The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ and the Middle East, 1945-1973

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That the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ fluctuated following the Second World War is widely recognized. At the end of December 1962, former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson went so far as to pronounce the last rites on the special relationship, declaring: ‘[Britain’s] attempt to play a separate power role – that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on the “special relationship” with the US ... – this role is about played out’. Nevertheless, ‘the special relationship’ has acquired something of a Lazarus quality. Even in the aftermath of Britain’s unwelcome - from the American perspective - announcement in 1968 of its intention to withdraw from East of Suez, the US State Department felt able to observe: ‘The special relationship has been pronounced dead as often as Martin Bormann has been reported alive.... Indeed, perhaps the best evidence that it is still alive is the fact that its detractors feel obliged to re-announce its death every few months.’ Edward Heath’s studied coolness to Washington notwithstanding, successive British Prime Ministers (and US Presidents) have had little compunction in ostentatiously adhering to the concept of the special relationship. During Prime Minister David Cameron’s first visit to the White House in July 2010, for instance, President Barack Obama himself proclaimed that the ‘special relationship will only grow in the years to come’. Referring to Anglo-American relations, he and David Cameron subsequently wrote that ‘Ours is not just a special relationship, it is an essential relationship – for us and for the world.’

The rhetoric of the special relationship, however, has often obscured underlying differences in policy, priorities, and interests which have blemished Anglo-American relations from the time of the Second World War onwards. In his celebrated work Allies of a Kind on the war against Japan, Christopher Thorne observes that ‘however close they might be to one another, Britain and the United States inevitably remained separate, sovereign states ... whose interests, contrary to Churchill’s assertion, could and did differ and conflict as well as coincide’. In a similar vein, Wm. Roger Louis has remarked that ‘The wartime archives amply reveal that the sense of historic antagonism between Britain and the United States continued to exist along with the spirit of co-operation generated by the war.’ David Reynolds, moreover, has characterized the war-time Anglo-American alliance as a ‘temporary marriage of convenience, with competition the persistent counterpoint to the melody of co-operation’. Reynolds has also emphasised that the relationship between Britain and America ‘though peaceful and often very close, particularly at the height of the Second
World War, was also one of persistent rivalry’.\(^9\) This was especially so with regard to the Middle East.\(^10\)

As early as 1942, the British War Cabinet ‘realised that there were dangers in bringing the Americans in too prominently into the Middle East. They might divest us completely of responsibility and attempt to oust us from our interests, particularly as far as oil was concerned.’\(^11\) Moreover, Britain’s Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell, warned that ‘in the Middle East it looks as though they wish to get as many cards in their hands as they can, or at least more than they have now’.\(^12\) Suspicion was not restricted to the British. In February 1943, US Interior Secretary, Harold Ickes, warned President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the British were ‘trying to edge their way’ into Saudi oil, concluding: ‘the British never overlooked an opportunity to get in where there was oil’.

Conversely, Winston Churchill, in an acerbic exchange with Roosevelt towards the beginning of 1944, admitted that ‘There is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which, among other things, the whole supply of our Navy depends’.\(^14\) ‘I am disturbed’, rejoined Roosevelt, ‘about the rumor that the British wish to horn in on Saudi Arabian oil reserves.’\(^15\) Roosevelt’s subsequent assurance ‘we are not making sheep’s eyes at your oil fields in Iran and Iraq’,\(^16\) did not satisfy the British, the Ministerial Oil Committee cautioning in April 1944: ‘it is not improbable that some sections of American opinion may seek an opportunity to improve their position at our expense.’\(^17\) Highlighting Britain’s resolve to preserve its oil interests in the region, newspaper tycoon and British Cabinet member, Lord Beaverbrook, stressed: ‘Oil is the single greatest post-war asset remaining to us. We should refuse to divide our last asset with the Americans.’\(^18\) During Anglo-American petroleum talks in 1944-5, the British negotiators, led by Beaverbrook, incensed the American side by seeking to discriminate against ‘dollar’ oil in order to protect Britain’s balance of payments position and ultimately the value of the pound sterling.\(^19\) Despite British efforts to protect its assets in the Middle East, even at the expense of Anglo-American harmony and co-operation in the region, Britain still sought to ‘harness’ American power to ‘serve its own ends’.\(^20\) This, nonetheless, was a challenging endeavour for a declining power with respect to a rising one. Far from turning American power to its own advantage, Britain often found its post-war policies frustrated by a lack of American support, not least with respect to Palestine.

In response to President Truman’s support for the idea of issuing 100 000 certificates to displaced Jews to travel to Palestine, which appeared to inflate Britain’s problems in this troubled territory, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee complained: ‘My annoyance is with
the Americans who forever lay heavy burdens on us without lifting a little finger to help.'

Attlee was also chagrined by Truman’s refusal to delay issuing his Yom Kippur statement at the beginning of October 1946 in which he called not merely for ‘substantial immigration into Palestine’, but also the establishment of a ‘viable Jewish state’. ‘I received with great regret’, Attlee informed Truman, ‘your letter refusing even a few hours’ grace to the Prime Minister of a country which has the actual responsibility for the government of Palestine in order that he might acquaint you with the situation and the probable results of your action.’

Referring to the widely held British view that post-war American policy towards Palestine was being unduly influenced by the domestic political considerations of the Truman White House, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin wapsishly stated: ‘in international affairs, I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections’. British despair at US failure to provide unambiguous support for its policies and position in the Middle East can also be identified with respect to Egypt.

In the years following the Second World War, Anglo-Egyptian relations had become increasingly fraught over failure to reach a negotiated settlement for the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone base. In the wake of a visit to Washington in January 1952, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was reported by his Cabinet colleague, Harold Macmillan, to have been ‘forcibly struck – indeed horrified – at the way [the British] are treated by the Americans today. They are polite; listen to what we have to say, but make (on most issues) their own decisions’.

Referring to the negotiations over the Suez base towards the end of 1953, Eden minutely indignantly: ‘The American position over Egypt becomes increasingly unhelpful. The Americans will have no friends left if they go on this way.’ Several months earlier, the United States Information Agency had conceded that ‘At present, we cannot support completely either the British or the Egyptian position. We wish to avoid the appearance of endorsing the positions taken by either side.’

From the British perspective the US failure not only to stand by Britain, but also to exert pressure on the Egyptians over the Suez base negotiations, made the achievement of an agreement acceptable to Britain more difficult. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had explicitly told Churchill that he wished to avoid the ‘appearance of ganging up on the Egyptians’. Such an approach was anathema to the British, the former Oriental Minister at the British Embassy in Cairo, Sir Walter Smart, maintaining that ‘If one day Egyptians, Arabs, Persians, realised that they cannot down us by playing the American card, the whole situation in the Middle East will become easier. That can only happen if the Americans come
to realise that we sink or swim together in the Middle East.'

In July 1953, the acting Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, complained that ‘so long as the Egyptians think they can play the Americans off against us, the chances of our reaching agreement are negligible’. Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang, was of a similar mind emphasizing: ‘I am sure that until our friends form up solidly behind us the Egyptians will try to evade in turn every commitment to the West which we seek from them.’

The Minister at the British Embassy in Cairo, Michael Creswell, had already expressed his fear of the ‘damaging effect of so flagrant a lack of Anglo-American solidarity’. This lack, from the British perspective, of solidarity reached something of a climax during the 1956 Suez crisis.

The nationalization of the British and French-owned Suez Canal Company by Egypt’s President Nasser in July 1956 had been considered by Anthony Eden, who by now had replaced Churchill as Prime Minister, to be not merely an affront to British prestige, but also an attack on vital national interests. Eden’s failure to enlist unequivocal US backing for diplomatic and ultimately military efforts to not merely reverse nationalization, but also unseat the recalcitrant Nasser, was a source of intense frustration to the embattled Prime Minister. Eden’s exasperation was heightened by his fraught relationship with US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Indeed, Eden’s highly strung personality clashed with Dulles’ lack of sensitivity which once prompted Churchill to remark: ‘Foster Dulles is the only case I know of a bull who carries his china shop with him’.

To reflect the Secretary of State’s dower nature, Churchill is also said to have coined the phrase: ‘Dull, Duller, Dulles’, while Eden described him as the ‘woolliest type of pontificating American’.

Shortly before the announcement on 3 August 1956 by Britain, France, and America of an international maritime conference to be held in London, Dulles told Eden that ‘A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he is attempting to swallow’, the British Prime Minister claiming these words ‘rang in my ears for months’. On the eve of a second international conference in London in September designed to give definition to Dulles’ idea of placing the waterway under international supervision through the creation of the Suez Canal Users’ Association, normally abbreviated to SCUA, the US Secretary of State appeared to undermine his own scheme by proclaiming that if Egypt blocked passage of American vessels sailing under the SCUA regime, ‘We do not intend to shoot our way through. It may be that we have a right to do it, but we don’t intend to do it as far as the US is concerned.’

Eden subsequently stressed that ‘it would be hard to imagine a statement more likely to cause the maximum allied disunity and disarray’. In a similar vein, Eden’s press secretary,
William Clark, complained: ‘Dulles pulled the rug from under us and watered down the Canal Association till it was meaningless.’

‘The nub of the thing,’ recalled US Ambassador in London, Winthrop Aldrich, ‘was that Eden thought this organization [SCUA] was being formed for the purpose of laying a basis for intervention by force’. Dulles’ intervention scotched any realistic chance of this and certainly Eden considered his acceptance of SCUA to be the ‘greatest mistake of his career’. To make matters worse, Dulles, during a press conference on 2 October 1956, remarked with reference to SCUA: ‘There is talk about teeth being pulled out of the plan, but I know of no teeth; there were no teeth in it’, adding that the US ‘could not be expected to identify itself 100 per cent either with the colonial Powers or the Powers uniquely concerned with the problem of getting independence as rapidly, and as fully, as possible.’

Eden’s reaction exemplified the exasperation felt at the Secretary of State’s apparent diplomatic chicanery and verbal dissimulation. Foreign Office Minister Anthony Nutting recalled that on reading Dulles’ statement, the Prime Minister ‘flung the piece of paper across the table, hissing as he did so “And now what have you to say for your American friends?”’ Eden also informed his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, that ‘We have been misled so often by Dulles’ ideas that we cannot afford to risk another misunderstanding .... Time is not on our side in this matter.’

The day after Dulles’ statement, Eden speculated that Nasser might be planning to subvert the governments of Saudi Arabia and Libya, adding that ‘everything U.S. say makes that more likely’. The years did not sooth the rancour and in retirement Eden described Dulles as ‘tortuous as a wounded snake, with much less excuse’. Eden also condemned Dwight D. Eisenhower’s opposition to the use of force in Egypt, characterizing the US President as ‘the Neville Chamberlain of the fifties’.

Lack of US support for British polices and position in the Middle East can also be detected with reference to Iran. In May 1951, the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, had nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which at the time was Britain’s largest single overseas asset and perceived as vital to Britain’s economic well-being. Although American oil companies participated in a British-sponsored boycott of Iranian oil, at a governmental level the British were much less impressed with the response of the United States to the nationalization crisis, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison informing the US Ambassador in London that ‘he could not understand [the] US attitude. He expected 100 percent cooperation and was only getting 20 percent’. While Britain and America eventually co-operated in unseating Mossadeq in August 1953, it was a CIA-led operation with MI6 playing a subordinate role. As the price of continuing to have a stake in Iran,
moreover, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s share of the consortium which replaced its former monopoly in the wake of Mossadeq’s fall was just 40 per cent. For the first time, the major US oil companies were also given an interest in the exploitation of Iranian oil, receiving a matching share in the new consortium. In addition to whittling down the proportion of the consortium owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, American negotiators also looked askance at the Company’s compensation claims, US Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, criticizing the British for ‘trying to sell something for twice what it is worth and they don’t [even] have clear title’. 51

In many ways, the crisis surrounding the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company encapsulates one of the principal reasons for Anglo-American discord in the Middle East, namely the clash between the British imperative to protect its national and imperial interests in the region on the one hand, and the American preoccupation with the Cold War and containment on the other. As the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang, presciently noted: ‘The main difference between us and the Americans in this affair seems to be that to the Americans, in the fight against Communism in Persia, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is expendable. It is not possible for us to start from this premise.’ 52 The nationalization of Anglo-Iranian provided a foretaste of much graver Anglo-American differences following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956.

Writing to Eden, President Eisenhower couched his opposition to the use of force very much in Cold War terms, warning: ‘the peoples of the Near East, and of North Africa and, to some extent, of all of Asia and all of Africa, would be consolidated against the West to a degree which, I fear, could not be overcome in a generation and, perhaps, not even in a century particularly having in mind the capacity of the Russians to make mischief’. 53 In his memoirs, Eisenhower cast doubt on the viability of military occupation which would result from the use of force. ‘Unless the occupying power was ready to employ the brutalities of dictatorship,’ he mused, ‘local unrest would soon grow into guerrilla resistance, then open revolt, and possibly, wide-scale conflict. We of the West, who believe in freedom and human dignity, could not descend to use Communist methods.’ 54

In the aftermath of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt at the beginning of November 1956, it was Dulles who led the charge against his allies, warning the National Security Council that

if we were not now prepared to assert our leadership in this cause, leadership would almost certainly be seized by the Soviet Union... For many years now the United
States has been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand, and on the other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism… Unless we now assert and maintain this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the USSR. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist policies.55

Dulles subsequently added that ‘what the British and French had done was nothing but the straight old-fashioned variety of colonialism of the most obvious sort’.56 To make matters worse, the Anglo-French action deflected attention away from the Soviet Union’s contemporaneous suppression of the Hungarian revolt which had threatened to disrupt the Warsaw Pact. In the words of Allen Dulles (brother of John Foster and Director of the CIA): ‘How can anything be done about the Russians even if they suppress the revolt, when our own allies are guilty of exactly similar acts of aggression?’57 ‘It is nothing less than tragic’, agreed his brother, ‘that at this very time, when we are on the point of victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe, we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from their course.’58

Referring to Britain and France during a hastily convened conference at the White House with his keys advisers, Eisenhower himself bluntly stated that ‘he did not see much value in an unworthy and unreliable ally and that the necessity to support them might not be as great as they believed’.59 The President was as good as his word, ostracizing Eden, permitting US condemnation of Britain and France in the United Nations, and remaining unmoved in the face of Britain’s economic plight caused by the virtual cessation of Middle East oil exports to Britain and a ruinous run on the pound. Eden’s assumption that the Eisenhower administration would, in the last resort, back British actions was arguably his most serious miscalculation during the Suez episode. US Ambassador in London Winthrop Aldrich mused that ‘even at the last moment Eden thought that, faced with a fait accompli, we were going to recognize what he believed was Britain’s vital interest and would support him’.60 In a similar vein, the former Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Archibald Ross, recalled that Eden was ‘determined to believe that in the end the Americans would be with us in benevolent neutrality. What in fact we got was hostile neutrality.’61 At the time of Suez, Eden told the Cabinet that there was ‘Little risk tht. in last resort U.S. would not support us.’62 Such complacency infected the thinking of other key
British decision-makers, not least Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan who recalled that ‘I was confident that if and when the moment for action arrived we should have, if not the overt, at least the covert sympathy and support of the Government and people of the United States.’

The failure of Eden’s inner circle to test the supposition that America would ultimately back, or at least not oppose, the use of force was matched by the US administration’s failure to spell out the consequences of British military action. Equally, Eden’s delusion that the United States would ultimately acquiesce in the use of force was mirrored by Eisenhower’s that the British premier would not embark on a military campaign without consulting with the Americans first. Indeed, the Suez crisis underscores that the special relationship had a tendency to obfuscate, rather than facilitate clear transatlantic communication, leaving policy-makers reliant upon implicit understandings rather than explicit statements, upon assumption rather than analysis. This reached a remarkable pitch in September 1956 during Macmillan’s infamous meeting with Eisenhower. Despite Suez being discussed in only the most tangential of ways, the Chancellor reached the remarkable conclusion that ‘I don’t think there is going to be any trouble from Ike – he and I understand each other – he’s not going to make any real trouble if we have to do something drastic.’ In fact Eisenhower was affronted by the apparent deception practised by his allies, famously exploding in the aftermath of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt: ‘nothing justifies double crossing us’.

Undeterred by the negative US response, Eden had told the Cabinet on 4 October 1955 that ‘Our interests in the Middle East are greater than those of the United States because of our dependence on Middle East oil, and our experience in the area was greater than theirs. We should not therefore allow ourselves to be restricted overmuch by reluctance to act without full American concurrence and support.’ At the end of October, and against the background of this policy statement, British-led forces evicted the Saudis who had been occupying the Buraimi oasis, a territory in South-East Arabia which was also claimed by the British protected states of Oman and Abu Dhabi. More significantly, this action was taken
without first informing the Americans, let alone consulting with them. This piece of brazen unilateralism on the part of Britain caused consternation in Washington, Assistant Secretary of State Herbert Hoover berating the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, for the lack of consultation and insisting that Britain and America ‘play it together from now on’. Despite this plea, British defiance of Washington continued with the attempt towards the end of 1955 to persuade Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. British failure prompted Eisenhower to remark: ‘We tried to make the British see the danger of ... pressuring Jordan into joining the Northern Tier Pact. They went blindly ahead and ... have been suffering one of the most severe diplomatic defeats Britain has taken in many years.’

Although Eden’s successors avoided a Suez-style breach with the Americans, they still showed a propensity to act in the Middle East without full backing from Washington. The decision of the new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, to send British troops to Jordan to stabilize the Kingdom following the July 1958 revolution in neighbouring Iraq was far from welcome in Washington and received, at best, grudging support. In Dulles’ opinion, the British allowed themselves to be ‘foolishly exposed in Jordan’, and in fact recalled that ‘we had not wanted the British to go in’. Macmillan also defied Eisenhower’s successor, John F. Kennedy, by refusing to accede to US pressure to recognize the new republican government in Yemen following the revolution there in September 1962 and providing covert support for the Yemeni royalists in the ensuing civil war, a conflict the Americans had sought to damp down for fear of its damaging regional effects. With typical understatement, Macmillan recalled that Kennedy was ‘somewhat ruffled by our intransigence’. More serious examples of the United States’ disenchantment with their British ally and its modus operandi occurred during Harold Wilson’s Labour government which came to office in October 1964.

Despite its ostensible warmth, the relationship between Wilson and Lyndon Baines Johnson, who had become US President in November 1963 following Kennedy’s assassination, was far from smooth. Although Johnson’s description of Wilson as ‘a little creep camping on my doorstep’ was apocryphal, he is alleged to have said in response to one of Wilson’s frequent requests for a meeting: ‘We have got enough pollution around here already without Harold coming over ...’ Personal animosities were heightened by policy differences, particularly over Vietnam. Johnson’s decision to escalate the war contrasted with Wilson’s studied refusal to commit troops and his forlorn efforts to broker peace which Johnson dismissed as a case of ‘Nobel Prize fever’. Nevertheless, Britain’s remaining imperial assets, which became known as the role East of Suez, were still valued by the Johnson White House and increasingly so, not least in the context of the Vietnam War. As
British Defence Secretary Denis Healey bluntly recalled: ‘The United States, after trying for thirty years to get Britain out of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, was now trying desperately to keep us in; during the Vietnam war it did not want to be the only country killing coloured people on their own soil.’ In the course of discussions in January 1966, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk had explicitly told Healey that ‘It would be disastrous if the American people were to get the impression that the US is entirely alone; they simply will not accept it…. insistent questions are being asked by the American people as to what our allies are doing while we are in Vietnam’. Unsurprisingly, the American reaction to the unilateral British decision at the beginning of 1968 to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971, itself precipitated by Britain’s unilateral devaluation of sterling at the end of 1967, was greeted with dismay in Washington.

On learning of British plans for total withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and Far East by 1971, Johnson gave full vent to his feelings: ‘I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news. If these steps are taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for future safety and health of the free world.’ Foreign Secretary George Brown, who had travelled to Washington to explain British policy, sampled American wrath at first hand. Brown confessed to having a ‘disturbing and distasteful’ discussion with Rusk during which the latter expostulated: ‘For God’s sake act like Britain’. Underlining his disapproval of the Wilson government’s apparent prioritization of the welfare state over the presence East of Suez, Rusk stated he ‘could not believe that free aspirins and false teeth were more important than Britain’s world role’. Rusk went on to fulminate that Britain appeared to be ‘opting out of its world responsibilities’, that confidence had been ‘terribly shaken’, and, perhaps most damagingly, that ‘it was an end of an era’ by which he implied that ‘it was the end of the age of cooperation between the United States and ourselves’. Rusk was particularly incensed by what he perceived to be the lack of consultation which had preceded the British decision, using the phrase ‘the acrid aroma of fait accompli’ to underline his point. In this sense, the reasons for America’s anger and disenchantment over Britain’s decision to withdraw from East of Suez can be compared to those following other unilateral British acts such as the expulsion of the Saudis from Buraimi in 1955, and the Anglo-French ultimatum and subsequent attack on Egypt towards the end of 1956. Using language reminiscent of that employed by Eisenhower on hearing of the Anglo-French ultimatum, Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, Edward Tomkins, noted the feeling among many Americans that ‘they had been “double-crossed” by the British Government in terms of assurances given to
them both in July and at the time of devaluation that the decisions then taken were not in conflict with basic foreign policy objectives’. In the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal announcement, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey also impressed upon the British Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, that ‘there really should be some prior consultation, at any rate between HMG and the US Government, before either of us simply walked out of places or abandoned our positions in them for our own unilateral reasons and without giving the other Government a chance to consider the implications and what, if anything, might be done to minimise the damage’. Unsurprisingly, the decision to withdraw from East of Suez resulted in not merely short-term irritation and dismay in Washington, but also a longer-term re-assessment of Anglo-American relations.

Shortly after the withdrawal announcement, Thomas L. Hughes of the State Department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau postulated that ‘Conventional wisdom holds that partnership between a big power and a smaller one can last only so long as the former finds it beneficial. Accordingly, it is said, the special relationship can be advantageous to the US only as long as the UK can make a meaningful physical contribution’. At a meeting of the National Security Council in June 1968, the new Defense Secretary, Clark Clifford, bluntly stated: ‘the British do not have the resources, the backup, or the hardware to deal with any big world problem.... they are no longer a powerful ally of ours as they cannot afford the cost of an adequate defense effort’. The Foreign Office, moreover, lamented that the East of Suez decisions had engendered a feeling in many Americans that Britain was ‘the sick man of Europe who lost his nerve and chickened out of his responsibilities’.

If British unilateralism and lack of consultation had been one of the major causes of US consternation at the East of Suez decision, the British could be equally disturbed by similar such examples deriving from American decision-making. Shortly after President Truman recognized the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, the US Ambassador in London, Lewis Douglas, reported: ‘Irrespective of [the] rights and wrongs of [the] question, I believe [the] worst shock so far to general Anglo-American concept of policy since I have been here was [the] sudden US de facto recognition [of] Jewish State without previous notice of our intentions to [the] British Government.’ Mention has already been made of British bafflement at Dulles’ public statement in September 1956 that the US did not intend to shoot its way through the Suez Canal. As Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd complained, it was ‘very difficult to build up any sort of pressure on the Egyptians when friend Foster has Press Conferences!’ In somewhat more measured tones, Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook
informed Winston Churchill that ‘during the last week or so, the Western position has been seriously weakened by public statements made in the United States’.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite Harold Macmillan’s assiduous efforts to re-build the special relationship, a ‘Declaration of Common Purpose’ following talks with Eisenhower in October 1957 being subsequently hailed by Macmillan as a ‘Declaration of Interdependence’,\textsuperscript{91} the British still felt dissatisfied at the level of consultation over Middle Eastern matters. For instance, President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon’s request in July 1958 for outside assistance was met by unilateral American intervention. As the US representative at the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, explained on the eve of US action: ‘If intervention in Lebanon by U.S. troops becomes unavoidable it would be very much better for U.S. troops to go in alone. The world sees us in an entirely different light than it sees the U.K. and France.’\textsuperscript{92} On discovering that the US had decided upon unilateral military intervention in Lebanon, despite his preference for a joint-Anglo-American response, Macmillan protested to Eisenhower: ‘You are doing a Suez on me.’\textsuperscript{93}

Macmillan’s disillusionment with US policy was intensified by President Kennedy’s approval in August 1962 of the sale of US Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel. The American decision caused consternation among British statesmen who believed the Americans had made a firm decision earlier in the year not to supply missiles to any Middle Eastern country and had high hopes of selling their own rival Bloodhound system to the Israelis. Macmillan was particularly incensed by the lack of consultation and dashed off an intemperate message to Kennedy:

To be informed on Saturday afternoon that your Government are going to make an offer to supply on Sunday is really not consultation. I cannot believe that you were privy to this disgraceful piece of trickery. For myself I must say frankly that I can hardly find words to express my sense of disgust and despair. Nor do I see how you and I are to conduct the great affairs of the world on this basis.\textsuperscript{94}

Macmillan proceeded to inform the President that he had ‘instructed our officials to let me have a list of all the understandings in different parts of the world which we have entered into together. It certainly makes it necessary to reconsider our whole position on this and allied matters.’\textsuperscript{95} That this response should come from a Prime Minister who had assiduously sought to repair the Suez breach, and had established an ostensibly close working relationship with President Kennedy, is particularly striking. Unsurprisingly, the much more distant relationship between Prime Minister Edward Heath and President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s translated itself into even greater strain over Middle Eastern matters.
In his memoirs, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger memorably likened Nixon’s relationship with Heath to ‘that of a jilted lover who has been told that friendship was still possible, but who remembers the rejection rather than being inspired by the prospect’. Accounting for Heath’s reserve, Kissinger mused ‘Whether it was the memory of the American pressure that had aborted the Suez adventure in 1956 when Heath was Chief Whip of the Conservative Party ... or whether the reason was dedication to a vision of Europe quite similar to de Gaulle’s, Heath dealt with us with an unsentimentality totally at variance with the “special relationship”’. Despite welcoming Heath’s unexpected general election victory in 1970, Nixon failed to establish a rapport with Heath, describing one unscheduled car journey they were forced to endure together as ‘tough going’. Personal incompatibility was compounded by policy differences.

In his annual review for 1973, British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Cromer, described it as ‘a year that turned sour’. While this was undoubtedly the case with respect to the Nixon White House which became mired in the Watergate scandal, it could equally be applied to Anglo-American relations. The year began inauspiciously with Kissinger’s declaration of the ‘Year of Europe’ which encountered a chilly reception in most European capitals. His attempts to clarify his thinking with calls for a US/European declaration in June were greeted with a ‘pregnant silence’ from Europe. Later in the year, Heath had told journalists that it was ‘wrong to imagine that the Americans could have “The Year of Europe” without consultation and yet it had been launched without a single word. He did not believe they would ask for “A year of China” without consulting the Chinese but they had done that in the case of Europe.’ Anglo-Americans differences cohered and intensified as a result of the renewal of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Six years earlier, Wilson and Johnson had been unable to co-ordinate a joint Anglo-American response in the lead-up to the 1967 Six-Day War. The Johnson White House favoured the British taking the lead in establishing a naval force of maritime countries to permit the freedom of international passage through the Straits of Tiran into the Gulf of Aqaba which had been closed to Israeli shipping by Nasser on 22 May. Despite Foreign Secretary George Brown’s brief flirtation with this idea, the full Cabinet declared that ‘it would be inconsistent with our interests in the Middle East to incur the risks inherent in any commitment to the use of force to reopen the Straits. In addition to its effect on our relations with the Arab States and on our difficulties in South Arabia in particular, such action might have grave financial consequences.’ Unsurprisingly, the Cabinet also emphasized that ‘we should seek to avoid the appearance of taking the lead’. As the crisis mounted, Hal
Saunders of the US National Security Council staff bemoaned that ‘we may face a situation where no one will come in with us on the regatta’, adding: ‘I gather the British and Canadians are wobbling’.105 Providing some background to the British position, the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research at the US State Department, George C. Denning, recorded that growing British reluctance to use force stemmed from the UK’s tendency to give ‘priority to its economic and commercial, rather than its political, links to the area’.106 Similar considerations informed British policy at the time of the next Arab-Israeli confrontation in 1973.

On 6 October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces caught their Israeli foes off-guard in a well co-ordinated attack which initially yielded considerable results. Although Secretary of State Kissinger from the outset called for transatlantic co-operation,107 the Yom Kippur War brought simmering Anglo-American tensions to the surface. Kissinger’s wish for a Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire and a return to the cease-fire line was rebuffed by the British, Lord Cromer informing the Secretary of State that ‘we do not want a resolution which called for the Arabs to withdraw from territory which was their own’.108 Britain’s continuing recalcitrance, which stemmed from an unwillingness to alienate Arab oil producers upon which Britain’s energy requirements had come to depend, prompted Kissinger to report: ‘As far as the President was concerned, he could not recall any crisis in the last three years when the British had been with the Americans when the chips were down.’109

If American ire had been raised by British reluctance to do America’s bidding in the United Nations, this was matched by British anger at US failure adequately to consult over the decision taken in the early hours of 25 October 1973 to place American bases on nuclear alert in response to General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev’s, threat to send Soviet forces to Egypt. Shortly after 1am Kissinger telephoned Lord Cromer to inform him of the Soviet threat and the US response. According to Kissinger ‘It was a classic example of the “Special Relationship” with Britain.... We shared our information as a matter of course, despite the fact that the Heath Government was doing its utmost to distance itself from us in Europe and had rather inconspicuously underlined its different perspective in the Middle East.’110 The British, however, viewed matters differently. On being awoken, Lord Cromer had bellowed: ‘Why tell us, Henry? Tell your friends the Russians.’111 The British Ambassador subsequently upbraided the US Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, for the lack of consultation with America’s NATO partners on the US military alert. While accepting that Britain had been kept well informed of the alert, Cromer was quick to point out that this
differed from being ‘closely consulted’.

For his part, and in reference to the UK, Kissinger told journalists that ‘the countries that were most consulted proved amongst the most difficult in their cooperation’.

Reviewing the 1973 Middle East crisis, US Ambassador to Britain, Walter Annenberg, noted that it had produced strains in the Anglo-American relationship which had been ‘as evident as they had been deplorable’. The Ambassador went on to notify Washington that ‘the British have reacted with acute sensitivity to US criticism of their attitude and performance: they considered our rebukes unjustifiably harsh and lacking in recognition of the difficult position in which Britain found itself, especially with respect to Arab oil on which the country’s industrial life depends’. Recognising that the ‘special’ quality in the Anglo-American relationship had been ‘more apparent than real for some time’, Annenberg remarked that the October War had ‘dramatically revealed the dimension of the change and surfaced divergences which had largely remained outside public scrutiny’.

Henry Kissinger at the end of 1973 went so far as to declare that the special relationship was ‘collapsing’. Shunning sentimentality, nonetheless, Lord Cromer observed that ‘the Anglo-American “special relationship”, and its successor the “natural relationship”, had always been based to a marked degree on myth’. Part of the myth was surely that the two countries’ shared interests would produce shared policies. In the Middle East, however, interests, and hence policies, often diverged. The concept of the special relationship itself hindered the smooth-running of Anglo-American relations in the region by obscuring differences, stymieing clear communication, and practising self-deception on policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic who assumed a unanimity which all too often failed to exist. As Thomas Hughes of the State Department perceptively noted in 1968: ‘critics of the special relationship on both sides complain that because it promises more than it can deliver, it leads each partner to be displeased upon finding the other less accommodating than could be wished’. Indeed, the failure of the special relationship, not least in the Middle East, to live up to expectations actually served to damage relations between Britain and America in the crucial period from the end of the Second World War to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.
4 The Times, 21 July 2010.
5 The Times, 24 May 2011.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
18 Yergin, The Prize, p. 401.
19 Galpern, Money, Oil and Empire in the Middle East, pp. 23-48.


31 Letter from Strang to Sir Roger Makins, 2 Oct. 1953, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), FO 371/104190/E 1022/7G.


37 Keith Kyle, *Suez*. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991, p. 246. Eisenhower also assured King Saud that ‘as far as the United States is concerned, there is no purpose to impose forcibly upon Egypt any international regime’ (Letter from Eisenhower to Saud, 18 Sept. 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower (hereafter DDE) Library, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), International Series, Box 46, Saudi Arabia, King Saud 1952 through 1956 (3)).


39 Bertjan Verbeek, *Decision-Making in Great Britain during the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p. 108. Exposing Anglo-American differences over Suez Canal Users’ Association, Selwyn Lloyd told Dulles that ‘if we now decide to pay our dues to SCUA, only to see them passed
on to Egypt, Nasser will be receiving more money from the Canal than he is now getting. Our negotiating position will thereby be much weakened for there will be no incentive for Nasser to make further substantial concession’ (Summary No. 35: Summary of developments in Suez Situation, 22 Oct. 1956, 22 Oct. 1956, DDE Library, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President (Ann Whitman File), International Series, Box 47, Suez Summaries). The US Embassy in London also reported that ‘the British are taking the line in background press briefings that US failure to act on the payment of tolls to SCUA is directly responsible for Egypt’s complete unwillingness to negotiate’ (Summary No. 39: Summary of Developments in Suez Situation, 29 Oct. 1956, ibid.). Dulles had earlier ‘vigorously denied that he had ever intended SCUA to be a means of bringing pressure to bear on upon the Egyptians’ (‘M. Pineau and Mr. Dulles in New York’, Minute by Selwyn Lloyd, 16 Oct. 1956, TNA, FO 800/728).

40 Interview with Mr. Winthrop Aldrich by David Berliner, New York, 16 Oct. 1972, 13, DDE Library, Oral Histories: Winthrop Aldrich (OH-250). Referring to the views of British Ambassador in Washington Sir Harold Caccia, following a discussion in early 1957, Dulles recorded: ‘the beginning of disillusionment with US policy came when we put a different interpretation upon the Users Association than that which had been put upon it by the British, and when I said that we would not “shoot our way” through the Canal’ (Memorandum of Conversation at the Secretary’s residence, 6pm, January 27, 1957, by Dulles, 30 Jan. 1957, DDE Library, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-9, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 1, Memos of Conversation – General S (1)).


44 Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 657.


46 Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 664.


52 J. H. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company: Vol. 2: The Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928-1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 418. Acheson confirmed that ‘the cardinal purpose of British policy is not to prevent Iran from going Commie; the cardinal point is to preserve what they believe to be the last remaining bulwark of British solvency’ (Galpern, Money, Oil and Empire in the Middle East, p. 122).


Ibid., p. 909.


Memorandum of a discussion at the 302nd meeting of the National Security Council, 1 Nov. 1956, cited in *FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. XVI*, 907. Summarising Foster Dulles’ thinking at the time of Suez, the Minnesota Congressman, Walter H. Judd, recalled that ‘What the British, French and Israelis are doing is aggression in open violation of UN commitments. We can’t jump on the Russians or anybody else for violating those, if we ignore it when our own allies do it’ (Interview with the Honourable Walter H. Judd by Paul Hopper, 18 Dec. 1970, p. 129, DDE Library, Oral Histories: Walter H. Judd (OH-196), Interview No. 4).


Eisenhower’s Press Secretary, James C. Hagerty, had advised the issuing of a presidential statement which would ‘Bluntly warn British and French that the United States will not tolerate or support a war, or warlike moves, in the Suez area’ (Memorandum from Hagerty to the President, 8 Oct. 1956, DDE Library, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dulles-Herter Series, Box 7, Dulles, Foster Oct. ‘56 (2)). No such forthright statement was issued however.


Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 213.

Ibid., p. 91.


Message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson, 11 Jan. 1968, cited in ibid., p. 609.

The following is based on Cabinet Conclusions, 12 Jan. 1968, CC 6 (68), TNA, CAB 128/43 Part 1. In the American version of the discussions, Rusk is more restrained, saying merely ‘be Britain’ (Memorandum of conversation, 11 Jan. 1968, cited in *FRUS, 1964-1968: Volume XII*, p. 604.)


Letter from Dean to Sir Burke Trend, 16 Feb. 1968, TNA, FCO 7/771.


Colman, ““Dealing with disillusioned men””, p. 262. One FO mandarin noted: ‘Americans are: resentful of our failure sufficiently to support the anti-communist crusade, especially against Red China and in Viet-Nam; frightened by our withdrawal from Asia; contemptuous of our economic and financial difficulties and diminished power-influence’ (Minute by D. J. Swan, 4 Dec. 1967, TNA, FCO 7/771).


Letter from Brook to Churchill, 4 Oct. 1956, TNA, CAB 21/4114.


Ibid., p. 162.


Ibid.

Ibid., 140.


Telegram from Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Washington, No. 2407, 1 Dec. 1973, TNA, PREM 15/1989. In retirement, Heath recalled that ‘For Henry Kissinger to announce a Year of Europe without first consulting any of us was rather like my standing between the lions in Trafalgar Square and announcing that we were embarking on a year to save America’ (Catherine Hynes, *The Year that Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration and the Year of Europe*. Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009, p. 103).

Telegram from Department of State to American Embassy, London, No. 200292, 23 May 1967, US National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA), RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-1969, Box 1788, POL ARAB-ISR. The British account of the meeting is to be found in Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, No. 1729, 23 May 1967, TNA, PREM 13/1617.

Cabinet conclusions, 23 May, 1967, CC(67) 31st conclusions, TNA, CAB 128/42, Part 2. See also Cabinet conclusions, 30 May 1967, CC(67) 33rd conclusions, TNA, CAB 128/42.


‘Estimated Reactions of West European Countries and Canada to Certain Proposals aimed at Restoring Freedom of Navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba’, Research Memorandum from Denning to the Secretary, 1 June 1967, LBJ Library, National Security Council File: Middle East, Box 107, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III, Memos and Misc [3 of 3], No. 91.

Telegram from Washington to FCO, No. 3117, 6 Oct. 1973, TNA, FCO 93/254.


Ibid., 151.


117 Ibid., p. 221.

118 Colman, ““What now for Britain!””, p. 353.