The OECD and economic governance: Invisibility and impotence?
Anja P. Jakobi
Chapter 3 sketches the OECD's role in economic governance, in particular the pursuit of its obligation to promote policies which maximize economic growth. While the OECD's work in the economic field evolves, its mechanisms of economic governance have barely altered. Richard Woodward argues that the OECD exerts ‘subtle discipline’ over the trajectory of economic governance through the use of its soft law mechanisms such as surveillance and peer review. These mechanisms can lead to convergence in national policies and, occasionally, outbreaks of international policy coordination. Ultimately, however, the proliferation of international mechanisms of governance and the internal politics of the OECD may be diluting its ability to shape the contours of international economic policy‐making.
Woodward, R. (2010). The OECD and economic governance: Invisibility and impotence?. In K. Martens, & A. P. Jakobi (Eds.), Mechanisms of OECD Governance: International Incentives for National Policy-Making?, 53-74. Oxford University Press (OUP). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591145.003.0003
|Publication Date||Sep 9, 2010|
|Deposit Date||Dec 19, 2014|
|Journal||Mechanisms of OECD Governance: International Incentives for National Policy-Making?|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press (OUP)|
|Peer Reviewed||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Book Title||Mechanisms of OECD Governance: International Incentives for National Policy-Making?|
|Keywords||OECD; Soft law; Peer review; Economy; Governance; Economic and development review committee; Economic policy committee; Transgovernmentalism; Group of 7/8|
This file is under embargo due to copyright reasons.