Nick Zangwill
Brutalist non-naturalism and Hume's principle
Zangwill, Nick
Authors
Abstract
Does moral non-naturalism have a problem with supervenience? That is, are necessary relations between moral and natural properties mysterious if those properties are distinct? Here I try to remove anxiety about the modal comments of moral non-naturalism. I also want to understand the source of the anxiety for those afflicted by it. That source is a commitment to what is called ‘Hume’s Principle’. I attack that principle.
Citation
Zangwill, N. (2018). Brutalist non-naturalism and Hume's principle. Dialectica, 72(3), 365-383. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12235
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Aug 8, 2018 |
Online Publication Date | Jan 22, 2019 |
Publication Date | 2018-09 |
Deposit Date | Oct 9, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Oct 27, 2022 |
Print ISSN | 0012-2017 |
Publisher | Wiley |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 72 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 365-383 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12235 |
Public URL | https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/1107489 |
Publisher URL | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1746-8361.12235 |
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©2019 The author
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