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Motivation, reconsideration and exclusionary reasons

Hatzistavrou, Antony

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Abstract

What do exclusionary reasons exclude? This is the main issue I address in this article. Raz appears to endorse what I label the ‘motivational' model of exclusionary reasons. He stresses that within the context of his theory of practical reasoning exclusionary reasons are reasons not to be motivated by certain first-order reasons (namely, the first-order reasons which conflict with the first-order reasons the exclusionary reasons protect). Some of his critics take him to be also committed to another model of exclusionary reasons which I label the ‘consideration' model. According to it exclusionary reasons are reasons not to consider or think of the conflicting first-order reasons. I argue that Raz's account of the exclusionary function of decisions suggests a third model of exclusionary reasons which I label the ‘reconsideration' model. On the reconsideration model exclusionary reasons are reasons not to reconsider the balance of first-order reasons. In this article I show how the reconsideration model differs from both the motivational and the consideration model and how it can account for the exclusionary function of not only decisions but also personal rules and authoritative directives.

Publication Date Sep 1, 2012
Journal Ratio juris
Print ISSN 0952-1917
Electronic ISSN 1467-9337
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 25
Issue 3
Pages 318-342
APA6 Citation Hatzistavrou, A. (2012). Motivation, reconsideration and exclusionary reasons. Ratio Juris, 25(3), 318-342. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2012.00516.x
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2012.00516.x
Keywords Law
Publisher URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2012.00516.x/abstract
Copyright Statement © 2014 University of Hull
Additional Information Author's final version of article published in Ratio juris, 2012, v.25, issue 3

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