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Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico: Incumbency and Distributive Politics

Abbott, Andrew; Cabral, René; Jones, Philip

Authors

René Cabral

Philip Jones

Abstract

In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2017-10
Journal Southern Economic Journal
Print ISSN 0038-4038
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 84
Issue 2
Pages 484-503
Series ISSN 2325-8012
Institution Citation Abbott, A., Cabral, R., & Jones, P. (2017). Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico: Incumbency and Distributive Politics. Southern Economic Journal, 84(2), 484-503. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12226
DOI https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12226
Publisher URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/23258012
Related Public URLs https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/incumbency-and-distributive-politics-intergovernmental-transfers-

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