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Are emotions perceptual experiences of value?

Whiting, Demian

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Abstract

A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by 'perceptual modality' I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with 'emotional perception'. But I also say why the usual candidate offered - namely feeling or affectivity - does not give us the sought-after perceptual modality. I conclude that as there seems to be nothing else that can provide the needed perceptual modality, we should reject the perceptual theory of emotion. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2012-03
Journal Ratio
Print ISSN 0034-0006
Electronic ISSN 1467-9329
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 25
Issue 1
Pages 93-107
Institution Citation Whiting, D. (2012). Are emotions perceptual experiences of value?. Ratio, 25(1), 93-107. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x
Keywords Philosophy
Publisher URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x/full
Copyright Statement ©2017 University of Hull
Additional Information This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Whiting, D. (2012), ARE EMOTIONS PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES OF VALUE?. Ratio, 25: 93–107, which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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