hectares. The arable land and land under permanent crops was, in 1962, about 3% of the total, and permanent meadows and pastures 24 million hectares or 9.6% of the total. The abundance of land has considerable consequences for the Sudanese productive activities. The Sudan is mainly an agricultural and

1. Archie Mafeje, 'The Ideology of Tribalism', Journal of Modern African Studies, 4, 2, 1971, 253-61.
2. Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis, MacMillan, London, 1975, p.13.
3. G. M. Hamid, The Utilization of Public Funds mainly originating from the Agricultural Sector and its impact on the Economic Development in the Sudan 1955/56-69/70, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Leeds, 1977, p.173.

pastoral community. Moreover, agricultural production and the related activities dominate the other forms of production in the country. The abundance of land has had important implications for the relations of production, especially concerning pastoral activities. For the rainfed cultivation, the determining elements in the production are land and rain. The latter is absolutely determined by the geographical and natural conditions. The potentially productive land which is still unused is estimated to be about 38 million hectares or 15.2% of the total.¹

Water Resources

The Niles are the main water source for riverain lands. Rainfall is the source of water in the areas away from rivers. The riverain lands receive rain varying from zero in the far north to over 1,000 mm annually in the south of the country. Prior to 1955, the allocation of Nile water was governed by the Nile Water Agreement of 1929 between Egypt and Sudan. This gave 4,000 million cubic meters (Milliards = MID) to Sudan and 48 MID to Egypt. With the construction of the Aswan Dam, the share of the Sudan in the Nile water rose to 18.5 MID. Of this, 3 MID has been available since the completion of the first stage of Roseires Dam, while the remainder will be available after the completion of the second stage of the Dam. The additional water resources will develop a total arable area of about 2.5 million hectares.² Water resources determine areas of agriculture, as well as pastoral activities. Moreover, fishery is completely related to the location of the Niles and the Red Sea. On a large scale, fishing is practised in the northern province in the Halfa Area and in the Port Sudan and Suakin areas, i.e. the Red Sea shores. Apart from those who depend on fishing on a self-sufficiency scale, fishing is also practised on a market level, for

1. Ibid. pp.181-182.

2. Ibid.

the local market as well as for export in a salted form.

Riverain and sea transport activities are also dictated by the communication between the productive communities in the areas at and around rivers and the sea. Merchant activities, however, penetrate further beyond these limits.

Forestry Resources

Forests cover an area of 91.5 million hectares or 36.5% of the total area of the Sudan. About a third of this area is composed of forests along the rivers and irrigated forests, mainly in the northern parts of the country. Two thirds of the forests are in the southern part of the country and these are dense and rich in hard woods. About one million and a half hectares of the forests are reserved, which is about 0.56% of the total area.¹

The Sudan forests produce wood for charcoal, household, building poles, Swan timber, railway sleepers, furniture and matches, and manufacturing industries. However, not all local needs are met by the present forestry resources. For example, the wood used for furniture, some of that used for the matches industry and other soft timber are imported.

Animal Resources

Sudan is rich in animal wealth. It occupies a leading place in Africa, and the world at large, in this respect. Its total animal population was estimated to be 32 millions according to Sudanese sources and 40 million according to F.A.O. in 1970/71. About 75% of the cattle are found in Darfur, Kordofan, Upper Nile and Bahr Algazal provinces. A third of this is said to be in Darfur province alone. About 80% of the sheep are found in Blue Nile, Kassala, Kordofan and Darfur provinces, the richest being the Blue

1. Ibid.

Nile province. Goats are present in all provinces with the highest concentration in Kassala, Blue Nile, Darfur and Kordofan.¹ The application of man's activities to animal resources in the Sudan is directly related to land, rain and rivers. This is because capitalization has only been introduced to it recently. The pastoral and nomadic activities will, however, be dealt with when I examine the pastoral production.

Mineral Resources

Very little is known about mineral resources of the Sudan. Up to 1967, geological surveys had not covered more than 35% of the total area of the country. However, there are several mineral and non-mineral deposits in the Sudan such as gold, silver, iron, copper, manganese, petroleum, gas, chalk, mica, gypsum and several others. The total amount of exported minerals amounted to just over Ls 1 million in 1965 which dropped to Ls 450,000 in 1972. The value of extracted common salt was Ls 700,000 and of iron ore Ls 74,000, chrome Ls 276,000 and manganese Ls 29,000 in 1968/1969.²

Population and Labour Force

According to the 1955/56 census the population of the Sudan was 10.3 million. The preliminary estimates of the 1973 census stated that the population had increased to 14.1 million. The Sudanese population is estimated to increase at 2.8% per annum. Considered as a whole, the country is sparsely populated (5 inhabitants per square kilometre - average for Africa 8 persons per square kilometre). About one third of this population are Southerners and two thirds are Northerners.³

1. Hamid op.cit. p.148.

2. Ibid. p.184-85.

3. DRS, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, 1955/56 Population Census and the Preliminary Estimates from; 1973 Population Census, Khartoum, 1956 and 1973.

The total labour force is estimated to be 4.45 million (32% of the population). The largest proportion of the Sudanese labour force is engaged in agricultural pursuits and related activities. This was a feature of the Sudanese economy prior to British colonial rule and it continued to be so. The main change that has taken place recently is some decrease in the population engaged in agriculture and some increase in the number of those engaged in industrial production.

In 1955/56 only 0.5 percent of the active population was involved in industrial production. By 1976/77 the proportion of the labour force engaged in industrial production increased to 4.5%.¹ In 1967, 79.6% of the labour force were engaged in agriculture² and in 1976, 68.5% were engaged in agricultural and related activities.³

Within the agricultural sector, 21.3% of the population is nomadic and 78.7% are dependent on crop production. For 1970, in the crop branch of agricultural activity about three million persons were estimated to have been engaged in commercial agriculture, whereas 6.6 million persons derived their livelihood from growing crops in small-scale agriculture.⁴

The percentage of the labour force working in agriculture also shows considerable variations among provinces. Over two fifths of the total working population are engaged in farming in Kordofan and Darfur provinces respectively, while about one third of the total is occupied in farming in Blue Nile and Kassala province. However, the proportion of the labour force engaged in farming in Khartoum and the Northern Province amount to about 18 percent. Female work tends to predominate in Western Provinces of Sudan relative to the other four Northern Provinces.⁵

1. DRS, Ministry of National Planning, The Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, Khartoum, April 1977 Vol.1, p.26.
2. A. A. Bishai, op.cit., Table 1, p.3.
3. The Six Year Plan, op.cit., p.126.
4. Farah Hassan Adm and Mahasin Kheider, 'Development of Small Scale Agriculture' ILO Growth Employment and Equity, Ali Mohd Alhassan (ed.) Khartoum, 1977. p.88 and 91.
5. Ibid.

Those engaged in handicraft production were 2.7% in 1966/67, and 2.8% in 1968. Those who were engaged in services activities such as building and public work, transport and other private services are 8.9% in 1966/67 and 15.6% in 1976.

Those who were engaged in commerce and finance constituted 4.9% of the total labour force in 1976.¹ According to the Economic Survey published in 1973, the government employed 2.4% of the active labour force.

Land Tenure

Sudan being an agricultural country, land tenure is an important aspect of its political economy. Ownership of land passed through various phases of development and its evolution affected, and was affected by, the nature of production and the different ruling groups throughout the history of the country. This section is a brief review of the major changes in the system of land tenure since the first Arab immigration until the contemporary period.

Land reform had taken place in the Sudan nearly half a century before the independent Arab and African nations began to reform their system of land tenure. Many of the changes which these nations introduced in recent years² had long been foreshadowed by the measures taken by Anglo-Egyptian colonialism (1899-1955) in its first years.³

The coming of the Arabs to Sudan heralded the destruction of feudalism in Ancient Nubia and introduced the existing system of individual land ownership in the riverain areas and communal holdings in the rainlands. This transformation was a long drawn-out process which lasted from the middle of

1. The Six Year Plan op.cit.

2. For detailed information of the changing patterns of some Arab and African countries, see D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, London, 1962, Chapters i-iv; ed. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, OUP, London, 1957, chapter xi.

3. See Mohmed Hashim Anwad, 'The evolution of landownership in the Sudan', Middle East Journal, Vol.XXV, 1971, p.212.

the seventh century to the middle of the seventeenth century.¹

Turkish colonial rule made land grants to influential persons as a special favour in return for their support of the regime. Most of those who acquired these lands became overlords to tenants, who were burdened with heavy rentals and land dues. The share of the landowner varied from ushur (one tenth) of the crop in the rainlands to khums (one fifth) in the riverain lands.

The short period of Mahdist rule (1885-1898) was characterised by extensive state intervention in the system of land tenure. The ownership of vast territories was transferred from disloyal factions to loyal ones and a large area of cultivable land turned into waste after the occupants had been massacred or forced to migrate. But the changes introduced by the Mahdists in the system of land ownership affected the place of certain groups within this system rather than the basic structure of land ownership.²

When Sudan became a British colony in 1899, the new rulers were shocked by the level of the dues which tenants had to pay to their overlords. At the time the government authorized its land commissioners to recognize the rights of the Wathiqab-holder i.e. a system of land tenure which began to emerge in what is now the Blue Nile Province, even if temporarily until a cadastral survey was conducted and all the land claims settled. But the government was also determined not to allow the overlords to drive the tenant class to revolt by their excesses. However, a compromise was reached in 1902, when the new administration recognized the seigneurial rights of the overlords and at the time issued an order restricting their share in the crop to one fifth.³

1. See *ibid.*

2. *Ibid*, pp.218-219.

3. *Ibid*, pp.220-221.

At present, private land ownership is largely confined to the banks of the main Nile and some of its tributaries which lie north of latitude 10°, most of the Gezira plain (roughly 70 percent), and cultivated areas of the Nuba Hills.¹ The total area owned in this manner is about six million feddans, most of which are regularly cultivated. The total area of the Sudan is 596.6 feddans, all of which except for the six million feddans, owned privately - are owned by the State.

The cultivable part of the country is no more than 18 percent, and the rest is either pastures and meadows (9.6 percent), forests (36.5 percent) or waste land (35.9 percent). Communally held lands are State lands subject to more unsurfruct rights, vested in a tribal, family or village community. Communal land holdings are found in the qoz (sand) and clay plains running across the centre of the country and in the ironstone plateau of the Southern Sudan. They cover river deltas, rainlands, pastures and some waste land and forests, and they add up to about 40 percent of the area of the country. The percentage of cultivable land and pastures tends to be higher in the areas under communal possessions than in the rest of the State owned territories.²

Compared to other African countries which are still burdened with settler colonialism, the Sudan is fortunate in that Egypt was officially, though not practically, an equal partner in the government of colonial Sudan. This prevented the British from encouraging foreigners to settle in the country for fear of an influx of immigrants from Egypt. Thus the system of land tenure remained basically unchanged except for a few changes introduced in the early years of the colonial rule.

1. As stated by Mohamed Hashim Aswad, Ibid. p.218, 'There has been no cadastral survey in Sudan except in parts of the three riverain provinces of North Sudan i.e. Northern Province, Khartoum and Blue Nile Provinces. The figures alone are either taken or calculated from various government and non-government records. These records are incomplete and the information which they contain must be treated with utmost caution.'

2. See Ibid, p.218.

In the post-colonial period no major changes took place in the system of land tenure. In the contemporary period, however, land in the Sudan was made available to foreign investors who were allowed to own vast agricultural lands (millions of feddans) on comparatively very long leases.

Transport

Before we move to discuss production it is important to give a short account of transport in the Sudan because it is an integral part of the process of production.

Investment in transport and communication was, and is, primarily undertaken by the State. The Sudanese State since the colonial period, and until now, has been allocating considerable resources to transport and communication hence facilitating the process of capitalist accumulation be it by the State or privately.

Since the colonial period investment in transport has been given a considerable attention. The development of railways and communication systems, as well as road transport, followed the development of capital and the movement of products. Between 1899 and 1918 capital investment in railways by the colonial government played a predominant role, with 60.6% of total capital investment allocated to it. Only after the establishment of the Gezira Scheme did it take second place (Gezira's share was 56%, while the railways got 24.1% of State investment between 1919-1934). During that same period road building was allocated 0.6% of a total investment of LS 26.036 million.¹ The railways run a route of 5493 km and are still exclusively owned by the State.

1. Adil Amin Bishai, op.cit. p.15.

Roads

Given the size of the Sudan, road transport is still at an early stage of development. There are about 10,228 km of roads and tracks, of which less than 823 km are asphalt-paved and around 2,000 km all-weather gravel roads. The rest are dry weather tracks. The number of road motor vehicles is about 50,000, half of them cars and the remainder trucks and buses. Between 1970 and 1977 road transport activities increased substantially. In the absence of recent figures, consumption of diesel fuel, which is used by lorries and commercial trucks, can be used as an index of this increase. The volume of diesel consumption increased at a rate of 6.2% in this period. Moreover the number of lorries and heavy trucks increased in this period at an annual rate of 14%.¹

River Navigation

River services operate on two stretches of the Nile only: the 1,400 km long Kosti Malakal Juba Section between the Kosti on the White Nile and Juba in Equatoria; and the 290 km long Karima-Dongola Section in the Northern Province. A third section links Wadi Halfa and Aswan in Egypt.

Ports

Port Sudan is the country's only deep water port. Fewer ships have been calling since the closure of the Suez Canal, but average cargo loaded and unloaded per ship has increased. The re-opening of the Suez Canal improved the sailing. The Port handles more than three million tons of dry cargo per year. Migrant loading and unloading workers are the backbone of the loading and unloading activities of the Port.

1. The Six Year Plan, op.cit. p.123-124.

Civil Aviation

The domestic air transport system connects 19 towns, with Khartoum the central point of the system through which most connections are made. Ground facilities and runway conditions at most airports are minimal. Only Khartoum has night landing facilities and only Khartoum, Port Sudan, Atbara and Juba can handle jet aircraft. For flights outside the country, the Sudan Airways is running services but in limited areas, both in Africa, Asia, Middle East and Europe. The capital operating is State capital. Of the active labour force, about 6% are working in transport and communications. The majority of them work in railways. The bulk of transport and communications labour force work in Khartoum, in the Northern Province, mainly Atbara, and in the Red Sea Province, mainly Port Sudan.

Production

Beginning with the 1955/56 census and up to the time when the research was carried out (1976), all official statistics concerning production have been collected and analysed in terms of the traditional/modern dichotomy. For a researcher whose point of departure in analysing production is the ownership in the means of production and the relations of production, wage labour etc., this dichotomy does not provide adequate information. This is simply because the traditional and modern sectors, as defined by these statistical sources, are not the equivalent of the capitalist and the non-capitalist sectors or modes of production. The criteria used in defining the modern sectors do not include, for example, all units that use wage labour but are only concerned with the number of labourers hired. The result is thus an underestimate of what is produced under capitalist relations. This problem becomes clear if we take industrial production as an example.

The problem with statistical data dealing with industrial production

in the Sudan, is that they do not have a line of demarcation between handicraft, and industrial capitalist plants. The only criteria used for calculating industrial production are the modernity of machines used and the number of workers employed. These criteria do not consider the nature of the relations of production. A workshop that is owned by one capitalist and is employing less than ten labourers producing the same or different articles and using the same space or workshop, is not classified within the modern industrial sector. This is mainly because the 1955/56 census considered as an industry only those plants which employed ten workers or more. Moreover, the 1973 industrial survey only included those plants which employed 25 workers or more. As a result, capitalist plants that did not satisfy the conditions laid down by the census of the industrial survey were excluded from the so-called modern sector.

As a result of this inadequacy, Sudanese economists, including Marxist economists, have been led to believe that the non-capitalist sector or the traditional sector is the prevailing or dominant mode of production.¹ Their argument is based on the available statistics: that 40% of the G.D.P. is produced within the modern sector, while 60% is produced within the traditional sector. There is reason to believe that an alternative approach to the analysis of the mode of production which does not restrict itself to a narrow gaze into the available statistics would produce quite different conclusions. Such an approach would establish clearly, I think, that in contemporary Sudan, the capitalist mode of production is dominant.

1. See G. M. Hamid, *op.cit.*, p.173.

The Concept of the Mode of Production

For one to be able to decide upon the dominant mode of production in a society at any stage of its history it is necessary first to define the concept of the mode of production itself. Without going into the contemporary controversy surrounding the concept I think that E. Laclau adequately defined the mode of production by saying:

"We understand by 'mode of production' an integrated complex of social production forces and relations linked to a determinate type of ownership of the means of production. From among the ensemble of relations of production, we consider those linked to the ownership of the means of production to be the essential relations, since they determine the forms of canalization of the economic surplus and the effective degree of the division of labour, the basis in turn of the specific capacity of the productive forces for expansion. Their own level and rhythm of growth depends, in turn, on the destination of the economic surplus. We therefore designate the mode of production the logical and mutually coordinated articulation of (1) a determinate type of ownership of the means of production, (2) a determinate form of appropriation of the economic surplus, (3) a determinate degree of development of division of labour, (4) a determinate level of development of the productive forces."¹

Laclau emphasizes that this is not merely a descriptive enumeration of isolated 'factors' but a totality defined by its mutual interconnections. Within this totality property in the means of production constitutes the decisive element.² Modes of production, according to Laclau, are incor-

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1. E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, NLB, London, 1977, p.34.
 2. Ibid.

porated in what he has called the economic system, provided that this system is defined as a whole proceeding from the element of law of motion that establishes the unity of its different manifestations.¹

The concept of the mode of production describes a statement of a systematic tendency, the dialectical working out of relationships between relations and forces of production over time. The mode or modes of production must be analysed as the base of the social formation that includes juridical political and ideological relations as well. The elements of this system must always be conceptualized as relations not as institutions such as kinship or the State. Superstructures allude to the base and often specify its essential contradictions.²

Having stated what is meant by the mode of production in this study it is important to state that even if we accepted the proposition that the traditional sector in the Sudan contributes more to the G.D.P. than the modern sector that would not, by itself, imply the dominance of the first over the former. It is not statistics alone that determine the dominance of one mode of production over the other. It is the forces of production, the relations of production, the contradiction between town and country, wage labour, the level of the integration of the non-capitalist production in the capitalist market, the reproduction of the producing and the appropriating classes, the imposition of economic laws by the State and the relation of the Sudanese economy to the international market that determines the dominant mode of production at each historical stage.

Production

Production in the Sudan may be analysed in terms of two modes of production: the non-capitalist and the capitalist.

1. Ibid.

2. See Bridget O'Laughlin, 'Marxist Approaches in Anthropology', Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol.4, 1975, p.365.

The Non-Capitalist Mode of Production

This is characterized by individual or communal ownership in the means of production. In the Sudan this includes the small proportion (2.8%) of the population who are involved in handicraft production, those who are involved in subsistence ^{or} petty commodity production and who do not hire wage labourers. The main sections of the population who are involved in this type of production are the pastoralists and small-scale agricultural producers. We shall therefore examine the pastoral and small-scale agricultural production and see how far these sectors are integrated into the capitalist market in spite of retaining their non-capitalist form.

Pastoral nomadism as practised in the Sudan is of three types. The first is pastoral nomadism which is the regular movement of whole families with their animals in search of pasture and water. The second type is semi-nomadism where part of the family is left in the *dar* (homeland) while the remainder move about with animals in search of good pasture and water. Those who are left in the *dar* mainly engage in agriculture. The third type is transhumance. This is developed from pastoralism as practised by sedentary people whose major economic activity is agriculture. Their movement is generally undertaken from a permanent base.¹

Different sources have given different estimates of the percentage of pastoralists in the total population. The FAO, for example, gives an estimate of 19.6%.² Henin gives an estimate of 32%.³ The supervisors of the 1955/56 census estimated that 50% of the total population of the Sudan were nomads. However, it can safely be concluded that 25% or over of the Sudanese population are nomads.

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1. M. S. Bayoumi, 'Guidelines Towards Development of Nomadism in the Sudan', in ILO, 1977, op.cit., pp.96-97.
 2. FAO, Report on Livestock Identification Mission, 2 vols, Rome, 1971.
 3. R. Henin, 'A Re-estimation of the Nomadic Population of the Six Northern Provinces', Sudan Notes and Records, No.47.

In pastoral production, the household i.e. the basic unit within which productive activity is co-ordinated and consumption provided. The normal household coincides with the elementary family - husband, wife, unmarried children - who live in a tent.

Labour is divided on the basis of sex and age within the household unit. The general principle underlying the division of labour on sex basis is that women perform the tasks associated with the household, and men take care of animals. Spinning wool and weaving the tent-top and sides is, exclusively, a female task.

Animals are individually owned and the household makes its livelihood from the production of the animals, owned by its members.

The majority of livestock is produced in Darfur Province, followed by Kordofan. However, about half of the pastoral population live in Southern Sudan.

In 1976 livestock contributed about 9.91% of the total G.D.P. and about 25.34% of the agricultural domestic product. Livestock contributes more than LS 1.175 million in the form of taxes. The revenue from marketing charges amounted to LS 100,328 for the major types of livestock in the major markets. The livestock trade in meat and milk can roughly be estimated as running to more than LS 120 million annually. Livestock is the fourth important export item and its share in total export amounted to about 7.7%¹ in 1976.

From the above account it is clear that although livestock is produced within the non-capitalist mode of production it is integrated within the capitalist market mainly through merchant capital activities. The direct producers are linked with the domestic and export markets through a chain of brokers and traders. On the other hand, they are linked with the money

1. M. S. Bayoumi, op.cit., p.98-102.

economy not only for the purchase of their necessities but also for the payment of taxes, animal vaccines, etc.

Direct producers send animals to big markets either through brokers or big merchants. The available evidence suggests that the major channels used¹ are:

1. producers → big merchant centres → butchers → consumers.
2. producers → merchants in small markets → big merchants → butchers → consumers.
3. producers → agents → big merchants → butchers → consumers.
4. producers → agents → big merchants → export.

The integration of the pastoral and small-scale agricultural population in the commodity market coupled with inflation has resulted in an increase of livestock sales as well as an increase in cash-related activities, such as gum collection, by pastoralists.²

In small-scale agricultural production, like that of the Fur society, every individual has his farm plot. The predominant form of labour utilization in the Fur economy has been described as one where every person uses his or her own labour for the direct satisfaction of his or her own needs. Some anthropologists have expressed the view that members of the Fur community look upon wages in the neighbouring communities as shameful.³ An interesting phenomenon connected with the labour tradition in the Fur community is the case where a person can use labour in his own field or where one can exchange it for beer, on a collective basis. The millet beer circle is the most clearly marked feature of the Fur economy.⁴

1. M. S. Bayoumi, op.cit., p.109.

2. See Ibid. p.103.

3. Frederick Barth, Economic Spheres in Darfur, Bergen, 1967.

4. Ibid.

The larger the field the more the beer that is available for drinking and hence the more the people who are present for work. The millet crop is not treated as a cash crop. Therefore, it depends almost exclusively on communal labour. Generally, in the Fur economy, a person can mobilize labour at the cost of some 1.7 lbs of millet per man-day and apply it to a task that produces, on the average, some 5 lbs of millet or three times as much as the cost of a day's work.¹

The evaluation of what a man-day of labour is worth in terms of beer may be compared to what could be obtained in the cash sphere. In the mid-sixties, the Forestry Department have achieved little success in attracting wage labour for production in Jebel Marra area even though its basic wage often has been about twelve times as much the value of millet which a man demanded for participation in a millet work party.

In recent years, however, the increasing burden of taxation, coupled with the introduction of new ranges of crops and the pressing competition emanating from development in mechanized agriculture, have led to the disintegration of the small-scale Fur economy and the extension of commodity relations. As a result, the members of the Fur community have been compelled to undertake wage-work outside the millet beer sphere in order to satisfy the basic needs of life.²

The pastoral and small-scale agricultural producers are not only integrated into the capitalist market through commercial capital and production for exchange. This integration is also accelerated by (1) direct State coercion practised through the increasing taxes on animals and on crops at crop markets, (2) increasing integration of those producers in the commodity market, which is compounded by increasing prices, especially

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1. Farah Hassan Adam and Mahagin Khidir, 'Development of Small-Scale Agriculture' in ILO, 1977, op.cit., p.92-93.
 2. Farah H. Adam and M. Khidir, op.cit., p.39.

recently (prices increased within the last two years (1976-78) by over 100%). To meet their cash demands these producers have to sell more to the merchant capitalists. Moreover, as is pointed out by Farah H. Adam, the penetration of mechanized farming forced them to be involved wholly or partially in wage production. The expansion of the capitalist mode of production is undermining the relations of production within the non-capitalist mode leading to continuous change and paving the way to its gradual decline and the simultaneous rise of the capitalist mode. Hence, dialectically, it could be argued that the capitalist mode of production is dissolving the non-capitalist mode not only through integration within the capitalist market but also by the continuous changes brought about by both the accelerating rate of this integration and the direct competition created by the involvement of capital at the level of production in mechanized farming, modern dairy produce etc.

This gradual dissolution of the non-capitalist mode of production is thus a direct result of the penetration of the capitalist mode. The impact of the latter on the former can best be analysed within a historical perspective. In the case of the Sudan, capitalist penetration passed through three main phases: the colonial phase, the post-colonial phase and the contemporary phase.

The Colonial Phase

In the history of the country the British colonial expansion in 1899 marked the most important phase in the penetration of the capitalist mode of production. From Lenin's perspective, imperialism is a new form of the capitalist mode of production. This new form cannot be considered as a different mode of economic organization, in so far as capital accumulation remains the basic feature of the system. In the Sudan British imperialism,

through the colonial state, had subjected the country to both an economic and political transformation. Colonial rule established the colonial state apparatus, introduced education and administration, both modern and traditional, to serve the objectives of that state. Transport and communication were established to link areas where export commodities were produced with foreign markets. Imported commodities were introduced, inducing various levels of integration in the money economy.

The colonial state organized production on capitalist bases. It established in 1924 the largest capitalist enterprise in the country, the Gezira Scheme. The scheme was mainly organized to supply British industrial capital with cotton. Since then the State emerged as a large capitalist entrepreneur, investing in production and infrastructure and hiring wage labour. During the period, handicraft production was halted by foreign manufactured imports, industry was arrested to keep the market open for British and foreign industrial goods. Agricultural production was stimulated and was mainly export-oriented. The subsistence production was slowly integrated in the money economy and small-scale agricultural and pastoral production were linked with the export market through the growing traders and small brokers, a faction of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois class.

The Post-Colonial Phase

After political independence in 1956 the nature of the State did not change radically. Political power went to the national bourgeoisie which had accumulated wealth and political influence during the colonial period. The economic system, however, did not change; the bourgeois governments pursued the established pattern of capitalist development. The major difference was that while formerly capital penetration was mainly controlled by British colonialism, the economy in this phase was subjected to various

forms of neo-colonial penetration.

Industrialization was locally introduced but it was mainly processing of export crops mainly oil seeds or packing of imported material. State investment increased to include industrial establishments, mainly sugar production. Both the State investment and private investment were dependent on foreign capital. The increase in capitalist investment by the State, foreign capital and the local capitalist class further stimulated the penetration of capitalist production. The expansion of cotton production to include Managil and the Nuba mountain area subjected an increasing number of the population to various forms of capitalist exploitation. The increase in investment in mechanized farms using wage labour marginalized a number of the pastoralists and the small agricultural producers who were supplying these schemes with wage labour. Industrial establishments which were located in big cities, mainly Khartoum, coupled with the previous agricultural capitalist penetration, stimulated migration from rural to urban areas. This was also accelerated by the location of government services in the big cities.

The third phase is the contemporary one which may be dated from the 1970s, and especially 1972 when the open-door policy was declared and effectively implemented. The nature of the Sudanese State as a capitalist State was clearly revealed during this phase. The State was not only acting as an entrepreneur by getting involved in capitalist investment but also became the vehicle of capitalist transformation in the country. It invited foreign capital to invest directly in the Sudan with extremely generous incentives. It encouraged local capitalists to embark in a variety of investment fields. The result was that larger capitalist undertakings were started with foreign capital in partnership with the State as well as with local capitalists. Moreover, the State declared explicitly its intentions of integrating the

non-capitalist sector into the money economy,¹ by which is really meant the integration of the non-capitalist mode of production into the capitalist one. The increasing number of capitalized agricultural schemes created a state of seige for the entire life of the pastoralists and the small agricultural producers, who are gradually succumbing to the new demands of capital in its classic forms: that of transforming the former small producers into wage labourers. Although the number of peasants and small commodity producers in the country who are not wage labourers and who may be said to own their own means of production is considerable, this is mostly nominal. For all practical purposes they own little more than labour: they are barely able to eke out a precarious existence and are easily compelled to submit to exploitation. In the Sudan capitalist exploitation is thus not only practised by individual capitalists but by the State also, which not only creates a favourable climate for the development of capitalism but also acts as a direct organ of repression for the ruthless extraction of surplus out of its subjects.

Capitalist Production

This is the part of the economy where capitalist relations of production are introduced, mainly capital and wage labour. The means of production are owned by State, private or foreign capital. All three forms were present in the Sudan throughout the period under study.

State Capitalist Production

This form of production witnessed a substantial increase from the expansion of the British capitalism in the Sudan and particularly after the

1. Even in the first Ten Year Plan in 1961 this was put as one of the objectives of the plan. The present Six Year Plan of 1977 stressed the necessity of 'modernizing' the traditional pastoral and small-scale agriculture sector. The declared intention was the achievement of a high rate of growth in agricultural production.

establishment of the Gezira Scheme in the 1920s. Historically, the first forms of capitalist investment during the colonial period were the infrastructure projects which were established for the further development of the capitalist process such as the construction of railways in the early years of the colonial period and the extensive road building programme embarked upon in the contemporary period. Although investment in transport and communications has regained its former favoured position in the current Six Year Plan,¹ from the establishment of the Gezira Scheme in 1924 agricultural production was the dominant form of the State's capitalist investment. In the following section, I shall trace State capitalist activities in agriculture. The forms and relations of production in the Gezira Scheme will be analysed. I will then move to trace the State investment in industry.

Agricultural Production

In the colonial period agricultural projects undertaken by the State mainly produced for the export market. In the post-colonial period this pattern continued, the only exception being sugar-cane production, which was wholly for local consumption.

The relations of production in the agricultural schemes undertaken by the State comprised several systems of which the main ones are the tenancy system and the direct labour system. The Gezira Scheme is the main example of the former type of relations. This type prevails in other schemes such as Khashm Algirba Scheme and Rahad Scheme. Direct labour is used in mechanized farming and the sugar plantations. Since it is the largest scheme in the country, it is instructive to deal with the Gezira Scheme in some detail.

1. According to the Six Year Plan op.cit. allocations for transport and communications (LS 320 million) comes second only to agriculture (LS 425 million).

The Gezira Scheme

The Gezira Scheme marked an important phase in the socio-economic life of the Gezira population. It introduced the most intensive form of capitalism in the history of the country. Before the introduction of the Scheme some form of wage labour was used along the banks of the Nile but this was practised in an area that constituted only about 15% of the entire agricultural area in the Gezira. In the rest of the region, production was carried on within non-capitalist relations. Land was communal and the family was the basic unit of production.

The establishment of the Gezira Scheme in 1924 was a response to the needs of the British industrial capital.¹ Between its establishment in 1924 and its nationalization in 1950, it was owned by the colonial government and the Sudan Plantation Syndicate. The Scheme is still (1976) the largest in the country. The land is under the ownership of the government. Tenancies are allocated and distributed by the State and the produce, mainly cotton, is marketed by the government.

The Gezira Board is the responsible administrative body of the Scheme. The government gets 50% of the value of the produce while the producers - i.e. tenants and farmers - get 50%.

The Gezira tenants use wage labour. This varies according to the size of the tenancy and the agricultural process. Accordingly, the Gezira Scheme allowed for the development of various fractions of classes within the Scheme itself. These include capitalist farmers, small capitalists, poor tenants and agricultural labourers. It is necessary to describe each of these.

1. It is interesting to borrow Tony Barnett's historical account of the establishment of the Scheme. In his paper 'The Gezira Scheme' (in Ivar Oxaal *et al*, (eds.) Beyond the Sociology of Development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1975, p.188) Barnett writes: "The whole affair came to a head in 1913, when in a number of parliamentary debates, MPs from Lancashire constituencies - acting as mouthpiece of the British Cotton Growers Association suggested in very strong terms that the only way to solve the problems of Lancashire was by creating a safe and dependable supply of long staple cotton. It was necessary to derive the cotton from an area in which Britain would have a virtual monopoly of purchase."

The Gezira Capitalist Farmers

These are tenants who are allocated 20 feddans or more for cotton cultivation, 10 feddans for Dura and other areas for wheat, peanuts, fodder and vegetables (two or more feddans).

They are classified as capitalists because they depend entirely on wage labour. They themselves do not participate physically in the production. Each of them hires forty or more wage labourers. Besides, they own other capitalist sources of profit e.g. trade, transport and other forms of agricultural capital. Some of them own tractors or grain threshers, which they hire to others. Some also own vast shares in the so-called co-operative societies. The capitalist farmers number about 1,220 and they are about 1.7% of the tenants in both the Gezira and the Managil, i.e. less than 2% according to the 1966/67 estimates.

Small Capitalists

Each of these utilizes about 20 feddans for cotton. They constitute about 41% of the Gezira tenants and 18% of the tenants in Almanagil area. They hire agricultural labour for about 80% of their cultivation. They do a meagre part of the work themselves. They, however, have no other sources of income.

The Poor Tenants

These cultivate a plot of land of five or ten feddans (five in Almanagil and ten in the Gezira). They constitute about 69% of tenants in the Gezira Scheme. These tenants rarely hire wage labourers and then only when necessitated by production conditions.

The Agricultural Labourers

There are two types of agricultural labourers: migrants and settled labourers. The former are 100-200 thousand, while the latter are about 250 thousand. The majority of these migrant labourers come from western Sudan.

Besides the agricultural labourers, the Scheme also attracted other wage labourers. These work in the ginning factories, in the maintenance, repair and engineering workshops as well as in other services such as building, forestry, loading and unloading, etc.

According to the logic of colonial and post-colonial capital, tenancy relations are the most profitable. In fact direct wage labour was experimented with by the colonial state but was found less profitable.

As indicated by Tony Barnett, the relationship between the government and the producers (tenants and agricultural labourers) is not a partnership:

"The Sudan Plantation Syndicate supplied the managerial ability, and the people of the area supplied the labour power upon which the entire enterprise was based. What has happened was that the three factors of production of neo-classical economics - land, labour, capital - were not represented by the government, the tenants and the Sudanese Plantation Syndicate. The whole undertaking was represented as a commercial partnership. Indeed the proceeds of cotton sales were divided up in proportion between the three factors. The government was to receive 40%, the SPS 20%, and the tenants collectively 40%. However, although the enterprise was represented as a partnership, it was in reality a partnership between the government and the SPS. The tenants have no direct way in the running of the Scheme."¹

1. Tony Barnett, op.cit.

The Gezira Scheme represents the intention of both colonial and post-colonial capital to make use of tenancy relationships rather than the sheer capital and wage relations. This was not only because this form of production relations was more profitable but also because it minimized the possibility of a threatening proletarian class.

The penetration of capitalism and the form it took in the Gezira resulted in fundamental changes in the class structure of the Gezira area. It allowed for the emergence of the capitalist farmers; it intensified money-lending within the commercial class, most of which are among the capitalist farmers themselves and the rich peasants. The Gezira acted as a centre of attraction for wage labourers, especially from Western Sudan. The rich farmers and the capitalist farmers became part and parcel of the State administration; they collaborated with it and used it for furthering their own capital accumulation. Although the poor peasants are exploited, the wage labourers are clearly the most exploited within the entire relationships governing the process of production in the Scheme. Nevertheless, these labourers are not recognized by the Scheme authorities. Minimum wages were not fixed for them. Moreover, the migratory nature of the bulk of them made it difficult for these labourers to effectively organize.

Other State Agricultural Enterprises

The Gezira-Managil and Khashm Algirba Schemes are not the only schemes owned by the government in the irrigated agricultural area. There are three forms of organization governing this type of agricultural investment. There are the pump schemes which are managed by the government and cultivated by tenants. These are the pump schemes which were originally started by private agricultural capitalists. Where cotton prices declined and tenant unrest rose these schemes were not any longer profitable and the government took them over.

The private capitalists were given generous compensation. This took place in 1968 and was called the 'Agrarian Reform'. These schemes include the pump schemes of the White Nile and Blue Nile. The Blue Nile Schemes cover a strip from about 40 km north to 120 km south of Sennar. They comprise 62 schemes of a gross area of 282,000 feddans. In the White Nile there are 186 schemes covering an area stretching for 380 km south of Gebel Aulia, close to Khartoum, with a gross area of 419,000 feddans.¹

There are also the Northern Province Schemes. These are located in the two narrow strips of land along the Nile north of Khartoum. These were started by the government during the First World War and were expanded in 1926 and 1935. One of these schemes has been submerged by the creation of the lake behind the High Aswan Dam. There are now (1976) nine government pump schemes with a gross area of 36,000 feddans. Farmers of these schemes mainly cultivate crops for local consumption such as wheat, lubia, broad beans, citrus fruits and dates. The individual holdings are small (2-5 feddans) and agricultural techniques are backward. Management of these schemes is relatively expensive because of their small size and remoteness.

Available statistics in the government agricultural schemes give figures on the area under cultivation and water intake (see Table 1.1) but do not include the number of workers.

Table 1.1 Area Under Irrigation (000) Feddans and Water Intake (milliard)
By Major Schemes 1974/75

	AREA	WATER INTAKE
Gezira Managil Geneid	2,052	6,85
Pump Schemes	1,404	5,52
Kashm-El-Girba	450	1,62
Northern Province Schemes	70	0.25

Source: Sudan Gezira Board and CESM estimates, 1976.

1. Ministry of Irrigation, Preliminary Reports of Classification Grouping Extension and Modification of Pumping Schemes on the Blue and the White

Production in the Gezira-Managil area alone shows that a labour of 61.8 million man-hours is required every month according to 1972/73 statistics.¹ The state capital involved in this type of agriculture is not static, it is increasing, seeking new areas of investment as well as expanding and consolidating existing schemes. Estimates of the additional areas to be included in investment schemes under the control of state capital in agriculture are as follows²:

	AREA
Rahad	300,000
Four Sugar Plantations	182,000
Expansion of Pump Schemes	380,000
Setet Upper Atbara Schemes	600,000
TOTAL	1,462,000 Feddans

State Capital in Mechanized Agricultural Production

Mechanized farming production did not arise from the natural development of Sudanese agricultural capital. The first mechanized farms were started in the Gadarif area in 1945. They were part of a mechanized crop-production scheme operated by share-croppers, whose purpose was to produce food for army units stationed in East Africa. After 1953, the government decided to allot land to private capitalists if they cleared the land themselves.

Since 1960, mechanized farming has been extended to other areas in the clay belt, which spreads west from Gadarif along the southern part of the

continued ... Nile, Khartoum, 1972.

1. Sudan Gezira Board and CESM estimates, 1976.

2. Same as Table 1.1

savannah region. By 1968, the government had allotted 1.8 million feddans to agricultural capitalists and another estimated 1 million feddans were cultivated in unauthorized lands. In that year the government established the Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC¹).

The total area in the mechanized farms is considerably larger than the cropped area because there is an obligation to keep part of the lands fallow. However, the mechanized area is recently estimated to extend over 4 million feddans. About 320,000 of the cropped area are State farms, another 300,000 feddans are in mechanized farming projects, and the balance of 2.5 million feddans is in private farms authorized and unauthorized.²

MFC is responsible for 30 schemes, most of which have allotments of 1,000 to 1,500 feddans. In a successful year, it is estimated that one third of a 1,500 feddan farm will incur an income of about LS 7,200. Estimated cost (calculated according to capitalist criteria) is about LS 7,000 on fixed capital and LS 3,000 on variable capital.

Mechanized agricultural capital uses wage labour, mainly migrants attracted from villages surrounding Gadarif, and from central and west Sudan. Whereas the general wage level for unskilled labour in rural areas is about LS 0.3 per day, mechanized farming capital pays LS 0.4-0.5 or more per day, especially during the picking season. This implies that labour in this process is reasonably productive since capital necessarily maintains an adequate surplus from buying the required labour force. On the other hand, because of time pressure during both the crop growing and picking seasons, capitalists are ready to increase wages so as to attract as many labourers as possible.

A mechanized farm of 1,000 feddans must employ two tractor drivers for 100 days from July to September, one driver for 200 days from October to March, two servicemen for 100 days from July to September, and one watchman and one manager the whole year round. Excluding the manager, staff require-

1. Mechanized Farming Corporation, Handbook 1974 (in Arabic), Khartoum, n.d.

ments for a farm of 1,500 feddans, including fallow, amounts to about 1000 man-days or three full-time jobs.¹ Mechanized farming is dominated by private capital. Over 63% of the area of mechanized farming is owned by private capitalists. Foreign capital, especially the World Bank, was the major source of finance for this type of investment mainly for private sector but for the State farms as well. The expansion of mechanized farming has dwarfed crop production of the traditional sector which in 1975/76 accounted for less than 29% of agricultural production despite the fact that it was produced in over 54% of the area cropped (see Table 1.2).

State Capital and Industrial Production

The restructuring of the Sudanese economy to meet the needs of the international capitalist market was best revealed in the development of industrial capital in the Sudan. Industrial investment had never been the concern of the colonial state, whose major objective was to develop cotton and other export crop production. Moreover, industry was halted to keep the Sudanese market dependent on foreign manufactured goods. When industrialization was started in the post-colonial period it was also export-oriented. The main industries were either processing, oil pressing for local consumption and export, or packing industries which depended on imported finished and semi-finished products. Industry was mainly private, with heavy dependence on foreign capital. The role of the State was almost completely confined to creating an atmosphere for private capital to invest. It provided concessions and incentives for both private and foreign capital. Moreover, it directed its investment to infrastructure and some industrial undertakings which the private sector is not willing to involve in either

continued ...

2. Source IBRD/IDA, Appraisal report on second mechanized farming project No.708 IBRD/IDAV 1972. Perhaps unauthorized lands are more than IBRD estimates, Khartoum.

1. ILO, Growth, Employment and Equity, Khartoum, 1975, vol.2.

TABLE 1.2 *Shares of Sectors in Production of Principal Agricultural Products of Sudan*

	Three Years' Average 1966/67 - 1968/69		Three Years' Average 1973/74 - 1975/76	
	area %	production %	area %	production %
irrigated	22.4	53.8	18.5	50.3
non-irrigated	77.6	46.2	81.5	49.7
State	27.6	54.9	22.3	51.6
private	72.4	45.1	77.7	48.4
mechanized	47.2	69.2	45.6	71.2
traditional	52.8	30.8	54.4	28.8

Source: The Six Year Plan, 1968/1982, DRS, Ministry of National Planning, Khartoum 1967, vol.2, Table 9-1, p.33

because they do not generate quick profit or they involve vast amounts of capital.

The most recent source of data for the industrial sector is the *Industrial Survey* which was carried out by the industrial section of the Department of Statistics in 1970/71. This survey included the industrial establishments that employed twenty-five workers or more. There were 209 establishments in the whole of the Sudan. The share of the government accounted for 36.8% of the establishments, 51.1% of the employment, 50.2% of the total wages and 53.1% of the aggregate value of production. Government establishments, however, generally employed twenty-five workers and more, so that the other smaller establishments in the country are all owned by private capital.

The State investment in industry over the period 1960-70, was almost solely concentrated in sugar refining, canning of fruit and vegetables, and leather tanning. With the exception of the Khashm Algirba Sugar Factory and Khartoum Tannery, all of these were a liability on the public purse, as is shown in table 1.3. Seven out of nine of these establishments operated at below 35% capacity and incurred heavy losses. As stated by G. M. Hamid, these factories were built without any serious pre-investment appraisal or feasibility studies about the availability of raw materials or the suitability of location or size of the market.¹ G. M. Hamid has also pointed out that during 1955/56-1969/70 the total State capital investment in industry amounted to LS 28 million, whilst the expenditure of central government amounted to 92.6 million Sudanese pounds, i.e. over three times as much as what was spent on industrial production. Expenditure in Administration, Social Services, Defence, Transport and Communications was LS 13, 8, 6 million and 1.5 times the investment in industry.

1. G. M. Hamid, op.cit., p.245.

Table 1.3 The Performance of the Public Sector (State Capital) Factories in the Sudan (LS 1000)

<u>Factory</u>	<u>First Year of Operation</u>	<u>Capital Investment</u>	<u>% of Capacity Utilized</u>	<u>Period During Which Capacity is Measured</u>	<u>Profit and Losses</u>	<u>Period of Calculation</u>
Karima Date Factory	1958	80	27.0	1965/66-69/70	-60	
Khartoum Tannery	1962	903	50.0	1966/67-68/69	+243	
Geneid Sugar	1962	10103	35.0	1962/63-68/69	-5500	
Aroma Carband	1962	720	5.5	1965/66-68/69	-600	
Khashm Algirba	1966	7804	75.0	1965/66-69/70	+520	
Karima Fruit and Vegetable Canning	1966	1028	---	---	-100	
Kassala Onion	1966	728	25.0	1966/67-68/69	-427	
Waw Canning	1967	900	20.0	1966/67-67/68	Loss	
Babanousa Milk	1968	900	1.0	1968/69-69/70	Loss	

Source: G. M. Hamid, The Utilization of Public Funds mainly originating from Agricultural Sector and its implications on the Economic Development of the Sudan 1955/56-69/70, Ph.D. Thesis, Leeds, 1977, Table 7.2, p.245.

Since introduced on a large scale in the post-colonial period, industry has been an important field for local capitalists and for foreign capital. Foreign capital investment in the Sudan constituted more than 50% of the total industrial investment in 1970/71. In some industries it constitutes over 73% of the capital invested. In fact even the industries that are owned by the government are mainly financed by foreign capital. In the canning, leather tanning and sugar industries foreign capital paid about 50% of the total capital of these industries.¹ In the following section a brief account of the extent of penetration of foreign capital in the Sudan will be given.

Neo-Colonialism and the Penetration of Capitalism

A general characteristic of the post-colonial countries is dependency on foreign capital. That usually takes place through direct and indirect penetration. Foreign capital penetration generally takes the following forms:

- (1) grants and technical assistance,
- (2) loans for the private and the State's capital activities,
- (3) direct investment,
- (4) finance and suppliers credits,
- (5) food supplies, and
- (6) military support.

In the Sudan foreign capital exists in all these forms, but the first four forms are found to prevail.

During the colonial period the entire economy was subjected to the needs of the British colonial capital. By controlling the state of the Sudan the

1. Department of Statistics, National Council for Planning, The Industrial Survey 1970/71, National Council for Planning, Khartoum, 1973, p.337 (in Arabic).

British dictated the forms in which Sudan was to be opened for other foreign capitalist penetration. However, if taken nationally, Sudan in this period was mainly subject to the penetration of British capital.

The process which led from Independence to fully-fledged neo-colonialism started with the acceptance of the U.S. aid in 1958. The years 1961-1964 were an important period for foreign capital penetration. During this period, Shell International established the refinery in Port Sudan with a basic capital of about six million Sudanese pounds. In the same period The Sudanese American Textile Factory, the largest industrial complex in the Sudan, was established. American capital also established a shoe and a match factory. These establishments, including Shell, invested about LS 14 million.¹

American capital also penetrated in the Sudan in the form of loans. In 1958 Sudan accepted four loans from the U.S. American loans are always conditioned. They are either given to certain investment schemes or on barter agreements. An example of the former was a loan of LS 3.1 million specified for the Khartoum North Sewerage, roads and airport equipment. The Tobacco and Dura Agreement exemplifies the latter form. According to this agreement, Sudan bought 200,000 tons of dura and 200,000 tons of tobacco from the U.S. for LS 5.2 million. At the time dura and tobacco were surplus commodities in the U.S. The money the Americans got was allocated as follows.²

75% Loan for the Sudan government.

20% To cover the expenses of the American Embassy in the Sudan.

5% Loans for the private sector.

The fourth loan was in a form of similar agreement whereby the Sudan was to buy American wheat and the Americans were to allocate the money in a form of loans to be invested in the Sudan American Textile Factory, Khartoum-

1. Marxism and Problems of Sudanese Revolution, 2nd Edition, Socialist Thought Publishing House, p.128. See also CPS, 'Studies Series in the Sudanese Economy', No.2, Khartoum, 1974.

2. Ibid.

Medani Road and the Agricultural Technical Institute. The loan amounted to LS 3.6 million.

In 1959 the government accepted a Yugoslav Loan of £7.8 at a rate of interest of 3% to be paid within eight years. From West Germany a loan of £2.1 million at a rate of interest of 5% was also accepted in the same year.

In 1960 loans from West Germany (£3.2 million), Holland (£2 million), the World Bank (£5.4 million) and Britain and West Germany (£3.4 million) were also accepted. These totalled £14 million. In 1961 the total amount of foreign loans increased to £28.2 of which IDA contributed £4.5 million and the World Bank £6.8 million. In 1962 foreign loans amounted to £9.5 million and in 1965 they increased to £24.7 million of which the government borrowed £10.8 million from the World Bank.¹

The period 1971-1973 marked a substantial increase of foreign loans. The Arab countries and China became an important source during this period. In 1971, for example, total loans were £40.08 million, of this £14 million was from China and £8.9 million was from Abu Dhabi and Kuwait. In 1972 foreign loans were £37.2 million. In 1973 loans increased to £73.2 million. Between 1971 and 1973, the inflow of foreign loans into the Sudan was as summarized in Table 1.4.

Foreign loans not only allowed the lending countries to dictate terms and thereby control the economy of the country but also exhausted the country's own revenues. Sudan's payments for foreign debts and debt service are increasing continuously. Sudan's foreign debt increased from LS 111 million in 1970 to LS 372 million in 1975. The servicing of debts increased in the same period from LS 24.5 million to LS 99.1 million - an annual rate of increase of 32.2%. In relation to export earnings debt service increased from 14% in 1970 to 28% in 1975.²

2. The Six Year Plan, op.cit., vol.1, p.36.

1. See Ibid.

TABLE 1.4 *Inflow of Foreign Loans 1971-1973 and Outstanding Indebtedness in 1973*

Source of Loan	Amount of loan (Sudanese Pounds)	Amount still to be repaid in 1973 (Sudanese Pounds)
World Bank	66,974,580	27,783,246
West Europe	44,872,470	11,245,646
East Europe	88,836,300	67,907,931
Arab Countries	26,048,416	10,734,507
African D.B.	1,249,200	1,185,364
Other Finances from West Europe	8,140,170	3,962,344
TOTAL	151,121,136	122,819,008

Source: Tables IX9, IX10, IX11, IX12, Department of Statistics, Statistical Survey 1973, Khartoum.

With regard to the first form, i.e. direct foreign investment, the Development and Promotion of Investment Act of 1972, the Organization and Encouragement of Investment in Economic Services Act of 1973 and the Agricultural Promotion Act of 1976 stated clearly that economic policy in the Sudan did not discriminate against foreign investors and institutions. In agriculture alone, and among the seven agricultural scheme licences offered to foreign capitalists, one capitalist was given a licence to invest in an area equal to that of the entire area of the Gezira Scheme.

According to the Six Year Plan 1977/78 - 1982/83, LS 1570 million are specified for State investment 53% of which will be financed by foreign capital. The Plan stated explicitly that foreign finance was going to be the backbone of capitalist investment in the country. The Plan expected an

inflow of LS 1,780 million of foreign capital. Of this LS 400 million would be spent in paying back debts on foreign loans. The rest would be divided between private capital investment (LS 550) and State investment (LS 1,380). Both were said to invest in partnership with foreign and especially the Arab capital.¹

This process of capital accumulation in the Sudan particularly since the colonial period resulted in various disparities. These disparities developed from within, and in antithesis to, the historical development of production. Regions where capitalist production flourished became centres of attraction of labour and more developed than others. The State, which was continuously playing a central role in creating the necessary conditions for capital accumulation, reinforced these disparities by allocating resources and centralizing infrastructure in the areas of production and centres of exchanges and finance. Sudanese society thus witnessed regional disparities between provinces which is especially acute in the case of the North and the South. Moreover, there are wide disparities between rural and urban areas in the country at large.

These disparities were apparent in incomes, unemployment and access to resources, and were the stimuli for migration.

The Disparity between the North and the South

As was previously mentioned, the British interest in the Sudan was as a supplier of raw materials (mainly cotton) and as a market for its manufactured goods. In the course of this process during the five decades of British colonial rule, areas of production like the Blue Nile and the Gadarif were subjected to direct forms of capitalist transformation. Others like Kordofan and Darfur were increasingly linked to the export market through merchant capital. The underdevelopment of Southern Sudan was a result of the fact that the British were not interested in the type of the potential

1. Ibid, p.92-94.

production of this area. This may have been partly because other equatorial areas within the British empire were cheaper to exploit than Southern Sudan. Another problem was that of transport. It was expensive for the British to link the entire vast country like the Sudan with transport.

Utilizing the cultural differences between the Northern and Southern tribes, the British adopted a separatist policy towards the southern region. They discouraged Northern-Southern interaction. They encouraged missionary education and introduced christianity but State education was only introduced in the South in 1955 during self-rule, and even then it was different from education in the North, the basic language used being English. This resulted in a prolonged conflict in the Southern region which started in the second year of self-rule (August 1954). Except for merchant capital activities which were mainly introduced by foreigners, immigrants and later Sudanese traders, the level of integration of the Southern region into the capitalist market was low. Its pace increased after Independence, when the government encouraged capitalized agriculture by offering generous loans to capitalists through the agricultural bank. Attempts to encourage the Southern people to integrate into the money economy, as exemplified by the establishment of the Zandy Scheme during the colonial period, were partially arrested by the mutiny. The main method used was by arousing the consumer desires through the provision of attractive consumer goods, such as bicycles, beads and clothing, which could only be obtained through money.

About one third of the pastoral population live in Southern Sudan. They sell relatively less animals when compared to their northern counterparts. With the introduction of consumer goods, however, and the increasing rate of education the take off from livestock even in South Sudan increased.¹

1. See ILO op.cit.

The uneven development between the North and the South resulted in migration from the South to the North. Migrant workers from Southern Sudan constitute an important proportion of the working force in the North especially in building, industry and domestic service.

Judged by the substantial expenditure of the government in the South, especially in the contemporary period when the Southern regional government received an average of LS 32 million annually from the country's revenue, it might appear as though the Southern population is dependent on the Northern one. It is important, however, to explain the nature of the money allocated to the South. This money is not used for production. It is mainly spent on the State apparatus in the form of salaries and buildings. The regional government of the South, which was established in 1972, consumes a substantial amount of this money in the form of salaries alone. In 1973 LS 4 million were spent on building houses for the regional government.

On dealing with Southern population, most Sudanese and foreign scholars have been mainly concerned with the ethnic and the racial composition of the Southern population. For an analysis from a political economy perspective, not disregarding the importance of the racial minority question, the most important issue is not the Southerners as racial beings but as productive beings. It is the process of capital accumulation that created the conditions for uneven development between the two regions. The separatist policy enforced during the colonial rule was only a manifestation of one of the poles of this process.

Rural-Urban Disparities

The process that resulted in the uneven development between the North and the South resulted also in the disparities between rural and urban areas in both the North and the South. These disparities manifest themselves in

unemployment, income distribution levels of consumption and the allocation of services and infrastructure.

Rural areas suffer from both overt and disguised unemployment. With the increase in the population and the progressive encroachment of the desert and mechanized farming, the rural population was pressured into migration from their communities to urban and semi-urban areas. According to the 1973 census, the scale of migration from one province to another within the Sudan trebled between 1956 and 1973. Khartoum Province represents the major attraction area for migrant population (30.6%) followed by the Blue Nile Province (29.7%) and Kassala (10.7%). The bush areas are Northern, Kordofan and Darfur Provinces as well as the Southern region.¹ In 1956 the urban population constituted 8.3% of the total population. In 1967 urban population increased to 20.4% of the total population. Thirty percent of the urban population live in Khartoum Province alone. Southern Sudan witnessed the highest rate of urban growth. Urban population in Southern Sudan increased by 38.1% between the 1956 census and 1967 estimates.²

Rural-urban disparities are also apparent in unemployment. According to recent statistics, unemployment is running at the rate of 2.9% ranging from 1.5% for rural areas to 7.5% in semi-urban areas and 9.6% in urban areas. It may seem from these figures, which are further broken down in Table 1.5, as though urban areas suffer more from unemployment. In fact, the rural unemployed are attracted either temporarily or permanently to the urban areas and they form the bulk of the urban unemployed. This is precisely because of the disparities and the biased distribution of employment and amenities in favour of urban areas.

The growth of towns is, itself, mainly an outcome of the concentration of services in the big towns, which generally followed the location of

1. Ibid, p.86-87.

2. Ibid, p.123-125.

TABLE 1.5 *Unemployment Rates by Sectors 1967/68*

	MALE		FEMALE		BOTH	
	Employed Earlier	Never Employed	Employed Earlier	Never Employed	Employed Earlier	Never Employed
RURAL	0.3	1.2	0.4	1.0	0.3	1.2
SEMI-URBAN	1.5	5.0	2.6	12.0	1.6	5.9
URBAN	2.1	4.9	1.3	28.7	2.0	7.5
ALL	0.6	2.0	0.6	3.7	0.6	2.3

Source: Dept. of Statistics, Household Sample Survey in the Sudan 1967/68, Khartoum, 1970.

Production since the colonial period. Surplus from rural areas was historically syphoned off in the form of migrant labour. Moreover, profits were also syphoned away from regions of production, like Kordofan and Darfur and the Blue Nile, and transferred to other areas like Khartoum and Port Sudan, to be invested for further profit-making where better infrastructure is located.

One of the consequences of this multiplicity of processes was income as well as expenditure disparities between rural and urban areas.

As is shown in Table 1.6, there is a sharp disparity in income distribution between urban, semi-urban and rural areas, with the rural areas receiving far less than the urban areas. 34.5% of the rural population are among those who receive the lowest incomes in the country (LS 100 annually) while only 3.8% of the urban population fall within this category. As for the semi-urban population, 15.5% fall within this category. 22.2% of the urban population were amongst the highest income group, while only 3.1% of the rural population fall within this category. Table 1.7 reflects the same disparity with regard to expenditure.

Table 1.6 *Distribution of Households According to Annual Income 1967/68*

% of Household in:

<u>Annual Income</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Semi-Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>All Areas</u>
Less than 100 pounds	3.8	15.5	34.2	30.7
Between 100 and 200	24.4	34.0	47.7	42.9
Between 200 and 300	25.1	22.3	11.1	13.4
Between 300 and 400	14.8	11.8	4.3	5.9
Between 400 and 500	9.7	5.8	1.4	2.7
More than 500	22.2	10.6	1.3	4.5
Average annual income	411	270	148	189

Source: same as Table 1.5.

Table 1.7 *Distribution of Households According to Annual Expenditure 1967/68*

% of Household in:

<u>Annual Expenditure</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Semi-Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>All Areas</u>
Less than 100 pounds	3.8	15.5	34.2	20.6
Between 100 and 200	24.4	34.0	52.0	45.9
Between 200 and 300	25.1	22.3	17.5	19.6
Between 300 and 400	14.8	11.8	3.9	7.0
Between 400 and 500	9.7	5.8	1.5	3.3
More than 500	22.7	10.6	0.5	3.6
Average annual income	411	270	158	196

Source: same as Table 1.5.

Agricultural production, which is the basic rural activity, contributes 40% of the G.D.P. These producers constitute about 78% of the entire population of the country yet, as the figures on consumption reveal, they consume far less than they produce. The ILO report of 1975 asserted the sharp disparities between rural and urban income levels. The report also highlighted the fact that there are also sharp differences in income level between the North and the South.¹

Government expenditure figures also reveal that the country's revenue is spent in favour of the urban population and the State apparatus itself. According to the 1973/74 statistical survey, only LS 1.1 million were allocated for the Ministry of Co-operation and rural water. This was so despite the fact that there was no water supply, let alone electricity, in Darfur Province and many areas of Kordofan. Moreover, in the other provinces, including Khartoum, certain areas and villages do not receive water and electricity services. LS 11.3 million were allocated for health services for the entire country and education received a budget of LS 20.4 million. These amounts, small as they are, were mainly spent on the administration of these services which are located at the disadvantage of rural and semi-rural areas. That same year LS 49.9 million were allocated to defence and security - almost 4½ times health allocations and 2½ times the education budget.

The obsession of the political system with its own security rather than with the welfare of the people is clearly revealed here. This is also reflected in the repressive laws and restrictions on the freedom of information, movement and organization with which the country has been plagued throughout most of the post-colonial period. It is evident that the Sudanese post-colonial state, in its eagerness to pave the way for capitalist development, had to face the rising consciousness of the masses with increasing repression. The penetration of the capitalist mode of production in the

1. ILO, 1975, op.cit., vol.1.

Sudan has always been characterized by a concerted effort on the part of the ruling classes to deprive the conscious masses of any means of arresting that penetration.

Conclusion

In analysing some aspects of the political economy of the Sudan, this chapter has arrived at a number of conclusions. The most important are as follows: (1) the relations and forces of production, forms of property and infrastructure in the Sudan were structured during colonial rule to serve British capitalist objectives. (2) The process of capitalist penetration in the Sudan, which started on a large scale during the colonial period, continued more intensively during the post-colonial period. The country was subjected to severe neo-colonial capitalist penetration. (3) Foreign capital was allowed to expand without restrictions during the colonial period and the State, revealing its increasing capitalist nature, continued to play a central role in encouraging both foreign and local capital to invest in the Sudan by creating the necessary atmosphere through incentives and investment in infrastructure. (4) This process led to the progressive disintegration of the non-capitalist mode of production and the hegemony of the capitalist mode. The former was not only integrated within the latter at the level of exchange but even the relations of production at the base were subjected in the contemporary period to direct forms of capitalist transformation. (5) The hegemony of the capitalist mode of production is apparent in the basic fact that it is the mode that controls and directs the commanding heights of the economy. (6) Further indices of the ascendance of the capitalist mode of production were also apparent in the disparities between rural and urban areas, as well as regional disparities. The same process of capital accumulation resulted in rapid urban growth, increasing

migration from rural areas as well as distinct disparities in income and expenditure among urban, semi-urban and rural populations. (7) The alliance between the capitalist forces and the State inevitably led to increasing repression during the post-colonial period, reaching its peak in the contemporary period. This took the form of total confiscation of democratic liberties, without which probable opposition to the extent of capital penetration in the country would have come to light and maybe to fruition.

CHAPTER TWO

Private Capital Accumulation In The Sudan: Trade and Agriculture

This chapter and the next outline the origin and development of private capital accumulation in the Sudan from the inception of British colonial rule in 1898 to the contemporary period (1975). In this chapter the changing patterns of investment which contributed to the formation of the Sudanese capitalist class in the two sectors of trade and agriculture are traced in turn. Chapter Three goes on to discuss the industrial, financial and services sectors.

During the colonial period, the development of private capitalism reflected the dependent nature of the Sudanese economy. Colonial dependency contributed directly to the creation of an indigenous agrarian capitalist class. It also enhanced the development of an allied commercial capitalist class.

After documenting these points, the chapter goes on to discuss private capital accumulation in the post-colonial period. The 'Sudanization' of foreign trade and the various facilities offered by the State to encourage private capital investment in new forms of agriculture and trade are outlined and their impact discussed. New forms of foreign capital penetration, and State policies on this issue, are also referred to.

Trade: The Colonial Period

Long distance trade existed in the Sudan long before the colonial period. According to O'Fahey, the Sultans of the Sudanese kingdoms were engaged in export and import trade since the establishment of those kingdoms in the seventeenth century.¹ The inception of British colonial rule in 1898 marked, nevertheless, a decisive turning point for local merchant capitalists. Their

1. R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of Sudan, London, Methuen, 1974, p.159.

role was, henceforth, subordinate to that of the British companies operating at that time, i.e. Gellatly Hankey, Mitchell Cotts, Boxall, Sudan Mercantile, and others.

The growth of the local capitalist class was closely associated with the demands of the international markets, particularly the British one. As a result, the commodities, and hence areas, which contributed to private capital accumulation were determined by the needs of foreign markets rather than by those of the domestic market.

Historically, and in varying degrees, certain commodities played a particularly significant role in private capital accumulation. The most important commodities from this point of view were gold, ivory, ostrich eggs and feathers, livestock and skins, gum Arabic, cotton, and oil seeds. The importance of these items was due mainly to their potential as exports.

Particular regions acquired significance through the opportunities they offered for private capital accumulation. Thus certain regions flowered as a result of the emergence and development of the first indigenous and immigrant merchant capitalists. Examples of such regions are Suakin, Messalamia, El-Gabsha and the South in the early period. Port Sudan, Gadarif, and Southern Kordofan and Darfur and Khartoum Province acquired significance at a later period.

The value of Sudan's foreign trade was continuously on the increase throughout the period under study. An interesting fact is the dramatic increase in certain exports due to demand fluctuations on foreign markets.

Although some immigrants and a few Sudanese were involved in the import-export trade, foreigners and foreign companies had by far the lion's share of this trade throughout the colonial period. Of the eleven major importers of agricultural machinery, for example, eight were foreign, two were Sudanese immigrants and only one was Sudanese-born.¹

1. The Sudan Chamber of Commerce Journal, No.432, April 1968.

Moreover, these foreign companies usually controlled the whole, or a very large share, of exports of the major commodities. They also acted as representatives in the Sudan for a multiplicity of foreign companies which, in the case of the Sudan Mercantile Group, for instance, came to a total of seventy-five British companies. There are numerous other examples (see Appendix 1).

A factor that facilitated foreign trade throughout the period under study was the fact that finance was easily available. All the finance came from branches of foreign banks in the Sudan, as the first Sudanese bank started operating only in 1960. The majority of the short-term loans given by those banks went to foreign trade. Even after the nationalization of the banks in 1970, foreign trade still headed the list of recipients of bank loans.

The original commodities from the handling of which traders accumulated capital - gum, livestock and oil seeds - were produced within the non-capitalist mode of production. The penetration of colonial capital had the effect not only of adding cotton to this list but also of facilitating the production of oil seeds and dura under capitalist relations of production, dwarfing thereby the output of the non-capitalist sector.

Private capital accumulation can be traced by following the historical development and changing economic significance of each of the main commodities traded in.

Gum Trade

The importance of gum as a source of private capital accumulation stems from the fact that, even before British colonial rule, the Sudan was the world's major supplier of gum. On average, the Sudan supplied seventy-five percent of the world imports of gum. This trade was run exclusively by the

private sector, local and foreign. Table 2.1 illustrates the Sudan's contribution to the world gum market.

TABLE 2.1 *Sudan Exports of Gum (Metric Tons)*

YEAR*	AMOUNT	PERCENTAGE OF WORLD EXPORTS
1926-1929	20,890	79.2%
1938-1941	22,005	72.0
1949-1953	37,950	84.0
1962-1965	49,280	88.4
1966	55,860	88.5

Source: Adil Amin Bishai, Export Performance and Economic Development in the Sudan, 1900-1967, London, Ithaca Press, 1976, p.103, Table 2.

* Average of four years.

The organization of the gum trade was left to the merchants, who created a chain of small traders and brokers to link them with the producers. These merchants eventually delivered the product to the export companies, which were mainly British.

According to Bishai, a succession of good gum harvests and the comparatively high prices it commanded produced a feeling of security in the gum trade, a feeling that was conspicuously lacking in other trades at the time. The local prices in Omčurman market between 1904 and 1910, the first years of British colonial rule, give an idea of these prices.

Adil Amin Bishai, Export Performance and Economic Development in the Sudan, 1900-1967, London, Ithaca Press, 1976, pp.114-115.

TABLE 2.2 *Local Prices of Gum at Omdurman Market*

	Hashab P.T*per 100 kilos	Talh P.T*per 100 kilos
1904	122	80
1905	129	81
1906	144	99
1907	190	124
1908	255	127
1909	217	118
1910	234	128

* One Sudanese pound = 100 P.T.

Source: Same as Table 2.1, page 118.

Bishai's statement is confirmed by the Central Economic Board of the Sudan Government in its Annual Report for 1910.¹

The steady rise in gum exports in the years 1900-1912 was further enhanced by the extension of the railways to reach El-Obeid, the main centre of the gum trade. The colonial government's transport policy, which sought to meet the demands of foreign markets, facilitated the growth of trade capitalists in this area. When the railway reached El-Obeid town in 1912, gum exports jumped in a single year by almost forty percent, from 14,000 to 19,000 tons.

The completion of the El-Obeid railway marked the beginning of a decline in gum transportation from Kordofan through Khartoum and Omdurman into Egypt, whence it used to be re-exported. The reason, clearly, was that this new railway extension linked El-Obeid with the Khartoum-Port Sudan railway, which had been completed in 1906. Thus gum could be transported directly from El-Obeid market to Port Sudan, where it could be shipped to external markets.

1. Sudan Government, Central Economic Board, Annual Report, 1910. Khartoum, 1910, p.47.

The development of transport in this period enhanced possibilities for local trade. Commodities could now be moved more quickly to markets, so capital turn-over was much more rapid.

An important concomitant of the expansion of the gum trade was the increasing importance of El-Obeid market. This market, which was located in the centre of the trade routes, played a key role in accelerating the rate of capital accumulation of the Sudanese traders operating in the area.

When the author met the members of El-Obeid Chamber of Commerce in May 1976, it was found that the majority of the older members (those aged over sixty years) were involved in several kinds of capital investment. Significantly, they originally accumulated their capital in the gum trade. Moreover, two of the leading industrialists in El-Obeid, who were to be interviewed later, were also involved in the gum trade at an early stage of their trade activities.

Livestock and Meat Trade

The livestock trade, like the gum trade, exclusively a private sector activity, started early in this century. Some forms of it are known to have existed even before that. With few insignificant fluctuations, livestock export increased throughout the period under study. Sheep and cattle were exported to Egypt through Wadi Halfa. This trade was exclusively the field of Sudanese traders, of whom perhaps not more than one was prominent throughout the pre-Second World War period. The name of the man in question was Mohammed Ahmed Alberair, whose sons were found to be prominent in all sectors at the time this research was undertaken. After the Second World War, a handful of traders started to export livestock to Egypt as well.

According to the records of the Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources, about 1,661 cattle and 7,555 sheep were exported to Egypt in 1904.

Another 291 sheep were also exported to Saudi Arabia. In 1910 sheep exports to Egypt increased to 65,660 and sheep exports to Saudi Arabia to 1,727.¹

In 1913 a law regulating livestock exports and tax rates was promulgated by the colonial state in order to regularise its income from this trade. Until 1919 exporters used to travel with their animals to external markets. The price of their animals was paid to them in gold. In 1919 some importers of livestock came to the Sudan to supervise the activity themselves.²

Average annual exports between 1921 and 1926 were about 16,000 cattle and 25,000 sheep. In 1924 livestock inspection centres at Port Sudan, Khartoum and Wadi Halfa were improved and the export of livestock from El-Obeid by railway started.

As was remarked to the author by a member of El-Obeid Chamber of Commerce, the Second World War period marked the turning point in the history of most of the capitalist traders in Western Sudan and Omdorman. The largest amounts of livestock in the colonial history of the trade were exported during the Second World War years. In 1942, 50,890 cattle and 151,782 sheep were exported to feed the British and Allied armies.³

During this period, Alsharika Alrubaiya, which literally meant the Company of Four, was established by four prominent traders as an export company. The owners were Mohamed Ahmed Alberair, the first Sudanese livestock trader already mentioned, Aboul Ela, Kardaman and Abdel Hameed Al-Mahdi. These men were all among the leading capitalists throughout the colonial period.

1. Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources, First Agricultural Conference Report, Khartoum, April 1975, p.13.

2. Ibid, p.14

3. Ibid, p.19.

Oil Seeds Trade

Another major trade item was the trade in oil seeds, especially groundnuts and sesame seed. Historically, the different oil seeds did not have the same importance, so each will be discussed separately.

Exports of groundnuts from the Sudan during the colonial period were as shown in Table 2.3.

TABLE 2.3 *Exports of Groundnuts from Sudan, 1922-56*

YEARS	QTY 1000 TONS	YEARS	QTY 1000 TONS
1922	2.7	1938-1940	6.0
1923-1925	9.4	1941-1943	2.2
1926-1928	4.8	1944-1948	-
1929-1931	3.8	1949-1951	10.7
1932-1934	3.9	1952-1954	28.8
1935-1937	5.2	1955-1956	114.0

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, First Agricultural Conference Report, Khartoum, April 1975, p.147, Tables 5 and 6.

The trade in oil seeds operated along the same lines as the trade in the previously discussed commodities. It was exclusively run by the private sector but the State, noting its growing volume, had to regulate its revenue from these trade activities by levying taxes on sales. To evade those taxes some traders used to buy directly from the small producers. The producers brought their products to the auction market, which was identical to that of gum. Local authorities, under The Local Government Ordinance of 1951, were empowered to set up those markets at which specific products had to be sold under conditions laid down by the local council. Taxes had to be paid to the local council before the commodity was released for transport to

the various markets.

The chain that linked the small producer to the export markets through the local traders led to the emergence of a few prominent oil seed merchants in the production regions of Kordofan and Darfur:

Second in importance among oil seeds was the sesame trade. The Sudan's relative position in the world market as a producer of sesame seeds increased progressively until the Sudan became the top producer in the later years of the colonial period. The changing positions of the major exporters may be summarized as follows:

Pre-1912	India	- the biggest world exporter
1912-1938	China	- the biggest world exporter
1939-1952	Nigeria	- the biggest exporter, followed by India and the Sudan
1953-Present	Sudan	- the biggest exporter. ¹

The leading oil seed traders were usually involved both in groundnuts and in sesame.

The Cotton Trade and Private Capital Accumulation

Unlike what happened in the case of other export commodities, cotton cultivation involved from the start the introduction of capitalist relations of production, in the form of the Gezira Scheme (1924). From the foundation of the scheme until the mid-1930s, the production of and the trade in cotton were exclusively run by a foreign company, The Sudan Plantation Syndicate, whose share was nationalized by the colonial government in 1951.

In the mid-1930s, when indigenous and immigrant Sudanese were given agricultural scheme licences, the cotton that was produced was mainly exported by foreign companies, e.g. Contomichalos, Tchivoglou and Boxall. Soon after, these were joined by a few indigenous Sudanese and immigrants,

1. Bishai, op.cit., p.176, on the basis of world export statistics.

who came to be involved in cotton trade as well. The latter were in most cases the owners of the larger cotton schemes and included such names as Aboul Ela, Abdel Maniem Mohamed, Osman Salih and Dairat Al-Mahdi. They not only traded in the cotton produced in their own schemes, but also purchased the produce of the smaller schemes which did not possess their own cotton ginning facilities. This gave them the singular privilege of control not only at the level of exchange but also at the level of production.

Trade: The Post-Colonial Period

We are now in a position to follow commercial capitalist activities into the post-colonial period. Although internal trade, particularly wholesalers, appropriated a part of the commercial surplus profit, and must have accumulated capital thereby, their share of the total was less significant than that of foreign trade. Not one of the leading ninety-three commercial capitalists in all of the regions covered by this research was found to be exclusively involved in domestic trade. All were involved in either exports or imports, or both.

After Independence, Sudan's foreign trade continued to increase steadily, with significant jumps in certain years. In addition, private companies involved in foreign trade were adept not only at over-invoicing their imports and under-invoicing their exports, but also were able to inflate other costs¹ to evade taxation so as to enhance their capital accumulation opportunities.

Table 2.4 shows the development of the Sudan's foreign trade between 1956 and 1976.

1. This is usually done through double book-keeping, company cars, generous housing, travel and other allowances.

TABLE 2.4 *Value of Selected Exports - Sudan 1956-1976*

YEAR*	EXPORTS in £S million						IMPORTS TOTAL L.S. MILLION
	TOTAL	GUM	GROUND NUTS	SESAME	CATTLE SHEEP MEAT	DURA	
1956-59	54.4	2.4	3.9	2.5	1.6	0.9	57.4
1960-63	67.9	5.8	5.1	4.8	1.2	2.2	83.8
1964-67	69.5	5.8	7.7	5.9	1.5	1.5 [†]	80.8
1968-71	96.2	8.7	6.6	7.3	2.3	1.4	99.4
1972-75	137.8	9.6	18.8	12.1	4.9	2.8	219.3
1976	193.0	11.2	39.0	17.3	0.6	3.2	341.4

* Average of four years until 1975. Appendix 2 gives annual breakdown.

† Average of three years only.

Source: DRS., Ministry of Finance and Economics, Economic Survey, 1956-1976. Compiled from Export-Import tables.

Foreign Trade

It is evident from Table 2.4 that foreign trade has been steadily increasing throughout the period. The only major change in the relative positions of the main export items was the decline in the position of gum and its replacement by oil seeds. In the colonial period, gum used to rank second only to cotton but it now ranks fourth after oil seeds. There was also a very significant rise in the export of Dura, which was far less significant during the colonial period. This was soon reflected in the introduction of capitalist relations at the level of production in the form of large-scale mechanised farms. An interesting feature of the effects of

the rise in Dura prices, particularly in neighbouring countries, was the stagnation and even decline of the areas allocated to the cultivation of Dukhn (millet). The latter was mainly produced for local consumption. In spite of the fact that in some years Dura export was banned (so that figures for it did not appear in the official foreign trade statistics) it is generally accepted that Dura smuggling out of the Sudan has never ceased. It contributed to the wealth of those traders who participated in smuggling activities, some of whom are held to be prominent today. The relative areas, and the corresponding yields, under Dukhn and Dura are shown in table 2.5.

TABLE 2.5 *Area and Output under Dura and Dukhn*

	SORGHUM (DURA)		MILLET (DUKHN)	
	Area Feddans (000)	Yield (000) Tons	Area Feddans (000)	Yield (000) Tons
1954/55	1,934	613	1,594	361
1955/56	2,135	860	1,618	386
1956/57	2,492	1,067	1,269	321
1957/58	2,607	1,139	1,006	262
1958/59	3,252	1,372	1,003	297
1959/60	3,251	1,313	878	280
1960/61	3,067	1,051	932	226
1961/62	3,515	1,434	758	205

Source: G. M. Hamid, *The Utilization of Public Funds mainly originating from the Agricultural sector and its impact on the Economic Development of the Sudan 1955/56-59/70*, Ph.D Thesis, University of Leeds, 1977, p.311-312.

Regardless of the relative rank of the export items, the value of each increased in absolute terms. What matters for the purposes of this study

is the share of local private capitalists in foreign trade, as opposed to that of the State. The share of private companies would itself have been a useful indicator if it had been broken down by foreign-owned versus Sudanese firms. No such breakdown was given, however, in the foreign trade statistics of the Sudan.¹ Bearing this in mind, the share of private companies throughout this period varied between approximately seventy and eighty percent of imports, and between thirty-five and fifty-five percent of exports. Table 2.6 shows the development of the state and private imports between 1956 and 1970.

TABLE 2.6 *Government and Private Imports in the Sudan.*
(Three-year average CIF value in Millions of L.S.)

YEAR	TOTAL IMPORTS	GOVERNMENT		PRIVATE	
		AMOUNT (MILLION)	%	AMOUNT (MILLION)	%
1956-58	57.46	13.86	24	43.60	76
1959-61	67.90	14.50	21	52.06	79
1962-64	93.40	25.03	27	68.33	73
1965-67	74.63	16.83	23	57.80	77
1968-70	96.83	23.21	24	73.57	76

Source: Derived from Annual Reports, Bank of Sudan. *

The legal limits on mark-ups on imports varied between thirty and forty-five percent of the cost of each item. It must be noted here that the mark-ups were calculated on the basis of the final cost of the product and not on the CIF value. This added the customs, the internal transport costs and the

1. Some attempts to do this were available but they did not seem reliable. This was mainly because of the inconsistencies in the sources that could not be easily verified, as all of the necessary documents were not available to researchers.

* Appendix 3 gives the same information on an annual basis.

overhead costs as stipulated by the company. On this basis, the profit of private companies could be considered to run at the rate of twenty million pounds on imports alone. The number of companies involved in foreign trade in this period was comparatively small. On the basis of reasonable assumptions it may be estimated that their total profits could be in the region of tens of millions.

A significant feature of the post-Independence period was pressure on the State from the Sudanese businessmen directed towards the Sudanization of foreign trade. It was noted earlier that during the colonial period foreign companies and immigrants dominated foreign trade. Pressure to change this situation came to a head after the October 1964 mass revolt. The result was not a legal formulation discriminating between foreign and Sudanese companies, but a *de facto* situation in which the Ministry of Trade favoured the indigenous Sudanese in the giving of import licences. The favouritism practised at the time was clearly partisan. This was revealed during the trial of the Minister of Trade after the 1969 coup.

The Sudanese traders managed during the ten years after Independence to create direct relationships with companies outside the British orbit. They acquired agencies, representation and sales rights from countries like West Germany, Italy and the United States. Moreover, they were able to create trade links with the Socialist countries for the first time in the history of the Sudan. British products thus had to compete with products from other countries to a degree that was unknown before Independence.¹

Thus the so-called Sudanization of trade did not eradicate the dependent nature of the Sudan's commercial transactions. What actually took

1. Examples of this were the introduction of Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola from U.S.A. and Volkswagen and Mercedes cars and trucks from West Germany. These firms were represented in the Sudan by immigrant Sudanese capitalists. At the same time, Sudanese introduced Moskovitch cars as well as building materials and sanitary equipment, from the Soviet Union. Two of the capitalists involved came to be selected among the cases studied.

place was an increase in the number of capitalist centres which competed with the British for the control of the Sudanese market.

A favourable factor affecting the rising capitalist traders in the post-colonial period was the establishment of the first indigenous Sudanese bank (Sudan Commercial Bank) in 1960. This bank, however, was comparatively a minor bank, as it managed to attract about twelve percent of total deposits at the time. The foreign banks operating in the Sudan controlled almost ninety percent of deposits, with over fifty percent in Barclays Bank alone. As in the colonial period, bank finance for commercial activities constituted the majority of the loans advanced. Table 2.7 gives an idea of the relative size of trade advances compared to the total loans.

TABLE 2.7 *Bank Advances to Sudan - Foreign Trade*
Selected Years

YEAR	ALL ADVANCES		EXPORTS		IMPORTS		TRADE TOTAL	
	AMOUNT LS '000'	%	AMOUNT LS '000'	%	AMOUNT LS '000'	%	AMOUNT LS '000'	%
1958	26,549	100	13,265	50	2,656	10	15,921	60
1961	59,881	100	25,936	43	12,523	21	38,459	64
1968	70,817	100	35,964	51	7,182	10	43,146	61
1971	69,830	100	44,808	64	10,097	15	54,905	79

Source: Based on Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, 1967, Appendix 12, p.122, 1976 Appendix 12, p.106.

Export finance went to the same commodities which were important in the colonial period. The relative positions of some of the commodities

were subject to fluctuations according to their positions in the international market, which were affected by factors like the invention of synthetic adhesives in the case of gum and fibres in the case of cotton. Despite adverse influences of this sort on prices, the total value of gum exports varied between nine and fifteen million Sudanese pounds annually.

In the post-colonial, compared to the colonial, period, oil seed exports increased substantially. In spite of the growing needs of the local oil mills, the proportion of total oil seed production exported increased dramatically. Between 1958 and 1967, for example, the proportion of sesame seeds exported increased from twenty-three percent to 56.4 percent of total production. Table 2.8 illustrates this fact.

TABLE 2.8 *Sudanese Exports of Sesame as Percentage of Production*

YEAR	PRODUCTION METRIC TONS	EXPORT METRIC TONS	PERCENTAGE
1954-58	128.7	29.3	22.8
1960	179.4	76.4	42.6
1962	232.2	77.0	23.2
1964	173.9	101.4	58.3
1966	160.1	77.5	48.4
1967	133.9	75.7	56.4

Source: Same as Table 2.1, p.202, Table 16.

The increasing demand for oil seeds both locally and internationally resulted in the introduction of capitalist relations in new production areas e.g. mechanized farming in Gadarif area. This, however, did not replace production under non-capitalist relations. In fact, the proportion

of groundnut production sold at the traditional auction markets in Western Sudan (Kordofan and Darfur) more than doubled between 1960 and 1965. This is illustrated in Table 2.9

TABLE 2.9 *Production and Traditional Auction Sales of Groundnuts 1960-65*

SEASON	(1) PRODUCTION (OOO) TONS	(2) AUCTION SALES (OOO) TONS	(2) AS % OF (1)
1960/61	79.6	26.4	33%
1961/62	63.9	40.9	64
1962/63	83.5	48.6	58
1963/64	79.2	58.4	61
1964/65	81.4	56.4	69

Source: Same as Table 2.1, p.163.

Commercial Capitalism and Meat Export

After political Independence in 1956 livestock export began to be formally regulated through registration requirements for exporters, who also had to pay a tax of fifty piasters, or half a Sudanese pound, for every animal exported. Exporters still bought the livestock from the producers through middlemen and small traders. Although the tax could hardly be described as high, the State revenue from it continued to increase with the increase in exports. Nor was the tax rate - even after it was increased in 1970 to LS 0.75 - a deterrent to the exporters, whose volume of trade increased, with the producer getting the smallest share of the export price. More serious was the capitalists' utter neglect of the requirements for the preservation and development of the country's animal wealth. This reached such alarming proportions in the early 1970s that the government was obliged to enforce some restrictions on the export of cattle and sheep in 1971 and 1972.

The export of livestock in the post-colonial period witnessed an increase from 102,400 head of sheep and goats in 1955/56 to 237,705 head in 1969/70. Cattle exports fluctuated wildly during the post-colonial period. The average of the first fifteen years of political Independence was about 18,028 head annually. Actual exports, however, varied between 55,076 and 3,518. The figures can be misleading because whenever the numbers of exported cattle decreased those for sheep and goats increased to compensate for it. In the year 1964/65, when 3,518 cattle only were exported, 118,389 sheep and goats were exported. The latter represented an increase of about forty percent over the preceding year.

The year 1969/70 witnessed the beginning of a new age in the history of the livestock trade. Frozen meat exports were first introduced on a substantial scale during that year. Exports of beef and lamb reached unprecedented levels within a short period. The distribution of meat exports reveals some striking features (see Table 2.10). Starting in 1969 at slightly over one thousand tons, meat exports increased almost twenty-fold when exports jumped dramatically to 21,698 tons by 1973.

Traditionally, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Zaire and Central Africa were the main export outlets for Sudanese livestock. When frozen meat exports were introduced in the recent period, new outlets were found. These included Libya, Kuwait and other Gulf States, Lebanon and Syria. It is important to note here that smuggling to neighbouring countries was again in the case of livestock a source of capital accumulation for traders and even middlemen.

In 1975, there were forty-three livestock and meat-export companies. They were classified by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources as "old traders" and were said to export to Egypt. According to the list

TABLE 2.10 *Exports of Livestock and Frozen Meat from Sudan, 1969-74*

YEAR	CATTLE (head)	SHEEP AND GOATS (head)
1969/70	17,880	237,705
1970/71	22,348	157,334
1971/72	10,457	109,071
1972/73	22,988	207,160
1973/74	15,229	242,617

FROZEN MEAT EXPORTS 1969-1974

Year	Quantity (tons)
1969	1,100
1970	102
1971	153
1972	4,117
1973	21,698

Source: For livestock, same as table 2.3, p.20 for meat export.
 Bank of Sudan, Foreign Trade Statistical Digest Annual 1973 Vol.6,
 Khartoum n.d.

of that same Ministry, however, the most established capitalists in livestock export at the beginning of the century, were still leading export traders in 1975. Moreover, the son of the very first livestock exporter in the Sudan is now one of the leading meat exporters. Three of the leading exporters in the trade since the colonial period were found to be among the major meat exporters in 1975/76. Thus, on the whole, the owners of the newly-established frozen meat exporting companies appear to be the direct descendants of the earliest livestock capitalists. One significant exception

is a trader, who is an industrial capitalist as well, who entered the field as a major meat exporter only in 1970.

Corruption, The State and Private Capital Accumulation

Frozen meat is not the only novelty among the Sudan's export commodities in the contemporary period. Markets were also opened up for the export of fruit, vegetables, handicrafts, animal guts and a host of minor items. The first was the most significant. Relying on often repeated public statements to the effect that the Sudan was potentially the bread-basket of the world, traders put pressure on the State to yield more and more concessions to them. New Acts for the encouragement of private investment, both foreign and local, were promulgated in the years 1971 and 1972. These either replaced old legislation, as in the case of industrial investments, or provided a completely new framework.

The State viewed its role, primarily, as an agent for facilitating and expanding the exports of the Sudan. The rationale was that hard currency was the key to 'development'. From the very start of the post-colonial period up until the recent period, the State has played this role to the benefit of the private commercial capitalists. Commercial attaché's offices were opened abroad. Understandably, they started with London, Cairo and Washington but they were extended later to include the capitals of Western Europe, India, Japan and many other countries, including some of the Socialist countries. Bilateral trade agreements were concluded by the State to secure more markets for Sudanese products.

The government was often pressed by commercial capitalists to give the top priority to export commodities in the provision of rail and river transport. It is important to note here that freight charges on the State railways were about one quarter those of private road transport, and sometimes

even less. Taxes on exports were often insignificant compared to the price the commodities commanded in the international market.

Another major development in the contemporary period, was the promulgation of the Concession Companies Act. This was presented to the country as a move towards the public control of foreign trade. In reality, however, it did little harm to the private commercial capitalists. Forty-nine percent of these companies' shares were allocated to the public, but it was the capitalists engaged in the trade who were the majority share-holders. The fact that the concession companies law stipulated certain maximum shares for each individual holder was hardly an obstacle. Wives, children and other family members could each own up to that maximum. Moreover, the unification of product supply in the international market often enabled each company to secure better prices for its exports.

A third feature of the recent period is the introduction of what have been referred to as nil-value imports. Many commercial capitalists benefited enormously from the lack of State control over the pricing of such imports. The mechanism side-stepped the normal procedures which required the approval of the Ministry of Trade and the Central Bank before any commodity could be imported. These two government agencies were responsible not only for ensuring that the price of the imported commodity was within an acceptable range, but also for deciding whether the commodity itself should be imported at all, given the Sudan's limited foreign reserves. Nil-value imports were not subject to such restrictions. Exporters could dispose of the hard currency they earned in whatever way they saw fit. This resulted in the import of numerous luxury and non-essential goods, which nonetheless sold quickly, reflecting the considerable purchasing power that was accumulated in the hands of the few.

Another dimension of the relationship between the capitalists and the State was corruption. State corruption has been known throughout the post-

colonial period. The nature of that corruption has varied, mainly according to the political system. The whole range of favouritism, graft, bribery, etc., was practised to a lesser or greater degree. In the process of private capital accumulation such practices were utilized and encouraged to the utmost, particularly under military regimes. These practices were more easily detectable under parliamentary regimes because of the existence of the legal opposition and its press. During military rule, however, both of these controls were absent, corruption took place behind closed doors and information about it was only circulated verbally. The published documents of a parliamentary committee that investigated corruption and irregularities of bank finance in 1976-1977 clearly revealed the extent to which capitalists utilized their relationship with top bureaucrats and political figures. The corrupt fashion with which Lonrho, the notorious multinational company, entered the Sudan has come to light only recently.

Government purchases were another field for extensive capital accumulation by private commercial capitalists as well as by state bureaucrats. In spite of the fact that regulations for government purchases and private imports were never formally waived, in practice they were hardly ever observed in the recent period. Examples of such infringements were revealed in the discussions of the Second Peoples Assembly 1974-1978. These, however, were only the tip of an iceberg. Individuals accumulated hundreds of thousands, some of them even millions, of pounds through the 'tips' they got or the deals they made with top bureaucrats or Ministers.

A fourth factor that facilitated commercial capital accumulation was the shortages of essential goods that continuously marked the recent period. The natural result of these shortages was the creation of an open and thriving black market in the goods in question. Some of them were imported through the already mentioned nil-value system. The majority, however, were smuggled

in. The black market prices for items like building materials, petroleum products and textiles were between five and twenty times the official price. In order to obtain the necessary hard currency for this trade, smuggling of exports took place on a considerable scale during this period.

Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Agrarian Capitalism

The Sudan's vast agricultural potential always fascinated foreign powers and attracted them to the country. Land-hungry Egyptians, throughout ancient and modern history, often gazed southward with a view to possible expansion. Britain openly desired the control of this enormous land and fought to secure a cheap supply of raw materials for its manufacturing industry. True to its ambition, soon after the Sudan was conquered, the colonial government set about the task of creating the necessary conditions for a secure and reliable supply of raw materials.

The first and largest agricultural capitalist scheme in the world, the Gezira Scheme, was not sufficient to satisfy the colonial government's ambition. It soon started offering licences for capitalist agricultural production, mainly for cotton, to private individuals of its choice. These licences were given to immigrants at first (1928) but soon afterwards indigenous Sudanese were included as well. Those picked among the Sudanese were the religious sect leaders.

The immigrants were mostly from Egypt, the Levant and Greece. The first agricultural scheme registered in the Sudan was owned by Dr. N. Maalouf, who developed a scheme of 10,023 feddans in the Khogalab area north of Khartoum. Fruit and vegetables grown on this farm were sold on both local and export markets. In 1929 an Egyptian immigrant, Mr. Sulaiman Dawood Michele, was also given a licence to grow cotton north of Khartoum.¹

1. Sudan Government, Irrigation Department, White Nile Committee, various files.

The first indigenous Sudanese agricultural capitalist was Sayid Abdel Rahman, son of the famous Almahdi. In 1933 the colonial administration gave Sayid Abdel Rahman this licence by a deliberate political decision in favour of the then leader of the Ansar Sect (i.e. Almahdi's followers). This sect later developed into one of the most important political currents in the Sudan, the Umma Party. The administration's decision was an attempt to contain Sayid Abdel Rahman within the colonial regime through the favoured status he would acquire by engaging in business activities. This took into account the role he had played in the pacification of the people after the 1924 'revolution'.¹

Following Sayid Abdel Rahman, and based on similar criteria, the government issued licences to a few other Sudanese - Shareif Alkhaleifa Al-Hilo, Shareif Yousif Al-Hindi and Sayid Ali Al-Mirghani were given licences to operate agricultural schemes. All three of them were leaders of major religious sects at the time. These sects later formed the base of the major political parties, the Umma Party, the National Unionist Party and the Peoples Democratic Party.

About a decade later, some prominent traders and native administrators got agricultural licences for the same purpose. Examples of these were Mohamed Ahmed Al-Berair, who was a prominent livestock exporter, Mohamed Ahmed Sanhowri, a son of a native administrator, and Abul Ela and Abdel Moneim Mohamed, who were prominent Egyptian immigrant traders.²

All the agricultural schemes were pump-irrigated and were located in Central Sudan and Kassala Province. They were the only form of private large-scale capitalist agriculture until the introduction of mechanized farming during the Second World War.

1. Ibid. A letter from the Governor of the White Nile Province to the Secretary for Economic Development in Khartoum, dated 9th April 1933. The letter urged the materialization of the permission to operate the scheme by Sayid Abdel Rahman on a political basis. It may be relevant to add here that, while Sennar^{dam} was being constructed in the early 1920s, Sayid Abdel Rahman was given a subcontract on the site as a result of another political decision.
2. The files contained the names of the licencees. Further information,

Pump Schemes and Private Capital Accumulation

Most of the land on which private pump schemes were established was publicly owned, with only fifteen percent of the land under individual ownership.¹

The area under private cotton cultivation increased steadily with a dramatic rise after the Second World War continuing throughout the fifties and sixties. Between 1950 and 1960, the area commanded by private pump irrigation increased almost ten-fold, from 20,000 feddans to 197,000 feddans. By 1967, the area had reached 217,000 feddans, consisting of a total of 659 schemes distributed all over the Blue Nile Province and the northern parts of the Upper Nile Province.

The allotment of pump schemes was carried out by local boards whose main directive was to consider the applicant's financial ability and place of residence. Financial ability, however, was the most crucial yardstick, because it supposedly guaranteed better managerial capabilities.

The relationship between the licencees and the government, on one hand, and the tenants on the other, was regulated by the Nile Pump Control Ordinance. This Ordinance entitled licencees to pump water for ten to fifteen years, depending on the size of the scheme. For the larger schemes, the capitalists had to apply the tenancy system for cotton production. This meant that the responsibility of the licensee was to provide irrigation water, advance loans to tenants and carry out the initial preparation and levelling of the land. They also had to pay the land and business profit taxes, as well as all of management expenses. Sixty percent of the joint cotton expenses were paid by the owner too.

continued ...

however, was revealed by the interview research reported in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

1. Farah H. Adam, Economic Appraisal of Agrarian Reform in the Private Cotton Estates, Sudan, Department of Rural Economy, University of Khartoum, Research Bulletin No.2, September 1971, pp.1-5.

The tenants were obliged to cultivate the cotton and to contribute forty percent of the costs of items debited to the joint account. They did the sowing, weeding, thinning and picking of the cotton, which they handed over to the licensee. In the sixties the tenants' share was raised to fifty percent as a result of loud protests by the Tenants Unions. The private scheme tenants were deprived of any of the services provided in the Gezira by the social welfare funds. Moreover, tenants in private schemes suffered from the high cost of irrigation, management, ploughing and marketing compared to the Gezira scheme.

In spite of the enormous windfall profits made in the early fifties because of the Korean War, the lot of the tenants in private cotton schemes was so abysmal that the Tenants Union of the White Nile schemes demanded a scrutiny of the accounts. The Ordinance gave the tenants the right to revise all the accounts and take any complaints to the District Commissioner of the area, since the government was the arbitrator between the tenants and the pump schemes licensees. Up until then the licensees had exploited the fact that almost all the tenants were illiterate and were therefore unable to check their own accounts. This contradiction produced a head-on collision in March 1954, when the tenants of one of the oldest and largest pump schemes refused to hand over their cotton without a revision of the scheme's account by the local authority. They organized a peaceful march to the office of the District Commissioner in Kosti, the District Commissioner being supposedly official arbitrator. The District Commissioner's reaction was a classic illustration of the unholy alliance between the colonial state and the agrarian capitalists. The 204 marchers were immediately locked up in a state prison in conditions which resulted in the death of all 204 by suffocation.¹ The cotton was duly handed over to the scheme licensee.

1. The investigating committee was appalled at the condition of the room where the tenants were imprisoned. There were no water and no containers to be used for urine or excrement. Days after the bodies were removed the stink was still unbearable.

Incomes from these schemes were substantial. Even during the decline in cotton prices in 1963-1967, total income averaged LS 9.6 million per annum. Of this the government received, in the form of various taxes, LS 2.1 million, and the private agrarian capitalists got most of the remaining LS 7.5 million.¹

The majority of these profits were re-invested in ginning factories, oil mills, trade or agriculture. Private ginning factories were owned by the above mentioned Al-Mahdi family and Abul Ela, who were able to rent their excess capacity to the smaller cotton schemes in the area. Thus the rich grew richer.

Investment funds for extending the areas of the schemes and for establishing processing plants for the cotton, particularly ginning, factories were provided by both foreign financial institutions and the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan. The lack of supervision over these funds helped to further capital accumulation for the few large scheme owners, who were favoured by the banks. The Agricultural Bank, for example, gave fifty-five percent of its loans, on average, to large pump scheme owners. The latter, whose conflicts with the tenants were reaching an acute level, realized that their licences were due to expire and did not use the funds to improve cotton production. Instead, they left the soil exhausted and the pumps delapidated, whilst the bank loans went to finance other business activities.

It was during the period of the declining cotton prices which followed the all-time high of the Korean War that the State had to establish an Agricultural Bank. The bank was designed to step into the gap left as a result of the comparative reluctance of the foreign banks to continue financing the schemes to the same extent as in the past. Cotton yields in the private schemes declined progressively, causing further discontent amongst the tenants. This made the renewal of the licences a difficult, if not

1. Farah Hassan Adam, op.cit., p.6.

impossible, task. So, after the 1964 October 'revolution', the popular demand for the nationalization of pump schemes became very strong. In 1968 the government promulgated the so-called Agrarian Reform Act. Despite appearances, the Act was primarily designed to safeguard the interests of the licencees. It came at a time when the schemes were no longer lucrative to their owners, when the licences were about to expire and would have needed considerable capital investment to restore their profitability. With the aforementioned decline in cotton yields and prices, as well as the continuous tenants strikes, such investment was hardly feasible. Despite the fact that the schemes were already indebted to the tenants, the agricultural bank and to the government, scheme owners were adequately compensated. The major beneficiaries were the most heavily indebted large scheme owners.

They were enabled to side-step their indebtedness and transfer their capital to more lucrative capitalist activities. (This indebtedness was still standing even at the time when this research was undertaken in 1976.) New investments by ex-scheme owners went mainly to industry and mechanized farming.

The writings of Hadari, Farah H. Adam, Zuhair Al-Mubarak¹ and the C.P.S.² give ample evidence that an enormous capital accumulation took place through this type of agriculture investment. This was accelerated by a considerable use of the state apparatus, which was dominated by this section of the agrarian capitalist class.

The Savanna Lands and the Tractor

As was the case with pump schemes, the very origin of mechanized farming was dictated by the needs of the colonial capitalist state. Mechanized

1. For full references, see S. A. Kabalo, Mechanization of Agriculture in Southern Sudan. B.Sc. Hons. Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Khartoum, 1975, p.4-5.

2. Communist Party of the Sudan, occasional papers, 'On the Agrarian Reform', Socialist Thought Publishers, Khartoum, N.D p.5-18.

crop production schemes were started for the purpose of producing food for British army units stationed in East Africa in the latter years of the Second World War. These first schemes were operated by share-croppers in the Gadarif area.

In 1948/49, farmers were allotted twenty-eight feddans each for cultivation in the Gadarif area. A year later some notables and merchants were given up to 240 feddans each. Machinery was hired to these capitalists by the State.¹

The total area cropped in 1944 in the whole region was 12,000 feddans, with an average yield of 0.15 ton per feddan. In 1946 the area increased to 21,000 feddans - an increase of seventy-five percent in one year. The average yield more than doubled reaching 0.31 tons per feddan. The high Sorghum prices of 1949/50 induced further expansion and in 1950/51 two schemes of 10,000 feddans each were started in the Um-Layoon and Um-Sagoora areas. The tractors had started rolling and the virgin soil was upturned. Gone were the days of relaxed pastoralism. The day of the tractor and wage labourer was ushered in.

The increase in the area under rainfed mechanized farming continued steadily from then on, while the area under flood and pump irrigation witnessed a steady decline. After the so-called Agrarian Reform in 1968, the area under mechanized farming increased to seventy-seven percent of the total area cultivated in the country. By 1972/73 this area had risen to 79.5 percent. Simultaneously, the area under pump irrigation decreased from eighteen percent to ten percent and that under flood irrigation from 2.4 percent to a mere 0.6 percent.²

The government committee formed in 1953 to assess the prospects for mechanized agriculture recommended that the private sector should be further

1. Sidgi A. Kaballu, op.cit., p.4-5.

2. Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics Yearbook, Khartoum, 1970, Section VI, Table 1.

encouraged by the State. As a result of this recommendation, and in view of the substantial profits the capitalists made during the season 1954/55, many merchants and agrarian capitalists were attracted to mechanized farming.

Capitalists engaged in mechanized farming got substantial assistance from the government at every stage of agricultural operations. The State constructed the roads,¹ made available research results and gave free advice on agricultural techniques. Moreover, the State had to prepare the land and clear it for cultivation. It also imported the agricultural machinery and offered it to capitalists on easy terms. Finally, it offered loans, through the State-owned Agricultural Bank, to finance operations. This bank gave assistance with the storage and marketing of the crop if the capitalists so desired.²

The Mechanized Farming Corporation reports reveal that the government was unable to cope with the expanding demand for more land to exploit. This is mentioned in a feeble attempt to rationalize the fact that capitalists cultivated thousands of feddans outside the areas allocated to them by the government.

In 1975 three million feddans were set aside for private capitalists in mechanized farming areas. Services and infrastructure for these new areas were to be provided by the government and finance was obtained from the World Bank.³

The World Bank and the International Development Association earmarked about half of the total loans for the agricultural sector specifically for

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1. Normally these roads were only raised dirt roads. Today, however, all-weather asphalted roads are being constructed. The Khartoum-Port Sudan road was designed to cross the mechanized agricultural area in the Gadarif region. In the West of the Sudan a new road is being constructed from Dibaibat to Dilling to assist mechanized farming in the area.
 2. Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Mechanized Farming Corporation, Second Agricultural Conference Papers, Khartoum, April 1975, pp.2-9.
 3. Ibid, p.3.

private mechanized farming, i.e. for capitalist production. In 1974/75, for example, out of the total loans of LS 2,558,500, mechanized farming alone got about LS 1,241,500, or about half the amount of the total loan.¹

Although the State invested in mechanized farming, in terms of both area cultivated and output private capitalists dominated the sector. The meagre proportion of State farms relative to private ones is illustrated by Table 2.11

TABLE 2.11 *Mechanized Farming Areas Cultivated 1974/75 by the State and by Private Capitalists (Feddans)*

TYPE OF CROP	STATE SCHEMES		PRIVATE SCHEMES	
	AREA	%	AREA	%
DURA	71,054	3	2,555,570	97
SESAME	14,943	3	571,510	97
COTTON	19,760	69	9,070	31
TOTAL	105,757	3	3,136,150	97

Source: Studies in Sudanese Economy, Communist Party of the Sudan Journals Series, Vol.4, 1975, p.11.

As the table also suggests, as a result of the decline in cotton prices and the increasing demand for sesame and Dura, capitalists were investing preferentially in the latter crops.

In investigations carried out by the author in Gadarif area, mechanized farming was found to be more profitable than the other forms of agricultural production. The net profit from a single scheme (1000 feddans) was estimated to be LS 2,260 annually in 1967 and LS 7,200 in 1976. In Gadarif, the

1. Ibid, p.3.

capitalists who cultivated outside the planned area or owned more than one scheme, were estimated to be not less than ten. These cultivated areas of 1000-5000 feddans. There were two who exploited areas of as much as 10,000 feddans each. It could thus be guessed that the latter were making about LS 72,000 annually. This was ten times as much as they could have made in any other form of agricultural production.

Apart from the facilities those capitalists were getting from the State and international capitalist organizations, there are additional explanations for the profitability of mechanized farming. These may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Rainlands situated in the Savanna belt which are suitable for this sort of cultivation are very fertile, flat and relatively easy to clear. Savanna Lands are vast and consequently they are highly suited to the use of farm machinery.
- (2) When compared to other forms of agriculture, mechanized farming was found to be cheaper. This was mainly because in mechanized farming areas no fertilizers or pesticides were used and capitalists usually expanded horizontally on land in order to avoid using fertilizers.
- (3) Mechanized farming agriculture needed labour mainly during the picking season. The supply of temporary labour came from areas of subsistence agriculture. The cost of this temporary labour, who depended on wage labour only partially for its sustenance, was low.

The rapid expansion of mechanized agriculture had results which may be summarized as follows:

- (1) This expansion was taking place at the expense of pastoral land, which caused a continuous movement of pastoralists and their animals to

unsuitable, or less fertile, lands.

- (2) The extensive clearing of trees practised by these capitalists was a threat to the Sudan's forestry resources and contributed to a decline in the humidity of the pastoral areas (resulting in lower rainfall), topsoil erosion and other environmental imbalances.
- (3) The Savanna pastoralists, small producers and the rest of the inhabitants were subjected to an increasing integration in the commodity market accompanied in the last years with a sharp increase in prices. In the Sudan the cost of living index for low income groups increased from 100 in 1970 to 221 in 1976.¹ To meet this increase pastoralists were forced to sell more animals. Moreover, alternatives available to them to increase their productivity by expanding in further areas were increasingly limited. This drove them either to accept low wages offered to them by the mechanized agriculture capitalists who exploited the situation or migrate to other areas and seek other jobs.
- (4) These temporary agricultural workers were not recognized by the government even if they formed trade unions. The temporary conditions governing the nature of their work hindered attempts to organize a struggle for such recognition. Moreover, the government did not specify a minimum wage for them and consequently their wages were solely determined by the agrarian capitalists.

From the above account it is evident that agrarian capitalism in the Sudan did not follow the classic pattern of the development of agricultural capitalism out of feudalism. Instead it followed a pattern corresponding to the needs of the already developed British industrial capitalist class. The

1. The Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of National Planning, The Six Year Plan of Economics and Social Development, Khartoum, April 1977, Volume 1, page 20.

agricultural capitalists themselves were either traders or the beneficiaries of actions of the colonial state, as was the case with the religious leaders (though the latter soon invested in trade as well). Capitalist agriculture in the Sudan was thus the creation of colonial capitalism and remained dependent upon it throughout the colonial period. In the course of the post-colonial period, the dependency of the agrarian capitalists on foreign capital was diversified as colonial rule gave way to another hegemony: that of neo-colonialism.

CHAPTER THREE

Private Capital Accumulation In The Sudan : Industry, Finance & Services

This chapter is composed of two parts. The first continues the sector-by-sector review of private capital accumulation begun in Chapter Two.

Industrial investment, first of all, is shown to have passed through two main phases. During the colonial period, it is argued, industrial investment was almost completely arrested, as the colonial system had a vested interest in keeping the country as a supplier of agricultural commodities and as a market for its own manufactured goods. A second phase corresponds to the post-colonial period. A dependent industrial capitalist class was now encouraged to develop by the concessions, facilities and finance offered by both the State and neo-colonial capital.

The first part of the Chapter continues with a discussion of the role played by finance in enhancing private capital accumulation throughout the period under study. The development of private capital accumulation in real estate and services is also surveyed.

The second part of the Chapter discusses the wide opportunities for foreign and domestic private capital accumulation which have opened up in the 1970s. A critical assessment is given of the investment acts introduced by the State to lure foreign and private capitalists to make further investment in the various sectors of the economy. The result of the government's so-called 'developmental' open-door policies are seen to have been greater opportunities for penetration by foreign capital. Consequently an increasingly favourable climate has been created for the indigenous capitalist class to develop in close connection with foreign capitalists and multinational firms.

The Sudanese Industrial Capitalists: From Siege to Dependency

Marx suggested that the rise of industrial capitalism followed two main roads. According to the first, a section of the craftsmen themselves accumulated capital and took to trade. In the course of time they began to organize

production on a capitalist basis free from the restrictions of the guilds. According to the second, a section of the existing merchant class took possession directly of production, organizing the craftsmen in the process along capitalist lines.¹

In the case of the colonial and post-colonial countries, the nature of capitalist development was different. Social formations in the colonial countries were maintained, destroyed or restructured to meet the demands of colonial capital. The development of capitalism in these countries was not only deflected from the classical pattern but was also directed so as to meet the needs of capital in the metropolises.

In the case of the Sudan, capitalists were encouraged to engage in activities that furthered the colonial government's designs. It was these designs that permitted and fostered the growth of merchant capital in foreign trade and implanted agricultural capitalists in the country. On the other hand, the development of handicrafts into fully-fledged manufacturing industry was contrary to the colonial regime's desire to keep the Sudanese market open for their own manufactured goods. Consequently an indigenous industrial capitalist class remained almost non-existent in the Sudan throughout the colonial period. Traders who were ambitious enough to attempt to move into production were faced with so many obstacles that many were forced to close down entirely. Thus, whereas in the history of Europe industry originated from handicrafts, in the Sudan the development of handicrafts was arrested as a result of the introduction of imported manufactures.

The Siege

The main purpose of British colonial capital's expansion in the Sudan was to make of the country both a market and a supplier of raw materials for

1. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, pp.336-337.

British industry. It was thus understandable that industry could not have developed in the Sudan during colonial era. Up until 1944 there were only ten industrial establishments (in fact only seven were registered in the Ministry of Industry's files). The majority were small-scale undertakings which employed few workers. Of these, few industries, mainly edible oil, survived into the post-war period. The point of interest here is that investors in other industries had either to revert to the one successful industry, edible oil, or to turn to non-industrial fields of investment, specially agriculture to survive as capitalists.

The outbreak of the Second World War provided an impetus to the development of industry in the Sudan. Under wartime conditions, the British colonial authorities felt the necessity of establishing certain local industries in order to supply goods which could no longer be imported. Thus the War Supply Department was forced in 1942 to set up a Local Industries Investigation Committee to advise on the industries that should be established in the country, to utilize local raw materials and to relieve the country of the need to rely on imports during the war. It was as a result of this turn that a number of enterprises, such as oil mills, soap factories, confectionaries, syrups and squash, and spinning and weaving plants were erected.

These undertakings, however, were unable to withstand competition from imported goods when imports were resumed immediately after the War. Their inability to compete on equal footing with imports resulted in their closing down permanently, until they were revived after Independence. In the case of textile plants a clear directive was issued to prevent the re-establishment of this industry.

The manufacturing industry which existed during the colonial period was on the whole inconsequential. At the end of this period, in 1955/56, all manufacturing activities made up less than one percent of the G.D.P. (little

more than half a million Sudanese pounds). The great majority of the manufacturing undertakings were on a very small scale. The two main large-scale units, a brewery and a cement factory, were owned by British companies.

Table 3.1 gives a picture of the situation of industry in 1955/56.

TABLE 3.1 *Industrial Output in 1955/56*¹

TYPE OF INDUSTRY	NET OUTPUT 1955/56 (LS 000)
Oil Pressing	1,000
Mineral Water Factories	374
Flour Mills	340
Cement Factory	228
Engineering Workshops	152
Brewing	137
Soap Factories	131
Ice Factories	106
Sweet Factories	84
Printing Presses	77
Carpentry Workshops	67
Tin Factories	38
TOTAL	2,736

Source: C. Harvie and G. Kleve, The National Income of the Sudan, Department of Statistics, Khartoum, 1959, p.31.

Oil seed pressing was by far the most significant industrial activity, not only at the time when this table was compiled but from very much earlier. Apparently the colonial government, perceiving its inability to stop oil extraction from taking place in Sudanese households, decided not to interfere directly. Instead, they used the pressing industry to export crude oil from the Sudan to British refineries, which subsequently re-exported it. It is also important to add that British edible oil exports to the Sudan were never significant compared to other exports such as textiles.

Oil seed pressing had been known in the Sudan since time immemorial. At a certain point which cannot be defined exactly, capitalists involved in oil seed trade in Western Sudan, perceiving the project potential of the activity, started to set up camel-driven oil presses throughout the region. The Asara (literally 'squeezer') was a wooden device with a large wheel and a container into which the seeds were put. The device employed a camel and a man. The camel revolved the wheels that pressed the seeds, commonly working for ten or more hours per day. Because the camel had to move around the device continuously, his eyes were masked to prevent dizziness. The man's job was to keep the container full of seeds, to guide the camel and replace the full oil containers with empty ones (see photograph).

Interviews in Western Sudan (Nyala) with an Asara owner and one of his workers revealed that the cost of the device was about five pounds during the 1930s and about fifteen pounds in 1976. An Asara produces eighty pints of edible oil within ten hours. The costs and the income involved in the production of this amount were calculated by our informants to be as follows:

1. THE TRADITIONAL EXPELLER



THE TRADITIONAL OIL EXPELLER:
THE CAMEL IS MASKED

The camel is masked..

2. THE TRADITIONAL EXPELLER



THE TRADITIONAL OIL EXPELLER:
THE SEED IS POURED

The seed is poured..

3. THE TRADITIONAL EXPELLER



THE TRADITIONAL OIL EXPELLER:
ROUND AND ROUND THE CAMEL GOES

Round and Round the camel goes.

4. THE TRADITIONAL EXPELLER



THE TRADITIONAL OIL EXPELLER:
AND OUT COMES EDIBLE OIL

~ and out comes edible oil.

Sesame seed (for 10 hours)	L.S 7.50
Wages of the Labourer (10 hours)	L.S 0.80
Food and water for camel (per day)	L.S 0.20
Cost of two tin cans	L.S 0.50
Total cost	<u>L.S 9.30</u>
Income from sale of oil at L.S 6.5 per forty pint can	L.S 13.00
Income from sale of cakes	<u>L.S 1.50</u>
Total income	L.S 14.50

Daily profit L.S 5.20 or 56%

The majority of the industrial capitalists of the colonial period started with this kind of activity and accumulated their capital within the oilseeds and oil-extraction sectors. Modern manufacturing activities played a very insignificant role in the economy during the colonial period. Of the total private sector capital formation industry accounted for 5% only.

— Another old quasi-industrial activity was on the salt works on the Red Sea shore. These works were established privately in 1934 and subsequently played an important role in private capital accumulation. Although their output was inconsequential in relation to the G.D.P., the salt works were substantial undertakings for the few private entrepreneurs who dominated the activity in the Port Sudan area.

Other mineral resources which contributed to private capital accumulation were chrome, iron ore and manganese. These were exploited by Sudanese immigrants. In 1965 total exports of these minerals amounted to slightly over one million pounds. Gold was also extracted, though the exact amounts are unknown because it was not all exported. One gold mining company that operated during the colonial period and survived until 1963 was owned by Abdullahi El-Fadil Almahdi and an Italian merchant. The mine is known to have been located in Wadi-Halfa in the Dowishat area but the specific date when extraction started is not known. However, the mine employed about one

hundred and fifty workers before it was submerged by the Aswan Dam in 1963. The hills were mined using primitive methods, mostly manual labour. The final processing of the dust was done by the Italian alone until gold extraction was completed. For this reason, no worker could have known how much gold was extracted.

Wages were not paid in money. Instead the workers used to borrow their daily needs from the shop set up by the owners of the mill, and at the end of every month they often found themselves indebted to the shopkeeper.¹ Thus the same two capitalists dominated the commercial activities of the village as well as being the sole employer of its labour force. The gold was sold to gold merchants in Omdorman, as gold prices in Sudan were always at least fifty percent higher than in neighbouring countries. The reason for this is that gold was, and still is, a traditional form of saving in the Sudan.

Thus, the colonial period came to an end with industry constituting only one percent of the G.D.P. Most capital accumulation had taken place in trade and agriculture rather than in industry. The siege was, however, to be lifted after political Independence in 1956.

From Siege to Dependency

The post-colonial period was characterized by an increase in private industrial investment as a result of the concessions and facilities given to local and foreign private capitalists by the governments of the day. The consequences of this policy were:

- (1) an inflow of foreign capital, in the form of aid to the State and facilities for the private sector, as well as direct investment;

1. This information was obtained through an interview with Mrs. Suad Ibrahim Ahmed who had been working in the Dept. of Statistics as a field inspector heading a team working in the area in 1960 when the social and economic survey that preceded the completion of the High Dam was carried out.

- (2) the creation of an indigenous industrial capitalist class dependent on foreign capital;
- (3) the hegemony of foreign capital in industrial investment; and
- (4) the subjugation of the State to both foreign and local capitalist interests.

On Independence the bourgeois parties that took over the State (Umma and N.U.P.) embarked on policies consistent with capitalist interests in all fields. The Sudanese capitalists who constituted the leadership of these parties had already accumulated capital from investments in agriculture, trade and services, and they had succeeded in buying substantial real estate holdings. The only field from which they had been debarred by the colonial state was industry. The new government redressed this grievance in the very first year of Independence, by introducing the first industrial law in 1956.

The State's industrial strategy was based upon the encouragement of the private sector to generate long-term investment in the field of industry. This policy was embodied in the Approved Enterprises Act 1956, which was the first official document to encompass both the machinery by which the new industrial policy was to be implemented and the procedure by which State assistance could be secured. State assistance included exemptions from import duties, accelerated depreciation allowances and the provision of land in industrial areas at nominal prices. As S. M. Nimairi puts it "It intended to stimulate new private investment by improving the investment climate and so ensuring the profitability and the safety of capital investment. These facilities were granted for both local and foreign capital without discrimination."¹

1. Sayid M. Nimairi, "Industry in the Sudan", in Ali Mohamed Alhassan (ed.), Introduction to Sudan Economy, Khartoum University Press, Khartoum, 1976, p.82.

According to the provisions of this Act, profits of up to five percent were exempt from the business profits tax. All profits in excess of that were taxed at half the normal rates. Depreciation was allowed at double the normal rate. Duties on imported raw materials and on capital goods necessary for production were reduced. Any losses incurred during the relief period could be carried forward against taxable profits. The duration of the tax holiday ranged from two to five years, depending on the size of the capital invested. If the capital employed was less than LS 20,000, the tax relief period was two years. For investments of between LS 20,000 and LS 100,000, the period was extended to five years.

The Act also provided for the protection of domestic industrial products against competition from imports, on the recommendation of an 'impartial expert body'. The Act granted other incentives as well, such as reduced power and freight rates, government purchases of locally produced manufactured goods, guarantees against nationalization and an assurance of transferability of capital and profits.¹

This legislation, as we have said, did not differentiate between foreign and local capital. The 'impartial' body empowered to recommend protection was part of the State apparatus and hence was very much open to influence by the investing class. It is clear that the State favoured big capitalists in its policy of concession: the greater the capital owned, the longer the exemption periods were. This alone gave an edge to foreign capital over the comparatively weaker local capitalists.

The Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, formulated in 1961, marked a new phase in the promotion of industrial activities. It allocated LS 76.3 million (13% of the total gross fixed investment) to manufacturing industry. A substantial amount was also allocated to the development of

1. Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Industry and Mining, Industrial Investment Promotion Act, 1956, Khartoum, 1956.

various infrastructural services which were essential for the growth of industry. The plan emphasized the role of the private sector, whilst the government took it upon itself to undertake activities which were deemed vital or strategic to the economy of the country but which the private sector was either hesitant or unwilling to undertake. The State was thus not in competition with the private sector, but was encouraging it by putting the State's resources at its disposal. This exemplified the success of the bourgeoisie in using the State apparatus in periods when they controlled political power.

The government also provided private capitalists with both financial and training facilities. In 1960, for example, the Ministry of Industry and Mining was created in order to plan and implement national industrial policies. In 1962 the Industrial Bank was established by the government to provide loans and technical assistance to new and existing privately-owned enterprises. With the help of the United Nations, the Sudan Industrial Research Institute and the Management and Productivity Centre were established to provide research and managerial training.

The 1956 Act was superseded by the Organization and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act 1967. This legislation increased the concessions given to industrial capitalists. The 1967 Act allowed for total exemption from business profits tax for a period of five years, starting from the date of commencement of production. For enterprises employing a capital of one million Sudanese pounds or more, a further exemption from payment of half the tax for another five years was granted. Machinery and spare parts necessary for production were fully exempted from customs duties, and duties on raw materials were reduced to ten percent or less of their c.i.f. value. With respect to protection against competitive imports, the granting of protection was to be given only on basis of the recommendation of the Minister

of Industry and other concerned Ministers. This suited the capitalists interests, as it centred decision making in the political apparatus rather than in the civil service. No safeguards to protect the interests of consumers were included in any of this legislation.

The Consequences

Until 1955 (one year before political Independence) there were only forty industrial establishments in the whole country. These were mainly carpentry and repair workshops, and small mineral water and other food industries. The only significant ones were those few engaged in edible oil extraction and related activities. With the passage of the 1956 Industrial Act, the number of industrial establishments shot up, reaching 146 in 1958. The increase continued, so that by the end of 1973 there were no less than 589 industrial establishments. Industrial growth was facilitated by the establishment of the Industrial Bank in 1963. By 1966, this bank had financed sixty-seven industries. The loans it had advanced amounted to LS 1,000,065. In fact the contribution of industry to the G.D.P. increased from 4.5% in 1955/56 to 7.4% in 1965/66 in ten years.¹ In the same period the number of industrial workers increased from 12,257 to 21,960, an increase of over 79%. A large proportion of these industries were established during the first military regime (1958-1964). Of all the industries established between 1947 and 1965, 62% were established in this period.²

The relative contribution of industry to the G.D.P. might seem small (32.5 million pounds out of the total G.D.P. of 450 million in 1966).³

1. Marxism and Problems of the Sudanese Revolution, Second Edition, Socialist Thought Publishing House, Khartoum, 1968, p.124.

2. Ibid, pp.124-126.

3. Hamid, op.cit. p.175, Table 5.1.

Nevertheless these investments contributed substantially to private capital accumulation, as the private sector's share of all industrial investment was as high as ninety-eight percent during the period 1955/60. In fact the private sector controlled a substantial proportion of industrial investment throughout the period under study. It is within this context that the breakdown of industrial investment into local and foreign acquires significance. Local industrial establishments, though numerous, were insignificant in terms of volume compared with the foreign firms. For example, a study of forty-four prominent industries carried out in 1967, found the ownership of capital to be as follows¹:

Number of Industries	%	Nature of Capital	Amount of Capital	%
9	20	Foreign	L.S 7,212,650	74
15	34	Mixed (Foreign and Sudanese)	L.S 995,318	11
20	46	Sudanese	L.S 1,523,670	15
TOTAL 44	100		L.S 9,731,638	100

Sudanese owned only fifteen percent of the total industrial capital invested in the country, while seventy-four percent was foreign-owned. Foreign capital shared the remaining eleven percent with Sudanese. This reveals that a few foreign undertakings dominated this field of investment. The failure of the industrial incentives provided by the post-colonial governments to differentiate between foreign and local capital resulted in the hegemony of the former. Even those industries which were owned by Sudanese were either export-oriented or dependent on foreign semi-finished imported

1. Marxism and Problems, op.cit, p.124.

goods. The crux of the matter is that industry in the Sudan was born dependent.

The Financial Sector and Private Capital Accumulation

Two types of finance have played an important role in the Sudan: the traditional finance system, usually referred to as the Shyle, and the banking system. The first was practised by traders and large agricultural scheme owners. The second was introduced to the Sudan during the colonial period, providing loans mainly to foreign establishments at first and later to some immigrants and a few Sudanese capitalists. In the post-colonial period, finance was characterized by the establishment of specialized State banks for the purpose of financing local capitalists.

The 'shyle' is said to be the oldest system of money-lending in the Sudan. It appeared with the development of merchant capital, before the establishment of banking system by the colonial state. Traditionally village merchants combined shop-keeping with money-lending. They would lend money to farmers against the pledge of the coming year's crops or other local produce or property. Some of the big merchants also acted as intermediaries between the banks and local producers, charging relatively high interest rates. These loans were resorted to by borrowers who were unable to meet bank credit standards.

Merchants provided loans on condition that repayment was made in kind at prices determined by the merchant at the time of the loan. These prices were always below what the crop could fetch, even at harvest time, let alone at the end of the season. Effective interest rates were thus very high.

— According to M. H. Awad they were in the region of 200-300 percent and were known to be even higher in places like Kordofan and Darfur.¹

1. M. H. Awad, The Economy of Internal Marketing in the Sudan, Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1967, p.21.

The Banking System

Banks were first established in the Sudan during the British colonial period. Three foreign banks set up branches: Barclays Bank D.C.O. in 1913, National and Grindlays Bank in 1946 and Bank Misr (Egypt) in 1953.

Whereas the 'shyle' form of finance was an important source of capital accumulation for Sudanese capitalists, especially in agricultural areas such as Northern Province, Blue Nile, Kordofan and Darfur, the banks were a significant source of accumulation for colonial capital.

Although there are no details on the total finance capital in operation during the colonial period, it is evident that the traditional forms of finance accounted for a relatively small share. Bank credit was available to the dominant British and other foreign export/import companies and to a handful of indigenous and immigrant Sudanese of the time. Barclays Bank D.C.O. was by far the largest bank in the Sudan. Throughout the colonial period and until it was nationalized in 1970 it had the largest number of branches and controlled about half the total deposits in the whole country.¹

Finance Capital and the Post-Colonial Period

The post-colonial State did not take over the foreign banks. In fact the foreign commercial banks expanded in this period. The national governments did, however, create three specialized banks, two of them specially for the purpose of providing finance for local capitalists. In 1970 foreign banks were nationalized by the military government which came to power in 1969.

On the whole branches of commercial banks were established and expanded in areas where substantial capitalist activities of one sort or another were in progress. Table 3.2 shows the geographical distribution of commercial bank

1. From author's interview with Sayid Ibrahim Ahmed, Minister of Finance 1956-58 and general manager of the Sudan Commercial Bank, 1960-1970.

branches, which reflects the fact that finance capital was first attracted to Khartoum but soon spread to places like the Blue Nile, where most of the pump schemes were located. In Kassala Province, where mechanized farming activities were intensive (Gadarif) and where merchant capital was also active (Port Sudan), bank branches increased from six in 1959 to nineteen in 1970.

TABLE 3.2 *Distribution of Commercial Bank by Province*

Province	Number of Bank Branches		
	1959	1969	1970
Khartoum	12	22	27
Kassala	6	14	19
Blue Nile	9	12	19
Northern	2	3	8
Kordofan	2	6	7
Darfur	-	4	6
Upper Nile	-	-	1
Equatoria	1	1	2
Bahr Algalal	-	-	1
TOTAL	28	62	90

Source: Compiled from Bank of Sudan, Annual Report, Khartoum, various years.

In Kordofan branches increased from two in 1959 to seven in 1970. Darfur, which had no banking facilities at all in 1959, had witnessed the establishment of six bank branches by 1970. As for the smaller provinces, they originally only had the privilege of one bank in Juba (Equatoria) but saw the establishment of three more banks by 1970.

A significant development not revealed by the above table is that until 1960 all the banks were branches of foreign banks. In 1960 Sudanese capitalists established an indigenous bank, Sudan Commercial Bank, where shares were offered for sale to the public, producing such an enthusiastic response that the shares were soon sold out. The paid up capital had to be increased by L.S 100,000. Over 17,000 people subscribed to the bank, sixty percent of them holding less than five pounds in shares. Nevertheless, the directors and major beneficiaries were the initial sponsors themselves.¹

In addition to creating the Central Bank, the post-colonial State founded three specialized banks, the Agricultural Bank, established in 1958, the Industrial Bank, in 1961, and the Estates Bank, in 1967. The objective of the first two, as defined by the State itself, was to finance local capitalists. The third was supposed to serve the population at large by providing housing loans. An examination of the activities of the three banks reveals that they not merely served the interests of the capitalists but specifically they reinforced the position of the largest capitalists.

The Post-Colonial State and Specialized Banks

When the problems of the agricultural capitalists were compounded by the reluctance of foreign banks to continue financing pump schemes, the government of the day decided to intervene. The major share of the two-party government in 1958 was that of the Umma Party, which was controlled by the Mahdi family and mainly represented the agricultural capitalists. The Agricultural Bank was established that same year and started giving loans to agricultural capitalists in 1959.

A striking feature of this bank was that, in financing agricultural capitalists, it favoured large scheme owners. This reveals that the policies

1. This information was obtained from Sayid Ibrahim Ahmed, the General Manager of the Commercial Bank from its establishment until its nationalization in 1970.

of the post-colonial State in this period served the objectives of the ruling fraction of the capitalist class. Sayid Abdel Rahman Almahdi, the prominent leader of the Umma party, was himself one of the largest agricultural capitalists in the country. Throughout the period between 1960/61 and 1966/67, owners of schemes of thousand feddans and more succeeded in getting more than half the capital paid in the form of loans. During this period the distribution of loans by size of scheme was as shown in Table 3.3.

These figures reveal that, by 1967, over seventy-three percent of the larger schemes were indebted to the Agricultural Bank. The loans they received constituted over fifty-two percent of the total value of loans advanced, although they represented about six percent of the borrowing schemes. In the same year the small schemes (less than 250 feddans) received about fourteen percent of the loans, while they constituted over seventy-three percent of the borrowing schemes.

Following the establishment of the Agricultural Bank, the Industrial Bank was established in 1961 to encourage capitalists to embark on industrial investment. The general supervision and management of the bank's affairs were vested in the Board of Directors. This consisted of seven members, with the Managing Director of the bank as chairman. These *ex officio* members represented the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the Ministry of Industry and the Bank of Sudan. The capitalists were effectively represented on the board by three paid appointees of the Minister of Finance. The composition of the board unmasks the nature of the State. It reflects the collaboration of the State, the capitalists and the political organizations. By reason of numbers alone, the appointing Ministry and the appointees would be able to control the board. Needless to say the political organizations controlled all Ministers.

TABLE 3.3

Size of Scheme (Feddans)	Share of Borrowing by Value of Loan %		Share of Borrowing by Number of Schemes %		Proportion of Indebted Schemes to Total of Category %	
	1960/61	1966/67	1960/61	1966/67	1960/61	1966/67
Up to 250	15.3	13.9	81.0	73.1	60.5	25.2
251-1000	31.6	33.7	14.4	20.8	25.6	48.3
1000 and over	53.1	52.4	4.6	6.1	28.6	73.1

Source: Farah H. Adam, Economic Appraisal of Agrarian Reform in the Private Cotton Estates, Sudan, Department of Rural Economy, University of Khartoum, Research Bulletin No.2, Sept. 1971, p.10, Table 3.

Those who benefited most from the Bank belonged to one of three categories: firstly, former Civil Servants who could exploit their connections in the State apparatus, including often enough, their personal acquaintance with members of the Bank boards; secondly, political party figures who related, politically or otherwise, to members of the ruling executive, such as Ministers; and thirdly, capitalists who, besides their connections in the State apparatus and the political system, had sufficient securities to qualify for big loans.

In addition to loans for local transactions the Industrial Bank extended guarantees and provided foreign exchange to private industrial enterprises for the import of machinery and equipment. This amounted to about a million and a half Sudanese pounds between 1962 and 1973. The penetration of foreign capital started early in the history of the Bank. Only one year after the bank started operating, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) extended it a loan of two million dollars at an interest rate of four percent. The World Bank gave it a loan of four million dollars in 1973. These two loans alone were almost the equivalent of what the government had paid to establish the bank.

The distribution of the Bank's loans between 1962 and 1973 clearly favoured wealthier capitalists. As Table 3.4 indicates, eighty-two percent of its loans went to fifty-five capitalists who constituted only thirty-three percent of the total number of recipients. In 1973 alone eleven borrowers were given an average of L.S 202,000 each. This constituted 96% of the total loans for that year.¹

The Agricultural and Industrial Banks were conceived as institutions for furthering the interests of capitalists. The Estates Bank, by contrast,

1. Industrial Bank of Sudan, Annual Report of Board of Directors, No.12, Khartoum, 1973, p.25.

TABLE 3.4 *Sudan Industrial Bank Loan Distribution 1962-1973*

Size of Loan	Recipients		Loans Advanced	
	Number	%	Amount	%
up to 5,000	56	34	168,831	4
5,000-10,000	21	13	157,064	4
10,000-20,000	35	21	376,854	10
over 20,000	55	33	3,251,649	82
TOTAL	167	100	3,954,380	100

Source: Based on Industrial Bank of Sudan, Annual Report of Board of Directors, No.12, Khartoum, 1973, p.25.

was meant to solve housing problems for low-income groups. The losses that the former banks incurred during the years of their operation did not discourage the State from supporting them. In the case of the Estate Bank, however, even its promised capital was not fully paid by the State. Nor was the dream of providing low-cost housing for the people ever fulfilled. In an attempt to persuade the capitalist to shoulder part of the housing problem, the State authorized the Bank to borrow from the private sector through the issue of shares and bonds with a promise to give participants priority in the allocation of loans as well as a say in the Bank's policy. Perhaps it was by design rather than by chance that the percentage of loans to low-income groups fell drastically from 82.4% in 1972 to 22% in 1973.¹ In the allocation of housing funds too therefore the interests of the capitalists, as members of the high income groups, were fully satisfied.

Real Estate and Services

Among Sudanese capitalists, real estate ownership is a custom with deep

1. The Sudanese Estates Bank, Annual Report 1973, Khartoum, n.d., Table XXI.

roots. In addition to providing a public sign of wealth, it has been the accepted security for obtaining bank finance and a standard method of hedging against inflation. It was at one time even a condition for participating in local government elections, as only rate-payers were permitted to vote and stand for municipal election until after the October 1964 'revolution'. Wealthy capitalists owned substantial numbers of houses or estates, which they were able to mortgage to banks. At the end of colonial rule, many immigrants and other foreigners hurriedly left the country and sold their substantial real estate holdings. Sudanese capitalists scrambled to buy these properties, particularly in urban centres like Khartoum and Port Sudan. Although the ownership of buildings has contributed a small percentage to the G.D.P., about three percent, the shares of private capital formation accounted for by this investment has often been substantial. In 1955/56 this share was as high as eighty-three percent.¹

Capitalists have accumulated substantial profits from construction, purveying, transport and shipping since colonial times. In the post-Independence era, particularly during the first ~~period~~ military rule (1958-1964), building and contracting activities increased rapidly. Moreover, the new fields of investment explored by Sudanese capitalists included insurance, hotels, tourism and the like.

During this period important government projects were established. In 1957, for example, thirty-one million pounds were spent on the Managil extension of the Gezira Scheme. Five million pounds were spent on the hydro-electric power station on Sennar Dam. The Ruseries ^{and} of Khashm El-Girba Dams, as well as the housing for the resettlement of Wadi-Halfa people, were all built between 1958 and 1963. Most of these projects were carried out by foreign private companies or Sudanese contractors. Foreign firms and the

1. Harvie and Kleve, op.cit., p.14. Also Department of Statistics, Capital Formation and Increase in National Income in Sudan, 1955-59, Khartoum, 1961, p.98.

State - particularly the Ministries of Works and Irrigation - used to execute between them a major proportion of building construction. This share gradually decreased in the post-colonial period in favour of Sudanese companies. The whole of the Khashm El-Girba housing project was completed by Sudanese contractors. Government expenditure on housing alone amounted to over seven million pounds. The award of this contract to Sudanese contractors was the result of frantic lobbying behind the scenes to withdraw the contract from a British company (Turrif). This was in line with the general atmosphere of favouring Sudanese contractors over the foreign and immigrant companies that used to operate during the colonial period.

The output of the building and construction sector increased from 16.2 million pounds to 26.5 million pounds in the two years 1956-1958, an increase of 63%. Its share of the G.D.P. also increased from 6 percent in 1955/56 to 9 percent in 1957/58.¹ Housing and other buildings constituted 49.2% of all private investment in the period from 1955 to 1963. This share increased between 1965 and 1970 to 56.3%. Housing alone constituted about 80% of the total of this item.²

Transport

Investment in transport has been closely connected with trade. To facilitate their trade activities, Sudanese businessmen purchased vehicles and established widespread trading networks with truck fleets and lorries. Private ownership of lorries, trucks and cars had always exceeded that of the government. In 1939 there were 2,099 registered trucks and lorries in the country, in 1945 2,718, and in 1956 10,798. On each of these three occasions approximately two thirds of the total consisted of privately owned

1. Republic of the Sudan, Economic Survey 1960, Khartoum, p.8.

2. Hamid, The Utilization of Public Funds, mainly originating from Agricultural Sector and its impact on the Economic Development of the Sudan 1955/56-1969/70, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Leeds, 1977. p?

vehicles. T. Niblock has constructed the following table.¹

TYPE OF VEHICLE	NUMBER IN 1956		
	Private	Government	TOTAL
Lorry	6,247	2,131	8,378
Box Car Truck	1,633	787	2,420
TOTAL	7,880	2,918	10,789

This trend continued throughout the post-colonial period. It reached one peak during the first military rule, with the purchase of the 25-35 ton trucks from W. Germany and Italy. The second peak came during the 1970s, with the establishment of highly capitalized road haulage companies operating mainly between Port Sudan and Khartoum. Road transport was a field in which Sudanese entrepreneurs were predominant. Only in the seventies did foreign capital (from Arab oil states) participate substantially.

Insurance

Insurance was exclusively monopolized by foreign companies until 1959. In 1960 there were sixty-seven insurance companies and only one national company. Between 1961 and 1970 the foreign insurance companies were gradually liquidated by decree and they were replaced with Sudanese firms. By 1972, as Table 3.5 illustrates, all foreign companies were banned, and the field was cleared for the six private national companies. The insurance market expanded in 1972 to become almost three times as big as in 1963. Except for a short period when the government participated in one of the companies through the nationalizations of 1970, the activity was exclusively subject to private capital accumulation.

1. T. Niblock, forthcoming work entitled, Class and Exploitation in the Sudan.

TABLE 3.5 *Gross Insurance Premiums in Sudan, 1963-72*

YEAR	FOREIGN			NATIONAL		
	LIFE		OTHER	LIFE		OTHER
	L.S. 000	%	L.S. 000	%	L.S. 000	%
1963	197.1	100	994.7	90	0.0	0
1965	134.9	59	1123.4	73	94.4	41
1968	150.7	46	708.4	44	174.0	54
1970	179.0	51	332.1	16	171.6	49
1972	0.0	0	0.0	0	393.0	100
					113.8	10
					425.8	27
					905.4	56
					1698.8	84
					3372.9	100

Source: S. T. Al-Mahdi "Insurance Industry in the Sudan", in A. M. El-Hassan (ed.)
An Introduction to the Sudan Economy, Khartoum, Khartoum University Press,
 1976, Tables 1 and 2.

The Contemporary Period - Sudan's Open Door

Our resources open in front of you wide realms of unlimited, infinite opportunities. There is nothing to check you but your own abilities, imagination, and energies ... doors are open - we mean what we say.

G. M. Nimeiri, President of the Sudan.

Opening address to the First Business
and Trading Congress, Khartoum,
December 1973.¹

To borrow the words of the editors of Sudan International in December 1973: "The Sudanese nation is wide open for investment without discrimination for whoever is capable of participating by effort, ability and knowledge ..."² This statement sums up the effect of a wave of legislation tailored to the encouragement of private investment. In the years 1972-76 private enterprise not only succeeded in the complete reversal of the 1970 nationalizations but went further to overturn much of the post-Independence effort to Sudanize business activities.

The most striking feature of this recent period is the favourable climate for, and extreme eagerness of the government to invite, foreign capital to invest in the Sudan. Foreign capital has been permitted to flow without restriction, encouraged and safeguarded by three investment Acts. The first to be introduced was The Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act of 1972. Compared to the 1967 Act, this law retained the main objectives of the previous act but added some further concessions. Regarding exemptions on imported raw materials, the new Act allowed for the repayment of any duties paid on raw and packing materials incorporated in exported products. This

1. Sudan International, No.6, p.33.

2. Ibid.

new provision was specifically aimed at encouraging export-oriented industries. The result of this concession was the emergence of packing industries which were heavily dependent on semi-finished and finished imported materials. The guarantees given to foreign investors with regard to transfer of profits, repatriation of capital and compensation in case of nationalization, were made very extensive and explicit in this Act.

An important innovation in this Act was the identification of two broad objectives of industrial policy. First enterprises should be able to contribute to economic co-operation with Arab and African countries, and, second, enterprises should be located in rural areas. The declaration of the first objective was meant to encourage investors from the Arab oil-producing countries, who immediately responded, investing either independently or in partnership with Sudanese capitalists. On the other hand the industrial establishments that started after the concession did not in general conform to the second objective. They were mostly located in areas where infrastructural facilities were available, that is in Khartoum, Port Sudan and Medani. The underdeveloped regions of the Sudan, such as the West, lacked even electricity and water supply at the time the Act was passed.

~~—~~ The second major piece of legislation was the Organization and Encouragement in Economic Services Act of 1973. The economic services referred to were tourism, transport and warehousing. Although similar to the previously mentioned law in encouraging vast amounts of capital by offering more concessions when capital is large, this Act went further and specified the minimum capital required to qualify for the concession. To obtain the concession, a minimum of L.S 50,000 had to be employed. If a capital of L.S 150,000 or more was employed the enterprise could enjoy six years of tax exemptions in addition to other concessions. This favoured big capitalists and invited foreigners to invest in the services activities. The three largest hotels

country were established after these concessions by three Arab capitalists.

The third Act to be considered is the Promotion of Agricultural Investment Act of 1976. In this case the concessions offered were similar to those of the Industrial Act. Exemptions from customs duties and business profits tax were granted for periods ranging between five and ten years at the discretion of the Minister of Finance. The law also stipulated that land required for projects would be granted for twenty-five years, subject to renewal. It also permitted the free transfer of imported capital as well as of profits. Facilities, such as reduced rates of electric power, reduced transport rates and any other special facilities that might be deemed necessary by the Minister of Finance, were also allowed for in the Act.

A common feature of this legislation was the presumption that economic development can be achieved by inviting local and foreign capitalists to invest. Another implicit assumption was that these capitalists would invest in rural areas, regardless of where they would make higher profits, simply because the Act suggested the importance of investing in rural areas. Moreover the concession did not specify in which rural areas capitalists should invest, for example Southern or Western Sudan. Instead more concessions were given to larger amounts of capital. The concept of development used in these Acts seemed identical to that of growth. The idea was absent that economic development in a country like Sudan might be implemented within an overall plan specifically aimed at developing the less developed regions of the country and setting down the number and nature of the desired investment schemes and the priorities of their location.

This thesis starts off from the view that economic development, unlike growth, is not simply an increase in production or capital invested. It involves basic changes with regard to the socio-economic structure of the country, the State and the political system. It also, and more importantly,

involves basic changes in the ownership of the means of production, in the relations of production and in the distribution of the social surplus. Opening the door to foreign and Sudanese capitalists only means offering further chances for private capital accumulation, which will accelerate social disparities, dependency and further underdevelopment.

With regard to the inflow of foreign capital, studies in various Third World countries have suggested that, the more foreign investment flows into the country, the more underdeveloped this country becomes. This is because the profits transferred out of these countries always add up eventually to a sum which is higher than the initial capital imported. Third World countries together incurred losses of about one thousand billion dollars annually in the form of profits transferred to the capitalist investing countries. To take another way of looking at the problem, Table 3.6 compares the mass of profits exported annually from the Third World to the U.S.A. with the inflow of new investment from that source. The figures establish that during the years 1959-66 the resulting flow was a very substantial loss to the Third World.

TABLE 3.6

Year	(a) Capital inflow from U.S.A. to Third World countries (million dollars)	(b) Profits transferred to U.S.A. (million dollars)	Losses incurred by Third World (b minus a) countries (million dollars)
1959	224	1410	876
1960	229	1469	1240
1961	419	1616	1197
1962	203	1882	1679
1963	451	1969	1518
1964	523	2289	1766
1965	807	2252	1445
1966	519	2344	1825
TOTAL	3,375	12,942	10,670

Source: Communist Party of the Sudan, Studies Series in the Sudanese Economy, No.2, Khartoum, 1974, p.13, Table 1.

In the Sudan in the recent period capital has been entering in new forms, though with the same objectives as before. Foreign capitalists have increasingly entered into partnerships with expanding Sudanese firms. This gives the former a relative security against possible nationalization affecting foreign firms. Moreover, it enhances the growth of a homogenous dependent local capitalist class whose interests may be expected to transcend national boundaries and conform to needs of 'capital' in the abstract.

As a result of the extra powers given to the political authorities, for example to the Minister of Finance, capital accumulation through corruption has increased. Not only that but, when in 1974 the Ministers of Industry and of Finance gave additional concessions to indigenous and foreign investors, some members of the executive were encouraged to engage in business themselves, in partnership with foreign or Sudanese capitalists. In 1976 four Ministers became businessmen in partnership with Saudi, Lebanese and Kuwaiti capitalists.

As was revealed from the author's interviews with some civil servants, the new powers given to the Executive also resulted in tax avoidance. Capitalists who had personal and political relations with members of the Executive were able to obtain longer tax holidays.

In 1975/76 Sudanese capitalists, operating in partnership with Kuwaiti capital, were offered vast areas for animal fattening and dairy production. These consisted of between one and two million feddans south and north of Khartoum. A group of American companies, among which were the Arizona and Arizona Colorado, were permitted to establish a meat production scheme in partnership with a Saudi capitalist. They invested about a hundred million dollars in an area of million feddans in the Blue Nile Province (Dindir area). The main purpose of the scheme was meat export. This group was also allowed to build a slaughter-house and a factory for meat canning.

A West German company, "Agrar", operating in partnership with the Gulf States, was offered a licence to start meat production in an area of two million feddans extending from Western Sudan to Bahr El-Ghazal Province in Southern Sudan. The so-called Arab Development Project, which included Saudi, Kuwaiti, Libyan and United Emirates capital, got a licence to invest in agricultural production and animal fattening in an area of five million feddans.

The most immediate implication of these schemes would seem to be that expansion is to take place at the expense of pastoral land. Pastoralists who have already been driven from the most fertile lands by the expansion of mechanized farming, are to suffer even more when these schemes are implemented. This will not affect the foreign markets which have in the past imported livestock and meat from Sudan. On the contrary, they have been seeking to safeguard their supply by introducing capitalized production of these products. Similarly the Sudanese capitalists who traditionally supplied these markets with animals produced within the non-capitalist mode of production are engaged in the new schemes as well. Some of them have already started frozen meat export on their own. The majority of larger operators, however, entered into partnership with Arab and American capital to start more heavily capitalized schemes. The penetration of capital thus excludes the pastoral producers. They would seem to leave the option of producing for subsistence in the lush fertile areas, working as unskilled labourers in the new schemes or migrating to the big cities.

In the recent period Sudanese industrial capitalists have started to seek finance from foreign firms and banks. When one of the leading textile industrialists started two textile factories, he obtained his finance from the Export-Import Bank of New York. Although the banks were nationalized in 1970, four new foreign banks were allowed to be established in 1978. One of

these was an Abu Dhabi Bank and another was a branch of the Chase Manhattan.

In the recent period foreign capital has not only operated in partnership with Sudanese capitalists; it has also operate in partnership with the State. The Kennana Sugar Company is the largest such venture, with a capital of forty million pounds divided between the Sudan government (twenty million), Kuwait (9.2 million), Lonrho (2.2. million) and the Arab Investment Company (6.8 million), the rest being divided between a Japanese company and the Gulf International Corporation. Another twelve companies have been established by the State in partnership with foreign capital.¹ This penetration of State investment schemes by foreign capital has not put the State in competition with private capitalists, however. The strategy of the foreign organizations, mainly the World Bank, has in fact been to weaken the State and strengthen private capitalism. The recommendations of the World Bank with regard to the Gezira reveals this. The World Bank has recommended:

(1) the increase of the size of the schemes in the Gezira from eighty to 360 feddans in the Gezira and to 270 feddans in the Managil; (2) that peasants be allowed to sell their schemes freely; (3) the transfer of agricultural processing to private capitalists and the transfer of items of operating capital like tractors to private contractors. The Bank has also recommended the creation of agents for selling machinery to the peasants instead of this provision by the Gezira Board.

Although the State has encouraged both foreign and private capitalists by tax concessions, financial liberalization and the provision of infrastructure, some academic commentators have argued that the State should go much further. S. M. Nimeiri, for example, has said: "The difficulty of obtaining concessions and the considerable waste in time, effort and expense which is

1. Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Economic Survey, 1976-77, Khartoum, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, pp.248-251.

involved [reference was made to administrative procedures] has led to withdrawal of numerous applications particularly by foreign investors, who are naturally unaccustomed to long periods of delay. Simplification and prompt decision are thus to be highly recommended"¹. Sayid Nimeiri thus invites the State to be more dynamic so as to cater for the unwillingness of capital to be delayed by administrative procedure. Since the State is seen as being in the service of private capitalists, it is also expected to concentrate its efforts on the provision of infrastructure. According to Nimeiri, "the availability of public utilities at reasonable cost, an adequate system of transport and efficient government are better stimulants" to investment than the expansion of public enterprise in productive sectors.²

Conclusion

The principal conclusions of this chapter are

- (1) As a Third World country, the Sudan has experienced specific forms of capitalist industrial development. This specificity begins with the question of origins: Sudanese industry, unlike that of Europe, did not develop from handicrafts.
- (2) Sudan's development was subjugated to the designs of British colonial policy, which arrested industrial investment to keep the Sudan as a supplier of raw materials and a market for Britain's own manufactures.
- (3) Industry became an important source of private capital accumulation during the post-colonial period. At this stage industry was formally encouraged, and provided with finance, through the promulgation of industrial investment acts and the establishment of the Sudan Industrial Bank.

1. Sayid M. Nimeiri, op.cit.

2. Ibid.

- (4) The increasing State activities and infrastructure schemes characteristic of the post-colonial period created further opportunities for capitalists involved in services to accumulate capital by involvement in government projects.
- (5) Traditional forms of finance assisted the development of private commercial capitalists, and modern finance, which was dominated until 1970 by foreign banks, was also of considerable help to the few Sudanese and immigrant capitalists during this period. The creation of specialized banks in the contemporary period further enhanced private capitalist activities.
- (6) Real estate and investment in services played a much more significant role in private capital accumulation during the post-colonial and contemporary periods.
- (7) Insurance, which was dominated by foreign capital throughout the colonial period, was gradually taken over by Sudanese capitalists until it became an exclusive field for the latter in the contemporary period.
- (8) According to the findings of the second part of the chapter:
 - (a) the 'open door' policy adopted by the present government marks an important new phase in capitalist penetration of the country and the dependency of the Sudanese bourgeoisie vis à vis the metropolitan centres; and
 - (b) the notion that such policies lead to development is a myth. Instead, it is concluded, the effect of the policy will be an increased outflow of profits from the Sudan and thus continued underdevelopment and further dependency.

CHAPTER FOUR

Methodology and Criteria

This chapter is concerned with methodological aspects of the major part of the research reported in this thesis, the interviews with one hundred leading Sudanese capitalists. The chapter begins with a discussion of various short-comings of the statistical material which served as the basic framework for the study. It goes on to specify in some detail the way in which the hundred individuals were selected for interview. Finally, a brief outline is given of the collection and analysis of the case histories and other data derived from the interviews.

Difficulties Encountered

A basic difficulty faced at the outset was that the statistics and records available to the researcher were not designed to provide a detailed picture of individual private capitalists. Added to that, wherever individual records did exist - e.g. in banks, concerned ministries, etc. - they were considered confidential and were not open to study.

In addition to this basic problem, a number of more specific difficulties had to be faced in the course of the study:

- (1) The first census ever to be made for the Sudan was the 1955/1956 census. This means that the earlier period is not covered by census statistics at all. Moreover, predictably the 1955/56 census did not include any information about private capitalist activities. Figures were given for aggregate private capital formation by sector. But the sectors were defined in terms of the traditional/modern dichotomy, which was considered inadequate for the purposes of this study.
- (2) It was difficult to obtain the names of businessmen in the Sudan, as the only place where these were reported was the Chamber of Commerce Yearbook.¹ Even this could only be of limited value because: (a) the

1. Published by Chamber of Commerce Head Office - Khartoum intermittently from about 1905.

yearbook was not in fact published annually; (b) it only included names of members; (c) certain areas had no branches of the Chamber; and (d) the names were simply classified in alphabetical order by area. There was, in other words, no mention of the nature or scope of their activities.

- (3) Few private business units in the Sudan kept records. Those which did were reluctant to permit researchers to have access to them. Moreover, keeping records was a recent phenomenon anyway and was mainly practised by the highly-capitalized firms in Khartoum and Port Sudan.
- (4) No published work was found on the history of the richest individuals or leading business families in the Sudan. Even the descendants of prestigious Sudanese and immigrant families often did not know the history of their fathers.
- (5) Public records were also incomplete, because specialized ministries such as the Ministries of Industry, Trade, etc., were only established after independence in 1956. Even then, these ministries did not develop the practice of organizing and classifying private business records. In fact, they kept no archives; files were usually burnt when considered of no immediate value.
- (6) Although specialized banks, such as agricultural, industrial and real estate banks, have recently been established (since 1958) they all consider borrowers' names and financial dealings to be confidential information.
- (7) In a few instances, some Departments and individuals were reluctant, possibly for political reasons, to allow the scrutiny of records which might have turned out to be of use.

Some Preliminary Considerations

The central objective of this research was to trace the private capitalist activities that played a strategic role in the dynamics of capitalist development in the Sudan. It was necessary, therefore, to devise a theoretical framework as a basis for the selection of a group of the most prominent members of the Sudanese private business class for intensive study.

It was evident from the outset that no single criterion, be it size of capital, historical reputation, area of activity, etc., was going to be adequate as a basis of selection. Inevitably, multiple criteria had to be employed if the research was to fulfil its aims. The kind of considerations that had to be borne in mind included the following:

- (1) Without going again into too much detail, certain features of the Sudanese economy had to be taken into account. Historically, the Sudan entered the world market as a producer of certain primary commodities such as ivory, gum arabic, livestock, oil seeds, cotton and some other less important products. As a result, the areas where these goods were produced, marketed and exported, acquired a relative significance. Therefore, the choice of the regions to be included in the study had to be based on the size of the contribution they made to the aggregate. This meant, among other things, the total exclusion of one province, the Northern Province, which contributed less than one percent of total agricultural production in the country. Considering the fact that this province's importance was mainly agricultural, the exclusion seemed logical.
- (2) Regarding three Southern Provinces (now six) the size of their economic contribution alone might not have warranted their inclusion in the study. However, the Southern regions and the rest of the country experienced, historically, different levels of development due to colonial policies

and other factors. This necessitated special treatment of the Southern regions. Questionable though this might seem, it was considered useful to include some of the private business activities in the South, (a) because of the contribution this region made to the individual wealth of some Northern capitalists, and (b) because it represented an important and distinct region in the country.

- (3) The next major consideration according to which the individual businessmen were to be selected was the sectoral distribution of private business activities. Bearing the primary concern of the research in mind, the relative importance of the sectors, as well as of the main components of each sector, in the process of private capital accumulation had to be taken into account.
- (4) For the purposes of this research, capital accumulation could only be usefully studied within a historical perspective. In order to do that, some criteria, based on an adequate periodization with regard to the history and the development of private business activities, had to be designed. Thus the selection had to include indigenous business establishments which were considered prominent at each historical stage from the colonial period up to the contemporary one. This proved to be a rewarding exercise, as it resulted in the inclusion of several individuals reputed to have achieved an early prominence but who were no longer prominent at the time the research was undertaken.
- (5) Finally, and as a result of the limitations encountered during the preparatory stage, it was considered appropriate to check the validity of the selection from alternative sources. This was done by: (a) asking people about any reputed men of wealth in the specific area; (b) holding meetings with the executives of the Chambers of Commerce wherever branches

existed; (c) interviewing old traders, even if they were not among the richest; and (d) consulting officials whose work was related to the research objectives, such as tax inspectors, crop markets directors, bank managers, former ministers, etc.

Bases of Case-Selection

In accordance with the above considerations, the task of selecting the actual cases to be studied was embarked upon. In an attempt to approach the subject comprehensively, it was decided to include the leading businessmen in all the major sectors of the economy in which private Sudanese capital was active. So trade, agriculture, industry and services seemed a logical framework within which to undertake the selection of the cases to be studied. In the financial sector, for example, private Sudanese capital was almost totally absent. Despite the fact that traditional finance did exist as a source of private capital accumulation, the part it played was relatively insignificant compared to the banks. The latter were almost exclusively controlled by branches of foreign banks. The only indigenous Sudanese bank started functioning in 1961 and its share of the total deposits was comparatively small. Moreover, those indigenous capitalists who were involved in traditional "shayl" finance were primarily traders.

Agricultural Sector

Private agricultural production in the Sudan emanated from three distinct types of organization. These acquired varying degrees of significance in the different historical periods.

Firstly, there were the irrigated pump schemes on the Blue and the White Niles. The importance of these pump schemes was historical, because of their decline as a source of private capital accumulation after the early sixties.

Secondly, there was rainfed traditional farming which, though important in size of output, was excluded because it was not organized under capitalist relations. Its importance with regard to private capital accumulation could only be considered at the level of exchange, i.e. in the form of trade capitalist relations.

Thirdly, there were the rainfed mechanized schemes, which have played an increasingly important role in private agricultural capital accumulation since 1945. These were to be found in three major regions: (a) El-Gadarif area in Eastern Sudan; (b) the Southern part of the Blue Nile Province between the Blue and the White Niles, extending southwards along the White Nile into Upper Nile Province; (c) Southern Kordofan and Darfur areas, within which the much mentioned Habeela schemes fall.

Of these three areas, the Gadarif region was selected for study on the following grounds:

- (a) According to the Statistics Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, Gadarif is considered the leading region on the bases of area cultivated, size of output and number of workers employed.
- (b) The information obtained from the Mechanized Farming Corporation in Gadarif revealed a relative concentration of ownerships which had direct bearing on private capital accumulation. Table 4.1 illustrates this point.

TABLE 4.1 *Concentration of Land Ownership in Gadarif*

NUMBER OF OWNERS	ALLOCATED AREAS IN FEDDANS	FEDDANS PER OWNER
33	600,000	18,182
1,000	1,000,000	1,000
2,500	500,000	0,200
10,000	500,000	0,500

(c) Even this level of concentration was probably an underestimate, because it was also found that the owners of the mechanized schemes cultivated vast areas outside their officially specified plots. Evidently, this could only be done by those who possessed excess mechanized capacity.

In the light of the first row of Table 4.1, it was decided that a minimum figure of 10,000 feddans per owner was a reasonable basis for selecting the leading businessmen in this area. This was arrived at on the understanding that the figure quoted in the table represented the mean for the group, which meant in reality that some individuals owned more and some less than 18,182 feddans. This resulted in the selection of twenty schemes, the owners of which turned out to be sixteen individuals.

We can now turn to agricultural capital accumulation prior to the decline, and eventual liquidation, of the private pump schemes in 1968. Although the first licence for a private agricultural scheme was issued by the British authorities in 1924, by 1968 only a handful of individuals seemed to dominate the scheme. For historical continuity it was considered necessary to include the most prominent of them.

According to Farah H. Adam, the total number of private pump schemes in the Sudan until 1968 was 659. Of these, sixty-five percent (428 schemes), were cotton-producing schemes.¹ The remaining thirty-five percent were mostly mixed farming schemes for fruit, vegetable and dairy production, which were mainly directed towards the local market. Compared to private cotton production, their contribution to agricultural private capital accumulation between the years 1924 and 1968 was insignificant. This was consistent with the fact that cotton was the major cash crop of the economy during that period and had generally commanded high prices in the international market up to the fifties. It was considered adequate, therefore, to confine the study to the

1. Farah Hassan Adam, "Economic Appraisal of Agrarian Reform in the Private Cotton Estates, Sudan", Department of Rural Economy, University of Khartoum, Research Bulletin No.20, September 1971 pp.1-5.

cotton-producing schemes.

In order to select the leading owners of private cotton pump schemes it was necessary to break down the total figures according to ownership. The picture that emerged from the breakdown was as shown in Table 4.2.

TABLE 4.2 *Private Pump Schemes and Area under Cotton by Size Categories*

SIZE OF CATEGORY IN FEDDANS	SCHEMES		AREA UNDER COTTON		AVERAGE AREA PER SCHEME FEDDANS
	NUMBER	%	FEDDANS	%	
Less than 300	313	73	23,125	15	74
301 - 1000	89	21	49,306	32	554
1000 and over	26	6	80,346	53	3,090
All Categories	428	100	152,777	100	317

Source: Farah Hassan Adam, 'Economic Appraisal of Agrarian Reform in Private Cotton Estates in Sudan', Department of Rural Economy, University of Khartoum, Research Bulletin, No.20, 1971.

This table reveals that only six percent of the schemes comprised fifty-three percent of the total area under cotton. Since the main concern was with the leading agricultural capitalists, further investigation was confined to the owners of those schemes. An unfortunate experience, however, was encountered before the completion of this preliminary task. Halfway through the work, the Director of The Nile Waters Commission suddenly reversed his original decision to make the relevant files available. As a result, alternative sources had to be relied upon to pick cases from this category. Those consisted mainly of Ministry of Agriculture officials and individual interviews with known owners of some of the largest pump schemes during the period in question.

This process yielded, by general consensus, five individuals who could be considered among the leading pump scheme owners. At the time the research was undertaken, one of those five had already left the country and the other four were dead. Of the four, however, two had had sons who were still engaged in business activities and were available for interview.

Industrial Sector

The only available comprehensive source on the industrial sector was the records of the Ministry of Industry and the Industrial Survey for 1970/71.¹ In the former, industries were registered according to: (1) type of industry, (2) location of industry, and (3) date of registration. For the purpose of selecting the leading industrial capitalists this classification was inadequate. Firstly, no names of owners were reported. Secondly, the type of industry was not specified. Thirdly, no information about the size of capital, output or number of workers was reported. Moreover, it was discovered, during the course of the research, that the records were never revised or updated, as the registration system was a cumulative one. This system resulted in the inclusion of industries which no longer existed. More serious was the fact that the record was incomplete. This transpired later, when it was found that some industries which actually existed were not included in the Ministry's records.

Thus, the information taken from this source had to be re-classified and presented in a more meaningful and complete fashion. According to the Ministry records, the first industry ever to be registered in the Sudan was established in the year 1928. The growth in the number of industrial establishments between 1928 and 1973 was found to be as shown in Table 4.3.

1. Department of Statistics, National Council for Planning, Industrial Survey, 1970/71, Khartoum, National Council for Planning, 1973 (in Arabic).

TABLE 4.3 *Registered Industries, 1928-1973*

PERIOD	CUMULATIVE NO. OF ESTABLISHMENTS
1928-1955	40*
1956-1958	106
1959-1964	123
1965-1969	356
1970-1973	589

Source: Corrected from registration records and licence files, 1928-1973,
Ministry of Industry.

A further breakdown of the figures in table 4.3 was necessary to allow the development of private industry in the Sudan to be followed. When the forty industrial establishments set up between 1928 and 1955 were traced back, it was found that ten of them started before the Second World War. Of these, eight were oil mills. The significance of this lay in the facts that: (1) a number of industries that sprung up, as a result of wartime shortages of imports, had to close down soon after the war; (2) the edible oil industry developed to become the leading industry in the country from that period until the present day. It was therefore decided to follow the development of those industrial pioneers.

Of these ten establishments, one could not be traced in the area where it was supposedly located according to the Ministry of Industry's records. The remaining nine establishments were owned by seven individuals, who were thus included in the case studies. It might be mentioned here that, of those

* This figure had to be changed (revised upwards) after the completion of the survey and the visits to the seven towns where most of the early industries were located. The Ministry's files listed thirty seven.

seven, six were still among the leading industrial capitalists of Khartoum in 1976. The seventh, although he acquired the mill at a later date from its original owner, was still found to be among the leading industrialists in El-Obeid town.

In addition to the seven already selected from the pre-war period, leading contemporary industrialists had to be selected also. This proved to be a less arduous task because the Industrial Survey published by the Department of Statistics in 1973 contained sufficient information which could easily be verified if need be. The survey included 211 industrial establishments employing twenty-five workers or more. It classified them according to the relative importance of each industry in the Sudan. The bases for classification were: (1) size of output, (2) value added, (3) number of workers employed, (4) total wages and (5) size of capital investment.

According to the above classification the leading industry was food processing followed by textile industries and chemical, mechanical and metal industries. To determine the identity of the leading capitalists in the industries, each must be looked at in more detail.

(1) Food Industries:

Food industries were further classified in the survey into twelve types of industries, the most important of which was the edible oil production, followed by the category including cotton ginning and flour mills. The third most important type was the sugar industry, which was exclusively owned by the state.

Table 4.4 shows the relative importance of food industry, as well as the relative size of the three leading types, i.e. edible oil, flour milling, cotton ginning, and sugar industries.

TABLE 4.4 *Relative Contribution of Selected Types to All Industry*

CATEGORY	% NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS	% VALUE ADDED	% VALUE OF OUTPUT	% NUMBER OF WORKERS	% TOTAL WAGES	% NET INVESTMENT
FOOD INDUSTRY TO TOTAL INDUSTRY	39.2	36.6	48.8	35.5	34.2	52.1
SELECTED TYPES TO FOOD INDUSTRY	45.1	57.1	71.2	58.4	54.8	69.9

Source: Department of Statistics, National Council for Planning, Industrial Survey 1970/71, Khartoum NCR (in Arabic), pp.61-62.

Being state-owned, the sugar industry was of no concern to this study, so edible oil, ginning and flour milling were selected. Starting with the latter it was found that, after the nationalizations and confiscations of 1970, the leading establishments were taken over by the State. Between 1970 and 1976, however, two new large flour mills were commissioned, and these were included among the case studies.

The edible oil industry was the oldest and largest single contributor to industrial output in the Sudan throughout the period under study. To pick the owners of the leading establishments in this industry, it was considered necessary to classify the establishments according to their size and relative importance. A demarcation line among the establishments had to be drawn. It was decided to include for intensive study the owners of establishments with a capacity of 9,000 tons per year and above. This exercise yielded twenty-three edible oil factories, owned by nineteen individuals. Twelve of these mills were located in Khartoum, seven in Western Sudan, two were in Port Sudan, one each at Wad-Medani and New Halfa.

(2) Textile, Cloth and Leather Industries:

This comes second only to edible oil industry in the Sudan. It employed the majority of the industrial workers and paid the majority of the total wages. Its share of the value added was the largest. It ranks second in terms of capital investment and value of output. Two important facts affected the choice of the cases studied in this branch: (1) the private sector played a minor role in the leather industry, as the big establishments were owned by the State; and (2) the biggest non-government leather establishment (the Bata Company) was nationalized in 1970. The remaining establishments in the industry were mostly handicraft workshops.

As for the textile industry, large privately owned factories were located at Khartoum, Port Sudan, Wad-Medani and El-Obeid. Other smaller ones did exist but they employed less than twenty-five workers, so the industrial survey did not include them. The three leading establishments were thus included for intensive study.

(3) Chemical, Mechanical and Metal Industries:

These are the third most important branch of industry. They comprised over twenty-nine percent of the number of establishments and employed 16.5 percent of industrial workers. They paid about eighteen percent of the total wage, and contributed twenty percent of total output and eighteen percent of the value added.

The leading industries in this branch were the oil refinery and the soap industry. The refinery was owned by the State and a foreign company (Shell), so it was excluded. The leading soap establishments were seven. They were all found to be part of edible oil mills, as a partial utilization of by-products. When the owners of these seven were traced out, they were found to be seven of the previously selected edible oil industrialists.

Thus, edible oil industrialists represented the leading capitalists in chemical industries as well.

Commercial Sector

Trade was the main source of private capital accumulation since long before colonial rule. Despite this fact, numerous difficulties were encountered in the attempt to compile a list of the leading traders in the country. These can be summarized as follows:

- (1) There was no single agency or Department where all trading establishments were supposed to register. Some were registered at local councils and municipalities. Others registered with the companies section in the Ministry of Trade (now Ministry of Finance and National Economy). Only limited liability companies, regardless of their size or capital, were obliged to register with the Ministry of Trade. Other types of traders had the choice of registering either with the Ministry or with the local authority.
- (2) It became evident on studying these lists that a very crude classification system was employed. The traders were classified according to type of activity, date of registration and nominal capital. Paid capital, which would have been a better guide, was not registered in all cases. (Neither, in fact, would this, by itself, have constituted an adequate basis for determining the relative importance of the establishment.) Moreover, the classification under type of activity listed sectoral divisions only, i.e. trade, industry, etc. This gave no indication of particular field of trading activities.

The leading trade establishments were therefore chosen on the basis of a somewhat complicated combination of two basic criteria and a set of

additional precautions. In the first place, only establishments with export-import licences were included. In this respect, an additional practical difficulty arose. Although every exporter and importer had to obtain a licence from the authorities, these licences were never filed in the name of the trader. They were only classified according to products, which were lacking in the former list. This difficulty was overcome by means of verbal consultations with officials of the Licencing Department.

Historically, and in varying degrees up to the present time, trade in certain commodities played an outstanding role in private capital accumulation. Areas where these commodities were produced came to be very important areas from a trading point of view. Commercial activities in these localities played, thereafter, a central role in the origin and development of private commercial capitalism in the Sudan. It was therefore decided to make the second basis of selection (in addition to licence-holding) a regional one. Thus, the prominent traders in the following areas were included: Khartoum Province, Port Sudan, Gadarif, Wad-Medani, New Halfa, Nyala, Rahad, El-Obeid, Um-Ruwaba, Juba and Yei. Different criteria had to be used for southern towns of Juba and Yei but with this exception, the minimum nominal capital for those selected was LS 50,000.

To ensure that the leading traders would indeed be selected, the following additional precautions were taken: (1) finding those who owned more than one capitalist establishment or property; (2) asking about those who were reputed to be rich traders in the localities; (3) cross-checking by asking tax inspectors and capitalists chosen by other means about who they thought were the leading traders in their areas; and (4) obtaining the list of subscribers to telecommunications devices (which were believed to be used only by the traders who had significant international contacts). This service was only available in Khartoum and Port Sudan. All who were selected from

these two areas proved to have telecommunications devices.

The two criteria and additional precautions yielded ninety-three individuals who could be considered leading traders. The registered nominal capital of those selected in the Northern provinces did not fall below LS 50,000. The twelve traders of the Southern provinces may not all have satisfied this requirement because of the inadequacies of the registration system with regard to the South. The distribution of those selected was as shown in Table 4.5.

TABLE 4.5 *Regional Distribution of Trade Cases*

REGION		NO. OF CASES	REGION		NO. OF CASES
1.	KHARTOUM	16	7.	RAHAD	6
2.	GADARIF	16	8.	UM-RUWABA	6
3.	PORT SUDAN	15	9.	YEI*	2
4.	NYALA	12	10.	NEW HALFA	1
5.	JUBA*	10	11.	WAD-MEDANI	1
6.	EL-OBEID	8		TOTAL	93.

* Located in Southern Sudan.

In view of the researcher's particular interest in the historical origins of capital accumulation, it seemed important to investigate the careers of all the individuals who had played a prominent role as traders before 1945. Information collected from diverse sources suggested that there were a handful of well-known multi-business families and individuals. Nine such early traders were found. Of these, six were dead and one had left the country as a result of the confiscation of his businesses in 1970. The businesses of all six dead men were nevertheless still thriving and had

been included for study on the basis of the criteria mentioned above. In these cases, additional questions were asked of the interviewees (in all cases relatives of the original owner). Of the original nine individuals, the two who were both alive and still resident in the Sudan were not found to be prominent in contemporary terms. It was thought to be of interest to interview these people, though for obvious reasons the resulting data were not computed along with the other interview findings.

Services Sector

This sector comprised, in order of importance, building and contracting, transport and shipping, hotel services, entertainment and insurance. The selected establishments had a registered nominal capital varying between LS 50,000 - 1,470,000.

A notable omission was real estate owners. This was justified on the grounds that bank loans in the Sudan can be obtained most easily on the security of property ownership. Real estate ownership was seen as a corollary to other business activities. It would have yielded an identical list to the one already at hand. Therefore, it could be considered a constant, despite the inevitable variation in the extent of ownership.

Another, less significant, omission was the port clearance and forwarding services. The reason for this was the fact that clearance was a subsidiary activity of the leading traders at Port Sudan. As the leading traders had already been selected for study, the omission seemed warranted.

The selection process ended up with nineteen establishments, owned by fifteen individuals, in Khartoum, Port Sudan and Wad-Medani. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the details of their type and distribution.

TABLE 4.6 *Distribution of Establishments by Type and Location*

TYPE LOCATION	BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION	TRANSPORT* AND SHIPPING.	HOTEL SERVICES	ENTERTAINMENT	INSURANCE	ALL TYPES
KHARTOUM	5	2	2	1	1	11
PORT SUDAN	0	3	3	1	0	7
WAD-MEDANI	0	0	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	5	5	6	2	1	19

* Owners of fifty trucks and over.

TABLE 4.7 *Distribution of Establishments by Type Ownership*

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS	NUMBER OF OWNERS
1. Building and Construction	5	5
2. Shipping and Transport	5	5
3. Hotel Services	6	2
4. Entertainment	2	2
5. Insurance	1	1
ALL TYPES	19	15

Outcome of the Selection

The total number of establishments that emerged from the selection described in the previous sections was 148. These were owned by one hundred individuals. The difference between the two figures was a result of two factors: (1) multiple ownership within each sector; and (2) multiple ownership between the four major sectors themselves. The nature of the 'overlap' between the nominal groups of agricultural, industrial, trade and service capitalists which emerged from the selection of establishments is of substantive interest. Table 4.8 and Figure 4.1 summarize this information.

A number of important points may be added:


- (1) The overwhelming predominance of trade establishments. Of the 148 business establishments, only nine were not present in the leading trade list.
- (2) All the leading agricultural capitalists but one were also leading traders.
- (3) Sixty-four percent of the leading capitalists in the services sector

TABLE 4.8 Selected Cases, Overlap Between Sectors

SECTOR	TOTAL CASES		TRADE		AGRICULTURE		INDUSTRY		SERVICES		OVERLAP TWO SECTORS OR MORE	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
TRADE	93	100	50	54	14	15	18	19	6	6	5	5
AGRICULTURE	18	100	14	78	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	22
INDUSTRY	25	100	18	72	0	0	2	8	1	4	4	16
SERVICES	15	100	6	40	0	0	1	7	4	27	4	27

Number of Actual Cases 100

Figure 4.1 CAPITALISTS OVERLAP AMONG SECTORS



were also leading traders. Twenty-nine percent were leading in industry as well. While twenty-one percent were leading in both services and agriculture.

- (4) Eighty-eight percent of the leading industrialists were leading traders as well.

Data Collection and Analysis

Once the cases had been selected, it was decided to collect the necessary information through both a standardized interview and a questionnaire to be filled by the establishments themselves. As only a minority of the establishments completed the latter, the standardized interview was expanded to compensate for that.

The effort of arranging meetings with leading businessmen was hampered by their numerous involvements with which the researcher had to compete for time. Despite this, however, only one of the cases refused to answer any of the questions. One other businessman, a man of a wide international link, was never reached personally, because of his frequent absence from the country. To obtain the information about these two subjects, interviews were arranged with their associates. All the interviews were carried out by the researcher in the localities of the businesses themselves. This process took about ten months to complete.

The interviews were carried out and the responses recorded in Arabic. Before they could be classified and coded the whole questionnaire had to be translated into English. That done, the codified responses were punched on cards and run at the University Computer Centre (see Appendix No. 4).

The resulting tables and cross-tables were the basis of the analysis presented in the chapters which follow.

CHAPTER FIVE

Capitalists Of The Sudan : A Preliminary Analysis Of Individual Case-Histories

This chapter provides a preliminary analysis of the case histories of the businessmen selected for study in the manner described in Chapter Four. It first deals with the immigrant Sudanese, by which is understood the capitalists of non-Sudanese origin who migrated to the Sudan during various historical periods. During the colonial period, as mentioned in the second chapter, these migrants were more prominent than the Sudanese and, this being the case, it is important to find out the factors that account for this relative success. Relations within this group, as well as those between them and the Sudanese, are examined. An attempt is made to shed some light on the nature of the relation between the Sudanese and these immigrants.

The chapter also discloses the countries, or regions, of origin of both the immigrants and the Sudanese capitalists and established the nature of the activities they started with. Evidence is then presented on how they succeeded in accumulating capital to the point where they came to be included among the leading capitalists in the country.

The study of these capitalists and the regions where they invested reveals certain facts with regard to (1) the relation of these capitalists to the indigenous people of the corresponding areas, and (2) the way in which the Sudanese and the immigrants respectively integrated within these regions.

Readers who do not wish to spend time on the detail of the case histories may turn to the Summary at the end of the chapter.

The Immigrants

The findings of this study reveal that twenty-four percent of the leading businessmen in the Sudan in 1976 were of non-Sudanese origin. Ten percent of the total were of Egyptian origin, three percent of Turkish origin, eight percent of Saudi, Yemeni or Hadarma origin, two percent of Syrian origin and one percent of Greek origin.

On further investigation it was found that these businessmen of non-Sudanese descent inherited their concerns from their fathers or grand-fathers, who had migrated to the Sudan during the Turko-Egyptian colonial period (1820-1881).¹ Descendants of such immigrants were found to be among the leading businessmen in Port Sudan, Nyala, Gadarif, El-Obeid, El-Rahad and Khartoum.

In the opinion of the indigenous Sudanese interviewed, the continued dominance in business of this immigrant group is mainly due to two considerations: (1) they received favourable treatment from the Turko-Egyptian colonial rulers, who saw them as naturally loyal for ethnic reasons; and (2) both the Turko-Egyptian and the British colonial authorities viewed them as the most acceptable group because they were not in any degree involved in political activities and were then isolated from the indigenous people. The indigenous Sudanese traders were subjected to discrimination and deprived of the free mobility between the provinces which was reserved for immigrants. As we have seen the first agricultural schemes were given exclusively to immigrants.

This immigrant group showed acceptance to all kinds of governments. Even during the Mahdist era (1881-1898), when Khaleefa Abdullahi attempted to put pressure on them, they achieved a *modus vivendi* by marrying Ansari women and allowing the Khaleefa's men to marry among them.² According to our figures, moslem groups predominated. The non-moslems were few and constituted only nine percent of the cases studied. This suggests that continuity during the Khaleefa period was more secure for moslems, who were able to

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1. T. C. Niblock, in his forthcoming work entitled 'Class and Exploitation in the Sudan', traces the migrant traders as far back as the seventeenth century and relates the disintegration of the Sultanates in part to the growth of this merchant class.
 2. One of the cases studied was the descendant of a rich immigrant family (from Egypt) who married into the Ansar during the Mahdist era.

intermarry with indigenous Sudanese Ansari women.

The geographical distribution of the immigrants studied shows that Port Sudan had the largest share (six out of fifteen). In fact, immigrant families were found in 1976 to control the business of the town. The indigenous Sudanese ~~there~~ were their subordinates until the late 1960s. The first immigrants frequently encouraged their relatives and countrymen to emigrate to the Sudan. They established multifarious family businesses through intermarriage among their own kind. The head of one such family encouraged his cousin to emigrate from Saudi Arabia to Port Sudan. When the latter did so, intermarriage resulted in ten members of his family becoming involved in business in Port Sudan. Members of this family were the leading shipping capitalists in the town in 1976. They were also involved in trade, construction and industry. Figure 5.1 shows the conjugal and business linkages between the two families.

Two other leading business families in Port Sudan were found to be linked by a similar net of business and conjugal relations. These were Yemeni families who were related by intermarriage not only to each other but also to four other of the business families of Port Sudan, including a Sudanese one. As Fig 5.2 illustrates, seven of our businessmen were members of this group of families.

It was found that five out of six leading immigrant business families in Port Sudan were linked by intermarriage. Moreover, they had already developed various business partnerships.

The same pattern was revealed in Nyala. A conjugal as well as business partnership was found to exist between one of the leading families in Nyala and the leading capitalist in Gadarif. Figure 5.3 illustrates this pattern. It also illustrates the intermarriage between the leading family in Nyala with business families in Omôurman.

FIG. 5.1






FIG. 5.2



KEY

- ▲ Leading Businessman
- ▲ Businessman
- Partnership

FIG. 5.3



Examples from Khartoum revealed the same pattern. Of the five immigrants in Khartoum, four were of Egyptian origin and one was of Turkish origin. The four Egyptians were members of two extended families whose heads were actually cousins. Through intermarriage the four merged to become members of the same kinship network.¹ Of the two cousins, the first emigrated to Khartoum as early as the Turko-Egyptian period and then persuaded his cousin to do the same. Under the British their business expanded to the point where it ranked second only to British companies. By the 1930s these men were among the first to be given agricultural scheme licences. As a matter of fact, they were the owners of the scheme in the White Nile area which was the scene of the bitter conflict of 1954 referred to in Chapter Two. By 1976, four of the sons or grandsons of this family were among the leading capitalists selected for all sectors of the economy.

One of these was the president of the Khartoum Chamber of Commerce at the time the research was undertaken, as he has been for nearly two decades.

Fig. 5.4 shows the conjugal as well as the partnership linkages between these families.

None of the immigrants studied was found to be a recruit from the Civil Service or the armed forces. The majority of them, especially the residents of Port Sudan and Khartoum, were found to have started in trade, real estate, agriculture and then industry and services. The majority of the individuals studied in Port Sudan bought their business establishments from the British. The majority of the cases interviewed became, in the second stage of their activities as traders, agents of British companies.

1. Three of the indigenous Sudanese businessmen were also found to have in-law relations with these two families. It is perhaps worthwhile to mention that two of these men who took their second wives from these families were found to have taken first wives from their relatives who were not as rich as these latter in-law families.

FIG. 5.4

KEY


letters indicate families

businessmen

leading businessmen (1c,2a,3b and 4b)
3b was the President of the Chamber of
Commerce for about two decades.

Partnership

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It might be interesting to note that there was found to be conjugal relations between these families and five of the leading indigenous Sudanese business families whose members were also found to be among the cases selected for this study. It is also worthwhile to mention that all these changes took place after Independence.

While the majority of the indigenous Sudanese became significantly wealthy after the Second World War and particularly after Independence, the immigrants were well established prior to both periods. The richest immigrant in Port Sudan, for example, was found to have developed his business network as follows. He came to Port Sudan in 1905 and started trade in Suakin. In 1918 he bought about twenty-five houses and shops in Port Sudan town. The First World War boosted his business activities. In 1930 he bought an agricultural scheme of 15,200 feddans from the British government. In 1939 he established a soft drinks factory and in 1951 he bought the Sudanese Salt Company from the government. In 1955 he bought two ships and started a shipping company. In 1960 he bought a ginning factory from a Syrian businessman. In 1967 he established ten warehouses in Port Sudan and a cleaning plant for export crops and seeds. The same year he established the largest edible oil mill in Port Sudan.

Another leading immigrant businessman in Port Sudan arrived in the town in 1892. In 1930 he bought a number of pieces of real estate and started shipping activities. In 1940 he acquired an agency from the Shell Company. In 1968 he started industrial activities. Another immigrant came to Port Sudan, started with trade and then acquired real estate in the form of houses, shops and hotels. After Independence he became an agent of a British Company (Mitchel Cotts) and by 1976 his son had established three factories.

The pattern in Nyala was slightly different. Here too the immigrant businessmen started in trade but they were also engaged in flour milling in the rural areas around Nyala. At a later date, all the immigrants were found to have invested in edible oil industry as well as in real estate.

In the Gadarif region the pattern was trade and mechanized farming at first and then industry. Some developed trade activities which extended to Khartoum and Port Sudan. Others invested the profits they made in Gadarif

in industry in Khartoum or Port Sudan.

In the South until the mid-1970s the wealthiest businessman was an immigrant of Syrian origin. He started business with his brother in Khartoum but transferred part of his capital to the South, where he set up tea packing and tobacco industries. In 1964 he bought a cigarette factory in Juba. He also invested in agriculture. He then invested in industry in Khartoum and Wad-Medani. This capitalist, whose early activities in the South coincided with the British colonial period, was allowed - unlike the indigenous Sudanese - to operate freely in this region. Indeed he was encouraged by the British authorities, who wished him to engage not only in trade and agriculture but in industry as well.

Predictably, all the Christians interviewed were found to be among the immigrants, except for one from the southern Sudanese tribes. Their number, even among the immigrants, was not very considerable. They constituted 37.5% or nine individuals. Moslem immigrants not only succeeded better in becoming integrated in the Sudanese culture; they were also more successful in accumulating capital. The leading immigrant capitalists in Khartoum and Port Sudan, for example, were all Moslems. The Moslems among the leading immigrant agricultural capitalists were also found to be amongst the leading agricultural capitalists in the country throughout the colonial period.

The material on this section has confirmed what was suggested in the second chapter: that immigrants developed as businessmen earlier than the Sudanese. Those who invested in agriculture during the colonial period were given licences before the Sudanese. Moslem immigrants were found to be absorbed within the Sudanese capitalist class through intermarriage and business partnership, especially after Independence. The Turko-Egyptian and British colonial policies contributed to the success and continuity of the immigrant group, reflected in the fact that they constituted 24% of the cases

studied in 1976.

Indigenous Sudanese Capitalists

In trying to cast light on the development of the indigenous Sudanese capitalist class it will be useful to begin with a general survey by region. This will make clear whether there is a possible conflict between rural and urban capitalists, and whether any important significance attaches to regionalism in relation to the socio-political composition of the indigenous Sudanese capitalists. It is also important to know how this relates to the migrants who invested in the same areas.

Although the majority of the indigenous capitalists whose case histories were collected accumulate substantial capital only during the years of the Second World War, three were able to trace the origin of their fathers' and grandfathers' capital accumulation back to the slave trade in the eighteenth century. These three men attributed the continuity of their family businesses to the fact that their fathers or grandfathers had been prominent followers of Almahdi, under whom they had been involved in gum export and livestock trade.

The South: Dominance of the Galaba

Our account of capital accumulation in Southern Sudan is based on the case histories of the interviewed capitalists from Juba and Yei towns. Juba is the capital of Equatoria Province and Yei is a small town located on the Southern edge of the province bordering Uganda. The description also draws on interviews with government officials and with Northern traders who worked over twenty years in the South.

The regional disparities referred to in Chapter One were apparent even in relation to capital accumulation. A striking fact resulting from the

survey was that, with one exception who started business in 1975, none of the capitalists in the South was a Southerner. The one exceptional case will be dealt with later.

Colonial policies with regard to the regions of the Sudan are reflected in the fact already noted that the richest capitalist in the South was found to have been an immigrant whose position could not be seriously challenged until the mid-1970s. All the indigenous Sudanese who invested in the South were Northerners. When interviewed these said that during the colonial period indigenous Sudanese traders were only allowed to be involved in trade activities in the South at the discretion of the colonial authorities. They could only enter the South when they could get an entry permit from the British provincial administrator. Those who were allowed were reputed to be politically acceptable to the British authorities.

Trade in ivory, ostrich eggs and feathers, beads, salt and grains was found to be the first form of trade undertaken by the cases studied in the South. All the capitalists were found to have started in trade. 60% (eight) of them diversified into river transport and two into contracting. Then three of them moved into industry in Khartoum. Among the cases three were found to have also invested in agriculture. They made use of the loans offered by the agricultural bank during the early 1960s. Those who invested in contracting were found to be ex-Civil Servants who utilized their contacts with government Departments to obtain government contracts. One of these was an ex-army officer whose decisive fortune was made during the first military period when he was offered a contract to supply food for the Northern army in the South.

The only ex-farmer among the Southern cases studied was a migrant from Merowe in the Northern Province. He left farming and started in petty trade. He then became one of the shyle merchants in the Northern Province,

later migrating to the South. He continued in trade and in 1976 he entered into partnership with another capitalist to start an industrial edible oil factory in Khartoum.

In the South, following what I shall suggest is a general pattern of rural-urban capital transference, capitalists were moving from small towns to Juba. Businessmen in Juba except two were found to have started in Mangala, Yei, Bour, Tourit and Terkaka. One was found to have invested in Yei after he established his business in Juba. That capitalist was found to be involved in smuggling activities between Sudan and Uganda. However many of the traders in Sudan who were operating in towns located at the boundaries (Port Sudan, Gadarif, Yei, Nyala) were found to have made some of their money through such activities. This was confirmed by the taxation officers in each of these areas, some of whom claimed that these capitalists often tried to bribe them.

Perhaps because of the mutiny in the South and the South-North conflict, e.g. the events of 1955, the northern businessmen in the South were, like those in other places, not involved in real estate in the South. Northern capitalists in the South only owned the houses in which they lived, plus a few shops. They usually bought houses in Khartoum, though this was a general pattern.

One of the cases studied in this context was a member of a very well known Sudanese business family, the Kameers. The first to start business in this family was an indigenous Sudanese Siri Tigar (chief merchant). He started trade as early as the time of Almahdi. His trade was said to have flourished during Almahdi's rule, as he was one of Almahdi's tribesmen and one of his strong supporters. This family developed businesses that extended to include many towns in Sudan. Members of the family were found by the present study to be among the leading twenty capitalists in Khartoum, among

the leading twelve in Nyala and among the leading fifteen in Port Sudan. In the South, a member of this family was found to be among the leading twelve. Three of the leading capitalists in Khartoum were found to have in-law relations with this family. One of these was wealthier than the Kameer family. Other members of the family who were not among the cases selected for this research were also found to be involved in capitalist activities in Gadarif, Port Sudan, in the South and in Nyala. The Kameer family members started the business in the South after Independence. They established a company with a capital of £25,000. The company was connected with the various Kameer activities in trade in Sudan as well as with the export-import trade. In 1976 the leading Kameer from the South in partnership with his family members of Khartoum started a plastic factory in Khartoum North.

The single case, mentioned above, of a Southerner who achieved prominence in business in the South started business as late as 1975/76, after the creation of the Southern government. He was found to be a Dinka and a relative of the regional governor. He was a pharmacist who had been given a loan by the bank of Juba (nationalized 1970) to start a pharmacy. His pharmacy became one of the only two pharmacies in Juba and the surrounding towns, as a result of which he made a considerable profit within one year. In 1976 this pharmacist was in the process of starting a cosmetics and medical imports company in partnership with three members of the regional parliament. (The latter are among the highest paid State employees from any part of the Sudan.)

In Southern Sudan, as also in the West, the indigenous tribes call the Northern traders the ⁵Galaba (traders), a term which became associated with the Northern traders in these areas since they were the first to migrate there. In both these areas some of these Galaba were found to have married

daughters of local tribal leaders. Three of the Sudanese merchants studied in the South were married to Southern women. In Nyala two Northern Sudanese and two immigrants were married to Western tribeswomen. This suggests that these capitalists integrated with the well-to-do and influential groups of the local areas. However, the ordinary people still think of them as the Galaba.

Four Towns in Western Sudan

The two provinces of Western Sudan, Kordofan and Darfur, were divided into four provinces in 1975: Northern Kordofan and Southern Kordofan and Northern Darfur and Southern Darfur.

A sizeable proportion of the Sudan's total exports historically came from these provinces, e.g. gum, groundnuts, sesame, karkadi. These areas provide the export and local markets with over two thirds of total supply.

The traditional edible oil industry started in these provinces and the first investments in edible oil plants using imported machines also came from these areas.

The case histories collected included those of capitalists from Nyala in Darfur province and Er-Rahad, Um-Ruwaba and Obeid in Kordofan province.

Er-Rahad: Town Without Water

Er-Rahad is a traditional trade area south of El-Obeid in Kordofan province. It was a centre of the trade in gum, oil seeds, dura and live-stock throughout the period under study. It was one of the towns where the traditional edible oil pressing industry started as early as the 1920s. This town illustrates the disparity between big and small towns and confirms what we said in Chapter One about the disparity between Khartoum and Port Sudan and other towns. In Er-Rahad in 1976 there were no taxi services.

Internal transport was still dominated by animal driven carts. There was also no running water, no electricity supply, no secondary schools, and not a single hotel. The only places where electricity and water were available were the factories and the houses of the capitalists who owned them. The capitalists used private pumps for water and private generators for electricity.

What seemed in Er-Rahad as a simple co-existence between the modern and the traditional 'sectors' was in fact, however, a maintenance of the conditions under which the small producers would continue to supply the factories and the trade companies with oil seeds, gum and other crops. The findings of this research reveal that the entire commercial and industrial activity of the town, as well as of the surrounding villages, was controlled by six capitalists.

The first Northern traders who migrated to the town were from the Gaaliyeen tribes. Five of the six commercial capitalists studied came from this tribe. The sixth was of Turkish origin but was married to a Gaalyi woman who was a descendant of a trading family. All six were found to be sons of traders. Three of them were involved in traditional edible oil pressing besides the trade in oil seeds. These were sons of the leading traders in Er-Rahad who had started traditional oil pressing during the 1920s and 1930s. At the time the research was undertaken the same three were also the leading edible oil industrial capitalists in the area.

Although all these traders started their trade in Um-Ruwaba, El-Obeid, Nyala and Genaina, they all eventually settled in Er-Rahad. The six of them moved a part of their capital into edible oil production in Er-Rahad. One of them invested in edible oil in Khartoum. Another, besides moving into edible oil in Er-Rahad, invested in mechanized farming in Habeela (Southern Kordofan). One also invested in trade in Port Sudan.

Um-Ruwaba: Town of Two Families

The striking feature of commercial capitalist activities of Um-Ruwaba was that they were controlled by just two families. The heads of these families, moreover, were relatives. They were from the Shaygia tribe and had migrated from the Northern Province one after the other. The first persuaded the second to join him in Er-Rahad. There were various in-law relations between the two families.

The older of the heads of these families (88 years old) was the son of a trader in the Northern Province who was involved in both farming and shyle lending. Following in his father's footsteps, this capitalist started trade and shyle lending between Albarkal and Aldamar (towns in the Northern Province) in 1928. He began to travel to Port Sudan to buy goods and sell them in Aldamar and Albarkal. He then migrated to El-Obeid and there he accumulated enough capital to compete with Um-Ruwaba merchants. He was buying oil seeds from the producers of the areas around Um-Ruwaba. At the same time he was trading in dates produced at his father's farms in the Northern Province. In 1935 he transferred part of his capital to develop date farming in the Northern Province. He bought some more land there, erected pumps and hired some former farmers to look after his farms. As a result of these developments he became the leading date wholesaler in Um-Ruwaba area as well as in the surrounding towns, including Er-Rahad.

In 1938 this capitalist established three traditional oil pressers which increased to twenty within four years. Soon after he sold all these mills and bought a modern factory from England. Within two years, in partnership with the richest capitalist in El-Obeid, he established another edible oil factory in El-Obeid. Soon after he entered into partnership with two immigrant capitalists and established a factory in Wad-Medani. He established his second factory in Um-Ruwaba in 1951. In 1976 two of his

sons were found to be in the process of establishing another edible oil factory in Khartoum.

Two of the cousins of the man referred to in the foregoing paragraphs moved into edible oil in Port Sudan. In partnership with each other, they also established an edible oil factory in Khartoum. The son and the son-in-law were also found to be among the leading commercial capitalists in Um-Ruwaba in 1976. The son-in-law was himself a member of a famous business family, the Kambal family. One of the members of this other family was among the leading capitalists in Nyala. Other members, though not found within the leading group, were wealthy factory owners in Omdorman. Still others were commercial capitalists in Port Sudan and Khartoum.

The second oldest migrant to Um-Ruwaba, the head of the other major family of the town, was the cousin of the first one. He was an ex-Civil Servant who had exercised trade besides his job in the Sudan Railways. He came to Um-Ruwaba when he was pensioned. This man died in 1975 and his son inherited his business, which included trade and industry in Um-Ruwaba, industry in Khartoum, and mechanized farming in Habeela, south of Kordofan. His daughter was married to the son of the head of the first family of the town already referred to. His other daughter was married to the fourth most prominent capitalist in Um-Ruwaba. This was the son of an old migrant from the Northern Province who migrated there during the 1920s. In 1951 this capitalist inherited his father's business and became a partner with the son of the head of the first family. Together they set an edible oil factory in Um-Ruwaba. In 1959 this capitalist set up an independent factory in Um-Ruwaba. His eldest son, who graduated from a British University, took over the management of his father's business and in 1961 set up an edible oil factory and a commercial company in Khartoum.

The fifth capitalist was a nephew of the first. He started trade with

his father in the Northern Province and he started his trade on his own in 1956 between Um-Ruwaba and Kassala (in the Red Sea Province). He then entered into partnership with his uncle (the head of the first family) and started an edible oil factory in Um-Ruwaba. In 1963 he started an ice factory. In partnership with all the four previously mentioned capitalists, he started an edible oil factory in Khartoum in 1976.

The last capitalist studied was a relative of the first. He started trade in Um-Ruwaba as an assistant to his father. He started an edible oil plant after Independence, going on to set up a road transport company that connected Um-Ruwaba with Khartoum. In 1974 he established an edible oil factory in Khartoum.

The two most important business families of Um-Ruwaba owned most of the real estate and all the private transport in the town. They effectively controlled the commercial activities of the town, as well as its edible oil production.

El-Obeid: A Fortune of Thousands, not of Millions

Of the eight capitalists studied in El-Obeid, two were leading industrialists and four were commercial capitalists. Five of the eight started in trade, one had been a craftsman and two had been civil servants.

The craftsman was one of just three of our national sample of industrialists who started from handicrafts and later became capitalists. This helps to confirm what was suggested in Chapter Three: that industrial capitalism in the Sudan did not develop from handicrafts. The man in question was originally an ironmonger. During the First World War he operated a workshop for the repair of simple machines, guns and motor vehicles, for which he obtained a contract from the colonial government. After the end of the war, however, he did not continue in the same line of work or

seek to enlarge to diversify his business, because his contract was terminated. Instead, he became involved in edible oil trade and eventually started an edible oil plant in El-Obeid. He was found in the process of establishing an edible oil factory in Khartoum in 1976. Originally this man had migrated from Turkey but, like the one in Um-Ruwaba, he was married to a Gaalyi woman from a trading family in El-Obeid.

The other industrialist in El-Obeid in 1976 was a former civil servant. After completing his secondary education he had joined the judiciary Court of Merawi for two years. He then resigned to join his father who was a trader as well as a shyle merchant in Merawi. He then migrated to El-Obeid to join his uncle as a business manager. The uncle, who was one of the wealthiest traders in El-Obeid, offered him 40% of the profits of his business as well as a manager's salary. In 1966, i.e. three years after joining his uncle, he married his uncle's daughter. In 1967 he started a cheese factory and in 1968 he bought the industrial possessions of the wealthiest industrialist in El-Obeid, who was transferring his business to Khartoum. These possessions included an edible oil factory and a number of houses and shops. In 1973 this capitalist started agriculture in mechanized farming in Habeela and a trading company in Khartoum. Two of the cases studied in Um-Ruwaba were found to be his kinsmen. The three of them were found to be starting an edible oil company in Khartoum in 1976.

The next most important capitalist in the town was a trader and an ex-civil servant. After finishing his elementary education he had migrated from Dongola (in the Northern Province) and worked as a clerk in the El-Obeid crop market in 1920. He then started trade in oil seeds in the nearby villages. He became an agent for a British oil seed export company (Boxall Company). He extended his trade to En-Nahud. Besides his commercial business, he started an edible oil plant in El-Obeid. In 1976 he started an

edible oil plant in Khartoum and was in the process of moving his trading company to Khartoum as well.

An old Gaali trader (84 years old) told the author he could trace the origin of his capital back to the slave trade in the eighteenth century. His grandfather, who had been a slave trader, had passed his capital on to the father, from whom our subject inherited it. The father was a strong supporter of Al-Mahdi. He was involved in livestock and gum trade during the Mahdi era and was a native administrator during the British rule. The son studied started in trade and he was found to own one of the leading textile factories by 1976.

Two of the commercial capitalists in El-Obeid were found to have diversified into both industry and mechanized farming in the Gadarif area and in Habeela. They both started commercial companies in Khartoum in 1976 and were thinking of transferring their factories there too.

Another trader was found to have been a middle-man for prominent livestock traders in Omdurman. He accumulated most of his capital during the Second World War. After the war he was involved in gum and oil seed trade. Contrary to what one would have expected, only two of the leading capitalists were involved in livestock trade during the process of their capital accumulation. Both of these were middle-men and neither continued on to become a prominent commercial capitalist in the livestock field.

A trader who developed into a contractor for the government was found to have become prominent as late as during the years 1970-1976. This was a migrant from the Northern Province who had been involved in trade there until he joined his uncle's commercial business in El-Obeid and married his daughter. During the years 1970-1976 he got involved in pro-government political organizations, becoming the regional representative of the government party (the Sudanese Socialist Union). He was also appointed as the representative of

national capitalists of El-Obeid. Besides his trade this capitalist got all the government contracts. He supplied the schools, government agencies, hospitals, army, etc. with all their needs. As he admitted to the author, he accumulated about half a million Sudanese pounds through government contracts between 1972 and 1976.

Most of the capitalists who accumulated capital in El-Obeid before, during and immediately after the First World War seemed to have left the town by 1976. Some of them turned up among the prominent edible oil industrialists of Khartoum. One was found to be in the process of moving to Khartoum, and one had already sold his possessions in 1974. Nevertheless, the majority of the leading capitalists in the town in 1976 were found to have accumulated the bulk of their capital during one or other of the two World Wars.

Trade between En-Nahud, El-Obeid, Wad-Medani, Er-Rahad, Alghabsha, Tandalti and Ed-Da'in seemed to have been a source of capital for most of those interviewed. Some of the cases studied also accumulated capital in towns and villages near El-Obeid. They continued in trade in El-Obeid and, when they had accumulated a certain amount, they tended to invest in edible oil industry. Their next step was to move to Khartoum, where they planned to follow others into trade and edible oil industry. In preparation for moving to Khartoum some capitalists had set up partnership with other capitalists in Kordofan area. An example of this was three capitalists from El-Obeid, Rahad and Ed-Dein, and another three from El-Obeid, Er-Rahad and Um-Ruwaba who were found to be setting up factories in Khartoum.

Patterns of partnership were found to be most common between capitalists in El-Obeid and businessmen from the other towns in Kordofan province. The buying of real estate in Khartoum was more prevalent among El-Obeid capitalists than among the others. When the author asked one of the commercial

capitalists in El-Obeid why he was buying real estate in Khartoum, he replied that he was not thinking of staying long in El-Obeid, adding that: "In El-Obeid, as well as the other towns in Western Sudan, one can make a fortune of thousands but not of millions. The time when that was possible has gone. In Khartoum, if one knows the rules of the game properly, one can become a millionaire within a few years ... perhaps within one year."

Nyala: A Flamboyant Failure

Before analysing the origin of the capital of the leading capitalists of Nyala it is worth tracing the history of the oldest and most famous trader in the area. This man happened not to be among the leading capitalists at the time the research was undertaken. Nevertheless, he was a member of the Executive of Nyala Chamber of Commerce and in the interviews with the leading capitalists of the town his name was always mentioned as that of one of the richest traders during the late 1920s and the 1930s.

Despite his famous life history, his many ambitious expeditions for trade purposes and his physical adventures,¹ Banaga failed to develop like other members of his age group, into a wealthy capitalist.

Banaga was in 1976 the oldest member of Nyala Chamber of Commerce. He had started petty trade with his father in the early years of this century, migrating from the Northern Province to En-Nahud and then to El-Obeid in 1916. In 1917 he went to a small town east of El-Obeid called Wadaa. He accumulated some capital from trade there and went back to En-Nahud again. In 1920 he was trading in Rizaigat area in South-West Sudan (Darfur Province).

In 1921 Banaga moved to Central Africa, where he traded in ivory, beads and ostrich feathers between there and Southern Sudan. He married the

1. When he started trade he made several trips to South Sudan using a donkey for transport. He was captured by thieves many times but claimed to have physically overcome all of them.

daughter of one of the tribal rulers of Central Africa (a Sultan) and lived there for two years. In 1922 he went to Nigeria on another trade trip. From there he went back to Central Africa and lived there until 1927. He claimed (and others interviewed confirmed this claim) that his picture was reproduced on one of the coins of Central Africa in his honour as a famous trader and the son-in-law of the Sultan. He then went to Chad, which was his last country of trade outside the Sudan. In 1929 Banaga came back to the Sudan and began trading between Fashir and Geneina in Darfur Province. He married the daughter of a Western tribesman and later also one of his own relatives. He ended up as a trader in Nyala and, when interviewed, he owned a few houses and was running a small shop. None of his numerous educated sons was involved in business with the exception of one who was found to be working as a business manager for one of the richest Sudanese capitalists. However, all his sons acquired university education and some did post-graduate degrees as well.

Banaga did not become a prominent capitalist for a variety of reasons. Some of these are:

- (1) he did not identify with the political system in the Sudan, as he was a member of none of the religious sects which were important during the colonial period;
- (2) he was not particularly friendly with the British authorities and was sometimes found to have been hostile to them;
- (3) in the post-colonial period he identified with no political party;
- (4) most importantly Banaga was illiterate and his educated sons were not interested in pursuing his life; and
- (5) these sons were so many (Banaga told the author he could not tell how

many they were) that none of them would have found it rewarding to take over the father's business.

As Banaga himself put it, trade was a means which permitted him to engage in adventures and travels. Whether this explanation is adequate or not, the fact remains that his consciousness was not a typical capitalist consciousness and as such did not motivate him to explore areas for further profit-making and capital expansion.

Nyala: The Leading Group

In Nyala, as in Khartoum and Port Sudan, there were a considerable number of immigrants who had started trade a good deal earlier than the Sudanese. These accounted for five of the twelve cases studied. Three of the remaining seven were members of the same extended family. This was the Kambal family previously mentioned in connection with Um-Ruwaba. The first member of this family, a member of the Shaygia tribe, came to Western Sudan from Korti and was first involved in trade between El-Obeid and Geneina. He accumulated his initial capital from gum and oil seed trade in El-Obeid. He then migrated to Nyala and established trade connections with the Kawarta of El-Obeid and later with those of Khartoum. In 1958 this capitalist was followed by another family member. The second Kambal succeeded in making a big fortune within a short period. He started trading in grains with Central Africa and in spices, mainly chilli, with Libya. Then he started a spices and dried food mill (by machine and hand). Most of his product was sent to Libya. The growing number of Sudanese migrating to Libya ensured a good market for his food products there. In 1974 he started a decorticator and an oil mill. At this stage he decided to leave the business in Nyala for his eldest son, who was persuaded to leave school at the age of nineteen. The father moved a substantial amount of his liquid capital and set up an

edible oil factory in Khartoum.

The young Kambal proceeded along the same lines as his father. In 1976 he was found to be the second richest capitalist in Nyala. He maintained trade connections with his relatives in Nyala, El-Obeid and Um-Ruwaba, as well as with his father and numerous uncles in Khartoum. This family established an organized net of distribution for their industrial products through their commercial establishments in El-Obeid, Nyala, Er-Rahad and Khartoum.

The fourth businessman was also a shaygi. He was a relative of the two leading capitalists interviewed in Um-Ruwaba. He obtained his capital by getting a loan from a cousin (also a businessman) after migrating to Nyala in 1944. With the loan, he bought a number of cattle, transported them to the North and sold them for 150% profit. He repeated this operation until he was able to back the loan with a balance of some thousand pounds. He then went to El-Obeid and bought a decorticator, which he used himself and rented to other merchants. In 1972 he bought two more decorticators. In 1976 he established an edible oil factory in Nyala in partnership with another capitalist.

Two of the leading indigenous Sudanese capitalists in Nyala were found to have accumulated their capital out of savings they made from their salaries as assistants to the third wealthiest Sudanese immigrant businessman in Nyala. They put to good use not only the knowledge of business practice but also the contacts they established in business circles in Nyala during their employment. Both started in commerce and transport and finally established edible oil factories.

The last man interviewed was the only Western Sudanese tribesman among the cases studied in Western Sudan. This was a lorry driver who had been working for an immigrant businessman. With his own savings he bought a lorry

and continued to transport crops for the traders. He then started trade himself between Nyala, Ed-Daein and Geneira¹¹. His tribal origin helped him in creating vast networks of commercial contacts with the small producers. Moreover, his political loyalties to the Umma Party gave him access to both finance and an export trade licence. He worked for this party in all the elections up to 1969 and was able to convince his tribesmen to vote for the Umma candidates. In 1968 he himself was the party candidate in the area. The owner of the largest export company in Khartoum, a member of the same party, gave this capitalist various special facilities e.g. advance payments on exports. In 1964 our subject started in industry by establishing an edible oil factory. In partnership with the richest capitalist in Nyala (an immigrant) he established another edible oil factory in 1968. He bought a substantial amount of real estate. He then married the sister of the Assistant Governor of Nyala. The brother-in-law was the political representative of the present (1978) military government. In 1976 this capitalist established the largest transport company in Nyala. The company linked Nyala with Fashir, Geneira, Ed-Daein, Obeid, Er-Rahad, Um-Ruwaba and Khartoum. In 1976 he established two decorticators and the third largest oil mill in Nyala.

It was discovered during the course of the research in Nyala that some of the commercial capitalists studied were involved in smuggling activities between Nyala and Central Africa, Libya and Chad.

Port Sudan: The Heart of Merchant Capital

After the closure of Suakin Port in 1905, Port Sudan was chosen to be the sole port of the country. The development of Port Sudan was also accelerated by the introduction of rail transport in 1906. At the same time, private road transport and the air connection with important towns like Khartoum and Atbara enhanced the development of Port Sudan.

Private capital accumulation in Port Sudan was highly influenced by the commercial nature of the town. As a result of the emergence of a commercial capitalist class, this town developed a crystalized class structure as early as the fifties. In 1958 the Doxiadis Study reported the income structure in the town to be as follows:¹

Income group per pound	Percentage of people
1000 and over	1%
500-1000	10
250-500	40
less than 250	49

Mercantile activities, salt production and shipping were the main sources of capital accumulation in Port Sudan.

A substantial proportion of the cases selected in Port Sudan were immigrants (6 out of 15). Of the indigenous Sudanese remainder, the Nubians constituted the majority (5 out of 9). The remaining four were also from the northern tribes, one Shaygi and three Gaalis. Only one was found to be from the eastern Sudanese tribes. He came from the Beja tribe and was the son of one of the prominent Beja merchants during the 1930s. As was the case in the previous towns we have considered the majority of the capitalists were descended from trading families. This was true of five out of the nine indigenous Sudanese and all of the six immigrants. Of the remaining four Sudanese, one was an ex-civil servant, two were ex-tailors and one had been a professional.

The professional was an electrical engineer who left his profession and established a repair workshop for refrigerators and other electrical equip-

1. Source: Doxiadis and Associates, The Future of Port Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan Government, Ministry of Local Government, 1958.

ment. His initial capital was a loan from a Commercial Bank whose Port Sudan branch was managed by a school colleague and friend. In 1968 this capitalist became an agent for an Italian company that exported refrigerators and electrical equipment to the Sudan. In 1968 he became a contractor for installation of electrical devices in the Port. In 1973 he started another workshop for pipe-line and ship repair.

The ex-civil servant was an inspector in the Gezira Scheme. After working for ten years for the Gezira Board, he joined the largest Sudanese export company (the Osman Salih Company) as a manager. He then got a loan from the Sudanese Commercial Bank and set up his own commercial business. Utilizing his previous experience in the Gezira and the knowledge he had acquired by working in a cotton export company, he started exporting cotton in 1965. In addition he became an agent for a foreign company that exported lorries and trucks to Sudan in 1975.

Two of the cases studied, like the one studied in El-Obeid, showed initial signs of reproducing the classic pattern of advance from handicrafts to capitalist production. Both were tailors who got a contract from the colonial government to supply the army with uniforms during the Second World War. For this purpose they set up a workshop and hired some tailors. After the War, however, they were unable to obtain the loan they needed to start a modern ready-made clothing factory. They eventually succeeded in starting a similar factory in partnership with an immigrant capitalist, going on to expand into trade business. In 1976 each of them was also involved in shipping and transport.

Although the development of these tailors seems different at first sight, it was in fact very much like that of the case studied in Er-Rahad. Their success was conditional upon the special circumstances of the World War: the contract they got, and subsequently the partnership with the

established capitalist, marked the decisive point in their careers.

Partnerships between indigenous Sudanese and immigrant capitalists seem to have played a more significant role in Port Sudan than in the other towns studied. Three of the commercial capitalists studied stated that the turning points in their commercial careers were due to the partnerships they entered into with one of the richest immigrant capitalists in Port Sudan in the early years of the post-Independence period. Two of them subsequently branched out with independent businesses in 1964. The other set up an independent trade business in 1974 but he was still found to have his partnership in 1976.

The last case studied in Port Sudan was another member of the Kambal family which we have discussed already.

Trade, salt extraction and shipping in Port Sudan were found to have been controlled historically by the immigrants. Only relatively recently, i.e. after Independence, have they been subject to significant competition from Sudanese. These immigrants were also found to control a substantial amount of real estate. They controlled not less than 40% of the real estate and the hotels in the town. Of the nineteen service establishments studied in the whole country, seven were owned by capitalists from Port Sudan. All the leading salt companies and shipping companies studied belonged to the immigrants of Port Sudan.

Gadarif: Farming Bonanza

During the last twenty years Gadarif has become the most important area in Sudan for private agricultural capital accumulation. As the leading area in the country for mechanized farming, Gadarif also acquired importance as a commercial centre. The introduction of mechanized farming in the area in 1945 was a turning point for most of the traders in Gadarif, who were the

first to invest in this type of agriculture.

Mechanized farming has a high rate of return and yields profits in a relatively short space of time. For this reason it attracted a variety of investors, including notably civil servants, sacked civil servants (who had lost their jobs for political reasons) and pensioned army officers. These people utilized their previous positions in the state apparatus and got access to the agricultural finance and to the various facilities provided by the state.

The first traders who invested in agriculture were immigrants. These were descendants of two families which migrated to Gadarif for trade purposes at the end of the last century. When mechanized farming was introduced they transferred part of their capital to agriculture, while maintaining their trade activities.

Four of the leading capitalists in Gadarif were Nubians. One was an ex-Agricultural Inspector and three were businessmen. The interviews revealed that they were all encouraged to invest in Gadarif by the first Agricultural Inspector in the area who belonged to the same tribe and hence was the kinsman of these investors. Besides encouraging them, he helped them to get loans from the Agricultural Bank and facilities from the Mechanized Farming Corporation.

Five migrants from the Northern Province were found to have arrived prior to the introduction of mechanized farming, attracted by the commercial prospects. They entered mechanized farming during the 1950s and made a substantial capital during the Korean War boom (1952-1956). They subsequently invested in agricultural machinery, which they hired out to other agriculturalists, thereby accumulating further capital. One of them was found to have invested in trade and industry in New Halfa and the others were found to have invested in mechanized farming in Habeela and trade in Port Sudan.

The wealthiest indigenous Sudanese in Gadarif was the descendant of a famous Sudanese family. His father was a previous Native Administrator (a Nazir) in Kordofan Province and a close friend of the British Provincial Governor of Kordofan. Besides his job as a Native Administrator, his father was involved in trade. He was one of the leading gum exporters and livestock traders during the 1940s and 1950s. The capitalist studied was originally involved in his father's trade activities.

In the hope of setting up an independent business, our subject contacted the British Governor (his father's friend). The latter offered him a licence to cultivate cotton on the White Nile. In 1945 this capitalist went to the Gezira area and, after selecting the area of the scheme, obtained the licence. Moreover, he got a loan from Barclays Bank through the same Governor. He also got some money from his father. In 1954 he started another scheme in the same area in partnership with some friends of his father. When he had accumulated some thousands of pounds he invested in services in El-Obeid. There he started the first film theatre and a transport company. When mechanized farming was introduced in Gadarif he invested part of his capital in Gadarif. In 1962 he transferred all his capital from the pump scheme to Gadarif. In Gadarif he owned an area of about 10,000 feddans and cultivated an equivalent area outside the land he was offered by the government. In 1976 he was found to be moving into commerce in Port Sudan and industry in Khartoum.

It may be interesting to mention that this capitalist was a brother-in-law of two of the leading capitalists in Khartoum.

Khartoum

The importance of Khartoum, as with all colonial capitals, revolves around the infrastructure of the facilities which are concentrated in the

capital. The striking facts of private capital transference from all other towns in the country to Khartoum can only be explained in the context of this concentration.

In contrast with Nyala, Er-Rahad and Um-Ruwaba, in none of which was there electricity supply in 1976, Khartoum enjoys not only electricity services but the best of all the government services. These start from clean water, health and educational services and end with services like telecommunications and internationally connected telephone services.

In colonial Khartoum, except for few immigrants and five Sudanese who were involved in export activities, nearly all business companies were run by the British. Indigenous Sudanese only succeeded in becoming as 'big' as Khartoum after political Independence.

Khartoum has no regional importance. It is the region of big businessmen and the centre of industrial capital. 73% of the industrial establishments of the Sudan are located in Khartoum. The total investment in Khartoum is a little less than half of the investment in the entire country. Moreover, 64% of the industrial working class of the country produce for the industrial establishments located in Khartoum. While the rural poor refer to Khartoum as a privileged city where services are concentrated, governments usually see it as the centre of a dangerous organized opposition.

Six of the seven edible oil industrial capitalists interviewed in Khartoum were found to have accumulated their capital in Western Sudan. This confirms what was suggested earlier to be a regular process of transference of capital from Western Sudan to other areas, especially Khartoum and Port Sudan. The careers of these capitalists also suggest that politics played a significant role in private capital accumulation. Finally, the success of these capitalists, especially the leading one of them, confirms the proposition in Chapter Three: that the interest of the British colonial system in

edible oil exports led them to encourage the prominent capitalists involved in edible oil to develop despite the fact that industrial development in general was suppressed during the colonial period.

These three general patterns may be illustrated by means of the life histories of four of the leading edible oil industrialists in the Sudan in 1976, whose businesses were located in Khartoum.

The most important edible oil industrialist and oil cake trader was a son of a man who started trading during the Mahdia and was also among Al-Mahdi's supporters. He disagreed with Khalife Abdullahi during the last years of Almahdia and collaborated with the British against him. His son, who started petty trade during the British period, was involved in edible oil trade in Western Sudan from 1909. In 1914 he was engaged in edible oil trade between Western Sudan, Khartoum and Port Sudan. In 1918 he became a wholesaler of oil seeds which were then exported to Egypt. He was also involved in the oil cake trade, exporting to England. The same year he established a traditional oil mill of the Asara type in El-Ghabsha in Western Sudan (Kordofan Province). By 1922 he had established twenty of these mills some of them in partnership with other oil seed traders. Following the first migrant, who established modern factories in 1930, he bought a modern edible oil mill from England and set it up at El-Ghabsha. In order to pay for this factory, which cost him £86,000, he had to sell all his shops and traditional mills. Nevertheless he obtained easy terms from the importing company (Sudan Mercantile Co.) on agreement to export all his product through the same company.

In 1938 he was approached by the same company to become its supplier of edible oil and oil cakes for export to England and its agent for this purpose in London. On accepting, this businessman, who was illiterate and did not understand English, left for London, where he established an office. The

company appointed the staff and a translator for him. However, after Independence he started to export to other countries besides England such as Belgium, Italy, France and Spain.

In 1956, being a prominent Umma Party member and a close friend of Sayid Abdel-Rahman Al-Mahdi (the then leader of the party), he became concerned at the party's evolution as a result of Independence. In 1957, vexed and anxious that the party might come to be controlled by the civil servants, he quarrelled with both Sayid Abdel-Rahman and the Prime Minister (although the latter mediated between them at some point).

He started buying real estate in Khartoum in 1957. In 1976 he stated that his revenue from real estate alone was four million pounds annually. Besides his factory in Khartoum, he established a factory in Port Sudan with an output valued at about eight million pounds. Employing about 700 workers, the factory was processing 150,000 tons of sesame and the same amount of groundnuts annually. The top technical and professional staff of this factory were British and Egyptians.

A notable competitor of this businessman in 1976 was one of the educated businessmen of our sample and also, incidentally, the son of one of those civil servants he was annoyed at within the Umma Party in the 1950s. This was a prominent party member, later to become a government Minister, and the manager of the Sudan Commercial Bank. While it took this businessman five decades to accumulate his capital, it took our new subject only ten years to establish one of the largest oil mills in the country. The only remaining difference was that the former, as one of the most prominent buyers of oil seeds over a long period, still had better control of the oil seed market. Though illiterate this old businessman succeeded in educating his sons who participated in the management of the entire business alongside him.

The second case to be described here is that of a young capitalist (23

years old) who inherited his business from his father who died in 1968. Here too the original capital was accumulated outside Khartoum. The father, who was born in 1890, was the son of a merchant and Shyle lender in the Northern Province. With his father (our subject's grandfather), he started trade in cotton and grains between Northern Province and Sennar, while his brothers were trading in Khartoum. During the Second World War he started a soap factory in Sennar but had to close it down after the War as a result of competition from imported soap. At this stage cotton prices were high and he was one of those who were given licences to cultivate cotton for export in the Blue Nile Province.

As a result of the industrial act of 1956 our businessman (the father) started a new soap factory in 1958 and a biscuit factory in 1961. The son set up a salt extraction works in Port Sudan in 1969. The capital for the salt works was about L.S 330,000. This was almost equal to what was given to the son as compensation for the expropriation of the agricultural scheme. This illustrates what was suggested in the Chapter Two: that agricultural capitalists profited from the so-called Agrarian Reform, which, together with the industrial concessions of 1968, encouraged many to transfer capital to industry.

Three of the leading edible oil factory owners were members of the same family. Two of them were brothers who inherited the business of their father, who had accumulated his capital in Western Sudan. The third man, their uncle, also accumulated his capital in Western Sudan.

The grandfather of the two brothers had been a trader since the Mahdi's days. Between 1912 and 1920 his eldest son (the father of the two businessmen studied) was involved in livestock, oil seed and gum trade in Western Sudan at Tandalti (Kordofan Province). In 1920 he established three traditional oil mills. His trade in oil seeds expanded and he became one of the

wholesalers to the British export companies. He was mainly selling to the Sudan Mercantile Company. After the Second World War he transferred part of his capital to agriculture. The British authorities gave him a licence for a scheme in Kostî where he cultivated cotton. He later established another scheme in the Blue Nile Province to produce cotton and groundnuts for export. In 1957 the National Unionist Party (NUP) won the elections. As he was a prominent member of that party he got a licence to start decorticators in Tandaltî. No other applicant was given a licence which may not be unrelated to the fact that those who applied were from the opposition party (Umma). He was thus decorticating groundnuts for the whole of Tandaltî market. In 1958 the Umma government gave seventeen others licences, as a result of which he had to compete with Umma party capitalists. In 1962 he started an edible oil factory in Tandaltî. When compensation was paid for his agricultural scheme in 1968, his sons, who took over the business after his death, transferred all the capital to Khartoum and established two of the leading edible oil factories in the capital. The career of his cousin, who was interviewed, was not different from his except that he did not invest in agriculture. Two of the cases studied in Khartoum were the sons of one of the early traders in the Sudan. Their grandfather was known to be a follower of Al-Mahdi who started trade in Suakin, as well as in Southern Sudan. During the First World War their father, in partnership with three others (two of them from the immigrants of Khartoum), set up a meat export company (Al-Rubaeya). This was established mainly to supply the British army with meat during the Second World War. The father was also involved in livestock export to Egypt and had established an office for the purpose in Cairo in 1918. In 1930 the sons were among the few to invest in agriculture. They owned a scheme in the White Nile Province. After Independence they entered into partnership with two of the leading immigrants in Khartoum and the leading Sudanese capitalist in

Gadarif. The latter became their brothers-in-law. In 1976 our subjects were found to be prominent in three sectors of the economy: they owned nine companies, operating in commerce, industry and services.

One of the Kameer family, referred to in detail earlier, was found to be one of the leading twelve edible oil industrialists in Khartoum.

Two sons of an ex-Minister of Finance who became the Director of the Sudan Commercial Bank were also found to be among the leading businessmen in Khartoum. One was the competitor of the oldest edible oil industrialist referred to previously. The other was a building contractor who was found to be executing a government scheme in association with a British consortium of consultants. The second son was an ex-army officer who had been sacked from the army in 1969.

Two businessmen were found to have come from a family of petty traders. Both of them made their fortunes through their political affiliations. One was an ex-journalist who was supporting the PDP party. He managed to get sufficient loans during the PDP/NUP government and started a printing firm. The other was a close friend of an influential minister who managed to get a contract for a large government building scheme and hence took off to become a prominent building contractor and commercial capitalist.

One ex-civil servant was found to have joined up with an immigrant businessman (the leading one in the South) during the 1960s. He was an NUP party member who succeeded in getting sufficient finance during the NUP government. He then started a packing industry for imported goods.

One of the millionaires in Khartoum in 1976 was found to have been a petty trader until as late as 1969. He was trading in grains and cigarettes in Gadarif and in 1970 started smuggling between Ethiopia and Sudan. In 1972 he benefited from hoarding goods and selling them when prices were high as a result of which he owned a substantial amount of real estate in Khartoum by

1975. He then began investing in agriculture in collaboration with Kuwaiti capital and in 1976 was starting an agricultural scheme in North Khartoum in partnership with the Gulf International Company. The scheme was estimated to be of 1,000,000 feddans. He is thus one of Khalil Osman's partners.

When he was in Gadarif this man was one of the agents of Sayid Abdel-Rahman Al-Mahdi's business in Gadarif. He was said to be an Umma party member who paid generous subscriptions to the party during the Abba War in 1970.

The two most prominent Sudanese businessmen of all in 1976 were found to have started business after Independence. One was an ex-civil servant who had a key administrative post. He resigned and in partnership with Sudanese capitalists in Nigeria he started in trade. Soon afterwards he got finance from an American firm and started a packing plant. He was in 1976 one of the two leading textile factory owners, though his industry was entirely financed by American capital. He was a prominent NUP member.

Khaleel

The other famous businessman (whom the reader will easily recognise as Osman) was a veterinary doctor who emigrated to Kuwait and entered into partnership with the Kuwaiti prince, Sabah Salim Alsabah. He started investing in Sudan in textile and packing industry with the finance of the Gulf International Company. Khaleel Osman owned the majority of the Gulf International Company shares in the Sudan and under his direction the Company was running about ten industrial firms employing about 30,000 workers.

One capitalist was established in the export and import trades since the colonial period and was an agent of numerous British and other foreign companies. He also established the largest flour mill in the country in the 1960s. His son, who managed the family business, emigrated from the Sudan in 1970 after the confiscation of all their property. Although his business was returned to him in 1976, he seemed not to be intending to return. The

son was (and still is) successfully operating in the export-import trade from London. He was recently chosen to be the chairman of the Groundnut Board in the City of London as a prominent trader in the commodity.

Two building contractors started contracting activities during the late 1960s. Both made the bulk of their capital through partnerships with more established capitalists. The two were educated, which gave them access to bank loans through their school colleagues. They were also able to get some of the government contracts that were allocated to Sudanese during the post-colonial period. In 1976 they were found to work for foreign contracting companies.

A son of a previous native administrator in Western Sudan was one of the leading capitalists in Khartoum. His father started livestock trade during the colonial period. The son who was a university graduate inherited the business and established a commercial company and a consultancy house in Khartoum. He invested in trade, industry and services as well as mechanized farming in Southern Kordofan.

In Khartoum eleven of the businessmen studied were found to be connected by intermarriage between their families. The eleven were members of three in-law families, including the families of leading immigrants. One of the business families in Khartoum was also found to have an in-law relation with the leading Sudanese capitalist in Gadarif. Partnerships were also common between both the Sudanese and immigrant capitalist families.

SUMMARY

The research confirms that although Sudan was already integrated to some extent into the capitalist world market through trade before the British colonial expansion, the latter was a decisive turning-point from the point of view of the origin and development of the indigenous capitalist class. The social layers from which we have seen that the Sudanese capitalists developed confirms the suggestion that the British colonial system "created a dualistic situation based upon the juxtaposition of dominant capital and dependent indigenous structures."¹

During colonial rule, the immediate dependent group was found to be the immigrants, who were the first to be allowed to be involved in capitalist activities. These were followed by the more important Sudanese religious leaders who were encouraged to invest in rivalry with each other to eliminate political opposition.

Besides these two categories, other early capitalists were found to come from the following groups:

- (3) Sons of Native Administrators. These were found to have been highly favoured and helped by the colonial government.
- (4) Sons of slave traders who had accumulated capital through slave trade prior to the Turko-Egyptian period.
- (5) Northern Province traders and Shyle² lenders who invested in trade in Western and Southern Sudan. These accumulated capital at a slow rate

1. E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, Heinemann, London, 1973, pp.20-21.

2. Those businessmen who began in farming, trade or Shyle lending in the Northern Province revealed an important fact: while colonialism implanted some indigenous capitalists and contributed to the development of others in a direct fashion, elsewhere it achieved the same in a more indirect way. These Shyle merchants abandoned trade in the Northern Province because products there were almost all for local consumption. They migrated to

compared to the previous categories and could only re-invest in industry after Independence.

- (6) Traders who accumulated a substantial capital during the Second World War by supplying the British army with food, particularly meat.
- (7) Handicraftsmen who achieved prominence by obtaining contracts to supply the needs of the British army and investing in trade and then industry after Independence (only 3% of our cases).

The research also reveals that the factors which accelerated capital accumulation in the colonial period included:

- (1) Openings created by the British for moving capital accumulated in trade into agriculture in the form of pump schemes after the increase in cotton prices in the 1940s and 1950s.
- (2) Investment in mechanized farming oriented to supplying the British Army during the Second World War and to the export of oil seeds and cotton afterwards.
- (3) Investment in industry during the War to meet the local demand in substitution for imported goods. Though this stopped after the War, the research revealed that some of those involved made considerable profits during the War period which they invested in agriculture and trade when it came to an end.

Immediately after Independence, members of the previously successful groups benefited in the following ways:

2. (contd.) ...

Western Sudan because here the trade in oil seeds, gum and livestock was mainly directed towards export. The alternative opportunities for them were thus determined by the demands of foreign markets.

- (1) Immigrants bought some of the establishments of the British when they left the country.
- (2) Some of the partners of the British and some of those who were working with foreigners, especially Greeks, either bought the establishments or became agents for these firms.
- (3) Some invested in government contracting, insurance and other services, though in insurance, up to the 1960s, they were found to be acting exclusively as agents of foreign insurance companies.

Besides the seven categories referred to previously, two groups of newcomers made their mark in the post-Independence period:

- (1) State bureaucrats. These included: (1) the top bureaucrats of the Gezira Scheme, who benefited from their previous position and were found to be involved in cotton export; (2) Civil Servants who held key positions and accumulated capital not only from their salaries but also by various corrupt means; (3) persons who advanced from this position as clerks in the export crop markets of Western Sudan; and (4) the sons of ex-Ministers and bank managers.
- (2) Party men who were given loans because of their positions in pro-government political parties. In the post-colonial period politics played an important role in promoting the business activities of both the previously established categories and the newcomers.

In this period, the research revealed that businessmen from various categories benefited from the Sudanization policies and the laws relating to import-substituting industries. Some were encouraged to invest in light industry. Others invested in contracting, road and shipping transport and

insurance, and many achieved prominence for the first time in this way.

In the 1970s too, politics have played a major role in private capital accumulation. Those who succeeded in becoming millionaires during this period were about 10% of the cases studied. Corruption, bribery and close relations with the military were found to have contributed significantly to this process of enrichment.

In this period those who were most successful in enriching themselves were those who invested in partnership with multi-national companies and/or with Arab capitalists.

At the outset it was expected that the research would reveal a degree of rivalry between the immigrant businessmen and the indigenous Sudanese. In fact the study proved the contrary. Intermarriage and partnerships, especially after the indigenous capitalists became wealthy, confirmed the absorption of the immigrant into the Sudanese capitalist class. Thus the basis for a conflict between the indigenous Sudanese and the immigrants was not found to exist.

The study revealed that the indigenous tribes of Southern and Western Sudan (especially Nyala) still view Northern Sudanese businessmen who invest there as Galaba, a term which in these areas has the connotation of non-indigenous trader, or Northern migrant.

In a general way, the material of this chapter confirms the following:

- (1) There is in the Sudan an indigenous capitalist class that was dependent, from its early development, on colonialism. In the post-colonial period its dependency did not disappear but was reoriented to neo-colonialism.
- (2) This is a relatively small, homogeneous and close-knit class, constituted by a net of families interrelated through marriage and business partnerships.

- (3) Its marked tendency to funnel its capital into a small number of urban centres and above all into the capital is creating a basis for a mass struggle against it.
- (4) By investing in a multiplicity of activities and owning more than one establishment, members of this capitalist class, though few, seem to control a substantial amount of the private capital in operation.
- (5) The new educated businessmen who are operating in partnership with multinational firms and foreign capitalists will constitute a substantial obstacle to any future attempt to disengage the economy from its foreign ties.

CHAPTER SIX

Socio-Economic Aspects Of Business Capitalists Careers

This chapter is concerned with two relatively independent issues and is therefore divided into two sections. While the first section discusses the role extended family-, kinship- and tribal ties and regionalism play in the process of capital accumulation, the second section discusses the impact of patterns of capital transference from one region to the other. Both discussions are prompted by patterns derived from the study of the business capitalist careers.

Section One:

Kinship, Extended Family Ties, Regionalism and Capital Accumulation

This section discusses the notion that extended family-, kinship- and tribal ties hinder capital accumulation. The material presented in this section not only provides evidence that such ties do not hinder capital accumulation but also confirms that, along with regional ties, they have helped to further capital accumulation.

Among Sudanese academic and political circles, with the exception of those which identify with the Sudanese Communist Party, the notion still prevails that classes do not exist in the Sudan. It is held, moreover, that a capitalist class is far from developing since kinship, tribal and extended family ties prevent capitalists from accumulating capital. These academics and politicians base their position on the assumption that, although the wealthy make money, they spend it on the poorer members of their extended families, their kinsmen and their tribesmen, so that the money they accumulate is dispersed and one cannot therefore talk about a Sudanese capitalist class. One can only talk about a wealthy group of Sudanese. It is also suggested in academic debates and lectures (even in the University of Khartoum) that 'class' is a concept that has been imported from the Euro-

pean situation without consideration to the different structure of the Sudanese society.

It is clear from the findings of this research (Chapters 2 and 3) that a capitalist class has existed for some time. Our account of re-investment patterns (Chapter 5) proves that what the Sudanese business class owns is not wealth but capital. To borrow G. Kay's words, 'the defining characteristic of wealth when it becomes capital is that no one form is an end in itself but a prelude to another'.¹

We shall thus examine, in the light of the findings of this research, whether extended family-, kinship- and tribal ties hinder the capitalists from accumulating capital. One expected to find that all the capitalists studied give help (السر بالاهل) to their poor relations, tribesmen, etc. However, those who were found to give such help were found to give it only to extended family members and to kinsmen. Tribesmen were not found to receive help from any of the cases studied. Furthermore, the findings revealed that 39% of the businessmen do not help relations at all. These were only found to be concerned with their nuclear family. 61% said that they keep relatives but 21% of them help only blood relatives who are also members of the same extended family. 38% help only relatives who are members either of the same family or the same class. 2% help poor persons to whom they are not related. In both cases these were found to be the families of dead partners.

Of those whom the capitalists said they helped 78% were given help to educate their able sons at schools. These sons were found to be expected to fill jobs in the capitalists' establishments. The help given to these families was found to be infrequent. On further investigation it was found that even those who receive help from these capitalists receive it as part

1. G. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis, MacMillan Press, London, 1976.

of the Zakat, which is a proportion of his income a wealthy moslem should pay as a charity to poor people each year.

It is perhaps interesting to note that the majority of the businessmen studied were found to be very superstitious. 96% of them believe in the evil eye and 100% of them were found to believe in omens. Relating this to their capitalist consciousness, one might suggest that these capitalists pay the Zakat because they fear that if they do not they may suffer from misfortune with regard to some adventuresome business undertakings. It is also possible to understand the payment of the Zakat to relations as a means whereby they maintain an image as moslems who give out of what God gave them. This image is especially important among relatives, who sometimes resent the privileges of their capitalist relatives.

The businessmen interviewed emphasized that they help their relatives because they consciously realize that this will enhance their prestige. It is our estimation that the amount they part with, even though directed to certain objectives like education, is small. The Zakat payment in the Sudan is not regulated in accordance with law, it depends on the estimates of the capitalist himself. According to the Koran: 'It is incumbent upon every one to pay wealth tax on gold, silver, cattle and agricultural produce, when all conditions are fulfilled. It consists of setting aside one fifth of the amount of a year's savings after deducting all the lawful expenses from the earnings of that year.'¹

When one of these capitalists was asked whether he pays a fifth of his annual savings as a Zakat he said: 'To start with, I do not save; all my money is working; it is creating jobs, helping people and paying taxes to the government, which in its turn spends it on the welfare of the people.' 'However', he added, 'I pay a reasonable amount in the form of helping poor

1. quoted in Elements of Islamic Studies, Bilal Moslem Mission, Tanzania, 1968, pp.13-14.

relatives.'

It is thus clear from the foregoing that helping tribesmen does not exist among the business capitalists we studied. Partial and infrequent help is given to extended family members and kinsmen. The majority of those helped were found to be helped to serve the establishment. The remaining few were found to be given help as part of the Zakat, which is solely determined by the businessman himself.

We are now left with tribal and ethnic relations and with the suggestion that these operate in such a way as to hinder capital accumulation. We found that no social bonds, starting from family and extended family relations and including ethnic and tribal links, prevented labourers from selling their labour power to their family, kinsmen or tribesmen. Such bonds also, obviously, did not prevent capitalists from buying this labour power. In refuting the previous assumption, we shall be able on the basis of the research findings to prove the reverse: that, instead of hindering capital accumulation, these forms are used to further capital accumulation.

First, all capitalists studied were found to employ family members in their establishment. These family members, especially sons, were often found to be the managers of the establishments. 86% of the cases were found to employ extended family members. 20% of these were found to hold managerial posts and the rest were found to hold clerical or supervisory posts. 30% of the subjects studied, most of them in industrial establishments, were found to employ tribesmen. These were found to fill in low clerical jobs and manual workers' jobs.

Second, all these employees, especially the manual workers, were found to be useful with regard to trade unions in the establishments. They represent the viewpoint of the establishment within the workers' trade unions and in some cases they work as agents to identify militant workers.

Following an argument between one of the capitalist's tribesmen and another worker in one of the trade union meetings in Western Sudan, the latter was sacked as a result of a report by the tribesman. The tribesman accused his fellow trade unionist of being an obstacle to production and creating chaos in the establishment. The trade union member had suggested a wage increase.

One of the capitalists who employed family members and tribesmen in his business (in Western Sudan) said that these were found to be more honest and more productive since they devote more time and effort to the business. It was found that, besides their salaries, kinsmen and tribesmen get additional financial help after a death in the family, for marriage and for sickness. This usually takes the form of help in kind, i.e. a present, and sometimes the form of money, depending on the specific occasion. Some of these relatives were found to supply the establishment with skilled labour i.e. by training their sons to fill jobs as technical labourers.

Members of the Nubian tribe especially in Gadarif made use of their Nubian inspector in Gadarif. The latter was the first mechanized farming inspector in Gadarif. He was found to encourage his tribesmen and capitalist relatives by helping them with the provision of agricultural bank loans. He even encouraged them to migrate from Halfa and invest in mechanized farming in Gadarif.

Among capitalists, the research found, tribalism and kinsmen relationships are a basis for partnership. Moreover, tribesmen who work in banks and government establishments related to business were found to be of great help to their fellow businessmen in finalising formalities and speeding bureaucratic procedures.

Another example is that of one of the most active importers and wholesalers. This is an extended family-based business which was found to be scattered all over the three towns in Khartoum province and some other areas

outside the capital city. The leading members of this family give capital to their relatives on condition that the latter invest in retail trade activities. These shopkeeper family members and kinsmen are used to distribute the wholesalers' and importers' goods. The system works as follows: the importers give to the wholesalers and the latter distribute to the shopkeepers. By financing relatives (an action which is understood by both parties as a kind of help) these wholesalers and import traders guarantee that their loans will be repaid. At the same time, they guarantee that all the goods they import or buy from the local industrial establishments are going to find an organized channel of distribution, in which case they quickly regain their capital which flows into merchant capital circulation.

Another example of how extended family and kinship are used to further capital accumulation was revealed from the cases studied in Nyala, Obeid and Khartoum. An extended family whose members were found to be among the leading capitalists in the former towns and also operated in the latter seem to practise an interesting linkage between trade and industry, using kinship and extended family ties.

This family derive their famous name from an area in the Northern Province. In Nyala two of them were found to be involved in industry and trade. One was the leading industrialist in Nyala. His factories produce soap, edible oil, and packed spices and food. The other is among the leading merchant capitalists. The latter was originally influenced by the former to migrate to Nyala. The merchant was found to buy the products from the traders and wholesale traders and sell them to the industrialist who grinds and packs them for export and internal distribution. So these products find their way from the direct producer to the industrialist through this merchant kinsman. In addition, after the dried food products are ground and packed they go back again to the merchant who distributes them to the

wholesalers, and so on.

Within this extended family some were found to be involved in transport between Nyala, Obeid, Port Sudan and Khartoum. It was found that during the shortage of edible oil (while the fieldwork was in process) prices of edible oil increased dramatically. These family members and their kinsmen were found to transport products to different areas and distribute them where there was a shortage.

In Gadarif while some capitalists stated that they faced some problems with regard to labour supply during the picking season, the richest Sudanese capitalist in the town said that he never faced such a problem. This capitalist was found to be the son of a prominent native administrator in Kordofan province i.e. Obeid. Using his father's previous position as the native administrator for the tribes in that region in addition to his own ethnic relationships, this capitalist was found to practise what I would call regionally- and ethnically-based organized labour migration.

The pastoralists of Kordofan area had been under the administrative control of this capitalist's father from the introduction of native administration under the colonial system. The father had been one of the sheikhs of one of these tribes but all the tribes in this administrative region had come under his administrative control. The son was found to have organized a number of Wakeels* from his tribe and the other tribes to organize for him the migration of labourers from Obeid to Gadarif during the picking season. These workers were collectively transported to Gadarif, where they were provided with food and accommodation on a collective basis. At the end of the picking they were given wages and some part of the produce, unlike regular wage-labourers who would have expected daily cash wages. These workers were found to be subsistence agriculturalists and pastoralists who, as such, received low wages. Moreover the collective accommodation and food arrange-

* Wakeel (in Arabic) means agent.

ments worked out cheaply for the capitalist. The result was that the capitalist obtained cheap labour and in the quantity required at a very sensitive stage of the agricultural cycle. As this capitalist himself admitted, this arrangement reduced his necessity for liquid capital during the harvest season, helping him to resort to the black market if necessary to obtain scarce items such as petrol.

It is clear then that this capitalist is at an advantage compared to the others because he uses his ethnic and 'regional' position to provide his business with a supply of cheap labour.

In this discussion we have argued that, contrary to the supposition that extended family-, kinship- and tribal relations hinder capital accumulation, these forms help the capitalists in furthering capital accumulation. In some cases these forms play an important role in promoting business activities.

Section Two:

Capitalist Careers and Patterns of Regional Development

This section discusses the impact of regional capital transference, with particular reference to Western Sudan. The discussion is based on the material reported in the preceding chapter, which revealed that there had been a regular transference of capital from Western Sudan, Southern Sudan and the Gezira to other regions, particularly Khartoum and Kassala Province. The section first outlines the nature of process of transference of capital and then discusses some of its consequences for the small producers operating within the non-capitalist mode of production in these areas, who have played historically an important part in supplying the capitalists with commercial products.

The concentration of infrastructure facilities in Khartoum has had immense consequences in terms of the concentration of capital in this province. At the time of the study, 73% of the industries in the country were located in Khartoum. 76% of the industrial establishments selected for the study were located in Khartoum. The attraction of large capitalist industrial establishments to Khartoum increased dramatically after Independence. This research revealed that prior to Independence modern industrialists basically accumulated the capital through traditional edible oil processing in Western Sudan. During the later 1930s and in the 1940s the majority of the now leading edible oil capitalists in Khartoum originally accumulated their capital in Western Sudan. They transferred all their capital, especially the industrial capital, and re-invested it in Khartoum. The research also revealed that pump-scheme agricultural capitalists who were compensated for their schemes after the 1968 'Agrarian Reform' all re-invested their capital from agriculture to industry in Khartoum. One, however, re-invested in mechanized farming in Gadarif. It was also evident from the previous documentation of the capitalist careers in West Sudan that the regular tendency of capital transference from this region to Khartoum is still going on. The reverse movement was never found to have taken place. However, a major new development which took place as recently as the 1970's by the extensive introduction of mechanized farming production in Western Sudan will be discussed later.

The South, on the other hand, was a source of commercial capital accumulation since before Turko-Egyptian rule and especially during and after the British rule. Some of the leading old commercial capitalists interviewed in Khartoum and Port Sudan had accumulated their starting capital in the South but they eventually transferred all of it to Khartoum and Port Sudan. None of the cases studied transferred any of their capital from Khartoum

and Port Sudan back to the South. Only one of the family-members of these traders re-invested in the South after Independence.

The commercial capitalists who accumulated capital in the West and the South were all from the North. Only two capitalists who started after Independence (one as late as 1975) were from the indigenous tribes of these areas: one from the South and one from the West. Regional loyalties, however, did not seem to be stronger than the profit motive, as one of these two capitalists was investing in Khartoum and was thinking of transferring his activities there when his capital grew big enough.

The reasons these capitalists gave as to why they transfer their capital to Khartoum are that industrial investment in Western Sudan cannot go beyond a certain limit because of the limited infrastructural facilities. For example, in Western Sudan there are problems: (1) of water supply, (2) of electricity supply, and (3) of transport and administration. Moreover (4) the businessmen complained about the nature of the labourers in West Sudan, describing them as relatively unskilled and scarce during the agricultural season.

Impact of Capital Transference:

West Sudan

This region played an important role in commercial and industrial capital accumulation as it was the major centre of oil seeds, livestock and gum production as well as of traditional and modern oil seed industry. Despite this fact, when capitalists had accumulated substantial amounts of capital they typically sold their factories and other possessions to smaller businessmen and transferred the capital to other areas, mainly Khartoum and Port Sudan. As a result of this process of capital migration, the small producers who were supplying these merchants with all livestock production

and other crops (until the latter were partly produced in mechanized farms after 1945) were never until very recently transformed completely into wage labourers. They continued to supply capital with these commodities which were produced under the non-capitalist mode of production. This mode was however integrated with the capitalist mode with the chain of small traders, brokers and wholesalers.

The sharp increase in investment in mechanized farming in the 1970s in Western Sudan had added another factor to the situation. It had led to a severe transformation in the mode of life of the small producers of the region. The mechanized farms were located in the fertile areas which these producers were using for agricultural and pastoral production. This additional factor accelerated the transformation of these producers into wage labourers but, more than that, it drove them out of Western Sudan. Some of them abandoned small-scale production and pastoralism and migrated to Khartoum, Port Sudan or the Blue Nile Province.

The result for Western Sudan was that migration was the highest from this region compared to the rest of the provinces. 47% of Western Sudan's original population was found in 1976-77 to have migrated to Khartoum Province and Kassala Province (where mechanized farming is located).¹ This suggests that migration of the Western Sudan's population follows capital migration. Migrants from Western Sudan provide Khartoum with unskilled and domestic labour; they provide the Blue Nile Province with seasonal agricultural labour; and they provide Kassala with loading and unloading labour, as well as agricultural labour. The internal migration within Western Sudan provinces is mainly directed to Habeela mechanized farms, where they provide seasonal agricultural labour.

To sum up:

- (1) In its first stages of accumulation, capitalism in Western Sudan main-

1. D.S.R. Ministry of National Planning, The Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, vol.1, Khartoum, April 1977.

tained the non-capitalist mode of production.

- (2) The process of transference of capital resulted in no significant re-investment in the area. The result was a gradual integration of the small producers into the capitalist market and their partial absorption by the relatively small industries of Western Sudan. Hence the direct producers in Western Sudan did not get the benefit of their contribution to the capital accumulated even in the form of the revolutionization of the base of production. They continue to supply the capitalist market with its needs using the same simple agricultural techniques.
- (3) The second phase in this process of transference is an expansion of capitalist production at the expense of the agricultural and pastoral areas which these producers have in the past used for small-scale production. The result is a limited area even for small-scale production, and the only options are migration or a complete subjection to wage labour.

As was stated before, capital accumulated in Western Sudan was re-invested in Khartoum, Port Sudan and the mechanized farming areas of Gadarif and Habeela. The fact that the highest share of migrants was received by Khartoum Province, followed by Kassala Province (where Port Sudan and Gadarif were located) suggests the link between capital transference and migration from Western Sudan.

The pattern of transference of capital casts new light on the continuing disparities which characterize the economy of the Sudan. The allocation of infrastructure which dictated the distribution of new investments was found to have been aggravated by the pattern of capital transference.

The situation in Western, as well as Eastern, Sudan challenges the dualists' assumption that the relationship between the capitalist and the

pre-capitalist structures creates a dualistic situation in which islands of capitalist modernity continue to co-exist with great seas of pre-capitalist traditionalism more or less indefinitely.¹ The dissolution of the pre-capitalist structures also challenges the modernization theorists who argued that there is a tendency for the values and skills existing in the 'modern' sector to be diffused outwards into the traditional sector. Modernization theorists feel that this process can be retarded because of the strength of the opposition to these values stemming from the hold which traditional values exert over the population. The basic challenge to these theories revealed in this study is that the pre-capitalist structure was partially maintained but this in the interests of capital accumulation. This did not continue indefinitely however, as the same process of capital accumulation subjected the pre-capitalist structure to a gradual process of erosion and, at a definite historical juncture, to severe changes. Though these changes do not necessarily take the form of a capital-wage labour relation, they are constantly taking forms that lead to that end.

A. G. Frank on rejecting dualism claimed that the whole of the third world society has been fully drawn into the international capitalist system but that the so-called traditional sectors are simply those which have to be kept in subordination to the dominant metropolitan centres in order to make it possible for the surplus profit to continue to be extracted from them.²

The subordination of the Western Provinces to the needs of the capitalist market has indeed subjected them to changes brought about by the process of capital accumulation. As Ernesto Laclau has argued, the traditional sector is an organic part of the overall system of capitalist exploitation but the

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1. E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, Heinemann, London, 1973, p.286.
 2. A. G. Frank, 'Dialectic not Dual Society', in Frank, Latin America Under development or Revolution? New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969.

traditional sector is not necessarily characterized by capitalist relations. In his view the capitalist system created a situation in underdeveloped countries where capitalist structures co-existed with pre-capitalist or feudal structures, and the former could more effectively extract profits from the latter because of their essentially feudal servile nature.¹

With regard to what has been explained in this study Laclau's proposition is only correct within a certain historical period; that is the first stage of capitalist accumulation. The co-existence of the two modes is subjected to dissolution the more capital is accumulated and re-invested.

As is pointed out by Keith Griffin in referring to regional capital transference in Peru,² it is likely that broader studies of inter-regional relations would indicate that relative poverty of some areas is due directly to the type of association experienced with other areas. Griffin's research in Peru suggested that internal migration had resulted in the transference of rural workers to cities and he adds that '... even more important than the transfer of labour to the coast has been the transfer of capital'. The transfer of capital through inter-regional trade between the Peruvian Sierra and the coast had not resulted in increasing saving and further investment in the Sierra. Contrary to that, the results had been as follows: "Peru's banking system, its land tenure arrangements, and its social institutions are so organized that savings are syphoned from the poorer region to the rich one. This exploitation of the poor by the rich through the mechanism of inter-regional trade is analogous to the relationship which existed between the metropole and the colonial territories."³

1. Brett, op.cit., p.287.

2. Keith Griffin, Underdevelopment in Spanish America, London, Allen and Unwin, 1969, pp.62-65.

3. Ibid. p.64.

In the case of the Sudan, the recent introduction of modern meat producing establishments by the foreign and multinational companies and the increasing investment in mechanized farming will worsen the situation of the small-scale producers and drive them out to become a proletariat in the big urban centres. In the absence of a regional investment plan, the location of big industrial establishments in Khartoum and Port Sudan will continue to send the rural population to big cities where capital is invested and transferred.

As the recent pattern of investment suggests, the implications of this pattern of capitalist development politically could not be directed towards the metropolitan capital alone. It will be immediately directed towards local capital which is operating under the hegemony of the former. The slow process of capital accumulation that characterized previous decades has recently been replaced by a rapid one. The adverse results for the proletarianized population are also rapid. The result is an army of exploited poor which awaits the necessary consciousness to seek to break away from the entire system of private and foreign capital accumulation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Businessmen & Their Families: Education & Consumption Patterns

This chapter is composed of two main sections. The first discusses the education of the selected businessmen and their families. The second begins by presenting findings on their access to, and consumption of, health services, going on to consider other distinctive aspects of their life style and consumption patterns.

The thrust of the chapter is that top Sudanese capitalists are not merely privileged in relation to the country's limited resources. Rather they enjoy a lifestyle which transcends national boundaries and gives them access to education and levels of consumption comparable in many respects to that of their counterparts in Europe. This of course is in spite of the fact that the income levels of the mass of the Sudanese people are far below those of the European working classes.

Education

This section begins with a brief discussion of the history of education in the Sudan. It gives a statistical outline of the meagre educational opportunities in contemporary Sudan and comments on the uneven rural-urban distribution of these opportunities, especially with regard to Higher Education.

In the light of this, the education of the cases studied, as well as that of their families, is discussed. The chapter considers both the chances these family members have within the Sudan and their access to education abroad. The nature and the direction of this education and the businessmen's attitudes towards education are also discussed.

During the Turko-Egyptian period, few Sudanese were educated. Most of those who were went to religious schools locally, whilst a handful went to Egypt's older Islamic institutions. These were the training grounds for the *Ulema*, or men of knowledge, who were the rationalizers of Turko-Egyptian

rule on the basis of Islam. They were political missionaries, spreading the claimed merits of the system among the Sudanese masses. These *Ulama*, as the educated religious notables, constituted the ideological backbone of Turko-Egyptian rule.

During the reign of Mohamed Ali, no state schools were established in the Sudan. Only in 1867 and 1868 were primary schools opened in Khartoum, Berber and Dongola. The pupils of these schools usually went into junior government service as apprentices, telegraph operators, accounting clerks, etc.¹ During the reign of Khedev Ismail, however, Sudanese were encouraged to enter Alazhar, the oldest and most prestigious Islamic educational institution in the world.

During British rule, education was limited to what was necessary to meet the needs of the colonial administration. Moreover, the selection of the few pupils to enter schools was not arbitrary. They were mainly picked from among the sons (and later daughters) of the Native Administrators, wealthy traders, and religious and other notables.

From the few primary schools of the period a tiny minority of students had the privilege of receiving secondary education, which was first provided at Gordon College in 1902. The College started as an intermediate and technical school whose aims were confined to the limited objectives formulated by the first Director of Education in the Sudan, Sir James Currie. Currie sought to establish a system of education that would enable the 'natives' "to understand the elements of the system of government", "and which would serve" to train a small class of competent artisans ... [and] to produce a small administrative class for entry to the government service."² Although Gordon College later shed its intermediate and technical classes

1. P. M. Holt, Modern History of the Sudan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1961, pp.194-95.

2. Ibid, pp.119-120.

and confined itself to secondary and post-secondary education, its content and organization were still ruled by these objectives. Holt describes the situation as follows:

"The Gordon College and other schools established in his time [Currie's] had very small intake, and their curricula were consciously planned, not to give a liberal education, but to provide adequately trained government employees. The danger of creating a large educated class, in excess of what could be absorbed by the administration, was thus avoided, but by the latter thirties the demand for education could no longer be contained."¹

Holt goes on to describe Gordon College as being highly controlled by the system, both administratively and politically. In fact, even its teachers were part of the colonial political administration.²

The post-colonial period³ witnessed a substantial growth of educational institutions. The number of schools established during the first year of Independence was equal to all those established during the six decades of colonial rule. Opportunities for education were no longer completely confined to the sons and daughters of Native Administrators and the like. These opportunities were the product, not only of popular demand for more education, but also of the needs of the expanding post-colonial state. In the recent period they are also explained by the needs of the expanding capitalist activities. These needs partially dictated both the nature of the educational system and the relative significance of its various levels.

Although schools increased at all levels when compared to their numbers in the colonial period, the disparities referred to in the first chapter

1. Ibid, p.195.

2. The lack of the spirit of education at Gordon College can be seen from the reaction of a young Lebanese Oxford graduate who came to teach at the College in 1926:

" ... I disliked the Gordon College the moment I walked into it. It was a military, not a human institution. It was a government school in a country where the government was an alien colonial government. The (British) tutors were members of the political service. They were there in the dual capacity of masters and rulers, and the second capacity

were clearly visible in this field as well. The same social developments resulted in a maldistribution of educational opportunities among the population.

The distribution of schools among the provinces, between rural and urban areas, and between males and females was most uneven. Predictably, boys and urban areas received the highest share of educational facilities. The percentage of seven year-olds (school starting age) attending schools varied between 81.3% in the North (Nile Province) and 16.6% in the South (Buhayrat Province), for example, with boys getting double the chances of girls their age. In 1974-75 about 25% on average of the primary school age children (7 to 12 years) were actually in school, with wide variations between regions. Table 7.1 reveals the extent of the variation of school enrolment between the rural and urban population.

TABLE 7.1 *Distribution of School Enrolment by Mode of Life*

MODE OF LIFE	PRIMARY (Age 7 - 12)	GEN.SECONDARY (Age 13 - 15)	HIGHER SECOND (Age 16 - 18)
URBAN	64.2%	41.8%	5.3%
RURAL	19.4%	2.5%	0.0%
BOTH	25.1%	7.3%	1.1%

Source: Mahdi Elamin, A Quantitative and Analytical Review of General Education in the Sudan 1974/75, Khartoum 1975, mimeo, p.6.

continued ...

overshadowed the first. The pupils were expected to show them not the ordinary respect owed by pupils to their teachers but the submissiveness demanded of a subject."

3. Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this section are based on Educational Statistics, Khartoum, Ministry of Education, annual.

This picture can only be properly understood when it is compared with illiteracy rates in the Sudan. The danger of non-participation by school-age children in primary education is that fresh additions to the ranks of the illiterate in the form of children who never get a chance to enter primary schools. The number of illiterates between the ages of 13 and 64 increased from about 5.5 millions in 1956 to over 12 millions in 1975. Of the 81% of the population of the Sudan which is illiterate, the majority come from rural areas and are mostly females.

In addition to the fact that even in 1975/76 only 43.7%¹ of the seven year-olds had access to primary education, the selection system allowed only a small proportion of these to continue to Secondary or Higher Education. The 17,000 students who managed to complete twelve years of education in 1973 represented 14% of the cohort which started school in 1962. In fact 77% of that cohort never went beyond the four years of primary school. Even today, the proportion completing primary schooling only has not decreased significantly, although primary schooling was extended to six years, reducing thereby the danger of a relapse into illiteracy.

Access to Higher Education was even more difficult. Places at the universities and higher institutes have always been very limited. Obtaining the necessary minimum qualifications has been no guarantee of entry. Khartoum University, the largest Higher Education institution in the country, admits only 1,500 students each year.

The allocation of resources among the various levels of education has reflected the State's preoccupation with Secondary and Higher Education rather than literacy and primary education. Specialized secondary schools and technical institutes, for example, increased disproportionately in

1. Democratic Rep. of the Sudan, Ministry of Planning, Six Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1977/78-1982/83, Vol.II, p.225.

relation to primary education. Twenty-nine technical schools were established between 1969 and 1977. The number of technical, agricultural and commercial classes increased from 37 in 1969/70 to 152 in 1976/77 - an increase of over 300% in seven years. This was one of the effects of increasing pressure from the growing business capitalist class, who expressed their views on the subject openly at their last conference (Khartoum 17-21 December 1973) which strongly recommended the establishment of more technical and business schools.

The present Six Year Plan reflects priorities which are in tune with the interests of this class. Of the total allocations for education in this plan, Higher Education alone gets 56%. The allocations for secondary education are mainly directed towards technical, agricultural and commercial schools. These are allocated 87% of the total budget.¹ The so-called diversification of secondary education is subscribed to in the name of making education more relevant to 'development' needs, but such specialization of education at secondary level can only contribute to the perpetuation of class divisions.

Education and The Businessman

The limited educational facilities that characterized in varying degrees the whole period considered were reflected even among the leading businessmen studied. Table 7.2 shows the level of education attained by the businessmen studied. It reveals the relatively high proportion (45%) of businessmen who either were illiterate or could only read and write (primary education). The 13% who had a university education were, predictably, found to be in the younger age-groups. Four of the five who were less than thirty years old were university graduates. The remaining one had had to leave

1. Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of National Planning, The Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, Khartoum, April 1977, vol.I, pp.141-44.

TABLE 7.2 *Education Attained by Businessmen*

Education Level	%
Illiterate	27
Primary	18
Intermediate	21
Secondary	21
University	12
Post-University	1
TOTAL	100

before finishing at the university to manage his father's business. All the illiterates were all over fifty years of age.¹ An interesting finding is that none of the immigrant Sudanese, regardless of age, was found to be illiterate or with primary education only.

Even among those who were illiterate, however, it was found that three had started to educate themselves by hiring private teachers. Among those with intermediate education, two were found to have private teachers of English.

There was a remarkable tendency for the businessmen to secure education up to university level for their sons and daughters. It was observed from the research findings that in contrast to the colonial period, when the majority of the leading traders were poorly educated or illiterate, the number of the educated businessmen successively increased during the post-colonial and contemporary periods. Judging by the number of the sons,

1. The age breakdown is given in Appendix 5 .

daughters and other family members of the cases studied who are taking education now, it is clear that the coming business generation is going to be fairly well educated. This is understandable because the nature of business and its dependency on metropolitan capital necessitates an adequate understanding of the international business language and operations.

Businessmen's Families and Education

Our data revealed that 93% of the businessmen studied had children and family members of school age whom they supported financially. The total number of these was found to be 808. This number might appear high but it can be understood if the marital status of the businessmen is explained. Seven percent of the businessmen were found to be unmarried, thirty percent were married to one wife, fifty-one were married to two wives and twelve percent were married to more than two wives. Some of the businessmen were found to have more than thirty children. Such was the case of the second richest businessman in the South, and of another in El-Obeid.

Of the 808, 57% were receiving higher or secondary education and the rest were receiving elementary or intermediate education. The latter were all found to be receiving their education in the Sudan. Of the 461 students who were receiving secondary or university education, 234, or 51.8%, were found to be studying in the Sudan. The remaining 227 (48.2%) were studying abroad. The majority of these went to England or the United States, with 78 students in each. The rest were sent to Egypt (48) or other countries, mainly Western Europe and especially Germany, though some went to India or Eastern Europe. Table 7.3 shows the distribution of these students by level and place of study.

It is clear from the findings that none of the children of the business families were deprived of education at the primary level. Secondly, their

TABLE 7.3 *Sudanese Students from Business Families by Level and Place of Study*

LEVEL	TOTAL		IN SUDAN		ABROAD	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Primary and Intermediate	347	100	347	100	0	0
Secondary and Higher	461	100	234	51	227	49
All Levels	808	100	581	72	227	28

chances of continuing their education to secondary and high levels were dramatically higher than those of the average Sudanese primary school student, whose chances of continuing to the general secondary level do not exceed 30% (while the chances that the secondary school student gets to continue to university is as low as 5%). Thirdly, the fact that the business families could afford to send their children to complete their studies abroad significantly increased their access to post-secondary education. In Britain, for example, of the 5,000 Sudanese receiving education, less than 1,700 are government scholars. The rest are studying privately.

Among the businessmen's family members sent abroad there were only five girls. Businessmen thus seem to concentrate on educating their sons and other male family members, expenditure on whom is viewed as an investment. Those who showed competence from among the family or the extended family, and sometimes even from among wider kin, were taken from their parents and offered educational opportunities on the understanding that they would join

the business later on. This pattern was significant in Khartoum (12) Gadarif and Port Sudan (7). Moreover, those who were sent by cases studied in Gadarif (5) were all sent to study agriculture.

Girls, then, were not found to be given equal chances to boys. They were usually married off after secondary education, mainly to the sons of other businessmen. Those who showed ability were sometimes sent to Egypt to study medicine. This was the case of three of the five girls who were sent abroad. Only two were sent to Europe, one to study textile design and one to study business and economics. As one would expect, the first was the daughter of the second most important textile industrialist and the other was also the daughter of a leading industrialist and contractor. This inequality in the distribution of education is to be explained as follows:

- (1) Boys are seen as the future businessmen who will inherit the business and develop it.
- (2) Boys are supposed to inherit twice as much as the girls according to Islamic Law (and 90% of the cases studied were moslems).
- (3) Boys are also considered the natural heirs to the business on the death of their fathers. In none of the cases did I find a woman running her father's business (perhaps the two women just referred to may be the first to do this). In the few cases where the father died while the sons were still at school, the eldest usually left school and took over the business. If the sons were too young, their uncles usually kept the business in trust until the male children grew up.

The breakdown of the figures on those who were studying abroad is given in Table 7.4. The table shows that businessmen's family members were studying subjects which are generally relevant to business. When one of the businessmen who had three of his sons studying abroad was asked why he sent them to study abroad, he said "... first my eldest son was sent to England to study business management because I felt the need for him to learn

TABLE 7.4 *Businessmen's Family Members Studying Abroad by Country and Specialization*

Specialization	Total	Egypt	U.K.	U.S.A.	Others
Arts	3	-	-	3	
Agriculture	14	11	-	-	3
Architecture	3	3	-	-	
Art	4	4	-	-	
Business	42	-	21	21	
Commerce	10	4	-		6
Economics	26	-	12	14	
Electronics	7	7	-		
Engineering and Technology	30	7	7	14	2
Law	4	2	2	-	
Medicine	12	10	-	-	2
Navigation	3	-	3	-	
Textile	7	-	2	5	
Ind. Chemistry	8	-	3	3	2
Social Sciences	16	-	4	8	4
Mechanical Engineering	9	-	-	5	4
General Sciences	10	-	5	5	
O-Levels	19	-	19	-	-
	227	48	78	78	23

things which I was unable to learn. When he comes back he will understand all the complicated banking operations, he will be able to travel abroad

and sign deals on my behalf. Previously, I had to have a translator because I do not know English. He will also be in a better position to negotiate with foreign firms when we need machinery for our expanding business. I will then be sure that we are not at a disadvantage because of inability to speak English or unfamiliarity with business language."

The increasing demand for education is thus not divorced from the demands of capital, which is now, as the quotation reveals, more closely associated with foreign capital. Education plays a crucial role in promoting business. This is further explained by something else the study revealed: that the two leading capitalists in the Sudan in 1976, who were mainly financed by foreign capital and worked in association with multinational corporations, were both well-educated. One of them was a university graduate and the other a secondary school graduate who had had an experience of twenty years as a top civil servant.

The linkage between patterns of education and patterns of association with foreign capital was not only evident in where they received education. It was also evident from the fact that to get placement in the various educational institutions, most of the businessmen were found to get assistance from the various companies and personalities especially in the case of Western Europe and America.

We have seen that educational opportunities among the businessmen's families studied were far from comparable to those of the population at large. One might suggest that among the different strata of the private and state bourgeoisies. The richest private capitalist ones have the best chance of enjoying education. Confirmation of this suggestion, however, necessitates the availability of research that studies the class basis of the Sudanese students and shows who, among the various factions of the bourgeoisie, get access to, or benefit more from, education opportunities

both locally and abroad. Such a study is not yet available for the case of the Sudan.¹ This research, however, showed that the children of the businessmen studied were provided with good atmosphere and facilities that allowed them to exhaust the local educational resources. 92% of the cases studied hired private tutors for their sons and daughters who were studying locally. The cost of a teacher for one child varied between LS 30 and LS 35 monthly. This seems prohibitive even for an upper middle scale bureaucrat. I am not suggesting that it is beyond the reach of sons of ministers or other wealthy individuals. The percentage of businessmen hiring private tutors among the richest of them seemed to be very high. When compared to top salaried bureaucrats, hiring tutors on any scale would seem beyond their means unless they get revenues from business themselves.

Besides getting private tutors sons and daughters of the capitalist cases studied had other facilities outside the school system which contributed to the creation of a better atmosphere enabling them to compete favourably with others. All the cases studied in Khartoum and Port Sudan for example provided their children with two special study rooms. 93% of all the cases studied provided their children with at least one special study room. All the children at school were found to possess imported games, toys and books. The children of all the cases studied have collections of books besides school ones. These were found to be in both Arabic and English.

Seventy-eight percent (78%) of the businessmen studied were members of their children's executive School Boards (Parent-Teacher Associations). They were found to pay generous subscriptions to these schools. These children were also given the chance to attend summer schools and courses abroad to improve their English as well as other subjects. In 1976 25%

1. But see the forthcoming work 'Class and Higher Education in the Sudan', by S. I. Ahmed, Department of Education, University of Sussex.

of the parents studied sent their children to summer schools in England.

The minimum cost of private education is about £3,000 annually in England and over that amount in the United States. In Egypt the student cost about E£2,000. The cost of educating one member of a family in England for one year is equivalent to 100 times the annual per-capita income in the Sudan.

The state has formulated laws whereby private students who study abroad can get money transfers from the Sudan in hard currency to cover both fees and living stipends. Although the parents of such students can afford such costs, in 1976 businessmen were putting pressure on the government to pay part of these expenses. Moreover, private students have full rights as members of the organizations of Sudanese students abroad. They also enjoy rights of emergency and other facilities provided by the Sudanese Embassies in the countries where they study.

The research also revealed that the first private phone call abroad (to London) was made in the 1940s. It was from a Sudanese agricultural capitalist (one of those referred to in the second chapter) to his son, who was receiving his education privately in London. At the time only a handful of Sudanese had private telephones. The cost of that telephone call was LS 12, equivalent to more than the annual per-capita income at the time.

The importance of education as an ingredient of business success was emphasized by all the cases studied. The three cases studied in New Halfa and Wad-Medani provide an interesting example in this respect. One of the cases in Wad-Medani was 65 years old. He was illiterate and had appointed his nephew as a Director at his oil milling factory. He sent his eldest son to England to study business administration. When he was asked about how he managed to be so successful without education, he said: "At the time

when I started business (1937) education was not very important. At that time, I was involved in trade and I could memorize my accounts. It was different when I started industry after Independence. Then I had to hire educated staff. I do not believe that my son could be successful with a Secondary education when he inherits this business from me. So, I had to send him to England to qualify him to take over my business." The other illiterate businessman from Wad-Medani, a trader and hotel-owner, was found to have married a second wife recently. He admitted that she helped him in checking his accounts. He also sent two of his sons to study economics in England. The industrial capitalist in New Halfa, who was also illiterate, sent three of his sons to study business, economics and social sciences in England and America.

One of the two non-leading businessmen who were interviewed in Khartoum suggested: "Education is now as important as politics for a Sudanese businessman. I failed in promoting my business because I am illiterate. Although I provided all my sons with education locally and abroad I could not convince any of them to become a businessman or a director of my business."

This section has confirmed that businessmen in the Sudan are very aware of the role education plays in business success. It reveals that businessmen provide education to their family members, particularly the males, so that the latter can take over the business in future. The nature of the subjects in which these students specialize suggests that their education is designed according to the needs of the business, and it also discloses the dependency of this business on foreign capital.

Health Conditions of the Business Families Studied

Before discussing the health conditions for the cases studied, it is worthwhile reproducing some of the tables provided by the Department of Statistics with regard to the subject of health in the Sudan in general. These tables, though they appear both inaccurate and inadequate from the point of view of the writer, give a rough idea of the health services provided to the entire population.

For the entire population of the Sudan of about 16.7 million people there is only one doctor for every 18,000 persons. There is one hospital for every 136,885. Table 7.5 shows the number of hospitals, doctors and beds in the Sudan in 1956 and 1973.

TABLE 7.5 *Number of Hospitals, Beds and Doctors in the Sudan 1956 and 1973*

	1956	1973
Doctor Population Ratio	1:51,000	1:18,000
Number of Hospitals	49	122
Number of Doctors	201	927
The Bed Population Ratio	1:1,068	1:1,085
Number of Beds	9,606	15,391

Source: Statistics Year Book, Department of Statistics, Khartoum 1973, Chapter 5, Table V.1. It is important to note that this yearbook gave two different figures for the total number of Doctors for the same year.

People in the Sudan still die of malaria, tuberculosis, trachoma and other eye diseases, bilharzia, dysentery, kalazar, leprosy, smallpox and many other curable diseases and conditions such as malnutrition, typhoid, miscarriages, delayed labour, diarrhoea (especially among children), etc.

The distribution of hospitals in the Sudan is biased against rural areas and villages. All four major hospitals are located in Khartoum Province. Moreover, all the specialized hospitals, such as the Tropical Diseases Hospital, the Chest Hospital, etc., are located in Khartoum Province. All private hospitals and notable specialists have private clinics in Khartoum. Apart from the large and relatively better-equipped hospitals in Khartoum, there are seven private clinics, two for gynaecology and five for surgery and general treatment. In the rest of the provinces there are either two or three less well-equipped hospitals. Only 33% of the hospitals in the country have X-ray units: many have no pathology laboratories.

The Six Year Plan of 1977¹ did not provide any indication of plans for a basic change in the inadequate health services for the masses. In the Six Year Plan which allocated funds totalling LS44.5 million, a mere LS 13.5 million was allocated to preventive medicine, of which self-help was supposed to contribute 32% (over 4.3 million pounds). Training schemes for medical assistants, midwives, health visitors and other auxiliary medical personnel were given a miserly LS 1.6 million over six years. A disturbing feature of the Six Year Plan was the fact that the rural health services were left to popular effort (LS 20.5 million). This is in line with the fact that mass support is expected to be the highest when the need is most felt. This attitude of muddled priorities, to say the least, is reflected elsewhere in the Plan, which unashamedly allocated over LS 19 million to three building projects: a new presidential palace (LS 7.3 million), new embassies abroad (LS 9.6 million) and an international exhibition hall in

1. The Six Year Plan, op.cit., pp.163-180.

Khartoum (LS 2.3 million) when compared to the LS 200 thousand allocated to research on tropical diseases, this seems to reflect a frivolous sense of priorities.

To turn to our capitalists, findings regarding their consumption of health services were as follows:

- (1) None of the cases studied or their family members go to general hospitals.
- (2) Each of them has his private doctor in Khartoum. This includes those who live outside Khartoum, who pay visits to their doctors in Khartoum regularly.
- (3) All businessmen travel annually for medical check-ups abroad. 27% go to Egypt, 3% to America, and 70% to England.
- (4) All members of these families who have surgical treatment go either to private clinics in Khartoum (38%) or abroad. The families who go for surgical treatment in Egypt were 34% and those who go to England were 28%. As for the businessmen themselves, they chose the country where the best specialists for their particular ailment were available. They, however, mainly go to England.
- (5) None of the businessmen or their families suffered from any of the common endemic diseases suffered in the Sudan, such as malnutrition, typhoid, tuberculosis, kalaAzar, bilharsia and the other diseases related to malnutrition.
- (6) None of the businessmen studied or members of their families died from a curable disease.
- (7) The study revealed that 37% of the businessmen were diabetic, 18% suffered from overweight, 67% of the businessmen were found to be

smokers, smoking 30-60 cigarettes daily, and eight use ^utambac.

Seven of the latter were over 60 years old. 2% suffered from thrombosis, 1 from gout and 17 from hypertension.

We may compare this to the health conditions of the inhabitants of one of the squatter areas in Port Sudan (Deim Omna), drawing on a study undertaken by the writer in 1973/74. In Deim Omna there was neither a medical centre nor a dispensary. There was only a small shack in the neighbouring Deim(settlement), Deim Arab. This shack was supposed to be a dispensary but it was run by one nurse and was only supplied with about 1000 tablets of aspirin, three bottles of Dettol, some cotton wool and a few bottles of vitamins. This dispensary was used by the inhabitants of the two Deims, the populations of which amounted to about 35,000.¹

Housing Conditions

The housing conditions for the business families studied confirmed the theoretical proposition that the housing problem is a product of the prevailing social order and that it hits the proletariat more than it hits the petty bourgeoisie. Moreover, the petty bourgeoisie suffer more of this problem than the bourgeoisie proper.

The richest capitalists studied were not only found to have no housing problem but 96% of them were in fact landlords.

Ownership of houses among the cases studied revealed that those who were not landlords were all among the educated. Three of them were secondary graduates and one was a university graduate. The four were found to be among the leading industrial capitalists in Khartoum. Except one, all were less than fifty years old. Table 7.6 shows ownership of houses among the business-

1. F. B. Mahmoud, 'On the Politics of Housing in the Sudan with Special Reference to Port Sudan Area', M.Sc. Thesis, Khartoum University, 1974, pp.150-151.

men studied.

TABLE 7.6 *Ownership of Houses Among Cases Studied*

Number of Houses Owned per individual	Frequency
1	4
4 - 10	43
11 - 20	29
21 - 30	20
30 and over	4

These capitalists were privileged not only in terms of ownership of houses but also in terms of the quality of their homes. Their homes were found to have rooms that numbered fifteen in some cases. Table 7.7 shows the number of rooms in the homes of the businessmen studied.

TABLE 7.7 *Number of Rooms in Homes of Cases Studied*

Number of Rooms per house	Frequency
Less than 5	16
5 - 8	60
9 - 12	19
13 - 16	3
More than 16	2

Some of these houses were three-floor houses but that is perhaps more of a

status symbol and a means of reserving a wider area for gardens. The number of floors was found to be as follows.

TABLE 7.8 *Number of Floors in the Homes of the Businessmen Studied*

Group	Number of Floors	Frequency
1	Ground Floor	69
2	One Floor	21
3	Two Floors	6
4	Three Floors	4

All those who had more than one-floor houses were found to be among the Port Sudan and Khartoum businessmen. Of group 2, 66% were from Port Sudan and 34% from Khartoum. In Khartoum and Port Sudan the number of rooms was also found greater than in other areas. It is worthwhile mentioning here that in Khartoum and Port Sudan the housing shortage is the highest in the country. In Port Sudan half of the population lives in squatter areas. Although families are larger in Sudan than in most European countries, the houses of these capitalists accommodated between one and two persons per room. In some cases (24%), each family member had a separate room.

Business Families and Domestic Workers

Unlike most of the women in Sudan the majority of the wives of business capitalists were neither working outside the home nor highly involved in the domestic production.¹ Only 5% of the businessmen were married to working

1. In his study of women's domestic and other economic production, (Some Problems of Population and Development in the Third World, University of Khartoum Press, Khartoum 1978) Mohamed Alawed Galal Alldain explains that women in Northern Darfur, besides contributing by 100% to domestic production, contribute by 26% to agricultural production and 60% to pastoral production. In pastoral production in the same province boys contribute by 5.5% while girls contribute by 25%.

women. Four of these were industrial capitalists from Khartoum. Their wives were all university graduates, one of whom is a university lecturer and another a physician. The fifth capitalist was married to a teacher (his second wife) who eventually left work.

Although 95% of the businessmen's wives were housewives, all had domestic workers including cooks and females to look after the children. Domestic workers who work for the whole day were found to live with these families in separate accommodation. In some cases they live-in with their families who also provide some services to the businessmen's families. 62% of these businessmen provided domestic servants with one room, 22% had two rooms for domestic workers, 1% had three rooms for these workers and 4% had four domestic workers' rooms.

74% of the Khartoum businessmen provided domestic workers with 2-4 rooms, mainly because these workers came from rural areas or towns from other provinces (mainly Darfur and Southern Sudan). Those who did not provide domestic workers with rooms (11%) were found to be from the South, Er-Rahad and Um-Ruwaba. Eight of these were from the South, where domestic workers are abundant and live nearby. Those from Er-Rahad and Um-Ruwaba, who were found to be fanatically religious, said that they would not allow male domestic workers to live with their family members.

Businessmen's houses have superb facilities. The total number of bathrooms in the 100 houses studied was found to be 425. The distribution of these is illustrated in Table 7.9. Of the three houses with only one bathroom, two were found to be in South Sudan and one in Nyala. Nine out of fifteen businessmen's houses in Port Sudan had more than four bathrooms and all businessmen's families in Khartoum lived in houses with more than four bathrooms. It may be worthwhile to mention that in the South clear water was not available; in Nyala, Er-Rahad and Um-Ruwaba running water was not

TABLE 7.9 *Number of Bathrooms in Businessmen's Homes*

Number of Bathrooms per House	Frequency
1	3
2	33
3	-
4	28
more than 4	32

available for the people. In Port Sudan, especially in summer, a tin of water costs about fifteen piasters (pence).

As for gardens (the average area of a garden varied between 100 and 1,500 square metres) only one house of the hundred surveyed was found to be without a garden.. Table 7.10 shows the number of gardens in the rest of the houses.

TABLE 7.10 *Number of Gardens in Businessmen's Homes*

Number of Gardens	Frequency
0	1
1	83
2	14
3 or more	2

Of the 16 houses which had 2 gardens or more, 12 were found to be in Khartoum. All these houses except one in Um-Ruwaba had stores. 74% had one store, 18 had two stores (10 of these in Khartoum), 5 had three stores (all in Khartoum)

and one had six stores and it also was in Khartoum.

Information about toilets and flushing systems is important because flushing services are only provided for first-class areas in certain regions. Moreover, many houses in the country do not even have toilets. In Port Sudan for example the half of the population who live in squatter areas live in houses without toilets. Needless to mention, the pastoral population just do not think of facilities such as bathrooms and toilets. Table 7.11 shows the number of toilets in the homes of the capitalists studied.

TABLE 7.11 *Distribution of Toilets in Businessmen's Homes*

Number of Toilets per house	Frequency
1 - 2	36
3 - 5	45
6 - 8	16
More than 8	3

As for flushing systems 80% of the houses had flushing systems. The twenty houses which do not have this system were all in areas where the government did not provide such a facility. This is in South Sudan, Nyala and Um-Ruwaba. Even in these areas five of the capitalists were found to have provided this system themselves.

In Um-Ruwaba, Er-Rahad and Nyala electricity was not available either to the population or to government establishments including schools and municipalities (with the exception of the Governor's Office in Nyala). As we mentioned in a previous chapter, in these areas the capitalists studied

were found to have provided their houses with electricity supply by means of private generators (which they hired to others). As a result, capitalists studied in these areas were able to use fans and air conditioners and acquire tape recorders, record players and other electrical equipment.

All the cases studied in Khartoum provided their homes with air conditioners, air coolers and fans. Each of these houses had more than four air conditioners. Eighteen of the 23 houses in Khartoum were found to have more than 6 air conditioners each. Where the weather is humid such as in Port Sudan and South Sudan capitalists were content with fans. They in fact provided each room (except domestic workers' rooms) with a fan.

As for devices like tape recorders, 96% were found to possess tape recorders, 38% had two tape recorders and 46% had more than two. 65% owned one or more record players. All those in Khartoum possessed more than one record player and 14 out of 15 in Port Sudan possessed record players.

In 1976 TV services had only reached Khartoum but all cases studied in Khartoum possessed a TV set. In Port Sudan, where it was only possible to watch Saudi Arabian programmes at certain times, all the cases were found to possess TV sets (a TV set costs LS 350-500).

Despite the availability of domestic workers in the Sudan, 20% of the capitalists studied possessed washing machines and driers. The majority of these, however, were among the Port Sudan cases (where humidity is high). 10% of the cases studied in Khartoum possessed washing machines (with no driers). Two business families from each of Gadarif, Wad-Medani and El-Obeid were also found to possess washing machines. In the case of Khartoum, the high percentage (43.5%) of ownership of washing machines despite the availability of domestic workers may be related to status rather than need.

Seventy-one percent (71%) of the homes of the capitalists studied were provided with modern kitchens, with cookers, refrigerators, mixers, electric

mincers, etc. Even those who did not have such facilities at least had refrigerators. As some of the businessmen stated, some of their wives objected to the use of gas cookers because they feared the danger of explosion. Most of them, however, hire cooks in addition to other domestic workers.

Businessmen and Nutrition

The yardsticks used for the comparison of the studied capitalists' nutrition with that of the rest of the population are: (1) the level of incomes in the Sudan, as given by 1973 government statistics; (2) a pattern of food imports that are not accessible to low-income groups; and (3) the amount of money spent on food (only) by the hundred capitalists studied. The earnings of the squatter settlement inhabitants as revealed by the study previously referred to are also used for comparison.

Table Two in the Statistics Year Book, 1973, Section XIII, shows data on the first point. Table 7.12 clearly reveals a disparity in incomes between urban, semi-urban, and rural areas. Almost 82% of the rural inhabitants earned LS 200 or less, while this was true of only 28% of urban dwellers. The annual incomes of the businessmen studied fell within the highest income category in the table. Over 51% of the capitalists studied were found to spend more than LS 4,000 annually on food alone. Average expenditure on food by the cases studied was found to be as shown in Table 7.13.

TABLE 7.13 *Businessmen's Monthly Expenditure on Food*

Category LS	Frequency	%
101-200	5	5.0
201-300	45	45.5
301-400	40	40.4
401-500	9	9.1
TOTAL	99*	100

* One business family did not wish to provide any information regarding expenditure on food.

TABLE 7.12 *Distribution of Households According to Annual Income in
Urban, Semi-Urban and Rural Areas in 1973*

Annual Income Sudanese Pounds	Urban Areas %	Semi-Urban Areas %	Rural Areas %	All Areas %
Less than 100	3.89	15.51	34.17	30.74
100 - 200	24.41	33.97	47.74	42.86
200 - 300	25.06	22.31	11.11	13.35
300 - 400	14.75	11.81	4.27	5.84
400 - 500	9.72	5.80	1.39	2.66
500 - 600	6.23	3.32	0.36	1.26
600 - 700	4.22	2.10	0.42	0.98
700 - 800	3.00	1.28	0.11	0.54
800 - 900	2.30	0.73	0.16	0.45
900 - 1000	1.49	0.61	0.06	0.27
1000 - 1200	2.15	1.60	0.13	0.48
1200 - 1500	1.57	0.42	0.01	0.22
1500 - 2000	1.23	0.31	-	0.17
2000 - 2500	0.30	0.10	-	0.04
2500 - 3000	0.17	0.13	0.06	0.08
3000 - 3500	0.12	-	-	0.01
3500 - 4000	0.14	-	0.01	0.02
4000 and above	0.24	-	-	0.03
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Department of Statistics, Statistics Year Book 1973, Khartoum, 1975,
Section XIII, Table 2.

It is interesting in this context to examine Sudan's total imports of consumer goods, as illustrated in Table 7.14.

These consumer goods include biscuits, cream, canned fruits and vegetables, sweets, cosmetics, including high quality soap, expensive shoes, ready-made fashionable clothing and alcoholic drinks. They also include electrical and Hi-fi equipment and toys¹ (though not cars). It is obvious from the income figures provided before, that the consumption of such consumer goods is far beyond the purchasing ability of 92% of the Sudanese population whose incomes fall below LS 600. As for the squatters, suffice it to mention that 95% of the families in Deim Omna area previously referred to only occasionally had two meals a day. The total cost of their meals was usually less than six pounds per month. The capitalists studied spent 50-83 times this amount every month. What some of the capitalists spent monthly on nutrition was more than the squatters spent in seven years.

It is perhaps interesting to point out that in areas where certain food consumption items are not available, for example in South Sudan, capitalists (as well as upper state bureaucrats) have such items flown in. In Juba, foodstuffs coming from Khartoum, like vegetables, white bread and meat, are received daily by the rich traders and top civil servants among whom all the cases studied fall. In El-Obeid the plane usually brings fresh fish (not available in West Sudan) as well as other food items to be consumed by the town notables.

From the previous account it might appear that Sudanese capitalists are extravagant and that they do not save much for further investment. Although

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1. In 1971 the Foreign Trade Statistical Digest reported that the Sudan imports of butter, confectionaries, biscuits, meat, fruit and vegetable preparations - hardly to be consumed by low-income groups - amounted to LS 1,504,000. Imported alcoholic drinks (whisky, brandy, champagne, etc.) were valued at LS 337,000 while imported perfumes cost LS 513,000. That same year the government's entire imports of medical and pharmaceutical products and fertilizers were no more than LS 302,000 and LS 140,000 respectively.

TABLE 7.14 Imported Consumer Goods in the Sudan 1966/1971

(Million LS)

Year	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Total Imports	77.4	74.3	89.7	92.5	108.3	123.7	123.1
Consumer Goods	41.3	38.9	51.7	39.9	47.6	61.4	63.2
of which: food and drink	16.3	16.4	19.8	11.7	22.0	24.4	26.8
clothing and footwear	11.1	10.2	18.8	13.2	10.2	20.5	14.6
fuel and light	1.4	0.3	1.1	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.1
other household goods	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.9	5.1	5.4	11.8
tobacco and cigarettes	0.9	0.7	7.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.8
others	7.6	7.0	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.0	6.1

Source: Department of Statistics, Statistics Year Book, Khartoum 1973, Section IX, Table 6.

it was difficult for the writer to collect statistical information on net profits and total consumption expenditures, it was possible from the information given by some of them to estimate their average annual net profits at between LS 4 million and LS 43,000. In the light of figures such as these the sort of expenditure on items of consumption which we have been discussing do not seem unreasonable or to conflict with the requirements of investment and capitalist accumulation.

The findings reported in the second section of this chapter have shed some light on the vast contrast between the life-style and consumption patterns of top Sudanese capitalists and those of the rest of the Sudanese people. The capitalists' control of the means of production and the vast capital accumulated in their hands allows them to enjoy a distinct and highly privileged life-style, which creates a good atmosphere for the perpetuation of this capital. Despite their luxurious consumption patterns, this section of the bourgeoisie are well able to save, to diversify their investments and expand their capitalist activities.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Sudanese Businessmen & Politics

This chapter falls into two sections. The first is a discussion of a representative selection of the marxist literature on the political role of the national bourgeoisie in the countries of the 'periphery'.¹ This includes the debates on the question which took place at the meetings of the Third International in 1920, as well as subsequent contributions on the question. Those who have contributed to the question from a marxist perspective have taken two main positions. The first characterises the peripheral national bourgeoisie as a dependent class of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and concludes that it will oppose revolutionary change. The second position attempts to classify the bourgeoisie into *comprador bourgeoisie* and *national bourgeoisie*. The latter is seen as playing a progressive role in the transition to socialism.

Proposing that the political history of the Sudan is amenable to class analysis, the second section traces the political role of the Sudanese bourgeoisie since the inception of colonial rule until the contemporary period. The role played by some of the individuals whose case histories were studied will be given special attention. The section also discloses the political affiliations of all the businessmen studied and discusses the ways in which they related to the state.

Early Discussions

The role of the national bourgeoisie of the colonies received attention as early as the Second Congress of the Third International, although the term itself was only adopted in 1924.² The concept of the national bourgeoisie was then defined in Alec Gordon's words as follows:

1. The reasons for restricting the discussion to marxist contributions have been given in the Introduction.
2. Alec Gordon, 'The Theory of the "Progressive" National Bourgeoisie', Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.3, no.2, 1973, p.193.

"The concept is not merely an empirical description of the indigenous bourgeoisie in an actual or former colony or semi-colony. It refers to an indigenous bourgeoisie whose economic activities and interests are seen as being different from and not dependent upon those of imperialism. Consequently, it came to be seen not as an importing and exporting mercantile bourgeoisie (compradore) but as a producing, industrial bourgeoisie interested in the national economy and in its development against internal feudal restrictions and imperialist domination. Examples of groups considered to be filling this role in recent history were the Indian Textile manufacturers such as Tata (linked to the Congress Party), the Southern Chinese textile bourgeoisie (linked to the Kuomintang) and the Turkish interests who found expression in Kamal Ataturk. Such groups were seen as being distinct from and opposed to the interests of imperialism on the basis of their interest in developing or protecting their respective national markets. Hence, there was the prospect, or even the actuality that such a national bourgeoisie would be an ally in the struggle of workers and peasants against imperialism."¹

When discussing the question in the Comintern debates of 1920, Lenin said:

"... the Communist Party, as the conscious expression of the struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of the yoke of the bourgeoisie, must put as the cornerstone in the national question not abstract and not formal principles, but, firstly, an exact estimation of the historically concrete situation and, primarily, the economic situation; secondly, it must distinctly single out the interests of the oppressed classes, of the toilers, of the exploited, from the general concept of national interests as a whole, which implies the interests of the ruling class; thirdly, it must make similarly distinct division between oppressed, dependent and subject nations and oppressing, exploiting and sovereign nations, in order to counter-balance the bourgeoisie - democratic lies which obscure the colonial and financial enslavement of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world ..."²

These points were contained in the Draft Theses he presented to the Second Congress. Following a discussion in the National and Colonial Commission, Lenin added:

"A certain reapproachment has been brought about between the bourgeoisie of the exploiting countries and those of the colonial countries, so that very often, even in the majority of cases, perhaps, where the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries does support the national movement, it simultaneously works in harmony with the imperialist bourgeoisie ..."³

1. Ibid, p.192.

2. Ibid, p.193.

3. Ibid, p.194.

The conditions set by Lenin for the alliance with the bourgeoisie in the colonial countries emphasized (a) the historical concreteness of the situation especially in its economic aspects, (b) the identification of the revolutionary nationalists on the basis of their attitude towards the popular movement, and (c) the level of their alignment with the imperialist bourgeoisie. In his writings, Lenin also emphasized the leadership of the proletariat and he did not in any incident consider the national or the industrial bourgeoisie as capable of playing a *leading* role in the national democratic revolution. On the contrary, he pointed out that the bourgeoisies of the colonial countries very often work in harmony with the imperialist bourgeoisie after the success of the national liberation movements in the colonies.

At the same Congress the Indian Marxist Roy distinguished between the bourgeois democratic nationalist movement and the mass movement. Roy stated that

"The popular masses of India are not fired with a national spirit. They are exclusively interested in problems of an economic and social nature ... The elements exist in India for creating a powerful Communist Party. But as far as the broad popular masses are concerned, the revolutionary movement has nothing in common with the national-liberation movement."¹

Roy was emphasizing class struggle (including class struggle against the bourgeoisie) while Lenin was stressing the importance of the rising national bourgeoisie. Despite this difference the Congress adopted both positions unanimously and the discussion at the Fourth Congress in 1922 maintained the position arrived at in 1920. As Gordon puts it,

"[t]he tension of a choice remained and the relatively undeveloped state of the socialist movement made the practical choice adopted one of alliance with the national bourgeoisie."²

1. Ibid, p.195.

2. Ibid.

As the Congress put it,

"... in the colonial East the slogan that must be emphasized is that of the anti-imperialist united front. The *expediency* of this slogan follows from the prospect of a prolonged and protracted struggle with world imperialism which demands the mobilization of all revolutionary elements."¹

Around the time of the Fifth Congress in 1924 the term 'national bourgeoisie' began to be used, although generally only as an equivalent of 'indigenous bourgeoisie'. This national bourgeoisie in China, for example, was seen by Stalin as having already split into a 'compromising national bourgeoisie' and a 'revolutionary bourgeoisie'. At the same time in the Communist International's practice the problem became much simpler, as in the interests of an international united front everyone confronting the international bourgeoisie was a welcome ally. The 'Manifesto to the Peoples of the East' concluded by sending fraternal greetings to the Kuomintang which "was forging a great and bright future for the people."²

The main shortcoming of the early contributions on the theory of the national bourgeoisie was that the participants, except perhaps the Indians, did not have first-hand experience of the colonial societies. For the African situation, this was aggravated by the fact that, at the time, marxist revolutionary movements in Africa were either weak or non-existent. This was clear from the reference to feudalism, which might have existed in Asia but did not exist in the majority of the African countries, or at least did not exist in the same form as it did in Asia. It could thus be said therefore that the discussion in the early 1920s on the bourgeoisie in the colonies did not develop in close connection with the specific situations in the colonies.

The practice of the revolutionary movement in the Third World indicates that a great deal of confusion resulted from the differing emphases of the

1. Ibid, p.195.

2. Ibid, p.197.

communist spokesmen from Europe and those from the Third World. The concrete situations in the colonies seemed subordinate to that of Western Europe, particularly in the 1930s when the fascist menace was mounting and popular Fronts characterized the activities of revolutionary movements in Europe.

This confusion was compounded after the Second World War when the national liberation movements intensified their struggle against imperialism, leading to an exaggerated appraisal of the role of the local bourgeoisie and the search for a national bourgeoisie even where no such bourgeoisie existed. The manner in which some communist parties identified and labelled this class can perhaps be exemplified by the Indonesian experience. Alec Gordon reports that although Indonesia had no national bourgeoisie, being a state of small proprietors, the Communist Party supported Sukarno as a "representative of the Progressive national bourgeoisie."¹ The massacre of thousands of Indonesian Communists in 1965/66 can be seen as a result of unconditional collaborationist policies of the Communist Party, which exaggerated the role of the national bourgeoisie to the detriment of the independence of the revolutionary organisations. In the contemporary period this confusion reached such disturbing proportions that some Communist parties voluntarily decided either to liquidate the party in favour of petty bourgeois organizations such as in the case of Egypt in 1964 or to subordinate the working class party in practice to such organizations, as was the case of Syria and Iraq.

Moreover, over-generalized as it was, the theory did not identify the basis of the national bourgeoisie. It was not clear whether this bourgeoisie should be identified by its economic activity, i.e. agricultural, industrial, etc., or on the basis of its degree of nationalism or the level of its alignment with foreign interests.²

1. Ibid, p.202-203n.

2. J. D. Cockroft, A. G. Frank and D. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment, Anchor Books, Garden City, 1972, p.199.

The Question of the National Bourgeoisie in the Literature

In the last decade or so the question of the national bourgeoisie has once again received attention from Third World and European marxists. Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and others have discussed the question in the framework of the 'periphery-centre' relationship. Hamza Alavi has discussed it in the context of an analysis of the nature of the post-colonial state. Others like Romano Ledda and Jack Woddis have discussed the question with regard to the 'national democratic alliance'.

In his book, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, Andre G. Frank concluded that national capitalism and the national bourgeoisie do not, and can not, offer any way out of underdevelopment in Latin America. According to Frank:

"If there is to be a 'bourgeois' democratic revolution at all and if it is to lead to a socialist revolution and the elimination of capitalist underdevelopment, then it can no longer be the bourgeoisie in any of its guises which is capable of making this revolution. The historical mission and role of the bourgeoisie in Latin America - which was to accompany and to promote the development of its society and of itself - is finished. In Latin America, and elsewhere, the role of promoting historical progress has now fallen to the masses of the people alone; and those who would honestly and realistically serve the progress of the people must support them in achieving progress for and by themselves."¹

For Frank the national big bourgeoisie, however dependent in the international economic sphere, usually retain dominant influence in national institutional spheres. Yet, the growing presence of multinational corporations signifies a trend towards a decrease in the power of these national bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the foreign bourgeoisie. The important point is that the fate of the two bourgeoisies and those of foreign investors are interdependent and cannot be separated.²

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1. Andre G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969, p.xv-xvi.
 2. James D. Cockroft, A. G. Frank and Dale Johnson, op.cit., p.xviii.

In a later work, Frank went on to describe the local peripheral bourgeoisie in the following terms, borrowed in part from a 19th century Mexican thinker:

"We may characterize as *lumpenbourgeoisie* the class which was no more than 'the passive [though I would prefer to call it active] tool of foreign industry and commerce and its interests were therefore identical' with theirs. The members of this class 'are deeply interested in keeping us in a state [or, rather, a process] of wretched backwardness from which foreign commerce derives all the advantage' - a state we may characterize as *lumpendevelopment*."¹

The Frankian dependency approach is useful in that it brings out sharply the dependent nature of the Third World bourgeoisie and its inability to play the classic historical role of the European bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, Frank's approach has been subjected to various criticisms, the most important of which is that of Laclau. Laclau accepts the dependent nature of the Third World countries vis-à-vis the metropolitan ones. He points out, however, that, by concentrating on the level of exchange and hence considering the peripheral societies as wholly capitalist, Frank does not succeed in giving a satisfactory account of internal structure of the peripheral social formations. Though dependent, peripheral societies may retain aspects of non-capitalist forms of production. The classification of these societies as capitalist emphasizes the level of exchange and underestimates the level of production.²

With regard to lessons on strategy to be inferred from this analysis, Usta Patnaik has pointed out that the Frankian model suggested that, since all peripheral countries are capitalist, the only possible immediate programme of the revolutionary party in each of these countries must be a socialist revolution.³ Jairus Banaji⁴ and Hamza Alavi also suggest that Frank's

1. A. G. Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie Lumpendevelopment, Monthly Review Press, London, 1972, p.5.
2. E. Laclau, op.cit., pp.15-50.
3. Quoted by Hamza Alavi, op.cit., p.180.
4. Quoted by ibid.

model leads to the conclusion that what we have now is a global capitalist system that operates identically everywhere.¹

Writers in Africa such as Colin Leys² and John Saul³ have viewed the African bourgeoisie as dependent just like its counterpart in Latin America. They propose that the dominant class in the developing African countries is still the foreign bourgeoisie. Their analyses confirm Franz Fanon's remark:

"... This native bourgeoisie ... will realise, with its mouth watering, that it lacks something essential to the bourgeoisie: money. The bourgeoisie of an underdeveloped country is a bourgeoisie in spirit only."⁴

Fanon went on to suggest that,

"It is not its economic strength nor the dynamism of leaders nor the breadth of its ideas that ensures its peculiar quality of bourgeoisie ... It is the position it holds in the new national administration which will give it strength and security. If the government gives enough time and opportunity, this bourgeoisie will manage to put away enough money to stiffen its domination. But it will always reveal itself as incapable of giving birth to an authentic bourgeois society with all the economic and industrial consequences this entails."⁵

In analysing peripheral dependency Samir Amin divides the countries of the world into two systems, the self-centred system and a peripheral system or model.⁶

In the self-centred system, the determining relationship is that which links the sector of mass consumption goods with that of the production of capital goods intended for the production of the former sector. The self-centred system was the characteristic feature of the historical development of capitalism at the centre (in Europe, North America and Japan). It pro-

1. Ibid.

2. Quoted by ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin, London, 1967, p.143-44.

5. Ibid.

6. Samir Amin, 'Accumulation and Development', Review of African Political Economy, No.1, 1974, pp.9-26.

vides an abstract definition of the 'pure' capitalist mode of production as analysed in Marx's *Capital*. It can be shown that the development process of the USSR, like that of China, is equally based on this determining relationship, although in China Amin sees the sequences of the process as more original.

In the periphery, the process of accumulation began when, under the impulse from the centre, an export sector was created. This was to play a determining role in the creation and shaping of the market. The periphery thus exported primary products to the centre. The centre made use of the cheap labour in the export sector of the periphery. The export sector advanced while other sectors remained backward. The dependency of the periphery on the centre led to a distorted structure in the former, including a marginalisation of the masses. This marginalisation of the majority is the pre-condition underlying the integration of the minority with the world system.¹

Basing his analysis on this account of the dissimilarities between the two systems, Samir Amin concludes that the Soviet system cannot be transferred to the Third World, because the USSR's structures are different from those of the Third World (dependent capitalism and marginalisation). At the same time, the periphery is faced with transcending the capitalist model, as it can never catch up with it. Therefore, the only option open to the countries of the periphery is a strategy based on self-reliance.²

On the political level Amin suggests that, while in the centre the masses are integrated into the system, in the periphery the system has forced the masses out (marginalised them), making possible its rejection by the latter. However, although Amin considers China as a self-centred system, it is not clear how far the Chinese system integrated the masses in view of

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

the fact that the Chinese masses were the ones who determined and carried out their country's break away from capitalism. Moreover, it is difficult to dismiss the entire history of the European working class in terms of its integration into the capitalist system.

Another problem with the self-reliance strategy proposed by Amin is that it ignores the necessary mutual solidarity of the socialist movement. The Chinese system in its first years needed the support of the Soviet system. Similarly the Vietnamese were supported by both the Russian and the Chinese systems. Both needed the support of the international revolutionary movement, which came in abundance not only from the periphery but also from the centre itself.

In his highly influential model Amin, unlike Frank, Fanon, Saul and Leys, does not specify the role of the national bourgeoisie. Leaving this for the concerned groups in the periphery to decide according to the prevailing objective and subjective conditions, as happened in Vietnam and China, Amin's model does not succeed in providing a specific position to be adopted by the peripheral revolutionary movement with regard to its own local bourgeoisie.

Nicola Swainson, on the other hand, has criticized the dependency theorists on the basis that in Kenya after Independence a substantial capital had accumulated in the hands of the Kenyan indigenous bourgeoisie, who moved from the sphere of exchange to that of production.¹ Using state power, the Kenyan bourgeoisie developed from a group of small-scale capitalists into a national bourgeoisie. Swainson argues that far from being auxiliary to international capital, (as suggested by Colin Leys)² the Kenyan bourgeoisie has used its connections with the Kenyan state successfully to establish itself in direct competition with foreign firms.

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1. Nicola Swainson, 'The Rise of the National Bourgeoisie in Kenya', Review of African Political Economy No.8, 1977, pp.37-39.
 2. Colin Leys, Development and Underdevelopment in Kenya, Heinemann, London, 1975.

Swainson then comments:

"However, this type of indigenous capitalism is obviously not operating independently of the international capitalist system. Nor does the localisation of productive capital which is beginning in Kenya, portend any kind of 'autonomous' capitalist development. Indeed few capitalist countries had developed in an isolated fashion, the very nature of advanced capitalism is the thorough interlinkage on a world scale. Nevertheless the dynamics of indigenous reproduction of capital must be analysed if we are to understand the political forms of that social formation and the nature of links with international capital. Simply to describe the indigenous capitalist class in Kenya or elsewhere as 'dependent' on metropolitan countries is inadequate in comprehending the specifics of that formation. The constant emphasis by radicals and the petty bourgeoisie on identifying the principle contradiction as imperialism operating from outside the social formation is a prescription for political complacency. For if the specifics of class formation are lost then so is political strategy."¹

According to Swainson, the main condition by which the indigenous bourgeoisie qualify as 'national' is the movement from the sphere of exchange to that of production in competition with foreign capital. This, however, is open to question because it disregards the manner in which the indigenous bourgeoisie were able to accumulate capital in order to move to production. As Swainson herself asserts, these capitalists used the State to effect the change. Can it be assumed then that the nature of the post-colonial Kenyan state is national? If the post-colonial state in Kenya was itself a bourgeois dependent state, then capital accumulated with its assistance cannot be said to lead to the growth of an independent national bourgeoisie. It is the way capital is accumulated and the conditions under which it operates, not the amount of that capital or where it is employed, that determines the independent nature or otherwise of the local bourgeoisie.

Not only does Swainson seem to disregard the bourgeois nature of the post-colonial Kenyan state, but this neglect is a result of her whole treatment of the problem. Three vital aspects seem to be absent from her

1. Ibid, p.55.

analysis. First, the nature and extent of the relationship between the Kenyan economy as a totality with the world capitalist system are not disclosed. Secondly, the control of the commanding heights of the Kenyan economy and the forces through which that control is exercised are also not discussed. Thirdly, the relationship between the business class and the governing class that control the state, although mentioned, is not analysed.

These questions acquire extreme significance when compared with Gavin Kitching's position, which identifies one capitalism, 'The World Capitalist Mode of Production', and recognizes the group of Kenyans Swainson describes but considers them a 'petty bourgeoisie', developing from Kenya's position as a 'subsystem' in the production and circulation of commodities on a world scale.¹ Moreover, Swainson contradicts herself in her own conclusion, which is unable to disregard the dependent nature of Kenyan capitalist development. Finally, she does not propose what specific role the Kenyan bourgeoisie might play in the breakaway from capitalism, and this, after all, is the crux of the matter.

Writing about Ghana, Paul Kennedy has approached the question of the local bourgeoisie along lines apparently similar to those adopted by Swainson. Kennedy asserts that the local Ghanaian bourgeoisie is in competition with foreign capital in both import-substitute industries and government contracts. This analysis is based on what Ghanaian businessmen believe rather than on the disclosure of objective reality. As in Swainson, no political role for the Ghanaian bourgeoisie is specified, although his concluding remarks emphasize that a local capitalist class has emerged in Ghana and that it represents "... an economic and political force that cannot be ignored."²

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1. Gavin Kitching, 'Modes of Production and Kenyan Dependency', Review of African Political Economy No.8, 1977, p.56-74.
 2. Paul Kennedy, 'Indigenous Capitalism in Ghana', Review of African Political Economy No.8, 1977, p.37.

To sum up the last few points, it is necessary to point out that the contradiction between local and foreign capital, which is emphasized by both Swainson and Kennedy, though it may be valid should not nevertheless mislead us. In the final analysis, such a contradiction should only be seen as a subsidiary one, the main one being that between capital and labour.

Jack Woddis has tried to suggest that not all sections of the African bourgeoisie may be categorized as a comprador bourgeoisie. Criticizing Romano Ledda¹, Woddis says: "When Ledda defines the national bourgeoisie as 'a social force capable of producing a high level of development of a country's forces', it seems to me that he is, to an extent confusing capacity with intentions, which arise from other objective factors. Certainly among the groups he lists, some can be dismissed as outside the ranks of the national bourgeoisie. If one takes the term in its more normal sense as referring not to the whole indigenous bourgeoisie but to that section of it which is interested in controlling and expanding its own internal market (which needs an attack on, or at least a weakening of, feudalism, and competition and conflict with imperialism), compradors and feudal landlords are not usually regarded as part of the national bourgeoisie. But can one so easily dismiss the African entrepreneurs, and even sections of the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie (which to some extent are to be distinguished from the older bureaucratic bourgeoisie reared by the colonial system)?²

It is clear from the above quotation that the classification given by Ledda is more concrete than that given by Jack Woddis. It is not clear what Woddis means by the African entrepreneurs whom he thinks should not be dismissed from taking part in the revolutionary process. If by the term entre-

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1. Romano Ledda, 'Social, human and political struggle', International Socialist Journal, vol.14, no.22, August 1967, pp.574-5. Romano Ledda outlined five groups of the African bourgeoisie, compradors (who function as middlemen for the large foreign trading firms), indigenous entrepreneurs, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, local planters and feudal landlords.
 2. Jack Woddis, 'Is There an African National Bourgeoisie?', in Peter C. W. Gutkind and Peter Waterman, African Social Studies, Heinemann, London, 1977, p.268-276.

preneurs Woddis means capitalists then he needs to list these capitalists as Ledda did and prove which section of them he thinks can play a role in the revolutionary process. In failing to do so, Woddis goes on to talk about the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The classification he gives for the latter section is based on a historical categorization: the new ones who were not reared by the colonial system and the old ones who were. However, if the old ones were reared by the colonial system, the new ones, as exemplified by the case of the Sudan, were very much reared by the neo-colonial and international capitalist system.

Woddis, falling back into the analysis of the national bourgeoisie followed by the Third International, seems to be searching for a bourgeoisie that may not exist in Third World countries. His analysis clearly underestimates the imperialist nature of both the colonial and post-colonial states, in close collaboration with which the African bourgeoisie, in many cases if not all, developed.

The nature of the colonial and post-colonial states is adequately described by Hamza Alavi. Discussing the nature of the colonial state, Alavi argues that

"the bourgeois revolution in the colonies was already accomplished by the imperialist bourgeoisie, which created in the colonies a bourgeois state and bourgeois property and a bourgeois legal and institutional apparatus precisely as an integral and necessary complement to its economic domination. Those who speak of the national democratic revolution in the colonies, misconceive the problem by overlooking this - in neither Russia nor China was such a bourgeois state established by the imperialist bourgeoisie."¹

In discussing the role of the state in the post-colonial societies, Hamza Alavi also suggests that:

"The essential problem about the state in post-colonial societies stems from the fact that it is not established by an ascendant native bourgeoisie but instead by a foreign imperialist bourgeoisie.

1. Hamza Alavi, 'India and the Colonial Mode of Production', Socialist Register, 1975, p.185, with reference to Alavi, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', New Left Review, No.74, July-August 1972.

At Independence, however, the direct command of the latter over the colonial state is ended. But, by the same token, its influence over it is by no means brought to an end. The metropolitan bourgeoisie, now joined by other neo-colonialist bourgeoisies, is present in the post-colonial society."¹

The significance of Hamza Alavi's contribution lies in the fact that he pinpointed one of the major historical facts that have deeply affected most Third World countries, that is the neo-colonial nature of the post-colonial state. Most of those who have discussed the question of the national bourgeoisie emphasizing its progressive role have overlooked this matter of the nature of the state.

The imperialist ties of the post-colonial state and the central role it plays in the process of capital accumulation in the Sudan, and probably elsewhere, poses another crucial question and that is the class, or classes, that controls the state and directs it to serve its interests, not only by using its apparatus and funds but also by its repressive institutions and confiscation of democratic liberties. Any viable strategy that attempts to draw up a blue-print for the break with capitalism must, of necessity, not only define the social forces that are capable of completing the transitional period and paving the way for socialism but also indicate the nature of the state and the level of the influence of the bourgeoisie (both local and foreign) over it.

Given that the working class, allied with the poor peasants, constitutes the cornerstone of these forces the problematic question is the definition of the role that other forces might play during this transitional period. It is within this context that the roles of the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie are being discussed among the revolutionary forces in the Sudan.

The organized struggle against capitalism in Sudan started in the 1940s. For approximately three decades the literature of the Sudanese revolutionary

1. Alavi, 'The State', op.cit., pp.61-62.

movement with regard to its strategy and tactics seems to have been geared towards the abolition of the various disparities that characterize the political economy of the country and breaking away from the capitalist system.

Our concern here is with tactics concerning the national bourgeoisie. Since the Communist Party of Sudan (CPS) is the most influential revolutionary organization in the country and one of the leading CPs in Africa and the Middle East, it concerns us to discuss the role it specifies for the national bourgeoisie in the process of breaking away from the capitalist system.

The programme of the CPS clearly emphasizes the leadership of the working class in alliance with the peasants, especially the poor peasants. The programme of the party divides the transition to the socialist revolution into stages, the immediate one being the national-democratic revolution.

With regard to the role of the national bourgeoisie, the Communist Party literature seems to be inconsistent. Prior to 1977 the party distinguished within the national bourgeoisie between the national bourgeoisie connected with imperialism and the national bourgeoisie not connected with imperialism.

In the book *Marxism and Problems of Sudanese Revolution*¹ the Party clearly states that the agents of foreign capital and the industrial capitalists have proved to be enemies of the national-democratic revolution and can play no role towards its fulfilment. In 1977 there is an apparent retreat from both classifications. In July 1977 a Central Committee meeting approved a document entitled 'External Questions and Tasks' which stated:

"... concerning the national bourgeoisie, we stand for drawing it into the national democratic alliance by a programme which does not jump over the present stage by posing socialism as the immediate goal or advocating prematurely the total liquidation

1. CPS Publications, Socialist Thought Publishers, (in Arabic), Khartoum, 1967, pp.144-148.

of capitalist social relationships. The programme should oppose the domination of foreign monopolies, invite the participation of the national bourgeoisie in implementing the development plan and direct its investments to productive spheres which serve the interests of the national economy."¹

This position poses certain problems. The national bourgeoisie is assimilated to the vague category of the 'allied strata' in the same document,² and appears as the class with which the party is proposing to ally for the revolutionization of the bases of production. Questions also need to be posed in relation to the alliance with the national bourgeoisie in the course of the national democratic revolution. When the national bourgeoisie, in its entirety and without distinction, is drawn into the national democratic alliance, will it accept a programme that opposes the domination of foreign capital? This acquires a special significance in contemporary Sudan, where foreign capital operates through finance and partnerships with this same bourgeoisie. In the event of the formulation of a plan, will not their participation in the democratic alliance affect the very nature of that plan? How will the national bourgeoisie react if the programme clashes with its profit-making interests? What will happen to existing private or even state capitalist establishments which are already dominated by foreign capital and which are not oriented to fulfil the needs of the Sudanese people?

The changes in the relations of production which the Party proposes as first steps towards socialism, no matter how gradual they might be, will involve, as the Party accepts, workers' control or, at the least, participation. Will the national bourgeoisie not react against such developments, given the role they played in destroying the 1971 regime, and given the progressively developing relation between local and multinational capital

1. 'Problems and Tasks of Foreign Policy and External Relations', The Sudan Bulletin (Central Committee, Communist Party of the Sudan), No.3, April 1978, p.4.
2. Ibid, p.1.

in the various fields of capital investment?

It seems that the earlier analysis by the CPS was the more adequate, since it gave specific details as to which, among the various sectors of the bourgeoisie, were aligned with neo-colonial capital. Although the document stated that these were unaligned sections among the national bourgeoisie, who could be part of the national-democratic alliance, no specific basis for their identification was laid down.¹

The more recent position of the CPS with regard to the national bourgeoisie must be evaluated in the context of the expansion of capitalist activities in the contemporary period compared with 1967. In view of the increase in the bourgeoisie's connections with foreign capital, the retreat from the 1967 classification becomes even more significant. Recent developments which have a direct bearing on the matter include: (1) the involvement of the present government with foreign aid and investment, and (2) the alliance of all the bourgeois parties with the government, with the intention of creating a new single party comprising the government single party, Sudanese Socialist Union, and the rest of the bourgeois parties, thereby unifying the state and private capitalists. These developments necessitate a sharper and more acute definition of the social forces that may be expected to stand up to the increasing ferocity of the combined local and foreign bourgeoisies. The 1977 position of the CPS is certainly not in line with these developments.

The relationship between the Sudanese bourgeoisie and imperialism is not a new phenomenon. Its roots go as far back as the early days of colonial

1. In his 1970-71 prison notes, the former secretary of the CPS who was assassinated by the Junta in 1971 discussed the question of the democratic alliance briefly and clearly stated that the alliance does not include big capitalists but only the petty bourgeoisie (handicrafts) and small industrialists and retail traders. He clearly stated that the democratic revolution necessitates the eventual liquidation of capitalist relations. These notes were circulated in 1973 as a basis for the discussion within the party as a guiding document for the programme that is to be adopted by the forthcoming Fifth Party Congress.

rule. This alliance has always been manifested in the political affiliation and activities of the Sudanese bourgeoisie.

Sudanese Bourgeoisie and Politics (1898-1975)

As remarked by Mekki Abbas, most books on the politics of the Sudan were written by colonial administrations such as Wingate, Lord Cromer and MacMichael.¹ These and others, including the Sudanese, wrote pro-colonial system literature that rationalized the regime and even praised it. The examples that could be given are many. The book *Behind the Modern Sudan* by H. C. Jackson proposes, in the context of a discussion of the tendency of the Ashiqqa Party to ally itself to Egypt, that the Egyptian people held the Sudanese in very low esteem and equated them with animals! J.S.R. Duncan gives an account of the 'achievements' of the colonial system realised despite the fact that it 'inherited' 'a basically poor country'. The 'achievements' listed included the 'creation of the trade unions, the transport system and the Gezira Scheme, as well as schools and hospitals.'²

Duncan was not the only writer to expound a pro-colonial perspective. Even Sudanese writers like Mekki Shibeika described the first years of the British colonialism from a similar perspective: "Although the first few years of the new regime were spent in establishing law and order and a workable machinery of government, yet economic and educational development were thought of at the start."³ Shibeika goes on to refer to the 1919 nationalist movement and the 1924 revolution in the following terms: "... when hostilities came to an end in 1919 a deputation of Sudanese ..." ⁴ (emphasis added). For Shibeika, colonialism was a new regime, repression by the

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1. Mekki Abbas, 'Introduction', in his The Sudan Question, Faber, London, 1952.
 2. J. S. R. Duncan, The Sudan's Path to Independence, W. Blackwood & Sons, London, 1957, p.125-209.
 3. Mekki Shibeika, The Independent Sudan, London, 1959, p.462 [my emphasis].
 4. Ibid, p.473.

colonial rulers was law and order, and revolution was a hostility.

Mandour Almahdi also refers to the colonial rule as 'the new government'. In a chapter about 'developing' economic resources and social services, he writes: "The Sudan emerged poverty-stricken and weak after the wars of the Mahdia and the conquest, in order to be able to cover the cost of the administration and other social services the new government had first to develop the economic resources of the country. Various means were attempted in order to increase the national income." He goes on to describe what the colonial regime did to expand the transport system and stimulate trade activities which, according to him, were done merely for the benefit of the Sudanese people and with the objective of raising the national income. According to Mandour, these had little to do with colonial interests.¹

A general characteristic of the literature on the political history of the Sudan is that it suffers from a lack, not only of a comprehensive outlook on that history, but also from a dearth of analytical content, leaving the material to become merely descriptive. An example here is Margery Perham who comments on the disagreement over independence between the Unionist Parties and the Umma Party by saying: "It is in the interest of both parts of the Nile valley that the people should live side by side in peace and contentment. The bonds of language and culture should be strengthened by forward policy inbred with the spirit of the modern age."²

The complex question of the type of relationship between the Sudan and the condominium powers, Egypt and Britain, should be viewed as a reflection of the underlying interests of the different factions of the bourgeoisie in the Sudan. They cannot be reduced to bonds of language and culture and a romantic desire to live in peace.

1. Mandour Almahdi, Anglo Egyptian Conquest, OUP, London, 1965, p.125.

2. Margery Perham, The Making of Modern Sudan, Oxford, 1951, p.154.

Others, like Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, a former Prime Minister and well-known leader of the Umma Party, have produced distorted and tendentious political tracts which can hardly be considered historically reliable. In his book *Democracy on Trial*,¹ Mahgoub deliberately omits political events highly relevant to the central theme of his book. The dismissal of the democratically elected parliament members who belonged to the CPS in 1966 is never mentioned. Nor is the unconstitutional dissolution of the Communist Party by that same parliament considered worthy of mention. On a less significant level, the demonstrations against the visit of the Queen of England to the Sudan in 1965 are never mentioned and the visit is portrayed in a completely different light. Mahgoub presents the visit as if it had taken place in an ordinary atmosphere.

P. M. Holt's book on the *Modern History of the Sudan*,² though more comprehensive than most other accounts, also suffers significant omissions. These include the Nuer revolt, which the author admits took over two decades to suppress, and the horrific events of Joda in which over two hundred peasants died of suffocation during the mounting unrest of the private scheme peasants in the 1950s.

The above-mentioned works and others like them, though useful in their documentation of some important aspects of the political history of the Sudan, were found to be inadequate for the purposes of this study. The need was for a comprehensive political history of the Sudan from a class perspective. Such a study is not yet available, although some attempts have been made in this direction. Works like the MERIP report on *Colonialism and Class Struggle in the Sudan*,³ Mohamed Sulaiman's work on the history of the

1. Andre & Deutsch, London, 1974.

2. P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1961.

3. MERIP Report, op.cit.

Sudanese left¹ and the Communist Party's publications, such as *Marxism and Problems of the Sudanese Revolution*,² *A People's Revolution*³ and other less significant pamphlets, constitute the main body of studies written from a class perspective. With the exception of the MERIP report, none of these publications were designed as analytical historical works covering the period under study. They had various objectives, of which historical analysis was only one.

The Bourgeoisie and the Anti-Colonial Struggle

After the suppression of the various revolts against the colonial rule that took place during the years following the British invasion, organized opposition was mainly led by the Sudanese educated. In the early 1920s the 'Sudanese Tribal Society' was founded. The 'White Flag League' was founded in 1924 and played a central role in the anti-colonial demonstrations during that same year. An interesting fact is that both were initiated by army officers.

At this stage the Sudanese agricultural capitalists were clearly opposed to the anti-colonial movement and were in complete alliance with the colonial system. Among the members of the delegation that went to England in 1919 to congratulate King George V on the British victory in the First World War were Sayid Abdel Rahman Almahdi and Sayid Ali Almirghani, both landlords and religious leaders who were to become prominent agricultural capitalists. As a token of complete surrender to the colonial rulers and abandonment of his father's revolutionary heritage, Sayid Abdel Rahman presented what was reputed to be Almahdi's sword to the King of England.⁴ The delegation were

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1. Mohamed Sulaiman, Ten Years of the Sudanese Left , Alfagr Books, Wad-Medani, 1971. (In Arabic)
 2. Marxism and Problems of the Sudanese Revolution , Socialist Publishing House, Khartoum, 1968. (In Arabic)
 3. A People's Revolution , Socialist Publishing House, Khartoum, 1967.
 4. See Holt op.cit., p.145.

rewarded with knighthoods by the British monarch, and Sayid Abdel Rahman soon afterwards regained Abba Island, where he planted cotton, and was given government contracts and other agricultural licences.

During the nationalist revolts against colonial rule in 1924 the religious leaders, together with the main spokesman on religious affairs within the colonial regime, sent a memorandum to the Governor-General condemning the Egyptian and Sudanese national movements. The signatories wished to express:

"Firstly, that we are extremely grateful for all that the British officials have done for the welfare of the Sudan, which has resulted in the country's advance and progress. Secondly, our great loyalty and sincerity to the British government which is unalterable. Thirdly, our perfect and complete assurance that we have no hand or connection with the movement which is now in progress in Egypt, nor is the movement in accordance with our desires."¹

The letter was signed by Sayid Abdel Rahman Almahdi, Sayid Ali Almirghani, Sayid Sharief Alhindi (another religious leader), Sayid Mirghani, Sayid Almakki, leader of Al-Ismailia religious movement, and Mufli Aldiar Alsudama, a senior religious judge.²

The editor of *Alhadara* magazine, which was owned by Sayid Abdel Rahman Almahdi, Sayid Ali Al-Mirghani and Sayid Shareif Al-hindi, wrote a long passage commenting on the 1924 anti-colonial demonstrations in the Sudan: "The White Flag Leage should know that it is embarassing the entire country. Those who demonstrated were the poorest and of the lowest strata of unrecognized members of the Sudanese Society." He went on to say that "... the storm created by the scum of society disturbed people of status, merchants, businessmen and the men of good origin.

• ما من الزوجة التي أتاها الدهمار قد أنجبت الجوار ورجال الأعمال "

He concluded that there was nothing wrong with the British system and that the Gezira Scheme was the best solution for the economic problems of the Sudan.

1. Mudathir Abdel Raheem, 'Early Sudanese Nationalism', Sudan Notes and Records, vol.47, 1966, p.45.
2. Ibid.

The religious leaders were joined by the notable traders, leading native administrators and top civil servants in condemning the demonstrations and the White Flag League. They went further and made clear their choice of England as a guardian of the Sudan in order to develop the country until it acquired self rule.¹

"وَمَا تَرَاهُمْ اخْتَارُوا لِنَجْتَرَا لِنَكُونُ وَصِيَّةً
عَلَى السُّودَانِ لِنَعْمَلْ عَلَى تَطْوِيرِهِ حَتَّى يَصِلَ مَرْتَبَةُ الْحُكْمِ الْذَاتِ"

The relation between the top state bureaucrats and the colonial state dates back to the Turko-Egyptian colonial period. The interests of this section of the bourgeoisie developed in unity with the interests of the capitalist class in general, and throughout the political history of the Sudan the top section of the state bureaucracy was in sympathy with the capitalists' perseverance in seeking to secure control of the state. On the other hand, the middle and lower sections of the state employees, including the army, who constituted the backbone of the White Flag League, took a different position. This difference disturbed the colonial rulers, as is evident from the security report of 20/7/1924 by Mr. Wallace, who expressed his worries by referring to the fact that the White Flag League was attracting more and more of the soldiers and officers at the bottom on the ladder of the army and the scale seven and eight civil servants.² It seems that direct confrontation with the colonial rulers in the form of British army officers overruling their Sudanese counterparts led to the earlier development of anti-colonial consciousness among the army officers who organized the White Flag League.³

The anti-colonial movement continued to expand and in 1938 the educated civil servants founded the 'Graduates Congress'. The membership of this organization was restricted to intermediate schools graduates. It attracted

1. G. M. A. Bakheit, British Administration and Nationalist Movement in the Sudan, (in Arabic), Dar Althagafa, Beirut, 1972, p.85.
2. Ibid, p.81.
3. P. M. Holt, op.cit., reports an open clash between the founder of the White Flag League, Ali Abdel Kalif, and a high ranking British official, who treated the former in an arrogant manner.

a membership of about 1,180 and gained support both locally and among Egyptian political circles. Until this point the capitalists had no organized parties and they started competing to win the support of the Graduates' Congress. The success of these efforts is perhaps illustrated by the fact that both Ismail Alazhari and Ibrahim Ahmed, who were President and Secretary of the Congress, became prominent figures of the NUP and Umma Parties.

With the growing political importance of the educated Sudanese after the 1924 demonstrations, the British government reacted by establishing the native administration system (1927) by which the administration was shifted into the hands of tribal sheikhs, while the role of the educated was progressively reduced. This policy was reversed later, when the educated Sudanese had been contained and absorbed within the bourgeois parties. The Local Government Ordinance promulgated in 1951 established that tribal leaders had to be content to function, within their set powers, only with local representatives and councils established within their own areas and not directly with the province governors. By this time the tribal sheikhs themselves were closely affiliated with the bourgeois parties particularly the Umma Party.

It was only during the Second World War, when the anti-colonial movement was at its peak, that the bourgeois parties were founded.¹ The Ashiqqa (literally blood brothers) Party was founded by Ismail Alazhari in 1943. The formation of the party was the result of a split between the Mahdist and the Khatmiya over strategies for independence. In response to the separate negotiations carried on by the pro-Ansar (Mahdist) graduates with the British, the Khatmiya-affiliated graduates joined the Ashiqqa Party. These succeeded in gaining control over the Graduates' Congress in 1944. The year 1945 saw

1. In the mid-1940s the Sudanese working class began to express itself politically. Throughout the preceding period, workers' unrest used to break sporadically against wage cuts etc. In 1946 the Workers' Affairs Association was organized, mainly from railway workers. The CPS was also founded in 1946, soon to be followed by Tenants and Farmers Associations.

formation of the Umma Party by the Mahdists.

The Khatmiya, whose ties with Egypt dated back to Turko-Egyptian rule, lost favour with the British after the rise of the nationalist movement in Egypt, and the Mahdists came to be considered by the British as the 'true' spokesmen of the Sudanese people. The rise in Mahdist fortunes went hand in hand with the British policy of consolidating a Sudanese capitalist class to support the British interest.

The Ashiqqa, which was under the Khatmiya influence until it split into PDP and NUP in 1956, thus had a dual rivalry with the Umma. First, while the latter was the direct representative of British interests, the former, whose composition comprised a wider spectrum of educated civil servants and urban sections of the community, was more opposed to British colonial rule in its political activities. Second, each was followed by a distinct religious sect..

The split between the two parties with regard to complete independence (meaning in reality closer association with Britain) and unity with Egypt was not merely a 'disturbing event', as P. M. Holt calls it. It was rather what was in the interests of the leaderships of each of these parties and particularly the different fractions of capital in operation at the time. Those whose trade interests were linked with Egypt (NUP), wanted unity with Egypt, while the Umma, whose agricultural export activities were linked with Britain, wanted independence in association with Britain.

The research revealed that, of the handful of wealthy capitalists at the time, four were prominent figures of the Umma Party. One of these was an agricultural capitalist and three were involved in foreign trade, mainly cotton export. The last one of the four was then and now (1976) a leading industrial capitalist. All four traded with England.

The two leading livestock export traders, on the other hand, traded with Egypt at the time. Both were found to be members of the Ashiqqa Party. A few immigrants of Egyptian origin were also found to be members of the Ashiqqa Party.

In 1956, as a result of a split in the NUP, the PDP was founded. The NUP membership was more dominated by petty capitalists and the educated civil servants and the urban masses, while the PDP was dominated by the Khatmiya religious leadership and big capitalists, particularly agricultural ones.

The colonial authorities were aware that the capitalists who were allied with the system throughout the period could easily be connected with the neo-colonial state of the Sudan. When they formed the Advisory Council in 1944, the only elected members were to come from the Chamber of Commerce. The rest of the membership was appointed by the Governor-General from the native administration and various other professions. This council, though operated under the control of the British, was dominated by the Umma Party.

In an attempt to drive a wedge between the Sudanese parties, the colonial rulers made a deliberate pre-emptive move in March 1946 and announced the right of the Sudan to self-determination. It was a long term plan which was understood to last for twenty years. Predictably, the Umma Party accepted the plan, while the Ashiqqa and other smaller unionist groups were not satisfied and boycotted all the institutions formed under the plan, such as the Advisory Council and the Legislative Assembly. However, the first elections for a Sudanese transitional government were to take place in 1953.

The Sudanese bourgeois parties did not question the parliamentary system; it was taken for granted that the Sudan should adopt a western type of parliamentary system. At the elections the political atmosphere was more favourable for the NUP party, since it clearly opposed the British. By that

time the trade union movement was active, a new left wing movement, the Anti Imperialist Front, was organized, comprising the CPS and supported by trade unions, farmers and tenants unions, women's union, student unions, etc. This movement voted for NUP candidates throughout the country, except when the Front had a candidate of its own.

The result of the elections gave a clear majority to the NUP. The elections returned 51 NUP representatives out of 97 seats against 22 Umma Party members, while the AIF had one seat in the house of representatives. The rest of the seats were taken by the representatives of the South and other minor parties. The NUP got complete control over the parliament, and the government was formed exclusively from NUP members.

In 1955 the Umma Party and the Khatmiya leadership held a meeting which culminated in the historic meeting of Sayid Abdel Rahman Almahdi and Sayid Ali Almirghani, the leaders of the two religious sects, the Ansar and the Khatmiya. The result was pressure on the NUP to form a coalition government, which succeeded in January 1956. The coalition lasted only a few months, after which the NUP was faced by another coalition of the newly formed PDP (Khatmiya) with the Umma Party. The coalition brought down the NUP government and resulted in the formation of a new government with an Umma Prime Minister and excluded the NUP altogether in July 1956.

This was soon put to the test when, after the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Americans offered aid to the Sudan in a new and more direct form. The Umma and their new allies, the PDP, were in favour of acceptance. The NUP, together with CPS and the mass movement, organized a front demanding that the American aid be rejected. The two parties, fearful of losing a vote of confidence in parliament over the issue, handed over state power to the right wing section of the army in November 1958.

Predictably, the military government soon accepted the American aid. The alliance of the PDP with the Umma over the issue of American aid not only reflected the common, cross-party interests of the agricultural capitalists; it revealed the links of the leaderships of both parties with neo-colonialism.

The expansion of state capital during the period of military rule, 1958-1964, disturbed the leading capitalists within the two parties, particularly the Umma. The patterns of investment during this period as revealed in previous chapters suggests a competition between these capitalists and the top state bureaucrats, who were entering fields of business such as industry and contracts. This brought about the competition between the bourgeois parties, who were no longer in direct control of state power, and the military government. The Umma, who first sent letters, just like the PDP, praising the new regime,¹ eventually joined the Opposition Front organized by the CPS,² the trade union movement and the NUP against the military Junta. In 1960 this front sent a memorandum to the military government demanding democratic freedoms.³ In 1961 they sent another similar memorandum. As a reaction to the second memorandum the government arrested twelve of the leadership of the Opposition Front.⁴

The Opposition Front, however, did not last for long. The bourgeois parties refused to go along with the demand to organize a mass struggle against the military Junta in the form of a general strike as well as the

1. Sayid Ali Almirghani sent a letter dated 17/11/1958, the day of the 1958 coup, accepting and welcoming the military government. The letter is documented in Mohamed Sulaiman's Ten Years of the Sudanese Left (op. cit.), p.357. It was also published in the PDP official paper Sudan Voice, 20/11/1958. Sayid Abdel Rahman Al-Mahdi sent a similar letter which was broadcast by the Minister of Local Government and published in Alneel, the Umma Party newspaper, 21/11/1958.
2. The Anti Imperialist Front distributed a leaflet warning the people of the imminent coup in the left wing newspaper Almaidan No.384, 27/10/1958.
3. A letter dated 29/11/1961, in Mohd Sulaiman op.cit. p.384.
4. Although of the twelve there were only two Communists in this particular occasion it is a historic fact that in all the prisons and the detention camps throughout the military regime were almost exclusively communist detainees and prisoners.

mobilization of the popular movement. The organized left opposition was growing and gaining support. The Railway Workers Union staged a successful seven-day strike that paralysed the whole country's transport system. The bourgeois parties were frightened by this leftist expansion and, realizing the extent of the economic problem the regime was facing at the time,¹ tried to avert the possibility of a radical government by first joining the bandwagon of opposition with the left. This same prospect drove them soon afterwards to retreat from the mass opposition and form their own right-wing alliance, which even included the non-mass based Moslem Brothers organization. This alliance was only to come to the forefront after the success of the October 'revolution' and in opposition to the spontaneously created leadership of the revolt.

In 1964 a mass revolt followed by a general strike (proposed by the CPS since August 1961) brought the military regime to an end. A new government was formed comprising not only the bourgeois parties, Umma, NUP, PDP and the Islamic Charter, but also the CPS and representatives from the Tenants and Farmers' Unions and Workers' Unions. For the first time in the history of the country the CPS was legally recognized. The trade union federation (banned during the military regime) was re-established and, more important, workers' unions in the private sector succeeded in gaining official recognition. Labour Unions were thus formed even in small private sector establishments.

The expanding organization and success of the trade union movement and the establishment of private sector labour unions constituted a clear threat to capitalist interests and disturbed the bourgeoisie. The Umma Party inci-

1. The MERIP Report, op.cit, states: "In 1963 a crisis of cotton growing schemes provoked by low world prices and rising production cost, stimulated the Gezira tenants to demand a greater share of the proceeds from cotton sales. By 1964 a national deficit in the balance of payments of \$214 million had accumulated ..."

ted the Ansar Sect to demonstrate violently against the transitional government and threatened to use force. The bourgeois parties were thus able to push the Prime Minister to resign and hurriedly organized general elections along the old lines for a new parliamentary government. The new elections returned eleven Communists to the parliament but the threat of slogans raised at the October mass revolt, such as nationalization and circumscription of the state apparatus, which characterized the post-October period, enhanced the reaction of the bourgeois parties and provoked them to take action against the CPS members who were advocating these revolutionary slogans within the parliament. In November 1966 the Umma, PDP, NUP and Islamic Charter formed a bloc to ban the CPS and dismiss its members from the parliament. They amended the constitution for the purpose, which they succeeded in doing by a majority vote.

It is important to see, for the first time since its formation, why the NUP stood with the other bourgeois parties on this issue. What was the difference between this issue and that of American aid for example? It is important to note, first, that the two Members of Parliament who voted against the dismissal of the CPS members were from the NUP. The fact that the whole of the rest of the Party did accept the dismissal reflect the changes that had taken place in the composition of its leadership. Between 1956 and 1966 the bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements within the NUP grew in strength in the shadow of foreign investment. The leading capitalist within this party controlled the Ministry of Trade in several governments during this period. They managed to obtain lucrative import licences, and many of them became agents of foreign companies. Several traders within the party, twelve out of the cases studied for example, re-invested in industry, and many of their supporters among the civil servants invested in contracts, insurance and other services. It seems evident that the new capi-

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talist interests of the NUP leadership led them to develop a political orientation similar to that of the rest of the bourgeois parties.

From 1963 onwards, economic conditions worsened in the Sudan. The result was a severe deterioration in the living standards of the poor. The leftist movement was gaining more ground. Internal stability was increasingly shaken by the war in the South and increasing repression, and the external situation was worsened by the impact of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The drain on resources represented by the Civil War in the South, which consumed 20-30% of the government budget, and the decline in foreign aid after the Arab-Israeli War led to considerable deficit financing. During 1964-1969 the foreign debt doubled, to \$260 million. Economic pressure was naturally strongest on the poor. Indirect taxation on basic commodities brought in over \$153 million in 1968/69, in contrast to only \$22 million in taxation of income.¹ All these factors weakened the government and invited another military coup in May 1969.

The coup was organized by the Free Officers Organization, which had been active within the armed forces in opposition to the first military regime (1958-64). It was comprised by the middle and lower ranking officers. The governing body of the new military regime was composed of a Revolutionary Council, whose ten members included two Communists. A Council of Ministers composed of 21 Ministers and a Prime Minister was also appointed. Of the twenty-one Ministers, four were well known members of the CPS who were appointed without the prior consent of the Party. The Prime Minister himself was the prospective candidate of the left for the presidential elections that were supposed to take place in 1970. The constitution was annulled and all political parties, including the already banned CPS, were dissolved. The declared programme of the 1969 military government was in line with the

1. MERIP Report, op.cit., p.11-12.

demands of the left.

The announcement of socialism as a goal and the apparent nature of the governing body frightened the capitalists, and private investment declined drastically in 1969/70. Although the bourgeois parties were all opposed to the regime, the Umma Party constituted the most prominent opposition to the coup d'etat in its first year. The findings of the present research help to explain this last fact. Among the cases studied, the largest proportion (38%) came from the Umma Party.

The Umma Party, together with the small, extreme right-wing, organization of the Moslem Brothers (Islamic Charter), staged a counter-revolt against the regime in March 1970 at their base in Abba Island. The military junta, squashed the revolt and the leader of the Ansar Sect - grandson of Almahdi - was killed in the process together with hundreds (some say thousands) of his followers.

The Abba revolt was immediately followed by the confiscation of all the property of the Almahdi family. This was soon followed, in May 1970, by sweeping nationalizations and confiscations, which included banks and trading, agricultural and industrial firms. The declared objective was to break the economic power of the leadership of the bourgeois political parties. Some of the nationalized firms, however, had already transferred their capital outside the Sudan. Moreover, the new boards of directors appointed by the state proved to be no different from the previous ones. The end result was that the majority of the enterprises taken over by the state incurred heavy losses through mismanagement and profiteering.

The nationalization was an isolated hurriedly enacted political decision designed to isolate the CPS, historically the main proponent of the nationalization of the means of production and to secure mass support for the regime. The CPS openly criticized the way the nationalization was

implemented. The major objective was based on the fact that nationalized firms became state capitalist concerns with no workers' control or participation in the running of the enterprises.¹

The regime was soon to bow to the right-wing pressure and had to face the fundamental class contradictions. It had to make the choice of either co-operating with the original base to which it appealed and pursuing a 'socialist' path or retreating to a capitalist policy. The choice they made reflected the wavering class nature of the regime as well as the strength of the pressure of the capitalist class and its links with international capital.

This was manifested first in the decision of 16/11/1970 by the Revolutionary Council to oust three left-wing members from its own ranks. Secondly it was reflected in its withdrawal of the Unified Labour Law, which would have equated private sector workers with those of the state sector and restricted the capitalists' ability to dismiss workers at will. Finally, the right wing course of the regime culminated in April 1971 when the capitalists and bourgeois parties organized a festival under the guise of 'national unity'. This came two months after CPS leadership and cadres were imprisoned as a result of an address by General Nimeiri on 11th February 1971 which promised to 'crush' the communists. At the same time, mass organizations such as Women's and Youth Unions were dissolved and government organizations with appointed leaderships were created to replace them. The main address at the festival praised the new anti-left policy, which, in the organizers' own words, was more conducive to a 'healthy investment climate.'² All these measures were meant to lure western and conservative Arab governments to resume foreign aid to the Sudan and contacts had already been made with

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1. CPS leaflet, On the Fifteenth Anniversary of Independence, 1st January 1971.
 2. The National Unity Festival, 16th April 1971, Ahmed Hamza's address on behalf of organizers.

Lonrho, the British multinational corporation, on possible ventures.

In July 1971 a group of pro-Communist army officers carried out a bloodless coup and declared their intention to reverse the right-wing shift in government policies, to fight neo-colonialism, etc. The events that followed revealed the true nature of the capitalists and the completeness of their alliance with international capital. The new regime lasted only three days and was crushed by direct foreign intervention in which Lonrho played an instrumental role. Cronje, Ling and Cronje in their work *Lonrho: Portrait of a Multinational* disclose the role played by Egypt, Libya and Lonrho in the counter-coup.¹

This was made possible by the role played by Khaleel Osman, one of the cases studied in this research and one of the three richest capitalists in the entire country. Khaleel accumulated his capital in Kuwait in partnership with Alsabah, the Amir of Kuwait, and the Gulf International Corporation. When he came back to the Sudan in the 1960s, he acquired about ten industrial establishments under the local branch of Gulf International. Moreover, he was trying to introduce large-scale operations in collaboration with Lonrho prior to the July coup. In June a Lonrho mission arrived in Khartoum for negotiations. In July a ministerial delegation went to London to negotiate the resumption of a £10 million British credit for the Sudan, which had been halted the previous year because of the nationalization of British banks and other interests. Lonrho and Khaleel Osman helped the Sudanese to negotiate the credit. A week later, when the 19th July coup took place, Lonrho's jet (a mystère) was sent to Belgrade to fly the Defence Minister and his party secretly to Cairo and Tripoli, where the counter coup was organized.

1. S. Cronje, M. Ling and G. Cronje, Lonrho: Portrait of a Multinational, Pelican Books, Harmondsworth, 1976, p.178-81.

The 19th July coup was crushed on 22nd July. The counter coup took place in a blood-bath in which the army elements suspected of participating in the coup were shot and the leadership of the CPS were assassinated. During the reign of terror that followed, thousands of citizens were rounded up in jails and detention camps throughout the country. The civil service was purged, allegedly of communists but in fact many sympathizers were affected.

The events that followed, with regard not only to British interests in general but to Lonrho and Khaleel Osman in particular, showed the newly reinstated regime's recognition of the role they had played. The £10 million loan was approved and Lonrho was appointed as the purchasing agent for the Sudan government, with a commission rate fixed at ten times the previous rate (0.2-2%). Khaleel Osman negotiated schemes for the joint production of sugar with Lonrho and the government as well as a private textile factory for Gulf International.

The 1971 events in the Sudan revealed that the Sudanese capitalist class, which was nurtured by international capital, had in this instance transcended the national boundaries in its efforts to control the state and change governments at will and was also willing and able to collaborate with international capital to safeguard the capitalist path of development in the Sudan. The crucial element in the way the 19th July government was removed is the fact that multinationals are not freely floating, disembodied and denationalized bodies. They have national bases and they require military and economic support provided by their base nation. Moreover, the nation-state has become almost powerless in the face of giant corporations whose ability to move capital across national boundaries had made it all but impossible to control them. Examples of this are numerous in Africa. Lonrho's operations which are hardly speculative concern the very close

relations they maintain with various governments and leaders. The company's first black director, Udi Gecaga, is both Lonrho's managing director in East Africa and President Kenyatta's son-in-law. The head of Lonrho's Ivory Coast operations is President Houphoult Boigny's son. In Zambia too Lonrho's relations with the government were so close that, when a board of directors revolt threatened Rowland's position as managing director, the Zambian government intervened and offered £8 million to the company as long as Rowland remained in his post. This shows the deep appreciation which this company has of the need, from its point of view, to ensure full representation of its interests in the councils of state.¹ In the Sudan, Rowland's access to General Nimeiri was enhanced by the role the former played in the latter's re-instatement. He and Khaleel Osman were reputedly the only two people who could see the President without an appointment at any time.

The immediate results of the government's shift to the right in the years that followed were the encouragement of foreign investment and a substantial increase in foreign aid from the capitalist countries. Another significant result was Western pressure on the Southerners to reach an accord with the regime on the basis of regional self-government. The agreement was reached under the auspices of the World Council of Churches and Emperor Haile Sellasie in March 1972, although the declaration of regional self-government for the South had been in existence since June 9th 1969. The implementation of the original declaration had faced numerous difficulties which were eagerly smoothed out after the clear right-wing shift in 1971.

The increase in foreign aid started immediately after the 1971 coup. The United States started by opening a credit worth \$18 million to Sudanese wheat importers (four of which were amongst the cases studied). The IMF

1. See Review of African Political Economy, No.2, 1975, p.7.

granted a credit of \$40 million. Britain gave £25 million, most of which in fact never left London and was used to compensate nationalized British firms and to purchase British products. The Saudi regime supported the shift to the right and offered a \$200 million loan to the Sudan. In return the regime signed an agreement covering joint exploitation of the Red Sea bed.¹ They also started various other schemes in partnership with the state and the private capitalists.

Internally, the regime revived the national unity slogan, originally initiated by the right, to permit the bourgeois parties to participate in the government's single party and its organizations. In 1972 and 1973 most of the nationalized private business establishments were returned to their previous owners and generous compensation and bank facilities were given to them.

The bourgeois parties (Umma, NUP, PDP) reached a reconciliation agreement with the regime in July 1977. This was brought about through the mediation of two capitalists who belonged to these parties (both of whom were among the cases studied). Their secondary contradictions resolved, the capitalist forces in the Sudan were to unite in the face of the rising consciousness of the masses. This left the CPS alone as the organized opposition to the present political system in the country.

Political Affiliation of the Cases Studied

In the light of the role the bourgeois parties have played in the politics of the Sudan, it is possible to expose the political affiliations of the cases studied and the role that affiliation played in their business careers. The distribution of the hundred businessmen studied among the political parties was the following:

1. MERIP Report, op.cit., p.15.

Umma	38%
PDP	30%
NUP	16%
others, i.e. either pro-government or did not disclose	16%

When these figures are broken down sectorally an interesting picture is revealed (see Table 8.1). In the agricultural sector the Umma Party leads, with 68% of those involved in mechanized farming belonging to it. The PDP comes next with 14%, with the NUP trailing behind with only 10%. The same pattern persists in the industrial sector, with 50% belonging to the Umma Party, 22% PDP and 11% NUP. The leading party in all sectors is clearly the Umma Party.

This is in line with the preceding account which revealed that the Umma Party throughout the colonial and post-colonial period has been the main representative of the rich capitalists in the country. This pattern seems to be persisting and even to be on the increase, because the research revealed that, among the younger businessmen with secondary and post-secondary education, a vast majority (75%) belong to the Umma Party. Predictably, the PDP comes next with 30% of the sample declaring their affiliation to it. The NUP comes last with 16% belonging to it.

Prior to Independence it was possible to relate the Umma Party to the agricultural bourgeoisie and the NUP Party to trade. After Independence, as the table reveals, the overlapping re-investment pattern characteristic of the post-Independence period has made such an identification impossible. The local bourgeoisie scattered its investment over all sectors, whilst retaining, on the whole, their political affiliations. The Umma, together with the PDP, continued to be the main representatives of the rich businessmen. The NUP gradually moved towards the right proving, thereby, that its

TABLE 8.1 *Political Affiliation of Businessmen Interviewed*

Sector Party	All Sectors	All Agriculture	Mechanized Farming	Industry	Trade	Services
UMMA	38%	44%	68%	50%	36%	50%
PDP	30	20	14	22	21	-
NUP	16	4	10	11	23	50
Pro-Government		12		11	18	-
Undisclosed	16	20	8	6	2	-

leadership was controlled by, and served the interests of, the capitalists affiliated to it.

In addition to their party affiliations, the businessmen studied also had varied relationships with the state apparatus. 78% of the cases studied knew the present Ministers and Deputy Ministers personally. 32% were found to be close friends of Ministers and prominent army officers in various periods since 1956. 8% were members of ministers' families. 8% had influence in banks, either through membership of the boards of directors or through members of their families working in banks. 8% had partnerships with ex-ministers or employed them as senior executives in their establishments. The capitalist interests were thus not only safeguarded on the macro level through the control of the bourgeois parties of the state but also on the micro level through personal relationships developed since 1956.

The manufactured relationship between the state and the capitalist class calls for further investigation. This research suggests not merely that the post-colonial state in the Sudan was influenced by these personal relationships but also that a common vested interest in support of the capi-

talist cause furthered its development.

Conclusion

The political history of the Sudan, analysed from a class perspective, reveals that the capitalist class had no major contradictions with the colonial system. Its organizations originated when the struggle for national liberation crystallized and conflicts between the bourgeois parties (during the colonial period) were an outcome of the subsidiary contradictions between the various fractions of capital.

The handing over of the government by the bourgeois parties to the reactionary faction of the military in 1958 was a reflection of the strength of the struggle of the mass movement against the infiltration of neo-colonialism and the failure of the parliamentary system to contain it.

The short-lived alliance of the bourgeois parties with the trade union movement and the CPS in opposition to the military government before October 'revolution' is evidence of two facts: (1) that the bourgeoisie felt threatened by the growing state capital investment, of which they were not wholly part, and so were driven into a tactical alliance with the revolutionary movement to regain state power; and (2) that they were confident that they would be able to contain or suppress the movement after the success of this immediate strategy.

The alliance of all the bourgeois parties against the CPS and the Front (جبهة الويلات) soon after October 'revolution', and the banning of the CPS in 1966, reveals the primary common interests that all the bourgeois parties had with each other.

The vital role played by the local capitalist class, in collaboration with international capital, in the events of July 1971 reveals the truly dependent nature of the Sudanese bourgeoisie and its opposition to any att-

empts to radicalize the political system. Their subsequent alliance with multi-national capital and the government (1977) marks a new turning point in the dependent nature of the Sudanese bourgeoisie. Its opposition to radical change, the mass movement and the independent development of the country has taken a fierce, violent and direct form.

Is it conceivable then that such a bourgeoisie could play any role in the breakaway from capitalism? Going back to Alec Gordon's definition of the national bourgeoisie, it seems that a national bourgeoisie as defined by Gordon never existed in the Sudan during the colonial period. At that time there was no industrial bourgeoisie in the Sudan in contrast to the cases of India, China or Turkey. The other productive bourgeoisie, the agricultural one, has been allied with imperialism from its creation to the present. Contrary to Gordon's definition, the commercial bourgeoisie in the Sudan had minor contradictions with the agricultural bourgeoisie and was part of the anti-colonial struggle until after Independence - 1956 - when it allied completely with the imperialist bourgeoisie.

The proposition of Jack Woddis that not all local bourgeoisies in Africa are connected with imperialism drove him to classify the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and what he calls the entrepreneurs among the national forces. This seems to be an extension of the confusion that followed the discussion in the Third International. Like some of the Third World communist parties, Woddis seems to be searching for a national bourgeoisie even where it does not exist. To propose that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of the post-colonial state are national is an example of this confusion. Hamza Alavi adequately dispelled the notion that political independence alone would transform the state and make it a national one and concluded that the post-colonial state was a neo-imperialist state.

The research undertaken suggests that among the capitalists studied the term national is not applicable. Both the established entrepreneurs and those newly recruited from the state bureaucracy were motivated by capitalist interests rather than national considerations. This was expressed politically through their party affiliations and the positions they took in the political struggle throughout the period under study.

After Independence an industrial bourgeoisie did develop in the Sudan under the sponsorship of the state, which they controlled. This industrial bourgeoisie developed from the ranks of former commercial and agricultural capitalists in close connection with neo-colonialism and the post-colonial state. Even if we were to concede that this bourgeoisie succeeded in accumulating capital with the assistance of the state and in competition with foreign capital as suggested for Kenya and Ghana by Swainson and Kennedy, and that it does not lack money, contrary to what Fanon suggested, it would still be necessary to scrutinize the proposition that they can play a national role with contemporary developments in mind.

The facts that the interests of capitalists in the Sudan are so intertwined, economically and politically, with those of foreign capital and that the consciousness of the masses has increased limit their role even further to make it almost non-existent. When this is juxtaposed with the reality of their actual political positions in the Sudan, such a statement seems even more valid.

It is within this context that the dependency theory offers a theoretical framework for the analysis of the peripheral bourgeoisie. Samir Amin's contribution is too generalized to be of much help in analysing specific situations in the peripheries. By proposing that the proletariat of the metropolis exploited that of the periphery he contradicts his own proposition that capital has consolidated transnationally and on a world scale to

become one unified force. It is thus not surprising that no specific strategy is given for the suggested breakaway from capitalism, other than the equally generalized proposition of self-reliance.

Andre Gunder Frank is more specific with regard to political strategy. His main premise is that the peripheral bourgeoisie is dependent and had a vested interest in the perpetuation of dependency. He clearly concludes that the bourgeoisie, in all its forms and guises, is incapable of playing any role in the democratic revolution if the latter were ever to take place. The origin and development of the capitalist class in the Sudan confirmed their dependent nature in all sectors of their activity. Their political affiliations provide further evidence that they have had a vested interest in the continuity of the dependent capitalist path that had characterized and continues to characterize the economy of the Sudan. Although further and more comprehensive studies of the various layers of the capitalist class are needed to arrive at definitive conclusions, no evidence of a possible progressive role for the Sudanese bourgeoisie can be visualized this far.

In view of all this, it is difficult to understand the retreat of the CPS from its former (1967) analysis of the bourgeoisie. If it can be shown that the capitalist mode of production is the determining mode of production in the Sudan; and given the considerable increase in local and foreign capitalist enterprise, together with the attempts at the unification of the capitalist forces in the country on the political level with the apparent blessing of international capital; then, it is hard to conceive of circumstances in which this bourgeoisie would relinquish its former position and stand for any change, however mild, in the relations of production.

CONCLUSION

Conclusions

- (1) In this thesis it has been argued that the political economy of the Sudan between 1898 and 1975 was characterized by regional as well as urban-rural disparities. These disparities resulted from a prolonged process of capital accumulation and were intensified by the policies of the state, which were largely determined by the needs of the same process. It has also been argued that in the contemporary Sudan, contrary to the claims of economists, including some marxists, to the effect that the 'traditional' sector is predominant, the capitalist mode of production is dominant. This is because it is the determining mode for the whole process of production, consumption and resource-allocation.

- (2) Private capital accumulation in the Sudan during the colonial period was determined to a great extent by colonial interests and the needs of external markets. This accumulation started in trade long before British colonial rule but the latter played a decisive role in its development and direction. It was by the colonial government's design that local agrarian capitalists were implanted while industrial capital investment was deliberately arrested so as to leave the Sudanese market open to imported manufactures. Those who invested in trade, agriculture, real estate and services in this period were mainly Sudanese of immigrant origin, religious leaders or notables. In addition, traders involved in the export of oil seeds, livestock and gum accumulated capital in the areas where these commodities were produced.

Finance in this period was mainly foreign. The traditional *shyle* system was insignificant in comparison with the role of foreign (mainly

British) banks, although it enhanced capital-accumulation opportunities for some of the traders who practised it. Finance facilities were provided preferentially to foreign firms, which were followed by the immigrant Sudanese, with the Sudanese-born tailing the list of bank loan recipients.

- (3) During the post-colonial period an industrial capitalist class emerged, its members being recruited mainly from the ranks of established traders and agriculturalists, and secondarily from among politicians and bureaucrats. Industrial capitalism thus did not develop from handicrafts, as was the case in Europe. The Sudanese industrial capitalist class developed as a result of the post-colonial concessions. It did not compete with foreign capital, since it was to a large extent dependent on this capital not only for its equipment but also for its raw materials and finance. In some cases, investment in partnership with foreign capital took place.
- (4) The leading group of Sudanese capitalists were found to have the following characteristics: (1) The vast majority of them started business in trade. (2) The majority of them invested in agriculture but generally maintained their trade activities. (3) Finally they started investing in industry, mainly after 'Independence'. (4) Patterns of investment thus revealed an intricate overlapping. Although trade was the common base for almost all of them, they generally invested in more than one sector in the economy. In fact the richest four capitalists in the country were found to be leading businessmen in all four main sectors of the economy.

Besides political and religious sect leaders, the cases studied had the following backgrounds:

- (1) sons of slave traders;
- (2) sons of Native Administrators;
- (3) Northern Province *shyle* lenders and traders;
- (4) handicraftsmen who got contracts from the British government during the Second World War;
- (5) sons of political figures, e.g. ex-Ministers;
- (6) political men and party supporters; and
- (7) state bureaucrats, including army men.

Since its origins this class was found to have been dependent on colonialism. After Independence it did not lose this character but saw it transformed into a dependency on neo-colonialism. Composed of both immigrants and indigenous Sudanese it was not initially a homogeneous class. However, the immigrants were absorbed through marriage and partnership so that any possible conflict between the two groups was dissipated. In general this was a small close-knit and cohesive class, the members of which were interrelated through marriage and business partnerships. By investing in a multiplicity of activities, they manage, despite their limited number, to control a substantial proportion of the private capital operating in the country.

- (5) The study of the leading businessmen revealed that they have a marked tendency to funnel their capital into a small number of urban centres and above all into the capital city, creating a basis for further regional disparities.

The new Open Door policy (1972) introduced by the government under the umbrella of development was an invitation to foreign capital to strengthen its grip on the Sudanese economy. It encouraged the local capitalist class to increase its investments and to enter into partner-

ships with foreign capital, thereby deepening the roots of its dependency and creating new obstacles to any disengagement of the economy from the foreign grip. The steep increase in the Sudan's foreign debt stands as glaring proof of this.

The factors that contributed to the success of these capitalists were: (1) links with the colonial authorities; (2) social background; (3) political affiliations; (4) education; (5) state policies; (6) engagement in activities connected with the international market; (7) connections within business circles; (8) utilization of family, personal and tribal connections within the state apparatus; (9) partnership with foreign capital; and (10) foreign or state finance.

The thesis has refuted the notion that classes do not exist in the Sudan. In particular the argument that a capitalist class is still far from developing because businessmen, though accumulating money, spend it on their extended family, kinsmen and tribesmen, has been firmly rejected. Evidence has been provided that these social ties are used, along with regional loyalties, to further capital accumulation.

- (6) The study of the educational opportunities and life-style of leading Sudanese businessmen suggested that education has played an important role in the development of capitalism in the Sudan. The businessmen were keen to provide their families - especially male family members who were seen as the heirs of the business - with higher education, both locally and abroad. The countries where these potential capitalists were receiving their education were in general the centres of the foreign capital with which they were connected and from which they were receiving assistance. The preferred academic specializations were mostly related to the business fields in which the families were active.

The businessmen and their families lead a distinct and luxurious style of life that is comparable to that of their European counterparts. This could scarcely be said of the working class, for example, whose life-style and standard of living is far from comparable with that of the European working classes. As is the case regarding access to education, the consumption patterns of these businessmen, whether in food, housing or health-care, have already transcended the boundaries of the country. Through the state, business families are also able to use the country's foreign reserves to pay for the importation of non-essential foodstuffs and beverages, as well as education costs abroad.

- (7) The study of the political history of the Sudanese capitalist class revealed that the top sections of this bourgeoisie, especially the agrarian capitalists, were politically allied with imperialism throughout the colonial period. They continued to be so even after Independence. The main parties to which they belonged are the Umma Party, People's Democratic Party (PDP) and National Unionist Party (NUP). Each of these organisations supported the capitalist pattern of development and they identified with imperialism in varying degrees (Umma the most, NUP the least). The most affluent of the subjects interviewed were found to belong most frequently to the Umma Party, followed by the PDP and NUP successively. These parties controlled the state throughout the post-colonial period and used its funds and apparatus to further private capital accumulation. In the contemporary period the government declared an Open Door policy and created the legal and economic framework to encourage capitalist activities both local and foreign.

The findings of the thesis with regard to the origin and nature of the Sudanese capitalists and their close alliance with foreign capi-

tal suggest that the strategy advocated recently the the Communist Party of the Sudan (CPS) is misconceived. In considering the whole of the Sudanese capitalist class as 'national bourgeoisie', the CPS overlooks the fact that there is no contradiction between the interests of the capitalists studied and those of foreign capital. This study has suggested that the Sudanese capitalists are in fact a *comprador* and dependent bourgeoisie. Given the repressive role their parties have played throughout the political history of the modern Sudan, and the personal role that some of those studied have played in opposition to radical change (to the extent of crushing governments in collaboration with foreign capital) these capitalists can in no way be classified as a 'national bourgeoisie'.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 *Hegemony of Foreign Capital in the Sudan*

SUDAN MERCANTILE GROUP OF COMPANIES SUDAN MERCANTILE CO. (KHARTOUM) LTD. Sole Agents in the Sudan for :-		
D. Anderson & Son, Ltd.		.. Rok roofing felt, asphalt-saturated felt, hard rock mastic, insulating paper etc.
Arthur Balfour & Co., Ltd.		.. "Capital" high speed steels and tools.
Art Metal Inc.		.. Steel office furniture, business equipment and systems, etc.
W. & T. Avery, Ltd.		.. Weighing, Counting and testing Machines.
B.I.P. Reinforcing Products Ltd.		.. "Filon" translucent sheets, etc.
Carron Company		.. Baths and accessories.
Chance Bros. & Co., Ltd.		.. Tropical glass "Calorex".
Crittall-Hope Export		.. Metal windows, doors, casements, louvres, etc.
Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd.		.. Cycle Covers, tubes and accessories.
Electrolux, Ltd.		.. Paraffin-operated refrigerators and bottle coolers.
Ernest E. Mayer, Fawsitt & Co., Ltd.		.. "Abavit" Preparations for protection of seeds and crops.
Hattersley International Valves, Ltd.		.. Bronze, cast iron, cast steel valves and fittings, power-operated valves and British Detroit lubricators.
Hoskins & Sewell, Ltd.		.. Hospital bedsteads and equipment.
The Hoyt Metal Co. of Gt. Britain Ltd.		.. White and anti-friction metal.
Lewis & Tylor, Ltd.		.. "Gripoly" hair belting, leather belting "Underwriter" canvas fire hose, etc.
Mo & Domsjo Trading Co., Ltd.		.. "Trecetex" insulating wallboard, flush doors, partition board etc.
Parkinson Cowan International, Ltd.		.. Domestic gas cookers.
Finch Johnson & Associates, Ltd.		.. High Class paints, Enamels, anti-corrosive paints, etc.
Printar Industries, Ltd.		.. Disinfectant fluids.
Ransomes, Sims & Jefferies, Ltd.		.. Agricultural implements for animal, draught, lawn mowers, grass cutters etc.
Read & Campbell, Ltd.		.. Fire fighting plant and equipment.
Solignum, Ltd.		.. "Solignum" wood preservative.
Turners Asbestos Cement Co., Ltd.		.. "Everite" Asbestos-cement sheets-pipes, "Ternall" tiles, partition insulation board, asbestos wood, decorated sheets, ceiling panel. "Pollite" sheets, tiles, slates etc.
Twyfords, Ltd.		.. Sanitary equipment.
The Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.		.. "Yale" locks, padlocks and builders' hardware.

Source: For all Appendix 1, The Sudan Chamber of Commerce Journal, No.432, Khartoum, April 1968.

APPENDIX 1 Hegemony of Foreign Capital in the Sudan

SUDAN MERCANTILE CO. (MOTORS) LIMITED

Sole Agents in the Sudan for :

Champion Spark Plug Co.	..	..	Sparkling plugs.
Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd.	..	..	Motor tyres and accessories.
Eversman Manufacturing Co.	..	..	Landlevellers and ditchers.
Ford Motor Co., Ltd.	..	..	Ford cars, trucks, tractors, etc.
Ransomes, Sims & Jefferies Ltd...	..	..	Agricultural machinery.
Whitemotor Company	..	..	Cockshutt Agricultural Machinery.

Also Stockists for :

Black & Decker Ltd.	..	..	Electric Tools.
Simoniz (England) Ltd.	..	..	Car Polishes.
Van Norman Machine Company	..	..	Automotive equipment.

SUDAN MERCANTILE CO. (ENGINEERS) LIMITED

Sole Agents in the Sudan for :

A.E.I. Export Ltd.	..	..	All types of electrical equipment
A.E.I. Lamp & Lighting Co. Ltd.	..	..	Lamps and Lighting equipment.
Allis-Chalmers International	..	..	Heavy duty tractors and earth moving equipment.
Atlas Engineering Co.	..	..	Machine tools.
Aveling-Barford Ltd.	..	..	Road graders, rollers, dump trucks.
Barber-Greene Overseas	..	..	Asphalt plants, conveyers, ditchers.
Braithwaite & Co. Structural Ltd.	..	..	Pressed steel tanks.
British Ferrograph Recording Co.	..	..	Tape recorders.
The British Oxygen Co., Ltd.	..	..	"Quasi-Arc" Electric Welding and Electrodes.
British Ropes, Ltd.	..	..	Steel and fibre ropes.
Broom & Wade Ltd.	..	..	Air compressors and pneumatic tools.
Bucyrus-Erie Company	..	..	Excavating machinery and well-drilling plant.
Cane Machinery & Engineering Co., Inc.	..	..	Cane harvesting and loading and associated machinery.
Churchill Redman Ltd.	..	..	Machine tools.
A.F. Craig & Co., Ltd.	..	..	Sugar machinery and equipment.
Creed & Co., Ltd.	..	..	Teleprinters.
Crypton Equipment, Ltd.	..	..	Automotive test equipment.
Davey, Paxman & Co., Ltd.	..	..	Oil engines and power packs, boilers, filters.
Electrolux, Ltd.	..	..	Refrigerators and freezers.
Sir James Farmer Norton & Co., Ltd.	..	..	Bleaching, dyeing, etc. machinery for textile industry.
General Electric Company	..	..	Refrigerators, air conditioning units, and electrical appliances.
H.J., Godwin, Ltd.	..	..	Industrial and Marine Pumps
A.B.C. Hansen Comp., Denmark	..	..	Grain Grinding Mills..
Hickson's Timber Impregnation Co. G. B. Ltd.	..	..	Timber preservatives and impregnation Plant

APPENDIX 1 *Hegemony of Foreign Capital in the Sudan*

Sudan Mercantile Co. Engineers Ltd.
Sole Agents in the Sudan for:

I.T.T. Standard	..	Telecommunication equipment.
H.W. Kerns & Co Ltd.	..	Machine tools.
P.A. Lister & Co. Ltd.	..	Oil engines, generating sets.
Mather & Platt Ltd.	..	Pump, Canning and Textile machinery.
M.E.M. Co. Ltd.	..	Electric accessories.
Frederick Parker Ltd.	..	Concrete mixers, stone crushers etc.
The Phoenix Engineering Co., Ltd.	..	Road making plant.
Platt Brothers & Co., Ltd.	..	Textile & Ginning machinery.
Pyrotenax Ltd.	..	Mineral Insulated cable.
Robey & Co. Ltd.	..	Portable Steam engines & sisal machinery
Thomas Robinson & Son Ltd.	..	Wood working machinery & flour milling plant.
Rose Downs & Thompson Ltd.	..	Oil extraction plants
Ruston Bucyrus Ltd.	..	Excavating machinery & well-drilling plant.
Ruston & Hornsby Ltd.	..	Industrial & marine oil engines
Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd.	..	Telecommunication equipment, radio & cables.
J. Stone & Co, (Deptford) Ltd.	..	Railway electrical machinery and air conditioning.
Yarrow & Co., Ltd.	..	Gun Boats, patrol boats & special naval craft, vessels up to 400 ft. in length shallow draft vessels.

P.O. Box 97, KHARTOUM, Telephone No. 70751 (Seven Lines)—
Telegrams "SUDANILE",

LONDON AGENTS: Keymer, Son & Co., Ltd. Imperial House, Kingsway,
London, W.C2

Companies at PORT SUDAN & WAD MEDANI

MITCHELL COTTS

& Co. (MIDDLE EAST) LTD.

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K H A R T O U M

Branches at :

PORT SUDAN, WAD MEDANI
EL OBEID, ALEXANDRIA
PORT SAID, PORT TEWFIK

Importers of : General Goods
Foodstuffs Engineering and
Agricultural Equipment Refriger-
ators Air Conditioners Electrical
Equipment Cars, Trucks and Tyres

Shipping, Forwarding, Airways
Insurance & General Agents,
Stevedores & Bunker Contra-
ctors, Owners of Produce
Cleaning Plants in the Sudan
& Large Sprinklered Ware-
houses at Port Sudan

SOLE AGENTS AND DISTRIBUTORS IN THE SUDAN FOR :-

GENERAL MOTORS PRODUCTS
"Chevrolet" Cars and Trucks.
"Vauxhall" Cars, "Bedford," Trucks
"Opel" Cars, and "Frigidaire"
Refrigerators.

ROVER CO. LTD. Landrovers, Sta-
tion Wagons, Pickups.

MICHELIN : Tyres and Tubes.

MARCONI WIRELESS TELEGRAPH
CO. LTD. Radio - Communication
Equipment.

CARRIER-EGYPT S.A.E. Air Condi-
tioning and Refrigerating Equipment

And many other products.

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Britain Aden Bahrein Canada Ceylon Egypt Ethiopia French Somaliland Hong
Kong Iraq Italy Kenya Lebanon Libya Malaya Portuguese East Africa Rhodesia
Sudan Somali Republic S.W. Africa Tanganyika.

Thailand Uganda South Africa U. S. A. Zanzibar

A MEMBER OF THE MITCHELL COTTS GROUP

Contomichalos, Sons & Co. Ltd.

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Registered Head Office

KHARTOUM — SUDAN

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Branches throughout the SUDAN

Charterers

Shipping, and Insurance Agents

Warehousemen

Exporters of Sudan Cotton & Produce

General Merchants

Tourist Agents

Telegraphic Address All Offices

CONTOLOS

TELEX :

251 Khartoum

ASSOCIATE COMPANIES

G. A. CONTOMICHALOS, LTD., LONDON

CONTOMICHALOS, SONS (RED SEA) LTD.

CONTOMICHALOS TRANSPORTS LTD.

APPENDIX 1 Hegemony of Foreign Capital in the Sudan

ESTABLISHED 1909

TSAKIROGLOU & Co. Ltd.

(Incorporated in the Sudan)

REGISTERED OFFICE Khartoum Gamhouria Avenue P.O. Box No. 198

Tel. Nos. 72081 - 71728 - 77771 - 77772

STORES Omdurman Atbara and Port Sudan

BRANCHES : Port Sudan P.O. Box No. - 233 Telephones 2130

Atbara P.O. Box No. 2 Telephone 2204

LONDON CORRESPONDENTS Carapanayoti Co. Ltd.

19, Estcheap LONDON E.C.3

ASSOCIATED COMPANIES

The Sudan Oil Mills Ltd., Khartoum North

Tsakiroglou & Co. (Port Sudan) Ltd., PORT SUDAN

IMPORTERS

Wheatflour, Jutebags, Building
Materials Pharmaceuticals, etc. etc.

EXPORTERS

Gum Arabic, Senna Leaves Sifting and Pods (Wild and Cultivated) Henna Leaves
Oil Cakes of all kinds, Whole, Donnuts, Sesame-seeds, Cottonseeds, Darri, Ground
Nuts, Colocynth Pulp, etc. etc.

PLANTERS

Alex Senna Henna

INSURANCE

Forwarding and Commission Agents Steamships Agents, Stevedores, Charterers,
Warehousemen

APPENDIX 2 *Sudan Foreign Trade 1956-1976*
Value of Selected Exports in LS millions

YEAR	E X P O R T S						TOTAL IMPORTS LS mln
	TOTAL	GUM	GROUND NUTS	SESAME	CATTLE SHEEP MEAT	DURA	
1956	65.3	5.4	3.8	2.1	1.5	0.4	45.2
1957	48.8	4.7	4.7	3.0	2.0	1.2	67.6
1958	39.8	5.2	3.4	2.2	1.6	0.3	59.5
1959	63.5	5.1	3.6	2.8	1.1	1.7	59.1
1960	60.7	7.0	4.5	4.6	1.5	2.8	63.7
1961	59.1	6.2	5.4	4.2	1.5	1.9	82.9
1962	74.6	4.5	6.7	5.7	0.8	1.5	89.3
1963	77.1	5.6	6.4	4.8	1.0	2.5	99.2
1964	67.1	6.6	9.7	5.6	1.3	1.6	95.5
1965	67.1	1.3	7.4	5.7	1.8	2.9	72.3
1966	69.8	7.2	7.3	5.7	1.3	0	74.3
1967	74.1	8.4	6.5	6.5	1.0*	NA	81.2
1968	80.8	8.8	5.7	6.6	2.6	1.0	89.7
1969	85.6	8.7	6.0	8.0	2.3	0	92.5
1970	103.9	9.1	5.5	6.5	2.4	0	100.1
1971	114.4	8.0	9.3	8.0	2.0	1.8	115.4
1972	124.4	9.1	9.7	9.2	3.3	1.7	117.9
1973	152.2	7.4	13.0	10.7	7.6	3.0	151.8
1974	122.0	14.3	18.2	16.5	7.8	4.4	247.5
1975	152.5	7.6	34.4	12.0	1.1	2.2	359.9
1976	193.0	11.2	39.0	17.3	0.6	3.2	341.4

* Nine months only

NA = not available

Source: Rep. of the Sudan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey.
 Compiled from various years.

*APPENDIX 3 Government and Private Imports in Sudan
(in Millions of LS)*

YEAR	TOTAL IMPORTS	GOVERNMENT		PRIVATE	
		AMOUNT IN MILLIONS	%	AMOUNT IN MILLIONS	%
1956	45.3	10.8	24	34.5	76
1957	67.6	11.4	17	56.2	83
1958	59.5	19.4	33	40.1	67
1959	57.1	12.6	22	44.5	78
1960	63.7	13.5	21	50.2	79
1961	82.9	17.4	21	61.5	79
1962	89.3	22.3	25	67.0	75
1963	97.6	25.6	26	72.0	74
1964	93.2	27.2	29	66.0	71
1965	72.2	16.9	23	55.3	77
1966	77.4	17.3	22	60.1	78
1967	74.3	16.3	22	58.0	78
1968	89.7	11.6	20	78.1	80
1969	92.5	19.7	21	72.8	79
1970	108.3	38.5	36	69.8	64

APPENDIX 4

The Questionnaire

Record Number

--	--	--

Card Number

0	1
---	---

Age

--	--

Tribe

--	--

Region

--	--	--

Residence

--	--

Since

--	--

Dependency:
Individuals

--	--

Families
Number

--	--

Persons

--	--	--

Relationship

--	--

Type of help

--	--

Residence

--	--	--	--

Father's occupation:

Government

Farmer

Worker

Petty Trader

Dead

Relations employed in the
establishment:

Close relations:

Workers

Clerks

Managers

TOTAL

Blood relations:

Workers

Clerks

Managers

TOTAL

Relations:

Workers

Clerks

Managers

TOTAL

--

--

--

--

--

--	--

--	--

--

--	--	--

--	--

--	--

--

--	--	--

--	--

--	--

--

--	--	--

Record Number

--	--	--

Card Number

0	2
---	---

Intimate friends:

Businessman:

No. of friends

--	--

Sudanese

--

Non-Sudanese

--

Neighbours

--

Relations

--

Work

--

Inlaws

--

Wife:

No. of friends

--	--

Sudanese

--

Non-Sudanese

--

Neighbours

--

Relations

--

In Work

--

Daughters:

No. of friends

--	--

Sudanese

--

Non-Sudanese

--

Neighbours

--

Relations

--

School or College

--

Sons:

No. of friends

--	--

Sudanese

--

Non-Sudanese

--

Neighbours

--

Relations

--

School or College

--

Nutrition:

Meat and Eggs

--	--	--

Cheese, Olives and Butter

--	--	--

Biscuits, Cakes, Honey and
Jam

--	--	--

Milk

--	--	--

Cereals (including Bread)

--	--	--

Cornflakes

--	--	--

Fruit and Vegetables

--	--	--

TOTAL

--	--	--	--

HOUSING: 1st House

Place

--	--	--	--

Area

--	--

No. of Floors

--

No. of Rooms

--	--

No. of Dom. Workers Rooms

--	--

Toilets

--	--

Bathrooms

--	--

Gardens

--

Stores

--

Flushing System

--

Record Number

--	--	--

Card Number

--	--

HOUSING: 2nd House

Place

--	--	--	--

Area

--	--

No. of Floors

--

No. of Rooms

--	--

No. of Dom. Workers Rooms

--	--

Toilets

--	--

Bathrooms

--	--

Gardens

--

Stores

--

Flushing System

--

Other Houses (No.)

--

Conveniences: Standard of Living

Radio

--

Refrigerator

--

T.V.

--

Cooker

--

Washer

☐

Drier

☐

Vacuum Cleaner

☐

Electric Iron

☐

Tape Recorder

☐

Record Player

☐

Air Conditioning

☐

Other Electric Equipment

☐

Original Paintings

☐

Health (Diseases)

Family Members:

Hypertension

☐

Diabetes

☐

Heart

☐

Malaria

☐

Businessman:

Hypertension

☐

Diabetes

☐

Heart

☐

Malaria

☐

Medical Treatment:

Public Hospital ☐Private Hospital ☐Abroad ☐

Transportation: Telephone:

Within Area ☐All Over Sudan ☐Abroad ☐No. of Cars ☐Drivers ☐Wages (Drivers) ☐ ☐How often change car ☐Cost of fuel ☐ ☐ ☐

Means of Transport (Sudan)

Family:

Car ☐Train ☐Plane ☐

Businessman:

Car ☐Train ☐Plane ☐

Record Number

--	--	--

Card Number

1	9
---	---

Relations of sons and daughters
to W and H

1st Number

--

Sex

--

Relation

--	--

Education

--	--

Father's occupation

--	--

Institution

--

Husband or wife occupation

--	--

Institution

--

2nd Number

--

Sex

--

Relation

--	--

Education

--	--

Father's occupation

--	--

Institution (father)

--

Husband or wife occupation

--	--

Institution

--	--

Record Number

--	--	--

Card Number

2	0
---	---

Q.17 answered

--

Q.18 answered

--

Relations involved in Business:

1st Relation:

Number

--

Type of Business

--

Place

--	--	--	--

Date of Starting

--	--

Relation to Businessman

--	--

2nd Relation:

Number

--

Type of Business

--

Place

--	--	--	--

Date of Starting

--	--

Relation to Businessman

--	--

3rd Relation:

Number

--

Type of Business

--

Place

--	--	--	--

Date of Starting

--	--

Relation to Businessman

--	--

4th Relation:

Number

--

Type of Business

--

Place

--	--	--	--

Date of Starting

--	--

Relation

--	--

Other Business Activities:

1st

Number

--

Type of Business

--

Location

--	--

Start Date

--	--

2nd

Number

--

Type of Business

--

Location

--	--

Start Date

--	--

3rd

339

Number

--

Type of Business

--

Location

--	--

Start Date

--	--

4th

Number

--

Type of Business

--

Location

--	--

Start Date

--	--

END OF CARD 20

Record Number

--	--	--

Card Number

2	1
---	---

Reason for choosing private
sector:

1st Reason

--	--

2nd Reason

--	--

3rd Reason

--	--

Occupation of the Father

--	--

Kind of work Started

--	--

Capital at Start

--	--	--	--

Location at Start

--	--	--	--

Business Partners

--

Relationship of Partners
(Close)

--

Relative

--

Friend

--

Banks loaned for Business:

Barclays

--

Commercial

--

Radio Stations heard to:

1st choice ☐2nd choice ☐3rd choice ☐4th choice ☐Languages spoken: ☐Did you have formal education? ☐Do you read newspapers? ☐Sudanese: ☐Foreign: ☐Do you read magazines? ☐Egyptian ☐Other Arab ☐Foreign ☐Wives leisure: ☐Stay at Home ☐Visit ☐Entertainment ☐

Businessman go to the Cinema

342

First Choice

Second Choice

Businessman visit Theatre

Watch T.V.

Listen to Music

Classical

Modern

Membership of organisation:

Political Party - Umma

Unionist

Socialist(M)
Khatmiya

Chamber of Commerce

Farmers Union

Social Club

Cultural Organization

Athletic Organization

Industrial Union

Board of Directors

Committee

Record Number

--	--	--

Card Number

2	2
---	---

Religion

--

Pilgrimage to Mecca

--	--

Pilgrimage to Omra

--	--

Do you say prayers regularly?

--

Do you fast?

--

Do you believe in evil eye?

--

Are you optimistic?

--

Are you pessimistic?

--

Religious sect or organisation

--

1st

--	--

2nd

--	--

How often travel abroad annually?

--

for medical reason

--

for holidays

--

for work

--

other

--

Do you smoke?

☐

Cigarettes (no. per day)

--	--

Cigars

☐

Pipe

☐

Tumbac

☐

Do you have a book collection?

How many books?

--	--	--

Is there a study room in the house?

☐

END OF CARD 22

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE

The information was then transferred from the original questionnaire to the coding form. This is punched into cards as data inputs to the SPSS Program.

The computation of the data was done under the supervision of Mr. Dominic Harling, of the Computer Centre, at Hull University.

APPENDIX 5

Age Composition of the Businessmen Studied

Age	%
Less than 30 years	5
31-39	22
40-49	26
50-59	33
60-69	8
70-79	4
80-89	2

Age/Pilgrimage

All the moslem businessmen who are over fifty nine years went to pilgrimage more than once. Those aged 70-89 (12) went to pilgrimage seven times. Young businessmen between 31-40 did not go to pilgrimage at all.

Entertainment

Young businessmen (age 31-40), particularly those in Khartoum go to the cinema and to the theatre. In many cases accompanying their wives (specially working ones). Old businessmen 70-89, think that cinema, theatre, et. are a waste of both time and money and they think women in particular should not go to these places. Entertainment and club-joining is found to be more prevalent among Khartoum and Port Sudan business families particularly those involved in industry.

Smoking and Tumbac

A substantial majority of the businessmen smoke ⁶⁷(62%) mainly among those whose age is between 30-59. Businessmen aged 60-89 usually use Tumbac (snuff) ⁷(10 out of 14). ⁸Only ²⁵27% of the businessmen neither smoke nor do they use Tumbac. These were generally among the hypertensive, diabetic, etc.

Partnership

The businessmen studied generally operated in partnership with relations (78%). 22%, however, were found to have partnerships with friends mainly Sudanese immigrant businessmen.

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