Criminalizing price-fixing

Dnes, Antony W.; Swaray, Raymond

Abstract

We assess whether recent US Department of Justice (DOJ) price‐fixing cases exhibit characteristics that are associated theoretically with optimal use of criminal law. We take our welfare standard from seminal work on optimal legal design. Optimal legal design recognizes the private and public elements present in all areas of the law. The mixed results show that the characteristics to be expected in criminal cases are not all present in the DOJ cases. Criminal sanctions applied in these collusive antitrust cases do however show significant responsiveness to some of the variables derived from the economic analysis of criminal law.

Citation

Dnes, A. W., & Swaray, R. (in press). Criminalizing price-fixing. Managerial and decision economics : MDE, https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3192

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 21, 2020
• Online Publication Date: Jun 9, 2020
• Deposit Date: Jun 11, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 10, 2022
• Journal: Managerial and Decision Economics
• Print ISSN: 0143-6570
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3192
• Keywords: Management of Technology and Innovation; Management Science and Operations Research; Strategy and Management; Business and International Management
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/3520543
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/mde.3192
• Additional Information: Received: 2020-04-28; Accepted: 2020-05-21; Published: 2020-06-09