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Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Dobson, Stephen; Goddard, John

Authors

John Goddard

Abstract

We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behaviour during the early stages of matches is typically superseded by non-cooperation during the latter stages. The propensity for violent play to take place in the latter stages of soccer matches is interpreted as novel non-experimental evidence that players typically resort to mutually detrimental non-cooperative forms of behaviour when the payoffs assume a prisoner's dilemma structure.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2018
Print ISSN 1973-3909
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 10
Issue 3
Pages 285-312
Institution Citation Dobson, S., & Goddard, J. (2018). Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Review of Economic Analysis : REA Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, 10(3), 285-312
Keywords Game theory; Prisoner's dilemma; Hazard functions JEL classification: C41; C70; L83
Publisher URL http://rofea.org/index.php?journal=journal&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=301
Copyright Statement This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License.

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Copyright Statement
© 2018 Stephen Dobson and John Goddard. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution - Noncommercial 3.0 Licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/.
Available at http://rofea.org.




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