Chapter 1

Introduction: European Union climate leadership

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Introduction

There is no shortage of would-be leaders in EU climate change politics. The EU institutions (e.g. European Council, Council of the EU, Commission and the European Parliament (EP)), member states and societal actors have all, though to varying degrees and at different time periods, tried to offer leadership in EU and international climate change politics. Importantly, public support for EU environmental policy in general, and climate change policy in particular, has been consistently high (e.g. Eurobarometer 2015). The economic recession which followed the 2008 financial crises triggered only a moderate drop in public support for EU action on climate change, although considerable variation exists between member states.

The EU has widely been portrayed as a leader in international climate change politics (e.g. Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Grubb and Gupta 2000; Jordan et al. 2010; Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008; Wurzel and Connelly 2011a). However, despite a burgeoning literature on EU climate change leadership it is still not well understood why, how and when the EU, its member states, and societal actors can offer what type of leadership in EU and international climate change politics.

Core themes and overall analytical framework

This book adopts an actor-centred approach to the analysis of EU climate change politics. Its chapters all address, from the perspective of the main actor(s) on which they focus, the following four key themes: (1) leadership, (2) multi-level and polycentric governance, (3)
policy instruments, and (4) green and low carbon economy. Of these, leadership is the overarching theme.

Leadership

Despite the surge in scholarly interest in the EU’s leadership role in international climate change politics, leadership remains a contested concept which is used in differing ways in different studies (cf. Nye 2008; Young 1991). Our Introduction explains the leadership concept as applied by the authors of the chapters in this book.

Many studies of environmental politics have identified different *types* of leadership, although their respective classifications vary between different studies. Drawing primarily on Young (1991), Underdal (1994), Grubb and Gupta (2000), Wurzel and Connelly (2011a) and Liefferink and Wurzel (2016), we distinguish four main *types* of leadership - structural, entrepreneurial, cognitive and exemplary - and two *styles* of leadership, namely humdrum/transactional and heroic/transformative.²

*Structural* leadership relates to an actor’s hard power, which depends on material resources (e.g. military and economic resources). As the relevance of military power tends to be low for solving environmental problems – not even the world’s most powerful country could prevent climate change by military action – structural leadership rests primarily on economic power. It is the Single European Market (SEM) – the world’s largest internal market – which gives the EU the economic power resources required for structural leadership. The EU may allow, for example, the import of certain products into its SEM only if they comply with minimum environmental standards. Similarly, member states (especially
large ones) and societal actors (e.g. businesses and environmental NGOs - ENGOs) can provide structural leadership (Wurzel and Connelly 2011b).

Secondly, entrepreneurial leadership involves diplomatic, negotiating and bargaining efforts which are necessary for finding compromise solutions in climate change negotiations. Entrepreneurial leadership enables the adoption of package deals which offer benefits to all parties involved. Successful French diplomatic efforts in the run-up to and during the 2015 Paris climate conference (COP 21) provide good examples (see Chapter 7). In international climate change politics it has traditionally been the Commission (see Chapter 3) and the rotating six-monthly EU Council Presidency (see Chapter 5) which have offered entrepreneurial leadership. However, especially large member states – France, Germany and the UK - have recently taken on the role of ‘lead negotiators’ which stay in place well beyond the rotating EU Presidency whose influence has declined in international climate change negotiations (Interviews 2013-15; see Chapters 2 and 5). The European External Action Service (EEAS), which was created in 2011, has potentially provided the EU with additional entrepreneurial leadership capacity in the form of a diplomatic service which can be activated on international climate change issues although in practice it is underutilised.

Thirdly, cognitive leadership involves the definition and/or redefinition of interests, problem perceptions and conceivable solutions through concepts such as the ‘green’ or low carbon economy, or ecological modernisation, which propounds the view that ambitious environmental measures are beneficial for both the environment and economy (Jänicke 1993). Cognitive environmental leadership often relies on scientific expertise and practical implementation knowledge (Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). The EU has been portrayed as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002), which suggests that it relies more heavily on cognitive
than on structural leadership. The Commission and other actors have tried to reconceptualise climate change from being a purely environmental issue, to one entailing both a security dimension (e.g. energy security) and an economic dimension (e.g. ‘green’ jobs in the low carbon economy) (cf. Wurzel and Connelly 2011b: 277-8).

Lacking significant military powers and only infrequently mobilising its structural ‘market power’ (Damro 2012) when exerting climate leadership, the EU has specialized in providing entrepreneurial and particularly cognitive leadership. Small member states which are keen on ambitious EU and/or international climate change policy measures but have few power resources often use similar strategies. For example, Denmark and the Netherlands have gained disproportionate influence (by comparison with their population sizes) on EU environmental policy (e.g. Liefferink and Andersen 1998).

Fourthly, our book will also focus on exemplar leadership or leadership by example (Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). Exemplary leadership is similar but not identical to directional leadership as defined by Grubb and Gupta (2000). While directional leadership assumes an intention to set a good example for others - actors which use directional leadership want to attract followers - our definition of exemplary leadership includes both (1) intentional example setting with the aim of attracting followers (i.e. directional leadership) and (2) unintentional example setting. In the latter case, actors adopt ambitious climate change measures primarily for internal reasons without wanting to influence others. However, unintentional example setting may nevertheless be emulated by others. Denmark is often held up as a member state which is primarily interested in adopting ambitious domestic environmental policy measures rather than in attracting followers (Andersen and Liefferink
1997; see also Chapter 6). The policy diffusion and transfer literature offers many instances of intentional and unintentional transnational example setting (e.g. Tews et al. 2003).

In this book we also draw on different leadership styles which has two major analytical advantages (Wurzel and Connelly 2011b; Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). First, it allows for the analysis of how leaders and pioneers act. Second, it enables us to introduce a time dimension (e.g. short or long term) for assessing the actions of leaders and pioneers. For our analytical leadership styles dimension we draw on Hayward (1975, 2008), who differentiated humdrum from heroic leadership, and Burns (1978, 2003) who distinguished between transactional and transformational leadership (see Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). Following Lindblom’s (1959) concept of ‘muddling through’, Hayward (1975, 2008: 6) defined a humdrum leadership style as one where there is no ‘explicit, overriding, long-term objective and action is incremental, departing only slightly from existing policies as circumstances require’. In contrast, a heroic style, which normally can be used only occasionally, ‘sets explicit long-term objectives to be pursued by maximum coordination of public policies and by an ambitious assertion of political will’ (Hayward 2008: 7).

For Burns (2003: 375), transactional leadership amounts to reactive leadership which adjusts to external circumstances and aims at achieving ‘short-term expedient goals rather than long-term political strategy’ (Burns 2003: 5). In contrast, transformational leadership aims to bring about profound or even ‘revolutionary’ change, which usually requires the pursuit of long term objectives. Importantly, although transactional leadership usually fosters only incremental piecemeal changes, ‘[c]ontinual transaction over a long period of time can produce transformation’ (Burns 2003: 25). Transactional and transformational styles should
Therefore be perceived as part of a continuum; the same applies to humdrum and heroic leadership (Wurzel and Connelly 2011b; Liefferink and Wurzel 2016).

Although subtle differences exist between humdrum and transactional leadership styles, and between heroic and transformational leadership styles (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2016), for the purposes of the argument of this book they are sufficiently close to permit the merging of humdrum with transactional, and heroic with transformational leadership styles.

Table 1.1 presents summary definitions of the leadership types and styles as used in the chapters which follow.

**Table 1.1: Types and Styles of Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of leadership</th>
<th>Styles of leadership</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Structural leadership:</td>
<td>a) Humdrum/transactional leadership:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Relies on material resources (e.g. economic or military strength) derived from hard power.</td>
<td>• Humdrum leadership is short-term and incremental, leading to marginal adjustments of existing policies. Transactional leadership is reactive and aims at short-term expedient goals without the provision of long-term strategies.</td>
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<td>2) Entrepreneurial leadership:</td>
<td>b) Heroic/transformational leadership:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Diplomatic, negotiating and bargaining skills.</td>
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<td>3) Cognitive leadership:</td>
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- Definition/redefinition of interests through ideas (e.g. low carbon economy).

4) **Exemplary leadership:**
   - Intentional and unintentional example-setting.

- **Heroic** leadership relies on long-term objectives, strong policy coordination and the assertion of political will. **Transformational** leadership aims to bring about radical or ‘revolutionary’ change.


Actors’ **internal** ambitions (to adopt progressive domestic climate change measures) have to be distinguished from their **external** ambitions (to lead others on climate change policy). Importantly, ambitions may change over time (e.g. the UK developed from an environmental laggard to a climate change leader) and vary between policy areas (e.g. Germany has high ambitions for renewable energy and low ambitions for phasing out coal (see Chapters 8 and 12 respectively).

Actors with **high internal** and **low external ambitions** are **pioneers** which unilaterally adopt more progressive internal climate change policy measures without regard for other actors. Pioneers set a good example without intending to attract followers. However, others may nevertheless follow their example. Leaders with **high internal** and **high external ambitions** are **pushers** which actively seek to attract followers. **Symbolic leaders** are
characterized by low internal and high external ambitions. *Laggards* have neither internal nor external ambitions (Liefferink and Wurzel 2016).

The early literature on leaders and pioneers in environmental/climate change politics focused almost exclusively on states (e.g. Andersen and Liefferink 1997; Underdal 1994; Young 1991). However, this has changed with non-state actors, such as the EU, ENGOs, businesses and cities, having also been identified as potential environmental/climate policy leaders and pioneers. The reasons why non-state actors have increasingly been seen as offering climate change leadership are complex and contested. The list of possible reasons includes the 2008 global financial crises and resultant global recession which pushed environmental/climate policy actors onto the defensive, the political salience of climate change becoming somewhat less important relative to other political issues (e.g. economic or migration issues), and state actor-dominated top-down *government* allegedly giving way to non-hierarchical forms of *governance* in which non-state actors play a central role. Although the reasons are contested, there is widespread agreement in the academic literature and amongst practitioners (Interviews 2013-15) that some of the EU’s traditional environmental leaders (e.g. the Netherlands, see Chapter 9) have become more cost-conscious and less willing to provide climate change leadership.

*Multi-level and polycentric climate governance*

Arguably, to a greater extent than most policy areas, climate change policy permeates all levels of governance and requires the involvement of a wide variety of actors ranging from international organisations to individual citizens. This is one important reason why this book
pays attention not only to the EU institutions, and (member) states but also to businesses and ENGOs. Multi-level governance (MLG) and polycentric governance therefore constitute important research themes in this book.

According to Stephenson (2013: 817) MLG ‘has been used to try to provide a simplified notion of what is pluralistic and highly dispersed policy-making activity, where multiple actors (individuals and institutions) participate, at various political levels, from the supranational to the sub-national or local level’, while Algica and Tarko (2012: 237) have defined polycentricity as ‘a social system of many decision centres having limited and autonomous prerogative and operating under an overarching set of rules’. MLG and polycentricity share certain core presuppositions, although conceptually they are not identical. Importantly, by comparison with polycentricity, MLG studies usually assume a stronger involvement of governmental actors in both the setting and implementation of the rules of the game. However, compared with state-centred approaches, MLG places more emphasis on sub-national governmental and non-state actors. Polycentricity, on the other hand, attributes a stronger degree of autonomy to subnational local actors and non-governmental actors, including individuals. Most MLG-inspired EU studies emphasise the mutual dependency of EU and governmental actors (including national and subnational governmental actors) as well as (although to a somewhat lesser degree) non-governmental actors. Polycentric studies are primarily interested in the discovery of cases of societal self-coordination at various levels of governance as well as the mechanisms and rules of the game which underpin successful self-coordination in the face of collective action problems. It is possible to argue that polycentricity is closer to the operation of markets (see Chapter 14) than networks in which governmental actors (including EU institutional actors) play an important, if not dominant, role as most MLG studies promulgate.
The concept of MLG has long been widely used in the assessment of the EU, especially its structural policy (e.g. Hooghe 1996; Marks 1993) and (though to a lesser degree) its environmental policy (e.g. Fairbrass and Jordan 2004). The concept of polycentricity has rarely been used to study EU climate change policy, although there are exceptions (Jordan and Huitema 2014; Rayner and Jordan 2013; Jänicke 2015). This is despite the plea by Elinor Ostrom (2012: 82), one of the pioneers of the concept of polycentricity: ‘Indeed, I argue very strongly for the need for polycentric institutions to cope with climate change’.

Broadly speaking, the EU has consistently demanded an MLG-type global climate governance system which relies on the UN as the negotiating forum for the adoption of legally binding GHGE reduction targets and deadlines. However, other important actors in international climate change politics (e.g. US, China and India, see Chapters 16, 17 and 18) instead favoured voluntary pledges or so-called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (see below).

Partly because the EU constitutes an unconventional MLG system rather than a conventional state, it has sometimes struggled both to act as a coherent collective political entity in the international climate change negotiations and, in cases where it did so, to be recognised by third states as such an actor. The EU’s capacity to act in the international arena has occasionally been contested by both EU internal actors (e.g. member governments) and actors outside the EU (e.g. developing countries). In other words the EU’s ‘actorness’ has been questioned: which is one important reason why most international climate change
agreements are so-called mixed agreements that are signed by the EU and its member states (see Chapter 2).

Some of the EU’s core characteristics as an MLG system help to explain its occasional inability to adopt progressive internal and/or external climate change goals and thus to provide successful climate change leadership. At first sight the EU seems ill equipped to offer climate change leadership because decision-making powers are dispersed amongst a wide range of actors. The EU was founded shortly after the Second World War with the aim of “‘taming’ the “beast” ... of leadership’ (Blondel 1987: 3). It is therefore not surprising that the EU has been characterised as a ‘leaderless Europe’ (Hayward 2008). The existence of many veto actors has repeatedly created political deadlock and ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf 1988) from which the EU had difficulties to escape.

Against this background, it is remarkable how often the EU’s climate change policy has in fact managed to overcome decisional stalemate. This shows that the EU’s MLG structures do not necessarily preclude it from adopting progressive internal climate policy measures and from acting as a leader in international climate change politics (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). Because MLG extends beyond the boundaries of the EU, this book also offers an external perspective provided by chapters on the US (Chapter 16), China (Chapter 17) and India (Chapter 18).

Policy instruments

Environmental policy instruments can be grouped into the following three main categories: (1) regulations (or ‘command-and-control’ instruments); (2) market-based instruments (e.g. eco-taxes and emissions trading schemes); and, (3) voluntary agreements and informational
devices (e.g. Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). Regulations set legally binding targets and
deadlines which governmental actors enforce. Market-based instruments provide fiscal
incentives for actors which can choose the most-efficient compliance option. Voluntary
agreements rely on companies or states’ willingness to honour pledges while informational
instruments appeal to the ‘green’ conscience of consumers.

Majone (1996) has characterised the EU as a ‘regulatory state’ because it relies
heavily on traditional regulation. Until the late 1990s, this has been true also for the EU’s
climate change policy (e.g. Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). There are three main reasons for
this. First, environmental policy was initially perceived as an inherently regulatory policy.
Second, the EU can make use only of a limited number of redistributive policy instruments
(e.g. structural funds). Third, the EU Treaties allow member states to veto eco-taxes.

Thus, attempts to adopt market-based instruments failed because the Commission’s
1992 proposal for a common CO2/energy was vetoed by the UK on sovereignty grounds (see
Chapter 12). Unable to overcome this stalemate, the Commission published its proposal for a
and the Environmental Council adopted the Commission’s EU ETS proposal speedily and
with relatively few changes (see Chapter 3). When the EU ETS became operational in 2005 it
was the world’s first supranational ETS. This is remarkable as it was the US which had first
innovated with regional emissions trading schemes (for sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxides) in
the 1980s, while the EU initially opposed American efforts to include emissions trading as a
possible policy instrument in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008;
Wurzel 2008). Voluntary agreements and informational policy tools have often been
promoted by businesses (see Chapter 14) while ENGOs have remained highly sceptical about
self-regulatory tools (see Chapter 15). Such instruments play only a secondary role in EU climate change policy.

Green economy and low carbon economy

One of the clearest statements in favour of a ‘green’ or low carbon economy by an EU institutional actor can be found in the Commission’s *Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050* (CEC 2011). The document argues that ambitious EU climate change policy measures will trigger ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (CEC 2011: 3) and states that

[i]nvesting early in the low carbon economy would stimulate a gradual structural change in the economy and can create in net terms new jobs both in the short- and the medium-term... In the longer-term, the creation and preservation of jobs will depend on the EU’s ability to lead in terms of the development of new low carbon technologies through increased education, training, programmes to foster acceptability of new technologies, R&D and entrepreneurship, as well as favourable economic framework conditions for investments (CEC 2011:12).

Although the 2050 Roadmap does not explicitly mention ecological modernisation, it is clearly compatible with the concept which has received widespread support particularly in the Northern Europe (Jänicke 1993; CEC 2008; Wurzel and Connelly 2011b). The claim is that ecological modernisation can create a ‘double dividend’ or ‘win-win’ situation in which economic growth and the protection of the environment take place simultaneously (Jänicke 1993). From a low carbon economy perspective, climate change therefore not only poses a threat but also creates opportunities for ‘green’ jobs. Moreover, a speedy uptake of renewable
energy would decrease EU member states’ dependence on energy imports (e.g. from Russia) and increase the EU’s energy security. However, the 2008 financial crises and the subsequent economic recession have diminished somewhat the support for a ‘green’ or low carbon economy while proponents of ecological modernisation have been put on the defensive.

**A short history of EU climate change politics**

As a brief introduction to the chapters which follow, this section provides a thumb nail guide to core events and actions in EU internal and external climate change politics.

The following five phases of EU climate change policy can broadly be identified: (1) late 1980s to 1992: formation and formulation phase; (2) 1992-2001: Kyoto Protocol negotiation phase; (3) 2001-2005: Kyoto Protocol rescue phase; (4) 2005-2015: Kyoto Protocol implementation and negotiation of a follow up agreement phase; and, (5) since 2015: 2015 Paris Agreement ratification and implementation phase.

Various EU institutional actors (Chapters 2-5), member states (Chapters 6-12) and societal actors (Chapters 13-14) as well as non-EU countries (Chapters 13 and 16-18) reacted somewhat differently to the challenges of climate change and the changing opportunity structures of EU and/or global climate change politics. As will become clear in the following chapters, from the perspective of different EU institutional, member state, societal and non-EU actors the phases can appear differently.

*Table 1.2: Main phases of EU climate change politics*

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<tr>
<th>Late 1980s-1992: formation and formulation phase</th>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>EP climate change policy resolution</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>Commission communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>European Council for early adoption of targets. Joint Environmental and Energy Council agreed CO₂ stabilisation of by 2000 (at 1990 levels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Commission’s proposal for EU climate change policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-2001</td>
<td><strong>Kyoto protocol negotiation phase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>UN Rio conference adopted UNFCCC: EU accepted CO₂ stabilisation by 2000 (compared to 1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol negotiations: EU proposed 15% reduction of three GHGs by 2010 (compared to 1990) but settled for 8% reduction of six GHGs by 2008-12 (compared to 1990/1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Burden sharing agreement</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>First ECCP</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td><strong>Kyoto Protocol rescue phase</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>US dropped out of the Kyoto Protocol. EU Environmental Council and European Council for Kyoto Protocol ratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>EP voted (540 to 4 votes) in favour of Kyoto Protocol ratification. Kyoto Protocol ratified by EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Commission’s EU ETS proposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005-2015</td>
<td><strong>Kyoto Protocol implementation and negotiations of a follow-up agreement</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol entered into force. EU ETS became operational.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>European Council agreed ‘20-20 by 2020’ climate and energy package:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unilateral 20% GHGE reductions by 2020 (compared to 1990)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Binding 20% renewable energy by 2020</td>
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- Non-binding 20% energy efficiency improvement by 2020
- Conditional 30% GHGE reductions by 2020 if ‘comparable efforts’ by other developed and ‘adequate efforts’ by leading developing countries

- 2008: EU adopted legally binding CO₂ limits for cars, revision of EU ETS and effort sharing decision
- 2009: EU agreed €7.2 billion fast track money for climate change adaptation in developing countries. Copenhagen climate conference (COP15) adopted Copenhagen Accord
- 2014: European Council adopted ‘2030 climate and energy package’:
  - at least 40% reduction of GHGE by 2030 (compared to 1990)
  - at least 27% increase of renewables by 2030
  - indicative energy saving target of 27% by 2030

Since 2015: Paris Agreement ratification and implementation phase

- 2015: Paris Agreement:
  - Limit global temperature rise to 2.0/1.5°C
  - Peak of global emissions as soon as possible
  - Voluntary national reduction pledges (NDCs)
- 2016: Ratification process of the 2015 Paris Agreement

Late 1980s-1992: Formation and formulation phase

In 1986 the EP became the first EU institution to request a common climate change policy (see Table 1.2 and Chapter 4). Two years later the Commission issued a communication on climate change. In 1990, the European Council adopted a resolution which demanded the early adoption of GHGE reduction targets on the UN level. In the same year a joint
Environment and Energy Council adopted a political agreement on the stabilisation of the EU’s CO₂ emissions by 2000 (compared to 1990) which, however, was conditional on other highly developed countries taking similar steps. According to Haigh (1996: 162) it enabled the EU ‘to take a strong and leading role, particularly in relation to the United States’. While the US had acted as a leader on the Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depleting substances, in climate change politics it was the EU which started to take over the leadership role from the US (see Chapters 2 and 17).

The EU signed the UN framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC) at the 1992 UN Rio ‘Earth summit’. Because it had not yet adopted adequate common policy measures to implement its commitments under the UNFCCC, the EU created a ‘capability-expectation gap’ (Hill 1993) which it was able to close only with the adoption of legally binding climate policy measures within the framework of the 2000 and 2005 European Climate Change Programmes (ECCPs).

In early 1992, at a time of high public environmental awareness and relatively strong support for deeper European integration, the Commission proposed an EU-wide carbon dioxide (CO₂)/energy tax which was, however, vetoed by the UK on sovereignty grounds (see Chapter 12). The Council adopted the Commission’s proposals for a Framework Directive on energy efficiency measures by member states (SAVE), a Decision on renewable energy (ALTENER) and a Decision to monitor CO₂ emissions, but these were insufficient measures for reaching the EU’s proposed CO₂ emissions stabilisation target.

1992-2001: Kyoto protocol negotiation phase
During the 1992 UNFCCC negotiations the EU acted largely as a symbolic leader because it did not yet have in place significant reduction measures to back up its ambitious rhetoric. In the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol the EU initially offered a 15 per cent reduction in GHGE by 2010 (compared to 1990 levels) on condition that its main economic competitors (at the time the US and Japan) would accept similar reductions. Because the US accepted only a seven per cent reduction target, the EU settled for an eight per cent reduction target in GHGE by 2008-12. Against initial opposition from the EU the US insisted on the inclusion of the following flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol: (1) emissions trading, (2) joint implementation (JI), which allowed developed countries jointly to implement GHGE reduction projects with developing countries, and (3) the clean development mechanism (CDM) which permitted developed countries to sponsor GHGE reduction projects in developing countries for which the former could earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits.

In 1998, the EU adopted the ‘burden sharing’ agreement which set member states differentiated reduction targets for achieving the EU’s collective 8 per cent CO₂ emissions target. Germany and the UK, which are the EU’s largest GHGE emitters, accepted CO₂ reductions rates of 21 and 12.5 per cent respectively. Germany benefited from ‘wall fall profits’ (due to the deindustrialisation of the former East Germany following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989), and the UK was helped by its 1980s ‘dash for gas’ which has a lower carbon content than coal (see Chapters 8 and 12).

In October 2000, the Environmental Council accepted most of the Commission’s communication Towards a European Climate Change Programme (CEC 2000) thus paving the way for the adoption of the first ECCP in 2000.
**Kyoto Protocol rescue phase: 2001-2005**

On 13 March 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the US would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol which had been signed by his predecessor Bill Clinton (see Chapter 16). Because, at the time, the US was the largest emitter of GHGE the Kyoto Protocol seemed doomed. However, a few weeks later, the Environmental Council agreed that the EU should pursue the Kyoto Protocol ratification process. After approval by the European Council and overwhelming support from the EP the EU ratified the Kyoto Protocol in May 2002 (see Chapters 4 and 5). After much lobbying from the EU, both Japan and Russia eventually ratified the Kyoto Protocol (thus reaching the required 55 per cent of the total 1990 CO₂ emissions from industrialised countries) which entered into force in 2005.

Frustrated by the veto to its CO₂/energy tax proposal and encouraged by the early experience with emissions trading in the US, the Commission’s Directorate General for Environment (DG Environment) commissioned studies on emissions trading in the late 1990s (see Chapter 3). Following meetings with member governments and stakeholders, the Commission published its proposal for an EU ETS Directive in 2001 (CEC 2001). The EP and the Environmental Council speedily adopted a modified version of the Commission’s EU ETS proposal in 2003 (Skjaerseth and Wettestad 2008). The EU had thus somewhat belatedly been transmogrified from an emissions trading laggard to a leader which set up the world’s first supranational ETS (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008; Wurzel 2008; see also Chapter 3).

**2005-2015: Kyoto Protocol implementation and follow-up agreement negotiation phase**

The EU ETS, which became operational in 2005, has become the EU’s main climate change policy instrument (Skjaerseth and Wettestad 2008) although, within the framework of the second EPCC, the EU also adopted Directives on energy efficiency and the promotion of
renewable energy and concluded a voluntary agreement with the European, Japanese and
Korean automobile manufacturers on the reduction of CO₂ which, however, was later
overtaken by legislation as the voluntary agreement had failed.

In March 2007 the European Council meeting affirmed the EU’s climate leadership when it adopted the ‘20-20-20’ climate and energy package which included a binding unilateral 20 per cent CO₂ reduction target by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels), a legally binding 20 per cent renewable energy target by 2020 and a non-binding 20 per cent energy efficiency improvement by 2020. The EU also adopted a 30 per cent CO₂ emissions reduction target by 2020 which was, however, made conditional on ‘comparable efforts’ by other developed and ‘adequate efforts’ by leading developing countries. After arduous negotiations the EU adopted the effort sharing decision (which replaced the burden sharing agreement) and agreed on a review of the flagging EU ETS at the European Council in December 2008. In order to strengthen its international climate leader position the EU offered 7.22 billion Euros in ‘fast track’ funding for climate adaptation measures in developing countries and tried to form alliances on the international level (see Chapter 2).

However, although the EU had adopted relatively ambitious internal climate change policy measures and pledged significant climate funds for developing countries, it was not able to significantly influence the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ adopted at the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference (COP15). The Copenhagen Accord, widely seen as a weak and vague agreement, was largely negotiated by the US and Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC countries) without direct EU involvement at the crucial negotiating phase (see Chapters 2 and 5). There are complex reasons why the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference arguably constituted a low point (if not the lowest point) for EU international climate
leadership (see Chapters 2, 5, 6 and 17). However, to a large degree the EU recovered its status as a leader in international climate change politics at the 2010 Cancún (COP16), 2011 Durban (COP17) and 2014 Lima (COP20) climate conferences which eventually paved the way for a Kyoto Protocol follow-up agreement in the form of the 2015 Paris Agreement.

In October 2014 the European Council adopted the 2030 climate and energy package which stipulated a legally binding GHGE reduction target of at least 40% by 2030 (compared to 1990), a legally binding target to increase the share of renewables to 27% by 2030 (although without binding national targets) and an indicative energy saving target of 27% by 2030 (see Chapter 5). However, unlike in the run up to the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference (COP15), the EU did not adopt an effort sharing decision prior to the 2015 Paris Agreement.

Since 2015: Paris Agreement ratification and implementation phase

In the climate change agreement, adopted in Paris in December 2015, 195 countries committed themselves to achieving as soon as possible a peak of global GHGE while trying to limit the global temperature rise to well below 2 °C and to undertake efforts to limit the temperature rise to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. The inclusion of the relatively ambitious 1.5 °C goal in the Paris Agreement came as a surprise to EU policy makers and even ENGOs (Interviews, 2015-16). The Paris Agreement will enter into force once it has been ratified by at least 55 countries accounting for at least 55 per cent of global GHGE.

In the run up to the 2015 Paris climate conference (COP21) countries had to submit national voluntary pledges (INDCs). The 2015 Paris Agreement made the INDCs legally binding, while turning them into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which,
however, are likely to limit the global temperature rise merely to about 3° C, unless they can be made more ambitions during the Paris Agreement implementation phase (Interview, EU official, 2016). A five-yearly review process, permitting only the ratcheting upwards of NDCs is meant to ensure that the 1.5° C goal will be achieved. Moreover, a $100 billion global climate fund was set up to assist developing countries in adapting to climate change.

The 2015 Paris Agreement constitutes a departure from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol because it adopted a bottom up approach which allowed countries to put forward voluntary national reduction pledges. The EU had initially favoured the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol’s top-down approach of internationally agreed legally binding reduction targets and deadlines. It finally accepted the new approach when it became apparent that several key countries (including the US, China and India) were only prepared to accept a bottom up approach. However, the EU succeeded with its demand that the national voluntary pledges should be enshrined in a legally binding UN climate change treaty which stipulates a five-yearly review and transparency measures (Interview, EU official, 2016; Oberthür 2016).

The EU played a significant role in the negotiations by brokering a ‘high-ambition coalition’ which eventually was made up by more than 100 developed and developing countries (including the US but not China and India). As mentioned above, in its 2030 climate and energy package, the EU had already ‘pledged’ a legally binding unilateral 40% GHGE reduction target for 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) (see Chapters 2, 3-5 and 7). The EU’s approach has been referred to as ‘leading’ (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; see also Chapter 5) because it consisted of both acting as leader and mediator. Such an approach helped the EU to regain much of its international climate politics leader status which it had lost at the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference (COP15). However, ENGOs have argued
that the 2015 Paris Agreement’s 1.5° C goal would necessitate a significant ratcheting up of the EU’s 40 per cent GHGE emission reduction target for 2030 (see Chapter 15).

**Structure of the book**

The next chapter (with this Introduction constituting Part I) focuses on the EU’s ability to act as a global player in international climate change politics. Part II assesses why, when, and how supranational institutional actors pushed the EU to adopt a leadership position in international climate change politics. The next two parts analyse why, when, and how member states (Part III) and important societal actors (Part IV) have offered domestic leadership and/or supported EU and international climate change leadership. Finally Part V offers an external perspective by focusing on the US, China and India.

**Bibliography**


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3 In the 1980s, the Thatcher government closed many coal mines and built gas fired power stations for cost reasons and to break the political influence of the left wing miners unions.