Leigh M. Davison L.M.Davison@hull.ac.uk
EC competition policy: is the role of the substantial part of the common market in determining jurisdictional subsidiarity redundant?
Davison, Leigh M.; Johnson, Debra
Debra Johnson D.Johnson@hull.ac.uk
The importance of the principle of subsidiarity lies in its role in drawing the demarcation line between EU and member state responsibility for policy formulation and implementation. In theory, the application of the principle of subsidiarity appears relatively straightforward based on the scale and effects of the action in question. The reality is somewhat more complex, at least in respect of two competition policy instruments—Article 102 EC and the ECMR. At the heart of this complexity is the little understood notion of a substantial part of the common market which, relative to competing jurisdictional subsidiarity tests, can fail to assign cases to the appropriate jurisdiction. This leads to the conclusion that the substantial part test is superfluous as the affects trade criterion and the distinct markets test perform the allocative role more effectively in relation to Article 102 and the ECMR respectively.
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Journal||Liverpool Law Review|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|APA6 Citation||Davison, L. M., & Johnson, D. (2010). EC competition policy: is the role of the substantial part of the common market in determining jurisdictional subsidiarity redundant?. Liverpool Law Review, 31(3), 273-288. doi:10.1007/s10991-010-9081-x|
You might also like
East meets West : toward a theoretical model linking guanxi and relationship marketing
EU competition policy: Article 82 EC and the notion of substantial part of the common market