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Defending simulation theory against the argument from error

Short, Timothy L.; Riggs, Kevin J.

Authors

Timothy L. Short

Abstract

We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi-type false belief tests. We provide novel responses to several examples showing that Simulation Theory can answer these challenges.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2016-04
Journal Mind and language
Print ISSN 0268-1064
Electronic ISSN 1468-0017
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 31
Issue 2
Pages 248-262
Institution Citation Short, T. L., & Riggs, K. J. (2016). Defending simulation theory against the argument from error. Mind & language, 31(2), 248-262. doi:10.1111/mila.12103
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12103
Keywords Simulation theory
Publisher URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mila.12103/abstract
Copyright Statement ©2018 University of Hull
Additional Information This is the accepted manuscript of an article published in: Mind and language, 2016. The version of record is available at the DOI link in this record.

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