Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico: Incumbency and Distributive Politics

Abbott, Andrew; Cabral, René; Jones, Philip

Abstract

In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.

Citation

Abbott, A., Cabral, R., & Jones, P. (2017). Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico: Incumbency and Distributive Politics. Southern Economic Journal, 84(2), 484-503. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12226

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 16, 2017
• Online Publication Date: Jul 24, 2017
• Publication Date: 2017-10
• Deposit Date: Apr 1, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 25, 2019
• Journal: Southern Economic Journal
• Print ISSN: 0038-4038
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 84
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 484-503
• Series ISSN: 2325-8012
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12226
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/1513557
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/23258012
• Related Public URLs: https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/incumbency-and-distributive-politics-intergovernmental-transfers-