Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Dobson, Stephen; Goddard, John
We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behaviour during the early stages of matches is typically superseded by non-cooperation during the latter stages. The propensity for violent play to take place in the latter stages of soccer matches is interpreted as novel non-experimental evidence that players typically resort to mutually detrimental non-cooperative forms of behaviour when the payoffs assume a prisoner's dilemma structure.
Dobson, S., & Goddard, J. (2018). Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Review of Economic Analysis : REA Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, 10(3), 285-312
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Acceptance Date||Apr 12, 2018|
|Deposit Date||Jun 2, 2018|
|Publicly Available Date||Oct 27, 2022|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|Keywords||Game theory; Prisoner's dilemma; Hazard functions JEL classification: C41; C70; L83|
© 2018 Stephen Dobson and John Goddard. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution - Noncommercial 3.0 Licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/.<br /> Available at http://rofea.org.
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