The uneasy case for parsimony in (law and) economics: conceptual, empirical and normative arguments
Taking Guido Calabresi’s discussion of preferences and value judgements in The Future of Law and Economics as a starting point, this paper analyses some conceptual difficulties, epistemic benefits and normative uses of parsimonious economic analyses of “tastes and values.” First, the paper shows that it is not only possible to analyse and model all the richness of “tastes and values” in terms of rational choice theory with intellectual honesty and epistemic benefit. In fact, economists and economically inspired legal scholars have been doing this for a while. Second, it discusses three arguments that economists can mount in support of parsimonious models. Third, it shows that in spite of these benefits the merits of such an exercise in parsimony do not always clearly outweigh its drawbacks. In doing so, the paper distinguishes three types of limits of such parsimonious modelling.
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Publication Date||Oct 25, 2019|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|APA6 Citation||Cserne, P. (2019). The uneasy case for parsimony in (law and) economics: conceptual, empirical and normative arguments. Global jurist, 19(3), https://doi.org/10.1515/gj-2019-0001|
|Keywords||law and economics: methodology; values and morality in economic theory; Guido Calabresi; parsimony in economic theory; law|
This file is under embargo until Oct 26, 2020 due to copyright reasons.
Contact P.Cserne@hull.ac.uk to request a copy for personal use.
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