

**PROFIT,  
POWER  
AND  
CONTROL:**

**THE THEFT OF MIGRANT  
WORKERS' WAGES IN ENGLAND**

**JON BURNETT AND FIDELIS CHEBE**

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**MIGRANT ACTION**

ADVOCACY - JUSTICE - EMPOWERMENT

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# INTRODUCTION

Founded in 2017, Migrant Action is a grassroots charity based in Leeds providing advice and advocacy for those subject to immigration control, supporting and securing access to justice, and working longer term for material change and migration justice through research-based interventions, through campaigns and as part of social movements. Its advice and 'case work' is multi-faceted, taking place primarily across South and West Yorkshire and including (among other things) supporting those from migrant communities facing eviction and experiencing housing concerns and/or homelessness, issues arising from contact with criminal justice agencies, working with those facing deportation/removal, working with those with irregular immigration statuses and experiencing immigration precarity, and challenging discrimination and combating work-placed problems.

What follows in this Briefing Paper draws from this 'case work' by examining the theft of a sample of migrant workers' wages employed in England between 2018 and 2023, based on interviews with ten people in 2023. In doing so, it explores some of the forces underpinning employers' theft of migrant workers' wages in these contexts, and further documents some of its parameters and consequences. First, it discusses conceptual understandings of wage theft and, in the context here, some of the broad policy trajectories and underlying forces creating the conditions for it to flourish. Second, it builds on this discussion by exploring immigration control as a factor in shaping particular parameters of wage theft. Third, it sets out its findings by way of accounts of wage theft by the individuals interviewed; and finally, it brings these together by developing an analysis of wage theft as a component of contemporary labour markets.

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# SECTION 1: SITUATING WAGE THEFT

Wage theft is not new, and as is well-established takes many forms including (but by no means restricted to): the reclassification of workers in order to circumvent paying wages or the minimum wage (Hallet, 2018); unauthorised deductions from people's pay (Lee and Smith, 2019: 165); and workers being compelled to work before/after shifts formally start and finish, or through all/parts of their breaks (Su, 2016: 147). Wage theft can be mediated through egregious charges such as requiring people to pay substantial sums for equipment necessary to carry out their work; for training; or for accommodation or travel tied to their labour. Wage theft is situated alongside the expropriation of labour power – working unpaid, and so on – without recompense; and as such often refers to that over and above the appropriation of surplus value through the wage form. The theft of wages is therefore diametrically connected to the theft of time (Bittle and Snider, 2018).

Wage theft is a structural component, rather than an aberration, of capitalist labour markets. However, a range of dynamics over recent decades have intensified the propensity for particular forms of wage theft to take place. For example, as Bittle and Snider (2018: 130) make clear, the widespread changes in employment relationships over the last half century, including the outsourcing of jobs, are fundamentally connected to vast increases in corporate power and overall inequality. Indeed, in the UK, some 3.6 million workers were classed as being in insecure work in 2022, according to the Trades Union Congress (TUC, 2022), compared to 3.2 million people six years earlier: or around one-in-nine of the workforce. However, while it is within such workplace segments that concentrations of power over employees and explicit workplace abuses are frequently concentrated, these are by no means restricted to these workplace segments (Eisenberg-Guyot et al, 2022).

At the same time, this takes on particular significance when set against a systemic undermining and reworking of workplace protections and regulations (Florrison, 2022) which has almost uniformly accelerated over the same time period. For instance, well over a decade ago, Tombs and Whyte (2009: 47) warned of an 'assault upon the regulatory structure governing worker safety in the United Kingdom' which could be traced back (at least) until the latter years of the 20th Century. Underpinned (among other things) by a desire to ensure that regulatory structures did or do not burden business or interfere with profit-maximisation, enforcement was to be culled or weakened in favour of 'consensus' approaches: characterised by collaborative working with employers, and 'light-touch' activities relating to worker protections and well-being. Meanwhile there have been concerted attempts to undermine and neuter the power of trade unions (Unison, 2023), and the point, here, is that while fissured employment relations geared towards intensifying the extraction of surplus value create the conditions for wage theft to take place, explicit attempts to increase employers' power over employees attack the ability to combat wage theft collectively.

Indeed, as Bittle and Snider (2018) have argued, while wage theft can be particularly pronounced in particular sectors and labour market segments, it is imperative that understandings of wage theft are not divorced from their structural conditions. For this runs the risk of normalising a perception of wage theft confined to specific labour market areas, as opposed to being normalised within labour markets more broadly. ‘The very definition of “normal” employment relationships and of what constitutes ‘reasonable’ demands from employers has shifted’, according to Snider (2018: 566) forcing notions that surveillance, heightened control, insecurity, stress and increased availability are ‘unavoidable’ components of contemporary work. What follows examines this in relation to wage theft experienced by a core component of workers in contemporary labour markets: migrant workers.

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# **SECTION 2: WAGE THEFT AND IMMIGRATION CONTROL**

It is well established that the underlying processes of capital accumulation which have fostered a concerted attack on labour standards, working conditions and have intensified inequalities on the one hand, have contributed to creating the conditions for particular migratory movements on the other. And it is against this backdrop that Britain, since the 1990s and early 2000s, has been among the core proponents of the managed migration systems that have been developed primarily by countries in the global North to link migration to (their) market needs or demands (Consterdine, 2015).

In the late 1990s and 2000s, this took shape through the development of systems attempting to ensure that the number of those entering the UK in particular labour market segments could be changed and altered at different points, with those in the upper economic strata afforded greatest rights and protections, and those at the lowest afforded least. At its sharpest points, this resulted in migrant workers in the lowest-paid segments in effect being tied to employers, with their right to remain linked to their employment itself (Kundnani, 2007). While simultaneously, state power against those whose status was irregularised was amassed at rapid pace. This included the build-up of an immigration detention estate which went from incarcerating just over 10,000 people in 1995 to more than 32,000 people twenty years later (Burnett, 2022). It included an unprecedented surge of immigration offences, with the 84 immigration offences created between 1997 and 2010 than in the 113 years previously (Aliverti, 2016). It further involved the expansion of a ‘deportation machine’ which by the mid-2000s was removing thousands of people per year (Fekete, 2005).

As such, these were two sides of the same coin: an interventionist immigration policy framework seeking to align migratory movements with market needs while fundamentally asserting punishing control over those whose movement existed outside these frameworks (such as asylum seekers, or those whose status existed outside these boundaries). While certainly not driven solely by economic imperatives, where these did coalesce with economic imperatives part of the aim was to create the temporal workforces demanded by contemporary labour markets, while further rendering migrant communities disposable themselves (Kundnani, 2021).

For example, fundamental drives to crack down on the presence of low-paid migrant workers in particular have been matched by drives to utilise welfare and criminal-legal policies to provide labour markets with differing forms of contingent labour forces (Burnett, 2022). Fundamental drives to control ‘irregular’ migration, meanwhile, have seen new forms of incarceration, surveillance and control. As has been noted persistently, the flagship hostile environment policy framework announced in 2012 (but with much longer roots) has provided one framework through which immigration control has not only spread among a range of institutions and agencies, but encompassed an increasing scope of those subject to immigration control (Webber,

2018). It is in such broad contexts that migrant workers can face particular risks of wage theft.

A body of research, for instance, has explored how immigration control’s ‘fashioning’ of precarity (Anderson, 2010), the power held by labour market intermediaries (LMIs) (Davies, 2019), the threat of immigration enforcement (Burnett and Whyte, 2010), racialised assumptions about workers (McCollum and Findlay, 2015), the opacity of labour regimes and the complexity or pressures embedded in supply chains are among the factors shaping the parameters of labour exploitation (including wage theft) of migrant workers in the UK (Scott, 2017). Indeed, that migrant workers are among those highly exploited in labour markets is well established; and this was part of the stated reasons that the UK’s Immigration Act 2016 created a Director of Labour Market Enforcement (DLME), the remit of which includes harnessing ‘the three main enforcement bodies [relating to combating labour market exploitation]: HM Revenue and Customs National Minimum Wage (HMRC NMW) enforcement, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA), and the Employment Agency Standards (EAS) Inspectorate’ (Taylor, 2021).

However, compare the combined funding of £35.2 million for these agencies (in 2021/22, see Beels, 2023: 27) to the £392 million budget (in 2019/20) for the Home Office’s Immigration Enforcement Directorate (IED) (National Audit Office, 2021). That is, there is around 11 times more expenditure on a punitive architecture regulating the presence of those subject to immigration control than on the primary infrastructure enforcing the workplace protections of not just migrant workers, but all workers.

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# SECTION 3: EXPERIENCES OF WAGE THEFT

It is against the above backdrop that this briefing paper is situated, drawing on the experiences and accounts of ten people about their experiences of wage theft by their employers. Each of the ten people interviewed here had engaged in at least one form of wage labour between 2018 and 2023, with eight people employed at the time of interview. Over this time period, workers recalled having experienced wage theft in a total of 47 different jobs, across multiple industries, the most prevalent of which was warehousing and packing. Many of these jobs had been secured through employment agencies in the north of England which, since the late 20th Century have become adept at fashioning 'strategies for reaching deep into under- employed, inner-urban labour pools' and marketing such labour supplies to employers (see Peck and Theodore, 2010: 96).

While the interviews took place in the north of England, and all respondents resided in the north of England at the time of interview, these forms of work were in multiple regions (See Appendix). Immigration status, as is well established, is not static, with those subject to immigration control frequently experiencing a form of temporality which can include moving between different forms of immigration status itself (Hughes, 2022). As such, interviewees discussed experiences of wage theft while working under a range of conditions and restrictions relating to their immigration status, including: as international students, on post-study visas, on work visas and on family and spouse visas. Five of the respondents were female, and five respondents male. All were born in Africa, and all were aged between 25 and 54 at the time of interview. All interviewees had been in the UK between four and sixteen years. All of the names used are synonyms.



## FORMS OF WAGE THEFT

All respondents reported experiencing wage theft on multiple occasions while working in England, which in many ways corresponded with established patterns of stealing from employees. For example, Sarah explained that while packing in a warehouse:

Many times, I am asked to work through part of my break or for a little bit longer after my shift so we can keep on schedule, so the production schedule can be met and everything is on track.

Similarly, Michelle, working in a baking factory, explained:

The people they are working, working, working, working. You start at 10pm, and sometimes you are going until around 5am for a break as there is a schedule to meet. There are productions targets and deadlines.

Under the Working Time Regulations 1998 (implementing the European Working Time Directive in to law in Britain), workers over 18 are entitled to an uninterrupted break of 20 minutes when working more than six hours, which should take place in working time and should not be taken at the start or the end of a working day (Health and Safety Executive, 2023). The law permits employers to decide whether this break is paid or unpaid. But interviewees frequently stated this sometimes appears to make little difference in practical terms, with break times routinely shortened in any case or working extra after shifts routine. Or as Richard put it: ‘There’s always a reason why you need to do a few more minutes here, or a bit more time there’.

Forms of wage theft, however, expanded beyond working through breaks or after shifts had finished. For example, Eva described ‘extra charges’ in her role working in a food production factory, including clothing and travel, which were nebulous, unexplained and expensive. ‘Say you are working the morning shift 6-2’, she said:

There are no buses to work at that time in the morning so if you don’t drive like many workers you use the pick-up bus they arrange. But you are being charged for that pick-up bus. It comes out of your wages and it costs a lot.

While in turn, Ajani recounted a job ‘painting walls and doors where I used to work (from 8am] until 7pm, but there was so much to do that I worked eight days to finish when it was meant to be seven; so they said they don’t pay this extra day. It happens’. Indeed, respondents consistently emphasised that wage theft in their experience has been an occasional event, but something more normalised. Anjani continued to discuss

having worked for more than one employer who ‘went out of business before me and other workers got paid. The company went broke, so we could not have our wages’. Meanwhile, Mariam explained how in multiple jobs she had had:

If you take holiday they are cutting your money. Sometimes I have just not been paid when I expected to be. Other times, I have worked with an agency and they have disputed hours I worked, so they said I did not have enough hours to be entitled to holiday pay. Either way, this does not just happen to me. It is not isolated’.

## PROFIT, PUNISHMENT AND CONTROL

This understanding of wage theft – as something routine and in many ways mundane – coincided with reflections on wage theft as one strategy among others to profit and extract as much surplus value as possible from workers. ‘Stealing wages, skimming wages, sacking people so they don’t have things they are entitled to’, Firash explained, ‘cutting corners, cutting costs, these are all ways of getting as much profit as possible, everything they can get away with, in any way they can’. And ‘this adds up very quickly’, Chapman suggested, as:

If one employer has a hundred workers and they each, or even some of them, work twenty minutes unpaid a day, even just over a few days a week, this adds up very quickly. This is a lot of stolen wages.

Indeed, providing specific examples, Mabel explained that, in her experience, working unpaid through breaks had coincided with the denial of other breaks – especially comfort breaks which would remove a person from their work, such that:

The toilet, you really have to wait. Sometimes someone is coming, like when another line manager or someone can cover. Or like when a supervisor who is able to do the job and can do the work. Or maybe when something is broken, then they can then go to the toilet. But other than that you cannot go to the toilet; they think that if you are going to the toilet you are going to rest and you are not allowed to rest. But sometimes you need it.

While similarly, Firash said: ‘When you have to go to the toilet you have to have someone to cover you. But when there is no cover you cannot leave your place, because you have your duty and the factory will not close the line. It needs to keep time’. As such, this equated to ‘companies thieving worker time’, he continued, ‘so that they can keep to their own time’.

Against this backdrop, what Firash – and other interviewees also – pointed to was fundamental power dynamics in workplaces, where the theft of wages in some contexts takes place to ensure that employer goals can be met, or where these might not be met. Eva, for example, reflected on explicitly punitive forms of wage theft where:

There was work to do not long ago but we had not finished, so they made us stay until we had finished all of the work to complete the target. I cannot remember how long extra we worked. An hour maybe. Maybe 90 minutes. We did not get [paid] overtime.

While Mariam discussed how:

I recently worked where it was meant to be production line work but some of us were instead told we were going to be loading and moving pallets – heavy pallets. I was with a girl who was strong. We were doing pallets and she said to me ‘don’t worry, you do the easy parts, I will do all the heavy parts’. We were a team of four, and she helped me so much but eventually she got hurt loading them. So, I said ‘no its not fair, we were not even meant to be doing this’. So, one day I went to my supervisor and told her that, and I could see on her face she was not happy, and as a result, she told me to go do jobs that were not really related to anything. She would give me pointless, degrading tasks all day. And then sometimes I would say ‘I have finished’; so she would find other things, but things you are not supposed to do: stupid things just to show me who was the boss. And when I got my wage that month there was some missing.

Indeed, for her this was not just about profit but – at least potentially – punishment and control, and elaborating on the same theme, Firash explained: ‘There was one decorating job I had recently which was meant to take ten days but I did it in eight, working really long days, so I could have two days rest.’ However, assuming control over his working hours, he continued, had significant consequences, as:

I waited for the payment and I didn’t get it. I phoned [the employer], and they said I wouldn’t be paid for days I was not there. I challenged it and challenged it, and in the end I got some pay but didn’t get everything I was owed, but by that point I felt like I should almost be grateful for anything.

As is well established control of the working day and the labour process is a central feature of wage labour (Thompson, 1967). Wage theft here appears to be a way of exerting it.

## CONSEQUENCES OF WAGE THEFT

Such forms of theft were and are particularly keenly felt – respondents pointed out – in a context of high living costs, variable wages and precarity. For example, as Michelle explained:

When you are having money taken – unpaid overtime, deductions from wages and you don’t know why, that’s a lot of money. It’s nothing for them [employers], but for us it’s a lot. If they take six hours from me, six hours from him, from her, it’s a lot of money.

Continuing, she said: ‘I have responsibilities. I cook, I clean and have children and so these things add up. Time taken from me is time taken from being with them. Money taken from me is money taken from them’.

As such, as she made clear, wage theft can and does have very real material consequences; and this was a point reiterated repeatedly elsewhere, with Chapman stating that ‘it can make the difference between paying rent or not’, for example, or Taye explaining that ‘getting wages or not ultimately impacts whether you are eating’. Indeed, every interviewee emphasised the fact that wage theft has very real implications. So, it is unsurprising that the emotional costs of this were also foregrounded consistently. For instance, Sarah recalled:

There was this one girl and she was decorating her apartment and she wanted this, she wanted that, she wanted to make it nice and she was so happy at the thought of having things and making it nice. So, she was coming and saying ‘come on, today we do twelve hours’ – morning, afternoon, night. She was strong. But then oh my word, not seeing the money at the end of it. We were getting £600 but we would have been getting more if they were honest people. And we didn’t understand if they were paying the tax for us. We didn’t understand nothing about it, about what they were doing.

Meanwhile, Mabel recalled feeling ‘devastated’ when finding out that there were wages missing for the second time in several months in one warehouse position, saying how she ‘had plans’:

I was going to pay back a friend who had been helping me, lending me money and putting herself in trouble. But then I was hoping to save something and be able to think ahead. I had ideas about treating my family; that’s what I wanted to do ultimately – so something nice, and that’s why I had chosen to work extra hours. But because of this, these plans had to be put to one side. They still are.

At the same time, the emotional costs of wage theft were bound together with an awareness of the way it could operate as a form of control, highlighted above. And reflecting on being over-charged for travel to and from work, for example, Eva noted how ‘when you work for them, you open yourself up to using the services put on by them and becoming reliant on them as you have no other choice if you are going to do the job – even though you know they are over-charging you’. Or, in another context, Richard pointed out how ‘struggling financially means you need the job even more, so it becomes a cycle. You become vulnerable to particular forms of treatment’. Wage theft, he continued, is ‘not just about the theft of money. It is about more than that.’

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# SECTION 4: UNDERSTANDING WAGE THEFT

As the above discussion has indicated, wage theft can and in many cases does have significant impacts on those victimised. Time is stolen from workers (Snider, 2001), in many cases quite literally away from being able to be with friends, families, loved ones. Workers are impacted materially, the consequences of which can affect people's ability to afford food, house themselves and ultimately live. Among the most startling forms of wage theft that interviewees here emphasised was someone not being paid three month's wages by an employment agency, having worked through them as a cleaner: wages which the worker has now resigned herself to having 'lost forever'. But such events should not be divorced from the myriad forms of wage theft which – although not as flagrant – occur alongside them: the grinding incidences of stealing which, while smaller in isolation, cumulatively add up. And it is against this backdrop, that in at least certain instances, wage theft is experienced as a form of violence.

As such, it is against such backdrops that the specific contours of wage theft experienced by migrant workers interviewed here can be read. For they provide indicative evidence of the ways that immigration control, its regulation and the regulation of migrant labour itself intersect with these dynamics and shape the conditions for wage theft to take place. For 'three months I am taking the bus going to work', explained Eva, for example, 'sometimes Monday to Sunday':

But then they say your work was rubbish so you get no pay. That's what they say. But where do you go to complain? I did that and he [her employer] threatened to sack me. He said there's many more people 'like me' [subject to immigration control] who need the job, and am I going to risk losing it? He said he could pick the phone up and call immigration to investigate all his workers any time he wanted.

Similarly, Taye recounted the withdrawal of wages related to a workplace injury where:

This guy was working beside me and using the product for cleaning and it went in my eye. So I took my glasses and I don't know what happened but my glasses got crushed and my eyes turned red and were really hurt. But because I couldn't perform anymore they wouldn't pay me – not even to the end of the shift I was working – and when I said I would complain he threatened my job. He said I needed to keep my head down. He said 'what are you going to do? Think about how hard it was to get this job. Think about what you have to lose'.

Indeed, as interviewees repeatedly pointed out, it was ambiguity about immigration status and precarity on the one hand, and the regulation of working conditions on the other, that was frequently utilised by employers as leverage for wage theft. And at a point where immigration enforcement is given far greater priority than labour rights enforcement (Kenway, 2021) this is hardly surprising. For it is this regulatory framework which has one role in fostering conditions for the stealing of wages. Some 696 penalties totalling £13.2 million were issued by HMRC to employers not paying

workers the minimum wage in 2021/22, for example (Department for Business & Trade, 2023: 6). But across 2022, 1,105 penalties were issued to employers employing undocumented workers, totalling £16 million (Home Office, 2023). Or put another way, the penalties for enforcement activity targeting migrant workers seen as 'immigration offenders' outstripped those from regulatory activities ostensibly protecting all workers against wage theft. Of course, this is a crude measure. But what it does indicate is that enforcement targeting the presence and immigration status of migrant workers is afforded far greater priority, in real terms, than enforcement ostensibly ensuring legal rights of not just migrant workers, but all workers.

Set against the analysis developed here, then, wage theft frequently operates as a way of extracting extra surplus value from the labour process, and simultaneously one strategy among others for managing workforces and as a form of labour control. It can operate as a mechanism for effecting control of employees and a form of labour discipline utilised to lock employees into dependence. As a body of work has attested, 'deportability', the potential threat of deportability and the fear of deportability are powerful factors shaping explicit workplace abuses (De Genova, 2002; Öberg, 2015), and this is something interviewees here reiterated. For instance, Mariam noted that when she was working close to the maximum hours she was legally allowed to (20 hours) as an international student, her employer warned her that she 'might get reported' if going over this limit, but by stealing her wages left her needing to work extra hours to make up for this shortfall: a situation which left her especially wary of attempting to recover what had been taken. Meanwhile, interviewees frequently emphasised that the financial precarity imposed by being subject to immigration control itself simultaneously had the capacity to force migrant workers into potentially greater reliance on employers, and reinforce the financial costs of wage theft indicated above. For example, Taye drew attention to the extortionate fees imposed on those subject to immigration control (for discussion, see Burnett and Chebe, 2020) – including the combined costs of the annual health surcharge, visa renewals and saving up to potentially secure leave to remain – stating that these charges cost his family thousands of pounds per year, and left him 'needing every penny I can get'.

Indeed, this, in many ways, is the point. Wage theft is not a new phenomenon, and nor is it confined to particular segments of labour markets, or to particular workers. However, the parameters of immigration control and its regulation are among the factors which can foster the conditions for wage theft in specific ways, and among these, it is the temporality of migrant workers and the precarity embedded within this which is leveraged, and ensures that the logics of wage do not just stop at expropriation, but operate on multiple levels at once. This is keenly understood by workers, who recognise its functions and the specific political and economic relations fostering the conditions for it to take place largely unchecked. What it points to is the need for community based solidarity and movements intervening to combat specific incidences of wage theft, while organising simultaneously to challenge and radically transform the legal and political frameworks and broader political economy which enable it to flourish. This Briefing Paper aims to contribute to this process.

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# METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

## METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This briefing paper draws from the accounts of ten migrant workers in West Yorkshire who have had parts of their wages stolen by employers while working in various positions between 2018 and 2023. Each of the people providing these accounts were in contact with Migrant Action, initially through semi-structured interviews carried out in 2023. These interviews took place on the premises of a migrants' rights organisation. Exploring themes around experiences of wage theft, interview questions were framed interpretively, moving between understandings and of wage theft, its consequences, its functions (within workplaces and more broadly), its contexts, its regulation and strategies of resistance. In this way, initial questions were starting points only, and springboards for broader, and further discussion to elaborate and explore the data. Interviews were coded and analysis and synthesis of thematic patterns was iterative and cumulative.

Ethical concerns were foregrounded throughout this process, cognisant of the specific context within which the research took place. Each of the participants were informed about the research after approaching this organisation for support. As such it was imperative that in the process of obtaining informed consent, all information provided made clear that engaging or not in the research would have no bearing on the 'case work' support that the organisation offers. At the same time, while it was made clear that the research intended to explore the parameters of wage theft and support the organisation's broader aims of engaging in struggles for justice, it was equally set out that one-to-one support offered by the organisation through its 'case work' was not linked to the research specifically. This was deemed essential, in order to ensure clarity that participants had autonomy in interviews over what to discuss (or not). Further, interviewees were informed if there was any issue which discussed which they would like to take forward with the organisation in terms of 'case work', they were welcome to do so.

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Profit, power and control: the theft of migrant workers' wages in England

# APPENDIX

## APPENDIX

Appendix: interview respondents and experiences of wage theft (all names are synonyms)

<b>NAME</b>	<b>AGE</b>	<b>INDUSTRIES EMPLOYED WHERE WAGE THEFT EXPERIENCED (NB – SOME INTERVIEWEES HAD WORKED MULTIPLE JOBS IN THE SAME INDUSTRY)</b>	<b>REGIONS WHERE WAGE THEFT EXPERIENCED</b>	<b>WORKING AT TIME OF INTERVIEW</b>
<b>AJANI</b>	25–34	Construction	London, Yorkshire and the Humber	Yes
<b>CHAPMAN</b>	35–44	Cleaning Retail Warehousing	North West Yorkshire and the Humber	Yes
<b>EVA</b>	35–44	Cleaning Factory	East of England Midlands Yorkshire and the Humber	No
<b>FIRASH</b>	25–34	Warehousing Catering Construction	North West Yorkshire and the Humber	Yes
<b>MABEL</b>	45–54	Factory Hospitality and Tourism Warehousing Retail	London, Yorkshire and the Humber	Yes
<b>MARIAM</b>	25–34	Construction Warehousing Hospitality and Tourism	London, North West Yorkshire and the Humber	Yes
<b>MICHELLE</b>	35–44	Factory Warehousing Retail	London, Yorkshire and the Humber	Yes
<b>RICHARD</b>	25–34	Cleaning Construction Warehousing	East of England Yorkshire and the Humber	No
<b>SARAH</b>	35–44	Factory Warehouse Cleaning	South East, South West, Yorkshire and the Humber	Yes
<b>TAYE</b>	45–54	Cleaning Factory Retail Warehousing	Midlands Yorkshire and the Humber	Yes