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Theism and contrastive explanation (2017)
Journal Article
Came, D. (2017). Theism and contrastive explanation. European journal for philosophy of religion, 9(1), 19-26 . https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1862

I argue that there could not be grounds on which to introduce God into our ontology. My argument presupposes two doctrines. First, we should allow into our ontology only what figures in the best explanation of an event or fact. Second, explanation is... Read More about Theism and contrastive explanation.

Moral and aesthetic judgments reconsidered (2012)
Journal Article
Came, D. (2012). Moral and aesthetic judgments reconsidered. Journal of Value Inquiry, 46(2), (159-171). doi:10.1007/s10790-012-9333-1. ISSN 0022-5363

Traditionally in philosophy, ethics and aesthetics are bracketed together under the heading of "value judgment." This classification tends to obscure important differences between the domains of ethical and aesthetic judgment as we normally practice... Read More about Moral and aesthetic judgments reconsidered.

Disinterestedness and objectivity (2009)
Journal Article
Came, D. (2009). Disinterestedness and objectivity. European Journal of Philosophy, 17(1), 91-100. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00334.x