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The Declaration of London: a matter of operational capability

Martin, Christopher

Authors

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Dr Chris Martin Christopher.Martin@hull.ac.uk
Reader in Maritime Security and Head of School of Politics and International Studies



Abstract

The Declaration of London (1909) has proven problematic for historians. The standard historiography has it that the first sea lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, allowed the Declaration to be negotiated only because he intended to tear it up, along with any other inconvenient international obligation, in the event of war. In reality, the London Naval Conference offered the British admiralty and Fisher - who was very aware of the effect of new technology on naval warfare - an opportunity to modernize the laws of war at sea. Accordingly, the British admiralty devised, negotiated and agreed the Declaration so that it matched commercial blockade rules to the operational capability of the larger, faster, modern oil-fired vessels to allow for maximum operational flexibility.

Citation

Martin, C. (2009). The Declaration of London: a matter of operational capability. Historical research : the bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 82(218), 731-755. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2008.00462.x

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 1, 2008
Online Publication Date Oct 20, 2008
Publication Date 2009-11
Deposit Date Nov 13, 2014
Journal Historical Research
Print ISSN 0950-3471
Electronic ISSN 1468-2281
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 82
Issue 218
Pages 731-755
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2008.00462.x
Keywords Cultural Studies; Sociology and Political Science; History
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/461689
Publisher URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2008.00462.x