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'Making Exceptions': A response to Shue

Connelly, James



© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2009. In what follows I respond to Henry Shue’s paper by focusing on three principal themes. The first is the relation of philosophical theory to practice, in which I agree that philosophers have to run the risks attendant upon applying reason to concrete cases. The second is the use of examples in moral philosophy, in particular the example used in the justification of torture as an exception; here I draw distinctions between different types of examples in philosophy and the uses to which they are put. Thirdly, in a brief consideration of our responses to climate change I suggest that, contra Shue, we are not being asked to go beyond a normal requirement so much as to re-establish the boundaries of what counts as normal.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Aug 1, 2009
Print ISSN 0264-3758
Electronic ISSN 1468-5930
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 26
Issue 3
Pages 323-328
APA6 Citation Connelly, J. (2009). 'Making Exceptions': A response to Shue. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 26(3), 323-328. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00456.x
Keywords Philosophy