EC competition policy: is the role of the substantial part of the common market in determining jurisdictional subsidiarity redundant?

Davison, Leigh M.; Johnson, Debra

Abstract

The importance of the principle of subsidiarity lies in its role in drawing the demarcation line between EU and member state responsibility for policy formulation and implementation. In theory, the application of the principle of subsidiarity appears relatively straightforward based on the scale and effects of the action in question. The reality is somewhat more complex, at least in respect of two competition policy instruments—Article 102 EC and the ECMR. At the heart of this complexity is the little understood notion of a substantial part of the common market which, relative to competing jurisdictional subsidiarity tests, can fail to assign cases to the appropriate jurisdiction. This leads to the conclusion that the substantial part test is superfluous as the affects trade criterion and the distinct markets test perform the allocative role more effectively in relation to Article 102 and the ECMR respectively.

Citation

Davison, L. M., & Johnson, D. (2010). EC competition policy: is the role of the substantial part of the common market in determining jurisdictional subsidiarity redundant?. Liverpool Law Review, 31(3), 273-288. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-010-9081-x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 1, 2010
• Online Publication Date: Dec 29, 2010
• Publication Date: 2010-12
• Journal: Liverpool Law Review
• Print ISSN: 0144-932X
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 31
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 273-288
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-010-9081-x
• Keywords: Law
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/423848
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10991-010-9081-x