Defending simulation theory against the argument from error

Short, Timothy L.; Riggs, Kevin J.

Abstract

We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi-type false belief tests. We provide novel responses to several examples showing that Simulation Theory can answer these challenges.

Citation

Short, T. L., & Riggs, K. J. (2016). Defending simulation theory against the argument from error. Mind & language, 31(2), 248-262. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12103

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 3, 2015
• Online Publication Date: Apr 4, 2016
• Publication Date: 2016-04
• Deposit Date: Apr 17, 2015
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 27, 2022
• Journal: Mind and language
• Print ISSN: 0268-1064
• Electronic ISSN: 1468-0017
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 31
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 248-262
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12103
• Keywords: Simulation theory
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/372609
• Publisher URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mila.12103/abstract
• Additional Information: This is the accepted manuscript of an article published in: Mind and language, 2016. The version of record is available at the DOI link in this record.