The Declaration of London: a matter of operational capability

Martin, Christopher

Abstract

The Declaration of London (1909) has proven problematic for historians. The standard historiography has it that the first sea lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, allowed the Declaration to be negotiated only because he intended to tear it up, along with any other inconvenient international obligation, in the event of war. In reality, the London Naval Conference offered the British admiralty and Fisher - who was very aware of the effect of new technology on naval warfare - an opportunity to modernize the laws of war at sea. Accordingly, the British admiralty devised, negotiated and agreed the Declaration so that it matched commercial blockade rules to the operational capability of the larger, faster, modern oil-fired vessels to allow for maximum operational flexibility.

Citation

Martin, C. (2009). The Declaration of London: a matter of operational capability. Historical research : the bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 82(218), 731-755. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2008.00462.x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 1, 2008
• Online Publication Date: Oct 20, 2008
• Publication Date: 2009-11
• Deposit Date: Nov 13, 2014
• Journal: Historical Research
• Print ISSN: 0950-3471
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 82
• Issue: 218
• Pages: 731-755
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2008.00462.x
• Keywords: Cultural Studies; Sociology and Political Science; History
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/461689
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2008.00462.x
• Contract Date: Nov 13, 2014