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EC competition policy: is the role of the substantial part of the common market in determining jurisdictional subsidiarity redundant?

Davison, Leigh M.; Johnson, Debra

Authors

Leigh M. Davison L.M.Davison@hull.ac.uk

Debra Johnson D.Johnson@hull.ac.uk



Abstract

The importance of the principle of subsidiarity lies in its role in drawing the demarcation line between EU and member state responsibility for policy formulation and implementation. In theory, the application of the principle of subsidiarity appears relatively straightforward based on the scale and effects of the action in question. The reality is somewhat more complex, at least in respect of two competition policy instruments—Article 102 EC and the ECMR. At the heart of this complexity is the little understood notion of a substantial part of the common market which, relative to competing jurisdictional subsidiarity tests, can fail to assign cases to the appropriate jurisdiction. This leads to the conclusion that the substantial part test is superfluous as the affects trade criterion and the distinct markets test perform the allocative role more effectively in relation to Article 102 and the ECMR respectively.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2010-12
Journal Liverpool Law Review
Print ISSN 0144-932X
Electronic ISSN 1572-8625
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 31
Issue 3
Pages 273-288
APA6 Citation Davison, L. M., & Johnson, D. (2010). EC competition policy: is the role of the substantial part of the common market in determining jurisdictional subsidiarity redundant?. Liverpool Law Review, 31(3), 273-288. doi:10.1007/s10991-010-9081-x
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-010-9081-x
Keywords Law
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10991-010-9081-x
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