Outputs (40)

Fixing the image : re-thinking the 'mind-independence' of photographs (2009)
Journal Article
Phillips, D. M. (2009). Fixing the image : re-thinking the 'mind-independence' of photographs. Postgraduate journal of aesthetics, 6(2), 1-22

It has been argued that photographs are unsuitable or inferior candidates for art because they are not intimately bound to the mind of an artist. I believe that we can address scepticism in the philosophy of art only if we recognise that it is linked... Read More about Fixing the image : re-thinking the 'mind-independence' of photographs.

Photography and causation: Responding to Scruton's scepticism (2009)
Journal Article
Phillips, D. M. (2009). Photography and causation: Responding to Scruton's scepticism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 49(4), 327-340. https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp036

According to Roger Scruton, it is not possible for photographs to be representational art. Most responses to Scruton's scepticism are versions of the claim that Scruton disregards the extent to which intentionality features in photography; but these... Read More about Photography and causation: Responding to Scruton's scepticism.

Normativity and the metaphysics of mind (2009)
Journal Article
Zangwill, N. (2010). Normativity and the metaphysics of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(1), 21-39. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400902739610

I consider the metaphysical consequences of the view that propositional attitudes have essential normative properties. I argue that realism should take a weak rather than a strong form. I argue that expressivism cannot get off the ground. And I argue... Read More about Normativity and the metaphysics of mind.

Are we our brains? (2009)
Journal Article
Burwood, S. (2009). Are we our brains?. Philosophical Investigations, 32(2), 113-133. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.01366.x

My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and tha... Read More about Are we our brains?.

Contextualizing rationality: Mature student carers and higher education in England (2009)
Journal Article
Gonzalez-Arnal, S., & Kilkey, M. (2009). Contextualizing rationality: Mature student carers and higher education in England. Feminist economics, 15(1), 85-111. https://doi.org/10.1080/13545700802528323

In England, the Government has implemented policies to increase and diversify participation in higher education (HE). Changes in funding arrangements that shift the burden of paying for education from the state to individuals have also been introduce... Read More about Contextualizing rationality: Mature student carers and higher education in England.

The widening participation agenda: the marginal place of care (2008)
Journal Article
Alsop, R., Gonzalez-Arnal, S., & Kilkey, M. (2008). The widening participation agenda: the marginal place of care. Gender and Education, 20(6), 623-637. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540250802215235

This paper is based upon two empirical studies, which identify care-giving responsibilities as a key mediator of mature students' - a target group within the widening participation strategy - experiences of higher education. Employing a feminist lens... Read More about The widening participation agenda: the marginal place of care.

The apparent truth of dualism and the uncanny body (2007)
Journal Article
Burwood, S. (2008). The apparent truth of dualism and the uncanny body. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 7(2), 263-278. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9073-z

It has been suggested that our experiences of embodiment in general appear to constitute an experiential ground for dualist philosophy and that this is particularly so with experiences of dissociation, in which one feels estranged from one's body. Th... Read More about The apparent truth of dualism and the uncanny body.

The indifference argument (2006)
Journal Article
Zangwill, N. (2008). The indifference argument. Philosophical Studies, 138(1), 91-124. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9000-0

I argue against motivational internalism. First I recharacterise the issue over moral motivation. Second I describe the indifference argument against motivation internalism. Third I consider appeals to irrationality that are often made in the face of... Read More about The indifference argument.

What can be shown, cannot be said: Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy in the Tractatus and the Investigations (2002)
Thesis
Phillips, D. M. (2002). What can be shown, cannot be said: Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy in the Tractatus and the Investigations. (Thesis). University of Durham. Retrieved from https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/4055594

My thesis is that the say-show distinction is the basis of Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in both the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the Philosophical Investigations (1953). Wittgenstein said that the Investigations should... Read More about What can be shown, cannot be said: Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy in the Tractatus and the Investigations.

Moral dependence
Book Chapter
Zangwill, N. Moral dependence. . The University of Hull