Expert testimony, law and epistemic authority

Ward, Tony

Abstract

© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2016 This article discusses the concept of epistemic authority in the context of English law relating to expert testimony. It distinguishes between two conceptions of epistemic authority (and epistemic deference), one strong and one weak, and argues that only the weak conception is appropriate in a legal context, or in any other setting where reliance on experts can be publicly justified. It critically examines Linda Zagzebski's defence of a stronger conception of epistemic authority and questions whether epistemic authority is as closely analogous to practical authority as she maintains. Zagzebski elucidates a kind of deference that courts generally, and rightly, try to avoid. Her concept of ‘first person reasons’, however, does capture an important aspect of the deliberations of conscientious legal actors.

Citation

Ward, T. (2017). Expert testimony, law and epistemic authority. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34(2), 263-277. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12213

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 19, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Mar 29, 2016
• Publication Date: 2017-02
• Deposit Date: Apr 28, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 3, 2018
• Journal: Journal of applied philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0264-3758
• Electronic ISSN: 1468-5930
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 34
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 263-277
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12213
• Keywords: Expert testimony; Epistemic authority; Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, 1946-
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/437304
• Publisher URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12213/abstract
• Additional Information: This is the accepted manuscript of an article published in Journal of applied philosophy, 2017. The version of record is available at the DOI link in this record.