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Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence

Zangwill, Nick

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Abstract

If someone knows something then there is something in virtue of which she knows it; and if someone justifiably believes something then there is something in virtue of which she is justified in believing it. That much is relatively uncontroversial. Only slightly more controversial is the claim that our having an epistemic achievement, such as knowing something or being justified in believing something, depends on how we are in non-epistemic respects. That is, our instantiating of epistemic properties depends on our instantiating non-epistemic properties. In this paper, I argue that epistemic/non-epistemic dependence should be given a central place in epistemology, and that doing so has significant consequences.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Nov 2, 2018
Journal Noûs
Print ISSN 0029-4624
Electronic ISSN 1468-0068
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 52
Issue 4
Pages 836-857
Institution Citation Zangwill, N. (2018). Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence. Noûs, 52(4), 836-857. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12197
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12197
Keywords Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence
Publisher URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nous.12197/full
Additional Information This is the accepted manuscript of an article published in Noûs, 2018. The version of record is available at the DOI link in this record.

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