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Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence

Zangwill, Nick

Authors

Nick Zangwill



Abstract

If someone knows something then there is something in virtue of which she knows it; and if someone justifiably believes something then there is something in virtue of which she is justified in believing it. That much is relatively uncontroversial. Only slightly more controversial is the claim that our having an epistemic achievement, such as knowing something or being justified in believing something, depends on how we are in non-epistemic respects. That is, our instantiating of epistemic properties depends on our instantiating non-epistemic properties. In this paper, I argue that epistemic/non-epistemic dependence should be given a central place in epistemology, and that doing so has significant consequences.

Citation

Zangwill, N. (2018). Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence. Noûs, 52(4), 836-857. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12197

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 26, 2016
Online Publication Date Mar 20, 2017
Publication Date Nov 2, 2018
Deposit Date Jun 15, 2016
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Noûs
Print ISSN 0029-4624
Electronic ISSN 1468-0068
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 52
Issue 4
Pages 836-857
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12197
Keywords Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence
Public URL https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/439581
Publisher URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nous.12197/full
Additional Information This is the accepted manuscript of an article published in Noûs, 2018. The version of record is available at the DOI link in this record.

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