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Epistemic pluralism : the missing link and the ambitions of epistemology

Zangwill, Nick

Authors

Nick Zangwill



Abstract

In this paper epistemic pluralism concerning knowledge is taken to be the claim that very different facts may constitute knowledge. The paper argues for pluralism by arguing that very different facts can constitute the knowledge‐making links between beliefs and facts. If pluralism is right, we need not anxiously seek a unified account of the links between beliefs and facts that partly constitute knowledge in different cases of knowledge. The paper argues that no good reasons have been put forward in favour of believing in a unified maker of knowledge. It then appeals to the role of knowledge in order to argue that we have positive reason to embrace pluralism.

Citation

Zangwill, N. (in press). Epistemic pluralism : the missing link and the ambitions of epistemology. Metaphilosophy, 51, 485-498

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 10, 2019
Online Publication Date Jul 21, 2020
Deposit Date Jul 11, 2019
Publicly Available Date Jul 22, 2022
Journal Metaphilosophy
Print ISSN 0026-1068
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 51
Article Number 4
Pages 485-498
Keywords Knowledge; Pluralism; Causation; Role
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/2177340

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Publisher Licence URL
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Copyright Statement
© 2020 The Authors. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.





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