Mistakes in Action: From the Normativity of Goal-Directedness to Novel Investigations of Avian Nest Construction

Project Description

When a bird builds a nest, when does it know it has built the "right " one? Is it when the chicks fledge, or when the eggs are first lay? How does Life find the "right" answer when several answers might be correct at different times? From cells, to individuals, to whole populations, biological systems are bounded by the normativity of their behaviour through the dynamic relationship between rightness and mistakes. Understanding the rules that govern this dynamic can shape the way we frame questions about the complexity of Life. We aim to show how examination of the normativity of goal-directedness in bird nest construction clarifies the phenomenon of what is "right" about a particular behaviour. There are several reasons to use nest building as a case study of the normativity of biological systems. Key among them is that bird nests have two kinds of goal, the reproductive fitness goal of producing live young, and the goal of constructing a nest with the right attributes, prior to egg laying. Given that the rightness of the nest properties cannot be evaluated against the survival criterion during construction, it must be evaluated against an independent standard of correctness.
This leads to a paradox that the rightness of the nest structure depends on its later success in providing the environment for egg hatching, but the mechanisms that generate and maintain this rightness must operate independently of this success.
The proposed experiments examine how zebra finches respond to potential departures from that standard, i.e. potential mistakes, and similarly from a standard of nest building in mates, hence providing pointers to the features of the standard. Furthermore, this standard has to be generated and upheld by the bird, which means it must be represented in some way in its brain. We will take first steps towards identifying the key features of the standard – for example number of materials, shape of the nest, nest temperature. By identifying goals as standards generated by organisms, we open up further possibilities for philosophical scrutiny. For example, if an organism is capable of generating one standard, logically they can generate others, independently of an immediate survival test. Suppose then that this was upheld by value processes such as is seen in dopaminergic responses to correct birdsong performance? How close does this take us to sporting, aesthetic or even moral standards which are such a major feature of human activities?