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Criminalizing price-fixing

Dnes, Antony W.; Swaray, Raymond

Authors

Antony W. Dnes

Dr Raymond Swaray R.Swaray@hull.ac.uk
Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Economics



Abstract

We assess whether recent US Department of Justice (DOJ) price‐fixing cases exhibit characteristics that are associated theoretically with optimal use of criminal law. We take our welfare standard from seminal work on optimal legal design. Optimal legal design recognizes the private and public elements present in all areas of the law. The mixed results show that the characteristics to be expected in criminal cases are not all present in the DOJ cases. Criminal sanctions applied in these collusive antitrust cases do however show significant responsiveness to some of the variables derived from the economic analysis of criminal law.

Citation

Dnes, A. W., & Swaray, R. (in press). Criminalizing price-fixing. Managerial and decision economics : MDE, https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3192

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 21, 2020
Online Publication Date Jun 9, 2020
Deposit Date Jun 11, 2020
Publicly Available Date Jun 10, 2022
Journal Managerial and Decision Economics
Print ISSN 0143-6570
Electronic ISSN 1099-1468
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
DOI https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3192
Keywords Management of Technology and Innovation; Management Science and Operations Research; Strategy and Management; Business and International Management
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/3520543
Publisher URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/mde.3192
Additional Information Received: 2020-04-28; Accepted: 2020-05-21; Published: 2020-06-09

Files

This file is under embargo until Jun 10, 2022 due to copyright reasons.

Contact R.Swaray@hull.ac.uk to request a copy for personal use.




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