Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence

Zangwill, Nick

Abstract

If someone knows something then there is something in virtue of which she knows it; and if someone justifiably believes something then there is something in virtue of which she is justified in believing it. That much is relatively uncontroversial. Only slightly more controversial is the claim that our having an epistemic achievement, such as knowing something or being justified in believing something, depends on how we are in non-epistemic respects. That is, our instantiating of epistemic properties depends on our instantiating non-epistemic properties. In this paper, I argue that epistemic/non-epistemic dependence should be given a central place in epistemology, and that doing so has significant consequences.

Citation

Zangwill, N. (2018). Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence. Noûs, 52(4), 836-857. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12197

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 26, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Mar 20, 2017
• Publication Date: Nov 2, 2018
• Deposit Date: Jun 15, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 21, 2019
• Journal: Noûs
• Print ISSN: 0029-4624
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 52
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 836-857
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12197
• Keywords: Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/439581
• Publisher URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nous.12197/full
• Additional Information: This is the accepted manuscript of an article published in Noûs, 2018. The version of record is available at the DOI link in this record.
• Contract Date: Jun 15, 2016