Are emotions perceptual experiences of value?

Whiting, Demian

Abstract

A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by 'perceptual modality' I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with 'emotional perception'. But I also say why the usual candidate offered - namely feeling or affectivity - does not give us the sought-after perceptual modality. I conclude that as there seems to be nothing else that can provide the needed perceptual modality, we should reject the perceptual theory of emotion. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Citation

Whiting, D. (2012). Are emotions perceptual experiences of value?. Ratio, 25(1), 93-107. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Feb 10, 2012
• Publication Date: 2012-03
• Deposit Date: Nov 13, 2014
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 13, 2014
• Journal: Ratio
• Print ISSN: 0034-0006
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 93-107
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x
• Keywords: Philosophy
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/465861
• Publisher URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x/full
• Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Whiting, D. (2012), ARE EMOTIONS PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES OF VALUE?. Ratio, 25: 93–107, which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
• Contract Date: Nov 13, 2014