Photography and causation: Responding to Scruton's scepticism

Phillips, Dawn M.

Abstract

According to Roger Scruton, it is not possible for photographs to be representational art. Most responses to Scruton's scepticism are versions of the claim that Scruton disregards the extent to which intentionality features in photography; but these cannot force him to give up his notion of the ideal photograph. My approach is to argue that Scruton has misconstrued the role of causation in his discussion of photography. I claim that although Scruton insists that the ideal photograph is defined by its ‘merely causal' provenance, in fact he fails to take the causal provenance of photographs seriously enough. To replace Scruton's notion of the ideal photograph, I offer a substantive account of the causal provenance of photographs, centred on the distinctive role of ‘the photographic event'. I conclude that, with a proper understanding of the photographic process, we have good reason to re-open the question of photography as a representational art.

Citation

Phillips, D. M. (2009). Photography and causation: Responding to Scruton's scepticism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 49(4), 327-340. https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp036

• Journal Article Type: Review
• Acceptance Date: Jan 1, 2009
• Online Publication Date: Aug 24, 2009
• Publication Date: Oct 1, 2009
• Deposit Date: Nov 13, 2014
• Journal: British Journal Of Aesthetics
• Print ISSN: 0007-0904
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 49
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 327-340
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp036
• Keywords: Photography Philosophy Causation Representation Art Aesthetics Scruton,
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/465127
• Contract Date: Nov 13, 2014