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The feeling theory of emotion and the object-directed emotions

Whiting, Demian



The 'feeling theory of emotion' holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object-directed emotions. © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2011-06
Journal European Journal Of Philosophy
Print ISSN 0966-8373
Electronic ISSN 1468-0378
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 19
Issue 2
Pages 281-303
Institution Citation Whiting, D. (2011). The feeling theory of emotion and the object-directed emotions. European Journal of Philosophy, 19(2), 281-303. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00384.x
Keywords Philosophy
Publisher URL