

World Polity: Anatomy of and arguments for regional and global Integration

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Introduction

This article is inspired by taking sort of a medical view on the international political world². A medical view here means that first we need to understand the anatomy of the organism that we observe, i.e. the world. Secondly, we need to make some diagnoses and prognoses about possible threats to the functioning of this organism as well as how to restore health. In Political Science terms this means identifying threats to security, peace, survival and wellbeing of states, nations, and individuals, as well as the whole, and to identify possible political solutions to these threats. The first part of this article will present the history of global integration and why it is necessary to prevent war and to facilitate peace at the example of Europe. Europe is here regarded a greenhouse for global integration. This part describes the attempts at integration before the major wars in Europe in the last centuries, the reasons for these wars as the failures or lack of integration, and the way it was overcome. The second part of this article will present an ideal type global political anatomy. This will be illustrated with graphics, which are thought to make the global political system better understood by visualising key aspects of it.

The third part of this paper will discuss the nature of reality, which is important to understand conflicts in today's world, as 'virtual', material, social and cultural. It will present a challenge to Alexander Wendt's recent idea of reality as a hologram and discuss how civilizational conflicts, as described by Samuel Huntington, can possibly be resolved by creating a global demos (polity) by establishing a global parliament.

As the basis for the latter argument, finally, this paper will present and analyse the results from the survey on global citizenship. Global demos here refer to the idea of a global polity, or identification of the global population with the global, or to say it alternatively: as global citizens. It is argued that, if we would have a global demos, this would facilitate global integration, which is necessary for peace. For example, further global integration towards a world state with a world parliament, is thought to be only possible and sensible if there is a reasonable global demos to build this entity on. For this reason, this article presents results from a survey run at the University of Hull in 2016 intended to measure global citizenship.

The Forty Years Peace


According to Steven Pinker in *The Better Angels of Our Nature*³, the world, at least among the great powers, is becoming ever more peaceful. The first period of peace, which came before the Long Peace after the Second World War to today, was a period roughly from 1871 to 1914 before the First World War. In this period, which is called the Forty Years Peace, the great powers did not engage in any significant wars amongst each other. There were some wars, however, such as the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878, and some other conflicts⁴. But generally speaking this period was one of unprecedented stability in Europe and amongst the European great powers since 1500.

¹ Illustrations: Max Roser (figure 1, with generous permission), Naveen Fiorano (all other figures created for the purpose of this publication).

² Cf. Galtung 1996.

³ Pinker 2012.

⁴ Midlarsky (1975, p. 56) mentions a couple of wars in the Forty Years Peace, such as Russia-Turkey 1877-1878; Pacific 1879-1883, Central American 1885, Sino Japanese 1894-1895, Greco-Turkish 1897, Spanish American 1898, Boxer 1900, Russo-Japanese 1904-1905, Central American 1906, Central American 1907, Moroccan 1909-1910, Italo-Turkish 1911-12, First Balkan 1912-13, Second Balkan 1913.

Figure 1: The level of war amongst great powers since 1500

This section will investigate what brought about this period of unprecedented peace amongst the great powers, and why it ended. It will be argued here that the processes that brought about the Forty Years Peace were similar to those that brought about peace in Western Europe and amongst the Western world after the Second World War and those that brought about peace after the end of the Cold War. There were some developments in various areas of politics and economy and security that seemed to have substantially contributed to bringing about the Forty Years Peace in 1871.

First, in the economic sphere, the era of industrialisation had spread through Europe by that time and seemed to have brought unprecedented wealth to the European countries, but created also global inequality. As Eric Hobsbawm argues: “By 1880 ... the *per capita* income in the ‘developed’ world was about double that in the ‘Third World’”⁵. Apparently, the process of industrialisation created wealth in Europe, and this pacified the nations. It is known from the literature on civil war causation and war causation in general that economic growth can have a pacifying effect. However, as he continues to argue, an increase in wealth did not help to maintain the peace as it brought inequality: “... by 1913, it was to be over three times as high, and widening”.

Furthermore, economic growth was also stalled in Europe, the UK in particular, and the US with a period of depression (which Hobsbawm doesn't mention). This was marked by a decline in prices, which harmed the producers, while being beneficial for the consumers. In the UK, this period, which by some is referred to either as the ‘Great Depression’ (this term was later adopted to talk about the economic difficulties in the 1930ies) or the ‘Long Depression’. However, this period did still experience industrial growth, in particular in the production of steel and weapons. Hobsbawm refers to this as the iron-age⁶. This allowed for the beginning of an arms race, in which the European powers started to engage and in which in particular Germany attempted to challenge British superiority with the building of a battle fleet.

⁵Hobsbawm 1987, p. 15.

⁶ Ibid.

This armament process, which is known to later have contributed substantially to the outbreak of the First World War, was substantially fuelled and made possible by industrialisation. An additional negative factor with economic growth in that period was that the 'periphery' was increasingly left behind. This means that nations, such as the Balkans, who were not substantially included in the progressive industrial movement, found themselves increasingly in a new position of inequality. Previous research indicates that inequality can contribute to political violence⁷. And while this argument is not to be found in the literature, it is possible that the terrorist attack of the Black Hand on Archduke Franz Ferdinand – which triggered the outbreak of the First World War – was in part inspired by the growing gap between central Europe and the periphery.

However, additional factors also contributed, both to peace first, and then to the outbreak of the First World War.

As Knapton and Derry⁸ write, a number of such factors that are generally thought to be peace inducing were present at the time. Among them are increasing democratisation, the adoption of near universal suffrage, increasing rights for women, better education, a freer and more prolific press and media. The main factor that worked against those processes was an increasing sense of Nationalism. Nationalism as an ideology became prominent both in central Europe as well as in the periphery. It is known also to have contributed significantly to the outbreak of the First World War. Changes in the balance of power contributed to this, as Germany grew very powerful in the period and this created a sense of fear amongst the other European powers⁹. The German principle of *Weltpolitik* contributed to this perception.

An important political factor that maintained the peace from 1871 onwards was the Concert of Europe. It had been installed as the first international peace conference system in Europe in 1815 after the end of the Napoleonic wars by Metternich. Previously, states, princes, popes etc. had managed their affairs in a much less organised way, more often bilaterally, by marriage diplomacy and similar traditional tools, and with much less cohesion in authority. Sovereign authority was more or less firmly installed only by 1815, meaning that now the governments of states were responsible for their foreign and common affairs. And while the Concert initially did not help maintain the peace in Europe in the mid-19th century, it helped manage the relations in Europe after 1871. However, the Concert was not strong enough to cope with additional crises that would follow in the early 20th century, such as two Balkan wars and a crisis over Morocco. In essence, it worked as an informal system of management by diplomacy, conferences and negotiation between nations, as the first forerunner for the European Union.

One factor for the breakup of the Concert of Europe were the politics of Bismarck, who at the one hand was regarded a skilled and talented politician who unified Germany and kept it in secure relations with its surrounding neighbours, but at the other hand undermined the Concert with his intense focus on alliances. According to Mowat, Bismarck was more interested in his alliance system than in the workings of the European Concert, which made the Concert increasingly weak¹⁰.

Germany's growth in power, presumably economic and military, and her alliances, as well as the politics after Bismarck, who was dismissed in 1890, contributed to the splitting up of Europe into two alliances, a bipolar alliance system. The allies were increasingly connected with secret treaties. This 'polarisation' of Europe and the unravelling of the Concert would present the structural factors allowing for the outbreak of the First World War.

In the interwar period, no new attempts at creating a unified Europe were made. However, democracy spread in Europe, for example Germany, with the creation of the Weimar Republic. The lack of wider integration along with the effects of the Great Depression and the emotions of shame and the need for grandeur and revenge stemming from the resolution of the First World War led to the Second World War. It was only after this major war that another, deeper, attempt at European integration was taken with the creation of the European Communities. These were slowly grown into the European Union, which managed to keep the peace in Europe until today, even though at the time of writing it is under severe challenge from populist parties. The breakup of the European Union, hence, would pose the severe danger of renewed major war in Europe, similar to the First and Second World Wars.

⁷ Beyer 2014.

⁸ Knapton and Derry 1965.

⁹ Seaman 2002.

¹⁰ Mowat 1930, p. 210.

Hence, this section attempted to illustrate how the first forms of international integration contributed to world, or at least European, peace, as far as they were successful. They failed in maintaining the peace in Europe, with the outbreak of the First World War, insofar as they were still too weak and did not manage to maintain a functioning economy and to distribute wealth equitably. The more successful entity later had been created with the European Union, after the end of the Second World War.

With the current discussion about the disintegration of Europe now, it has to be mentioned that the referendum vote in Britain was relatively close. Only 52% (versus 48%) voted 'leave'. This could indicate that there could be some room for saving the membership in the EU if the political will was present. One idea would be to run a widespread survey with the British population on what the conditions would be so that they would have voted 'remain'. This could be practically organised for example similar to the questionnaire surveys that are often distributed by service providers or local authorities in England. The results of such a survey could then inform the negotiations with the EU. The leadership could then return from these negotiations with a 'list of achievements' versus these concerns in the population.

A global political Anatomy today

This second part of the article will illustrate how the current 'anatomy' of the international political world can be thought about. It starts from the lowest level, the typical society in the state, and moves through various levels to describe a relatively complete 'structure' or anatomy of the international political and social world. Hence, this description starts from the bottom to work its way up to the largest level. From the individual and the group, to the state, to regions and global governance.

Illustrations are used here because they facilitate the understanding of the arguments provided. Any science book on anatomies, human or else, provides illustrations and graphics or sketches to facilitate an understanding that cannot be provided by mere textual descriptions. Anatomies, so the general consensus, are described best in a very visual manner.

The illustrations provided here are works of art, rather than purely technical illustrations. Nonetheless, they are thought to convey the ideas as well as any technical illustration could. For similar, more technical illustrations in a very similar vein compare Albert¹¹. Albert created his illustrations unrelated to my work, but has produced remarkably similar outcomes. The illustrations provided here build on, but go beyond Albert's illustrations.

¹¹Albert 2016, p. 142-146.

Figure 2: Level 1 - Society: individuals and groups in the state

This is an abstract illustration, but it conveys the idea that society in states is a mosaic of groups and individuals of different forms and sizes, similar to a fractal. It needs to be thought about as being three-dimensional or layered, though, as individuals and groups are belonging to different entities. For example, an individual can belong to a sports club, a church, a business etc. But it does usually not belong to only one of those entities at any one time. For this reason, we need to think of a layered, three-dimensional system. Furthermore, not all of the units in the state are of fairly the same size.

These units represent groups, and groups can be things like families, groups of friends, firms, businesses, societies, parties, sports clubs, interest groups, educational establishments, and what not. There are so many of them! And of course, they are not all of equal size. The layered and multidimensional system of society within the state is similarly illustrated and described as stratification in Albert¹². In the figure above, the various shapes of different sizes represent groupings. Different shapes with different sizes and different colours illustrate the diversity of groups in society in any state, from the large to the small and with various points of concern. Some of the larger shapes are positioned across some of the smaller shapes, overlapping and partially including them. This illustrates the multi-dimensionality of society and the groups therein.

¹²Albert 2016.

Figure 3: Level 2 - the state world

This second level, the state level, is traditionally described as a ‘billiard ball system’¹³. Waltz compares the states to ‘units’ that fulfil each similar functions (similar to any household or firm in society). Each of them are self-contained, sovereign and autonomous to a large degree, which is illustrated in this image. Similar to my illustration here, Albert illustrates this system in *A Theory of World Politics*¹⁴. The billiard balls (states) vary in size and power. So, for example, the United States are more powerful than Switzerland. Germany is less powerful than the United States, but more powerful than Nigeria, etc. With Waltz, power is calculated in material terms, called ‘capabilities’, such as military endowment, economic strength, population size etc.¹⁵. Other authors stress the power of geography¹⁶, knowledge, ideas and emotional attractiveness¹⁷. While there is not necessarily an agreement on which state is precisely how powerful compared to others, given the different possibilities of calculating power, there is an agreement that different states vary in power. Apart from being of dissimilar size and having different capabilities, additional factors interfere with this picture, for example additional hierarchies that the states find themselves embedded in (see next figure) as well as transnational flows (see further below). Furthermore, the question that Albert raises is if the idea of functional similarity can be taken too literally or if we need to think of functional differentiation, which would result in distribution of labour and a resulting more intense need to integrate. The most obvious example for functional differentiation and distribution of labour would be found in the period of colonialism or in traditional empires. In those, labour, resources, and other ‘functionalities’ or commodities were provided unequally by some regions or states and consumed predominantly by other regions or states in the center.

So, for example, under colonialism luxury goods such as tea and coffee, or under the system of slavery manual work were imported from subjugated states. In today’s international system, after the abolition of colonialism and slavery, this differentiation of labour and functional differentiation might still occur in different ways. So, for example, fossil energy resources are predominantly provided by certain states in the Middle East and Russia. Certain production tasks are mainly fulfilled by some Asian countries, such as call centres for many service providers in India. Knowledge production is still mainly a Western enterprise, with the US and UK at the centre.

¹³Cf. Waltz 1979.

¹⁴Albert 2016.


¹⁵Cf. Waltz 1979.

¹⁶Mearsheimer 2001.

¹⁷ For example Nye 2005.

It could be debated how far this distribution of work and functional differentiation reaches, and where it ends, and if it is principally to be embraced as something beneficial or to be criticised as oppressive. The positive aspects of this at least partial functional differentiation might be that it facilitates integration. Functionally differing states need to collaborate to fulfil their own needs, similar to an enterprise in which everyone needs to collaborate to produce services or products. Hence, with integration as a peace promoting systemic feature in mind, functional differentiation might be very beneficial. On the other hand, it might also produce frustrations about the fairness of the functions or tasks assigned to any one country, similar to discussions about the distribution of work in any one household. If such disagreements would occur, then probably re-negotiating and calibrating the distribution of functions could be a remedy, which would also allow for the emergence of new outcomes, such as completely new consumer products, technical inventions, social ideas etc. Complete homogenisation, which is sometimes attributed to the spread of globalisation and feared as destroying local cultures and traditions, is not desirable and would also not necessarily be the outcome of functional differentiation at the one hand, or integration as the other side of the same coin on the other.

Figure 4: Level 3 - Global hierarchies, the world above the states




This level presents regions and global governance (i.e. UN, EU, ASEAN etc). The illustration is not precise, as the sublevels (regions, below that states, localities below that) have a large amount of autonomy, i.e. it is not as strictly top down as this illustration would indicate. It is not the case that the supra-level orders everything down until the lowest level, even though there might be strong influences. Complete control doesn't seem to be present. The above is a rough and abstract illustration. Also, it is not in existence everywhere and at any time as regional integration is not similarly developed everywhere, and some states are failing or experiencing civil wars or other upheavals at times, and some places are not complying with international law, etc. So, the real world is not as perfectly structured through as the illustration would indicate. And maybe it should not be too tightly structured through either, as this could be too dictatorial. Potentially, the level of hierarchical structuration would depend on the level of need, to be determined either in terms of security or in terms of human security or in terms of human rights or all three of the above. However, at the same time, one needs to keep in mind the differences between the units in the lower levels in terms of economic capacity, political capacity, culture etc. This makes it more difficult to structure everything from top down. Also, there needs to be a bottom up mechanism to allow for a basic level of democratic feedback and control. At the European level, this is provided with the elections to the European Parliament, but as the recent referendum in Britain illustrated, this mechanism might be too weak. For the global level, a UN parliament could be one idea for remedying this problem. Further down the road there probably need to be even more ideas, such as global parties etc.

The creation of more bottom up democracy at regional or global levels might potentially entail risks, such as the emergence of increased instability, as is often seen in times of transitions of states towards a democratic system. Two points need to be made here: gradual approaches might help remedy these risks, possibilities for securing transitions while they occur against negative effects of political crises could be invented, which would require more research, but generally the goals of more democracy should not be dismissed, at least not theoretically, and probably also not practically.

Figure 5: Horizontally to this, transnational, we find flows

This picture presents the flows that connect the globe at all levels. They are denser and more varied than pictured here. But the basic idea is presented in this illustration. Flows can be presented in migration, communication, trade, tourism, finance etc. And of course we also have unwanted flows, such as drug trade and crime and terrorism etc. These flows, even if they are not illicit, can cause problems and disturbances. But they are also needed, as they create interdependence, which is thought to contribute to integration and hence peace¹⁸.

Figure 6: The information grid connecting the globe – the internet

The internet serves as the ‘global brain’¹⁹. It’s not evenly connecting the globe yet, it’s denser in the West and Asia, and less intensively distributed in the Middle East and Africa, where often the basic access to a PC or the network is missing. This information grid can be understood to resemble something of the sort of the global brain, as it connects the various parts of the globe with instant communication – similar to a neuronal network – and facilitates therefore material exchanges, such as traffic and goods exchanges etc.

¹⁸ Nye and Keohane 2011.

¹⁹ Cf. Castells 2009.

Reality as not simply a hologram: A Reply to Wendt

The international political world is not necessarily or simply, as Alexander Wendt wrote a hologram²⁰. It has some aspects of a hologram, but nonetheless this image can be qualified and discussed. Let me present some arguments towards this.

A hologram is a virtual picture in which each part contains the whole. I.e. if I destroy the basis of the hologram and have only a part left, I can still recreate the whole picture. This would not be possible with the world and with groups or individuals. If we had only one group of people left, we could reproduce, so that life could go on. But our world would be lost forever and could not be recreated. It is simply not the case that any group or state could rebuild the world as it was before after, for example, a nuclear war. A certain resilience in the international world is present, of course. For example, Germany was rebuilt and recreated after the Second World War.²¹ But on the other hand, civilisations have been completely destroyed historically by war or other misfortunes, and have not and cannot be recreated. Similarly, in our natural world many species are going extinct each day without the possibility to save them, even if efforts are made.²² Furthermore, a hologram is a virtual entity. The international political world is very material, in a general and a social sense. For example, states and people live and die with increases in food production or import, by natural disasters or wars, which are usually still fought with very material means. If the argument of the hologram is partially true²³, then we need to at least combine it with a more material perspective. While on the one hand quantum physics, as well as New Age spiritual approaches and cutting edge science inspired by quantum physics, maintain the 'like virtual' aspects of reality, such as illustrated by para-psychological research, and the results are not necessarily to be dismissed²⁴, the counterargument is that reality also still is Newtonian, with material aspects still holding ground. Reality is both 'virtual' – or pure mind or spirit or information or energy – and material. As the pop singer Madonna succinctly put it: 'We are spirits in a material world'.

Hence, we need to introduce to the idea of the hologram the idea of the organism, a more biologically inspired idea. An organism resembles a hologram in a certain way: Information, or mind, or consciousness, are key elements in an organism without which it could not survive. Every function in any organism is dependent on information transfer between the different cells, accompanied by energy transfers to maintain life. These aspects are similar to how a hologram works. However, in any organism, apart from some special, simple organisms, reproduction of the whole is difficult after injury, such as loss of limb. Modern medicine has found many advances to remedy this natural difficulty, but even with the most modern medicine complete reconstruction of organisms after life threatening injury is not yet possible. Similarly, reproducing any one complete complex organism from any single cell of the body seems not yet possible.

These arguments are not to refute, but to qualify Wendt's ideas. The idea of a hologram is helpful and enlightening. However, caution needs to be taken to take it too literally or to the extreme.

Reality is both 'virtual' and material. Both elements apply. It is also social and cultural.

So, for example virtual and 'para-virtual' aspects such as information exchange, emotions, thoughts, telepathy, the effect of intentions and prayers etc. apply. They have been studied and confirmed as real.²⁵ On the other hand, matter persists likewise. The virtual turns into the material. Ideas turn into goods, thoughts turn into books, and emotions turn into behaviour.²⁶ It all starts in the mind, however. All springs forth from consciousness. However, as soon as matter is created, it takes up a reality of its own and cannot be simply thought otherwise.

For example, books enable thoughts to survive that otherwise would have been lost. They can even create entire social systems, such as state systems or religions.

²⁰ Wendt 2015, p. 271. He is not the only author claiming that the world or the universe is a hologram. Cf. Suskind 1995; Talbot 1991.

²¹ Wenger and Zimmermann 2003; Gilbert and Large 2002.

²² Kohm 1990.

²³ Cf. also Laszlo 2016.

²⁴ Cf. also Beyer 2015.

²⁵ Matthews et al. 2000; Byrd 1988; Harris et al. 1999.

²⁶ Perugini and Bagozzi 2001; Kushnir et al. 2010; Ajzen 2011; Watson and Spence 2007; Carrus et al. 2008.

Thoughts also turn into other material facts, such as airplanes, tables, chairs. These persist beyond the thoughts that created them, even though not indefinitely, as all matter decays.

Social facts also shape these two. Thoughts are a product always of society. Even the most solitary scholar relies on at least other books for their work. Hence, all thought is social, there is no entirely 'free' thought. If one would put a newborn into isolation and bring it up without human contact, it is very unlikely that this human would either survive or be able to create and utter intelligible thoughts. The case of Caspar Hauser has illustrated this. Such an individual would probably have some thoughts, however, and it would indeed be interesting to know how much these really 'free' thoughts would resemble anything human.

So, to summarise: Reality is virtual, 'para-virtual', material and social. An aspect that has not been mentioned yet is culture. One could talk here also about civilisation or identity, but to me culture seems to capture the idea more closely. Cultures are the basis for identities of groups, such as Western, Asian, Middle Eastern, African cultures. They form the basis of identities, usually contained in nation states or groups of states. Conflicts between those – either states or what Huntington²⁷ has termed civilisations – are common, at least in the form of competition.

This would mean, for making the world more peaceful, we do not necessarily need a cultural homogenisation. This would represent a cause of conflict in itself, if attempted. However, we need cultural dialogue, exchange and tolerance.

The 'Clash of Civilisations' was described and analysed before 9/11 by Samuel P. Huntington, an American political scientist.²⁸ He had argued that world civilisations competed globally for predominance and that due to their high birth and conversion rates the Muslim civilisation was growing. He predicted the Muslim civilisation at some point in the future to challenge the Christian civilisation, which was later interpreted as an explanation for the attacks of 9/11 and Islamist terrorism more generally. While the Clash of Civilisations theorem was heavily criticised in the academic literature, it might very well have served as a blueprint for anti-immigration groups to justify their position against in particular immigration from Muslim countries.

Huntington's clash of civilizations hypothesis has many facets. If there is, however, one central hypothesis in his work it is this: the dominant source of conflict will shift from the clash of ideologies during the Cold War period (liberal democracy vs. communism) to the clash between nations and groups of different civilizations after the end of the ColdWar: 'conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization.'

He defined civilizations as 'the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have', being 'differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion'.

Huntington distinguished seven, or possibly eight civilizations – Western, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, SlavicOrthodox, Latin American and, possibly, African. He posited that civilizational differences 'are the product of centuries' and 'far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes' and are therefore 'less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones'.

Moreover, such differences are not merely an abstract construction: '[that] civilizations are meaningful entities accords with the way in which people see and experience reality'.

Huntington's theoretical argument was not limited to the matrix of inter-civilizational conflicts. But he remained unclear about his second most important term: clash. While he stated that clashes between civilizations would become the greatest threat to world peace and that 'the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future', the term is nowhere explicitly defined or thoroughly explained. Rather, Huntington subsumed very different things under the same umbrella, depending on specific civilization dyads looked at. For example, the clash between the West and Japan is mainly described in economic terms, the conflict between the Western and the Siniccivilizationmainly in military terms.

Huntington did not provide a systematic explanation of why terrorism is a favourite weapon employed in some of these clashes. The reason given for the use of terrorism by other civilizations against the West did not go beyond the observation that 'terrorism historically is the weapon of the weak'.

²⁷ Huntington 2002.

²⁸Huntington et al. 1997; Huntington 1993.

His explanation of the extraordinary conflict intensity of Islam was not based on profound theoretical reasons either. He perceived Islam as a 'religion of the sword' with an absolutist ideology that makes cohabitation with other religions extremely difficult. One justification for this could be that, different to Christianity and Buddhism for example, the founding mythos of Islam includes war and violence. Mohammad, the messenger of God, engaged in battle to spread his ideas and to conquer Mecca.

However, many religions, not just Islam, can be and have historically been misused for the purpose of justifying terrorist violence.

One possible solutions lies in the cultures, according to Huntington based on religions, themselves.

First, it seems necessary to state that in a globalized world, in a world in which different cultures meet in many places, ethics and spirituality must follow a multicultural, interculturally sensitive, principle. This would apply both to humanist ethics, as well as spirituality, for either the atheistically inclined person or community, or the spiritually inclined ones of whatever kind. We know from the past decades that differences on interpretations of ideologies or other thought systems (for example a strong secularism with intensive materialist overtones versus a more holistically oriented secularism with some spiritual overtones, or Western Capitalism versus Marxism, or Islam versus Christianity, as some of the many different, sometimes overlapping examples) can cause friction and can lead to conflict. For resolving these conflicts, it is necessary to identify the commonalities and potential meeting grounds between these different viewpoints in order to connect them, as well as allowing and tolerating difference, which gives freedom to each side to exist without conflict. For example, meeting grounds and commonalities between the great religions have been identified by several authors²⁹. If we assume, in a religious or secular interpretation, that humanity is one shared family, one species, then we should be able to find commonalities, and common principles. They might not necessarily have to imply any specific religion, or religion at all, but they should not contradict the great religions either, as the latter have provided guidance and still do for many peoples and even cultures, and can be understood as the distilled wisdom of many centuries. So, we need to find guiding principles that are not in contradiction, based on, but separate (for the secularly inclined) to and from all of the great religions. If we assume that human nature per se is principally stable, and humans are basically very similar 'creatures', then it would follow that probably societies, hence interaction principles, should follow fairly similar principles all over the world. This is the secular science, the Enlightenment perspective, which in a way fulfills the role of religion for the rational modern West. The specifics of cultures, societies, nations, groups, communities and individuals might be culturally different and derived from historically different experiences and customs. But some common basic principles should theoretically exist. To find these principles, it would be necessary to look also, but not only, into the religions. It would also be necessary to compare this knowledge with knowledge from secular sciences. But let us start with the former. The religions are arguably the oldest and most longstanding norm providers for societies. In many societies they still hold a strong ordering function over individuals. They have been developed usually over many centuries, and are therefore probably based on fundamental wisdoms, which can provide some insights on important principles for human interaction. While this should maybe not mean to uncritically accept all traditional rules, as change is not always negative, as history also shows frequently (for example in the area of women's rights, LGBT rights, protection of minorities with human rights etc. etc.), we must therefore look into the major religions to identify some basic guiding principles. These should probably be basic and 'slim' enough to not contradict other approaches, such as other religions or secular worldviews. The more principles one would try to identify, the more one would in all likelihood contradict one or another approach. Hence, these common rules should be basic, simple, and sparse, as well as allow for change, which is a necessary requirement to allow societal progress and 'social evolution' of a sort.

For example, as stated in the previous chapter, Lundberg brings together a number of common principles in the great religions, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism: The Golden Rule - Reciprocity, Patience, Harmlessness, Charity and Helping Others, Loving Speech and Kindness, Forgiveness and Mercy, Honesty and Truthfulness, Respect for Others and Non-Judgement³⁰.

²⁹ Moses 2007; Lundberg 2010.

³⁰Lundberg 2010.

Lundberg presents evidence from the different scriptures about the existence of these principles in all of the above named religions. Furthermore, these principles are ‘slim’ enough to be possibly applicable more widely.

Another publication with a similar intention – Oneness, by Jeffrey Moses – provides already more principles: The Golden Rule, Love Thy Neighbor, The World is Our Family, There is One God, More Blessed to Give than to Receive etc.³¹. Overall, he provides about 65 principles. While this might be useful and welcome, and might provide fantastically helpful as a guide towards a cosmopolitan spirituality, it might also already present a too large number of guiding principles to avoid contradictions. Any single guiding principle could potentially find contradiction at least in some cases. Moses saves his list by including a guiding principle ‘Moderation in everything is key’. This would mean that even these guiding principles should not be applied too strictly and without any possibility of reform or exception, or with the possibility to discuss and potentially refine these principles. With this move, he saves an otherwise very exhaustive list of principles. For general societal interaction, however, on a day to day basis, it would probably be sensible to rather use some shorter list of principles for general use, and allow different groups and individuals to follow their own, specific, principles, which don’t necessarily have to be completely similar. The latter allows for a certain pluralism in societies, as well as would in the world, if applied, and therefore would be an essential requirement of freedom, which is also a necessary requirement for peace. The guiding principle could be phrased as ‘unity in diversity’ (which is not a new principle, but describes the principle of multiculturalism in the United States³²). For peace to prevail, arguably a balance between difference and commonality, between order and freedom, needs to be found. This should maybe not be a too rigid balance, but a flexible balance, which needs to adapt according to pressures, needs, opportunities and demands. Freedom per se is necessary for each individual as well as societies at large, as without freedom prosperity and growth are impossible. To give an analogy: a young tree might need a pole or cage like structure to protect it and it needs water to support it, but it needs space, earth, and sunshine and air to grow. Similarly, societies or world systems, for that matter, or ideologies that are too rigid do not allow for growth, hence prosperity, will decline. The most obvious example to give from recent history is the Soviet Union, which attempted to install an alternative (principally based on quite benign ideas) system in a too rigid and controlling way, so as to prevent freedom of expression, thought, movement and business, which resulted in it’s stagnation, economic decline and frustration in the population, which led to the collapse of this system.

Another possible solution would be to build a global polity (demos) via the creation of a global Parliament.³³ Identities are constructed by thought and experience. They are both traditional and handed down and deeply embedded in culture, as well as acquired and updated every day through the ideas we are exposed to. Identities can change, as anyone who has moved from one country or culture to another can testify, even if such change is often slow and difficult and maybe only partial. However, in terms of civilizational clashes even slight modifications of the clashing identities might suffice to end these conflicts or to transform them into something benign. For this purpose, ideas are necessary, such as promoted by science, culture, the media, and politics. In political terms, then, we would indeed need a global parliament as only such could create a consensus on politics that are acceptable to the global populace and only such could therefore create the legitimacy of the international order.

A Global Polity (‘demos’)

World peace requires global integration. Many international theorists, Constructivist, Liberal or Realist, agree that global integration is necessary for creating a stable and violence-free international order. While Liberals are more inclined to support this integration under international institutions³⁴, facilitated by trade, education and the spread of democracy, Realists often go further and argue for the necessity – even if sometimes impossibility³⁵ – of a

³¹ Moses 2007.

³² Dunn 2006; Schermers and Blokker 2011; Parker 2003.

³³ Cf. Beyer 2017; Falk and Strauss 2001; Patomaki 2006; Bummel 2011; Falk and Strauss 2003; Thompson 1999; List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010; Weinstock 2009; Scholte 2007; Valentini 2014; Scholte 2002; Hirst 2000; Cohen and Sabel 2004.

³⁴ E.g. Rittberger and Zangl 2012.

³⁵ Waltz 1959.

world government³⁶. Just recently, the discussion about a world government has been revived (World Government Project, and others), inspired by an article by Alexander Wendt³⁷.

There therefore seems to be an agreement on the need for global political integration on the highest level. The main achievement in the past after the Second World War was the creation of the United Nations. It arguably ensured the peace since 1945. In Europe, the regional peace was achieved by the creation and expansion of the European Union. However, what is the situation on the ground on a global level? What about common citizens? The argument, promoted for example by Robert Keohane, is that for global integration a global demos is needed³⁸, meaning: citizens worldwide would need to form some sort of common identity, or at least a common orientation towards their fellow citizens worldwide as members of the same community of humanity. On the one hand, it would be necessary to have such a global demos existing for creating, improving or expanding international integration, for example with a global UN Parliament³⁹, but it is not known if it is in existence. On the other hand, possibly the creation of a global Parliament would create such a global feeling, idea and identity of citizenship.

This project seeks to take up this question in order to investigate how far global community orientation already exists to evaluate how much basis for a global demo has already developed.

Question

How far has the global demos already developed? Can we speak of a global community today as the basis for further global integration?

Methodology

The easiest way to test for global community / global demos is to evaluate common orientations towards the globe as well as subjective statements about identity. Both are needed to come to a realistic estimation about global community identity.

An easy way to establish this would be to refer to global surveys, such as the Pew Research Center surveys. But, even given these globally oriented surveys, no proper global survey is currently conducted that tests for the presence of the factors relevant for this study. Therefore, a survey at the University of Hull was created and individuals recruited around the globe, but mainly Europe and in particular Germany, to self-select for answering questions about their awareness of global events throughout the year. This was determined by asking about their consumption of news from various outlets as well as which type of news they focused on. Secondly, the survey did include a brief questionnaire about global identity (first), and support for further global democratic integration (second). This was asked for by, for example, asking about identification with the national, regional, or global level, the amount of international travel, the number of languages spoken, the amount of relatives and friends living abroad. The support for further global integration was asked for with a question if the respondents would vote for a global Parliament.

Overall, 253 individuals responded to the survey. While gender was not asked for, the vast majority of the respondents came from Europe (89%) and were between 25-34 years of age (58%).

³⁶ Craig.

³⁷ Wendt 2003.

³⁸ Grant and Keohane 2005.

³⁹ Cf. Beyer 2016.

Survey responses

Which news outlets do you normally consult (i.e. daily)?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– national TV	46.43% 117
– private TV	10.71% 27
– national newspapers	56.75% 143
– international newspapers	35.71% 90
– radio	40.08% 101
– online sources	88.10% 222
– other	7.54% 19
Total Respondents: 252	

What kind of news interests you most?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– national news	72.33% 183
– world news	95.65% 242
– science	31.23% 79
– sport	15.02% 38
– entertainment	7.51% 19
– other	10.28% 26
Total Respondents: 253	

How would you describe yourself?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– a citizen of your country	34.66% 87
– a citizen of your region	31.47% 79
– a world citizen	65.74% 165
Total Respondents: 251	

How often do you travel to foreign destinations?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– frequently	64.14% 161
– sometimes	33.07% 83
– never	2.79% 7
Total	251

How many of your family members or friends/acquaintances live in foreign countries?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– Many of them live in countries around the world.	28.06% 71
– Some of them live in countries around the world.	44.66% 113
– Many of them live in countries nearby.	9.49% 24
– Some of them live in countries nearby.	17.79% 45
– None of the above.	12.25% 31
Total Respondents: 253	

How likely would you move to a different country?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– Very likely	44.62% 112
– Somewhat likely	41.04% 103
– Unlikely	14.34% 36
Total	251

How many languages do you speak?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– One	10.67% 27
– 1 to 3	52.96% 134
– More than 3	36.36% 92
Total	253

What is your education level?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– basic school level	0.40% 1
– high school or equivalent	6.72% 17
– university	91.70% 232
– other	1.19% 3
Total	253

Where do you currently live?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– Africa	0.79% 2
– Asia	2.77% 7
– Australia	0.40% 1
– Europe	88.93% 225
– Latin America	1.19% 3
– Middle East	1.98% 5
– US & Canada	3.95% 10
Total	253

What is your age?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– 18 to 24	14.68% 37
– 25 to 34	57.54% 145
– 35 to 44	12.30% 31
– 45 to 54	7.94% 20
– 55 to 64	1.98% 5
– 65 to 74	4.37% 11
– 75 or older	1.19% 3
Total	252

How likely would you vote in elections for a world parliament?

Answer Choices–	Responses–
– Very likely	71.15% 180
– Somewhat likely	19.37% 49
– Unlikely	9.49% 24
Total	253

Interpretation

The results of the above presented questionnaire indicate that there is already a strong global commitment and identification, at least among Europeans. In addition, Europeans feel that their region is an important focus point of identification. The latter is arguably a strong argument for keeping the European Union intact, as far as possible. It is also fascinating to learn that many of the respondents would ‘very likely’ vote for a global Parliament. Travels, migration and communication via news readership seems to be fairly global in orientation according to this survey, which would further support the idea that there is an increasing global citizenship present.

Most respondents were below the age of 35 (75%), had attended university (92%), and came from Europe (89%).

News consumption seemed to be dominated by online media, the most important topic in the news were global events: Out of 252 respondents, 222 (88%) use online media for being informed about news, 143 (57%) use national newspapers 117 (46%) use national TV. Out of 253 respondents furthermore, 242 (96%) were interested in world news, 183 (72%) were interested in national news.

Identity seemed to be strongly leaning towards ‘world citizen’ in most respondents (66% versus 35% for national and 32% for regional identity). In addition, most respondents know family or friends living in countries around the world (45% ‘some’, 28% ‘many’), travel themselves to foreign destinations frequently (65%, 33% ‘sometimes’) and would very or somewhat likely move to another country (45% and 42%). Most respondents spoke 1 to 3 languages (53%) or even more than 3 (36%).

When asked if they would vote for a global parliament, 72% answered affirmative ‘very likely’, compared to 19% ‘somewhat likely’ and only 9% ‘unlikely’.

Overall, these results would support the idea that a global demos is emerging, at least in Europe, where most of the respondents came from, and that it would therefore make sense to keep building on regional and global political structures, to strengthen them, and to support them in their functioning. Further integration into a global political structure as presented above in the second section therefore would make sense and would be supported by the global populace, as far as the results of this survey can guide us.

Conclusion

This article attempted to make an argument in favour of further global integration at the political level based on the idea of the global demos, a historical analysis of global, or rather regional integration, serving peace, a theoretical sketch of the current global political structure and empirical research on the existence of a global demos. All of this indicates that it is useful and necessary to continue with further global political integration, such as represented in the European Union, the United Nations, or global governance more widely. The general popular support in the population seems at least present in Europe.

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