Keys for peace in the Middle East: interview with Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich

ABSTRACT This article records my interview with Professor Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich. We discussed the keys for successful peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians; the differences between Camp David 1978 and Camp David 2000; The Oslo Accords; the role of the United States as a mediator and the potential of other countries to become mediators; the viability of a two-state solution; peace with Syria; Taba; Annapolis; the Israeli evacuation of Gaza, and the rise of Hamas. The interview assesses the positive and negative lessons and implications of the peace process, and the likelihood of bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a close.


Introduction
The United States is a powerful player with leverage and ability to drive the process forward; but successful mediation also requires impartiality and credibility. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was able to succeed in his mediation between Israel and Egypt because he was perceived as an objective, fair broker between the two sides. Kissinger was able to maintain a balanced view regarding the competing interests of Israel and Egypt. The same can be said about President Jimmy Carter 1 and his successful mediation in Camp David 1978. 2 But no such perception of the American broker was apparent in the peace summit of Camp David 2000. Arafat 3 thought the American negotiating team had coordinated the negotiation plans with the Israelis. His suspicions were confirmed by American negotiators Kurtzer 4 and Miller. Aaron David Miller 5 confessed: 'Not only did we consistently coordinate our positions with the Israelis, showing them our negotiating texts firsta practice I might add the Palestinians had come to expectbut we saw the issuess largely from Israel's point of view. I remember how impressed we all were when we learned that Barak was willing to concede 80 percent of the West Bank.' 6 The inability of the Palestinian negotiators to trust President Clinton 7 undermined his position and his ability to relay information effectively to both sides. Presently the Palestinians have little reason to perceive President Trump 8 as an unbiased mediator. Thus they are trying to involve Europe in the process.
As the Americans continue to fail in their mediation attempts. Still senior Israeli and American diplomats continue to think that the role of the United States is irreplaceable. What can the USA do to be perceived as impartial in its mediation? What were the mistakes in Camp David? How could it be done differently? What lessons did the Americans learn? Is there a role for other countries to play in mediation? These and other questions are at a center of research that I have been conducting during the past decade. The research is based on primary sources: research in archives, and interviews with senior negotiators, politicians and implementers who were and are involved in peace negotiations.
This paper records one of the 35 interviews that I conducted until now with a seasoned scholar and diplomat: Professor Itamar Rabinovich. Rabinovich is the author of numerous books and articles about Israel and the Middle East. 9 Between 1992 and 1996, he served as Israel's ambassador to the United States, and as Prime Minister Rabin's chief negotiator with Syria. Rabinovich has also wealth of experience in academic administration as he served Tel Aviv University in various capacities: Chairman of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Director of the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Dean of Humanities, Rector and President. Politics in academia is different, yet in many respects similar, to state politics. Diplomatic and negotiation skills are certainly essential. The interview was conducted on 21 July 2017 at Tel Aviv University.
Cohen-Almagor: What do you think are the keys to successful negotiations? I'm talking about peace negotiations, of course. Rabinovich: Yes. One is the determination by both sides to come to an agreement. The second is a sense of urgency. Both sides need to balance what I call pain and reward. As they reflect on the situation, leaders assess the desirable outcomes. They normally would be motivated either by the price of continuing the status quo, or the rewards of changing the status quo. This is 'the balance of pain and reward'. The third is very important: the sense of time. Is time working for me or against me? The parties need to feel that time is not on their side, and that they need to conclude a peace deal now, rather than wait. Cohen-Almagor: Ripeness. The time has to be ripe for both of them. 10 with massive demands and then, in a short time span, modified them significantly. Barak created the sense with Arafat that he could be pushed further. Barak arrived at Camp David basically without a coalition, without a government. His political future depended on the outcome, and Arafat felt that he had a very comfortable position vis-à-vis Barak. And the U.S. was not an effective mediator. Clinton is too nice a man. He is not Carter. And the Arab environment was not very helpful.  20 Rabinovich: Yes, they were gifted, but I don't think they were more gifted than Ross, 21 Indyk, 22 24 When Sadat came to Jerusalem, the outline of the deal was already made. The United States came in later. Cohen-Almagor: So, you think Oslo was a success?
Rabinovich: Oslo was a success in the sense that a deal was made. You can argue about the quality of the deal, but a deal was made. Cohen-Almagor: Okay, let's speak about the quality of the deal. Do you think it was enough to base on it peace between Israel and the Palestinians? Rabinovich: I think it provided a basis for making a deal. Remember, Oslo was an interim agreement. It was very much predicated on the autonomy plan. 25 And there were five years for turning it into a deal. Now, both sides sinned against it. Arafat did not really fight terrorism; he did not clamp down on Hamas. We, the Israelis, did not deal with the settlement issue. Settlement construction continued.
There is peacemaking and peace building. There was very little peace building done during that time. So, I think, there were some flaws in Oslo. If you read Joel Singer's testimonies, you see that he was brought in at a later stage of the negotiaitons and didn't like the document he saw. He thought the document prepared by Hirschfeld 26 and Pundak 27 was amateurish. 28 He tried to fix it. He was told, actually, to start afresh and he was told that there was no time. So, basically, he fixed something that was flawed in many respects. So, there are problems with the agreement, but, still, if both sides were determined from that point on to use the five years to really move from interim stage to final status, and build the peace, then it could have been done.

Conclusion
Rabinovich notes five keys for successful peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO: (1) both sides need determination to close a deal.
(2) Both sides should think that the rewarding outcomes would outweigh the 'pain', i.e. the costs they would need to pay.
(3) both sides should feel that if they wait they would lose; thus, they better sign an agreement now. (4) supportive regional environment, and (5) effective American mediation. Asked why Camp David 1978 was successful whereas Camp David 2000 ended in failure, Rabinovich explained that there is a difference between state-to-state negotiations and unequal negotiations that involve states and non-states. In 2000, Barak needed to address the Palestinian suspicions and sense of insecurity. He failed to do this. Not only that the Palestinians felt that they were the weaker and vulnerable side, they soon realised that the United States was collaborating with the Israelis behind their backs. They did not trust Clinton and his team, and did not see the Americans as credible and unbiased moderator.
Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not only about territory. The Palestinians demanded a sovereign state and an Israeli recognition of what the Palestinian perceived as their natural, historical rights. In addition, there was no sense of urgency among the Palestinians to resolve the conflict; Barak and Clinton lacked the required abilities to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. Finally, the Palestinians need the support of the Arab world. Being a weak side, they are acutely aware of the wider Arab interests and are, to a significant extent, dependent on the Arab world, in need of Arab backing. In 2000, this support was deficient.
Rabinovich does not think that, at present, there is any other country but the United States that can mediate between Israel and the Palestinians. Arab countries can play a vital role in supporting the Palestinians in the process as facilitators, but not as mediators. Small states, like Norway, may play a positive role, as it did in 1993.
Of all possible solutions, Rabinovich perceived the two state solution as the most viable. A new government, under different leadership and with different aspirations is needed to make this happen.
Rabinovich has dedicated much of his scholarly career to study Syria. Applying his five keys for successful negotiations to the Israeli-Syrian peace talks, it is evident why the talks ended in failure. The determination of both sides to come to an agreement was dubious. Balancing pain and reward, both were not convinced that the rewards outweighed pain. There was no sense of urgency for both to come to an agreement. Both thought that time was working for them, not against them. The regional environment was supportive, at least in part, and the United States was involved, trying to bridge the gaps between the two sides, but Secretary of State Christopher did not make prudent use of Rabin's deposit. Israel and Syria could not agree on the terms of the peace treaty. Both Israeli prime ministers, Rabin and Barak, did not wish to satisfy President Assad's territorial demands, whereas Assad was not prepared for full normalization with Israel.