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R. G. Collingwood's overlapping ideas of history

Fear, Christopher



Does R. G. Collingwood's theory that concepts in philosophy are organized as “scales of forms” apply to his own work on the nature of history? Or is there some inconsistency between Collingwood's work as a philosopher of history and as a theorist of philosophical method? This article surveys existing views among Collingwood specialists concerning the applicability of Collingwood's “scale of forms” thesis to his own philosophy of history - especially the accounts of Leon Goldstein and Lionel Rubinoff - and outlines the obvious objections to such an application. These objections however are found to be answerable. It is shown that Collingwood did indeed think that the scale of forms thesis should apply to the philosophy of history, and even that he identified the “highest” form in history as a kind of scientific research or inquiry. But it is not claimed that Collingwood identified the “lower” forms explicitly. An account is provided of the three distinct forms that can be identified in Collingwood's philosophy of history, and of the “critical points” by which (according to Collingwood's meta-philosophy) lower forms are negated and incorporated by higher forms. But it is also explained that these forms are not neatly coterminous with the stages in Western philosophical thinking about history as Collingwood narrates them in The Idea of History.


Fear, C. (2021). R. G. Collingwood's overlapping ideas of history. Journal of the Philosophy of History, 1-21.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 10, 2019
Online Publication Date Jan 16, 2020
Publication Date 2021
Deposit Date Jul 16, 2019
Publicly Available Date Jan 17, 2021
Journal Journal of the Philosophy of History
Print ISSN 1872-261X
Electronic ISSN 1872-2636
Publisher Brill Academic Publishers
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Pages 1-21
Keywords R. G. Collingwood; Philosophy of history; Meta-philosophy; Methodology; Metaphysics; Epistemology
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