Emotion as the categorical basis for moral thought

Whiting, Demian

Abstract

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. I offer and develop an original answer to the question of whether emotion plays an important role in the formation of moral thought. In a nutshell, my answer will be that if motivational internalism provides us with a correct description of the nature of moral thought, then emotion plays an important role because emotion is required to explain or ground the behavioral dispositions that are involved in moral thought.

Citation

Whiting, D. (2018). Emotion as the categorical basis for moral thought. Philosophical psychology, 31(4), 533-553. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1456653

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 8, 2018
• Online Publication Date: Apr 4, 2018
• Publication Date: May 19, 2018
• Deposit Date: Mar 27, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 5, 2019
• Print ISSN: 0951-5089
• Electronic ISSN: 1465-394X
• Publisher: Routledge
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 31
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 533-553
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1456653
• Keywords: moral judgment, emotion, motivational internalism, behavioral disposition, categorical basis
• Public URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/output/757058
• Additional Information: Peer Review Statement: The publishing and review policy for this title is described in its Aims & Scope.; Aim & Scope: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=cphp20