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Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico: Incumbency and Distributive Politics

Abbott, Andrew; Cabral, René; Jones, Philip

Authors

Andrew Abbott

René Cabral

Philip Jones



Abstract

In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.

Citation

Abbott, A., Cabral, R., & Jones, P. (2017). Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico: Incumbency and Distributive Politics. Southern Economic Journal, 84(2), 484-503. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12226

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 16, 2017
Online Publication Date Jul 24, 2017
Publication Date 2017-10
Deposit Date Apr 1, 2019
Publicly Available Date Jul 25, 2019
Journal Southern Economic Journal
Print ISSN 0038-4038
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 84
Issue 2
Pages 484-503
Series ISSN 2325-8012
DOI https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12226
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/1513557
Publisher URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/23258012
Related Public URLs https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/incumbency-and-distributive-politics-intergovernmental-transfers-

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