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Jenny Macleod

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Chanak and the Memory of Gallipoli: A British Crisis of Cultural Demobilisation

Jenny Macleod

School of Humanities, University of Hull, Hull, UK

ABSTRACT

The Chanak crisis of September-October 1922 brought the British government to the brink of international warfare. Although Britain observes 11 November 1918 as the end of the First World War, perhaps it is Chanak that truly marks the end of Britain's Greater War. Echoing the strategic considerations that had prompted the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, and with many of the same political leaders involved (Kemal, Lloyd George, Churchill, Hughes, Massey), Chanak prompted a domestic and imperial crisis and demonstrated the limits of cynical uses of memory. This article uses Chanak to explore how cultural demobilisation intersects with diplomacy and statecraft.

KEYWORDS

Chanak; Gallipoli; First World War; demobilisation

The Chanak crisis of September-October 1922 brought the British government to the brink of international warfare. This moment came at the end of a turbulent few 'post-war' years for the United Kingdom, Europe and the wider world. Although Britain observes 11 November 1918 as the end of the First World War, perhaps it is Chanak that truly marks the end of Britain's Greater War. When Lord Balfour[1] spoke at the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva in September 1922 during the crisis, he described the First World War as a continuing phenomenon that was only just nearing its end: 'The League was not armed with machinery capable of ending the great war, of which the calamitous struggle now proceeding was *probably the last episode*'.[2] The crisis focused attention on a location – Gallipoli and the Dardanelles – where the British had launched its invasion of the Ottoman Empire seven years earlier. In 1922 many of the same men were in key leadership positions, some of the same strategic considerations pertained, and yet the outcome was very different. It prompted a domestic and imperial crisis and demonstrated the

CONTACT Jenny Macleod j.macleod@hull.ac.uk School of Humanities, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, UK

limits of cynical uses of memory. This article uses Chanak to explore how cultural demobilisation intersects with diplomacy and statecraft.

The Chanak crisis was short lived: a few tense weeks between 15 September and 11 October 1922 when it seemed possible that Britain might go to war against Turkish forces at Chanak, a town on the Asian coast of the Dardanelles straits. Since its defeat in the First World War, and the peace settlement, the Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August 1920, the sprawling Ottoman Empire had been dismembered. The victorious powers had occupied strategic locations including the imperial capital, Constantinople, and the small outpost at Chanak. Meanwhile, Greek forces amongst others had invaded to seize further territory. But even before Sèvres was signed by representatives of the legacy Ottoman regime, Mustafa Kemal was galvanising nationalist Turkish forces. By early September 1922, his forces had swept away the invaders. His dominant position was made apparent to the world in the brutal death toll amidst the burning of the cosmopolitan port city of Smyrna, the last bastion of the Greek presence in Anatolia.

Kemal's forces then rapidly moved up to the British line at Chanak on 23 September. Confident in the strength of their military position, they indicated that they did not intend to initiate a violent confrontation.[3] The French and Italian forces on site withdrew, but Britain decided to take a stand. The British Cabinet sent reinforcements and contacted Dominion governments to request more men. They then issued an ultimatum to Kemal, but the local commander, General Charles Harington, sensing the possibility of negotiation, chose not to deliver it, and instead secured an end to the crisis through an agreement with the Kemalists reached at Mudania.[4] From there, diplomacy moved rapidly. France had already negotiated with the Kemalists through the Franklin-Bouillon agreement of 1921, and then a further inconclusive conference in Paris in March 1922 indicated the Allies' willingness to re-negotiate the post-war settlement.[5] With the final flurry of belligerence at Chanak out of the way, negotiations opened at Lausanne to replace the Sèvres treaty on 20 November 1922.

The idea of a Greater War concluding at Lausanne in 1923 has gained credence in recent historiography. A global war such as the First World War with its diverse array of belligerents along with the destabilising impact of sustained total warfare could never have ended neatly with an armistice in a single theatre. Robert Gerwarth argues that the periodisation of the war focused on 1918 as an end point only works from the point of view of Britain and France.[6] Even then, the revolutions, civil wars and paramilitary violence unleashed across Europe from 1917 onwards which Gerwarth explores, also require us to consider Britain within this extended chronology. British soldiers intervened in the Russian Civil War between 1918 and 1920. More significantly, the United Kingdom was torn apart and remade as a result of the Irish War of Independence between 1919 and 1921. Richard Grayson's work has located it

within a series of interconnected 'Great Wars', tracing Dubliners' military service from 1914 through to 1923 and beyond.[7] Events in Ireland were themselves part of a wider 'crisis of empire' stretching into 1922 that is sometimes treated as the end point for British imperial histories focused on the tumult of the initial post war years.[8] More recently, however, works such as Varnava's *British Cyprus and the Long Great War* situated its history of the internal dynamics of the island and the empire within an extended timeframe (reaching here to 1925 when Cyprus became a Crown Colony) in order to better understand competing loyalties and long term ramifications of the war.[9] This article also seeks to contribute to locating British imperial history within this chronology of the war through this snapshot of a momentous crisis.

Moreover, a focus on war beyond this British perspective, and particularly approaches that centre the Ottoman Empire also demands a different chronology. David Fromkin, whilst exploring the actions of European diplomats in regard to the Middle East took his time frame as 1914–1922.[10] Gerwarth and Manela extend the chronology even further, arguing that: 'the paroxysm of 1914–1918 was the epicentre of a cycle of armed imperial conflict that began in 1911 with the Italian invasion of Libya and […] continued unabated until 1923, when the Treaty of Lausanne defined the territory of the new Turkish Republic'.[11] Indeed, Lausanne has lately been the focus of renewed interest, but conceptualised as an integral part of not just what Tusan calls 'the slow motion ending of the war between 1918 and 1923', but of a greater war in both a geographical and chronological sense.[12] As such Lausanne's significance in creating the new alignments of the Middle East, and as Kieser argues, rewarding revisionist violence and paving the way for proto-fascism, is brought into sharper relief.[13] Lausanne thus emerges as the pivotal moment between war and peace. The moment which swept away the last remaining opposition to that thoroughgoing re-negotiation of the First World War peace treaty for the Ottoman Empire was Chanak.

The political crisis provoked by Chanak brought the final death knell of Britain's wartime political culture. The coalition government was first formed in May 1915 and steadily reconstituted thereafter, notably with the elevation of Lloyd George to No 10 Downing Street in December 1916. Once the armistice on the Western Front was secured, this political marriage of convenience caused a split in the Liberal party when Lloyd George and some other Liberals continued their cooperation with the Conservatives at the general election in December 1918. The resulting government lasted until 1922 when the Chanak crisis brought to a head broader concerns about Lloyd George's leadership, electoral calculations, and fundamental foreign policy contradictions between the two parties.[14] Since the revolution, Lloyd George had broadly aligned with a Liberal acceptance of some Russian aspirations in the Near East, and combined it with philhellenism; whereas anti-Bolshevism loomed larger for the Conservatives, for whom Turkey therefore posed a useful

buffer against Russia.[15] Ultimately, short on support within parliament, running out of policy steam, and beset by political scandal,[16] Lloyd George was expelled from office following a Conservative backbench revolt.[17] Once the dominant force in late Victorian and Edwardian politics, this was the ignominious end of the Liberal party's experience of power which inaugurated nearly a century in the political wilderness for its successors.[18] Chanak had a seismic impact on British politics.

That view is not endorsed uniformly in the historiography. Darwin downplayed Chanak's political significance. He dismissed the most febrile interpretations of Lloyd George's leadership of the crisis, pointing to the Cabinet unity and subsequent continuity on the key issue of the freedom of the Straits.[19] But Arnold-Forster had argued earlier that it 'rocked the Empire', marking the de facto independence of the Dominions that subsequently became de jure with the 1931 Statute of Westminster.[20] Its potential significance, according to Ferris, was even more pointed. In Ferris' terms it was 'the gravest strategic crisis between 1918 and 1938' which nearly caused the start of a Second World War, given the likelihood that a British conflict with Turkey would rapidly draw in the USSR.[21] This is an overstatement: Britain was isolated in the international community in its stated willingness to use force to resolve the crisis, and therefore the scope for Britain to escalate the crisis was inherently limited. More recent scholarship has emphasised the internal and ultimately terminal contradictions in British coalition diplomacy, Macarthur-Seal, using intelligence sources, reveals the extent of Lloyd George's mendacity in promoting Greek expansion in Asia Minor.[22] Toye & Thomas have explored Chanak as the 'highest point of Franco-British imperial tension after 1919'.[23] In doing so, they looked at imperial rhetoric and that combination of cultural and diplomatic history is extended here. This article contends that the firmest claim to the significance of Chanak arises from its imperial consequences from the Australian point of view, it therefore makes sense to place the 1922 crisis in the Dardanelles in the context of the imperial memory of earlier events in that location. The Gallipoli campaign of 1915 was vividly recalled as the birth of a nation in Australia and New Zealand.[24] The attempted instrumentalisation of that memory in 1922 provoked significantly different reactions in these two Dominions: confirmation of Gerwarth and Manela's key argument that the First World War should be seen 'not simply as a war between European nation-states but also, and perhaps primarily, as a war among global empires'.[25] Chanak was an intersecting political, diplomatic and imperial crisis.

The political crisis leading to the collapse of the coalition government in Britain may be viewed as the final demobilisation of its wartime political culture, whilst the wider imperial crisis may be viewed as the last moments of cultural demobilisation. Adam Seipp has identified cultural demobilisation as one of four component parts in the process of restoring peace at the end of war (the others being physical, economic, and bureaucratic demobilisation).

He explains that the diffuse process of cultural demobilisation 'refers to both the ending of state-sponsored or supported advocacy designed to develop and maintain popular enthusiasm for armed conflict and the recognition among civil society that the need for such enthusiasm has ended'.[26] In the Chanak crisis, much of the Empire as well as British civil society demonstrated no enthusiasm for renewed armed conflict, even whilst Lloyd George and Churchill pulled rhetorical levers referencing the sacrifices at Gallipoli aiming to build support for it.

Parallels Between the Dardanelles and Gallipoli (1915) and Chanak (1922)

There are many points of comparison between the situation in 1922 and the 1915–16 Gallipoli campaign, not least the location and the personnel involved. When the Chanak crisis arose, a small British garrison was located in the town of Chanak (present day Çannakkale) on the Dardanelles straits and there was also a British/French/Italian/Greek occupation force in Constantinople (Istanbul, capital of the former Ottoman Empire, but no longer the seat of government for the emergent Turkish Republic). Constantinople and the straits had been the focus of Great Power jockeying for position pre-1914. In 1915 Britain and France launched a naval assault on the straits and then an amphibious invasion on the adjacent Gallipoli peninsula. Winston Churchill, then the First Lord of the Admiralty, had been a keen advocate of this action, whilst Lloyd George as a prominent member of the Cabinet always tended to support innovative schemes away from the stalemate of the Western Front. By 1922, Lloyd George had been Prime Minister for almost seven years, whilst Churchill, whose career had been temporarily eclipsed by the defeat at Gallipoli, was the Secretary of State for the Colonies. There was significant consistency in the leadership of the Dominions in this phase as well, with Billy Hughes as Prime Minister of Australia and William Massey as Prime Minister of New Zealand both having been in office since the outset of the Gallipoli campaign. Yet there was also momentous change: since the important and perhaps underrated role of Irish soldiers at Gallipoli,[27] the country had won its independence from the United Kingdom through rebellion, the ballot box and guerilla war.[28] The Irish Civil War was ongoing at the time of the Chanak crisis.[29] Meanwhile, in facing seeming threat from a force led by Mustafa Kemal, who had made his name as an inspirational commander in 1915, it is little wonder that parallels to Gallipoli and its costs readily sprung to mind.

Some of the fundamental strategic motivations were similar too. First, there was the overarching issue of Britain and France as multi-ethnic empires. Both countries were jockeying for power and influence in the region throughout this period and were mindful of the impact of their actions on the rest of their empires. In 1922, the risk of inflaming Muslim opinion in North Africa was one of the reasons cited by the French government for not threatening

Turkey, conversely, the British government sought to maintain its pre-eminence over its Muslim subjects through its belligerence.[30] The more pressing issue, however, was independence of movement through the Dardanelles, much as it had been in 1915. As Lloyd George told the Cabinet on 7 September, the Gallipoli peninsula on the European side of the straits 'was the most important strategic position in the world'.[31] In 1915 the driving concern had been to maintain access to Imperial Russia's wheat exports and to draw the Ottoman threat away from Egypt.[32] Its importance remained a point of general agreement in 1922.[33]

If both Britain and France had important interests in the Near East in both 1915 and 1922, it was Britain that had always pushed for decisive action against the Ottomans/Turks. In 1915, France joined the action at the Dardanelles as a 'docile supernumerary',[34] but in 1922 France refused to act belligerently, much to the angst of the British.[35] These different outcomes point to the transformation in the strategic context in the region. The punitive Treaty of Sèvres, finalised in 1920, had dismantled the sprawling Ottoman Empire, carving up vast swathes of its territory between new states, neighbouring states' claims and imperial mandates. The Ottoman Empire may have been defeated overall in 1914–18, but it was victorious at Gallipoli and the Dardanelles in 1915, and its putative successor state had achieved a string of victories. Much of this was due to the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who established the pre-eminence of his leadership in the rump state of Turkey and created a new capital in Ankara. His army drove out French, Armenian and Greek forces from Anatolia and European Turkey between 1919 and 1922. The final decisive defeat of the Greek Army led to the capture of Smyrna (Izmir), and the northwards movement of Turkish forces towards the neutral zone of the Dardanelles straits.[36] In contrast to 1915, then, the Allies were on the defensive and divisions swiftly emerged between them. A revision of the Sèvres peace settlement had already been the subject of negotiations between the Allied Powers and the Turks in March 1921,[37] and then in October France made its own agreement with Kemal to withdraw French forces from Cilicia in the south of the country, and to recognise Kemal's government.[38] The British continued to consider the Sultan's government as the legitimate authority in Turkey. Cracks in the alliance were therefore starting to show, but all of the Allies remained committed to the neutrality of the Dardanelles straits as a fundamental goal. What changed was the position of Greece.

Thus a vital difference in the strategic circumstances of 1922 in comparison to 1915 was that the Turkish armed forces were in the ascendant. In spring and early summer 1921, Greece was still to be given Eastern Thrace and Smyrna/Izmir was to be under the administration of the League of Nations.[39] Turkey's defeat of Greece had radically altered the calculations of what diplomatic outcomes were feasible. It rendered impossible Lloyd George's promotion of Greek territorial ambitions within Thrace. He had encouraged

them on, and had even acted secretly to undermine his foreign secretary's efforts to resolve the Greco-Turkish war in 1921.[40] The absolute failure of his policy represented by the Chanak crisis was recognised in the British press: 'the hopeless situation which confronts him [Lloyd George] and this country in the Near East. *He and he alone is responsible for it*'.[41] His domestic political isolation resulted because gains for Greece were not a fundamental strategic interest for Britain. As the *Daily Mail* pointedly argued in an editorial early in the crisis, 'The only British interest in Constantinople is the Freedom of the Straits'.[42]

A final note about what was *not* part of the strategic issues informing the Chanak crisis: humanitarian concerns.[43] In 1915, the invasion at Gallipoli provoked the first stages of the Armenian Genocide, but consideration was never given to intervention in this wider aspect of the war. In 1922, reports of atrocities during the Greco-Turkish War or after the capture of Smyrna by Turkey – with deaths in the city ranging from 12,000 to 30,000 in September 1922[44] – were widely published[45] and witnessed from the quayside by British and foreign troops.[46] Lloyd George and Churchill were appalled by the violence there, but it was realpolitik regarding the straits and a future negotiating position rather than humanitarian concerns which drove the consideration of intervention by British forces. The likelihood of further atrocities was only considered in terms of the need to ensure order in the eventual planning for a handover of the civil administration in Eastern Thrace.[47] This marked, as Tusan argues, the 'symbolic end' of the British impetus to intervene on behalf of Christian minority populations in the Near East that dated back to the days of Gladstone.[48]

Hence the most important difference in the strategic context is that Chanak was part of a failed diplomatic end game of a world war, whereas Gallipoli was the first salvo in the Allied war on the Ottoman empire. In 1914–15 when discussion of attacking at the Dardanelles was underway, there was no thought of negotiating a suitable outcome – the rubicon of declaring war had been crossed, and the use of force was the tool to be used. Britain was in the process of mobilising all the resources of the Empire. That led to 132,175 casualties for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and 250,000 Ottoman casualties.[49] By contrast, in 1922, the process of demobilisation had been underway for four years and diplomacy had taken centre stage. But would the memory of those earlier casualties, which included 7,825 Australian and 2,445 New Zealand dead, affect the final stages of cultural demobilisation?

Chanak, Memory & Cultural Demobilisation

On 15 September 1922 the British government decided to 'take steps to safeguard the neutral zone of the Straits against the Turkish menace'.[50] Acting without the Cabinet's knowledge, Lloyd George and Churchill then decided

to add the rhetorical top dressing of an emotional appeal to the losses of 1915 in their pronouncements.[51] Accordingly, Churchill wrote to the Governors General of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (and to the Officer Administering the Government of Newfoundland in similar terms the following day) explaining the decision and enquiring:

> I should be glad to know whether the Government of [Dominion/Commonwealth/Dominion/Union] wish to associate themselves with our action and whether they desire to be represented by a contingent. Not only does the freedom of the Straits for which such immense sacrifices were made in the War involve vital Imperial and world wide interests, but we cannot forget that there are 20,000 British and Anzac graves in the Gallipoli Peninsula and that it would be an abiding source of grief to the Empire if these were to fall into the ruthless hands of the Kemalists.[52]

This was an extraordinarily emotive way to frame the issue at hand. By 1922, Australia's and New Zealand's tradition of commemorating the invasion of the peninsula each Anzac Day was firmly established, articulating a distinctive national identity, profound grief, and tremendous pride thereby. In the contexts of both the antipodean commitment to this 'sacred' place and concern over the orderly stewardship of this area, there had been repeated diplomatic interventions to safeguard these graves from 1916 onwards. But such interventions were concerned with inspection of the graves and the facilitation of the work of what became the Imperial War Graves Commission.[53] Churchill's call to arms over the issue was of a different order of magnitude and therefore bound to provoke a strong reaction. A statement of British policy was published on 16th September,[54] presumably to amplify the sabre-rattling towards Kemal.

Toye & Thomas, taking their cue from the derision of an E.M. Forster article[55] in October 1922, term the rhetorical reference to the losses of 1915 the 'Graves of Gallipoli' argument. It had a mixed effect. The rhetoric found its most powerful response in New Zealand. Always the most loyal Dominion, the memory of fallen New Zealand men in the ANZAC (Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) contingent who had died at Gallipoli had become a highly emotive strand in the country's identity, commemorated with solemn sincerity each year.[56] Such was the alacrity of New Zealand's response, it threatened to race ahead of London's diplomatic posturing. The New Zealand Prime Minister, Massey, replied very rapidly with the offer of a contingent.[57] When subsequently discussing the matter in New Zealand's House of Representatives on 19 September, he stressed the importance of the freedom of the straits, and then deployed the Graves of Gallipoli argument:

> The bones of 20,000 British dead lie on the hills of Gallipoli, and it would be to our eternal disgrace if we allowed that strip of territory, with all those hallowed memories attached to it – nothing less than sacrilege to allow the Turk to have access to our graves and to tread the soil which covers our gallant dead.[58]

The opposition amendment demanding that New Zealand's parliament and people should have been consulted before the government had consented to support Britain's actions was handily defeated.[59]

It was not just within New Zealand's political class that the 'Graves of Gallipoli' resonated. Multiple New Zealand newspapers published editorials on 18 September indicating a near automatic willingness to serve in response to the call from Britain, accepting the (rather thin) explanation of the strategy, and repeating *and expanding upon* the Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric. See for example, the response in *Southland Times*:

> The answer to the call in the Great War will be repeated if the summons goes forth, because the young manhood of the Dominion will regard such an expedition as a sacred duty cast on them by the glorious memory of those brothers who sleep in Anzac graves, the sanctity which the advance of the Turks threatens.[60]

Newspaper editorials such as this one mirrored the response from the veteran community. The New Zealand Returned Services Association immediately offered the government its 'emphatic support' to 'conserve Imperial interests in the Near East and India'.[61] Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric also had a powerful impact on some would-be recruits who rushed to enrol, many of whom were too young to have served at Gallipoli in 1915.[62] By 20th September the Governor General, Lord Jellicoe, was reporting to Churchill that 5,000 men had registered as volunteers even before an official call had been issued.[63] On 21st September, *New Zealand Times* estimated that 10,000 volunteers had come forward including 128 nurses.[64] A day later, Jellicoe put the figures at 12,000 and 300 respectively.[65] In addition,

> offers of whole-hearted support had also been received from the YMCA, the Salvation Army […], the Returned Soldiers' Association, the South African War Veterans, the Auckland Soldiers' Mothers' League, the Wellington Patriotic Society, and others, and the Auckland Provincial Homing Pigeon Association.[66]

In New Zealand, then, Churchill's cynical use of the 'Graves of Gallipoli' instantly resonated. It was repeated by politicians and in newspaper articles, and it fed into an immediate practical response through volunteering.

Australia had a similar, perhaps even more passionate connection to Gallipoli[67] and received the same emotive message drawing the link between the present-day crisis at Chanak and the threat to the legacy of 1915. Initial public responses by politicians echoed some of his language. Walter Massy Greene, the Minister of Defence (17th September) stated,

> apart altogether from the serious issues which were involved in the situation in the Near East, the association of Gallipoli with the immortal deeds of the Anzacs and the hallowed memories that surrounded the resting places of so many Australians who fell in the never-to-be-forgotten struggle, would make a peculiar appeal to Australia to see that their resting places were never disturbed. He had no official

> notification from the British Government up to the present, but if it came he did not think there was any doubt what Australia's answer would be.[68]

In a statement that same evening, reported in the newspapers of Monday 18th September, the Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, also referenced the Graves of Gallipoli whilst taking care to link them to the more important strategic issue at hand:

> Mr Lloyd George emphasised in his telegram the gravity of the position, pointing out that altogether apart from the vital Imperial and world-wide interests involved in the freedom of the Straits for which such immense sacrifices were made in the war, Britain could not forget that the Gallipoli Peninsula contained over 20,000 British and Anzac graves, and that these should fall into the ruthless hands of the Kemalists would be an abiding source of grief to the Empire.[69]

In reporting the news from London, some Australian newspapers referenced this rhetoric in their subsidiary headlines, for example *Express and Telegraph*'s 'Gallipoli / British Decision / Appeal to the Dominions / Immortal Memory of the Anzacs'[70] or *Sunraysia Daily*'s 'Britain Calls the Dominions / To Guard the Ground Made Sacred By Their Dead in Turkey / Allies Order Kemalists to Respect the Neutral Zone'.[71] The following day, the *Newcastle Morning Herald and Advocate* was alarmed and alarmist. It used Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric as a springboard for anticipating religious hatred, desecration, and a wider Mahomedan uprising around the world:

> It is not merely the defence of the sacred soil of Gallipoli, where thousands of brave Australians are buried, which is at stake, although that would be sufficient ground for the appeal to Australia. The possibility of these cemeteries being despoiled and defiled by racial and religious hatred could not be calmly contemplated in the country which has given birth to the Anzacs. Too many memories of poignant sorrow are associated with the names of that ancient Thracian peninsula for its desecration to be permitted.[72]

Although this was the most overwrought commentary that day, there were quite a few Australian newspapers which found the emotional call to arms to be rousing and linked it to a wider concern about losing the strategic gains that had been made.[73]

However, other Australian newspapers ignored the febrile rhetoric or rejected its intended consequences. The *Sydney Morning Herald*'s editorial chose not to take the rhetorical bait and discussed the nature of the crisis in sober terms on 18th September.[74] The mixed rhetorical picture continued the following day on 19th September. The *Singleton Argus* discussed the 'grave situation' and alluded to the sacrifices of the war without turning to the most emotive language:

> It will mean, for one thing, that the Allies' sacrifices at the Dardanelles will go for nothing, and to avoid this, at least, Britain is certain to have France and Italy with her in guarding the Straits and what are now neutral zones.[75]

Yet Adelaide's *Daily Herald* used the idea of sacrifices being made in vain to argue against further bloodshed,

> The sanctity of the spot must be preserved at all costs. From a sentimental point of view that sounds all right. But there is a practical side to the question that must not be overlooked. The practical side is that the sacrifices made by the men now lying on Gallipoli peninsula were made in vain. In view of these circumstances, the voice of the people should be heard in solemn protest against embarking on any more military expeditions.[76]

All told, then, initial reactions in Australia were marginally less likely than their New Zealand counterparts to take up the Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric, but the potential remained for political leadership to capitalise on the country's emotional investment in the region.

As in New Zealand, representatives from veterans' organisations responded positively to the call of duty, but were perhaps a little less eager. Colonel Vernon, the president of the New South Wales branch of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of Australia (RSSILA) referenced the legacy of Gallipoli but referencing the political status rather than its legendary position, avoided the most emotive rhetoric

> He was sure that, animated by the spirit of fair play regarding Gallipoli, returned soldiers would respond to any call that is made for their services. "We have dead buried there," he said, "the ground is neutral and we are going to keep it neutral".[77]

Mr Turnbull, acting Federal president of the RSSILA's statement tended to more purple prose, but still avoided the Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric:

> I do not hesitate to say that Australia's manhood, which answered the call during the hours of peril between 1914 and 1918, will again readily answer the Empire's call in the same loyal spirit.[78]

Although there was some anecdotal evidence of Australian interest in volunteering,[79] one report suggested that much of this was driven by unemployed men looking for work.[80] In any case, there was not much time for volunteering to swing into action before Billy Hughes had the chance to make the statement in the House of Representatives on 19 September 'that there was no necessity for a single enlistment. The situation was well in hand'.[81] Indeed, although Hughes had been one of the few to echo the Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric in the first instance, in distinct contrast to his New Zealand counterpart, he actively dampened down the comparatively limited enthusiasm for the cause thereafter. This political leadership seems to have been the crucial difference between the two countries.

An important factor here was the diplomatic faux pas that Churchill had committed. The publication of Britain's appeal occurred before the enquiry from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Australian government[82] (or the Canadian government)[83] had been received. As Hughes' private

correspondence with the British government shows, he was livid at the attempt to bounce Australia into action. He was outraged at the disrespect for imperial decision-making processes and maintained a keen sense of the strategic stakes. Hughes wrote an extended telegram to Lloyd George on 20th September:

> It is not right that a Dominion should be stampeded into action by premature statements in the press. […] Either the Empire is one and indivisible or it is nothing. If it is only another name for Britain, and the Dominions are to be told that things are done after they have been done […] all talk about the Dominions having a real share in deciding foreign and imperial policy is empty air. [84]

He continued:

> The Australian people are sick of war. In their view, except in defence of vital national interests is not only a blunder but a crime. While they fully recognise the importance of the freedom of the Straits and would be grieved and angry if the sanctity of Anzac graves in Gallipoli were violated, they have no sympathy whatever with King Constantine's ambitious projects.[85]

Hughes thought he was being hoodwinked in order to promote Greek territorial claims. Given the vociferous criticism and the fast-moving pace of the crisis which combined awkwardly with the technological limitations of global communications at that time, Churchill took to sending telegrams after each Cabinet where decisions had been taken. In them, he repeatedly explained how he was trying to inform Dominion politicians ahead of stories appearing in the press.[86] Despite his protestations, Hughes committed to sending troops if needed,[87] but no mobilisation process was undertaken. With a more sober public response, and a much sharper private one, Hughes' leadership shaped the Australian response, and contributed to the country's cultural demobilisation, whilst New Zealand, always the more straightforwardly loyal of the two Dominions (thinking, for example, of its wartime adoption of conscription[88]) was seemingly raring to go to war at a moment's notice.

If the call to return to defend the Dardanelles straits garnered rather different responses in the two countries which had invested so much emotion in the memory of Gallipoli, how did Lloyd George's and Churchill's invitation land in Dominions with a lesser or non-existent connection? Like New Zealand and Australia, Newfoundland had sent its men to Gallipoli. However, its very small contingent suffered comparatively minor losses there and the Newfoundland Regiment's searing experience on the first day of the Somme overshadowed their contribution to the later phases of the 1915 campaign.[89] It seems that the Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric was not echoed in the Newfoundland response, but the Prime Minister, Sir Richard Squires, did rapidly indicate that generalised patriotism meant that it would support action: 'Newfoundland does not want the British Empire to get into another row, but if there has to be a row we want to be in it'.[90] The private response to the Colonial Office was a little less emphatic. It was somewhat vague but loyal nonetheless: 'Ministers

appreciate position taken by His Majesty's Government and Allies and are in fullest sympathy therewith. I believe that as in past Newfoundland will be ready to render all assistance available'.[91] An editorial in St John's' *The Evening Advocate* explained some context: the extent of disillusionment with warfare and thus demobilisation in both the cultural and more literal sense.

> The four years of war dissipated a great deal of the fascination, and stern realities, while leaving us still loyal, brought home to us a feeling that sacrifice means suffering.
>
> […] none of the British Dominions will be found wanting if they are convinced that the cause is a just one.
>
> […] The military machine in Newfoundland is well nigh dismantled, the training ship of the Royal Naval Reserve is no more. We do not want either revived, if it be for the deadly purposes of horrible war, and we hope there will be no necessity to do so.[92]

Newfoundland's response was dutiful but lukewarm. Meanwhile, its media watched the response of its neighbour closely.

Canada was also a loyal member of the empire, but was more sceptical about the need for direct Canadian involvement at Chanak. With only limited ties to Gallipoli via a contingent of nurses,[93] and no tradition of commemorating the campaign, the nation's press commentary was essentially untouched by the Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric.[94] Although some newspapers took the view that Canada's service to Empire was automatic if Britain called and, accordingly, there were some limited reports of former soldiers' willingness to volunteer,[95] others newspapers doubted that the Empire's (and especially Canada's) interests were truly endangered, and commentators in Quebec were particularly sceptical.[96] Two days after the news of the invitation to the Dominions reached the press, Canada's Prime Minister Mackenzie King summoned his Cabinet committee.[97] Prior to that he complained to Lloyd George that the premature publication had caused a 'most embarrassing situation'.[98] The Cabinet Council concluded that there was insufficient information available to make a decision or to warrant recalling Parliament.[99] Mackenzie King's diary entry a week later reveals his scorn for the stance of the British government and some of the more patriotic elements in the Canadian press:

> It wd seem that the Br. Govt. had gone too far and have had to restrain their action somewhat. The absurdity of the jingoism of a part of our press lies in their appeal to the Treaty of Sevres which does not exist, & to driving the Turk out of Constantinople which Britain now proposes to restore to him. The whole question has narrowed down to maintaining the freedom of the Dardanelles and it is for this that Canada is being asked to be prepared to go to war![100]

No Canadian promise of support was made during the crisis.

South Africa's response was even more cool. The *Cape Times* was reported in London as arguing 'there is no specially urgent question of the Union sending a contingent to the Dardanelles' and that the matter should be referred to the

League of Nations.[101] It took ten days for a formal reply from the Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, who explained to Lloyd George by telegram,

> I regret that an answer to your message of September 15th has been delayed by my absence on tour in inaccessible part of the Union. In the meantime position appears to have altered materially for the better and no longer to call for the active intervention of the Union.[102]

The other major military power in the British Empire was India. It had made a significant contribution to the First World War, including sending 15,000 troops to Gallipoli.[103] In March 1921, India's Legislative Assembly had passed a resolution against deploying the Indian Army outside of India, save for very limited exceptions.[104] No attempt was therefore made to involve India in the Chanak crisis; it featured only as a cause for concern amongst British politicians who worried that action against Turkey might arouse unrest.[105] *The Times* reported sharp criticism in the Indian press of the 'Graves of Gallipoli' call to the Dominions. *The Times of India* was reported as saying

> With appeals which are of a semi-sentimental character and have no bearing on the present situation is rather like using a steam hammer to crush a fly.[106]

Perhaps surprisingly, given its belligerent and jingoistic reputation, the most vociferous newspaper criticism of Chanak came from Britain's *Daily Mail*. Its proprietor Lord Rothermere had become distrustful of Lloyd George's government by this stage.[107] Many of its articles, particularly those by its correspondent on the spot in Smyrna, George Ward Price (himself a veteran war correspondent from the tail end of the Gallipoli campaign) [108] were quoted in Australian newspapers.[109] The *Daily Mail* was stridently critical of the government's policy regarding Chanak. In a strongly worded editorial on 18 September, 'Stop this New War!',[110] it described the Government's moves to send reinforcements to the Near East as bordering upon 'insanity' which has 'no other purpose than to cover up Mr Lloyd George's irreparable blunders'. It reserved particular ire for the use of the Graves of Gallipoli rhetoric. It described the sending of the 'Fiery Cross' to the Dominions as 'astonishing': 'We trust the Dominions will flatly refuse to be entangled in another disastrous military enterprise'.[111] Beyond the *Daily Mail*, the British press demonstrated its derision for the 'Graves of Gallipoli' rhetoric. *The New Statesman* described it as 'that base device of raking up the soldiers' graves' and 'mischievous incitements to jingoism'.[112] *The Nation and The Athenaeum* commented acerbically,

> Apparently, there are not enough graves on Gallipoli. Probably some vague gambler's idea agitated the mind of the political underworld that it is a good policy, when you have lost, to double the stakes; or perhaps it was the old trick of the politician to hide the tracks of one's own follies by raising blind war-passions. The trick has not worked.[113]

By contrast, and somewhat surprisingly given the newspaper's antipathy towards Lloyd George, *The Times* was unusual in supporting the government. On 16 September, it called for reinforcements to be sent to defend the Straits.[114] It nonetheless described the call to the Dominions as 'semi-official' and 'somewhat provocative', fearing its impact on the possibility of coordinating policy with the French government.[115] *The Manchester Guardian* accepted that there was 'still an odd job from the Great War left over to do, and a truculent minor enemy to remind that he was beaten in 1918',[116] but always preferred the issue to be resolved by the League of Nations and criticised Lloyd George's seemingly unilateral and hasty appeal:

> our Dominions, to whose support the Government, or its head, so heedlessly and prematurely appealed, gallant and loyal people who would help us to the last in any real pinch, but should not be appealed to except in a case most clear and under stress of perils most undoubted.[117]

Neither paper employed the heightened 'Graves of Gallipoli' rhetoric, preferring to focus on strategic issues and emphasising the relationship with France. Diplomatic relations with France were certainly difficult during the crisis, and the public reaction there indicated zero appetite for a return to this former theatre of war. The *Daily Mail*, potentially seeking to bolster its own vehement anti-war stance reported that criticism of British belligerency in five French newspapers including *La Liberté* which called 'The British statement "a warlike manifesto". France has no soldiers for any ill-considered and desperate adventures and certainly none for such ruinous folly'.[118]

The End of the Crisis and its Significance

The newspaper coverage of the Chanak crisis demonstrates the near complete cultural demobilisation of Britain. As *The New Statesman* commented on 23 September,

> The present crisis has accidentally revealed the truth. Mr Lloyd George is the first Prime Minister of this country whom even Fleet Street, let alone the nation, will not follow into war. This is the decisive comment upon his career. It should be his epitaph.[119]

Lloyd George's and Churchill's call to the empire was made primarily for rhetorical purposes, and in practice no Dominion forces were deployed to Chanak. British reinforcements were sent and tension in the area ratcheted up. Cabinet ministers met frequently – three times on 28th September, for example, the day that it was resolved to order General Harington, the commander on the spot to deliver an ultimatum and a pre-emptive strike. Harington, taking refuge in the time delay involved in the communications, effectively ignored this direct order and chose to continue with negotiations at Mudania.[120] An agreement was signed there on 11 October and tensions in the region dissipated. This

opened the door to the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres at Lausanne in 1923 which, save for the Mosul frontier, settled Turkey's borders and confirmed the defeat of Greece's (and Lloyd George's) extravagant ambitions in Eastern Thrace. As part of the treaty, Greece and Turkey agreed to a population exchange which caused further terrible bloodletting and death. The Graves of Gallipoli were confirmed as neutral ground to be administered by the Imperial War Graves Commission.[121] The freedom of the straits was finally resolved in the 1936 Treaty of Montreux with Turkey left to control the straits and able to close them in time of war. Most recently, this occurred in February 2022 in the response to war in Ukraine.

Meanwhile in Britain, tensions within the coalition government were brought to boiling point. At the peak of the crisis, Conservative leader Bonar Law wrote to *The Times* to argue that Britain couldn't act alone as the 'policeman of the world'.[122] Lloyd George remained belligerent, and a speech he made on 14 October[123] precipitated a growing rebellion from Unionist ministers, and on 19 October at a meeting at the Carlton Club, the Conservative party decided to withdraw from the coalition. This triggered a general election on 15 November which saw significant losses for Lloyd George's Liberal faction and installed the Conservatives as a government in its own right under Bonar Law. He was not the last Dominion leader to be brought down by Chanak and the Graves of Gallipoli. On 27 January 1923, Billy Hughes, acting unilaterally, warned the new British Secretary of State for the Colonies that a renewed Turkish threat to the Graves of Gallipoli which had arisen during the peace negotiations at Lausanne would be regarded as 'a casus belli'. He was effectively threatening that Australia would go to war by itself. It was the last straw for his party colleagues (following an election in December 1922 which had altered parliamentary dynamics) and Hughes resigned on 2 February 1923. His desire to assert Australian foreign policy autonomy had been taken too far.[124]

The Chanak crisis demonstrates the continuities of personnel, strategic concerns and belligerent attitudes from wartime. It also shows their limit and their end point. Appeals to the memory of wartime had only a limited impact, and diplomacy was determined in practice by the realities of military power on the ground and the extent of cultural demobilisation with Britain. There was no appetite within Britain beyond limited circles around Lloyd George for a renewal of warfare. Can Chanak be considered to be the end of Britain's First World War? When do wars end, then? To paraphrase Clausewitz, it is when politics can be continued without recourse to other means. The strategic issue of the freedom of the Straits retained its importance, but the appetite to resolve it through force had dissolved. As the *New York Times* remarked from its distant viewpoint: 'World weariness with war was never so extreme as today'.[125] Britain's cultural demobilisation was complete.

Notes

1. The former Prime Minister had been Foreign Secretary between 1916 and 1919, but by 1922 was continuing his interest in foreign affairs as Lord President of the Council and Britain's representative at the League of Nations; Mackay and Matthew, 'Balfour, Arthur James, First Earl of Balfour (1848–1930), Prime Minister and Philosopher'.
2. 'The League'. (My emphasis).
3. Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 550.
4. For an extended description of the crisis see chapter 45 of Martin Gilbert, *World in Torment.* Gilbert claims that the British Cabinet's belligerence had averted war (p.861).
5. Tusan, *The Last Treaty*, 200.
6. Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*, 4.
7. Grayson, *Dublin's Great Wars*.
8. For the classic exposition of the idea of a crisis of empire, see Gallagher, 'Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919–1922'. For British imperial history focused on this post-war era, see Jeffery, *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire* or Gilbert, *World in Torment*.
9. Varnava, *British Cyprus and the Long Great War*.
10. Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*.
11. Gerwarth and Manela, "The Great War as a Global War", 787.
12. Tusan, *The Last Treaty*, 198.
13. Kieser, *When Democracy Died*. See also, Winter, *The Day the Great War Ended* which is similarly interested in the world that came after Lausanne.
14. Sharp, "A Missed Opportunity?" 8.
15. Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 145.
16. Morgan, "George, David Lloyd, First Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor (1863–1945), Prime Minister".
17. Contrary to myth, the 1922 Committee of Conservative backbench MPs is not named after the pivotal meeting at the Carlton Club which prompted the end of the coalition, but instead is named after the intake of MPs at the subsequent general election, Ball, "The 1922 Committee", 130.
18. The successor party to the Liberals, the Liberal Democrats served in a coalition government with the Conservatives between 2010 and 2015.
19. Darwin, "The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet".
20. Arnold-Forster, "Chanak Rocks the Empire", 169. Bartrop, *Bolt from the Blue* adopts a similar line of argument.
21. Ferris, "Far Too Dangerous a Gamble"? 139, 163, 172–3.
22. Macarthur-Seal, "Intelligence and Lloyd George's Secret Diplomacy in the Near East, 1920–1922".
23. Thomas and Toye, *Arguing about Empire*, 122.
24. Ken Inglis' work pioneered the cultural history of the Anzacs and remains superlative within a now teeming field.
25. Gerwarth and Manela, "The Great War as a Global War", 788.
26. Seipp, *The Ordeal of Peace*, 8.
27. Macleod, *Gallipoli*, 143.
28. For an exploration of all these elements of Ireland's experience of war 1914–1923, see Grayson, *Dublin's Great Wars*.
29. Recent high-profile deaths in this conflict will have furthered the continuance of a wartime culture. The IRA murdered Lloyd George's former Chief of the Imperial

General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson in June 1922. Michael Collins, leader of the pro-Treaty faction in Ireland died in an ambush on 22 August 1922. During the Anglo-Irish treaty negotiations a year earlier, Lloyd George had threatened war to secure the deal. Jeffery, "Wilson, Sir Henry Hughes, Baronet (1864–1922)"; Hart, "Collins, Michael (1890–1922)".

30. Thomas and Toye, *Arguing about Empire*, 143.
31. TNA CAB 23/31/1 Cabinet conclusions, 7 September 1922, p.6.
32. Lambert, *The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster*.
33. TNA CAB 23/39/32 'Conclusions reached by a Conference of Ministers held on Wednesday September 20th, 1922 at 9.30pm', p.319.
34. Dutton, "Docile Supernumerary".
35. Curzon described the 'consistent treachery of France' on 7 September 1922 and spoke in similar terms on 6 October, London, The National Archives (TNA) CAB 23/31/01 'Cabinet Conclusions', p.2; CAB 23/31/11 'Cabinet Conclusions', p.273.
36. Erickson and Hook, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, 39–47.
37. Macarthur-Seal, "Intelligence and Lloyd George's Secret Diplomacy in the Near East, 1920–1922", 714.
38. Macmillan, *Peacemakers*, 460–61.
39. Güçlü, "Turkey's Entrance into the League of Nations", 187.
40. As the crisis unfolded, as Macarthur-Seal has demonstrated, Lloyd George was never more slippery than in his private use of intelligence reports and secret machinations to cling on to his ambitions for Greek advancement in Thrace and Anatolia. Macarthur-Seal, "Intelligence and Lloyd George's Secret Diplomacy in the Near East, 1920–1922", 714.
41. 'The Liquidation of Mr. Lloyd George'. Italics used in the original publication.
42. 'The Freedom of the Straits'.
43. 'Smyrna. A New Horror'. This was an appeal by the Save the Children Fund 'cordially approved by Lord Curzon on behalf of the British Government'.
44. Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*, 230–32, 242.
45. See, for example, 'British Officials Massacred by Turks in Smyrna'; 'Smyrna in Flames'; 'The Burning of Smyrna'.
46. Macmillan, *Peacemakers: Six Months That Changed the World*, 462.
47. TNA, CAB 23/31/12 'Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W. on Saturday 7th October, 1922 at 2.30pm', p.1.
48. Tusan, *Smyrna's Ashes*, 145–6. Tusan, *The Last Treaty*, 203–7 notes the extent to which the protection of minority populations were a concern in this phase, but the overall point stands.
49. Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth, 242; Göncü and Aldoğan, Siperin Ardı Vatan, 146.
50. TNA, CAB 23/31/2 'Conclusions of the Cabinet 15th September 1922', 54.
51. Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, subsequently explained he was 'astonished' to learn that Churchill and Lloyd George 'had between them settled the matter' without reference to Lord Curzon or the Foreign Office. CAB 21/334 Hankey to Chamberlain, Secret and Personal letter, 6th November 1933.
52. Churchill Archive, CHAR 22/15, 'Paraphrase of a Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors-General of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, 11.30pm 15th September 1922'.
53. Foster, *Sacred Space and Anglo-Turkish Relations*, 165–71.
54. CAB 21/334 Memo 'Recent Events', 2.

55. Forster, "Our Graves in Gallipoli". For detailed discussion of this article, see Roessel, "Live Orientals and Dead Greeks".
56. See, Macleod, *Gallipoli*, chapter 6.
57. Churchill Archive, CHAR 22/15, 'Paraphrase of Telegram from Governor General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dated 16th September 1922'.
58. 'Force for a War'.
59. Churchill Archive, CHAR 22/15, 'Paraphrase Telegram from Governor General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dated 20th September 1922'.
60. 'Call to Dominions'.
61. 'Dominion Aid'.
62. 'The Rush to the Colours'.
63. Churchill Archive, CHAR 22/15, 'Paraphrase telegram from the Governor General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dated 20th September 1922'.
64. 'Rush to the Colours'.
65. Churchill Archive, CHAR 17/28, 'Paraphrase telegram. Governor General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 22nd September 1922'.
66. 'Rush to the Colours'.
67. See, Macleod, *Gallipoli*, chapter 5.
68. 'A Peculiar Appeal to Australia'.
69. 'A Call to Arms'.
70. 'Gallipoli'.
71. 'Britain Calls the Dominions'.
72. 'The Appeal to Australia'.
73. See also, Ziino, *A Distant Grief*, 71–72.
74. 'A Call to the Empire'.
75. 'Grave Situation in the Near East'.
76. 'Another Call to Arms'. See also, 'Mars Furbishes His Sword. Eyes of World on Turkey' for a more emotive anti-war stance.
77. 'We Have Dead Buried There'.
78. 'Australia's Part'.
79. 'Returned Soldiers'.
80. 'Reason for Enlistments'.
81. 'No Enlistments'.
82. Churchill Archive, CHAR 22/15, 'Paraphrase Telegram from the Governor-General of Commonwealth of Australia dated 20th September, received at the Colonial Office, 20th September at 6.27am'.
83. 'Telegram from Byng, Governor-General of Canada'.
84. Churchill Archive, CHAR 22/15, 'Paraphrase Telegram from the Governor-General of Commonwealth of Australia dated 20th September, received at the Colonial Office, 20th September at 6.27am'.
85. Ibid.
86. For example, Churchill Archive, CHAR 17/28, 'Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors General of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand. Sent 10.35pm 30th September 1922'.
87. Hughes told Australia's House of Representatives, 'We have said, "We pray that there will be no war. We urge upon you to do everything in your power to prevent war. But if war comes we are going to stand by your side."', *House of Representatives Official Hansard*, No. 39 1922 (29 September 1922), p. 2943.
88. Macleod, "Conscription and the British World".
89. Lackenbauer, "War, Memory, and the Newfoundland Regiment at Gallipoli".

90. 'Prime Minister Gives Answer When Colonial Office Approaches Him'.
91. Churchill Archive, CHAR 22/15, 'Paraphrase telegram from the Officer Administering the Government of Newfoundland to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18th September 1922'.
92. 'The War Feeling'.
93. McKenzie, "Our Common Colonial Voices".
94. An example of an allusion to the idea would be the *Calgary Herald's* sub-headline 'Must Defend Interests For Which They Have Already Made Sacrifices. War Clouds Gathering Around Constantinople'.
95. 'Veterans Sniff Powder; War Fever Hits Vancouver'.
96. 'Canadian Press Comment on Britain's Invitation'; 'How Press Views War'; 'How the Call to the Dominions for Military Aid by the British Govt Has Been Received in This Country'.
97. 'Cabinet Is Summoned to Discuss War'.
98. Churchill Archive, CHAR 22/15 'Paraphrase of Telegram from Governor-General of Canada to Secretary of State for the Colonies, received 3.40am 18th September 1922'. The telegram reported the text of a telegram from Mackenzie King to Lloyd George, sent 17 September.
99. 'In Great Doubt Whether There Will Be A War'.
100. Library and Archives Canada, MG26-J13 Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, Item 5260, 26 September 1922
101. 'South African View'.
102. Churchill Archive, CHAR 17/28 Message from General Smuts to Lloyd George, 'Telegram from Governor-General of the Unions of South Africa to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dated September 25th'.
103. Stanley, *Die in Battle, Do Not Despair*.
104. Jeffery, *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire*, 57, 60.
105. This concern had provoked the resignation of Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, in March 1922 at an earlier effort to resolve competing claims in the Near East. Darwin, "The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet", 37.
106. 'Indian Views Of British Manifesto'.
107. George Boyce, "Harmsworth, Harold Sidney, first Viscount Rothermere". His brother, Lord Northcliffe, had died on 14 August 1922, at which point Rothermere acquired the controlling interest in Associated Newspapers which owned the *Daily Mail*, the newspaper they had founded together.
108. Hiley, "Making War', 185.
109. See, for example, 'No Immediate Need for Men'.
110. 'Stop This New War!'
111. 'Stop This New War!'
112. 'Europe and the Turks'.
113. 'The Liquidation of Mr. Lloyd George'.
114. 'A Grave Emergency'. At this point in time, the previous proprietor of *The Times*, Northcliffe, had died and the sale of the newspaper to John Jacob Astor would not be finalised until December 1922. Hence Wickham Steed was still the editor of *The Times*. His biographer describes Northcliffe and Steed as being 'fully engaged in a battle to oust Lloyd George'. Morris, "Steed, Henry Wickham".
115. 'Responsibilities In The Near East'.
116. 'A Call for Unity'. Such condescending comments reveal ignorance of the new balance of military power on the ground and the continuation of a wartime mindset.
117. 'Why Not the League?'

118. 'French Alarm'.
119. 'Mr Lloyd George's Epitaph'.
120. Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, 182–83.
121. 'Peace With Turkey'; 'Lord Curzon On Lausanne'.
122. Bonar Law, 'The Near East'.
123. 'Mr. Lloyd George in Manchester'.
124. Bartrop, *Bolt from the Blue*, 129–34.
125. 'A War Unnecessary.'

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ORCID

Jenny Macleod http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5277-7063

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