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Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China’s anti-bribery blacklist

Jin, Zhangfeng; Zhou, Liming; Wang, Zheng

Authors

Zhangfeng Jin

Liming Zhou

Zheng Wang



Abstract

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This article empirically investigates why in a corruption-pervasive country only a minority of the firms get caught for bribery while the majority get away with it. By matching manufacturing firms to a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector of a province in China, we show that the government-led blacklisting is selective: while economically more visible firms are slightly more likely to be blacklisted, state-controlled firms are the most protected compared to their private and foreign competitors. Our finding points to the fact that a government can use regulations to impose its preferences when the rule of law is weak and the rule of government is strong.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Feb 23, 2017
Journal Applied economics letters
Print ISSN 1350-4851
Electronic ISSN 1466-4291
Publisher Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 24
Issue 4
Pages 258-263
APA6 Citation Jin, Z., Zhou, L., & Wang, Z. (2017). Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China’s anti-bribery blacklist. Applied Economics Letters, 24(4), 258-263. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1181826
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1181826
Keywords Corruption, Bribery, Healthcare, China
Publisher URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2016.1181826
Additional Information Peer Review Statement: The publishing and review policy for this title is described in its Aims & Scope.; Aim & Scope: http://www.tandfonline....cope&journalCode=rael20

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