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The apparent truth of dualism and the uncanny body

Burwood, Stephen

Authors



Abstract

It has been suggested that our experiences of embodiment in general appear to constitute an experiential ground for dualist philosophy and that this is particularly so with experiences of dissociation, in which one feels estranged from one's body. Thus, Drew Leder argues that these play "a crucial role in encouraging and supporting Cartesian dualism" as they " seem to support the doctrine of an immaterial mind trapped inside an alien body". In this paper I argue that as dualism does not capture the character of such experiences there is not even an apparent separation of self and body revealed here and that one's body is experienced as uncanny rather than alien. The general relationship between our philosophical theorizing and the phenomenology of lived experience is also considered.

Citation

Burwood, S. (2008). The apparent truth of dualism and the uncanny body. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 7(2), 263-278. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9073-z

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Oct 9, 2007
Publication Date Jun 1, 2008
Deposit Date Nov 13, 2014
Journal Phenomenology And The Cognitive Sciences
Print ISSN 1568-7759
Electronic ISSN 1572-8676
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 7
Issue 2
Pages 263-278
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9073-z
Keywords Philosophy; Cognitive Neuroscience
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/461491
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11097-007-9073-z


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