Epistemic pluralism : the missing link and the ambitions of epistemology

Zangwill, Nick

Authors

Nick Zangwill

Abstract

In this paper epistemic pluralism concerning knowledge is taken to be the claim that very different facts may constitute knowledge. The paper argues for pluralism by arguing that very different facts can constitute the knowledge?making links between beliefs and facts. If pluralism is right, we need not anxiously seek a unified account of the links between beliefs and facts that partly constitute knowledge in different cases of knowledge. The paper argues that no good reasons have been put forward in favour of believing in a unified maker of knowledge. It then appeals to the role of knowledge in order to argue that we have positive reason to embrace pluralism.

Citation

Zangwill, N. (2020). Epistemic pluralism : the missing link and the ambitions of epistemology. Metaphilosophy, 51, 485-498

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Jul 10, 2019
Online Publication Date	Jul 21, 2020
Publication Date	2020
Deposit Date	Jul 11, 2019
Publicly Available Date	Jul 22, 2022
Journal	Metaphilosophy
Print ISSN	0026-1068
Publisher	Wiley
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	51
Article Number	4
Pages	485-498
Keywords	Knowledge; Pluralism; Causation; Role
Public URL	https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/2177340

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© 2020 The Authors. Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd<br /> <br /> This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.