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Theism and contrastive explanation

Came, Daniel

Authors

Daniel Came



Abstract

I argue that there could not be grounds on which to introduce God into our ontology. My argument presupposes two doctrines. First, we should allow into our ontology only what figures in the best explanation of an event or fact. Second, explanation is contrastive by nature, in that the explanandum always consists in a contrast between a fact and a foil. I argue that God could not figure in true contrastive explanatory statements, because the omnipotence of God guarantees that for any true proposition p, God could have made it the case that ~p just as much as He could have made it the case that p.

Citation

Came, D. (2017). Theism and contrastive explanation. European journal for philosophy of religion, 9(1), 19-26 . https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1862

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Nov 6, 2016
Online Publication Date May 3, 2017
Publication Date May 3, 2017
Deposit Date Dec 5, 2016
Publicly Available Date Nov 23, 2017
Journal European journal for the philosophy of religion
Print ISSN 1689-8311
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 9
Issue 1
Pages 19-26
DOI https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1862
Keywords God; Contrastive explanation; Theism; Atheism; Naturalism
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/445874
Publisher URL https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1862
Additional Information This is the author's accepted manuscript of an article accepted for future publication in: European journal for the philosophy of religion, 2017, v.9 issue 3.

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