What reasons do legitimate authoritative directives generate in their subjects? Raz identifies two relevant reasons: (a) a first-order reason to do as directed; and (b) a second-order, exclusionary reason not to be motivated by at least some of the first-order reasons which conflict with the corresponding legitimate directive. In this chapter, I put forward two claims. The first claim, which I develop in the first section of the chapter, introduces a revision to the Razian framework: I argue that legitimate authoritative directives also exclude a particular type of reasoning about the balance of first-order reasons which is similar to the type of reasoning involved in the reconsideration of decisions. This captures the deliberative dimension of legitimate authoritative directives. The second claim, which I develop in the second section, is that the reasoning-excluding reasons legitimate authoritative directives generate have important epistemic value. This captures their epistemic dimension. My revisionism does not affect Raz's account of legitimate authority, and more specifically his normal justification thesis. Rather I presuppose it in developing my arguments. Reconsideration and reasoning-excluding reasons. What exclusionary reasons exclude has been a matter of debate. We can take them to exclude motivation by, consideration of, or reasoning about a certain range of first-order reasons.
Hatzistavrou, A. (2015). The deliberative and epistemic dimension of legitimate authoritative directives. In G. Pavlakos, & V. Rodriguez-Blanco (Eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency (140-158). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107707573.010