Brutalist non-naturalism and Hume's principle

Zangwill, Nick

Abstract

Does moral non-naturalism have a problem with supervenience? That is, are necessary relations between moral and natural properties mysterious if those properties are distinct? Here I try to remove anxiety about the modal comments of moral non-naturalism. I also want to understand the source of the anxiety for those afflicted by it. That source is a commitment to what is called ‘Hume’s Principle’. I attack that principle.

Citation

Zangwill, N. (2018). Brutalist non-naturalism and Hume's principle. Dialectica, 72(3), 365-383. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12235

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Aug 8, 2018
• Online Publication Date: Jan 22, 2019
• Publication Date: 2018-09
• Deposit Date: Oct 9, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 1, 2020
• Print ISSN: 0012-2017
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 72
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 365-383
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12235
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/1107489
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1746-8361.12235
• Contract Date: Oct 9, 2018