All Outputs (49)

What makes responses prepotent for young children? Insights from the grass-snow task (2008)
Journal Article
Simpson, A., & Riggs, K. J. (2009). What makes responses prepotent for young children? Insights from the grass-snow task. Infant and Child Development, 18(1), 21-35. https://doi.org/10.1002/icd.576

Understanding how responses become prepotent is essential for understanding when inhibitory control is needed in everyday behaviour. We investigated prepotency in the grass–snow task—in which a child points to a green card when the experimenter says... Read More about What makes responses prepotent for young children? Insights from the grass-snow task.

Counterfactual and mental state reasoning in children with autism (2004)
Journal Article
Grant, C. M., Riggs, K. J., & Boucher, J. (2004). Counterfactual and mental state reasoning in children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34(2), 177-188. https://doi.org/10.1023/B%3AJADD.0000022608.57470.29

The contributions of counterfactual conditional reasoning (CCR), belief understanding, and inferential reasoning to the performance of children with autism (CWA) on standard false belief tasks were investigated. To assess the roles of these three fac... Read More about Counterfactual and mental state reasoning in children with autism.

What makes the windows task difficult for young children: Rule inference or rule use? (2003)
Journal Article
Simpson, A., Riggs, K. J., & Simon, M. (2004). What makes the windows task difficult for young children: Rule inference or rule use?. Journal of experimental child psychology, 87(2), 155-170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2003.11.002

The windows task is difficult for young children. In this task, a child is shown two boxes with windows revealing that one is empty, whereas the other contains a treat. The child is asked to point to a box for an opponent to look in. The child then "... Read More about What makes the windows task difficult for young children: Rule inference or rule use?.

Motion processing in autism: evidence for a dorsal stream deficiency (2000)
Journal Article
Spencer, J., O'Brien, J., Riggs, K., Braddick, O., Atkinson, J., & Wattam-Bell, J. (2000). Motion processing in autism: evidence for a dorsal stream deficiency. NeuroReport, 11(12), 2765-2767. https://doi.org/10.1097/00001756-200008210-00031

We report that motion coherence thresholds in children with autism are significantly higher than in matched controls. No corresponding difference in form coherence thresholds was found. We interpret this as a specific deficit in dorsal stream functio... Read More about Motion processing in autism: evidence for a dorsal stream deficiency.

Children's Reasoning and the Mind (2000)
Book
Mitchell, P., & Riggs, K. (Eds.). (2000). Children's Reasoning and the Mind. London: Psychology Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315784670

Adaptive modelling and mindreading (1999)
Journal Article
Peterson, D. M., & Riggs, K. J. (1999). Adaptive modelling and mindreading. Mind & language, 14(1), 80-112. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00104

This paper sets out to give sufficient detail to the notion of mental simulation to allow an appraisal of its contribution to 'mindreading' in the context of the 'false-belief tasks' used in developmental psychology. We first describe the reasoning s... Read More about Adaptive modelling and mindreading.

Are errors in false belief tasks symptomatic of a broader difficulty with counterfactuality? (1998)
Journal Article
Riggs, K. J., Peterson, D. M., Robinson, E. J., & Mitchell, P. (1998). Are errors in false belief tasks symptomatic of a broader difficulty with counterfactuality?. Cognitive Development, 13(1), 73-90. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014%2898%2990021-1

When children acknowledge false belief they are handling a counterfactual situation. In three experiments 3-and 4-year-old children were given false belief tasks and physical state tasks which required similar handling of counterfactual situations bu... Read More about Are errors in false belief tasks symptomatic of a broader difficulty with counterfactuality?.

Children's memory for drawings based on a false belief (1996)
Journal Article
Robinson, E. J., Riggs, K. J., & Samuel, J. (1996). Children's memory for drawings based on a false belief. Developmental Psychology, 32(6), 1056-1064. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.32.6.1056

In 3 studies, preschool children drew or saw another person draw what they wrongly thought were the contents of a box, saw the true contents, and then were asked what had been drawn and what they (or the other person) had thought was in the box. Chil... Read More about Children's memory for drawings based on a false belief.

Children’s memory for actions based on a false belief (1995)
Journal Article
Riggs, K. J., & Robinson, E. J. (1995). Children’s memory for actions based on a false belief. Journal of experimental child psychology, 60(2), 229-244. https://doi.org/10.1006/jecp.1995.1039

In four investigations, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked to recall their own or another person′s actions, as well as acknowledge the false belief upon which the action was based. Recalling that somebody else went to a wrong location was easier than ackn... Read More about Children’s memory for actions based on a false belief.