Epistemic pluralism : the missing link and the ambitions of epistemology

Zangwill, Nick

Abstract

In this paper epistemic pluralism concerning knowledge is taken to be the claim that very different facts may constitute knowledge. The paper argues for pluralism by arguing that very different facts can constitute the knowledge‐making links between beliefs and facts. If pluralism is right, we need not anxiously seek a unified account of the links between beliefs and facts that partly constitute knowledge in different cases of knowledge. The paper argues that no good reasons have been put forward in favour of believing in a unified maker of knowledge. It then appeals to the role of knowledge in order to argue that we have positive reason to embrace pluralism.

Citation

Zangwill, N. (2020). Epistemic pluralism : the missing link and the ambitions of epistemology. Metaphilosophy, 51, 485-498

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 10, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Jul 21, 2020
• Publication Date: 2020
• Deposit Date: Jul 11, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 22, 2022
• Journal: Metaphilosophy
• Print ISSN: 0026-1068
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 51
• Article Number: 4
• Pages: 485-498
• Keywords: Knowledge; Pluralism; Causation; Role
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/2177340