Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Dobson, Stephen; Goddard, John

Abstract

We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behaviour during the early stages of matches is typically superseded by non-cooperation during the latter stages. The propensity for violent play to take place in the latter stages of soccer matches is interpreted as novel non-experimental evidence that players typically resort to mutually detrimental non-cooperative forms of behaviour when the payoffs assume a prisoner's dilemma structure.

Citation

Dobson, S., & Goddard, J. (2018). Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Review of Economic Analysis : REA Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, 10(3), 285-312

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 12, 2018
• Publication Date: 2018
• Deposit Date: Jun 2, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 16, 2019
• Print ISSN: 1973-3909
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 10
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 285-312
• Keywords: Game theory; Prisoner's dilemma; Hazard functions JEL classification: C41; C70; L83
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/860801
• Publisher URL: http://rofea.org/index.php?journal=journal&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=301
• Contract Date: Jun 5, 2018