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Using game theory to describe strategy selection for environmental risk and carbon emissions reduction in the green supply chain

Zhao, Rui; Neighbour, Gareth; Han, Jiaojie; McGuire, Michael; Deutz, Pauline

Authors

Rui Zhao

Gareth Neighbour

Jiaojie Han

Michael McGuire



Abstract

This paper provides an approach in the context of green supply chain management, using game theory to analyze the strategies selected by manufacturers to reduce life cycle environmental risk of materials and carbon emissions. Through the application of the 'tolerability of risk' concept, a basis for determining the extent of environmental risk and carbon emissions reduction has been established. Currently, scant attention is given to holistic supervision of the supply chain with respect to carbon emissions by governments, and thus the starting hypothesis here is that the default strategy that manufacturers will adopt is only to reduce carbon emissions, and thereby environmental risk, in so far as this is compatible with the aim of increasing revenue. Moreover, we further hypothesize that, once necessary governmental policy has been established in the supply chain management, the strategic choices of the manufacturers would be influenced by government penalties or incentives. A case example is provided to demonstrate the insight that indicates the application of game theory. The limitations of the game model and analysis are discussed, laying a foundation for further work. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd.

Citation

Zhao, R., Neighbour, G., Han, J., McGuire, M., & Deutz, P. (2012). Using game theory to describe strategy selection for environmental risk and carbon emissions reduction in the green supply chain. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 25(6), 927-936. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2012.05.004

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 10, 2012
Online Publication Date May 21, 2012
Publication Date 2012-11
Deposit Date Apr 13, 2022
Journal Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
Print ISSN 0950-4230
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 25
Issue 6
Pages 927-936
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2012.05.004
Keywords Game theory; Green supply chain management; Environmental risk; Carbon emissions; Tolerability of risk
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/3597738