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Brutalist non-naturalism and Hume's principle

Zangwill, Nick

Authors

Nick Zangwill



Abstract

Does moral non-naturalism have a problem with supervenience? That is, are necessary relations between moral and natural properties mysterious if those properties are distinct? Here I try to remove anxiety about the modal comments of moral non-naturalism. I also want to understand the source of the anxiety for those afflicted by it. That source is a commitment to what is called ‘Hume’s Principle’. I attack that principle.

Citation

Zangwill, N. (2018). Brutalist non-naturalism and Hume's principle. Dialectica, 72(3), 365-383. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12235

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Aug 8, 2018
Online Publication Date Jan 22, 2019
Publication Date 2018-09
Deposit Date Oct 9, 2018
Publicly Available Date Oct 1, 2020
Print ISSN 0012-2017
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 72
Issue 3
Pages 365-383
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12235
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/1107489
Publisher URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1746-8361.12235

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