Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China’s anti-bribery blacklist

Jin, Zhangfeng; Zhou, Liming; Wang, Zheng

Abstract

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This article empirically investigates why in a corruption-pervasive country only a minority of the firms get caught for bribery while the majority get away with it. By matching manufacturing firms to a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector of a province in China, we show that the government-led blacklisting is selective: while economically more visible firms are slightly more likely to be blacklisted, state-controlled firms are the most protected compared to their private and foreign competitors. Our finding points to the fact that a government can use regulations to impose its preferences when the rule of law is weak and the rule of government is strong.

Citation

Jin, Z., Zhou, L., & Wang, Z. (2017). Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China’s anti-bribery blacklist. Applied Economics Letters, 24(4), 258-263. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1181826

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 19, 2016
• Online Publication Date: May 14, 2016
• Publication Date: Feb 23, 2017
• Deposit Date: Apr 20, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: May 14, 2016
• Journal: Applied economics letters
• Print ISSN: 1350-4851
• Electronic ISSN: 1466-4291
• Publisher: Routledge
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 24
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 258-263
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1181826
• Keywords: Corruption, Bribery, Healthcare, China
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/436515
• Publisher URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2016.1181826
• Additional Information: Peer Review Statement: The publishing and review policy for this title is described in its Aims & Scope.; Aim & Scope: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=rael20